Re: [tor-bugs] #20160 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport - MP3 playback is broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20160: Backport - MP3 playback is broken
-+-
 Reporter:  bugzilla |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash, tbb-easy, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R, GeorgKoppen201609   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 r=mcs
 These changes look OK to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20111 [Applications/Tor Browser]: use Unix domain sockets for SOCKS port by default

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20111: use Unix domain sockets for SOCKS port by default
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-security, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:  #14270   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:13 gk]:
 > Do you see the same on your machines? It seems we are hitting a tor bug
 or is there something wrong with your patches (they looked reasonable to
 me after the first code-review pass).

 I see the same messages, although I do not remember seeing them before
 (maybe Kathy and I failed to notice them or maybe we tested with a
 different version or tor).  This could be a tor bug; the
 tor_addr_compare_masked() function does not seem to support Unix domain
 sockets (but I have not had time to debug it yet).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20151 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix parse_virtual_addr_network minimum network size

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20151: Fix parse_virtual_addr_network minimum network size
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy intro|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_revision


Comment:

 Thanks for this fix!

 Here's what I would change before merging it:
 * rebase on the latest master
   * that is, cherry pick afbda70 onto master, removing dbbd36e and b5b8d62
 - these are merge and fix commits that aren't relevant to the patch
 * keep the newline that's removed from the end of addressmap.c
 * add the smallest network size to the manpage, with a note that larger
 sizes are better :-)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20116 [Applications/GetTor]: Get @get_tor twitter account verified

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20116: Get @get_tor twitter account verified
-+---
 Reporter:  mrphs|  Owner:  mrphs
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by ilv):

 thanks a lot!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15634 [Applications/Tor Browser]: cookie exception list always deleted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15634: cookie exception list always deleted
--+--
 Reporter:  ciddu2000 |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  cookies list exception|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 I have also noticed this issue. I am fairly sure it is an option in
 about:config. But I am not sure which one.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #4998 [Core Tor/Tor]: MyFamily as a list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#4998: MyFamily as a list
+--
 Reporter:  weasel  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  0.2.3.11-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay lorax easy intro  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #15060  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 The code that processes MyFamily still expects it to be a `char *` - this
 patch changes it to a `smartlist *` containing `char *`, but doesn't
 change how it's processed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20250 [Obfuscation/meek]: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20250: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues
-+-
 Reporter:  tordevSZ0|  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek, macOS, TorBrowser, 10.12,  |  Actual Points:
  sierra, macOS  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [ticket:20250 tordevSZ0]:
 > Having issues using the meek pluggable transports on macOS 10.12
 installation with a fresh install of TorBrowser.

 Are you using the stable release 6.0.5, or the alpha release 6.5a3?

 In the stable 6.0.5, meek is compiled with Go 1.4.3. In the alpha 6.5a3,
 meek is compiled with Go 1.6.3. Go 1.6.3 has
 [https://github.com/golang/go/issues/16354 a fix] for Sierra; Go 1.4.3
 does not have the fix. If this Go bug is the cause, then the alpha release
 may work for you where the stable release does not.

 Note that there is an unrelated bug in the alpha release, #20030, which
 means that you will have to manually kill the firefox and meek-client
 processes after you close the browser.

 Please try the alpha release 6.5a3. If it works for you, that means we
 have to use a newer version of Go to compile the next stable release.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #4998 [Core Tor/Tor]: MyFamily as a list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#4998: MyFamily as a list
+--
 Reporter:  weasel  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  0.2.3.11-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay lorax easy intro  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #15060  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20234 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Define CollecTor's file-structure protocol 1.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20234: Define CollecTor's file-structure protocol 1.0
---+
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Please find two more commits on the above branch.
 The first removes the questions that are answered or in discussion and
 corrected the issues you noticed.
 And, it adds two small sections for 'sync' ans 'stats' (the latter still a
 placeholder).

 The second commit corrects some directory names in section 5.

 Regarding your question in no. 7: this is similar to no. 8. Both refer to
 grouping by published date vs. download date. I moved the discussion to
 #20228, as the question was first raised there.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19755 [Metrics/CollecTor]: improve code quality of bridgedescs module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19755: improve code quality of bridgedescs module
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.2.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Alright, I cleaned up my earlier task-19755 branch by rebasing it to
 master and rewriting Git history to make more sense.  Please review my
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-db.git/log/?h=task-19755-2
 task-19755-2 branch].  (Note that I did ''not'' put in the binary literals
 suggested on #19317, because that confuses Cobertura.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13893 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbrowser crashes on start when using MS EMET 5.x

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13893: Torbrowser crashes on start when using MS EMET 5.x
-+-
 Reporter:  Diapolo  |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-crash, tbb-|  Actual Points:
  usability-stoppoint-app, fuck-mingw-gcc,   |
  GeorgKoppen201609, TorBrowserTeam201609|
Parent ID:  #12820   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * keywords:
 tbb-security, tbb-crash, tbb-usability-stoppoint-app, fuck-mingw-gcc,
 GeorgKoppen201609, TorBrowserTeam201609R
 =>
 tbb-security, tbb-crash, tbb-usability-stoppoint-app, fuck-mingw-gcc,
 GeorgKoppen201609, TorBrowserTeam201609


Comment:

 \o/ and thanks for the report back. Let me produce a proper patch then...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser cannot connect on Windows 10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20220: TorBrowser cannot connect on Windows 10
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 The exact same Tor Browser 6.0.5 directory works fine for me on Windows 8
 32-bit.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser cannot connect on Windows 10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20220: TorBrowser cannot connect on Windows 10
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  needs_information => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser cannot connect on Windows 10 (was: TorBrowser cannot connect on Windows)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20220: TorBrowser cannot connect on Windows 10
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13827 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cell handling code duplication in channel.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13827: Cell handling code duplication in channel.c
---+---
 Reporter:  rl1987 |  Owner:  pingl
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  refactoring, easy, review-group-9  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet|Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by pingl):

 Please check the new channel.c attached in the previous post. I think you
 are right about DG1 and also there is an issue about the fact that the
 dereferencing is not available outside the switch scope. That means that
 cell would remain of type void*. For these reasons I've moved the (still a
 bit duplicated) code into the switch cases. I'll add the default case (I
 wasn't sure how to manage it) and change the `ctype`.

 Thanks for the comments, I am new to tor.

 Replying to [comment:12 dgoulet]:
 > (I've pull your patch into `bug13827_029_01` if anyone wants to see it
 from git.tpo in my repo.)
 >
 > DG1: This worries me:
 > {{{
 > -  q.u.var.var_cell = var_cell;
 > +  q.u.fixed.cell = cell;
 > }}}
 >
 > In theory, that could work since it's a union and all cell points there
 but kind of recipe for disaster and bad semantic. What you could do is
 take a reference on the right cell member of the union while in the switch
 case and then assign it after.
 >
 > DG2: Can't you use `CELL_QUEUE_*` as the cell type?
 >
 > DG3: Few things. I would rename `ctype` to `cell_type`. The switch case
 MUST have a default branch that you could do a BUG() on and bail. Finally,
 no need for extra space between the case and the end of the function.
 >
 > Thanks for this!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20116 [Applications/GetTor]: Get @get_tor twitter account verified

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20116: Get @get_tor twitter account verified
-+---
 Reporter:  mrphs|  Owner:  mrphs
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by mrphs):

 I finally submitted the request. Special thanks to isa for her help.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20121 [Applications/Tor bundles/installation]: Create Seatbealt profile(s) for Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20121: Create Seatbealt profile(s) for Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  bundles/installation   |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security TorBrowserTeam201609|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19750   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * parent:   => #19750


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19750 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Sandboxing in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19750: Sandboxing in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-sandboxing|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorU
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * sponsor:   => SponsorU


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13893 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbrowser crashes on start when using MS EMET 5.x

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13893: Torbrowser crashes on start when using MS EMET 5.x
-+-
 Reporter:  Diapolo  |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-crash, tbb-|  Actual Points:
  usability-stoppoint-app, fuck-mingw-gcc,   |
  GeorgKoppen201609, TorBrowserTeam201609R   |
Parent ID:  #12820   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-

Comment (by Diapolo):

 @gk I verified that you were able to fix this bug, by testing your nightly
 on Win7 EMET 5.2 and Win8.1 EMET 5.51. 6.5a3 (based on Mozilla Firefox
 45.4.0) is still suffering the bug, I cross-verified that also.

 Thanks for your work :)!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20228 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Append all votes with same valid-after time to a single file in `recent/`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20228: Append all votes with same valid-after time to a single file in 
`recent/`
---+-
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by iwakeh):

 * Regarding grouping by download vs. published time which came up in
 #20234, too.
  Let's have the discussion for all descriptors here, if this is ok?
  1. Grouping by published time brings more data consistency between
 CollecTor instances, as their download times for the same descriptors
 surely differ often.
  2. Grouping by download time means keeping track of a data item, i.e.
 download time, that so far is not part of the Tor protocol.  Why introduce
 it for descriptors that provide a published time?  Which is the download
 time after syncing descriptors: the initial download by the supplying
 CollecTor or the sync-download-time by the receiving one?
  3. Regarding #20234:comment:5: Clients might not be interested in past or
 future (according published time) descriptors and just download the file
 they consider current, if it changed since their last visit.


 * Regarding the notice:  I think the two week time frame is fine.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript places WebM videos too late behind click-to-play in higher security levels

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19210: NoScript places WebM videos too late behind click-to-play in higher
security levels
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-regression, tbb-security-|  Actual Points:
  slider, tbb-6.0-issues |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ma1):

 Replying to [comment:9 test400]:
 > I find more wierd behavior on other sites and some webm
 > [...]
 > If you need specific tests please write.

 Yes, please, the more the reproducible cases I can test against, the
 better.
 Thank you.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13893 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbrowser crashes on start when using MS EMET 5.x

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13893: Torbrowser crashes on start when using MS EMET 5.x
-+-
 Reporter:  Diapolo  |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-crash, tbb-|  Actual Points:
  usability-stoppoint-app, fuck-mingw-gcc,   |
  GeorgKoppen201609, TorBrowserTeam201609R   |
Parent ID:  #12820   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 tbb-security, tbb-crash, tbb-usability-stoppoint-app, fuck-mingw-gcc,
 GeorgKoppen201609, TorBrowserTeam201609
 =>
 tbb-security, tbb-crash, tbb-usability-stoppoint-app, fuck-mingw-gcc,
 GeorgKoppen201609, TorBrowserTeam201609R
 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 I prepared branches for review. The tor-browser one is:

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser.git/log/?h=bug_13893_v3

 which contains three fixes for GCC 6 compat. The relevant tor-browser-
 bundle commit is:

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/commit/?h=bug_13893_v4&id=ce775578f0dcdf79d4517c90b3c39804d1dea4e0

 (Note: the latter is missing the pointer to the tor-browser bug_13893_v3
 branch in my repo. That needs to get adjusted while testing).

 I'd still like to hear feedback about whether my nightly build in
 comment:71 fixes the problem.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript places WebM videos too late behind click-to-play in higher security levels

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19210: NoScript places WebM videos too late behind click-to-play in higher
security levels
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-regression, tbb-security-|  Actual Points:
  slider, tbb-6.0-issues |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by test400):

 I find more wierd behavior on other sites and some webm
 Sometime simple reloading direct link for webm play whole video without
 confirm,
 sometime reloading make play for 10 second instead of 5 and then blocked
 by click-to-play.

 Something is clearly wrong here.
 If you need specific tests please write.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20250 [Obfuscation/meek]: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20250: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues
-+-
 Reporter:  tordevSZ0|  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek, macOS, TorBrowser, 10.12,  |  Actual Points:
  sierra, macOS  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by tordevSZ0):

 Replying to [comment:9 cypherpunks]:
 > > tor were finished (socks port closed on exit)
 >
 > Or DisableNetwork option activated

 Has anyone else actually tried using meek with TorBrowser for more than 2
 minutes on 10.12?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript places WebM videos too late behind click-to-play in higher security levels

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19210: NoScript places WebM videos too late behind click-to-play in higher
security levels
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-regression, tbb-security-|  Actual Points:
  slider, tbb-6.0-issues |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by test400):

 I confirm behavior for linked video (​http://gensho.acc.umu.se/pub/debian-
 meetings/2016/mini-debconf-vienna/webm/Debian_Installer_for_Novena.webm)

 and all other webm i request directly, also for mp4 files.

 Video plays for 5 seconds, then stops.
 Although sometimes Shorter, only 2 seconds play (even if video is longer)

 Behavior for Embedded video (webm and mp4) is correct though (blocked by
 default, confirm enables).

 With noscript set to "temporarily allow all this page", behavior is same
 for first direct request.
 After requesting video directly a second time, video plays full without
 confirm need.
 This is also not wanted behavior.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20234 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Define CollecTor's file-structure protocol 1.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20234: Define CollecTor's file-structure protocol 1.0
---+
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Thanks for the thorough review!

 I only skimmed through yet, but want to quickly reply to the question
 about section 5.

 As we're relying on the 'out' structure to produce tars this should be
 documented, and the part of the directory structure inside the tars is
 visible to clients.

 The two use-cases I have in mind are:
 1. When parsing unpacked tar-balls part of the structure of 'out' is part
 of the tar-balls' structure, i.e. below month there is the 'out' structure
 to be found.
 2. When running a CollecTor instance for getting access to the data, it
 could make sense to use the 'out' structure to further operate on the
 data.  Here the CollecTor instance's purpose would tend to be data
 collection not mirroring.

 So, it is useful to describe 'out', I think.

 And, I think you're right that also 'stats' and 'sync' (introduced with
 #18910) should be part of the document.  That won't be much more text, but
 really clarifies what all the directories are about and gives operators an
 idea where they should place these directories etc.  And, it will help to
 get new developers started, or help us when debugging or changing things
 in a few months.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20111 [Applications/Tor Browser]: use Unix domain sockets for SOCKS port by default

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20111: use Unix domain sockets for SOCKS port by default
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-security, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:  #14270   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 When testing your patches in a clean, new hardened build I got the
 following issue:
 {{{
 Sep 28 11:34:45.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug:
 src/common/address.c:1119: tor_addr_compare_masked: This line should not
 have been reached. (Future instances of this warning will be silenced.)
 (on Tor 0.2.9.2-alpha 00ec701f8343f552)
 Sep 28 11:34:45.000 [warn] Bug: Line unexpectedly reached at
 tor_addr_compare_masked at src/common/address.c:1119. Stack trace: (on Tor
 0.2.9.2-alpha 00ec701f8343f552)
 Sep 28 11:34:45.000 [warn] Bug:
 /home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/debugging/20111/tor-
 browser/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/libasan.so.2(+0x4bc88) [0x7fa4d26eac88] (on
 Tor 0.2.9.2-alpha 00ec701f8343f552)
 Sep 28 11:34:45.000 [warn] Bug:
 /home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/debugging/20111/tor-
 browser/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor(log_backtrace+0x46) [0x560e0b946df6]
 (on Tor 0.2.9.2-alpha 00ec701f8343f552)
 Sep 28 11:34:45.000 [warn] Bug:
 /home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/debugging/20111/tor-
 browser/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0x13b)
 [0x560e0b99423b] (on Tor 0.2.9.2-alpha 00ec701f8343f552)
 Sep 28 11:34:45.000 [warn] Bug:
 /home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/debugging/20111/tor-
 browser/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor(tor_addr_compare_masked+0x455)
 [0x560e0b941105] (on Tor 0.2.9.2-alpha 00ec701f8343f552)
 Sep 28 11:34:45.000 [warn] Bug:
 /home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/debugging/20111/tor-
 
browser/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor(connection_edge_compatible_with_circuit+0x2a3)
 [0x560e0b866873] (on Tor 0.2.9.2-alpha 00ec701f8343f552)
 Sep 28 11:34:45.000 [warn] Bug:
 /home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/debugging/20111/tor-
 browser/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor(+0x73a276) [0x560e0b7d5276] (on Tor
 0.2.9.2-alpha 00ec701f8343f552)
 Sep 28 11:34:45.000 [warn] Bug:
 /home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/debugging/20111/tor-
 browser/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor(+0x749a3a) [0x560e0b7e4a3a] (on Tor
 0.2.9.2-alpha 00ec701f8343f552)
 Sep 28 11:34:45.000 [warn] Bug:
 /home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/debugging/20111/tor-
 
browser/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor(connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit+0x722)
 [0x560e0b7e6e22] (on Tor 0.2.9.2-alpha 00ec701f8343f552)
 Sep 28 11:34:45.000 [warn] Bug:
 /home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/debugging/20111/tor-
 browser/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor(connection_ap_attach_pending+0x4ac)
 [0x560e0b85707c] (on Tor 0.2.9.2-alpha 00ec701f8343f552)
 Sep 28 11:34:45.000 [warn] Bug:
 /home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/debugging/20111/tor-
 browser/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor(circuit_build_needed_circs+0xe7)
 [0x560e0b7e38a7] (on Tor 0.2.9.2-alpha 00ec701f8343f552)
 Sep 28 11:34:45.000 [warn] Bug:
 /home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/debugging/20111/tor-
 browser/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor(+0x552488) [0x560e0b5ed488] (on Tor
 0.2.9.2-alpha 00ec701f8343f552)
 Sep 28 11:34:45.000 [warn] Bug:
 /home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/debugging/20111/tor-
 browser/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0x937)
 [0x7fa4d1f488d7] (on Tor 0.2.9.2-alpha 00ec701f8343f552)
 Sep 28 11:34:45.000 [warn] Bug:
 /home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/debugging/20111/tor-
 browser/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor(do_main_loop+0x398) [0x560e0b5ee898]
 (on Tor 0.2.9.2-alpha 00ec701f8343f552)
 Sep 28 11:34:45.000 [warn] Bug:
 /home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/debugging/20111/tor-
 browser/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor(tor_main+0x140d) [0x560e0b5f3a3d] (on
 Tor 0.2.9.2-alpha 00ec701f8343f552)
 Sep 28 11:34:45.000 [warn] Bug:
 /home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/debugging/20111/tor-
 browser/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor(main+0x1c) [0x560e0b5e102c] (on Tor
 0.2.9.2-alpha 00ec701f8343f552)
 Sep 28 11:34:45.000 [warn] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf0) [0x7fa4d0195700] (on Tor
 0.2.9.2-alpha 00ec701f8343f552)
 Sep 28 11:34:45.000 [warn] Bug:
 /home/thomas/Arbeit/Tor/debugging/20111/tor-
 browser/Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/tor(+0x547dcd) [0x560e0b5e2dcd] (on Tor
 0.2.9.2-alpha 00ec701f8343f552)
 }}}
 Do you see the same on your machines? It seems we are hitting a tor bug or
 is there something wrong with your patches (they looked reasonable to me
 after the first code-rev

Re: [tor-bugs] #20234 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Define CollecTor's file-structure protocol 1.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20234: Define CollecTor's file-structure protocol 1.0
---+
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Thanks for starting this!  Here are some answers and some feedback:

  - It makes sense to specify the web-visible directories in this protocol,
 but what's the reason for also specifying the web-invisible `out/`
 directory there?  If the audience is developers who rely on the directory
 structure provided via HTTP, I'd say it's fine and even better to leave
 out that last directory.  And if the audience is operators and
 contributors, then we might have to include even more directories,
 including the `stats/` directory and others.  For comparison, the Onionoo
 protocol specification doesn't say anything about the `status/` directory
 which would be important for operators and contributors but which Onionoo
 client developers don't need to worry about.

  - "Shouldn't 'exit-list' be changed to 'exit-lists'?" -- Yes, we can do
 that.  In fact, I had this on my local TODO list for years and only
 recently dropped it, because meh, but if you also found this confusing,
 then it gets above the meh threshold again.  Let's do it.

  - "Shouldn't there be different markers for different torperf sources?"
 -- Maybe, but I'd rather not want to touch anything with the label Torperf
 on it unless it breaks apart or explodes.  Let's wait for the switch to
 OnionPerf and do something reasonable there.

  - "The 'compression-type' is one element of "xz", "gz", or "zip".  
 Is this true?" -- No, the only compression type that is currently in use
 is "xz".  We did use "bz2" until a few years ago, but we recompressed all
 tarballs, because "xz" compresses much better.  Of course, there's no
 guarantee that we'll stick with "xz" forever, so it might be fine to
 mention all possible compression types there.

  - Section 2.4 says that server descriptors are sorted into tarballs by
 download date.  That's not true, we're using published dates just like
 we're sorting extra-info descriptors into tarballs.

  - In Section 4.1.1, you ask: "Shouldn't the seconds be dropped?" -- No,
 because it's just coincidence that seconds are always zero.  That's
 because the new scheduler is super precise compared to the cron-based
 scheduling which put a 01 or 02 there at times.

  - Also in Section 4.1.1, "Why not group extra-info according to published
 time?" -- I don't understand that question.  Can you rephrase?

  - In Section 4.2.1, "What is the reason _not_ to group according to
 published time?" -- This question is very related to my recent thoughts on
 appending multiple votes to a single file:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20228#comment:2.
 Basically, if we were to store server descriptors and extra-info
 descriptors in hourly files, I'd expect that we update a couple of those
 files during a single update run.  (In fact, see the command and output
 below.)  And a client who wants to stay up to date would have to download
 all files that have changed.  Therefore it's much easier to append
 everything we learn in a single execution to a single file.

 {{{
 wget -O - https://collector.torproject.org/recent/relay-descriptors
 /server-descriptors/2016-09-28-09-05-00-server-descriptors | grep
 "^published " | cut -c1-23 | sort | uniq -c
1 published 2016-09-28 04   # <- this comes quite late
7 published 2016-09-28 07   # <- these, too
  786 published 2016-09-28 08   # <- one would only expect those
   16 published 2016-09-28 09   # <- and maybe a few of those
3 published 2016-09-28 10   # <- hello, future
1 published 2016-09-28 11   # <- and future
1 published 2016-09-28 16   # <- and future
1 published 2016-09-28 18   # <- hello, wrong clock
 }}}

  - I didn't look at Section 5 yet, because it's yet unclear whether that
 section belongs in the protocol.

 Again, thanks for writing this document!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20252 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: Identify changes to dir-spec.txt from proposal 264

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20252: Identify changes to dir-spec.txt from proposal 264
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * owner:   => karsten
 * priority:  High => Medium
 * component:  Metrics/CollecTor => Metrics/metrics-lib


Comment:

 Okay, I looked at the changes and believe that it's safe to just keep
 these lines in sanitized bridge server descriptors.  Pushed the trivial
 patch, will deploy it this hour.

 Now we need to make plans for parsing these new lines in metrics-lib, so
 I'm moving this to the metrics-lib component.  I'm also reducing priority
 to medium, because nothing's on fire while we discuss adding this feature.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20250 [Obfuscation/meek]: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20250: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues
-+-
 Reporter:  tordevSZ0|  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek, macOS, TorBrowser, 10.12,  |  Actual Points:
  sierra, macOS  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > tor were finished (socks port closed on exit)

 Or DisableNetwork option activated

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20250 [Obfuscation/meek]: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20250: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues
-+-
 Reporter:  tordevSZ0|  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek, macOS, TorBrowser, 10.12,  |  Actual Points:
  sierra, macOS  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > it seems meek-client is crashing.

 There are no facts about crashing or terminating meek abnormally in your
 logs

 > tor.real.4637 closes 127.0.0.1:9150 <-> *:*

 > ff.4673 closes

 >127.0.0.1:49344 <-> *:*
 >LOCALIP:49100 <-> :443

 > meek-client.4674 quits

 > ff.4673 quits

 it seems meek quits when tor were finished (socks port closed on exit)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20160 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport - MP3 playback is broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20160: Backport - MP3 playback is broken
-+-
 Reporter:  bugzilla |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash, tbb-easy, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R, GeorgKoppen201609   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-crash, tbb-easy, TorBrowserTeam201609 => tbb-crash, tbb-
 easy, TorBrowserTeam201609R, GeorgKoppen201609
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 bug_20160 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/log/?h=bug_20160) has backports of three patches fixing both
 the crash and the related usability bugs (seekbar goes to the end/total
 duration is not displayed).

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[tor-bugs] #20256 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Cloudfront resources are isolated to the FQDN

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20256: Cloudfront resources are isolated to the FQDN
--+-
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-linkability
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Opening
 
https://dlnmh9ip6v2uc.cloudfront.net/datasheets/Dev/Arduino/Shields/MP3_Player_Example.pde
 results in `SOCKS_USERNAME="dlnmh9ip6v2uc.cloudfront.net"`. But instead of
 isolating to the FQDN we should do so using the domain name, i.e.
 `cloudfront.net`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19954 [Metrics/ExoneraTor]: Non-ASCII characters are not displayed correctly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19954: Non-ASCII characters are not displayed correctly
+
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/ExoneraTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed, closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20255 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Noscript fails to block webm in high security settings, but still prevents watching

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20255: Noscript fails to block webm in high security settings, but still 
prevents
watching
--+---
 Reporter:  test400   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  noscript webm torbrowser  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 We are on it in #19210 and have a theory. If you could help confirming
 that one we can work on a proper fix. Marking this as a duplicate of
 #19210.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript places WebM videos too late behind click-to-play in higher security levels

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19210: NoScript places WebM videos too late behind click-to-play in higher
security levels
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-regression, tbb-security-|  Actual Points:
  slider, tbb-6.0-issues |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: test400 (added)


Comment:

 #20255 is a duplicate.

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