Re: [tor-bugs] #21380 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Onionoo web-page(s) should have new Metrics design

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21380: Onionoo web-page(s) should have new Metrics design
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Sounds fine.  The one-page change is a good one.
 (Maybe, we keep the navigation discussion on #21381?)

 As with CollecTor: Should we include a link to the wiki mirror list or
 have mirrors listed here?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21381 [Metrics/CollecTor]: CollecTor web-page should have new Metrics design

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21381: CollecTor web-page should have new Metrics design
---+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 That sounds good, and I second the emphasis on the archive- and recent-
 buttons.
 A box for navigation might be sufficient.  Maybe RaBe has some
 suggestions, too?

 Should we include a link to the wiki mirror list or have mirrors listed
 here?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21387 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Enabling the bookmarks bar can allow websites to fingerprint you

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21387: Enabling the bookmarks bar can allow websites to fingerprint you
--+
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Here is a video showing the issue.
 http://sendvid.com/k840iy0x

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[tor-bugs] #21387 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Enabling the bookmarks bar can allow websites to fingerprint you

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21387: Enabling the bookmarks bar can allow websites to fingerprint you
--+
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.9
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 go to http://whatsmy.browsersize.com/and check the size of the browser
 window.
 then click on view in torbrowser and enable the bookmark bar. the go to
 http://whatsmy.browsersize.com/
 again and the size of your browser window will change from the default
 values. This can allow websites to uniquely identify users that have
 bookmark bar enabled.

 before enabling bookmark bar.
 Browser window width:   1000
 Browser window height:  500
 Screen width:   1000
 Screen height:  500
 Screen color depth: 24

 After enabling bookmark bar.
 Browser window width:   1000
 Browser window height:  477
 Screen width:   1000
 Screen height:  477
 Screen color depth: 24

 tor browser version tested.
 6.5 (based on Mozilla Firefox 45.7.0)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21376 [Metrics]: add javadoc metrics style

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21376: add javadoc metrics style
-+
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Good catch!  Indeed, there is no such file or fonts.  After a small search
 this seems to be a re-occurring bug in the
 [https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-8129828 jdk javadoc tool].

 Removed the line in my branch.

 (Are the fonts taken from the browser or os?)

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[tor-bugs] #21386 [Metrics/Ooni]: http://www.2600.org check fails due to wrong subjectAltNames

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21386: http://www.2600.org check fails due to wrong subjectAltNames
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  hellais, anadahz
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Ooni  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   |   Keywords:  decks
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 The check for 2600 should probably change to http://2600.org. When I try
 to access http://www.2600.org in a browser, I get redirected to
 https://www.2600.org, which gives a cert error because of a hostname
 mismatch. https://2600.org works fine, however.

 {{{
 2017-02-03 05:15:15,659745+ [-] [!] Error performing HTTP request:
 http://www.2600.org
 2017-02-03 05:15:16,042177+ [-] [!] Error performing HTTP request:
 http://www.2600.org
 2017-02-03 05:15:16,450418+ [-] [!] Error performing HTTP request:
 http://www.2600.org
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21241 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: Should we stop setting AuthDirBadExitCC?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21241: Should we stop setting AuthDirBadExitCC?
--+-
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by Sebastian):

 I think this ticket will stay open the next two years if we don't just
 make a decision here. Roger, you're still voting for badexit. Would you be
 willing to change that? I'd then commit a patch to dirauth git and mail
 operators with an explanation.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21366 [Metrics/Atlas]: support whitespace in search term (as does onionoo)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21366: support whitespace in search term (as does onionoo)
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by teor):

 In #21373, I had no idea that atlas had qualifiers, or I had forgotten.

 So my use case would be resolved by making "contact" part of "the usual
 fields we search for".
 Or I can work around it by searching once for the name I remember, then
 again using "contact:".

 (I really don't care much about names with spaces, or getting the query
 exactly right: I am quite capable of refining my search using an
 appropriately unique string. Is there a specific use case that requires a
 quoted string? Perhaps a programmatic search by contact in an
 application?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21107 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.0.x dir auths enforcing ED identity keys: intended?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21107: 0.3.0.x dir auths enforcing ED identity keys: intended?
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 moria1 has been running the fix for the past hours. Somebody should check
 if they like its new behavior. It looks promising.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20980 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use the standard OpenBSD preprocessor definition

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20980: Use the standard OpenBSD preprocessor definition
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Given cypherpunks' comment, I think we should switch all uses of
 __OpenBSD__ and OPENBSD to OpenBSD instead. (Unless there's some reason we
 only want those OSs defining one of the other macros.)

 Ideally, we should avoid using these macros at all, and check for features
 with configure instead.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20998 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Partition Tor Browser heap with jemalloc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20998: Partition Tor Browser heap with jemalloc
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-hardened  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20955| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by tom):

 * cc: tom (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21030 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Test integration of PartitionAlloc/HardenedPartitionAlloc in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21030: Test integration of PartitionAlloc/HardenedPartitionAlloc in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-hardened  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20955| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by tom):

 * cc: tom (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20957 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Get DieHarder working with Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20957: Get DieHarder working with Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-hardened  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20955| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by tom):

 * cc: tom (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20955 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser memory hardening

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20955: Tor Browser memory hardening
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by tom):

 * cc: tom (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13154 [Applications/Tor bundles/installation]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/WikiFormattingDebian's "popularity contest" package as threat vector?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13154: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/WikiFormattingDebian's
"popularity contest" package as threat vector?
-+-
 Reporter:  saint|  Owner:  saint
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.0-alpha-
  bundles/installation   |  dev
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs, Debian, Stormy   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by satiroloko):

 * version:   => Tor: 0.3.0.0-alpha-dev
 * type:  enhancement => project
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor4


Comment:

 Replying to [ticket:13154 saint]:
 >   I am wondering whether to force-uninstall Debian's `popularity-
 contest` package as part of Stormy's installation process.  It would be
 good to have an idea how popular Stormy is, but on the other hand, I'm not
 sure how anonymous the reporting is on Debian's end.
 >
 >   This is also relevant for users of the `tor` package, who might also
 be at mild risk (though far less so because the number of users is so
 high, and doesn't reveal location of location-hidden services).
 >
 >   Anyone have opinions on this?  I'm leaning towards checking if
 popularity-contest is installed and then asking if the user would like it
 to be removed.
 >
 > EDIT: We should also discuss whether to remove it as part of Tor's
 installation process overall.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13154 [Applications/Tor bundles/installation]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/WikiFormattingDebian's "popularity contest" package as threat vector? (was: Debian's "popul

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13154: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/WikiFormattingDebian's
"popularity contest" package as threat vector?
-+-
 Reporter:  saint|  Owner:  saint
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  bundles/installation   |
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs, Debian, Stormy   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by satiroloko):

 * cc: satiroloko (added)
 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Major


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21381 [Metrics/CollecTor]: CollecTor web-page should have new Metrics design

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21381: CollecTor web-page should have new Metrics design
---+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Right.  A few thoughts:

  - I hear that people use the two blue buttons at the top a lot.  Whatever
 we change, we should make sure that these buttons can be reached without
 scrolling down.
  - The lists under Parsing Libraries and Related Work should go away.  We
 should instead include links to the Tor Metrics home page or the Tor
 Metrics development page in the introduction.
  - I guess the Support section can also go away, if we tell people to go
 to Tor Metrics for questions, suggestions, or other feedback.
  - Similar to the Onionoo page, I could imagine that we need some box with
 links to anchors on the page.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21380 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Onionoo web-page(s) should have new Metrics design

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21380: Onionoo web-page(s) should have new Metrics design
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Some ideas:

  - The list of Onionoo clients can go away.  (The introductory paragraph
 before that should probably stay.)
  - We could easily merge the remainder of the home page with the protocol
 page into a single page.
  - Protocol versions should be a section of its own.
  - Example usage should be moved closer to the top before we dive too much
 into technical details.
  - We might need a box with links to anchors on the page.  We don't have
 that on Tor Metrics, because we have many shorter pages there.  But here
 we have one long page (or two, if we can't agree on the single-page
 change), so we'll need at least some navigation.
  - We don't have a logo for Onionoo.  We could just use the normal Tor
 logo.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21379 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: Metrics-lib web-site

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21379: Metrics-lib web-site
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Sounds like a good start.  Building upon it, how about:

  - an overview what it is,
  - link to CollecTor,
  - link to releases or release table,
  - change log or link to change log,
  - instructions for verifying releases,
  - javadocs,
  - tutorials,
  - link to sources,
  - link to bug tracker, open bugs and direct link for adding new bug, and
  - link to contributor docs on team wiki page.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21376 [Metrics]: add javadoc metrics style

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21376: add javadoc metrics style
-+
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by karsten):

 * cc: RaBe (added)
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I didn't try this out yet, but quick question before I do: Could it be
 that the line `@import url('resources/fonts/dejavu.css');` refers to a
 file that does not exist?  At least my browser complains about that file
 being missing on RaBe's server, that is, only in the web console.  Do we
 need that file?  And if it's not available, can we even use the DejaVu
 Sans font a few lines later?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21385 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ensure fonts are always loaded in the same order

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21385: Ensure fonts are always loaded in the same order
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18097| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Description changed by arthuredelstein:

Old description:

> We bundle fonts with Linux Tor Browser, but I recall noticing that the
> bundled fonts are used with different priorities on different Linux
> flavors, such that a given code point is displayed with Font 1 on Linux
> flavor A and Font 2 on Linux flavor B. This probably has to do with the
> order of font loading being different.
>
> Currently we use a workaround in 000-tor-browser.js, where we enforce
> priorities useing the font.name* prefs. But we should investigate the
> underlying reason for this problem and come up with a better patch that
> ensures our whitelisted fonts always have the same order or priorities.
> That way a given code point will always use the same font.

New description:

 We bundle fonts with Linux Tor Browser, but I recall noticing that the
 bundled fonts are used with different priorities on different Linux
 flavors, such that a given code point is displayed with Font 1 on Linux
 flavor A and Font 2 on Linux flavor B. This probably has to do with the
 order of font loading being different.

 Currently we use a workaround in 000-tor-browser.js, where we enforce
 priorities useing the font.name* prefs. But we should investigate the
 underlying reason for this problem and come up with a better patch that
 ensures our whitelisted fonts are always applied in the same order. That
 way a given code point will always use the same font.

--

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[tor-bugs] #21385 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ensure fonts are always loaded in the same order

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21385: Ensure fonts are always loaded in the same order
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #18097
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 We bundle fonts with Linux Tor Browser, but I recall noticing that the
 bundled fonts are used with different priorities on different Linux
 flavors, such that a given code point is displayed with Font 1 on Linux
 flavor A and Font 2 on Linux flavor B. This probably has to do with the
 order of font loading being different.

 Currently we use a workaround in 000-tor-browser.js, where we enforce
 priorities useing the font.name* prefs. But we should investigate the
 underlying reason for this problem and come up with a better patch that
 ensures our whitelisted fonts always have the same order or priorities.
 That way a given code point will always use the same font.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21384 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Add a graph on Tor Browser downloads by platform

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21384: Add a graph on Tor Browser downloads by platform
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-
 web.git/commit/?h=task-21384&id=fd5f640af28b4854b3e3cc999a51a37dc0267a53
 this patch].

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[tor-bugs] #21384 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Add a graph on Tor Browser downloads by platform

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21384: Add a graph on Tor Browser downloads by platform
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 We have been asked on the [https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-
 numbers blog] to provide another graph on Tor Browser downloads by
 platform, and I agree that this graph can be useful.  I'll provide a
 branch as soon as I have a ticket number.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21200 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Move all TB Mozilla service calls to .onions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21200: Move all TB Mozilla service calls to .onions
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by tom):

 This is a near-complete list, I think. It does _NOT_ include every place
 that Tor Browser *links* to a website, but it hopefully contains every
 automated behind the scenes call to Mozilla websites and it does include
 some links also.

 - Extension Blacklisting from Mozilla is enabled
  - Pref: extensions.blocklist.enabled
  - URL: https://blocklist.addons.mozilla.org/
 - Extension Updating
  - Pref: extensions.update.background.url
  - Url: https://versioncheck.addons.mozilla.org
 - 'Get Add-Ons' - this happens if you choose that tab in Tor Browser
  - Pref: extensions.getAddons.*
  - URL: https://services.addons.mozilla.org
 - Extension Discovery - not sure what this is
  - Pref: extensions.webservice.discoverURL
  - https://discovery.addons.mozilla.org/
 - Customize -> Themes -> Get More Themes opens a tab with this url
  - Pref: lightweightThemes.getMoreURL
  - URL: https://addons.mozilla.org/
 - There's some stuff about media.gmp* but I'm not sure what this is...
 - Firefox Sync
  - Left uninvestigated due to the assumption that while I believe you
 _can_ use this in Tor Browser, that no one does. (and I have no idea how
 it would behave)
 - Devtools
  - It appears devtools.devices.url
 (https://code.cdn.mozilla.net/devices/devices.json) will get downloaded
 for a database of device information.
 - WebIDE will auto-install extensions from https://ftp.mozilla.org/
  - In particular I saw devtools.webide.adaptersAddonURL and
 devtools.webide.adbAddonURL but devtools.webide.simulatorAddonsURL looks
 like another one
  - And templates downloaded from devtools.webide.templatesURL
 - OneCRL and other Kinto-based services (This may not be in ESR 45 but
 will be in 52)
  - Services: OneCRL, 'addons', 'gfx', 'plugins'
   - OneCRL is certificate blacklisting
   - gfx is disabling hardware acceleration for graphics cards or drivers,
 see https://wiki.mozilla.org/Blocklisting/Graphics
   - I am unsure how addon/plugin blacklisting functions here compared to
 the above blocklist.
  - Pref: services.settings.server and services.blocklist.*
  - URL: https://firefox.settings.services.mozilla.com/v1
  - Example:
 
https://firefox.settings.services.mozilla.com/v1/buckets/monitor/collections/changes/records
 (I couldn't figure out what a link to an actual data source would be...)
 - Crash Reporter and Telemetry are disable

 I researched what would happen if Mozilla's blocklist was used against the
 Tor add-ons. The next restart of Tor Browser would have the add-ons
 disabled; and browsing would not work, giving an error that the proxy
 server is refusing connections.

 I confirmed that extensions.systemAddons were not enabled. I also put some
 random other notes in #19048

 Based off of all of this I am going to propose Mozilla start with one of
 the following with the choice probably being whichever one is easiest:

  - ​https://versioncheck.addons.mozilla.org - This one may be most
 preferable, as the version check can be initiated by the user, which
 allows for easy testing.
  - https://blocklist.addons.mozilla.org
  - https://firefox.settings.services.mozilla.com

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19048 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Review Firefox Developer Docs and Undocumented bugs since FF45esr

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19048: Review Firefox Developer Docs and Undocumented bugs since FF45esr
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201701  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by tom):

 We will want to set browser.selfsupport.enabled to false to disable
 Normandy aka Shield aka Self Support aka Self Repair. To be safe we can
 also redirect browser.selfsupport.url

 We probably want to disable stuff under browser.uitour.

 I'm not sure how to get to it in 52, but in 53, the WebIDE auto-installs
 some extensions it downloads from Mozilla. Probably best to disable it via
 devtools.webide.enabled

 The Telemetry experiments features should be disabled (experiments.*)

 There is something called "Extensions Discovery" governed by
 extensions.getAddons.showPane

 Probably want to disable security.ssl.errorReporting

 There's something called 'Social' under social.* including the scary one
 social.remote-install.enabled

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5292 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Build a (manual) TBB test suite

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5292: Build a (manual) TBB test suite
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  satiroloko
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by satiroloko):

 * status:  assigned => accepted
 * owner:  boklm => satiroloko


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[tor-bugs] #21383 [User Experience/Website]: Audit and suggest improvements for torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21383: Audit and suggest improvements for torproject.org
-+
 Reporter:  lnl  |  Owner:  lnl
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  audit, website
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 = Overview =

 https://www.torproject.org/ is the face of Tor. It has many functions
 currently, including providing a place to download Tor, establish trust
 with users through transparency, and provide troubleshooting
 documentation.

 = Tasks =

 We want to redesign torproject.org to specifically be targeted for new Tor
 users and the general public. But  we still want to organize the
 information targeted toward developers, relay operators, researchers, and
 other user personas. I would like for you to answer the following
 questions:

 * From examining the website, without knowing the purpose of the wrong
 page, what do you think the purpose of the front page is?
 * From examining the website, without knowing what our user personas are,
 who do you think the website is trying to appeal to? Is it effective in
 doing so?
 * Tell us the three most urgent things we should fix on the website.
 * Tell us the three more impactful enhancements we could make to better
 the website.

 = Resources =

 * An [https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B36YkvDtVNK_ZkllTnhxZktULTQ
 example] of an audit of the front page. You should audit all of
 torproject.org.
 * A [https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B36YkvDtVNK_eWxGT3Vwbkl4YjA pdf] of
 torproject.org as of Jan 2017. You can use this to annotate for your
 audit.

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[tor-bugs] #21382 [Applications/GetTor]: Implementing a GetTor FaceBook Messenger Bot

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21382: Implementing a GetTor FaceBook Messenger Bot
-+-
 Reporter:  iooryx   |  Owner:  ilv
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 I believe a FaceBook messenger bot would be a great addition to the GetTor
 service and purpose we begin researching into if a FB bot would be
 suitable for distributing GetTor and how the community feels about it. I
 am happy to take questions and gather the answers required as I am the one
 purposing this.

 Bot can be implemented in Python for ease of integrating into GetTor.
 There are a few FB policies covering the use of bots and what they can and
 cannot do, I do not see how the current GetTor bot would fall foul of
 these policies.
 There are limits for api requests which vary depending on which of the two
 FB api is used for the bot, both of which are very high
 A verified (via mobile phone or cc) FB account would be required for
 making the Bot public along with a review of the bot by FB itself.

 I believe this could be a viable and beneficial project and welcome any
 comments or criticisms.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21376 [Metrics]: add javadoc metrics style

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21376: add javadoc metrics style
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/metrics-
 base.git/commit/?h=task-21376&id=324ffacb73e6fdc7f4c9bc931eaeec999687effe
 Here is a branch] of metrics-base with the new style included.

 Works fine locally.  Please review.

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[tor-bugs] #21381 [Metrics/CollecTor]: CollecTor web-page should have new Metrics design

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21381: CollecTor web-page should have new Metrics design
---+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 web-page(s) and file listing (maybe) should have new Metrics design

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[tor-bugs] #21380 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Onionoo web-page(s) should have new Metrics design

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21380: Onionoo web-page(s) should have new Metrics design
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 web-page should have new Metrics design

 what else?

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[tor-bugs] #21379 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: Metrics-lib web-site

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21379: Metrics-lib web-site
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 Quote from meeting:

  [this should contain]
  * an overview what it is with a link to releases,
  * javadocs,
  * tutorials.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14165 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor needs a protocol versioning scheme

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14165: Tor needs a protocol versioning scheme
-+-
 Reporter:  TvdW |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, needs-proposal,|  implemented
  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged, term-project-   |  Actual Points:
  ideas, tor-03-unspecified-201612   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  medium
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


Comment:

 I believe this was done with the implementation of proposal 264.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21377 [Core Tor/Tor]: DirAuths should expose bwauth votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21377: DirAuths should expose bwauth votes
--+-
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by tom):

 The ticket blocks archiving the data in collector, #21378

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[tor-bugs] #21378 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Collector should archive bwauth votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21378: Collector should archive bwauth votes
---+--
 Reporter:  tom|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 The raw bwauth votes (sample:
 https://bwauth.ritter.vg/bwauth/bwscan.V3BandwidthsFile) contain
 information such as last measured time, circuit failures and (eventually)
 scanner information. This can be used for debugging purposes.

 Blocked by #21377

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[tor-bugs] #21377 [Core Tor/Tor]: DirAuths should expose bwauth votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21377: DirAuths should expose bwauth votes
--+-
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Currently, DirAuths that vote on bwauth files do not expose the raw voting
 file they used. This data would be good to archive for debugging and
 transparency purposes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21376 [Metrics]: add javadoc metrics style

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21376: add javadoc metrics style
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by RaBe):

 Here you can download the two files you need to include in the javadocs
 builds:

 javadocs.cc-ltd.net/descriptor/stylesheet.css
 javadocs.cc-ltd.net/descriptor/tor-onion.png

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21107 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.0.x dir auths enforcing ED identity keys: intended?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21107: 0.3.0.x dir auths enforcing ED identity keys: intended?
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 `bug21107` is a possible one-line fix.

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[tor-bugs] #21376 [Metrics]: add javadoc metrics style

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21376: add javadoc metrics style
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 Add common javadoc style to metrics-base.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21027 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:816: entry_guard_add_to_sample_impl: Non-fatal assertion !(have_sampled_guard_with_id(gs, rsa_id_digest)) failed. (o

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21027: tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:816:
entry_guard_add_to_sample_impl: Non-fatal assertion
!(have_sampled_guard_with_id(gs, rsa_id_digest)) failed. (on Tor 0.3.0.0
-alpha-dev 8b75261b6dc341de)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-guards-revamp,|  Actual Points:
  regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 Let's triage this out of 0.3.0, I couldn't reproduce this issue with
 master.
 Needs more testing to see if the bug is still here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21107 [Core Tor/Tor]: 0.3.0.x dir auths enforcing ED identity keys: intended?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21107: 0.3.0.x dir auths enforcing ED identity keys: intended?
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Okay, theory supported.  It means that moria is not voting "Running" for
 any version between 0.2.7.2-alpha and 0.3.0.0-alpha-dev.  But it's voting
 Running for 0.2.7.1-alpha, and voting Running for 0.3.0.1-alpha.

 0.2.7.2-alpha was the first version for relays to have Ed25519 keys.

 During 0.3.0.0-alpha-dev, we implemented the link handshake part of
 Ed25519.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21294 [Core Tor/Tor]: Exits don't allow single-hop SOCKSPorts - update single onion man page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21294: Exits don't allow single-hop SOCKSPorts - update single onion man page
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  doc, tor-hs, single-onion  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged that too!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21294 [Core Tor/Tor]: Exits don't allow single-hop SOCKSPorts - update single onion man page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21294: Exits don't allow single-hop SOCKSPorts - update single onion man page
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, tor-hs, single-onion  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  reopened => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21294 [Core Tor/Tor]: Exits don't allow single-hop SOCKSPorts - update single onion man page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21294: Exits don't allow single-hop SOCKSPorts - update single onion man page
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, tor-hs, single-onion  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 My bad, we broke the unit test expected log message.

 See branch `bug21294_030_02`, top commit fixes that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21356 [Core Tor/Tor]: [0.2.9.9] Bug: compat_time.c: monotime_coarse_absolute_nsec() called before monotime_init() on windows service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21356: [0.2.9.9] Bug: compat_time.c: monotime_coarse_absolute_nsec() called 
before
monotime_init() on windows service
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  windows 029-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


Comment:

 ok, merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21372 [Core Tor/Tor]: Don't crash when we fail to find extend info for a middle node

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21372: Don't crash when we fail to find extend info for a middle node
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash-resistance  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.0.x-final


Comment:

 (Should this be 0.3.0?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21052 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bad prop271 behavior when exhausting all guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21052: Bad prop271 behavior when exhausting all guards
+--
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  prop271, tor-guard, regression  |  Actual Points:  0.6
Parent ID:  #20822  | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer:  nickm   |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks! Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20980 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use the standard OpenBSD preprocessor definition

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20980: Use the standard OpenBSD preprocessor definition
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * cc: teor (added)
 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 Back in needs_review and there is an action item for teor.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21294 [Core Tor/Tor]: Exits don't allow single-hop SOCKSPorts - update single onion man page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21294: Exits don't allow single-hop SOCKSPorts - update single onion man page
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  doc, tor-hs, single-onion  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21266 [Core Tor/Tor]: test: Improve hs intropoints unit test with expected msg log.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21266: test: Improve hs intropoints unit test with expected msg log.
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  test, tor-hs, prop224, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #12424   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 great, merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21230 [Metrics/Atlas]: Atlas should work with a restrictive CSP policy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21230: Atlas should work with a restrictive CSP policy
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  security,css,javascript,csp  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 The underscore JavaScript library generates
 {{{
 Error: call to Function() blocked by CSP
 }}}
 and has been addressed in
 [https://github.com/jashkenas/underscore/issues/906 issue 906] on their
 bug tracker. In that issue they advise to precompile the templates to
 solve the error. I don't know yet what precompiling templates actually
 means.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21374 [User Experience]: What the hell? I am trying to sign up and log in and Tor will not let me. I will distroy you if you don't get this shit fixed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21374: What the hell? I am trying to sign up and log in and Tor will not let 
me. I
will distroy you if you don't get this shit fixed
-+
 Reporter:  StevieB  |  Owner:  lnl
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.7.x-final
Component:  User Experience  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  Can NOT LOG IN   |  Actual Points:  CAN NOT SIGN IN
Parent ID:   | Points:  YOU SUCK
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorU
-+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 Sorry to hear that. Sign in to what?

 Trac is not a support portal. Please use our IRC channels for support.
 Thanks.

 I'm closing this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21240 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create patches to fix mingw-w64 compilation of Firefox ESR 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21240: Create patches to fix mingw-w64 compilation of Firefox ESR 52
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21147| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 I tested a build with the usual modifications we need to apply to get it
 running on Windows and it worked on a Windows 7 machine. I surfed a bit
 (read news and watched some youtube videos) and no crashes or other things
 that would worry me. \o/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21052 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bad prop271 behavior when exhausting all guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21052: Bad prop271 behavior when exhausting all guards
+--
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop271, tor-guard, regression  |  Actual Points:  0.6
Parent ID:  #20822  | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer:  nickm   |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:6 nickm]:
 > Yes, I think this is a good approach.  Nice code reuse too. I've merged
 it to master.
 >
 > I ''do'' wonder about whether this can ever cause us to hammer on all of
 our sampled guards, over and over.  But maybe that suggest we should rate-
 limit circuits when we seem to be down or something.  In any case, it's
 not a regression from 0.2.9.x behavior as far as I can tell.
 >
 > As a followup, could you please write a quick note about this in guard-
 spec.txt before we close the ticket?
 >

 ACK. Please see branch `bug21052` in my torspec repo.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21375 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please add karsten to torextratpo group

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21375: Please add karsten to torextratpo group
-+
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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[tor-bugs] #21375 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please add karsten to torextratpo group

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21375: Please add karsten to torextratpo group
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 I'd like to add stuff to extra.torproject.org for a blog post.  Please add
 me to the torextratpo group.  Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21364 [Metrics/Atlas]: Remove flag label from tooltips

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21364: Remove flag label from tooltips
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by RaBe):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18530 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider dropping support for Mac OS 10.6, 10.7, and 10.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18530: Consider dropping support for Mac OS 10.6, 10.7, and 10.8
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21147| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:3 cypherpunks]:
 > Is there any chance that you will do not as Mozilla does?

 We decided on Monday to follow Mozilla as it is too risky that any
 security fix assumes macOS > 10.9 and would break on macOS < 10.9.

 This ticket is then about the transition off macOS < 10.9.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21366 [Metrics/Atlas]: support whitespace in search term (as does onionoo)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21366: support whitespace in search term (as does onionoo)
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Great to see that others (teor) also have a use case here.

 Replying to [comment:10 karsten]:
 > The `contactonly:` suggestion is a hack.  We shouldn't go that route.

 I agree that would be a hack, but a hack is still better than no solution
 at all - for me.
 (I'm not in favor of that hack if there is someone implementing a proper
 solution.)

 If anyone implements something proper, let me add something that I didn't
 mention until know because it reduces the likelihood of any solution at
 all.

 I'd actually like to search for perfect matches only.

 Search term:
 "Neel Chauhan"

 should not match on

 Chauhan Neel
 or
 Neel Chauhan 123

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21357 [Core Tor/Tor]: potential bug: Some IPv6Exits do not add the ipv6-policy line to their descriptor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21357: potential bug: Some IPv6Exits do not add the ipv6-policy line to their
descriptor
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.7-alpha
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6 029-backport  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID: | Points:  2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 The relay operator who originally reported this bug has upgraded to a
 nightly including this patch, and reports that it works:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 relays/2017-February/011856.html

 Their relay now has an IPv6 exit policy:
 https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/5E762A58B1F7FF92E791A1EA4F18695CAC6677CE

 > It is likely that 0.2.8 and later are affected, possible that 0.2.7 is
 affected, and unlikely that earlier versions are affected.

 I'll clarify: earlier versions may be affected if they explicitly block
 networks smaller than an IPv6 /32 or larger than an IPv6 /7. The first
 behaviour is unintentional, the second is intentional but the wrong number
 of addresses for IPv6 (both are fixed in this patch).

 Later versions automatically block their own IPv6 ORPort's address, so
 IPv6 Exits with an IPv6 ORPort are almost always affected (unless their
 Exit policies start by blocking a /32 to /7 containing their IPv6 address,
 which ends up removing the individual address as redundant).

 I suggest we give it at least another week of testing before a backport.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21373 [Metrics/Atlas]: Atlas search for contact info

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21373: Atlas search for contact info
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 See the discussion on #21366.  Closing as duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21366 [Metrics/Atlas]: support whitespace in search term (as does onionoo)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21366: support whitespace in search term (as does onionoo)
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by karsten):

 The `contactonly:` suggestion is a hack.  We shouldn't go that route.

 The stop-gap solution would be that you prefix each contact part with
 `contact:`, as in:
 [https://atlas.torproject.org/#search/contact:Neel%20contact:Chauhan].

 One possible real solution would be to extend Onionoo to accept quoted
 strings.  Needs more discussion and somebody to write it.

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