Re: [tor-bugs] #20495 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Unexplained drop in meek users, 2016-10-19 to 2016-11-10

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20495: Unexplained drop in meek users, 2016-10-19 to 2016-11-10
-+
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  cn us ru de gb meek  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Closing because this seems settled.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20419 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: iran has banned tor successfully

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20419: iran has banned tor successfully
-+-
 Reporter:  ufd33|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block ir  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * keywords:   => censorship block ir


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20781 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Figure out how to sandbox meek in a sensible way.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20781: Figure out how to sandbox meek in a sensible way.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  meek  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * keywords:   => meek


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20785 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Block of some direct users in Saudi Arabia, 2016-11-20

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20785: Block of some direct users in Saudi Arabia, 2016-11-20
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  censorship
 |  block sa
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 On 2016-11-20, the number of direct users dropped from about 8000 to about
 5500. There was a simultaneous increase in bridge users from about 500 to
 over 1200.

 [[Image(userstats-relay-country-sa-2016-08-28-2016-11-26-off.png)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
 country.html?start=2016-08-28=2016-11-26=sa=off link]

 [[Image(userstats-bridge-country-sa-2016-08-28-2016-11-26.png)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 country.html?start=2016-08-28=2016-11-26=sa link]

 [[Image(userstats-bridge-combined-sa-2016-08-28-2016-11-26.png)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 combined.html?start=2016-08-28=2016-11-26=sa link]

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20784 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TOR Not working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20784: TOR Not working
--+
 Reporter:  devildevine   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major |   Keywords:  Torbrower,
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 I am new to TOR. Downloaded browser and went to open it. Once opened it
 stated "Something Went Wrong TOR not working in this browser. For help
 contact : h...@rt.torproject.org

 I'm running the latest version of OSX. I do not have a VPN as I can not
 afford to buy one...

 Help!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20783 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: General `sandboxed-tor-browser` UI/UX improvement catch-all.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20783: General `sandboxed-tor-browser` UI/UX improvement catch-all.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 The `sandboxed-tor-browser` UI/UX is something that was done by someone
 that is not a UI/UX person, and it shows.  There is tons of room for
 improvement, and this is the catch-all for tracking such things.

 Off the top of my head:

  * Allow the ability to localize it. (https://github.com/nicksnyder/go-
 i18n looks promising).
  * Use a progress bar instead of a spinner for the progressDialog.
  * Add an `About` dialog somewhere so that it's easy to query version
 information, without resorting to the command line (`--version`).
  * Improve the appearance of the error dialog, provide access to the log
 when convenient (rather than the console, or a log file).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20782 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Use a seccomp whitelist when the tor daemon is configured to use Bridges.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20782: Use a seccomp whitelist when the tor daemon is configured to use 
Bridges.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 The seccomp whitelist for the tor sandbox only has the system calls
 required for the tor daemon itself (based off tor's `UseSandbox`
 implementation).  This causes obfs4proxy to not work, so when Bridges are
 enabled, a rudimentary blacklist is installed instead.

 The proper thing to do would be to figure out what systemcalls obfs4proxy
 needs in addition to the ones in the current whitelist and selective
 expand the whitelist at runtime based on configuration.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20781 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Figure out how to sandbox meek in a sensible way.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20781: Figure out how to sandbox meek in a sensible way.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Right now `sandboxed-tor-browser` does not support meek at all.  This is
 suboptimal since it is popular.

 There's two ways forward from my perspective:

  * The correct fix would be to add code to spin up another sandbox
 container (since I do not think that even a neutered firefox process
 should live in the tor sandbox), for the meek helper firefox instance.

  * The quick and dirty way would be to use `meek_lite` since obfs4proxy is
 allowed, and shipped versions contain the code.  The downside is that it
 is even more distinct than meek usually is.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20780 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Shuffle and persist the ordering of internal bridges.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20780: Shuffle and persist the ordering of internal bridges.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Right now, when internal bridges are used, the ordering is not shuffled
 like normal Tor Browser (#18113), and instead, all `sandboxed-tor-browser`
 users using the same built in transport, use exactly the same bridge list
 and ordering.

 This is bad, primarily for load balancing reasons and should be changed.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20779 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Deal with Tor Browser not storing data in the application directory.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20779: Deal with Tor Browser not storing data in the application directory.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #20599
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 The sandbox container filesystem layout and permissions, and updater logic
 currently are dependent on the user profile being inside the application
 install directory, and the `updater` invocation fully updating the
 browser, including the addons/prefs/etc that are under the
 `profile.default` directory.

 #20599 needs to be followed, and the sandbox creation code adjusted
 accordingly.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20778 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Check and download updates in the background.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20778: Check and download updates in the background.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Instead of the current logic which is "Check for updates once at launch,
 if it has been either over 6 hours since the last successful check OR the
 time of last check is in the future.", the update check/update download
 should happen every six hours in the background, and the user should be
 prompted to restart.

 Full integration into the Tor Browser UI is likely a lot of work, so this
 is probably best accomplished by the agent popping up a dialog box when
 the update is complete (or using GNotification and a system tray
 icon/menu).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20777 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Investigate ways to make the install/update download process more robust.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20777: Investigate ways to make the install/update download process more 
robust.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 In particular this applies to updates that are always fetched over tor.
 The file downloader should be more robust to failures and maybe
 transparently retry without kicking the user back to the interface.

 In the case of failures I'm not sure if I should force a new circuit or
 not either...

 If/when the update process moves to being done primarily in the
 background, this can pushed back because the background downloader can be
 made to retry properly with less thought about the UX.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20776 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Remove the X11 `MIT-SHM` workaround from the stub.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20776: Remove the X11 `MIT-SHM` workaround from the stub.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 The `sandboxed-tor-browser` `tbb_stub.so` stub currently contains a
 workaround for https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1271100.

 Once all releases are ESR52 based, this will be unnecessary and should be
 removed.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20775 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Use Tor Browser's integrated `AF_LOCAL` support on alpha.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20775: Use Tor Browser's integrated `AF_LOCAL` support on alpha.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 The `tbb_stub.so` used by `sandboxed-tor-browser` currently overloads
 `socket()` and `connect()` to force Firefox into using an AF_LOCAL socket
 for the control and socks ports.

 Once the stable release series has first class support for AF_LOCAL, the
 surrogate and stub should be changed to use those over the hack to reduce
 the amount of code in the stub.

 Note: The stub has other duties and likely will be impossible to eliminate
 entirely, but the smaller the stub is the better.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20774 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Support foreign language input where possible.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20774: Support foreign language input where possible.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 The `sandboxed-tor-browser` sandbox creates new NET and IPC namespace,
 breaking most foreign language input methods.  This will require figuring
 out how the input method communicates with X and the client app, and
 writing code to bridge the host system and the firefox sandbox.

 Eg: IBus based input methods use D-Bus for communication.  Simply allowing
 host D-Bus access is extremely suboptimal and is not something I'm
 currently considering.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20283 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser should run without a `/proc` filesystem.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20283: Tor Browser should run without a `/proc` filesystem.
--+--
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-sandboxing|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20773| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by yawning):

 * parent:   => #20773


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20773 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Stop mounting `/proc` in the various containers once this is feasable.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20773: Stop mounting `/proc` in the various containers once this is feasable.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 All three containers currently used by `sandboxed-tor-browser` (tor,
 firefox, and the updater) currently mount `/proc`.  Once it's been
 verified that relevant versions of the software shipped do not require
 such, this mount should be removed to reduce fingerprinting and to close
 an attack vector.

 In the mean time, stopgap solutions such as AppArmor could be investigated
 as well, though that is not a good long term solution as it is not
 ubiquitous.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20772 [Applications/Tor Browser]: src="data: ; base64 images rendered when "Show images"="Blocked"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20772: src="data:;base64 images rendered when "Show images"="Blocked"
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Any webpages (e.g. ht tp://defensivepatentlicense.org/) that use base64
 encoding thwart people's disabling of images.
 Due to there not being enough software writers to go around, TBB and its
 derivatives e.f. Orfox(ht tps://dev.guardianproject.info/issues/8039)
 often leave remote code execution vulnerabilities in the image parser.
 Disabling images would protect against this vector of infection, but they
 can't be disabled. Due to the almost identical codebase for everything but
 the menus and window borders, I think that this is likely a bug in the TBb
 source code rather than in the tiny delta that is Orfox.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20352 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate sandboxed Tor Browser into our gitian build system

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20352: Integrate sandboxed Tor Browser into our gitian build system
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, tbb-sandboxing,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201611, TorBrowserTeam201611R   |
Parent ID:  #19750   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by adrelanos):

 * cc: adrelanos (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20768 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Please create a new trac component "Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20768: Please create a new trac component "Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox"
--+
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by qbi):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20771 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: support multiple componenet owners

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20771: support multiple componenet owners
--+-
 Reporter:  mrphs |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Currently each component can only have one owner. If you add more than one
 owner to that component, trac is going to ignore the whole list all
 together and none of the owners are going to get notified when a new
 ticket is being filed.

 Tor Browser team has found a way around that issue by assigning tickets to
 a trac account that is linked to a mailing list, but that's not
 necessarily a good option for all the teams. Therefore, it would be very
 useful if we can find a way to make trac let us have multiple component
 owners.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20770 [Applications/GetTor]: Support Tor Browser Alpha

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20770: Support Tor Browser Alpha
-+-
 Reporter:  mrphs|  Owner:  ilv
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Today I was trying to hand out a mirror link to Tor Browser Alpha to an
 Iranian fellow and after trying to look for the mirror list on the site
 (and failing), turned to GetTor and realized we don't support alpha Tor
 Browser.

 I think it comes very handy to have it added to the list. Especially for
 the times of testing.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20769 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TB on Windows: Fails to connect to socks proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20769: TB on Windows: Fails to connect to socks proxy
--+--
 Reporter:  mrphs |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mrphs):

 Apparently this has happened only after upgrading to the latest version.
 I'm trying to confirm the version of Tor Browser and Windows. Might take a
 while for user to come back online.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20769 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TB on Windows: Fails to connect to socks proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20769: TB on Windows: Fails to connect to socks proxy
--+--
 Reporter:  mrphs |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 I just had a report from an Iranian user that Tor Browser on Windows has
 stopped working for them. After seeing the logs, I asked them to download
 a fresh copy to make sure none of the files have been accidentally
 damaged. The problem still consists.

 Here's the log file:

 {{{
 05/09/1395 23:49:49 ب.ظ.800 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not
 make or accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 05/09/1395 23:49:49 ب.ظ.800 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not
 make or accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 05/09/1395 23:49:49 ب.ظ.800 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not
 make or accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 05/09/1395 23:49:49 ب.ظ.800 [NOTICE] Opening Socks listener on
 127.0.0.1:9150
 05/09/1395 23:49:49 ب.ظ.800 [NOTICE] Renaming old configuration file to
 "C:\Users\xxx\Desktop\Tor
 Browser\Browser\TorBrowser\Data\Tor\torrc.orig.1"
 05/09/1395 23:49:57 ب.ظ.300 [NOTICE] Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to
 directory server
 05/09/1395 23:50:18 ب.ظ.300 [WARN] The connection to the SOCKS5 proxy
 server at 127.0.0.1:50481 just failed. Make sure that the proxy server is
 up and running.
 05/09/1395 23:50:18 ب.ظ.300 [WARN] The connection to the SOCKS5 proxy
 server at 127.0.0.1:50481 just failed. Make sure that the proxy server is
 up and running.
 05/09/1395 23:50:18 ب.ظ.300 [WARN] The connection to the SOCKS5 proxy
 server at 127.0.0.1:50481 just failed. Make sure that the proxy server is
 up and running.
 05/09/1395 23:50:18 ب.ظ.300 [WARN] The connection to the SOCKS5 proxy
 server at 127.0.0.1:50481 just failed. Make sure that the proxy server is
 up and running.
 05/09/1395 23:50:18 ب.ظ.300 [WARN] The connection to the SOCKS5 proxy
 server at 127.0.0.1:50481 just failed. Make sure that the proxy server is
 up and running.
 05/09/1395 23:50:18 ب.ظ.300 [WARN] The connection to the SOCKS5 proxy
 server at 127.0.0.1:50481 just failed. Make sure that the proxy server is
 up and running.
 05/09/1395 23:50:18 ب.ظ.300 [WARN] The connection to the SOCKS5 proxy
 server at 127.0.0.1:50481 just failed. Make sure that the proxy server is
 up and running.
 05/09/1395 23:50:18 ب.ظ.300 [WARN] The connection to the SOCKS5 proxy
 server at 127.0.0.1:50481 just failed. Make sure that the proxy server is
 up and running.
 05/09/1395 23:50:18 ب.ظ.300 [WARN] The connection to the SOCKS5 proxy
 server at 127.0.0.1:50481 just failed. Make sure that the proxy server is
 up and running.
 05/09/1395 23:50:18 ب.ظ.300 [WARN] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 5%:
 Connecting to directory server. (Connection timed out [WSAETIMEDOUT ];
 TIMEOUT; count 10; recommendation warn; host
 752CF7825B3B9EA6A98C83AC41F7099D67007EA5 at 198.245.60.50:443)
 05/09/1395 23:50:18 ب.ظ.300 [WARN] 9 connections have failed:
 05/09/1395 23:50:18 ب.ظ.300 [WARN] 9 connections died in state
 connect()ing with SSL state (No SSL object)
 05/09/1395 23:50:23 ب.ظ.100 [WARN] The connection to the SOCKS5 proxy
 server at 127.0.0.1:50481 just failed. Make sure that the proxy server is
 up and running.
 05/09/1395 23:50:23 ب.ظ.100 [WARN] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 5%:
 Connecting to directory server. (Connection timed out [WSAETIMEDOUT ];
 TIMEOUT; count 11; recommendation warn; host
 FE7840FE1E21FE0A0639ED176EDA00A3ECA1E34D at 154.35.22.13:443)
 05/09/1395 23:50:23 ب.ظ.100 [WARN] 10 connections have failed:
 05/09/1395 23:50:23 ب.ظ.100 [WARN] 10 connections died in state
 connect()ing with SSL state (No SSL object)
 05/09/1395 23:50:23 ب.ظ.100 [WARN] The connection to the SOCKS5 proxy
 server at 127.0.0.1:50481 just failed. Make sure that the proxy server is
 up and running.
 05/09/1395 23:50:23 ب.ظ.100 [NOTICE] Closing no-longer-configured Socks
 listener on 127.0.0.1:9150
 05/09/1395 23:50:23 ب.ظ.100 [NOTICE] DisableNetwork is set. Tor will not
 make or accept non-control network connections. Shutting down all existing
 connections.
 05/09/1395 23:50:23 ب.ظ.100 [NOTICE] Closing old Socks listener on
 127.0.0.1:9150
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org

Re: [tor-bugs] #20352 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate sandboxed Tor Browser into our gitian build system

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20352: Integrate sandboxed Tor Browser into our gitian build system
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, tbb-sandboxing,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201611, TorBrowserTeam201611R   |
Parent ID:  #19750   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by yawning):

 The official repo now exists.

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser/sandboxed-tor-browser.git/

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20767 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Please create `/sandboxed-tor-browser.git` repository.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20767: Please create `/sandboxed-tor-browser.git` repository.
-+
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20760 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Please create git repository user/boklm/tor-browser-build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20760: Please create git repository user/boklm/tor-browser-build
-+
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17379   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20767 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Please create `/sandboxed-tor-browser.git` repository.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20767: Please create `/sandboxed-tor-browser.git` repository.
-+
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by yawning):

 Per IRC, this can/should probably be `tor-browser/sandboxed-tor-
 browser.git`.  Thanks.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20768 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Please create a new trac component "Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20768: Please create a new trac component "Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox"
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 This will be used for tracking bugs/tasks related to the Tor Browser
 sandboxing efforts.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20767 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Please create `/sandboxed-tor-browser.git` repository.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20767: Please create `/sandboxed-tor-browser.git` repository.
-+
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 Please create `/sandboxed-tor-browser.git` as a repository.  Description
 should be "Sandboxed Tor Browser".

 (Per discussion with the Tor Browser developers, the linux sandbox being
 *the* sandboxed-tor-browser is apaprently ok).

 Thanks in advance.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #8298 [Core Tor/Tor]: Do not start write to connection if blocked on bw

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8298: Do not start write to connection if blocked on bw
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  kludgy, tor-relay, 024-deferrable,   |  Actual Points:
  nickm-patch|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by chelseakomlo):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This passes the full test suite after rebasing to master.

 Beyond the standard checks, do you have any recommendations for how to
 review this? Otherwise, it looks good to me.

 As a side note, it would be nice to add tests for connection.c, but this
 is a longer term goal.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20352 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate sandboxed Tor Browser into our gitian build system

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20352: Integrate sandboxed Tor Browser into our gitian build system
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, tbb-sandboxing,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201611, TorBrowserTeam201611R   |
Parent ID:  #19750   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:19 boklm]:
 > I attached a patch for `builders/gitian-builder.git` which updates
 `libexec/stop-target` to use `poweroff` instead of `halt`.
 >
 > It seems that in previous versions of Debian/Ubuntu, `halt` and
 `poweroff` were equivalent, but it is no longer the case in Debian Jessie
 (maybe after the switch to systemd) where `halt` shuts down all services
 but does not turn off power (which results in the qemu process not
 exiting). Using the `poweroff` command instead of `halt` should fix that.

 Thanks! Works for me and is now commit
 0557666cb7d3bf474cb36d5d755438b06af86b7d on tor-browser-builder-4.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20735 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add snowflake pt to alpha linux builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20735: Add snowflake pt to alpha linux builds
--+--
 Reporter:  arlolra   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201611R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201611R
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20735 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add snowflake pt to alpha linux builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20735: Add snowflake pt to alpha linux builds
--+
 Reporter:  arlolra   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:5 arlolra]:
 > > 4) Is there really no way to avoid cluttering the disk with all that
 stuff to just build the webrtc part? Think about us builders who usually
 have a dev, hardened, alpha and stable tor-browser-bundle tree to get
 releases faster out.
 >
 > Yeah, webrtc is a beast to build.  In the short term, this ticket is
 only about the alpha channel.  In the long term, switching to rbm will
 ameliorate the issue, in that it makes better use of reusable components.
 >
 > But, your objection is noted and we'll try and think of how to improve
 the situation.

 FWIW: it is not an objection in the sense that a thing needs to get fixed
 to get the patch merged. I am just annoyed that this thing causes quite a
 big part of my hard disk filled with crap I don't want (and IMO should not
 be needed in an ideal world) :) `rbm` not really mitigates this concern
 (although, sure, I don't have to check out all of this four times).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20735 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add snowflake pt to alpha linux builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20735: Add snowflake pt to alpha linux builds
--+
 Reporter:  arlolra   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arlolra):

 > 1) I'd like to have an enhanced commit message. At least the bug number
 should be a part.
 > 2) I heard there were snags (comment:19:ticket:19001) like the need for
 apt-get install curl pkg-config libgtk2.0-dev libglib2.0-dev. I hit that
 one, too. This should be handled in our check-prerequisites.sh script.

 Ok, see the newly attached `0001-Bug-20735-Add-snowflake-pt-to-alpha-
 Linux-builds.patch`

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20352 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate sandboxed Tor Browser into our gitian build system

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20352: Integrate sandboxed Tor Browser into our gitian build system
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, tbb-sandboxing,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201611, TorBrowserTeam201611R   |
Parent ID:  #19750   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 I also opened a pull request on upstream gitian-builder:
 https://github.com/devrandom/gitian-builder/pull/141

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20761 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Tor Browser 6.5a4 is ignoring additional SocksPorts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20761: Tor Browser 6.5a4 is ignoring additional SocksPorts
---+---
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201611   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by mcs):

 Yes, breaking this was an oversight on our part (mcs + brade) when we did
 the work for #14272 and #20111.

 If I remember correctly, Tor Launcher now always passes SocksPort and
 ControlPort as arguments when starting tor. This works well if no one has
 edited torrc outside of Tor Launcher, and we wanted to ensure that
 toggling the use_ipc pref(s) would cause the right thing to happen. But we
 will have to think about how to support more scenarios.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20352 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate sandboxed Tor Browser into our gitian build system

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20352: Integrate sandboxed Tor Browser into our gitian build system
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, tbb-sandboxing,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201611, TorBrowserTeam201611R   |
Parent ID:  #19750   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 I attached a patch for `builders/gitian-builder.git` which updates
 `libexec/stop-target` to use `poweroff` instead of `halt`.

 It seems that in previous versions of Debian/Ubuntu, `halt` and `poweroff`
 were equivalent, but it is no longer the case in Debian Jessie (maybe
 after the switch to systemd) where `halt` shuts down all services but does
 not turn off power (which results in the qemu process not exiting). Using
 the `poweroff` command instead of `halt` should fix that.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20735 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add snowflake pt to alpha linux builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20735: Add snowflake pt to alpha linux builds
--+
 Reporter:  arlolra   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by arlolra):

 * cc: boklm (added)


Comment:

 > 4) Is there really no way to avoid cluttering the disk with all that
 stuff to just build the webrtc part? Think about us builders who usually
 have a dev, hardened, alpha and stable tor-browser-bundle tree to get
 releases faster out.

 Yeah, webrtc is a beast to build.  In the short term, this ticket is only
 about the alpha channel.  In the long term, switching to rbm will
 ameliorate the issue, in that it makes better use of reusable components.

 But, your objection is noted and we'll try and think of how to improve the
 situation.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20758 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make Linux sandbox build deterministic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20758: Make Linux sandbox build deterministic
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201611R,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201611  |
Parent ID:  #19750   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201611, GeorgKoppen201611 =>
 TorBrowserTeam201611R, GeorgKoppen201611
 * cc: boklm (added)


Comment:

 Okay this was easier than though: bug_20758
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/commit/?h=bug_20758=e440393104ee04128a8660fecd0cce2f25bcaed8)
 in my tor-browser-bundle repo has a fix for review. It solves all the
 problem I encountered while doing several builds of the sandbox on the
 same machine and comparing the outputs. It is atop of the patches for
 #20352.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20735 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add snowflake pt to alpha linux builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20735: Add snowflake pt to alpha linux builds
--+
 Reporter:  arlolra   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arlolra):

 > 3) Snowflake is not working:

 The browser proxy has not been distributed widely yet, so noone is coming
 along in time to answer your offer.  Try visiting
 https://keroserene.net/snowflake/snowflake.html in another browser
 simultaneously, or run one locally https://gitweb.torproject.org
 /pluggable-transports/snowflake.git/tree/proxy/README.md#n18

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20764 [Core Tor/Tor]: Duplicate memset call in tor_addr_from_sockaddr

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20764: Duplicate memset call in tor_addr_from_sockaddr
+
 Reporter:  icanhasaccount  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very Low|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Trivial | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Yes good idea, a comment would be useful here and we'll then see what
 nickm says :).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20764 [Core Tor/Tor]: Duplicate memset call in tor_addr_from_sockaddr

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20764: Duplicate memset call in tor_addr_from_sockaddr
+
 Reporter:  icanhasaccount  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very Low|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Trivial | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by icanhasaccount):

 Thanks for looking at this and thank you for the explanation :)

 I could amend the patch to add a comment to tor_addr_from_sockaddr stating
 that inner functions should call memset, but as you note it might just be
 best to leave as is - the tor_addr_t structure should be quite small so I
 doubt its very expensive. Happy either way :)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: kz no need tor, tor no need kz, if anybody want they can to use ultrasurf. cyberoam assists bloody dictatorships.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: kz no need tor, tor no need kz, if anybody want they can to use 
ultrasurf.
cyberoam assists bloody dictatorships.
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 btw, graphs is great but actual timings need to see is request-answer
 pair. you can to delay requests (client's writes) for seconds in kz but
 it's not matter, while graphs can be similar to Lisbeth's

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: kz no need tor, tor no need kz, if anybody want they can to use ultrasurf. cyberoam assists bloody dictatorships.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: kz no need tor, tor no need kz, if anybody want they can to use 
ultrasurf.
cyberoam assists bloody dictatorships.
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 riemann detected in kz, bridge from comment:10 still undetected
 riemann observes 70Mbit/s, bridge from comment:10 observes 70Kbit/s

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: kz no need tor, tor no need kz, if anybody want they can to use ultrasurf. cyberoam assists bloody dictatorships.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: kz no need tor, tor no need kz, if anybody want they can to use 
ultrasurf.
cyberoam assists bloody dictatorships.
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > so close to riemann's

 btw, i don't know if riemann was tested in kz actually

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20766 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Videos no longer (automatically) working on Medium-High Privacy and Security settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20766: Videos no longer (automatically) working on Medium-High Privacy and
Security settings
--+---
 Reporter:  n9i9i |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 That they played automatically was a bug (#19200) which got fixed by a
 recent NoScript update.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: kz no need tor, tor no need kz, if anybody want they can to use ultrasurf. cyberoam assists bloody dictatorships.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: kz no need tor, tor no need kz, if anybody want they can to use 
ultrasurf.
cyberoam assists bloody dictatorships.
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > This is the non-default iat-mode=0 bridge from comment:10. It looks
 about the same as riemann

 Why it works in kz then if timings so close to riemann's?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20764 [Core Tor/Tor]: Duplicate memset call in tor_addr_from_sockaddr

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20764: Duplicate memset call in tor_addr_from_sockaddr
+
 Reporter:  icanhasaccount  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very Low|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Trivial | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * points:   => 0.1
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.0.x-final


Comment:

 I think this is fine. However, it means that `tor_addr_from_sockaddr()`
 now relies on its inner functions to wipe the `tor_addr_t *a` so if any
 "else if" is added later, we must be very careful.

 For this reason, I'm not too bothered by that extra memset() but I'll let
 nickm judge this if he wants to merge it or not. Thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20766 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Videos no longer (automatically) working on Medium-High Privacy and Security settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20766: Videos no longer (automatically) working on Medium-High Privacy and
Security settings
--+--
 Reporter:  n9i9i |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Videos no longer automatically work on Medium-High Privacy and Security
 settings, one should manually enable them via noscript

 This wasn't the case with the Tor Browser version 6.0.5 on  Medium-High
 Privacy and Security settings

 Is this intentional or just a bug?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20717 [Core Tor/Tor]: Hashing api should return negative values for errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20717: Hashing api should return negative values for errors
--+
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by chelseakomlo):

 * status:  new => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #20765 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: adapt to new lines in votes and consensus and make the adaption to protocol changes easier

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20765: adapt to new lines in votes and consensus and make the adaption to 
protocol
changes easier
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.6.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+---
 New protocol versions 23 and 25 introduce new lines for votes and
 consensus; e.g. [https://collector.sky-ip.org/recent/relay-
 descriptors/votes/2016-11-25-12-00-00-vote-
 
D586D18309DED4CD6D57C18FDB97EFA96D330566-5858C65AC36DE37F3CA8EE03059A8730A97D31B8
 vote from moria]

 {{{
 ...
 recommended-relay-protocols Cons=1-2 Desc=1-2 DirCache=1 HSDir=1 HSIntro=3
 HSRend=1 Link=4 LinkAuth=1 Microdesc=1-2 Relay=2
 recommended-client-protocols Cons=1-2 Desc=1-2 DirCache=1 HSDir=1
 HSIntro=3 HSRend=1 Link=4 LinkAuth=1 Microdesc=1-2 Relay=2
 required-relay-protocols Cons=1 Desc=1 DirCache=1 HSDir=1 HSIntro=3
 HSRend=1 Link=3-4 LinkAuth=1 Microdesc=1 Relay=1-2
 required-client-protocols Cons=1-2 Desc=1-2 DirCache=1 HSDir=1 HSIntro=3
 HSRend=1 Link=4 LinkAuth=1 Microdesc=1-2 Relay=2
 ...
 shared-rand-participate
 shared-rand-commit 1 sha3-256 D586D18309DED4CD6D57C18FDB97EFA96D330566
 AFg3fwANZSmhaatp83nojq97N/eLHSCShOFJqiR1Skc9lO/dXA==
 AFg3fwDxNhND8l9+/S4fxn+yeCKNgaZp3yJ8qWSkg8NICmZ+PA==
 }}}

 These should not be treated as unknown lines by metrics-lib.

 In addition, the process of recognizing lines should be improved to make
 accommodation of new protocol versions a lot easier, ideally without code
 changes, i.e. w/o having to compile metrics-lib for such changes.

 (should be tackled together with #17861, #19640, #19607)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20691 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Updates are not getting properly applied when trying to update to 6.5a4(-hardened) on Linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20691: Updates are not getting properly applied when trying to update to
6.5a4(-hardened) on Linux
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201611R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: arthurdelstein (removed)
 * cc: arthuredelstein (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20691 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Updates are not getting properly applied when trying to update to 6.5a4(-hardened) on Linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20691: Updates are not getting properly applied when trying to update to
6.5a4(-hardened) on Linux
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201611R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: arthurdelstein (added)


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:17 mcs]:
 > Kathy and I created a patch for the underlying updater bug. Please
 review.
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug20691-01=d2225a513147e33a9d50476174ca053cb9107880

 Looks good to me (I did not test the patch, though, assuming you did :) ).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20756 [Applications/Tor Browser]: apple.com "connection is not secure" error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20756: apple.com "connection is not secure" error
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 Seems to be an Apple bug then we can't do anything about.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20735 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add snowflake pt to alpha linux builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20735: Add snowflake pt to alpha linux builds
--+
 Reporter:  arlolra   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201611R =>


Comment:

 Here is some feedback for the attached patch:

 1) I'd like to have an enhanced commit message. At least the bug number
 should be a part.
 2) I heard there were snags (comment:19:ticket:19001) like the need for
 `apt-get install curl pkg-config libgtk2.0-dev libglib2.0-dev`. I hit that
 one, too. This should be handled in our `check-prerequisites.sh` script.
 3) Snowflake is not working:
 {{{
 2016/11/25 08:28:57 BrokerChannel Error: No snowflake proxies currently
 available.
 2016/11/25 08:28:57 Failed to retrieve answer. Retrying in 10 seconds
 2016/11/25 08:29:07 Negotiating via BrokerChannel...
 Target URL:  snowflake-reg.appspot.com
 Front URL:   www.google.com
 2016/11/25 08:29:07 BrokerChannel Response:
 503 Service Unavailable
 }}}
 4) Is there really no way to avoid cluttering the disk with all that stuff
 to just build the webrtc part? Think about us builders who usually have a
 dev, hardened, alpha and stable tor-browser-bundle tree to get releases
 faster out.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs