Re: [tor-bugs] #11211 [Core Tor/Tor]: Multiple ServerTransportListenAddr entries should be allowed per transport.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11211: Multiple ServerTransportListenAddr entries should be allowed per 
transport.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  kaie
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, pt, needs-proposal,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-pt, bridgedb-parsers, 028-triage, ipv6,|
  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:  #10629   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  T/U
-+-

Comment (by isis):

 Replying to [comment:27 yawning]:
 > At a minimum tor will need more changes, and probably BridgeDB as well.
 Solving this problem correctly requires all of:
 >
 >  * Figuring out what to do with Bridge Descriptors and modifying tor to
 do the right thing.
 >  * Modifying the pt-spec such that it has backwards compatible
 provisions for multiple args and multiple bind addresses, and modifying
 tor to do the right thing.
 >  * Modifying obfs4proxy to implement the new pt spec changes.
 >
 > Personally I'd rather see this fixed correctly than a kludgy alias
 thing, but since I'm not going to be the one that works on it in any major
 capacity, my opinion doesn't mean much.

 Yawning is correct; please don't do the alias thing. BridgeDB (because it
 uses Stem) can already handle multiple lines of the same transport type,
 without needing any changes at all.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21269 [Core Tor/Tor]: Switch IPv6Traffic to on?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21269: Switch IPv6Traffic to on?
--+-
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by teor):

 Oh, also, two other things:
 * the default-setting code for these options is duplicated in at least 3
 places. There's a ticket to fix that, too.
 * I can only open https://ipv6.google.com/ in Tor Browser 1/10 times when
 using "New Circuit For This Site", so maybe we don't have enough IPv6
 exits for PreferIPv6 yet. That said, if IPv6Traffic is off, that would be
 0/10 times.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21269 [Core Tor/Tor]: Switch IPv6Traffic to on?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21269: Switch IPv6Traffic to on?
--+-
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by teor):

 arma said I might have an opinion, and he was right:

 I think the Tor Browser default means that tor has more users with these
 options on than off.
 If it works for Tor Browser, I can't see the harm in turning it on.

 But I'd like to know what consensus weight of the total exit consensus
 weight supports IPv6.
 (My stem isn't quite up to the task.)

 (One way of increasing this proportion is to have exits automatically use
 IPv6 when it's available. I think there's a separate ticket for that.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21270 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB noscript settings break WebExtensions addons

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21270: TBB noscript settings break WebExtensions addons
--+--
 Reporter:  replaythesong |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by replaythesong):

 Sorry, should have previewed before posting; wiki formatting has
 misinterpreted the square brackets in manifest.json, and hidden the addon
 id because it looks like an email address. The file contents should be:

 {{{
 {
   "manifest_version": 2,
   "name": "Ping Test",
   "version": "1.0",

   "description": "Tiny extension which pings the console from a bg
 script.",

   "background": {
 "scripts": ["ping.js"]
   },

   "applications": {
 "gecko": {
   "id": "p...@ping.me",
   "strict_min_version": "42.0",
   "strict_max_version": "50.*"
 }
   }
 }
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21270 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB noscript settings break WebExtensions addons

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21270: TBB noscript settings break WebExtensions addons
--+--
 Reporter:  replaythesong |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 In TBB 6.0.8, depending on the position of the security slider, NoScript
 can end up blocking WebExtensions background scripts from running,
 breaking some firefox addons entirely.

 This occurs when security slider is medium-high or high, unless moz-
 extension: is added to capability.policy.maonoscript.sites.

 This bug does not seem to affect vanilla FF with latest NoScript
 installed, unless capability.policy.maonoscript.sites is set to the value
 used in TBB. Which is why I'm reporting it as a TBB bug, not a NoScript
 bug.

 NB This bug does not prevent WebExtension content scripts from running,
 but blocking background scripts is still enough to break many
 WebExtensions.

 Suggested fix: default prefs shipped with TBB should include moz-
 extension: in capability.policy.maonoscript.sites, (unless this has
 undesired security outcomes that I'm not aware of).


 Steps to reproduce

 1. Create a directory somewhere called ping.
 2. Create a file ping/manifest.json which contains:

 {
   "manifest_version": 2,
   "name": "Ping Test",
   "version": "1.0",

   "description": "Tiny extension which pings the console from a bg
 script.",

   "background": {
 "scripts": ["ping.js"]
   },

   "applications": {
 "gecko": {
   "id": "p...@ping.me",
   "strict_min_version": "42.0",
   "strict_max_version": "50.*"
 }
   }
 }

 3. Create a file ping/ping.js which simply contains:

 console.log('ping');

 4. Open Tor Browser, browse to about:config and set
 xpinstall.signatures.required to false, so that we will be allowed to
 install our own extensions.

 5. Set security slider to medium-high.

 6. Open Browser Console (Ctrl-Shift-J) and click 'Clear'.

 7. Browse to about:debugging, click 'Load Temporary Addon' and select
 ping/manifest.json.

 8. Go to Browser Console and note that 'ping' has NOT appeared.

 9. Set security slider to medium-low.

 10. Browse to about:addons. Disable 'Ping Test' then re-enable it.

 11. Go to Browser Console and note that 'ping' HAS now appeared.

 12. Set security slider back to medium-high.

 13. Browse to about:config and add " moz-extension:" to the end of
 capability.policy.maonoscript.sites.

 14. Clear the Browser Console.

 15. Browse to about:addons. Disable 'Ping Test' then re-enable it.

 16. Note that 'ping' HAS appeared.

 17. To clean up, just remove 'Ping Test' and set
 xpinstall.signatures.required and the security slider back to your
 preferred settings.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21117 [Core Tor/Tor]: can't migrate onion services to single-hop onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21117: can't migrate onion services to single-hop onion services
--+
 Reporter:  weasel|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, single-onion  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #21049| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 (Or do we want an option that's a once-off "fix the poisoning state", so
 that users can use it during the transition, but have future transitions
 prevented?)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21117 [Core Tor/Tor]: can't migrate onion services to single-hop onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21117: can't migrate onion services to single-hop onion services
--+
 Reporter:  weasel|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, single-onion  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #21049| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => tor-hs, single-onion
 * status:  new => needs_review
 * points:   => 1
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 My branch bug21117 updates the documentation to describe the current
 implementation, including both transitions being prevented by tor.

 It also describes a workaround to enable transitions for individual keys.

 I am happy to implement yet another option that ignores the poisoning
 state if that's the way we want to go.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20174 [Core Tor/Tor]: Automate checking existing fallbacks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20174: Automate checking existing fallbacks
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, tor-03-unspecified-201612  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Thanks for this patch!
 It implements the existing fallback check from
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/UpdatingFallbackDirectoryMirrors

 But I think we can do it better:
 * using os.system() is error-prone, because it calls out to a shell. It
 also raises security concerns. Can you re-write the loading and parsing
 steps in Python?
 * modifying the existing files isn't necessary - instead, create a
 temporary file, and change WHITELIST_FILE_NAME to point to it - or, even
 better, parse the existing file straight into the whitelist data structure
 * now that the script takes arguments, please modify the script's usage
 comment (line 3), or, even better, provide a "help" command that outputs
 the usage string on any unrecognised command-line argument

 (I'll review the #20178 part after these changes.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20956 [Core Tor/Tor]: optionally do not write command line config to torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20956: optionally do not write command line config to torrc
+
 Reporter:  mcs |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-wants 029-backport  |  Actual Points:  .2
Parent ID:  | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by mcs):

 This seems to work, at least for the scenarios that Kathy and I tested
 (thanks Nick!).

 We modified Tor Launcher to pass `+__ControlPort` and `+__SocksPort` as
 args when starting tor.
 We also removed the default `ControlPort` and `SocksPort` lines from the
 `torrc-defaults` file that ships with Tor Browser.

 With Nick's tor changes plus these Tor Launcher changes, there is no
 longer any interference with any additional control or SOCKS ports that
 users might add to their torrc. Duplicates need to be avoided though;
 otherwise tor will not start up (I think that is okay).

 The original Tor Launcher ticket is #20761.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21269 [Core Tor/Tor]: Switch IPv6Traffic to on?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21269: Switch IPv6Traffic to on?
--+-
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by arma):

 * cc: mikeperry (added)


Comment:

 And GeKo asked me to cc Mike so here I am doing it.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21269 [Core Tor/Tor]: Switch IPv6Traffic to on?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21269: Switch IPv6Traffic to on?
--+-
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by arma):

 GeKo tells me that Tor Browser chooses
 {{{
 SocksPort 9150 IPv6Traffic PreferIPv6 KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth
 }}}
 so it might be worthwhile to consider PreferIPv6 too.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19553 [Metrics/Atlas]: Do not plot empty graphs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19553: Do not plot empty graphs
---+---
 Reporter:  twim   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by arma):

 For completeness, the issue comes up again at
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2017-January/011759.html

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21269 [Core Tor/Tor]: Switch IPv6Traffic to on?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21269: Switch IPv6Traffic to on?
--+-
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 dkg discovers in https://bugs.debian.org/851798 that Tor's SocksPort
 defaults to IPv6traffic 0.

 But Tor Browser set it to 1 18 months ago in #16684.

 It looks like Tor 0.2.4.7-alpha, back in 2012, decided to "wait for enough
 exits to support IPv6" before turning it on.

 Has that time arrived?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21243 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser: Add links for pt, es, fr manuals

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21243: Tor Browser: Add links for pt, es, fr manuals
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, TorBrowserTeam201701  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Alright, applied to `master` and `maint-1.9.6` (commits
 2fae9fd6f9f85d586963e5437ce1a34d1653ddbc and
 fb69e9af6a723f894b53ac176ffdc2df5e74ed45). I guess we need to rebundle at
 least for that one.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21223 [Metrics/Metrics website]: use the empty field consistently throughout the data sets

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21223: use the empty field consistently throughout the data sets
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Great, merged.  Thanks!  Closing.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21223 [Metrics/Metrics website]: use the empty field consistently throughout the data sets

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21223: use the empty field consistently throughout the data sets
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Seems to do what was intended :-)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20538 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: TB manual single page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20538: TB manual single page
--+--
 Reporter:  weasel|  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by phoul):

 * status:  new => accepted


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20664 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: Enable Tor Browser Manual translations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20664: Enable Tor Browser Manual translations
--+
 Reporter:  phoul |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by phoul):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This has been completed, as of a few weeks ago.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12685 [Metrics/Atlas]: Wrap fingerprint line on smaller displays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12685: Wrap fingerprint line on smaller displays
--+--
 Reporter:  Zitlo |  Owner:  RaBe
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  visibility of uptime  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_review => assigned
 * owner:  irl => RaBe


Comment:

 This change shouldn't be happening in the model, but in the view. It's not
 changing a property of the data but a property of the presentation. By
 changing it in the model it breaks generated URLs. You'll see that in the
 "Top 10" page, none of those links are usable as the URLs are generated
 from the fingerprint in the model and you end up with links like:

 index.html#details/81B75D534F91BFB7C57A%E2%80%8BB67DA10BCEF622582AE8%E2%80%8B

 Just for fun, by the time it gets to being a link it's also been URL
 encoded.

 Looks like the right fix, but not in the right place.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20663 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: New image for Security Slider window in Tor Browser manual (alpha)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20663: New image for Security Slider window in Tor Browser manual (alpha)
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by phoul):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This has been merged.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21223 [Metrics/Metrics website]: use the empty field consistently throughout the data sets

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21223: use the empty field consistently throughout the data sets
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 This seems to work just fine on the server.  Here's the
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-
 web.git/commit/?h=task-21223&id=90ed8824011c16d8af4694b576a09b3e26ea2327
 patch] to review.  Thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #9913 [Metrics/Atlas]: Explain relay flags in detail view using tooltips

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9913: Explain relay flags in detail view using tooltips
+--
 Reporter:  f3ndot  |  Owner:  RaBe
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  flag description tooltip flags  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by irl):

 * owner:  irl => RaBe
 * status:  needs_review => assigned


Comment:

 This doesn't seem to render correctly in Firefox ):

 I'll attach a screenshot. I'm using Firefox ESR 45.4.0.

 I get $.fn.tooltip is not defined in the console output.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21268 [Applications/Tor Browser]: e10s compatibility for New Identity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21268: e10s compatibility for New Identity
--+
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  torbutton,ff52-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 When Firefox's multiprocess mode (aka electrolysis/e10s) is enabled, New
 Identity fails while trying to close all open tabs:
 {{{
 [...] Torbutton WARN: Unexpected error on new identity: TypeError:
 remove[i].contentWindow is null
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20174 [Core Tor/Tor]: Automate checking existing fallbacks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20174: Automate checking existing fallbacks
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, tor-03-unspecified-201612  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by haxxpop):

 I'm not sure whether the patch in the attachment also solves #20178. Check
 it please.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20177 [Core Tor/Tor]: When checking existing fallbacks, report those fallbacks at warning log level

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20177: When checking existing fallbacks, report those fallbacks at warning log
level
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, tor-03-unspecified-201612  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by haxxpop):

 The patch is in the attachment of #20174. I'm not sure whether this patch
 also solves #20178.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20177 [Core Tor/Tor]: When checking existing fallbacks, report those fallbacks at warning log level

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20177: When checking existing fallbacks, report those fallbacks at warning log
level
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, tor-03-unspecified-201612  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by haxxpop):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20174 [Core Tor/Tor]: Automate checking existing fallbacks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20174: Automate checking existing fallbacks
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, tor-03-unspecified-201612  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by haxxpop):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21267 [Applications/Tor Browser]: e10s compatibility for Torbutton's content sizer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21267: e10s compatibility for Torbutton's content sizer
--+
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  torbutton,ff52-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Torbutton will need to be revised in various ways for compatiblity with
 Firefox's multiprocess mode (aka electrolysis or e10s). One example is the
 content sizer code. Here is the first error that Kathy and I saw:
 {{{
 A coding exception was thrown and uncaught in a Task.

 Full message: TypeError: gBrowser.contentWindow is null
 Full stack:
 quantizeBrowserSize/updateDimensions@chrome://torbutton/content/content-
 sizer.js:247:18
 quantizeBrowserSize/autoresize/<@chrome://torbutton/content/content-
 sizer.js:436:7
 TaskImpl_run@resource://gre/modules/Task.jsm:319:42
 TaskImpl@resource://gre/modules/Task.jsm:277:3
 createAsyncFunction/asyncFunction@resource://gre/modules/Task.jsm:252:14
 Task_spawn@resource://gre/modules/Task.jsm:166:12
 quantizeBrowserSize/autoresize@chrome://torbutton/content/content-
 sizer.js:431:3
 quantizeBrowserSize/quantizeBrowserSizeMain/activate@chrome://torbutton/content
 /content-sizer.js:487:30
 bindPref/update@resource://torbutton/modules/utils.js:31:24
 bindPref@resource://torbutton/modules/utils.js:39:5
 bindPrefAndInit@resource://torbutton/modules/utils.js:49:5
 quantizeBrowserSize/quantizeBrowserSizeMain@chrome://torbutton/content
 /content-sizer.js:501:16
 quantizeBrowserSize/stopObserving<@chrome://torbutton/content/content-
 sizer.js:508:5
 observe/observer.observe@resource://torbutton/modules/utils.js:61:9
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20348 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications hardware, 2016-06

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20348: Kazakhstan blocking of vanilla Tor and obfs4 by Allot Communications
hardware, 2016-06
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block kz  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by dcf):

 kzblocked, can I restore your deleted comments?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21264 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: torlauncher has no readme file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21264: torlauncher has no readme file
---+---
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: mcs (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20739 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: https://tb-manual.torproject.org should redirect to the manual for the platform the user is actually on

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20739: https://tb-manual.torproject.org should redirect to the manual for the
platform the user is actually on
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 We went with option 2:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser/user-
 manual.git/commit/?id=9f7e9af7673c9a685b23d78670269be3041356b9

 And here's the torbutton patch (from #21243)
 that points to URLs such as `https://tb-manual.torproject.org/es-ES`
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/commit/?id=4e9c7c8ba121e0ec39d65deefd5cea3657dcc27d

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21243 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser: Add links for pt, es, fr manuals

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21243: Tor Browser: Add links for pt, es, fr manuals
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, TorBrowserTeam201701  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:7 cypherpunks]:
 > Tor Browser Manual has the old Security Slider description (with images
 of new) which will confuse the users.

 Please see #20663.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20663 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: New image for Security Slider window in Tor Browser manual (alpha)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20663: New image for Security Slider window in Tor Browser manual (alpha)
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Here's a patch for review that changes the images and also modifies the
 text on that page a little to match the new slider.
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tb-user-manual/commit/20663

 And here's what it looks like with this patch applied:
 https://torpat.ch/tb-manual/en-US/security-slider.html

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20959 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: Localized images for Tor Browser user manual

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20959: Localized images for Tor Browser user manual
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:
  |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 All images from this ticket are now in the repo as of:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser/user-
 manual.git/commit/?id=680635eaf61b88bcc44dd016e054421af3b754bb

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21243 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser: Add links for pt, es, fr manuals

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21243: Tor Browser: Add links for pt, es, fr manuals
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, TorBrowserTeam201701  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > There is now a `>>` after the menu entry on the help menu. Could you fix
 that? Otherwise this looks a bit weird given no other entry on that menu
 has that suffix.
 >
 > I've pushed the patch to `master` (commit
 4e9c7c8ba121e0ec39d65deefd5cea3657dcc27d) as we could use it as-is for the
 alphas.

 Here's a patch to remove the double arrow from the help menu entry. Also,
 this patch fixes URLs that have been unfortunately overwritten by
 Transifex, and adds some localized URLs we will need in the future:

 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/torbutton/commit/21243+2

 I've asked phoul what I can do differently to make sure these links don't
 get overwritten again.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #9913 [Metrics/Atlas]: Explain relay flags in detail view using tooltips

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9913: Explain relay flags in detail view using tooltips
+--
 Reporter:  f3ndot  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  flag description tooltip flags  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by RaBe):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 I updated the patch for the current atlas website version and used the
 texts from the link in the comment in #7939. Here's the patch:

 
https://github.com/RaphaelBergmann/atlas/commit/ef7b682fc12223193efff2bebe8538aad3bb149d

 (I also prepared the flag "NoEdConsensus" which was in the documentation,
 but has not yet been implemented on Atlas.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21265 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create LDAP account for Alexander Færøy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21265: Create LDAP account for Alexander Færøy
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Final information collected:
  Alexander Færøy :
Assigned UID: 2103  GID: 2103
supplementary group: torproject
Email forwarded to: a...@0x90.dk
GECOS Field: "Alexander Færøy"
Login Shell: /bin/bash
Key Fingerprint: FDB16F45A477B314E87432EC61A208E16E7CB435
 Continue [No/yes]? yes
 Updating LDAP directory..
 Sending Welcome Email

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21236 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Put a visualization of Tor Browser downloads and updates on the Metrics website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21236: Put a visualization of Tor Browser downloads and updates on the Metrics
website
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Regarding graph and web-site text:
 The graph and data description should maybe mention that the logs used
 were cleaned to avoid any privacy issues and also have a link to the logs?
 Otherwise people seeing these graphs might wonder, how the particular data
 were gathered and worry about privacy.

 (sql queries: As there are so many pattern matching queries and in case
 that these take real long, an operator class (varchar_pattern_ops, see
 [https://www.postgresql.org/docs/9.4/static/indexes-opclass.html
 Postgresql manual]), e.g., on resource_string, could improve the
 situation. Maybe, useful once there are more logs to 'crunch'.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21103 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update descriptors for sandboxed-tor-browser-0.0.3.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21103: Update descriptors for sandboxed-tor-browser-0.0.3.
--+
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201701R tbb-gitian  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by boklm):

 The three commits in branch `bug_21103` look good to me.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20956 [Core Tor/Tor]: optionally do not write command line config to torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20956: optionally do not write command line config to torrc
+
 Reporter:  mcs |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-wants 029-backport  |  Actual Points:  .2
Parent ID:  | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by gk):

 mcs/brade: could you take a look whether that is what we need and whether
 it is working the way we need it?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21266 [Core Tor/Tor]: test: Improve hs intropoints unit test with expected msg log.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21266: test: Improve hs intropoints unit test with expected msg log.
---+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  test, tor-hs, prop224, easy
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #12424
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorR-must  |
---+-
 Now that #20029 has been merged, during review there has been a request
 for improving the unit tests for the failure cases to expect a log
 message.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20374 [Metrics/Atlas]: Atlas should warn its users if Onionoo serves outdated data

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20374: Atlas should warn its users if Onionoo serves outdated data
---+--
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:  RaBe
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by RaBe):

 * owner:  irl => RaBe


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21265 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create LDAP account for Alexander Færøy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21265: Create LDAP account for Alexander Færøy
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 +1 to creating the account, though I can neither confirm nor disconfirm
 the key.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21265 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create LDAP account for Alexander Færøy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21265: Create LDAP account for Alexander Færøy
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => new


Comment:

 ahf agreed on making the forwarding address public. Here it is:

 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256

 Forwarding address: a...@0x90.dk
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQF8BAEBCABmBQJYgORHXxSAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w
 ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXRCNzQ0MTdFRERGMjJBQzlGOUU5MEY0OTE0
 MkU4NkEyQTExRjQ4RDM2AAoJEELoaioR9I02dqkH/1gZP0PWV5mUILEvKq/bvZM5
 rJnLelWtgB0fznpwaUJdTbonMb+LN9AO1BMomGeXZKRtQI2rrxG+qAawvC/BG9i6
 hl/xVVbKzXTURUL/qAYBKAvRElZ6/ZstGs8YxSD646MttkW9P1qlON5HFLpN4sll
 b91m2w/5afnSbuKOjVWKhGfEZwdDY3NFMbfddZvv4e4G+z9Smbrt8i3wKfasn8md
 CRCn4R7k/ohaeAYjYr/bT5mIgA7k98Aif/vuPMnfMeHc6wIxtiq1lxyeZ/dqMEOa
 2nacr8zqsHjukHP5mHsue9dVOTnlYCJqIN2nc0bUFRNX+imgqb4kGEYJgxL2LO0=
 =J/ae
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21265 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create LDAP account for Alexander Færøy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21265: Create LDAP account for Alexander Færøy
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => needs_revision


Comment:

 missing information

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21265 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create LDAP account for Alexander Færøy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21265: Create LDAP account for Alexander Færøy
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256

 Hello!

 I would like to request an LDAP account for Alexander Færøy joining the
 network
 team on Feb. 1st 2017.

 First name: Alexander
 Last name: Færøy
 Desired uid/email alias: a...@torproject.org
 Forwarding addr: [I'll let ahf set it up once the account exists so not to
 leak
   publicly his personal addr.]
 GPG public key fingerprint: FDB1 6F45 A477 B314 E874  32EC 61A2 08E1 6E7C
 B435

 Thanks!
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQF8BAEBCABmBQJYgOIKXxSAAC4AKGlzc3Vlci1mcHJAbm90YXRpb25zLm9w
 ZW5wZ3AuZmlmdGhob3JzZW1hbi5uZXRCNzQ0MTdFRERGMjJBQzlGOUU5MEY0OTE0
 MkU4NkEyQTExRjQ4RDM2AAoJEELoaioR9I02oC4IAIS+iCg9aW+f4pAhtWxF18xN
 q4cBeWMiRBXF1TLg8F75INzCODlF1OkjXS/PRsjGnzaT1SMC28v8xlAj4K+X8ci3
 9o6DolXkcq/MKoKEagIKjlaZYb5CfJ+BMbOEqFX4GwpCBYlF8evHjCUN+fXHOT1k
 Ee/SZnO3ndhVQebelhk5DU3OnGgqAewGvxTDaUDzJGVxLYL1i/q28Wh+kJ+qZNIj
 TY6G3QnoUqK3T9C2Yli2k9rmZ0xpwcYs8+QkA9KNi7nsK42hmRiN4Ml06SnRSQsV
 32GBgcnIoZKslUPsNR7xN5Ft9e4nvM2quEBbK5+xKDywwauJco39FQAwouSLTKs=
 =8Q3U
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12685 [Metrics/Atlas]: Wrap fingerprint line on smaller displays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12685: Wrap fingerprint line on smaller displays
--+--
 Reporter:  Zitlo |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  visibility of uptime  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by RaBe):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12685 [Metrics/Atlas]: Wrap fingerprint line on smaller displays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12685: Wrap fingerprint line on smaller displays
--+--
 Reporter:  Zitlo |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  visibility of uptime  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by RaBe):

 * owner:  phw => irl
 * status:  needs_review => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20635 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Compiling Go 1.7.3 is randomly segfaulting targeting 32bit Linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20635: Compiling Go 1.7.3 is randomly segfaulting targeting 32bit Linux
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Maybe not surprisingly but still noteworthy: I hit this with 1.7.4 again.
 Just restarting the build solved this for me, though.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17241 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement relay side support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17241: prop224: Implement relay side support
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #12424   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:  asn, dgoulet |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 We are done in theory with relay side :). Big milestone accomplished!
 Thanks all!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #15502 [Applications/Tor Browser]: URL.createObjectURL() considered harmful

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15502: URL.createObjectURL() considered harmful
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, tbb-newnym, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-4.5-alpha, TorBrowserTeam201504R,  |
  MikePerry201504R   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:25 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [comment:16 mikeperry]:
 > > While testing the Torbutton piece, I noticed that about:memory was
 still reporting many page objects still present after New Identity. I
 couldn't manage to catch any blob: urls still alive in there, but it was
 enough to worry me.
 > blob: URIs still survive New Identity. Is this OK?

 I don't think so. Do you mind opening a ticket and add steps to reproduce
 your findings? Commenting on an old and closed ticket risks that folks are
 missing your issue.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #15502 [Applications/Tor Browser]: URL.createObjectURL() considered harmful

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15502: URL.createObjectURL() considered harmful
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, tbb-newnym, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-4.5-alpha, TorBrowserTeam201504R,  |
  MikePerry201504R   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:16 mikeperry]:
 > While testing the Torbutton piece, I noticed that about:memory was still
 reporting many page objects still present after New Identity. I couldn't
 manage to catch any blob: urls still alive in there, but it was enough to
 worry me.
 blob: URIs still survive New Identity. Is this OK?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21117 [Core Tor/Tor]: can't migrate onion services to single-hop onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21117: can't migrate onion services to single-hop onion services
--+
 Reporter:  weasel|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21049| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:2 nickm]:
 > To be clear, the anonymous->nonanonymous transition is dangerous for
 obvious reasons.

 I think this direction is the one that this ticket is about.

 If the user goes through the steps of trying to transition their double
 onion service to a single onion service, including the extra "no really I
 mean it" torrc lines, doesn't that imply that they have considered and
 accepted the obvious reasons?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21243 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser: Add links for pt, es, fr manuals

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21243: Tor Browser: Add links for pt, es, fr manuals
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, TorBrowserTeam201701  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Tor Browser Manual has the old Security Slider description (with images of
 new) which will confuse the users.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21259 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove extra newline from proxy_prepare_for_restart definition

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21259: Remove extra newline from proxy_prepare_for_restart definition
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 It looks like this branch was done on top of some 20996 branch, not on top
 of master?

 Cherry-picked  705802e35ab5d672db442956f5088901bad8025a as d35ca518b41a0e.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #13818 [Applications/Tor Browser]: [PATCH] Active tab looks ugly (inherits system color scheme only partially)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13818: [PATCH] Active tab looks ugly (inherits system color scheme only 
partially)
--+--
 Reporter:  gentoo_root   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: scootergrisen (added)


Comment:

 Resolved #21252 as a duplicate.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21252 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Wrong color for rounded tabs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21252: Wrong color for rounded tabs
--+---
 Reporter:  scootergrisen |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 cypherpunks]:
 > This sounds like a duplicate of #13818.

 Indeed.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21252 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Wrong color for rounded tabs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21252: Wrong color for rounded tabs
--+--
 Reporter:  scootergrisen |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 This sounds like a duplicate of #13818.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21243 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser: Add links for pt, es, fr manuals

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21243: Tor Browser: Add links for pt, es, fr manuals
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, TorBrowserTeam201701  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 I've taken the fix for the stable branch as well (commit
 c4295bf010c637f13c8766cfc203369183b5725f on `maint-1.9.6`) as the benefit
 to have it in 6.5 seems to outweigh the merely visual drawback.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20951 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Back out Unix domain socket related patches for Tor Browser 6.5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20951: Back out Unix domain socket related patches for Tor Browser 6.5
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201701R,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201701  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:1 mcs]:
 > Kathy and I created 3 patches (tor-browser, tor-launcher, torbutton):
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug20951-01&id=093d0348526aed12fd9d15c7211c1a6ea362d93d

 FWIW: `tor-browser-45.7.0esr-6.5-1` has the respective commits backed out.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21117 [Core Tor/Tor]: can't migrate onion services to single-hop onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21117: can't migrate onion services to single-hop onion services
--+
 Reporter:  weasel|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21049| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by weasel):

 [best case scenario is the whole poisoning anti feature go away entirely]

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21117 [Core Tor/Tor]: can't migrate onion services to single-hop onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21117: can't migrate onion services to single-hop onion services
--+
 Reporter:  weasel|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21049| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by weasel):

 * parent:   => #21049


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21263 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbutton's readme still talks about toggling

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21263: Torbutton's readme still talks about toggling
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-torbutton
 * owner:   => tbb-team
 * component:  Applications/Torbutton => Applications/Tor Browser


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17669 [User Experience/Website]: Old links to outdated versions of Tor Browser should redirect to a page with the latest version of Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17669: Old links to outdated versions of Tor Browser should redirect to a page
with the latest version of Tor Browser
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by arma):

 I don't think we want a 301 redirect. These links are genuinely 404, and
 we don't want to confuse crawlers. Unless I'm wrong?

 That said, I don't object to a more helpful 404 page.

 *That* said, is there a way to make a more helpful 404 page inline, e.g.
 via an htaccess file? Otherwise it involves an apache config change on
 each of the webservers serving dist.tp.o. Maybe that's not so bad?

 I don't have strong feelings here, so mostly am raising issues to be sure
 they're considered.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21264 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: torlauncher has no readme file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21264: torlauncher has no readme file
---+---
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-launcher.git/tree/
 doesn't give me any place to start in terms of building or using the
 extension.

 It would probably be helpful to teach people at least these few things:

 * Tor launcher is intended only for use in Tor Browser, not for putting in
 your own Firefox. (But also it's supported for use in Tor Messenger, and
 maybe others?)

 * Here's what you need to do to make your own xpi, e.g. if you've changed
 the translations and you want to rebuild it for testing.

 * Some pointer to the Tor Browser build docs, so people can learn where
 Tor Launcher fits into the bigger picture.

 And maybe more?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21263 [Applications/Torbutton]: Torbutton's readme still talks about toggling

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21263: Torbutton's readme still talks about toggling
+-
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+-
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbutton.git/tree/README
 has the very first FAQ entry of "I can't click on links or hit reload
 after I toggle Tor! Why?"

 and at the very end it says
 {{{
There is currently one known unfixed security issue with Torbutton: it
 is
possible to unmask the javascript hooks that wrap the Date object to
conceal your timezone in Firefox 2, and the timezone masking code does
 not
work at all on Firefox 3.
 }}}
 and I bet a lot of the stuff in the middle is obsolete now too.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17669 [User Experience/Website]: Old links to outdated versions of Tor Browser should redirect to a page with the latest version of Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17669: Old links to outdated versions of Tor Browser should redirect to a page
with the latest version of Tor Browser
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by hiro):

 * owner:  cypherpunks => hiro


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17669 [User Experience/Website]: Old links to outdated versions of Tor Browser should redirect to a page with the latest version of Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17669: Old links to outdated versions of Tor Browser should redirect to a page
with the latest version of Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by hiro):

 This need to be solved in dist.torproject.org

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12685 [Metrics/Atlas]: Wrap fingerprint line on smaller displays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12685: Wrap fingerprint line on smaller displays
--+--
 Reporter:  Zitlo |  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  visibility of uptime  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by RaBe):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 Here's a patch that follows Karsten's suggestion:

 
https://github.com/RaphaelBergmann/atlas/commit/3ee5db41cc1416945f33b2fda7643f69f7a7a764

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18650 [User Experience/Website]: Verifying signatures date should be updated

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18650: Verifying signatures date should be updated
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by hiro):

 * owner:  cypherpunks => hiro


Comment:

 Hi, I have added a short paragraph explaining that signature may differ
 from the example.

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/hiro/webwml.git/commit/?h=sig_date

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11211 [Core Tor/Tor]: Multiple ServerTransportListenAddr entries should be allowed per transport.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11211: Multiple ServerTransportListenAddr entries should be allowed per 
transport.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  kaie
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, pt, needs-proposal,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-pt, bridgedb-parsers, 028-triage, ipv6,|
  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:  #10629   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  T/U
-+-

Comment (by kaie):

 Yawning, I think your opinion matters, because you are the expert in this
 area and are providing review feedback.

 The question is, how important is it to have this enhancement, and how
 could it be implemented with available resources?

 If the ideal solution that you describe is the only acceptable solution,
 then I most likely won't be able to find enough time to help, and the
 feature needs to be delayed, until enough developer time resources are
 available.

 However, if the feature is sufficiently important to not wait for the
 ideal implementatiom, but accept a simpler solution, then it's easier to
 find the time to get it done, and maybe I'll be able to help.

 So, it's interesting to get more feedback, if the suggested alias solution
 seems like an acceptable implementation, or if there are good arguments to
 reject that approach, too.

 Regarding BridgeDB registration: If Tor is the software that handles the
 registration into the BridgeDB, then the Tor software knows for which
 aliases a ListenAddr has been registered, and which transport type is used
 for each ListenAddr, and should be able to register accordingly?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #14952 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit HTTP/2 and SPDY if needed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14952: Audit HTTP/2 and SPDY if needed
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, tbb-usability-  |  Actual Points:
  website|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: gk (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #14952 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit HTTP/2 and SPDY if needed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14952: Audit HTTP/2 and SPDY if needed
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, tbb-usability-  |  Actual Points:
  website|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-linkability, tbb-usability-website
 * owner:  mikeperry => tbb-team


Comment:

 Keep #16673 in mind.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21242 [Core Tor/Tor]: Start-up error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21242: Start-up error
--+
 Reporter:  Felixix   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Felixix):

 The torrc file:

 {{{
 SocksPort 0
 RunAsDaemon 1
 Address ex.ter.na.l
 ORPort ex.ter.na.l:443 NoListen
 ORPort lo.c.al.jail:1234 NoAdvertise
 DirPort ex.ter.na.l:993 NoListen
 DirPort lo.c.al.jail:5678 NoAdvertise
 Nickname ...
 RelayBandwidthRate  15000 KB
 RelayBandwidthBurst 5 KB
 ContactInfo ...
 MyFamily ...
 ExitPolicy reject *:*
 HeartbeatPeriod 3600 seconds
 #AvoidDiskWrites 1
 NUMCPUs 2
 #HardwareAccel 1
 MaxMemInQueues 2 GB
 #DisableNetwork 1
 Log notice file /var/log/tor/tor
 EntryStatistics 1
 ConnDirectionStatistics 1
 #DirPortFrontPage /var/mypage.html
 ExtraInfoStatistics 1
 #DownloadExtraInfo 1
 }}}

 More?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #10394 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbrowser's updater updates HTTPS-everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10394: Torbrowser's updater updates HTTPS-everywhere
--+--
 Reporter:  StrangeCharm  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Replying to [comment:11 yawning]:
 I made a video showing the updater I'm talking about, because I'm still
 not sure that I explained it properly.
 https://www.expirebox.com/download/50307432778945f2330b0e670b718e36.html

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11211 [Core Tor/Tor]: Multiple ServerTransportListenAddr entries should be allowed per transport.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11211: Multiple ServerTransportListenAddr entries should be allowed per 
transport.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  kaie
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, pt, needs-proposal,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-pt, bridgedb-parsers, 028-triage, ipv6,|
  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:  #10629   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  T/U
-+-

Comment (by yawning):

 At a minimum tor will need more changes, and probably BridgeDB as well.
 Solving this problem correctly requires all of:

  * Figuring out what to do with Bridge Descriptors and modifying tor to do
 the right thing.
  * Modifying the pt-spec such that it has backwards compatible provisions
 for multiple args and multiple bind addresses, and modifying tor to do the
 right thing.
  * Modifying obfs4proxy to implement the new pt spec changes.

 Personally I'd rather see this fixed correctly than a kludgy alias thing,
 but since I'm not going to be the one that works on it in any major
 capacity, my opinion doesn't mean much.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #10394 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbrowser's updater updates HTTPS-everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10394: Torbrowser's updater updates HTTPS-everywhere
--+--
 Reporter:  StrangeCharm  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by yawning):

 * cc: yawning (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21262 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Installing Firefox Language Pack does not change language

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21262: Installing Firefox Language Pack does not change language
--+
 Reporter:  scootergrisen |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 You have to adapt `general.useragent.locale` as well.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20192 [Core Tor/Tor]: When outputting potential new fallbacks, blacklist the whitelist

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20192: When outputting potential new fallbacks, blacklist the whitelist
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, tor-03-unspecified-201612  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by haxxpop):

 * owner:   => haxxpop
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20981 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The localized date string on Windows reveals local time

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20981: The localized date string on Windows reveals local time
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerinting, tbb-regression,|  Actual Points:
  tbb-6.0-issues, TorBrowserTeam201701R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:10 arthuredelstein]:
 > I believe the malloc'd memory is necessary -- later code attempts to
 free it if I recall correctly.

 Yes, in `timezone.cpp`:
 {{{
 #if U_PLATFORM_USES_ONLY_WIN32_API
 // hostID points to a heap-allocated location on Windows.
 uprv_free(const_cast(hostID));
 #endif
 }}}

 Looks good to me. I tested the patch on a Windows machine and the issue is
 fixed with it.

 Applied to `tor-browser-45.6.0esr-6.5-1` (commit
 025f08062d4e633432e0248bbd047ac5d61c4399). I guess this can make it into
 6.5 as the patch is quite simple.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20842 [User Experience]: Proposal: Improve Tor Browser font whitelist / bundled fonts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20842: Proposal: Improve Tor Browser font whitelist / bundled fonts
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by vegansalad):

 I also posted an issue in Tails just in case they might have some fonts
 that they already use that might be good whitelisting candidates:
 https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/12154

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21262 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Installing Firefox Language Pack does not change language

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21262: Installing Firefox Language Pack does not change language
--+--
 Reporter:  scootergrisen |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 I wanted to download the Firefox Language Pack for my language in Tor
 Browser but it does not seem to change the language.

 Even if i use Tor Browser based on Firefox version X.X and download the
 Language Pack with the same version X.X number it don't seem to change the
 language.

 Like if i go to https://addons.mozilla.org/da/firefox/addon/dansk-da-
 language-pack/versions/ and select the correct version.

 Using Tor Browser 6.0.9.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21243 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser: Add links for pt, es, fr manuals

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21243: Tor Browser: Add links for pt, es, fr manuals
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, TorBrowserTeam201701  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-usability, TorBrowserTeam201701R => tbb-usability,
 TorBrowserTeam201701


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21243 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser: Add links for pt, es, fr manuals

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21243: Tor Browser: Add links for pt, es, fr manuals
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201701R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_revision


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #10394 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbrowser's updater updates HTTPS-everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10394: Torbrowser's updater updates HTTPS-everywhere
--+--
 Reporter:  StrangeCharm  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: Dbryrtfbcbhgf (added)


Comment:

 #21260 is a duplicate.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21260 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor browser should be set so add-ons will not automatically update in the background

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21260: Tor browser should be set so add-ons will not  automatically update in 
the
background
--+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:5 Dbryrtfbcbhgf]:
 > Replying to [comment:4 yawning]:
 > > Replying to [comment:2 Dbryrtfbcbhgf]:
 > > >  But the add-ons are set to update automatically from
 addons.mozilla.org servers when a new version of the add on is released to
 the public.
 > >
 > > I know, and I think that's wrong, and I specified what I think what
 the behavior should be changed to, at least for HTTPS-E and NoScript.  I'm
 not sure about what behavior for random other things users decide to
 install should be, in general I think they have other more fundemental
 problems than the updater when they do that...
 > >
 > > Coincidentally, the Linux sandbox disables the addon updater by
 default.
 > Will future versions of tor browser have automatic updates disabled for
 every add-on  including HTTPS-E and NoScript?

 The plan to do this only for the extensions we ship. Marking this as a
 duplicate of #10394.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11211 [Core Tor/Tor]: Multiple ServerTransportListenAddr entries should be allowed per transport.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11211: Multiple ServerTransportListenAddr entries should be allowed per 
transport.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  kaie
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, pt, needs-proposal,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-pt, bridgedb-parsers, 028-triage, ipv6,|
  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:  #10629   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  T/U
-+-

Comment (by kaie):

 Which part of the software performs the bridge distribution?
 Is it tor, or is it the transport plugin?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20842 [User Experience]: Proposal: Improve Tor Browser font whitelist / bundled fonts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20842: Proposal: Improve Tor Browser font whitelist / bundled fonts
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by vegansalad):

 Ok, I looked into noto emoji a bit more. I found that the "noto color
 emoji" font is being packaged here: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-
 bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=849042

 It was said that this should allow for color and black and white emojis
 once it is finished.

 In the mean time, that link also said that
 https://packages.debian.org/jessie/ttf-ancient-fonts offers black and
 white fonts. I don't know how to look through it to see if it has the
 Unicode 1 thru Unicode 4 dingbats though. If it does, perhaps we could
 whitelist that.

 I also looked at https://wiki.debian.org/Fonts/UnicodeCoverage to see if
 it might describe any packages that cover these old dingbats, but I wasn't
 able to figure it out.

 Can anyone help me figure out what debian packaged font should be
 whitelisted to get these old Unicode Characters to work in TBB?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11211 [Core Tor/Tor]: Multiple ServerTransportListenAddr entries should be allowed per transport.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11211: Multiple ServerTransportListenAddr entries should be allowed per 
transport.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  kaie
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, pt, needs-proposal,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-pt, bridgedb-parsers, 028-triage, ipv6,|
  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:  #10629   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  T/U
-+-

Comment (by yawning):

 That doesn't solve the bridge distribution side of the problem.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs