[tor-bugs] #21825 [Core Tor/Tor]: no symbol warning for hs_service.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21825: no symbol warning for hs_service.c
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 During compilation, this warning is thrown:

 ranlib: file: src/or/libtor.a(hs_service.o) has no symbols
 Probably because there is no content other than unit tests.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18100 [Core Tor/Tor]: src/or/connection_edge.c typo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18100: src/or/connection_edge.c typo
-+-
 Reporter:  jirib|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  isaremoved, nickwants029, lorax, |  Actual Points:
  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by d4fq0fQAgoJ):

 System: Linux 4.10.5-1-ARCH x86_64, tor 0.2.9.9

 It appears to me that TPROXYing only works for me when connection tracking
 is active. When I apply the patch TPROXYing works for me no matter if
 conntection tracking is active or not.

 Steps to reproduce:

 Make sure no conntrack modules are loaded.
 # lsmod | grep conntrack
 should print nothing.

 Flush your firewall rules:
 # iptables -t raw -F
 # iptables -t mangle -F
 # iptables -t nat -F
 # iptables -t filter -F

 Setup TPROXYing with iptables:
 # iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -m socket --transparent -j ACCEPT
 # iptables -t mangle -A PREROUTING -p tcp --syn -d 127.192.0.0/10 -j
 TPROXY --on-port 9052

 Start Tor with the following config:
   SOCKSPort 0
   TransPort 9052 IsolateClientProtocol IsolateDestAddr
   TransProxyType TPROXY
   DNSPort 9053
   AutomapHostsOnResolve 1
   Log notice stdout
   DataDirectory /tmp/tor
   User tor
 # tor -f ./
 [notice] Opening DNS listener on 127.0.0.1:9053
 [notice] Opening Transparent pf/netfilter listener on 127.0.0.1:9052

 Verify traffic to 127.192.0.0/10 is routed properly to localhost (should
 always be):
 # ip route get to 127.192.0.0/10 from 127.0.0.1
  local 127.192.0.0 from 127.0.0.1 dev lo uid 0
  cache 

 Ask Tor to automap an onion for us:
 # drill -p 9053 duskgytldkxiuqc6.onion @127.0.0.1

 Make sure no conntrack modules are loaded (or more precisely: connection
 tracking is not active for the path to 127.192.0.0/10), otherwise curl
 will succeed! Use the IP address reported by drill.
 # curl 127.192.A.B
 Tor will report:
 [warn] getsockopt() failed: No such file or directory
 [warn] Fetching original destination failed. Closing.

 Call curl again but this time with loaded conntrack modules.
 # modprobe nf_conntrack_ipv4
 # curl 127.192.A.B
 It should succeed now.

 Looking at the code it seems that getsockopt() is called. The patch
 activates a code path where getsockname() is called instead which seems to
 make it work even if no connection tracking is active. Maybe the author of
 that code can shed more light into that?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21797 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable Firefox Telemetry experiments in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21797: Disable Firefox Telemetry experiments in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:1 cypherpunks]:
 > `toolkit.telemetry.enabled` is currently `false`, but
 `experiments.enabled` is `true`.
 >
 > Does this mean Tor Browser is currently sometimes performing experiments
 for Mozilla? Where can one read more about this?
 It can. Read the source (c).
 There are no experiments for release channel now (#13575 is separate). See
 https://telemetry-experiment.cdn.mozilla.net/manifest/v1/firefox/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21814 [Core Tor/Tor]: can we make a thin Tor proxy?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21814: can we make a thin Tor proxy?
-+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm_mobile):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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[tor-bugs] #21824 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate using runc instead of docker

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21824: Investigate using runc instead of docker
--+
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  TorBrowserTeam201703
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #17379
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 In the rbm based build system, we are currently using docker to run the
 builds in containers. We could use runc instead of docker to run the
 containers:
 https://runc.io/

 Packages for runc are available for Debian in the jessie-backports
 repository.

 Ubuntu provides some base images as tar.gz, signed with gpg, that we can
 use as the containers rootfs:
 http://cdimage.ubuntu.com/ubuntu-base/releases/

 Debian does not seem to provide the same base images. However, we can
 generate some using debootstrap from an Ubuntu container.

 Using runc instead of docker to start the containers would have some
 advantages:
 - this avoids having to trust the debian and ubuntu images from the docker
 repository. Instead we can use an image directly from ubuntu.
 - the container images would be stored in the `out/` directory, rather
 than in `/var/lib/docker`, which make cleaning easier.
 - running i386 containers with runc seems to be working. Using an i386
 container would simplify the build of linux32 versions of Tor Browser.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21816 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add support for Pluggable Transports 2.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21816: Add support for Pluggable Transports 2.0
--+--
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm_mobile):

 And in parallel: We all review the thing on tor-dev and make sure that
 it's what we want to implement :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21823 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor FTBFS on clang/i386

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21823: tor FTBFS on clang/i386
--+
 Reporter:  weasel|  Owner:  nickm_mobile
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm_mobile):

 * owner:   => nickm_mobile
 * status:  new => accepted
 * priority:  Medium => High
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21813 [Core Tor/Tor]: create a JSON-based alternative control port protocol

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21813: create a JSON-based alternative control port protocol
-+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by nickm_mobile):

 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 I think if someone wants to pursue this, the best way would be to separate
 the encoding/decoding of control messages from acting on and generating
 them, so that they could each be parsed and encoded separately from its
 implementation.  This would probably want to be a machine-generated or
 automated thing, so that we can have less message-specific parsing code,
 not more.  This might also help formalize the informal meta-format of the
 control port by giving it a mapping to json.

 cypherpunks:

 Our main reason for not going with an "internal filter" for the control
 port is that we aren't convinced that there _is_ a useful safe subset of
 the control protocol's functionality.  Nearly all control port commands
 are potentially dangerous if used by a hostile party.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21797 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable Firefox Telemetry experiments in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21797: Disable Firefox Telemetry experiments in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 `toolkit.telemetry.enabled` is currently `false`, but
 `experiments.enabled` is `true`.

 Does this mean Tor Browser is currently sometimes performing experiments
 for Mozilla? Where can one read more about this?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21813 [Core Tor/Tor]: create a JSON-based alternative control port protocol

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21813: create a JSON-based alternative control port protocol
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Hopefully that any new tor control protocol will rethink the all-or-
 nothing security model of the existing one (which has led to the
 proliferation of tor control port filtering programs; tails, subgraph, and
 whonix have now each written their own).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21804 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser refuses to start with : Corrupt redzone 0 bytes after 0x7f0503ede9d0 (size 80), byte=0x0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21804: Tor Browser refuses to start with : Corrupt redzone 0 bytes 
after
0x7f0503ede9d0 (size 80), byte=0x0
--+--
 Reporter:  adrelanos |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by adrelanos):

 * status:  needs_information => new


Comment:

 No.

 6.5.1 works for me. Any other versions I should try?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18100 [Core Tor/Tor]: src/or/connection_edge.c typo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18100: src/or/connection_edge.c typo
-+-
 Reporter:  jirib|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  isaremoved, nickwants029, lorax, |  Actual Points:
  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 could someone (nickm?) explain/discuss the effect/significance of this
 bug?

 it appears that a block of code was ifdef'd with a typo'd name, so it was
 never running, and now it will run (when `TRANS_TPROXY` is set).

 what does this code do?

 (how) did transparent proxying support work without this code (with this
 typo)?

 thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21804 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser refuses to start with : Corrupt redzone 0 bytes after 0x7f0503ede9d0 (size 80), byte=0x0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21804: Tor Browser refuses to start with : Corrupt redzone 0 bytes 
after
0x7f0503ede9d0 (size 80), byte=0x0
--+---
 Reporter:  adrelanos |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 And this works (worked) with 7.0a1?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21805 [Applications/Tor Browser]: webgl is getting blocked in low security

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21805: webgl is getting blocked in low security
+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider, tbb-usability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-security-slider, tbb-usability


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18589 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor browser writes SiteSecurityServiceState.txt with usage history

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18589: Tor browser writes SiteSecurityServiceState.txt with usage history
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: gacar (added)


Comment:

 We might want to look at the amount of sites that provide HSTS/HPKP
 headers while not being on the preload list. If the amount of those sites
 is small (or if the amount of those sites in the top 1,000,000 sites is
 small?) we might want to think about clearing the state after a session as
 well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21683 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure safebrowsing is still disabled in ESR 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21683: Make sure safebrowsing is still disabled in ESR 52
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Major   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-proxy-bypass  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * priority:  Medium => High
 * severity:  Normal => Major


Comment:

 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=134105#c154
 Is that a joke or what?! Lamers from Mozilla say they can't reproduce DNS
 leaks anymore. So they are waiting for TTP to explain them what else needs
 to be fixed to resolve that 15 years old bug!

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[tor-bugs] #21823 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor FTBFS on clang/i386

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21823: tor FTBFS on clang/i386
--+--
 Reporter:  weasel|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 https://jenkins.torproject.org/job/tor-ci-linux-master-
 clang/ARCHITECTURE=i386,SUITE=sid/1905/consoleFull
 {{{
 21:22:55 mv -f $depbase.Tpo $depbase.Po
 21:22:55 src/common/storagedir.c:209:18: error: implicit conversion loses
 integer precision: '__off64_t' (aka 'long long') to 'size_t' (aka
 'unsigned int') [-Werror,-Wshorten-64-to-32]
 21:22:55 *sz_out = st.st_size;
 21:22:55 ~ ~~~^~~
 21:22:55 1 error generated.
 21:22:55 Makefile:4834: recipe for target 'src/common/storagedir.o' failed
 21:22:55 make[1]: *** [src/common/storagedir.o] Error 1
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21822 [Metrics/Atlas]: atlas thinks kbytes are 1000 bytes, but relays think kbytes are 1024 bytes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21822: atlas thinks kbytes are 1000 bytes, but relays think kbytes are 1024 
bytes
---+-
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by arma):

 * cc: kat5 (added)


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[tor-bugs] #21822 [Metrics/Atlas]: atlas thinks kbytes are 1000 bytes, but relays think kbytes are 1024 bytes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21822: atlas thinks kbytes are 1000 bytes, but relays think kbytes are 1024 
bytes
---+-
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 Gurgle has this bandwidth line in its descriptor:
 {{{
 bandwidth 12582912 52428800 10079609
 }}}

 That 52428800 means that Ian wrote "50 MBytes" in his torrc file.

 But Atlas, when you hover over the advertised bandwidth, says that Ian set
 his burst to 52.43MB/s.

 It would seem that Atlas should divide by 1024*1024, rather than dividing
 by a million, when telling us the bandwidth numbers.

 (Also, technically burst is measured in MB, not in MB/s.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21799 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unittest fail: FAIL ../tor/src/test/test_entrynodes.c:618: assert(smartlist_len(gs_br->sampled_entry_guards) OP_EQ 2): 1 vs 2

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21799: Unittest fail: FAIL ../tor/src/test/test_entrynodes.c:618:
assert(smartlist_len(gs_br->sampled_entry_guards) OP_EQ 2): 1 vs 2
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-guard |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm_mobile):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!  Let's see if things are happy now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21392 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "New Identity" takes too long

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21392: "New Identity" takes too long
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:1 cypherpunks]:
 > Is this bug tracker still being monitored and supported? Seven weeks and
 no reaction from the developers seem to indicate that this bug tracker has
 become useless. Sad.

 Well, it might be good to specify what "too long" means. Knowing the
 operating system used and the problematic Tor Browser version and the
 version that last worked (older ones are at https://archive.torproject.org
 /tor-package-archive/torbrowser/) are most helpful as well. Without that
 it is not really possible to act on this bug (which is the sole cause of
 silence in this case) as nobody from the dev team seems to be able to
 reproduce the problem.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17533 [Applications/TorBirdy]: do not use keyserver-options in Whonix

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17533: do not use keyserver-options in Whonix
---+-
 Reporter:  proper |  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by sukhbir):

 Have the requirements for this changed since the ticket was opened?
 (Sorry, been a long a time). I am wondering if the changes in #19971 are
 relevant to Whonix in any way?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20751 [Applications/TorBirdy]: enforce stronger ciphers in torbirdy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20751: enforce stronger ciphers in torbirdy
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy|Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  torbirdy, thunderbird,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBirdy0.2.2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sukhbir):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed in
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbirdy.git/commit/?id=c0e12ccb97ac07861417bbffbac58f95557bc23c
 c0e12ccb9]. Please let me know in case we can enforce even stronger
 ciphers without breaking major email providers?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #6958 [Applications/TorBirdy]: Implement JavaScript HTTP proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6958: Implement JavaScript HTTP proxy
---+-
 Reporter:  ioerror|  Owner:  ioerror
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by sukhbir):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 #19971 is merged, so closing this ticket.

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[tor-bugs] #21821 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Remove debian-master branch from TorBirdy's repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21821: Remove debian-master branch from TorBirdy's repository
-+
 Reporter:  sukhbir  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 Can you please remove/delete the `debian-master` branch from
 `torbirdy.git` since it's no longer being used and may be a bit
 misleading.

 Thank you.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16935 [Applications/TorBirdy]: Enigmail advanced preferences gets overridden by TorBirdy on start-up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16935: Enigmail advanced preferences gets overridden by TorBirdy on start-up
---+--
 Reporter:  proper |  Owner:  ioerror, sukhbir
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by sukhbir):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16935 [Applications/TorBirdy]: Enigmail advanced preferences gets overridden by TorBirdy on start-up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16935: Enigmail advanced preferences gets overridden by TorBirdy on start-up
---+--
 Reporter:  proper |  Owner:  ioerror, sukhbir
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by sukhbir):

 Since this is related to #19971, I am marking this as fixed, unless you
 disagree in which case feel free to reopen this ticket :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19971 [Applications/TorBirdy]: Option to disable gnupg version dependent changes in the Enigmail settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19971: Option to disable gnupg version dependent changes in the Enigmail 
settings
---+-
 Reporter:  p.hansen   |  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by sukhbir):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged in
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbirdy.git/commit/?id=09acfd09c465ba9cb50b6a4d03f155f02a081391
 09acfd09c465]. Thank you for the patch!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21819 [- Select a component]: iceheart

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21819: iceheart
--+-
 Reporter:  iceheart69|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by nickm_mobile):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


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