Re: [tor-bugs] #19999 [Core Tor/Tor]: Maybe test-cases should complete without BUG warnings?

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#1: Maybe test-cases should complete without BUG warnings?
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  testing TorCoreTeam201609  |  Actual Points:  3
Parent ID: | Points:  2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by rubiate):

 Tangentially related; addr/ip6_helpers will usually crash if run with
 --verbose

 The loop which builds the string in src/test/test_addr.c:88 never gets run
 because it declares `ii_=0` but uses `i` as the condition, and `i` is
 already incremented to 16 on test_addr.c:278

 Possible fix: (using `j` here instead of `ii_` to avoid touching every
 line realigning the backslashes)

 {{{
 diff --git a/src/test/test_addr.c b/src/test/test_addr.c
 index c8a9e6d..1d91194 100644
 --- a/src/test/test_addr.c
 +++ b/src/test/test_addr.c
 @@ -85,10 +85,10 @@ test_addr_basic(void *arg)
  char *, "%s",\
  { char *cp;  \
cp = print_ = tor_malloc(64);  \
 -  for (int ii_=0;i<16;++i) { \
 -tor_snprintf(cp, 3,"%02x", (unsigned)value_->s6_addr[i]);\
 +  for (int j=0;j<16;++j) {   \
 +tor_snprintf(cp, 3,"%02x", (unsigned)value_->s6_addr[j]);\
  cp += 2; \
 -if (ii_ != 15) *cp++ = ':';  \
 +if (j != 15) *cp++ = ':';\
}  \
  },   \
  { tor_free(print_); },   \
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14881 [Core Tor/Tor]: incorrect defaults when producing bandwidth-weights line in directory footer

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#14881: incorrect defaults when producing bandwidth-weights line in directory
footer
-+-
 Reporter:  robgjansen   |  Owner:  pastly
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged,   |  Actual Points:
  pre028-patch, tor-sponsorU-orphan, |
  TorCoreTeam-postponed-201604, review-group-9   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 And I just attached two more from the distant past, to give you a bit more
 variety.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14881 [Core Tor/Tor]: incorrect defaults when producing bandwidth-weights line in directory footer

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#14881: incorrect defaults when producing bandwidth-weights line in directory
footer
-+-
 Reporter:  robgjansen   |  Owner:  pastly
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged,   |  Actual Points:
  pre028-patch, tor-sponsorU-orphan, |
  TorCoreTeam-postponed-201604, review-group-9   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-

Comment (by pastly):

 Replying to [comment:46 arma]:
 > Sure. What log lines would you like?
 >
 > moria1 is currently outputting lines like
 > {{{
 > [...] Case 3a (E scarce) with v10: [...]
 > }}}

 Lines exactly like that, thanks!

 I bet Tor usually sticks with the same Case for long periods of time, but
 for the sake of variety, could you do a quick search for other Cases in
 recent history?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14881 [Core Tor/Tor]: incorrect defaults when producing bandwidth-weights line in directory footer

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#14881: incorrect defaults when producing bandwidth-weights line in directory
footer
-+-
 Reporter:  robgjansen   |  Owner:  pastly
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged,   |  Actual Points:
  pre028-patch, tor-sponsorU-orphan, |
  TorCoreTeam-postponed-201604, review-group-9   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Sure. What log lines would you like?

 moria1 is currently outputting lines like
 {{{
 Oct 04 18:55:01.567 [notice] Computed bandwidth weights for Case 3a (E
 scarce) with v10: G=29322240 M=4721546 E=1522058 D=9273571 T=44839415
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12381 [Applications/Tor bundles/installation]: Pluggable Transports + proxy is not working on Windows with TBB 3.6.2

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#12381: Pluggable Transports + proxy is not working on Windows with TBB 3.6.2
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  bundles/installation   |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-helpdesk-frequent|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arma):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Hello abandoned ticket still in needs-revision.

 Is this thing (fte + proxy on Windows) still an issue?

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[tor-bugs] #20291 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create user experience for security slider on Android (wireframes)

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20291: Create user experience for security slider on Android (wireframes)
--+
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  android, ux-mobile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 '''Background:'''

 We got a small grant to start implementing Tor Button into Orfox and for
 it we plan to also bring the security slider feature.

 We are not bringing the other features from Tor Button just yet. But we do
 have plans to do and have applied for more grant to do so.

 You can find more information about this project and it's roadmap here:

 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/ApplicationsTeam/TorBrowserAndroid/Roadmap

 
 '''Work:'''

 The attached pdf and OmniGraffle source file were created based on
 multiple conversations during Tor Meeting in Seattle (Sept 2016).

 It shows current user path for general settings and how they get to
 privacy settings.

 It also contains a suggested experience for when we bring Tor Button and
 the Security Slider that follows the standard flow from the application.

 With lack of landscape to work on we had to make some changes such as:

  * horizontal slider - instead of vertical
  * combine both medium options - saved space and it will also be less
 confuse to the user if we just display 'low, medium, high'. (Tor Browser
 Desktop will also make such change)
  * we reorganized the way we present the description of each security
 level
* presenting a short description giving a highlight of what that level
 means
* organized each item from previous description into group so the user
 can make the connection of what that action will affect in their
 experience

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20023 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Upgrade Go to 1.7.1

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20023: Upgrade Go to 1.7.1
--+-
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20250 [Obfuscation/meek]: meek fails on macOS 10.12 when built with Go 1.4.3 or Go 1.6.3 (was: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues)

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20250: meek fails on macOS 10.12 when built with Go 1.4.3 or Go 1.6.3
-+-
 Reporter:  tordevSZ0|  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek, macOS, TorBrowser, 10.12,  |  Actual Points:
  sierra |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dcf):

 Thanks, tordevSZ0, for making the report and for your cooperation, and
 thanks mcs for testing. Ticket #20023 is about upgrading Go to 1.7.1. Once
 that is merged, the problem should be resolved and we can close this
 ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20023 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Upgrade Go to 1.7.1

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20023: Upgrade Go to 1.7.1
--+-
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by dcf):

 Go 1.7.1 is out now, released 2016-09-07:
 https://golang.org/doc/devel/release.html#go1.7.minor

 I'm testing a build of the attached patches now. If they work, I'll mark
 this ticket needs_review.

 According to comment:26:ticket:20250, we're going to need to use Go 1.7 or
 later even for the stable builds, for the sake of compatibility with macOS
 Sierra. There's no release of the 1.4 series or the 1.6 series that has
 the necessary fix (see [https://github.com/golang/go/issues/16352
 GH#16352] and [https://github.com/golang/go/issues/17234 GH#17234]).
 That's why the maint-6.0 patch is bigger than the master patch, because it
 also includes upgrades that were intentionally left out of maint-6.0 in
 #19703.

 #20290 (upgrade meek to 0.24) should be merged before this ticket, since
 that version of meek fixes a problem that only arises when it is built
 with Go 1.6 or later (#20030).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20023 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Upgrade Go to 1.7.1 (was: Upgrade Go to 1.7)

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20023: Upgrade Go to 1.7.1
--+-
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20290 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Upgrade meek to 0.24

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20290: Upgrade meek to 0.24
+--
 Reporter:  dcf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek TorBrowserTeam201610R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Updated the patch to fix the commit message; #20030 affected Go 1.6 and
 later, not Go 1.5 and later.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20290 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Upgrade meek to 0.24

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20290: Upgrade meek to 0.24
+--
 Reporter:  dcf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek TorBrowserTeam201610R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Description changed by dcf:

Old description:

> Version [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
> transports/meek.git/log/?id=0.24 0.24] has a fix for #20030, which
> prevented meek-client-torbrowser from cleaning up is subprocesses when
> built with Go 1.5 or later.
>
> Here's the diff from the version we're using now. The only substantive
> changes are those that have to do with #20030.
>   https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
> transports/meek.git/diff/?id=0.24=0.22-18371-3
>
> A patch is forthcoming.

New description:

 Version [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/meek.git/log/?id=0.24 0.24] has a fix for #20030, which
 prevented meek-client-torbrowser from cleaning up is subprocesses when
 built with Go 1.6 or later.

 Here's the diff from the version we're using now. The only substantive
 changes are those that have to do with #20030.
   https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/meek.git/diff/?id=0.24=0.22-18371-3

 A patch is forthcoming.

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20030 [Obfuscation/meek]: meek-http-helper doesn't shutdown cleanly in 6.5a1

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20030: meek-http-helper doesn't shutdown cleanly in 6.5a1
--+
 Reporter:  arlolra   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  regression|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by dcf):

 Ticket #20290 asks to include this fix in Tor Browser.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20290 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Upgrade meek to 0.24

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20290: Upgrade meek to 0.24
+--
 Reporter:  dcf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek TorBrowserTeam201610R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * keywords:  meek => meek TorBrowserTeam201610R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Here is a patch. I tested a complete build on top of maint-6.0 (currently
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/log/?h=maint-6.0=cb3868eb1cc556bee8d0bf2d95d3ef3e9811b8a8
 cb3868eb]) and was able to bootstrap meek-amazon on linux and windows. I
 didn't test mac. I had also applied a commit to upgrade Go to 1.6.3, but I
 don't think that would affect the results.

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[tor-bugs] #20290 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Upgrade meek to 0.24

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20290: Upgrade meek to 0.24
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  meek
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Version [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/meek.git/log/?id=0.24 0.24] has a fix for #20030, which
 prevented meek-client-torbrowser from cleaning up is subprocesses when
 built with Go 1.5 or later.

 Here's the diff from the version we're using now. The only substantive
 changes are those that have to do with #20030.
   https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/meek.git/diff/?id=0.24=0.22-18371-3

 A patch is forthcoming.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20205 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Implement SASL EXTERNAL

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20205: Implement SASL EXTERNAL
+-
 Reporter:  arlolra |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-

Comment (by arlolra):

 Submitted the patch for discussion upstream as,
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1307603

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20250 [Obfuscation/meek]: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20250: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues
-+-
 Reporter:  tordevSZ0|  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek, macOS, TorBrowser, 10.12,  |  Actual Points:
  sierra |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by tordevSZ0):

 Can confirm that the meek build with go 1.7.1 seems to fix the problem
 using both 6.0.5 and 6.5a3.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20288 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use correct arguments to tor_calloc

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20288: Use correct arguments to tor_calloc
--+
 Reporter:  mfrw  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 arma: it's perfectly _safe_ to call calloc with the arguments reversed;
 it's just bad style.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20288 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use correct arguments to tor_calloc

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20288: Use correct arguments to tor_calloc
--+
 Reporter:  mfrw  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 Jeez. Well, the patch looks smart to apply.

 Did this code just never get called? It looks like the offending line went
 into Tor 0.2.7.2-alpha (git commit 6c564e6c).

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[tor-bugs] #20289 [Core Tor]: HS_DESC event while waiting for upload

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20289: HS_DESC event while waiting for upload
-+-
 Reporter:  meejah   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor|   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 There is currently a "synthentic" delay before upload hidden-service
 descriptors. It would be nice if there was a "WAITING" (or similar) sub-
 event to the HS_DESC events to tell controllers that.

 For context, txtorcon listens to HS_DESC events when adding a new Onion
 service (either via ADD_ONION or SETCONF) and bubbles this out to txtorcon
 users as "progress" (txtorcon may also decide it needs to launch a new tor
 instance, which is also bubbled out via the same progress API).

 So for the 30 seconds (or whatever) of induced delay, there appears to be
 nothing happening, and then you get 6 "HS_DESC UPLOAD" and (hopefully also
 6) "HS_DESC UPLOADED" sub-events all "near the end".

 It would provide nicer UX to have a "HS_DESC WAITING" (or similar) every
 few seconds.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20288 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use correct arguments to tor_calloc

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20288: Use correct arguments to tor_calloc
--+
 Reporter:  mfrw  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20288 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use correct arguments to tor_calloc

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20288: Use correct arguments to tor_calloc
--+
 Reporter:  mfrw  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by mfrw):

 Flip the arguments in tor_calloc function call.

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[tor-bugs] #20288 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use correct arguments to tor_calloc

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20288: Use correct arguments to tor_calloc
--+
 Reporter:  mfrw  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18753 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unix socket paths cannot contain spaces

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#18753: Unix socket paths cannot contain spaces
+--
 Reporter:  special |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  nickm-deferred-20160905, tbb-needs  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18753 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unix socket paths cannot contain spaces

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#18753: Unix socket paths cannot contain spaces
+--
 Reporter:  special |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  nickm-deferred-20160905, tbb-needs  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  yawning => nickm
 * status:  needs_information => accepted
 * actualpoints:   => 1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18753 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unix socket paths cannot contain spaces

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#18753: Unix socket paths cannot contain spaces
+--
 Reporter:  special |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  nickm-deferred-20160905, tbb-needs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by nickm):

 Branch `spaces_in_unix_addrs` in my public repository may DTRT here.
 Needs review and acceptance testing.

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[tor-bugs] #20287 [Metrics/CollecTor]: digest computation for names of vote files in CollecTor's file protocol and code differs

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20287: digest computation for names of vote files in CollecTor's file protocol 
and
code differs
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 It seems that
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/collector.git/tree/src/main/resources/docs/PROTOCOL#n202
 section 4.3.3] of the protocol doesn't coincide with CollecTor's code.

 The section reads:
 {{{
 4.3.3
'votes' contains files named

year DASH month DASH day DASH hour DASH minute DASH second
DASH VOTE DASH fingerprint DASH digest

Where VOTE is the string "vote" and all time related
values are derived from the valid-after dates. 'fingerprint'
is the fingerprint of the authority and 'digest' is the SHA1
digest of the authority's medium term signing key.
 }}}

 But the code for creating the digest calculates a digest for the
 descriptor bytes from the start of the vote to the 'directory-signature '
 (incl.).
 (cf.
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/collector.git/tree/src/main/java/org/torproject/collector/relaydescs/RelayDescriptorParser.java#n204
 here]).
 {{{
 #!java
 ...
 String ascii = new String(data, "US-ASCII");
 String startToken = "network-status-version ";
 String sigToken = "directory-signature ";
 int start = ascii.indexOf(startToken);
 int sig = ascii.indexOf(sigToken);
 if (start >= 0 && sig >= 0 && sig > start) {
   sig += sigToken.length();
   byte[] forDigest = new byte[sig - start];
   System.arraycopy(data, start, forDigest, 0, sig - start);
   String digest = DigestUtils.shaHex(forDigest).toUpperCase();
   if (this.aw != null) {
 this.aw.storeVote(data, validAfter, dirSource, digest,
 serverDescriptorDigests);
   ...
 }}}


 Which is correct?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20250 [Obfuscation/meek]: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20250: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues
-+-
 Reporter:  tordevSZ0|  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek, macOS, TorBrowser, 10.12,  |  Actual Points:
  sierra |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Using either the build from comment:25 or my own build fixes this problem
 for me. It would be great to have another data point, but go 1.7.1 seems
 to be the answer.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20224 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Fix `BridgeDescriptorMappingsLimit` config option

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20224: Fix `BridgeDescriptorMappingsLimit` config option
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * owner:   => iwakeh
 * status:  needs_review => assigned


Comment:

 Oh, those date formats must have caused many programming/troubleshooting
 years on earth, in total.

 The cut-off makes sense; there are no older descriptors.

 I'll add this to my list.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20205 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Implement SASL EXTERNAL

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20205: Implement SASL EXTERNAL
+-
 Reporter:  arlolra |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-

Comment (by arlolra):

 Three reasons why the Webcrypto API was perhaps not the best choice to
 quickly push ahead on `ECDSA-NIST256P-CHALLENGE`,

 * Raw export of the public key is uncompressed.  See "2.2.  Subject Public
 Key" in https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5480.txt where it says,
   > The uncompressed form is indicated by 0x04 ...
   which means you need to do something like the following to get the
 string to set with nickserv,
   {{{
   crypto.subtle.exportKey("raw", kp.publicKey).then(function(ab) {
 // the first byte of ab indicates the form
 let v = new Uint8Array(ab);
 let u = v.slice(0, 33);  // +1 here for the compressed point
 u[0] = 2 + (v[v.length - 1] & 1);
 let s = String.fromCharCode.apply(null, u);
 console.log(btoa(s));
   });
   }}}
   (note, to retrieve the uncompressed point from a PEM, `openssl ec -noout
 -text -conv_form uncompressed -in test.pem`)

 * The returned signature from `crypto.subtle.sign` is a byte array of
 concatenated `r,s` values, but the protocol wants a base64 encoding of the
 DER formatted signature.  A library like https://github.com/Brightspace
 /node-ecdsa-sig-formatter is useful, once you change the `Buffer` calls to
 use `Uint8Array` APIs.

 * The biggest issue is the ECDSA algorithm itself. As defined,
   https://www.w3.org/TR/WebCryptoAPI/#ecdsa-operations
   it necessitates using a hash function before signing, which matches,
 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_Curve_Digital_Signature_Algorithm#Signature_generation_algorithm
   However, the challenge in the protocol is already the bit length of the
 group order (256) and wants that signed w/o hashing.
   The tool above just calls `ECDSA_sign` directly,
   https://github.com/kaniini/ecdsatool/blob/master/libecdsaauth/op.c#L64
   which seems like a showstopper.

 Switching to https://github.com/indutny/elliptic, producing a patch that
 worked was a lot simpler,
 https://github.com/TheTorProject/tor-messenger-
 build/commit/5cbff442d43f47672faa23f6c0247ae62f3bfb3c
 but adds this ~10k LOC library, which is obviously not ideal.

 Here's a build w/ the above patch applied,
 https://paganini.erinn.org/~arlolra/tor-messenger/tor-messenger-0.2.0b2
 -osx-x86_64-6f7049.dmg

 To use it, take the tool linked to above and follow its readme.  Then, do
 `ecdsatool keyinfo test.pem` and copy the `priv` hex pairs but remove the
 newlines and colons. Add the preference `messenger.account.accountN.ecdsa`
 in the Tor Messenger config editor, and connect.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20281 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please make the following user accounts for GiantRabbit

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20281: Please make the following user accounts for GiantRabbit
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19922   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by isabela):

 Try Ubuntu public keyserver:

 keyserver.ubuntu.com/

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[tor-bugs] #20286 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate if we could do Tor Browser builds using gitian on Mozilla TaskCluster

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20286: Investigate if we could do Tor Browser builds using gitian on Mozilla
TaskCluster
--+---
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 Mozilla said they could possibly donate us some build capacity, using
 TaskCluster:
 https://docs.taskcluster.net/

 We should investigate if building Tor Browser with gitian on TaskCluster
 is possible.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20182 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Recreating the ja .mar files on OS X is not working correctly

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20182: Recreating the ja .mar files on OS X is not working correctly
---+---
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, TorBrowserTeam201610R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-gitian, TorBrowserTeam201610 => tbb-gitian,
 TorBrowserTeam201610R


Comment:

 The branch `bug_20182` in my git repo should fix this:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/commit/?h=bug_20182

 When running `dmg2mar` from this branch on `6.5a3` I now have this:
 {{{
 $ ../../tools/dmg2mar
 Starting TorBrowser-6.5a3-osx64_ja.dmg -> tor-browser-osx64-6.5a3_ja-JP-
 mac.mar
 Finished TorBrowser-6.5a3-osx64_ja.dmg -> tor-browser-osx64-6.5a3_ja-JP-
 mac.mar
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20043 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SharedWorker uses catchall circuit

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20043: SharedWorker uses catchall circuit
-+-
 Reporter:  bugzilla |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201610R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:5 gk]:
 > Another thing: Are we sure the patch for
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1268726 copes with the
 scenario in this bug?

 I'm optimistic that it does. We will need to ensure that the patch for
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1264577
 includes the test we are adding here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20043 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SharedWorker uses catchall circuit

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20043: SharedWorker uses catchall circuit
-+-
 Reporter:  bugzilla |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201610R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:4 gk]:
 > Could you check the `rv` of `NS_NewURI()`? That would fit better in the
 code context. Not sure what we want to do if that call failed, though.
 Could/should we emit an error message visible in the console or in the
 terminal?

 That's a good suggestion. Here's a new version (same two commits rebased
 to the latest tor-browser) that logs a warning in the terminal:
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commits/20043+2

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20250 [Obfuscation/meek]: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20250: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues
-+-
 Reporter:  tordevSZ0|  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek, macOS, TorBrowser, 10.12,  |  Actual Points:
  sierra |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * keywords:  meek, macOS, TorBrowser, 10.12, sierra, macOS => meek, macOS,
 TorBrowser, 10.12, sierra
 * status:  new => needs_information
 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:24 mcs]:
 > I somewhat randomly found this article which implies but does not
 confirm that go 1.7 may include fixes for Sierra that are not in 1.6.3:
 https://github.com/github/git-lfs/issues/1440
 > Maybe we should try to compile meek with go 1.7?

 I think you're right. While I didn't find any mention of a problem in the
 [https://golang.org/doc/go1.7 Go 1.7 release notes] nor the
 [https://github.com/golang/go/issues?q=milestone%3AGo1.7.1 1.7.1
 milestone], further searching turned up:
  * [https://github.com/golang/go/issues/16352#issuecomment-236918099
 GH#16352] 2016-08-02: "As of Sierra Beta 4, this issue is again relevant."
 (Go 1.6.3 was released before that,
 [https://golang.org/doc/devel/release.html#go1.6 2016-07-07].)
  * [https://github.com/golang/go/issues/16570#issuecomment-236979733
 GH#16570] 2016-08-02: "Wanted to add this also happens with 1.6.3"
  *
 [https://github.com/golang/go/commit/2da5633eb9091608047881953f75b489a3134cdc
 2da5633e] 2016-08-02: "fix nanotime for macOS Sierra, again."
  * [https://github.com/golang/go/issues/17234 GH#17234] 2016-09-26:
 "backport 'fix nanotime for macOS Sierra, again' to go 1.6.x maybe"

 tordevSZ0, mcs, I made a build of meek-client and meek-client-torbrowser
 using Go 1.7.1. Please try copying it into your installation and see if it
 helps:
   attachment:meek-0.22-18371-3-go1.7.1.zip
   attachment:meek-0.22-18371-3-go1.7.1.zip.asc
 If you prefer to build it from source yourself:
 {{{
 git clone https://git.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/meek.git
 cd meek
 git checkout 0.22-18371-3
 (GOOS=darwin GOARCH=amd64 cd meek-client && go build)
 (GOOS=darwin GOARCH=amd64 cd meek-client-torbrowser && go build)
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20283 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser should run without a `/proc` filesystem.

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20283: Tor Browser should run without a `/proc` filesystem.
--+--
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-sandboxing|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by yawning):

 AFAIK no, but I will admit that I didn't look very hard through bugzilla.
 It's probably a fairly uncommon use case, so I'm not sure how much
 upstream will care about it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20216 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Iran blocking of direct users, 2016-08 and 2016-09

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20216: Iran blocking of direct users, 2016-08 and 2016-09
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Description changed by dcf:

Old description:

> Direct users in Iran dropped from 8,000 to 2,000 between 2016-08-20 and
> 2016-08-23. The numbers recovered to 4,000, then crashed to 400 on
> 2016-09-03 and 2016-09-04.
>   [[Image(userstats-relay-country-ir-2016-06-24-2016-09-22-off.png)]]
> [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
> country.html?start=2016-06-24=2016-09-22=ir=off link]
>
> Looking at bridge users, there is an increase right around 2016-08-20,
> the time of the first blocking, then an abrupt return to previous levels
> around 2016-09-03, the time of the second blocking.
>   [[Image(userstats-bridge-combined-ir-2016-06-24-2016-09-22.png)]]
> [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
> country.html?start=2016-06-24=2016-09-22=ir link]
>
> Looking at the graph of bridge users by transport, obfs4 continued
> working while obfs3 and vanilla were blocked.
>   [[Image(userstats-bridge-country-ir-2016-06-24-2016-09-22.png)]]
> [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
> combined.html?start=2016-06-24=2016-09-22=ir link]

New description:

 Direct users in Iran dropped from 8,000 to 2,000 between 2016-08-20 and
 2016-08-23. The numbers recovered to 4,000, then crashed to 400 on
 2016-09-03 and 2016-09-04.
   [[Image(userstats-relay-country-ir-2016-06-24-2016-09-22-off.png)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
 country.html?start=2016-06-24=2016-09-22=ir=off link]

 ''Edit 2016-10-04: the bridge changes below, on further investigation,
 appear to be unrelated to anything done by Iran.''

 Looking at bridge users, there is an increase right around 2016-08-20, the
 time of the first blocking, then an abrupt return to previous levels
 around 2016-09-03, the time of the second blocking.
   [[Image(userstats-bridge-country-ir-2016-06-24-2016-09-22.png)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 country.html?start=2016-06-24=2016-09-22=ir link]

 Looking at the graph of bridge users by transport, obfs4 continued working
 while obfs3 and vanilla were blocked.
   [[Image(userstats-bridge-combined-ir-2016-06-24-2016-09-22.png)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 combined.html?start=2016-06-24=2016-09-22=ir link]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20250 [Obfuscation/meek]: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20250: macOS 10.12 TorBrowser meek pluggable transport issues
-+-
 Reporter:  tordevSZ0|  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek, macOS, TorBrowser, 10.12,  |  Actual Points:
  sierra, macOS  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Kathy and I tried to reproduce this problem using TB 6.5a3 on an macOS
 Sierra system. Using the built-in meek-amazon option, we experienced
 general flakiness: sometimes Tor bootstrapping would stop, sometimes
 bootstrapping would complete but we could not load any pages, and
 sometimes we could browse for a short time.

 At least some of the time, the meek-client process disappears. Just now, I
 caught it in a crash after attaching lldb to it. Here is the stacktrace:
 {{{
 * thread #8: tid = 0x873b, 0x0001214f meek-client`runtime.unlock + 271,
 stop reason = EXC_BAD_ACCESS (code=1, address=0xe5db311a)
   * frame #0: 0x0001214f meek-client`runtime.unlock + 271
 frame #1: 0x000328b1 meek-client`runtime.findrunnable + 849
 frame #2: 0x000330f6 meek-client`runtime.schedule + 502
 frame #3: 0x0001 meek-client`runtime.park_m + 337
 frame #4: 0x00052e23 meek-client`runtime.mcall + 67
 }}}
 I somewhat randomly found this article which implies but does not confirm
 that go 1.7 may include fixes for Sierra that are not in 1.6.3:
 https://github.com/github/git-lfs/issues/1440
 Maybe we should try to compile meek with go 1.7?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20281 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please make the following user accounts for GiantRabbit

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20281: Please make the following user accounts for GiantRabbit
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19922   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Old description:

> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
> Hash: SHA256
>
> User accounts:
> name: Peter Haight
> email: pet...@giantrabbit.com,
> PGP fingerprint: 4F95 A91F 7B34 8723 0BC9 CCF5 B5FB 9E3E 3661 A436
> username: peterh
>
> name: Ben Wheeler
> email: bwhee...@giantrabbit.com
> PGP fingerprint: E7CC 8108 A3A5 285B 84F3  EC17 14F6 1726 6D4E EB80
> username: bwheeler
> -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
>
> iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJX8lCqAAoJEDIkSZQVBkx74zoP/2Chx3eSkwX9iGq7nZ5YtYjg
> pgb1YbZW3s4nNLfuiRpabFUKqxCWT4i+C802lXVJHRq8FftNK5CscyZgLmC+IA0E
> 9S8RJu19h/r4hb1pVtU27pbTqBQ68/CHAV5ug430Ef5qnCXqWtnxHV22G3m4Plna
> bugXEeHgQTr02ZLy1Va3moWf2+LEhsnMSRRp3DIQ822OsTXfqWp3V11YPFOTq3Ye
> uoHuM4PibOqvR2jSjBlnCzEbeYBcKGbCtTqhljgMvn8aQ512dak1J/v352nB8uYJ
> 78xaO2IUz82yBhdD/esgGgMIR1ACYkpZXl4eiS8BYtN98R8/8KF5BFU51Fpag4A9
> s5d7OFQ8Zc6n0uuB2GUu2zfzNDM8U9ZxjzlYpCenpF4UdtndjHuNGlbsOSvKZVgs
> KGQYRfPJ6vAoDaalUVydlyQb77568vNa4gaWymWedgax/JUO6bVbPhdlGi75p2Mf
> 4P03yfYZwA0mBDqR7IbBltI0NrjEjolQCydP6lxMjsgwVHIcUjVLgPa+fymfqePh
> /soe3ujgu2qtFBA4XWL4TkeycTQI1xffM4jrIGqngIE3o6wKRMjxexU7VfKtBdtj
> u9gtC10o7b71mGuu7MNBoscJeF9MSlnWY61lHe+qx/NRmz7P6Ka0E1RPE5YsfVR1
> 8UW6IeyYDw/cKXhGdGUZ
> =5Gzd
> -END PGP SIGNATURE-

New description:

 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256

 User accounts:
 name: Peter Haight
 email: pet...@giantrabbit.com,
 PGP fingerprint: 4F95 A91F 7B34 8723 0BC9 CCF5 B5FB 9E3E 3661 A436
 username: peterh

 name: Ben Wheeler
 email: bwhee...@giantrabbit.com
 PGP fingerprint: E7CC 8108 A3A5 285B 84F3  EC17 14F6 1726 6D4E EB80
 username: bwheeler
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJX8lCqAAoJEDIkSZQVBkx74zoP/2Chx3eSkwX9iGq7nZ5YtYjg
 pgb1YbZW3s4nNLfuiRpabFUKqxCWT4i+C802lXVJHRq8FftNK5CscyZgLmC+IA0E
 9S8RJu19h/r4hb1pVtU27pbTqBQ68/CHAV5ug430Ef5qnCXqWtnxHV22G3m4Plna
 bugXEeHgQTr02ZLy1Va3moWf2+LEhsnMSRRp3DIQ822OsTXfqWp3V11YPFOTq3Ye
 uoHuM4PibOqvR2jSjBlnCzEbeYBcKGbCtTqhljgMvn8aQ512dak1J/v352nB8uYJ
 78xaO2IUz82yBhdD/esgGgMIR1ACYkpZXl4eiS8BYtN98R8/8KF5BFU51Fpag4A9
 s5d7OFQ8Zc6n0uuB2GUu2zfzNDM8U9ZxjzlYpCenpF4UdtndjHuNGlbsOSvKZVgs
 KGQYRfPJ6vAoDaalUVydlyQb77568vNa4gaWymWedgax/JUO6bVbPhdlGi75p2Mf
 4P03yfYZwA0mBDqR7IbBltI0NrjEjolQCydP6lxMjsgwVHIcUjVLgPa+fymfqePh
 /soe3ujgu2qtFBA4XWL4TkeycTQI1xffM4jrIGqngIE3o6wKRMjxexU7VfKtBdtj
 u9gtC10o7b71mGuu7MNBoscJeF9MSlnWY61lHe+qx/NRmz7P6Ka0E1RPE5YsfVR1
 8UW6IeyYDw/cKXhGdGUZ
 =5Gzd
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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Comment (by weasel):

 I cannot find these keys on keyservers.  Where can I get them?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19922 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: server set up for giant rabit

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#19922: server set up for giant rabit
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by weasel):

 vhosts created.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16211 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser's security slider is too big for some notebooks

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#16211: Tor Browser's security slider is too big for some notebooks
-+-
 Reporter:  T(A)ILS developers   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-security-slider,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201610   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I tested this with Tails on an old netbook and the fix for #17904 seems to
 address this issue. Feel free to reopen if that is not the case for you.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19274 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate and address remaining/long-term iSEC Findings

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#19274: Investigate and address remaining/long-term iSEC Findings
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201610,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201610   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This ticket can be closed. We have the remaining issues in own tickets
 (#10281, #13893, #12820, and #15138).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20204 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows don't drag on macOS Sierra

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20204: Windows don't drag on macOS Sierra
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr-will-have, tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:15 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:14 gk]:
 > > mcs: do you think we should just take those patches there, too,
 without further testing?
 >
 > Yes. This problem is annoying enough to users that I think we should
 take that risk.

 Done with commits 95b008b232fb75f09541ac43e3d1ef5482ad2590,
 b3e5e45fc43646fa658cd8bbb43389a02e391150, and
 8b1f07f31cd04fb157bf99a9e2e600b4422f277f on tor-browser-45.4.0esr-6.0-1.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20160 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport - MP3 playback is broken

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20160: Backport - MP3 playback is broken
-+-
 Reporter:  bugzilla |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-crash, tbb-easy, tbb-usability,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201609R, GeorgKoppen201609   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-crash, tbb-easy, TorBrowserTeam201609R, GeorgKoppen201609
 =>
 tbb-crash, tbb-easy, tbb-usability, TorBrowserTeam201609R,
 GeorgKoppen201609


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #13017, #18820, #20184, #20210, ...

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
Batch modification to #13017, #18820, #20184, #20210, #18101, #19200, #19857, 
#20185, #15988, #17509, #17662, #18292, #18925, #19646, #19741, #20018, #20182, 
#20217 by gk:
keywords to TorBrowserTeam201610

Comment:
Moving tickets to October.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #20121, #10281, #14270, #12820, ...

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
Batch modification to #20121, #10281, #14270, #12820, #15138, #16211, #16622, 
#18093, #19067, #19274, #19459 by gk:
keywords to TorBrowserTeam201610

Comment:
Moving SponsorU items to October.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19750 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Sandboxing in Tor Browser

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#19750: Sandboxing in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-sandboxing,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201610   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-sandboxing => tbb-sandboxing, TorBrowserTeam201610


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16621 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Can we merge torbutton_do_new_identity with Clear Private Data?

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#16621: Can we merge torbutton_do_new_identity with Clear Private Data?
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton-conversion  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * sponsor:  SponsorU =>
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Good thing to think about but it requires more thought before we start
 implementing this.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #18820, #20184, #18101, #19200, ...

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
Batch modification to #18820, #20184, #18101, #19200, #12820, #15988, #17509, 
#18925, #19274 by gk:
keywords to GeorgKoppen201610

Comment:
Moving my tickets

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20283 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser should run without a `/proc` filesystem.

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20283: Tor Browser should run without a `/proc` filesystem.
--+--
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-sandboxing|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: gk (added)


Comment:

 Do you know whether there is already an upstream bug for this?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20183 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Only recreate the incremental OS X MAR files if we need to take OS X signatures into account

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20183: Only recreate the incremental OS X MAR files if we need to take OS X
signatures into account
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, TorBrowserTeam201610R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good. This is commit ac9c992cae2078c866b67341d929c61fe54f5437 on
 tor-browser-bundle master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update from 6.5a2 to 6.5a3 on OSX breaks Tor Browser

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20210: Update from 6.5a2 to 6.5a3 on OSX breaks Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  mrphs |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201609  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:24 boklm]:
 > Replying to [comment:23 mcs]:
 > > Replying to [comment:20 gk]:
 > > > We set them already before creating the .dmg file with the `ddmg.sh`
 script, no?
 > >
 > > I might be overlooking something, but it looks like ddmg.sh relies on
 some of the mode bits being correct in order to determine which files
 should have mode 0755, etc. Since the exec bits are lost during the 7z
 extraction process, I don't think ddmg.sh will work as-is (but I have not
 tried it).
 >
 > I think you are right, `ddmg.sh` is using `find $@ -executable` to find
 which files to change.
 >
 > I can see two options to fix this permissions problem:
 > - generate the new mar files using the `*-signed.tar.bz2` files instead
 of the .dmg files
 > - generate them from the .dmg files, and extract the old mar file to
 replicate the file permissions from the old mar file to the new one

 So, I really like to avoid roping the .bz2 files in as this adds an
 additional kludge to this signing nightmare. Two additional options:

 - maybe we can look at Mozilla code checking how the correct permission
 are set in the first place and replicate that
 - fix `7z` as this seems clearly to be a bug that deserves to get fixed
 upstream

 My hope is that fixing the permission problem in `7z` is not that hard
 which is why I would start with that one first. Otherwise taking the
 option that consumes the least amount of time to implement and test seems
 to be a good heuristic. If it turns out to include the .bz2 files I guess
 I'd bite that bullet.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #2106 [Core Tor/Tor]: Controller can't unset httpsproxy if it doesn't resolve

2016-10-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#2106: Controller can't unset httpsproxy if it doesn't resolve
-+--
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by arma):

 We just had a user on #tor who was bitten by this bug -- they configured a
 proxy for their tor browser, then took the laptop to another network, and
 now Tor Browser can't start Tor.

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