Re: [tor-bugs] #21420 [Core Tor/Tor]: Link certificate start date in the future

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21420: Link certificate start date in the future
--+-
 Reporter:  mmcloughlin   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by mmcloughlin):

 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor


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[tor-bugs] #21420 [- Select a component]: Link certificate start date in the future

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21420: Link certificate start date in the future
--+-
 Reporter:  mmcloughlin   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Some link certificates are generated with start dates in the future. Is
 this intentional, or a bug?

 These lines of code generate a start date for the link certificate. Why
 does this add two days?

 
https://github.com/torproject/tor/blob/9a9f4ffdfa965e50de05a4f1bd8c4d68cfb95f12/src/common/tortls.c#L481-L487

 I confirmed this happens in the wild. This code connects to tor relays and
 inspects the link certificate. (Not beautiful code but it does the job.)

 https://github.com/mmcloughlin/torcerts

 It doesn't take too long to find an example. One I found just now:

 {{{
 addr=117.201.240.2:9001
 now=Wed Feb  8 22:05:15 UTC 2017
 notBefore=Feb 10 00:00:00 2017 GMT
 -BEGIN CERTIFICATE-
 MIIBtzCCASCgAwIBAgIJAOqgI76M4OOKMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMBsxGTAXBgNV
 BAMMEHd3dy5iamdpN2d0dS5jb20wHhcNMTcwMjEwMDAwMDAwWhcNMTcwMjE2MjM1
 OTU5WjAgMR4wHAYDVQQDDBV3d3cuM242bWNvaWp6Z3Jzai5uZXQwgZ8wDQYJKoZI
 hvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAKRkfrD4q5HNIkE9lglJjljlZoT15OE3VDE66GYT
 hZ/FsCMtGPw1TKj+EB6NyjEYSxP7+EgJOOVGzxb3ybmEs8wJSbVhue8NeavbgcVY
 X3UcVyPMFLSDGBKhOADrHztyznMRzDkmMx83OtJH5QpNZvNcMVP0H1QHCFB/YJMY
 iIVnAgMBAAEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADgYEAvPVq5VcF/s9TCknZaxzDNHT/c0SQ
 4UKQ0y1iZbMJeWlYeMqU3o1NwGnvJ7PEeVo+Cpst0A6accbStYpiXuhuuaFGcpFl
 ZJWMlMpr5GSK9uxrxwa82M69hukW4eVP4o7rZARN0o5/ilNLmy3r/vJkvFPNX5us
 80t7Euud8VkyVJU=
 -END CERTIFICATE-
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17849 [Core Tor/Tor]: Warn if single-stack IPv4/IPv6 clients have very restricted guard choices

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17849: Warn if single-stack IPv4/IPv6 clients have very restricted guard 
choices
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ipv6, easy, prop259, tor-guard,  |  Actual Points:  0
  isaremoved, tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:  #17811   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * actualpoints:   => 0


Comment:

 This was implemented as part of proposal 217 in #19877.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5462 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clients should alert the user if many guards are unreachable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5462: Clients should alert the user if many guards are unreachable
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, large-feature, path- |  Actual Points:
  bias, 026-triaged-1, 027-triaged-1-in, |
  028-triaged, prop259, tor-guard, tor-guards-   |
  revamp, tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Was this implemented as part of proposal 217 in #19877?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21418 [Applications/Tor Browser]: New Tor Browser http response header, for high security websites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21418: New Tor Browser http response header, for high security websites
--+--
 Reporter:  micahlee  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by tom):

 Is a header the right choice for this? On the surface, I kind of like the
 ability for a website to opt-in to stricter security controls but the
 threat model is odd.

 If it's a HTTP Header that applies per-request, the attacker has hacked
 the server or the network, but not completely otherwise they could remove
 or disable the header.

 If it's some sort of persistent mechanism (for example: a HTTP Header that
 gets remembered with max-age) then we're presuming the HTTP Server is
 trustable at one point in time and then gets compromised later.

 That second one seems a lot more reasonable to me than just a per-response
 header.

 It does; however, introduce the state problem - you don't actually want to
 remember state in Tor Browser so we would have to solve that problem.



 I would note that this really applies more for the other features of the
 Tor Browser security slider than Javascript. You can effectively disable
 javascript entirely using Content Security Policy with _is_ a per-response
 header that Tor Browser already supports.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21418 [Applications/Tor Browser]: New Tor Browser http response header, for high security websites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21418: New Tor Browser http response header, for high security websites
--+--
 Reporter:  micahlee  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by micahlee):

 * type:  defect => enhancement


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21383 [User Experience/Website]: Audit and suggest improvements for torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21383: Audit and suggest improvements for torproject.org
-+--
 Reporter:  lnl  |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  audit, website   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by antonela):

 Hola! I made a first approach for this task.
 Take a look and leave your thoughts, ideas and comments here. If you want
 to discuss something specific, please leave a comment in the doc, I’ll get
 back to you ASAP.

 https://docs.google.com/a/antonela.me/document/d
 /1LmidX2kLutU0SXBkkucBPHJIGxu8XPb-5LmMHEmK3o4/edit?usp=sharing

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21383 [User Experience/Website]: Audit and suggest improvements for torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21383: Audit and suggest improvements for torproject.org
-+--
 Reporter:  lnl  |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  audit, website   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  lnl => antonela


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21301 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adjustable parameters for torrc-defaults file path and "Tor files" directory path

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21301: Adjustable parameters for torrc-defaults file path and "Tor files"
directory path
--+---
 Reporter:  proxybrain|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by proxybrain):

 Thank you for the helpful suggestions. I was able to use the preferences
 and custom `torrc` (vs. `torrc-defaults`) you suggested to achieve my
 desired configurations. One point of difficulty that took awhile to debug
 was owed to `extensions.torlauncher.tordatadir_path` and
 `extensions.torlauncher.torrc_path` having maximum supported lengths, with
 respect to the tor executable (or so it seems). It was not clear to me why
 I was experiencing repeat failed launches of TBB, until I lucked out in
 noticing a tor log entry re: the path-length. Once I got that sorted out,
 all worked as desired.

 Here's a closely related question:

 Let `firefox` be the TBB executable and `/some/path` be an empty
 directory; these commands produce rather different output in `/some/path`:

 `firefox --profile=/some/path`

 `firefox -CreateProfile "some_name /some/path"`

 How can I generate the same output that results from the first command –
 let's call it the `TBB default profile` – but without starting the TBB
 application ''per se''?

 The `-CreateProfile` option is going the right direction, since it exits
 after writing to disk, but doesn't output the `TBB default profile`.

 My use case: when the TBB executable is invoked by Selenium (+gecko-
 driver) and when Selenium is not supplied with a custom profile, then a
 profile is created for the driven instance that is entirely different from
 the `TBB default profile`, one which does not function properly. Why
 that's the case, I'm not sure. It's possible, of course, to manually
 generate the `TBB default profile` by way of a TBB launch that's aborted
 after the expected files are written to disk. Then one can copy around
 those files and pass them – plus `user.js` – to Selenium as a custom
 profile for the TBB instance/s Selenium will launch. However, that initial
 profile generation adds a bit of a wild hair to the automation process;
 for example, one has to manually keep a manifest of what's in the `TBB
 default profile`, which could change across releases. So, all considered,
 the automation process would be much simpler if it were possible to invoke
 the TBB executable such that it writes the `TBB default profile` to disk,
 at a specified path, and then exits.

 I will be happy to turn this inquiry (feature request?) into a separate
 ticket, but I felt it made sense to ask here first since it's closely
 related to customization of TBB profiles per the preferences you
 recommended.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21418 [Applications/Tor Browser]: New Tor Browser http response header, for high security websites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21418: New Tor Browser http response header, for high security websites
--+--
 Reporter:  micahlee  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16456 [Applications/Tor Browser]: screen size fingerprint with findbar panel/bookmarks toolbar

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16456: screen size fingerprint with findbar panel/bookmarks toolbar
---+--
 Reporter:  tmpAnon|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by gk):

 See #21409 when working on this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21409 [Applications/Tor Browser]: bookmark bug

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21409: bookmark bug
--+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Yeah, we don't take care of enabling/disabling toolbars yet and this bug
 is a result of that. Let's take care of this in #16456. FWIW: this might
 be an OS X issue as I don't see it on my Linux box.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21419 [Metrics/Metrics website]: avoid spurious downturns and 'spamming' of top-10-censorship list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21419: avoid spurious downturns and 'spamming' of top-10-censorship list
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Description changed by iwakeh:

Old description:

> [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-censorship-
> events.html?start=2016-01-01=2016-12-31 top 10 list for 2016]
> [[Image(top10censorship-2016-marked.png)]]
> The marked countries have a very low client count and the predicted lower
> value is zero.
> Starting from the top, Christmas Island has a median user count of one
> in 2016 with the third quartile being two.  Also, Netherlands Antilles
> have a median of two connections, Kiribati, British Indian Ocean
> Territory, Norfolk Island, and Tokelau each a 2016 user count median of
> one.
>
> Similarly, the downturns in country specific censorship events, for
> example [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
> country.html?start=2016-01-01=2016-12-31=an=on
> Netherlands Antilles in 2016] [[Image( userstats-relay-country-
> an-2016-03-01-2016-09-30-on.png)]]
>
> I attached a simple path.

New description:

 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-censorship-
 events.html?start=2016-01-01=2016-12-31 top 10 list for 2016]
 [[Image(top10censorship-2016-marked.png)]]
 The marked countries have a very low client count and the predicted lower
 value is zero.
 Starting from the top, Christmas Island has a median user count of one
 in 2016 with the third quartile being two.  Also, Netherlands Antilles
 have a median of two connections, Kiribati, British Indian Ocean
 Territory, Norfolk Island, and Tokelau each a 2016 user count median of
 one.

 Similarly, the downturns in country specific censorship events, for
 example [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
 country.html?start=2016-01-01=2016-12-31=an=on
 Netherlands Antilles in 2016] [[Image( userstats-relay-country-
 an-2016-03-01-2016-09-30-on.png)]]

 I attached a simple patch.

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21419 [Metrics/Metrics website]: avoid spurious downturns and 'spamming' of top-10-censorship list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21419: avoid spurious downturns and 'spamming' of top-10-censorship list
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Description changed by iwakeh:

Old description:

> [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-censorship-
> events.html?start=2016-01-01=2016-12-31 top 10 list for 2016]
> [[Image(top10censorship-2016-marked.png)]]
> The marked countries have a very low client count and the predicted lower
> value is zero.
> Similarly, the downturns in country specific censorship events, for
> example [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
> country.html?start=2016-01-01=2016-12-31=an=on
> Netherlands Antilles in 2016] [[Image( userstats-relay-country-
> an-2016-03-01-2016-09-30-on.png)]]
>
> I attache a simple path.

New description:

 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-censorship-
 events.html?start=2016-01-01=2016-12-31 top 10 list for 2016]
 [[Image(top10censorship-2016-marked.png)]]
 The marked countries have a very low client count and the predicted lower
 value is zero.
 Starting from the top, Christmas Island has a median user count of one
 in 2016 with the third quartile being two.  Also, Netherlands Antilles
 have a median of two connections, Kiribati, British Indian Ocean
 Territory, Norfolk Island, and Tokelau each a 2016 user count median of
 one.

 Similarly, the downturns in country specific censorship events, for
 example [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
 country.html?start=2016-01-01=2016-12-31=an=on
 Netherlands Antilles in 2016] [[Image( userstats-relay-country-
 an-2016-03-01-2016-09-30-on.png)]]

 I attached a simple path.

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21419 [Metrics/Metrics website]: avoid spurious downturns and 'spamming' of top-10-censorship list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21419: avoid spurious downturns and 'spamming' of top-10-censorship list
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/metrics-
 web.git/commit/?h=task-21419-spurious-
 downturns=b7c73c3249c412afd8a106e97015dca715f0c539 my branch].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21419 [Metrics/Metrics website]: avoid spurious downturns and 'spamming' of top-10-censorship list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21419: avoid spurious downturns and 'spamming' of top-10-censorship list
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Description changed by iwakeh:

Old description:

> [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-censorship-
> events.html?start=2016-01-01=2016-12-31 top 10 list for 2016]
> [[Image(top10censorship-2016-marked.png)]]
> The marked countries have a very low client count and the predicted lower
> value is zero.
> Similarly, the downturns in country specific censorship events, for
> example [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
> country.html?start=2016-01-01=2016-12-31=an=on
> Netherlands Antilles in 2016] [[Image(userstats-relay-country-
> an-2016-01-01-2016-12-31-on.png)]]
>
> I attache a simple path.

New description:

 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-censorship-
 events.html?start=2016-01-01=2016-12-31 top 10 list for 2016]
 [[Image(top10censorship-2016-marked.png)]]
 The marked countries have a very low client count and the predicted lower
 value is zero.
 Similarly, the downturns in country specific censorship events, for
 example [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
 country.html?start=2016-01-01=2016-12-31=an=on
 Netherlands Antilles in 2016] [[Image( userstats-relay-country-
 an-2016-03-01-2016-09-30-on.png)]]

 I attache a simple path.

--

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[tor-bugs] #21419 [Metrics/Metrics website]: avoid spurious downturns and 'spamming' of top-10-censorship list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21419: avoid spurious downturns and 'spamming' of top-10-censorship list
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-censorship-
 events.html?start=2016-01-01=2016-12-31 top 10 list for 2016]
 [[Image(top10censorship-2016-marked.png)]]
 The marked countries have a very low client count and the predicted lower
 value is zero.
 Similarly, the downturns in country specific censorship events, for
 example [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
 country.html?start=2016-01-01=2016-12-31=an=on
 Netherlands Antilles in 2016] [[Image(userstats-relay-country-
 an-2016-01-01-2016-12-31-on.png)]]

 I attache a simple path.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21418 [Applications/Tor Browser]: New Tor Browser http response header, for high security websites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21418: New Tor Browser http response header, for high security websites
--+--
 Reporter:  micahlee  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by micahlee):

 * owner:   => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


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[tor-bugs] #21418 [- Select a component]: New Tor Browser http response header, for high security websites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21418: New Tor Browser http response header, for high security websites
--+-
 Reporter:  micahlee  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 When someone uses Tor Browser to load a SecureDrop website, if javascript
 is enabled, it recommends that they disable it. But at the moment, there
 are some big UX problems with how it's done: It's a big scary red warning
 that's displayed to nearly all users, and the instructions are out-of-date
 (they tell you to disable JS using NoScript instead of the Tor Browser
 security settings slider). Overall, it's scary and confusing, and tells
 _everyone_ to jump through hoops.

 Here's some of the discussion about this on the SecureDrop issue tracker:
 https://github.com/freedomofpress/securedrop/issues/1566

 The rationale behind telling users to disable javascript is because the
 SecureDrop server itself is part of the threat model. If someone
 successfully hacks a SecureDrop server, they can then serve Tor Browser
 exploits to all of its users to deanonymize them (similar to the Freedom
 Hosting attack), and high security mode reduces this attack service a lot.

 I'd like to propose a new custom http response header that Tor Browser
 watches for: `X-Tor-High-Security: 1`. If you load a website with this
 header set, no matter what the Tor Browser security slider is currently
 set to, it should treat that tab as if the slider were set to high.

 This would also be very useful for anyone running websites where they
 include themselves in the threat model, such as Tor-based email providers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21183 [User Experience]: Basic Usability Issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21183: Basic Usability Issues
+-
 Reporter:  ninavizz|  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  UX, UI, torbrowser  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20843  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by micahlee):

 * cc: micahlee (added)


Comment:

 I agree, these look like great UX improvements.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21409 [Applications/Tor Browser]: bookmark bug

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21409: bookmark bug
--+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 The gray box does go away after a restart but following the directions
 above causes it to come back.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21409 [Applications/Tor Browser]: bookmark bug

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21409: bookmark bug
--+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 What happens if you restart Tor Browser again? Does the gray box go away
 then and your window dimensions are properly rounded (again)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20988 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test fgets_eagain fails on FreeBSD-amd64

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20988: Test fgets_eagain fails on FreeBSD-amd64
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  freebsd, tor-03-unspecified-201612  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Closed #21416 as a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21416 [Core Tor/Tor]: util/fgets_eagain test failure on FreeBSD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21416: util/fgets_eagain test failure on FreeBSD
--+---
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 This is a duplicate of #20988.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21116 [Core Tor/Tor]: fix building on raspbian wheezy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21116: fix building on raspbian wheezy
--+
 Reporter:  hein  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


Comment:

 The changes file contains a extraneous dot and a version number prefixed
 with `tor-`.

 {{{
 diff --git a/changes/bug21116 b/changes/bug21116
 index 2304ab0fd..09b6e6293 100644
 --- a/changes/bug21116
 +++ b/changes/bug21116
 @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
o Minor bugfixes (test):
 -- Fix Raspbian build missing socket errno in test util. Fixes bug
 21116.;
 -  bugfix on tor-0.2.8.2. Patch by "hein".
 +- Fix Raspbian build missing socket errno in test util. Fixes bug
 21116;
 +  bugfix on 0.2.8.2. Patch by "hein".
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21268 [Applications/Tor Browser]: e10s compatibility for New Identity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21268: e10s compatibility for New Identity
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,ff52-esr,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201702R  |
Parent ID:  #21201   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-torbutton,ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201702 => tbb-
 torbutton,ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201702R


Comment:

 Here is a patch for review:
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/torbutton.git/commit/?h=bug21268-01=5e5d313fa4789ee9151dc653909e95bb236ae8d4

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21205 [Core Tor/Tor]: Instrument clients to measure directory usage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21205: Instrument clients to measure directory usage
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  sponsor4  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  parent
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * cc: ahf (added)


Comment:

 Additional possible scenarios for client usage after a discussion in
 `#tor-dev`:

 - Client turns on, fetches an HTTP website, idles for N minutes, then
 shuts down for M minutes, then starts again.
 - Add systematic "noise" to some of the already listed tests: For example:
 client is completely unused, but have a flaky network connection.
 - For the IRC test (long-lasting connection): add occasional retries and
 some bursty behaviour.

 Roger additionally suggested using `tgen`, from Shadow, to generate
 realistic-looking network traffic, but since this is about directory
 connectivity performance enhancements, we decided to not look at it for
 now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21410 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Pagewise scrolling up with [Shift]+[Space] not working on some websites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21410: Pagewise scrolling up with [Shift]+[Space] not working on some websites
--+--
 Reporter:  Runawe|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-usability


Comment:

 5.0a4 is the first that breaks the correct behavior. My bet goes to our
 keyboard fingerprinting defense but I am bisecting it to be sure.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20989 [Applications/Tor Browser]: browser sandbox profile too restrictive on OSX 10.12.2

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20989: browser sandbox profile too restrictive on OSX 10.12.2
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-sandboxing,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201701R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 I closed #21395 as a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21395 [Applications/Tor Browser]: can not run torbrowser sandbox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21395: can not run torbrowser sandbox
-+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-sandboxing tbb-security  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 Dbryrtfbcbhgf]:
 > Torbrowser now opens

 Great!

 > ... here is a error I get.
 > 2017-02-04 22:18:48.940 firefox[2175:84645] kCFURLVolumeIsAutomountedKey
 missing for file://localhost/Volumes/Recovery%20HD/: The file “Recovery
 HD” couldn’t be opened because you don’t have permission to view it.

 The above message can be safely ignored. It occurs because the sandbox
 blocks access to /Volumes, and something in the browser (or an Apple dylib
 that it uses) tries to look at all mounted volumes. It does not seem to
 affect use of the browser.

 > 1486275529500 addons.xpi-utilsERROR   Unable to read anything
 useful from the database
 > 0 migrated.

 This message occurs the first time the browser is open and is not related
 to the sandbox. It also may be ignored.

 I am closing this ticket as a duplicate of #20989.

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[tor-bugs] #21417 [Applications/Tor Browser]: cannot use search engine

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21417: cannot use search engine
--+-
 Reporter:  suriela   |  Owner:  suriela
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 everytime I made a search it refuses to pull any information of my
 request.  When I put in a link in the URL BAR it also denies access.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21408 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser auto resize broken (was: Tor Browser auto resize broken in Virtualbox)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21408: Tor Browser auto resize broken
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  not a
 Keywords:  tbb-usability tbb-fingerprinting-|  bug
  resolution |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 Ah, I misunderstood you then. This is not a bug. This features is
 currently only available on the alpha series as we are testing it and
 there are still some rough edges we need to solve. See: #14429 for more
 details.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21381 [Metrics/CollecTor]: CollecTor web-page should have new Metrics design

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21381: CollecTor web-page should have new Metrics design
---+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by RaBe):

 Ah, I see. I added a side nav box with anchors for the data formats
 section. We could also think about putting the three content sections at
 three separate pages...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21408 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser auto resize broken in Virtualbox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21408: Tor Browser auto resize broken in Virtualbox
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability tbb-fingerprinting-|  Actual Points:
  resolution |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I'm really confused. This may not be affecting just VirtualBox

 I realized that when I tested with Tor Browser 7.0a1, this problem went
 away. Then I tried extracting a new Tor Browser 6.5 on my main Windows
 system and realized resizing didn't work there too, i.e. not VirtualBox.
 Apparently I have been using a user.js file that includes
 user_pref("extensions.torbutton.resize_windows", true);

 I don't even remember when I added that line, but apparently resizing was
 not working and this has fixed it for me.

 So I found the problem, when I install stable 6.5,
 extensions.torbutton.resize_windows is set to false by default however
 when I install 7.0a1 it is set to true by default

 However I have no idea how many people is affected by this and for how
 long

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21416 [Core Tor/Tor]: util/fgets_eagain test failure on FreeBSD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21416: util/fgets_eagain test failure on FreeBSD
--+-
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by ahf):

 Error correction: I meant to return the pointer to the input buffer and
 **not** `NULL`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21116 [Core Tor/Tor]: fix building on raspbian wheezy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21116: fix building on raspbian wheezy
--+
 Reporter:  hein  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 I've cleaned up and taken this one ready for merge: `bug21116_030_01`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21416 [Core Tor/Tor]: util/fgets_eagain test failure on FreeBSD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21416: util/fgets_eagain test failure on FreeBSD
--+-
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by ahf):

 I've run the attached test case on a couple of targets thanks to some help
 by some friends on IRC.

 Linux with glibc:

 {{{
 feof()   = 0
 ferror() = 1
 retptr   = 0x7ffcefd02030
 }}}

 Linux with musl-libc (Thanks to Somasis):

 {{{
 feof()   = 0
 ferror() = 1
 retptr   = 0
 }}}

 FreeBSD:

 {{{
 feof()   = 0
 ferror() = 1
 retptr   = 0x0
 }}}

 OpenBSD (Thanks to Kramse):

 {{{
 feof()   = 0
 ferror() = 1
 retptr   = 0x7f7bfd40
 }}}

 OS X

 {{{
 feof()   = 0
 ferror() = 1
 retptr   = 0x7fff5d37d710
 }}}

 It seems like the assumption that the returned pointer value is always the
 same as the input buffer in this case is incorrect for some of our
 supported operating systems.

 Should we consider making a `tor_fgets` in our compatibility layer, which
 checks for `ferror(file) == 1` and `errno == EAGAIN` and in that case
 returns `NULL`?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21415 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_: Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:1845: select_entry_guard_for_circuit: Non-fatal assertion !(!guard_has_descriptor(guard)) failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21415: tor_bug_occurred_: Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:1845:
select_entry_guard_for_circuit: Non-fatal assertion
!(!guard_has_descriptor(guard)) failed.
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Reproduced. Posting complete log this time.

 {{{
 Feb 08 13:36:10.759 [notice] Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha (git-bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 running on Darwin with Libevent 2.1.8-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.2k and Zlib
 1.2.11.
 Feb 08 13:36:10.760 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn
 how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning
 Feb 08 13:36:10.760 [notice] This version is not a stable Tor release.
 Expect more bugs than usual.
 Feb 08 13:36:10.760 [notice] Read configuration file "/Users/tor/.torrc".
 Feb 08 13:36:10.765 [notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9050
 Feb 08 13:36:10.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file /.../tor/geoip.
 Feb 08 13:36:10.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file /.../tor/geoip6.
 Feb 08 13:36:10.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%: Starting
 Feb 08 13:36:11.000 [notice] Starting with guard context "bridges"
 Feb 08 13:36:11.000 [notice] new bridge descriptor '...
 Feb 08 13:36:11.000 [notice] new bridge descriptor '...
 Feb 08 13:36:11.000 [notice] new bridge descriptor '...
 Feb 08 13:36:11.000 [notice] Delaying directory fetches: Pluggable
 transport proxies still configuring
 Feb 08 13:36:12.000 [notice] Ignoring directory request, since no bridge
 nodes are available yet.
 Feb 08 13:36:12.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor
 network
 Feb 08 13:36:12.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 85%: Finishing handshake with
 first hop
 Feb 08 13:36:xx.000 [warn] Proxy Client: unable to connect to ...
 ("general SOCKS server failure")
 Feb 08 13:36:xx.000 [warn] Proxy Client: unable to connect to ...
 ("general SOCKS server failure")
 Feb 08 13:37:xx.000 [notice] Ignoring directory request, since no bridge
 nodes are available yet.
 Feb 08 13:37:xx.000 [warn] Proxy Client: unable to connect to ...
 ("general SOCKS server failure")
 Feb 08 13:37:xx.000 [warn] Proxy Client: unable to connect to ...
 ("general SOCKS server failure")
 Feb 08 13:37:xx.000 [warn] Proxy Client: unable to connect to ...
 ("general SOCKS server failure")
 Feb 08 13:37:xx.000 [warn] Proxy Client: unable to connect to ...
 ("general SOCKS server failure")
 Feb 08 13:37:30.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_: Bug:
 src/or/entrynodes.c:1845: select_entry_guard_for_circuit: Non-fatal
 assertion !(!guard_has_descriptor(guard)) failed. (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha
 bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 13:37:30.000 [warn] Bug: Non-fatal assertion
 !(!guard_has_descriptor(guard)) failed in select_entry_guard_for_circuit
 at src/or/entrynodes.c:1845. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha
 bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 13:37:30.000 [warn] Bug: 0   tor
 0x000103a98f98 log_backtrace + 73 (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha
 bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 13:37:30.000 [warn] Bug: 1   tor
 0x000103aad52b tor_bug_occurred_ + 268 (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha
 bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 13:37:30.000 [warn] Bug: 2   tor
 0x000103a24587 entry_guard_pick_for_circuit + 307 (on Tor
 0.3.0.3-alpha bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 13:37:30.000 [warn] Bug: 3   tor
 0x000103a282b5 guards_choose_guard + 138 (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha
 bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 13:37:30.000 [warn] Bug: 4   tor
 0x0001039b5c16 circuit_establish_circuit + 2261 (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha
 bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 13:37:30.000 [warn] Bug: 5   tor
 0x0001039c6f1b circuit_build_needed_circs + 751 (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha
 bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 13:37:30.000 [warn] Bug: 6   tor
 0x000103a344ef second_elapsed_callback + 811 (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha
 bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 13:37:30.000 [warn] Bug: 7   libevent-2.1.6.dylib
 0x000103bf6127 event_process_active_single_queue + 1262 (on Tor
 0.3.0.3-alpha bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 13:37:30.000 [warn] Bug: 8   libevent-2.1.6.dylib
 0x000103bf29d6 event_base_loop + 1189 (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha
 bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 13:37:30.000 [warn] Bug: 9   tor
 0x000103a33ed4 do_main_loop + 1118 (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha
 bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 13:37:30.000 [warn] Bug: 10  tor
 0x000103a360cd tor_main + 235 (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 13:37:30.000 [warn] Bug: 11  tor
 0x00010399e775 main + 25 (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 13:37:30.000 [warn] Bug: 12  libdyld.dylib
 0x7fffbc194255 start + 1 (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 13:37:31.000 

[tor-bugs] #21416 [Core Tor/Tor]: util/fgets_eagain test failure on FreeBSD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21416: util/fgets_eagain test failure on FreeBSD
--+-
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 The `util/fgets_again` test currently fails on FreeBSD with the following
 error:

 {{{
 $ ./src/test/test util/fgets_eagain
 util/fgets_eagain:
   FAIL src/test/test_util.c:3969: assert(retptr OP_EQ buf): 0x0 vs
 0x7efe49dea1f0
   [fgets_eagain FAILED]
 1/1 TESTS FAILED. (0 skipped)
 }}}

 This causes the FreeBSD build-bot to report failure on every commit.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21415 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_: Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:1845: select_entry_guard_for_circuit: Non-fatal assertion !(!guard_has_descriptor(guard)) failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21415: tor_bug_occurred_: Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:1845:
select_entry_guard_for_circuit: Non-fatal assertion
!(!guard_has_descriptor(guard)) failed.
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.0.x-final


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[tor-bugs] #21415 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_bug_occurred_: Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:1845: select_entry_guard_for_circuit: Non-fatal assertion !(!guard_has_descriptor(guard)) failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21415: tor_bug_occurred_: Bug: src/or/entrynodes.c:1845:
select_entry_guard_for_circuit: Non-fatal assertion
!(!guard_has_descriptor(guard)) failed.
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 using public obfs4 bridges.

 {{{
 Feb 08 12:13:40.000 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_: Bug:
 src/or/entrynodes.c:1845: select_entry_guard_for_circuit: Non-fatal
 assertion !(!guard_has_descriptor(guard)) failed. (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha
 bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 12:13:40.000 [warn] Bug: Non-fatal assertion
 !(!guard_has_descriptor(guard)) failed in select_entry_guard_for_circuit
 at src/or/entrynodes.c:1845. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha
 bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 12:13:40.000 [warn] Bug: 0   tor
 0x00010f4e3f98 log_backtrace + 73 (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha
 bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 12:13:40.000 [warn] Bug: 1   tor
 0x00010f4f852b tor_bug_occurred_ + 268 (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha
 bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 12:13:40.000 [warn] Bug: 2   tor
 0x00010f40f587 entry_guard_pick_for_circuit + 307 (on Tor
 0.3.0.3-alpha bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 12:13:40.000 [warn] Bug: 3   tor
 0x00010f4732b5 guards_choose_guard + 138 (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha
 bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 12:13:40.000 [warn] Bug: 4   tor
 0x00010f400c16 circuit_establish_circuit + 2261 (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha
 bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 12:13:40.000 [warn] Bug: 5   tor
 0x00010f411f1b circuit_build_needed_circs + 751 (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha
 bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 12:13:40.000 [warn] Bug: 6   tor
 0x00010f47f4ef second_elapsed_callback + 811 (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha
 bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 12:13:40.000 [warn] Bug: 7   libevent-2.1.6.dylib
 0x00010f641127 event_process_active_single_queue + 1262 (on Tor
 0.3.0.3-alpha bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 12:13:40.000 [warn] Bug: 8   libevent-2.1.6.dylib
 0x00010f63d9d6 event_base_loop + 1189 (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha
 bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 12:13:40.000 [warn] Bug: 9   tor
 0x00010f47eed4 do_main_loop + 1118 (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha
 bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 12:13:40.000 [warn] Bug: 10  tor
 0x00010f4810cd tor_main + 235 (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 12:13:40.000 [warn] Bug: 11  tor
 0x00010f3e9775 main + 25 (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 Feb 08 12:13:40.000 [warn] Bug: 12  libdyld.dylib
 0x7fffbc194255 start + 1 (on Tor 0.3.0.3-alpha bb2ea3642d54ff03)
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21334 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Update prop224 HS desriptor generation code to produce the latest descriptor format

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21334: prop224: Update prop224 HS desriptor generation code to produce the 
latest
descriptor format
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Please see my branch `bug21334_v1` for an initial implementation of this
 feature.

 I still need to check the new code coverage and write tests as needed, but
 I'm putting this branch out in case someone wants to review code.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21381 [Metrics/CollecTor]: CollecTor web-page should have new Metrics design

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21381: CollecTor web-page should have new Metrics design
---+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Replying to [comment:8 RaBe]:
 > I removed the three menu items and the affiliated content.

 Thanks :-)

 > Since the menu items ARE the anchor links, I did not add an additional
 box. But we could do that if needed, it'd look like here: metrics.cc-
 ltd.net/?page=examples - if we use a box like this for the three anchor
 links, we could remove the main menu. But I think it's nice to have the
 full width available for the content, especially the table list. What do
 you think? :)

 There are many second level headlines, which would be reachable from the
 box (that's what the example does).  So, the box would contain more than
 the three menu items.

 I see the problem about the width, but the page is really long and one can
 get easily lost.  The table wastes a lot of space for the button links.
 Could that be improved?  Then the box on the left would have room.  The
 paragraphs with text are short enough to not pose a problem, when there is
 a box on the right, I think.
 What other options do we have for structuring the page better?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16540 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Close the the updater's shared HttpUrlConnection socket if an exception occurs.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16540: Close the the updater's shared HttpUrlConnection socket if an exception
occurs.
-+-
 Reporter:  leeroy   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #16426   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This is obsolete metrics-lib uses DescriptorIndexCollector as default
 since [https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-
 lib.git/commit/?id=d00b8ac09b0bd1225e882137460a4847c88e6621 Oct 2016].
 The use of HttpURLConnection should be avoided (there is a ticket about
 this, too).


 Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21381 [Metrics/CollecTor]: CollecTor web-page should have new Metrics design

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21381: CollecTor web-page should have new Metrics design
---+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by RaBe):

 I removed the three menu items and the affiliated content. Since the menu
 items ARE the anchor links, I did not add an additional box. But we could
 do that if needed, it'd look like here: metrics.cc-ltd.net/?page=examples
 - if we use a box like this for the three anchor links, we could remove
 the main menu. But I think it's nice to have the full width available for
 the content, especially the table list. What do you think? :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16401 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Fail-fast if file access permissions for out and status prevent an update

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16401: Fail-fast if file access permissions for out and status prevent an 
update
-+-
 Reporter:  leeroy   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 The lock-file is not used anymore.

 Closing as obsolete.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21376 [Metrics]: add javadoc metrics style

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21376: add javadoc metrics style
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21414 [Metrics]: Should metrics web sites (metrics.tp.o, collector.tp.o, onionoo.tp.o) display currently running software version?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21414: Should metrics web sites (metrics.tp.o, collector.tp.o, onionoo.tp.o)
display currently running software version?
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * cc: RaBe (added)


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[tor-bugs] #21414 [Metrics]: Should metrics web sites (metrics.tp.o, collector.tp.o, onionoo.tp.o) display currently running software version?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21414: Should metrics web sites (metrics.tp.o, collector.tp.o, onionoo.tp.o)
display currently running software version?
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 Should metrics web sites (metrics.tp.o, collector.tp.o, onionoo.tp.o)
 display currently running version?

 For example, the two recent releases of Onionoo and CollecTor contained
 important fixes and for Onionoo a protocol change.  The fix for collector
 was about the quaity of exit-list descriptors.  A version information
 about the software running placed in some prominent place on the
 respective web sites would be helpful for users to determine, if fixes are
 running on the mirror.

 1) Where should the version info be placed?
 2) How to automate this?  (Somewhere in the build, maybe include the
 version from a textfile generated when packaging ...)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21272 [Metrics]: Onionperf deployment

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21272: Onionperf deployment
-+--
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * type:  defect => enhancement


Comment:

 Adding a link from our mail conversation to the first analysis:
 https://github.com/hiromipaw/onionperf-notebook

 Changed ticket type to 'enhancement'.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19751 [Metrics/Onionoo]: switch to newer jetty in onionoo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19751: switch to newer jetty in onionoo
-+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 You're right the versions were
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/onionoo.git/commit/build.xml?id=f191927eb0c8cc1c53cecd21fedbc0f25be3691e
 upgraded] without adapting this ticket.

 Closing.

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21408 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser auto resize broken in Virtualbox (was: Tor Browser auto resize broken)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21408: Tor Browser auto resize broken in Virtualbox
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability tbb-fingerprinting-|  Actual Points:
  resolution |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-usability tbb-fingerprinting => tbb-usability tbb-
 fingerprinting-resolution


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21381 [Metrics/CollecTor]: CollecTor web-page should have new Metrics design

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21381: CollecTor web-page should have new Metrics design
---+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Thanks for the update!

 Could you just remove the menu points for 'related work', 'parsing
 libraries', and 'support'?
 These will be removed when we edit the content (see comment:1); and
 without them we get a better picture of the future site.

 There is one more feature missing (comment:1): some box (or similar) with
 links to anchors on the page.
 Is that troublesome to add?

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