Re: [tor-bugs] #21308 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix modernizr breakage for TBB/ESR52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21308: Fix modernizr breakage for TBB/ESR52
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52esr   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20680| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-52esr => ff52esr


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21308 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix modernizr breakage for TBB/ESR52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21308: Fix modernizr breakage for TBB/ESR52
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20680| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52esr => ff52-esr


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20994 [Metrics/Onionoo]: invalid first_seen timestamp on bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20994: invalid first_seen timestamp on bridges
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Replying to [comment:9 karsten]:
 > Please review
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/onionoo.git/commit/?h=task-20994-2&id=fef8118ac82d0a97c9cfc4cdcdb95931edbe4aa4
 the last commit in my task-20994-2 branch].  We'll need this change in
 order to fix existing Onionoo instances.

 Good idea!
 Did I overlook the test for this change?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix Omnibox for TBB/52ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21309: Fix Omnibox for TBB/52ESR
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20680| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-52esr => ff52-esr


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20994 [Metrics/Onionoo]: invalid first_seen timestamp on bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20994: invalid first_seen timestamp on bridges
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Replying to [comment:10 karsten]:
 > Okay, local tests look good.  I took a backup from the main Onionoo
 instance and imported archived bridge statuses since 2014-12.  I uploaded
 the `status/summary` file from
 [https://people.torproject.org/~karsten/volatile/summary-before.xz before]
 (31M) and [https://people.torproject.org/~karsten/volatile/summary-
 after.xz after] (32M) importing bridge statuses, please take a look if you
 want.  I'll also keep a backup when updating, so that we can roll back the
 day or two after without any issues.  Just in case.  But I think we're
 good here, assuming that the code review does not uncover any major
 issues.

 How did the 37 (mostly 'ki') bridges sneak in?  (grep [-c] "1970-01-01"
 summary-after)
 {{{
 b   ki  03F7D8305D9924E9C26FA29A4DB556AA62605F3E
 10.103.149.101;;2017-01-23  08:41:0454588   0
 V2Dir,Valid -1  ??  -1  nullnull1970-01-01
 00:00:00nullnullnullnull::
 b   ki  0B35992DAC9039C0C1B5F3E3277B6D52D0E01D0C
 10.86.91.208;;  2017-01-23  08:41:0459449   0
 V2Dir,Valid -1  ??  -1  nullnull1970-01-01
 00:00:00nullnullnullnull::
 b   ki  0CE94B36871A2A9311407C477FAC2C5F7F33C473
 10.96.43.158;;  2017-01-23  08:41:0454636   0
 V2Dir,Valid -1  ??  -1  nullnull1970-01-01
 00:00:00nullnullnullnull::
 b   mullbinde12 0F6EFF59CA04EC8CD2B8ED4920660B624721E24D
 10.3.54.27;;2017-01-23  08:41:0452317   0
 Fast,Running,V2Dir,Valid-1  ??  -1  null
 null1970-01-01  00:00:00nullnullnull
 null::
 ...
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21117 [Core Tor/Tor]: can't migrate onion services to single-hop onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21117: can't migrate onion services to single-hop onion services
--+
 Reporter:  weasel|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, single-onion  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by weasel):

 * parent:  #21049 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21049 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Make some of torproject.org's onion services into single onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21049: Make some of torproject.org's onion services into single onion services
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Seems we are nowhere close to deployable single onion services.  We can
 always reconsider at a later point.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21307 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create a tpo hostname for the tor messenger build machine

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21307: Please create a tpo hostname for the tor messenger build machine
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by weasel):

 Maybe we should move to building on torproject.org hosts instead?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19892 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: viewvc broken on svn.tpo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19892: viewvc broken on svn.tpo
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:
 |  sebastian
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Removed the link from / and all the text and link instead to help.tpo
 which.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19845 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create an LDAP account for Huy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19845: Please create an LDAP account for Huy
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  not a
 |  bug
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 No ack from nickm/arma for over a month.  Closing for now.  Feel free to
 re-open.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17310 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: PGP Key change

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17310: PGP Key change
-+-
 Reporter:  anadahz  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user
 |  disappeared
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared


Comment:

 TTL exceeded.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21313 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Snow Leopard - Browser close/minimize/expand window buttons shifted up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21313: Snow Leopard - Browser close/minimize/expand window buttons shifted up
--+---
 Reporter:  cartj |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 Can you pinpoint the first version where that behavior started? For older
 versions see: https://archive.torproject.org/tor-package-
 archive/torbrowser/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21313 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Snow Leopard - Browser close/minimize/expand window buttons shifted up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21313: Snow Leopard - Browser close/minimize/expand window buttons shifted up
--+--
 Reporter:  cartj |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => assigned
 * owner:   => tbb-team


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21277 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please set up a new PostgreSQL database called webstats on meronense

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21277: Please set up a new PostgreSQL database called webstats on meronense
-+
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Note that .pgpass has well defined semantics.  Also, you already have the
 password.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21296 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: gitweb.torproject.org onion service doesn't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21296: gitweb.torproject.org onion service doesn't work
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by weasel):

 We track the underlying Tor bug in #21297.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #4929, #6367, #10341, #13134, #20275

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #4929, #6367, #10341, #13134, #20275 by weasel:


Action: reassign

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10338 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: [hw14] Upgrade Tor's virtual machine infrastructure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10338: [hw14] Upgrade Tor's virtual machine infrastructure
-+-
 Reporter:  phobos   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Upgrade Tor's VM
Component:  Internal Services/Tor|  Infrastructure
  Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sysadmin sysupgrade  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  accepted => assigned
 * owner:  phobos => tpa
 * severity:   => Normal


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #4929, #6367, #10341, #13134, #20275

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #4929, #6367, #10341, #13134, #20275 by weasel:


Action: new

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17467 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add proposals to spec.torproject.org?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17467: Add proposals to spec.torproject.org?
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by weasel):

 * owner:  weasel => tpa


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20994 [Metrics/Onionoo]: invalid first_seen timestamp on bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20994: invalid first_seen timestamp on bridges
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:12 iwakeh]:
 > How did the 37 (mostly 'ki') bridges sneak in?  (grep [-c] "1970-01-01"
 summary-after)

 Oh, those are still included with date 1970-01-01, because CollecTor's
 bridge descriptor archives have been created a bit before I created the
 Onionoo snapshot for this test.  Note how the examples you gave all have
 2017-01-23 as last_seen date.  I guess that most or all of those entries
 would be fixed when using newly created archives from after taking the
 snapshot.

 Regarding tests, I'll look into writing a test for the `NodeStatus` change
 in a bit.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20956 [Core Tor/Tor]: optionally do not write command line config to torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20956: optionally do not write command line config to torrc
+
 Reporter:  mcs |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-wants 029-backport  |  Actual Points:  .2
Parent ID:  | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by arma):

 mcs: I don't think you need the + signs when using the new __SocksPort /
 etc args?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21296 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: gitweb.torproject.org onion service doesn't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21296: gitweb.torproject.org onion service doesn't work
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 restarted tor, so the service is back for now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19048 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Review Firefox Developer Docs and Undocumented bugs since FF45esr

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19048: Review Firefox Developer Docs and Undocumented bugs since FF45esr
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201701  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr => ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201701


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21236 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Put a visualization of Tor Browser downloads and updates on the Metrics website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21236: Put a visualization of Tor Browser downloads and updates on the Metrics
website
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-
 web.git/log/?h=task-21236-4 my task-21236-4 branch] with three new
 commits:

  - [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-
 web.git/commit/?h=task-21236-4&id=9f412c8450704514e5caa2bd7106f1ee96898348
 9f412c8] fixes the issue above,
  - [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-
 web.git/commit/?h=task-21236-4&id=24cfe7d3c0f588322a771bf2bfe955f0b3853b29
 24cfe7d] fixes a timezone-related issue with exporting statistics, and
  - [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-
 web.git/commit/?h=task-21236-4&id=6b6748f522f53f021139ea0106ce9903a7fdee5a
 6b6748f] fixes two checkstyle issues entirely unrelated but not worth
 opening a new ticket for.

 Thanks!

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[tor-bugs] #21314 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: snowflake-client needs to stop using my network when I'm not giving it requests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21314: snowflake-client needs to stop using my network when I'm not giving it
requests
---+-
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 I started my Tor Browser, and told it to use snowflake, and it did. Then I
 changed my mind and told it to stop using snowflake. Now, apparently
 there's a bug in Tor where Tor is supposed to kill snowflake-client when
 there are no more bridge lines in my torrc that want to use it. But
 ignoring that Tor bug, snowflake-client should also be defensive for me.
 Right now it is touching the broker every 10 seconds, looking for a
 snowflake, even though it is getting no requests. That can't be good for
 scalability or for the broker or for the users.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21314 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: snowflake-client needs to stop using my network when I'm not giving it requests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21314: snowflake-client needs to stop using my network when I'm not giving it
requests
---+-
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by arma):

 My first thought was that snowflake-client needs to go dormant when it
 hasn't received any requests in a while.

 Yawning thinks it should be a more aggressive, and simpler, plan: it needs
 to be dormant when it is not right now having a request that it's supposed
 to answer.

 (After all, Tor tries to maintain circuits to its guards, so it will have
 a persistent connection, and if Tor goes dormant because it doesn't expect
 to use the network for a while, then that's a great time for snowflake-
 client to notice that there is no network use, and go dormant too.)

 I am fine with either approach, so long as pretty soon after I stop trying
 to talk to snowflake-client, it stops trying to use my network.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21144 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: remove 604 checkstyle complaints from metrics-lib

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21144: remove 604 checkstyle complaints from metrics-lib
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-help |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/metrics-
 lib.git/log/?h=task-21144 my branch task-21144].  Thanks!

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[tor-bugs] #21315 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: publish some realtime stats from the broker?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21315: publish some realtime stats from the broker?
---+-
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 How many snowflakes are there registered right now and happy to serve
 censored users?

 Right now there's a big difference between 0 and 1, and it's not easy to
 figure out which it is.

 Knowing this number would help me as a snowflake volunteer decide whether
 I am needed, and whether to do advocacy at this moment to get other people
 to be snowflakes.

 Knowing this number would help the censored users too, because it would
 give them a sense of the health of the snowflake population, and also it
 can help them debug their "it's not working, I wonder if I can narrow down
 some possible problems" situations.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21315 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: publish some realtime stats from the broker?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21315: publish some realtime stats from the broker?
---+-
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by arma):

 I would also be interested in stats about users and usage (including e.g.
 number of users being handled divided by number of snowflakes handling
 them), but I recognize anything involving the users is a more complicated
 topic, and we shouldn't do things that could put users at risk without
 sorting through what we ought to protect and how we can make sure it's
 being protected.

 So, step one, tell me more about the snowflakes please. :)

 One other concrete thing that I want: how many times are you giving
 snowflakes out? How many times did you stop giving a snowflake out because
 you've given it out so many times already? These questions tie into the
 address distribution algorithm question: it's not clear how to pick the
 right parameters in a vacuum, but we're not *in* a vacuum, so maybe we can
 gain some intuition by seeing how things play out in practice.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17797 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Medium-High security enables HTTPS javascript despite noscript settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17797: Medium-High security enables HTTPS javascript despite noscript settings
--+--
 Reporter:  special   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 I think this is fixed, probably by NoScript 2.9.5.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17797 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Medium-High security enables HTTPS javascript despite noscript settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17797: Medium-High security enables HTTPS javascript despite noscript settings
--+--
 Reporter:  special   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20994 [Metrics/Onionoo]: invalid first_seen timestamp on bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20994: invalid first_seen timestamp on bridges
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Please find
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/onionoo.git/commit/?h=task-20994-2&id=0b7eff1aa7e7d69961c7c32814d8244396696f89
 this new test] for the `NodeStatus` change.

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[tor-bugs] #21316 [User Experience]: Update gpg verification instructions for Linux users on our verifying signatures page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21316: Update gpg verification instructions for Linux users on our verifying
signatures page
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  lnl
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Doing a
 {{{
 gpg --verify Downloads/tor-browser-linux64-6.5_en-US.tar.xz{.asc*,}
 }}}
 seems to break under some circumstances for Linux users yet we recommend
 something like that on our website where we explain how to verify the
 signatures of freshly downloaded Tor Browser bundles.

 It seems to me doing something like
 {{{
 gpg --verify tor-browser-linux64-6.5_en-US.tar.xz.asc tor-browser-
 linux64-6.5_en-US.tar.xz
 }}}
 is a saner approach.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20300 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Unable to launch stable Tor browser on OS X (could not connect to control port)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20300: Unable to launch stable Tor browser on OS X (could not connect to 
control
port)
--+
 Reporter:  grobin|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:16 mcs]:
 > Is any info available from the #tor user?

 Unfortunately, not. Given that

 1) Users affected by this did really not download and use an alpha.
 2) TorL Launcher is not able to update itself

 users must have got a "wrong" update. Now, how could that have happened in
 detail? First, they have been on the stable series. An update to the alpha
 series would have been a full update. But then they were on the alpha
 channel and the question would be how were they getting the stable tor
 (again)? Which is causing the problem in combination with unix domain
 socket support. I guess they could have got a full update back to the
 stable channel with a stable tor but Tor Launcher would not have been
 updated as it would have been a downgrade which gets prevented? Otherwise
 it is hard to see why they are stuck with the alpha Tor Launcher it seems.

 It that makes any sense then we would have given wrong updates out twice
 at least. :/

 Anyway, I guess this is now even harder to debug given that with the
 advent of tor-0.2.9.x in the stable series the issue in this ticket is
 gone.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20893 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a fuzzing harness for Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20893: Add a fuzzing harness for Tor
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fuzz, review-group-15  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by asn):

 Hello. I tried to test run the fuzzer but it seems like `make fuzz` does
 not exist on purpose but that's what `Fuzzing.md` is suggesting to use...
 Shouldn't we also include `make fuzz`? Otherwise how do we test this
 feature?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20905 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser window does not get resized to the same sizes as before 6.5a4 anymore

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20905: Tor Browser window does not get resized to the same sizes as before 
6.5a4
anymore
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting-   |  Actual Points:
  resolution, tbb-6.5-regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting-resolution => tbb-usability,
 tbb-fingerprinting-resolution, tbb-6.5-regression


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[tor-bugs] #21317 [User Experience/Website]: Replace Maintainger with Maintainer on the pluggable transports page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21317: Replace Maintainger with Maintainer on the pluggable transports page
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Simple typo fix:

 https://people.torproject.org/~irl/volatile/0001-Replace-Maintainger-with-
 Maintainer-on-pluggable-tra.patch

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21317 [User Experience/Website]: Replace Maintainger with Maintainer on the pluggable transports page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21317: Replace Maintainger with Maintainer on the pluggable transports page
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by hiro):

 * owner:   => hiro
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21317 [User Experience/Website]: Replace Maintainger with Maintainer on the pluggable transports page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21317: Replace Maintainger with Maintainer on the pluggable transports page
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21306 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Be more helpful in the "cannot connect to tor control" error case

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21306: Be more helpful in the "cannot connect to tor control" error case
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:1 teor]:
 > Similarly, the "tor exited on startup" case could do with some work.
 > It happened to me (my fault for editing the torrc), but there were no
 log messages and no helpful options except "restart". Which didn't work,
 of course.

 That's #12501, yes. All in all what this ticket needs is a fix for #10059
 first. That is we need a tor patch to get the relevant information to be
 able to be more helpful.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21306 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Be more helpful in the "cannot connect to tor control" error case

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21306: Be more helpful in the "cannot connect to tor control" error case
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #10059| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * parent:   => #10059


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21316 [User Experience/Website]: Update gpg verification instructions for Linux users on our verifying signatures page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21316: Update gpg verification instructions for Linux users on our verifying
signatures page
-+--
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  lnl => hiro
 * component:  User Experience => User Experience/Website


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20905 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser window does not get resized to the same sizes as before 6.5a4 anymore

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20905: Tor Browser window does not get resized to the same sizes as before 
6.5a4
anymore
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-6.5-regression|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting-resolution,
 tbb-6.5-regression => tbb-6.5-regression


Comment:

 > it was/is rounded properly
 So, not a fingerprinting issue.
 > code is not really using the available space as it could.
 The available space could be seen in debug log during startup, e.g.:
 {{{
 Torbutton INFO: Initializing the Torbutton button.
 Torbutton INFO: init completed
 Torbutton INFO: Window: (132,38) ?= (1920,1160)
 Torbutton DBUG: Window is normal
 }}}
 for 1920x1200 monitor. So, if you have 1080p monitor you should check how
 much space is available after XFCE takes some. And if it takes more than
 80px (<1000 available), then it's not a bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20905 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser window does not get resized to the same sizes as before 6.5a4 anymore

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20905: Tor Browser window does not get resized to the same sizes as before 
6.5a4
anymore
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-6.5-regression, tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-6.5-regression => tbb-6.5-regression, tbb-usability, tbb-
 fingerprinting-resolution


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21236 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Put a visualization of Tor Browser downloads and updates on the Metrics website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21236: Put a visualization of Tor Browser downloads and updates on the Metrics
website
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 And now there's yet one more commit in that branch:

  - [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-
 web.git/commit/?h=task-21236-4&id=2f00ddf47bae7e3f6f3d9a2776cfacabadfb58ca
 2f00ddf] handles a bug with long (> 2048 characters) resource strings.

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[tor-bugs] #21318 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use MAKEOPTS for GMP build in Linux descriptor as well

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21318: Use MAKEOPTS for GMP build in Linux descriptor as well
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-gitian
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 It seems we forgot to do a
 {{{
 make $MAKEOPTS
 }}}
 when compiling GMP for Linux.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21318 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use MAKEOPTS for GMP build in Linux descriptor as well

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21318: Use MAKEOPTS for GMP build in Linux descriptor as well
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I went forward with commit 18bb5d3c20f563f774a7c935b1572f60d6330a06 and
 1d289e1565405dbb8f328d466716dc754db96017 on `master` and `hardened-
 builds`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21318 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use MAKEOPTS for GMP build in Linux descriptor as well

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21318: Use MAKEOPTS for GMP build in Linux descriptor as well
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, TorBrowserTeam201701  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-gitian => tbb-gitian, TorBrowserTeam201701


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21313 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Snow Leopard - Browser close/minimize/expand window buttons shifted up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21313: Snow Leopard - Browser close/minimize/expand window buttons shifted up
--+--
 Reporter:  cartj |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


Comment:

 Another question: Does this problem occur with Firefox ESR 45.x?
 Download link: https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/organizations/all/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20956 [Core Tor/Tor]: optionally do not write command line config to torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20956: optionally do not write command line config to torrc
+
 Reporter:  mcs |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-wants 029-backport  |  Actual Points:  .2
Parent ID:  | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:16 arma]:
 > mcs: I don't think you need the + signs when using the new
 {{{__SocksPort}}} / etc args?

 Hmm. I think we do, because otherwise an {{{__SocksPort}}} that is passed
 by Tor Launcher when starting tor will replace all {{{SocksPort}}}
 definitions that are present in torrc or torrc-defaults. At least that is
 what I thought I observed. I will re-test.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20300 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Unable to launch stable Tor browser on OS X (could not connect to control port)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20300: Unable to launch stable Tor browser on OS X (could not connect to 
control
port)
--+
 Reporter:  grobin|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:17 gk]:
 > users must have got a "wrong" update. Now, how could that have happened
 in detail? First, they have been on the stable series. An update to the
 alpha series would have been a full update. But then they were on the
 alpha channel and the question would be how were they getting the stable
 tor (again)? Which is causing the problem in combination with unix domain
 socket support. I guess they could have got a full update back to the
 stable channel with a stable tor but Tor Launcher would not have been
 updated as it would have been a downgrade which gets prevented? Otherwise
 it is hard to see why they are stuck with the alpha Tor Launcher it seems.

 Yes, that could have happened... but it is still difficult to explain how
 these users ever got the alpha version. Several people seem sure that they
 never downloaded an alpha, and we did not (as far as I know) ever publish
 bad/misconfigured update files on the TPO servers. But if a similar
 problem occurs again, we will investigate then.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20680 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20680: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR
+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201701  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Kathy and I slightly messed up the #4234 patch. Mozilla removed support
 for the
 `--enable-update-packaging` configure option (but we don't think it is
 needed anyway). I will attach a fixup patch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #6276 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Hiding the context menu button breaks the Tools->HTTPS Everywhere menu

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6276: Hiding the context menu button breaks the Tools->HTTPS Everywhere menu
-+-
 Reporter:  grarpamp |  Owner:  pde
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:  HTTPS-E
  Everywhere |  4.0dev8
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs, gk (added)
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This bug was reported again (by a user of Tor Browser 6.5):
 https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-65-released#comment-232536

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18650 [User Experience/Website]: Verifying signatures date should be updated

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18650: Verifying signatures date should be updated
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by hiro):

 This is now online.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18650 [User Experience/Website]: Verifying signatures date should be updated

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18650: Verifying signatures date should be updated
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21315 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: publish some realtime stats from the broker?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21315: publish some realtime stats from the broker?
---+-
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by arlolra):

 Shirking these questions for now, just linking this issue w/
 https://github.com/keroserene/snowflake/issues/29

 And pointing to,
 https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 transport.html?transport=snowflake

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19845 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create an LDAP account for Huy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19845: Please create an LDAP account for Huy
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  not a
 |  bug
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arlolra):

 Sorry for having left this open, we talked about it in Seattle and it's
 blocking on all the membership docs, and whatnot.

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[tor-bugs] #21319 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Update verification fails, but update still applies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21319: Update verification fails, but update still applies
-+-
 Reporter:  Digitalcourage   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
  Sandbox|   Keywords:  sandboxed
 Severity:  Minor|  0.0.3 binary
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 This resembles an issue Tor Messenger had (#19809), but I downloaded
 https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbrowser/7.0a1/sandbox-0.0.3-linux64.zip
 manually and started it.

 Everything works, but these error messages on the console worry me:

 2017/01/25 18:MM:SS update: Downloading
 https://cdn.torproject.org/aus1/torbrowser/7.0a1-hardened/tor-browser-
 linux64-6.5a6-hardened-7.0a1-hardened_ALL.incremental.mar
 2017/01/25 18:MM:SS update: Validating Tor Browser Update.
 2017/01/25 18:MM:SS update: Shutting down old tor.
 2017/01/25 18:MM:SS tor: Jan 25 18:MM:SS.000 [notice] Catching signal
 TERM, exiting cleanly.
 2017/01/25 18:MM:SS tor: ==3==AddressSanitizer CHECK failed:
 
../../.././libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_stoptheworld_linux_libcdep.cc:326
 "((sigprocmask_status)) == ((0))" (0xffda, 0x0)
 2017/01/25 18:MM:SS tor: SRAT init
 2017/01/25 18:MM:SS tor: SRAT warning: cannot find Memory Layout File.
 Stack trace will be probably wrong.
 2017/01/25 18:MM:SS update: Updating Tor Browser.
 …
 2017/01/25 18:MM:SS update: ERROR: Error verifying signature.
 2017/01/25 18:MM:SS update: ERROR: Not all signatures were verified.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21307 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create a tpo hostname for the tor messenger build machine

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21307: Please create a tpo hostname for the tor messenger build machine
-+-
 Reporter:  arlolra  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arlolra):

 Well, we're happy with the machine (and dns seems to be resolving again).
 But I'll trust your guidance if you think that's the best long term
 solution.  Alternatively, we can wontfix for now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21319 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Update verification fails, but update still applies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21319: Update verification fails, but update still applies
--+---
 Reporter:  Digitalcourage|  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * keywords:  sandboxed 0.0.3 binary =>
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 It just says so. In fact it is checking the signature. But it is done with
 the backup key (we are about to phase out our regular MAR signing key and
 rotate). This is a duplicate of #15532.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15532 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 4.5 displays signature validation error during update

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15532: Tor Browser 4.5 displays signature validation error during update
-+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-firefox-patch, ff38-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: Digitalcourage (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20174 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Automate checking existing fallbacks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20174: Automate checking existing fallbacks
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts|Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 |  implemented
 Keywords:  fallback, tor-03-unspecified-201612  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 applied; thank you!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21280 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor-resolve: Do not truncate too long hostnames

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21280: tor-resolve: Do not truncate too long hostnames
-+-
 Reporter:  junglefowl   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.8
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-resolve, security-review,|  Actual Points:
  029-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21134 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fail if file is too large to mmap.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21134: Fail if file is too large to mmap.
+--
 Reporter:  junglefowl  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.8
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor_mmap_file, review-group-15  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm   |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by nickm):

 Merged!  I added a cast to the comparison to avoid a signed/unsigned
 comparison warning.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21134 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fail if file is too large to mmap.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21134: Fail if file is too large to mmap.
+--
 Reporter:  junglefowl  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.8
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor_mmap_file, review-group-15  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm   |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21317 [User Experience/Website]: Replace Maintainger with Maintainer on the pluggable transports page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21317: Replace Maintainger with Maintainer on the pluggable transports page
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by hiro):

 Applied and deployed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21316 [User Experience/Website]: Update gpg verification instructions for Linux users on our verifying signatures page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21316: Update gpg verification instructions for Linux users on our verifying
signatures page
-+
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Applied and deployed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20177 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: When checking existing fallbacks, report those fallbacks at warning log level

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20177: When checking existing fallbacks, report those fallbacks at warning log
level
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts|Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 |  implemented
 Keywords:  fallback, tor-03-unspecified-201612  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by haxxpop):

 * component:  Core Tor/Tor => Core Tor/Fallback Scripts


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix Omnibox for TBB/52ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21309: Fix Omnibox for TBB/52ESR
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20680| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Are you referring to the following two patches?

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/commit/?h=tor-
 browser-45.7.0esr-7.0-1&id=773b70c590a5897de9a87c4ffb8b844f5eeb519b

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/commit/?h=tor-
 browser-45.7.0esr-7.0-1&id=b839017ae214ec42cf203b711d371ab90bdc959b

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20178 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: The fallback update script should log stem connection errors at warning level

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20178: The fallback update script should log stem connection errors at warning
level
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 |  implemented
 Keywords:  fallback, tor-03-unspecified-201612  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by haxxpop):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20177 [Core Tor/Tor]: When checking existing fallbacks, report those fallbacks at warning log level

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20177: When checking existing fallbacks, report those fallbacks at warning log
level
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 |  implemented
 Keywords:  fallback, tor-03-unspecified-201612  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by haxxpop):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21317 [User Experience/Website]: Replace Maintainger with Maintainer on the pluggable transports page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21317: Replace Maintainger with Maintainer on the pluggable transports page
-+
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21268 [Applications/Tor Browser]: e10s compatibility for New Identity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21268: e10s compatibility for New Identity
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,ff52-esr|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:  torbutton,ff52-esr => tbb-torbutton,ff52-esr


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21201 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adapt torbutton to TBB/FF52ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21201: Adapt torbutton to TBB/FF52ESR
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,ff52-esr|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20680| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:   => tbb-torbutton,ff52-esr


Comment:

 Kathy and I also noticed that the circuit display code triggers a crash in
 our debug build when e10s is enabled. This happens because GetProxyInfo is
 not implemented by HttpChannelChild (the getSOCKSCredentialsForBrowser()
 function tries to access `channel.proxyInfo`; on the browser side, see:
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-
 browser/blob/20680%2B2/netwerk/protocol/http/HttpChannelChild.cpp#L2395).

 Should I file a new ticket for this issue or will it be covered by this
 ticket?

 Also, here is a related question: should we make this the parent bug for
 #21267 and #21268 or do we want to track e10s issues separately?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21236 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Put a visualization of Tor Browser downloads and updates on the Metrics website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21236: Put a visualization of Tor Browser downloads and updates on the Metrics
website
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 I based a my [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/metrics-
 web.git/commit/?h=task-21236-5 new modular branch] on your commit 2f00ddf.

 Reasoning behind this new branch is that it is better to make this change
 now (while we are both reading this code again and again) than in several
 month.  And, it will then be easier to integrate into a new metrics-web
 code structure.

 Using my branch I imported a lot (not all) of logs and found one more bug:
 The matcher can match w/o having found the wanted number of groups, which
 led to an addition in LogMap.accept(), but other than that the code does
 as before.

 LogDb handles all db-access, DirectoryListing does all the url harvesting,
 LogMap parses log lines and counts, Main controls only the program's flow.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19048 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Review Firefox Developer Docs and Undocumented bugs since FF45esr

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19048: Review Firefox Developer Docs and Undocumented bugs since FF45esr
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201701  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by mcs):

 While experimenting with an ESR52 Tor Browser, Kathy and I noticed a fetch
 of http://detectportal.firefox.com/success.txt at startup. Captive portal
 detection is enabled in Firefox 52; we will need to decide whether we
 should disable it in Tor Browser.
 See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=989193#c54

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21306 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Be more helpful in the "cannot connect to tor control" error case

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21306: Be more helpful in the "cannot connect to tor control" error case
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #10059| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs, phoul (added)


Comment:

 As gk said, in many cases it would help if users were shown the messages
 that tor generated during startup. Unfortunately, if Tor Launcher is not
 able to connect to the control port due to AV software or if tor exits
 before Tor Launcher can connect, fixing #10059 may not help. Tor Launcher
 really needs a way to capture the messages that go to stderr; hopefully
 that is something we can address when we port Tor Launcher to use the
 WebExtensions APIs (we will probably need to use
 https://wiki.mozilla.org/WebExtensions/Native_Messaging, which means we
 will have the "opportunity" to wrap tor in such a way that stderr output
 is sent back to Tor Launcher).

 In the near term, suggestions for improved error messages are welcome.
 Colin, do you happen to have any text for these cases, e.g., text you will
 someday add to the support portal?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20981 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The localized date string on Windows reveals local time

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20981: The localized date string on Windows reveals local time
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-6.0-issues, TorBrowserTeam201701R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:
 tbb-fingerinting, tbb-regression, tbb-6.0-issues,
 TorBrowserTeam201701R
 =>
 tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-regression, tbb-6.0-issues,
 TorBrowserTeam201701R


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10943 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Sandboxing Instantbird

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10943: Sandboxing Instantbird
+-
 Reporter:  sukhbir |  Owner:
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-

Comment (by indolering):

 I'm sure you all know about [http://flatpak.org/ Flatpak] and
 [https://github.com/projectatomic/bubblewrap Bubblewrap] already, but I
 figured I would drop it in here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10943 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Sandboxing Instantbird

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10943: Sandboxing Instantbird
+-
 Reporter:  sukhbir |  Owner:
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by arlolra):

 * cc: yawning (added)


Comment:

 Thanks, yes, we'll be following Yawning's lead on Tor Browser sandboxing
 with those utilities.

 https://blog.torproject.org/blog/q-and-yawning-angel
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorBrowser/Sandbox/Linux

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[tor-bugs] #21320 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Glyphs/Dingbats in uBlock Origin TBB not displaying in Gnu+Linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21320: Glyphs/Dingbats in uBlock Origin TBB not displaying in Gnu+Linux
--+--
 Reporter:  vegansalad|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #18364
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 When the uBlock Origin icon is clicked in Tor Browser and the toggles at
 the bottom of uBlock are also clicked, the icons show a red box with the
 numbers 2715 instead of a black X. This is because this very generic and
 very old unicode
 https://www.fileformat.info/info/unicode/char/2715/browsertest.htm is
 either not supported by the current fonts in TBB on Gnu+Linux or, if it is
 supported, the font fallback mechanism isn't working.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18172 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Emoji support is broken in Tor Browser 5.5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18172: Emoji support is broken in Tor Browser 5.5
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-fonts, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  usability-website, tbb-5.5-regression, |
  TorBrowserTeam201603   |
Parent ID:  #18097   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by vegansalad):

 uBlock is also having similar problems:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21320#ticket

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21312 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21312: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu
---+-
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by yawning):

 * cc: yawning (added)


Comment:

 To clarify, cgo calls are dispatched in their own OS thread, and the
 massive VM use is more than likely multi-megabyte stacks being allocated
 per thread.  Go's lightweight concurrency does not apply with cgo in the
 picture, especially if "blocking in cgo calls" is part of the equation.
 `GOMAXPROCS` will not save you because the parameter does not apply to cgo
 calls.

 The easy way to confirm that this is what is happening is probably to set
 `GODEBUG` to something appropriate and look at debug spew on stderr
 (https://golang.org/pkg/runtime/ probably want `scheddetail` and
 `schedtrace`).

 Instrumenting the code to utilize `runtime/pprof`'s `threadcreate` profile
 will be able to give stack traces at thread creation time, if that's
 useful.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21312 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21312: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu
---+-
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by yawning):

 There's other things that appear to result in extra threads (nb: libwebrtc
 has the best documentation ever, so this may be totally wrong).

 This: https://github.com/keroserene/go-
 webrtc/blob/master/peerconnection.cc#L60

 Is this:
 
https://chromium.googlesource.com/external/webrtc/stable/talk/+/master/app/webrtc/peerconnectionfactory.cc#141

 Which calls this:
 
https://chromium.googlesource.com/external/webrtc/stable/talk/+/master/app/webrtc/peerconnectionfactory.cc#167

 Which prevents this:
 
https://chromium.googlesource.com/external/webrtc/stable/talk/+/master/app/webrtc/peerconnectionfactory.cc#189

 I'd expect cleanup/deallocation in this: https://github.com/keroserene/go-
 webrtc/blob/master/peerconnection.cc#L185

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[tor-bugs] #21321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Convince Mozilla; .onion HTTP is SECURE.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21321: Convince Mozilla; .onion HTTP is SECURE.
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 blog.mozilla.org/security/2017/01/20/communicating-the-dangers-of-non-
 secure-http/

 http version of .onion is safe. This must be the exception of that slash/
 icon.

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[tor-bugs] #21322 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB6.5: Always open fixed window position & size, I'm not asking for this.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21322: TBB6.5: Always open fixed window position & size, I'm not asking for 
this.
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 After I upgraded to TBB 6.5, everytime when I start TBB, Firefox opens
 fixed window size & fixed position.

 Before upgrade(TBB 6.0.5 IIRC), I was using TBB as simple Firefox(because
 I dislike mozilla trackers); torbutton & torlauncher disabled. I'm using
 this for .onion development and I know what I am doing.

 When the user checked this box below, allow the user to use their own
 window size.
 This is seriously annoying and I want you to reconsider about it.

 [X] Change details that distinguish you from other Tor Browser users

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[tor-bugs] #21323 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activate mixed content blocking

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21323: Activate mixed content blocking
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 I'm informed that HTTPS-Everywhere has likely disabled any rules that
 break with mixed content blocking for active content, as suggested in
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=878890#c20. So I think we
 should activate MCB (set "security.mixed_content.block_active_content" to
 true). It seems dangerous to have it disabled, and Firefox's default value
 is true as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21323 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activate mixed content blocking

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21323: Activate mixed content blocking
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201701R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201701R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Here's my patch for review:
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commit/21323

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10507 [Applications/Tor Browser]: firefox 24.0 in tbb 3.5 is leaking referring page data

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10507: firefox 24.0 in tbb 3.5 is leaking referring page data
+--
 Reporter:  unclejed613 |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-3.0, tbb-firefox-patch  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by elisebenine):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Is this fixed already? I think I have noticed this when browsing
 http://buywebtrafficexperts.com/ recently.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17619 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Tor Messenger timezone in chats

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17619: Tor Messenger timezone in chats
+-
 Reporter:  sukhbir |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-

Comment (by arlolra):

 Hmm, I just noticed that in porting the 6.5 changes in,
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-messenger-
 build.git/commit/?id=1eb04e3a93a72627cea0d3ffdcd1ad3fcd13fdd7

 we're not setting, `pref("privacy.use_utc_timezone", true);`

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