Re: [tor-bugs] #21873 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clarify KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth behavior in documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21873: Clarify KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth behavior in documentation
-+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21873 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clarify KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth behavior in documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21873: Clarify KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth behavior in documentation
-+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Here's a patch for consideration:

 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor/commit/21873

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[tor-bugs] #21873 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clarify KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth behavior in documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21873: Clarify KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth behavior in documentation
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 The Tor manual is a little unclear about when SOCKS-auth'd circuits die.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19531 [Core Tor/Tor]: Major cleanup in our baseXX APIs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19531: Major cleanup in our baseXX APIs
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  util, tor-03-unspecified-201612  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 Further complication: in our baseXX APIs, base64 is optionally padded, but
 base32 never is (even though the RFC4648 default is to pad).

 Also, should we reject encodings whose padding bits are non-zero?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21846 [Metrics/Torflow]: BwAuthority can't be run out of the box without manual work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21846: BwAuthority can't be run out of the box without manual work
---+--
 Reporter:  davidwf|  Owner:  aagbsn
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Torflow|Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  chelseakomlo, tom  |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by tom):

 * cc: tom (added)
 * reviewer:  chelseakomlo, tjr => chelseakomlo, tom


Comment:

 This seems good, but I'm wondering if it conflicts or subsumes some
 outstanding work in #20466, #20452, #20454, #20452

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17868 [Core Tor/Tor]: base64_decode_nopad() destination buffer length problem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17868: base64_decode_nopad() destination buffer length problem
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  nikkolasg
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-12  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19531   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
-+

Comment (by catalyst):

 I think part of the difficulty is that the contract of
 `base64_decode_nopad()` is a bit ambiguous. Must padding be absent? Must
 spaces (or newlines) be absent? i.e., must the unpadded input encoding be
 of minimum length (which also means that the output length is a function
 solely of the input length)? If the input to `base64_decode_nopad()`
 doesn't meet these constraints, should that be an error?

 Also, in `base64_decode()`, the length check at the beginning is overly
 conservative. Maybe it should just start decoding and return an error if
 it runs out of space? Or maybe make a first pass over the input to count
 the actual number of output bytes required before the actual decoding?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21872 [Core Tor/Tor]: encoded length macros for baseXX encodings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21872: encoded length macros for baseXX encodings
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  util  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19531| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 BUFSIZE sounds good

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21155 [Core Tor/Tor]: Similar to #14917: Client's choice of rend point can leak info about guard(s) of misconfigured hidden services with EntryNodes option

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21155: Similar to #14917: Client's choice of rend point can leak info about
guard(s) of misconfigured hidden services with EntryNodes option
---+
 Reporter:  Jaym   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-guard  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21155 [Core Tor/Tor]: Similar to #14917: Client's choice of rend point can leak info about guard(s) of misconfigured hidden services with EntryNodes option

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21155: Similar to #14917: Client's choice of rend point can leak info about
guard(s) of misconfigured hidden services with EntryNodes option
---+
 Reporter:  Jaym   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-guard  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => accepted
 * owner:   => dgoulet


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21155 [Core Tor/Tor]: Similar to #14917: Client's choice of rend point can leak info about guard(s) of misconfigured hidden services with EntryNodes option

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21155: Similar to #14917: Client's choice of rend point can leak info about
guard(s) of misconfigured hidden services with EntryNodes option
---+
 Reporter:  Jaym   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-guard  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review
 * points:   => 0.1


Comment:

 I went with a potential controversial patch ;). Warning the operator if
 `EntryNodes` are pinned. We already NOT allow it if only one entry node is
 pinned (#14917). It seems there are too many issues with pinned node so at
 the very least warn the operator.

 In the future, we might want a Wiki page explaining the dangers and
 pointing to that? What do we all think of this solution?

 See branch: `bug21155_031_01`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21872 [Core Tor/Tor]: encoded length macros for baseXX encodings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21872: encoded length macros for baseXX encodings
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  util  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19531| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by catalyst):

 That's a good point. I'd like to keep the macro names short, especially if
 they're going to end up in array declarations. Maybe something like
 `BASEXX_BUFSIZE()`?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16706 [Core Tor/Tor]: Too many connection_edge_process_relay_cell warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16706: Too many connection_edge_process_relay_cell warnings
-+-
 Reporter:  s7r  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.6.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, nickm-deferred-20161017, |  Actual Points:
  triage-out-030-201612  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 Very small fix for this which is to not print the warning if an invalid
 hidden service port is requested. As far as I can tell, it's the only case
 where the reason `END_CIRC_AT_ORIGIN` is returned in that code path.

 It's not an ideal fix I would say but it's that or a *massive* refactoring
 of `connection_edge_process_relay_cell()` and how it's used.

 Now, with `ProtocolWarnings 1`, you see this and set to 0, the warning
 line is not present.

 {{{
 Apr 05 16:22:53.000 [info] rend_service_set_connection_addr_port(): No
 virtual port mapping exists for port 18163 on service bdf2bzs2od7ynr33
 Apr 05 16:22:53.000 [info] connection_exit_begin_conn(): Didn't find
 rendezvous service (port 18163)
 Apr 05 16:22:53.000 [warn] circuit_receive_relay_cell (backward) failed.
 Closing.
 }}}

 See branch: `bug16706_031_01`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21852 [Applications/Tor Browser]: update jemalloc?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21852: update jemalloc?
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704, tbb-7.0-must-alpha => ff52-esr
 * type:  defect => enhancement


Comment:

 Actually, this is currently an alpha-only feature. Therefore, this should
 be lesser prio.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21147 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Get Tor Browser based on ESR 52 compiled for all three platforms

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21147: Get Tor Browser based on ESR 52 compiled for all three platforms
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, GeorgKoppen201703, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-nightly, TorBrowserTeam201704 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 We are done here, closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21872 [Core Tor/Tor]: encoded length macros for baseXX encodings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21872: encoded length macros for baseXX encodings
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  util  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19531| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 I like this idea, except that SIZE vs LEN seems a bit error-prone.  how
 about ALLOC_SIZE instead of SIZE()?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21240 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create patches to fix mingw-w64 compilation of Firefox ESR 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21240: Create patches to fix mingw-w64 compilation of Firefox ESR 52
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704R, |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201703, tbb-7.0-must-nightly|
Parent ID:  #21147   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 The tor-browser-bundle change is in commit
 b5beb33b57643ff83838337ded870511599d45f5 on `master`, the patches for tor-
 browser are on `tor-browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-2` in commit
 70fd0587c18f111fbae0e64b03ca7a273e5c0e94,
 b63cc0d449954e51a72721f34e3628e75daba59a,
 d4b359c42ae2dbd3ab6406cdf99db796602aaedf,
 1be3aec99fc7731563715dcfc7724fcd7ca4a6fb,
 01f545c45a48f7805637b6eb0db26589dc079a96, and
 a6a430bf6393f51a778b8dfe19103ae708bfcc5c.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21834 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ExcludeExitNodes settings ignored

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21834: ExcludeExitNodes settings ignored
--+--
 Reporter:  JoeDiFostar   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21834 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ExcludeExitNodes settings ignored

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21834: ExcludeExitNodes settings ignored
--+---
 Reporter:  JoeDiFostar   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by JoeDiFostar):

 Replying to [comment:10 mcs]:
 > The screen capture that you attached to this ticket does not show a CA
 exit node.

 > Are you actually seeing US and CA nodes used as exits to the Internet?
 If not, then this bug is invalid.

 Oh, that is very interesting.  I wasn't aware of that particularity.
 Thanks for the clarification.  Therefore, this bug is invalid.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18831 [Applications/Tor Browser]: We need Yasm >= 1.2.0 to build ESR 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18831: We need Yasm >= 1.2.0 to build ESR 52
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-gitian,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704R, GeorgKoppen201703,  |
  tbb-7.0-must-nightly   |
Parent ID:  #21240   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This is commit 910094fc33ae4e75e10fee754bec106e83e0eac5 on tor-browser-
 bundle `master`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21239 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adapt Linux Firefox descriptor for ESR 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21239: Adapt Linux Firefox descriptor for ESR 52
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, ff52-esr,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201703, tbb-7.0-must-nightly,   |
  TorBrowserTeam201704R  |
Parent ID:  #21147   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 The tor-browser fix is in commit b9d5e7c1a8ec3455857e2752d021b85dcc187ea9
 on `tor-browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-2`, the one for the tor-browser-bundle repo
 is commit f279b94f424c1c7eeabaa0119ccfc8fea326bed6 on `master` and
 f76d0980596273327554c96fdb88e0b749552036 on `hardened-builds`. Thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21240 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create patches to fix mingw-w64 compilation of Firefox ESR 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21240: Create patches to fix mingw-w64 compilation of Firefox ESR 52
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704R, |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201703, tbb-7.0-must-nightly|
Parent ID:  #21147   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:10 gk]:
 > The tor-browser changes are in my `bug_21240` (the last 6 patches). The
 tor-browser-bundle changes are in my `bug_21240_v2`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/commit/?h=bug_21240_v2=546273fb78b4dc7bf346505bf6262bc779dacb2c).
 The change in #18831 is needed as well.

 The tor-browser and tor-browser-bundle changes look good to me.

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[tor-bugs] #21872 [Core Tor/Tor]: encoded length macros for baseXX encodings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21872: encoded length macros for baseXX encodings
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  util
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #19531
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 It can be useful to have macros that give the lengths of byte strings
 encoded with baseXX, particularly for declaring fixed-size buffers. Some
 use cases will need to include a terminating NUL, others not. These macros
 won't check for overflow, so nothing should pass untrusted inputs to them.

 I propose macros named like `BASE64_LEN()` for the raw length and like
 `BASE64_SIZE()` for the length with NUL.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21871 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Change descriptor format for legacy encryption key

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21871: prop224: Change descriptor format for legacy encryption key
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Here is my proposed patch to proposal 224: `ticket21871_01`

 If this makes sense, let's put this ticket in `accepted` state so we can
 proceed with the code change.

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[tor-bugs] #21871 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Change descriptor format for legacy encryption key

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21871: prop224: Change descriptor format for legacy encryption key
---+
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorR-must  |
---+
 It turns out that we might have miscalculated the legacy feature for
 introduction point.

 Currently, proposal 224 looks like this for legacy encryption keys:

 {{{
 Encryption key is specified as follow:

 [Exactly once enc-key per introduction point]

"enc-key" SP "ntor" SP key NL

  The key is a base64 encoded curve25519 public key used to
 encrypt
  the introduction request to service.

"enc-key" SP "legacy" NL key NL

  Base64 encoded RSA key, wrapped in "BEGIN RSA PUBLIC
  KEY-" armor, for use with a legacy introduction point as
  described in [LEGACY_EST_INTRO] and [LEGACY-INTRODUCE1]
 below.
 }}}

 This doesn't make much sense because this encryption key is used to
 encrypt the `ENCRYPTED` section of the INTRODUCE1 cell (section 3.2.1. and
 3.2.2.). That section can only be decrypted by the service so the
 introduction point, being legacy or not, doesn't touch it at all, it just
 passes along the bytes.

 So, the descriptor should always contain a ntor key per intro point
 because we still want the ntor handshake to happen since both client and
 service do speak the prop224 protocol.

 If the intro point is a legacy one, it should also have a "legacy key"
 which is an extra RSA public key needed in the INTRODUCE1 legacy cell and
 used by the intro point to relay the cell on the right circuit (used in
 the ESTABLISH_INTRO):

 {{{
LEGACY_KEY_ID[20 bytes]
[...]
Here, LEGACY_KEY_ID is the hash of the introduction point legacy
encryption key that was included in the hidden service descriptor.
 }}}

 In the legacy `ESTABLISH_INTRO`:
 {{{
 PK   Bob's public key or service key[KL octets]
 }}}

 In the current legacy code, the intro point validates that this PK field
 is an ASN.1 encoded RSA key (`rend_mid_establish_intro_legacy()`).

 Fortunately for us, this code is getting release in 030 *but* only be
 actually used in 032 (#12424).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21239 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adapt Linux Firefox descriptor for ESR 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21239: Adapt Linux Firefox descriptor for ESR 52
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, ff52-esr,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201703, tbb-7.0-must-nightly,   |
  TorBrowserTeam201704R  |
Parent ID:  #21147   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:5 gk]:
 > `bug_21239` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/commit/?h=bug_21239=49d4448e9292181f6a94eda2ee4b3a135d740319)
 in my tor-browser-bundle repo has the descriptor changes. And the
 `.mozconfig` one is attached.

 Both patches look good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21617 [Applications/Tor Browser]: RWX page observed on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21617: RWX page observed on Windows
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 esr52/search?q=PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE=false
 What about disabling ctypes?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21870 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Tor Messenger Profile Problem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21870: Tor Messenger Profile Problem
+-
 Reporter:  SuperCodingPanda|  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-

Comment (by arlolra):

 Tor Messenger on Windows is a portable application, meaning the profile is
 installed in the directory alongside the rest of the application, and thus
 requiring those permissions to modify it.

 My suggestion would be to uninstall what your currently have (ie. remove
 the directory) and then reinstall the application, not as administrator,
 but as a regular user in a directory it has access to, like the desktop.

 It's the same procedure as for Tor Browser,
 https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en#windows

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21870 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Tor Messenger Profile Problem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21870: Tor Messenger Profile Problem
+-
 Reporter:  SuperCodingPanda|  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by arlolra):

 * keywords:  permission, Tor Messenger, profile problem =>
 * component:  Core Tor => Applications/Tor Messenger


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20114 [Applications/Tor Check]: Tor Browser v6.0.4 on Linux reported that exiting via node 162.243.117.41 was "not connected through tor" on check.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20114: Tor Browser v6.0.4 on Linux reported that exiting via node 
162.243.117.41
was "not connected through tor" on check.torproject.org
+-
 Reporter:  6h72Q484AddGha8H|  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Check  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-

Comment (by arlolra):

 Thanks for continuing to report.

 I will carve out some time to look at this asap.

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[tor-bugs] #21870 [Core Tor]: Tor Messenger Profile Problem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21870: Tor Messenger Profile Problem
-+-
 Reporter:   |  Owner:
  SuperCodingPanda   |
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor|   Keywords:  permission, Tor Messenger, profile
 Severity:  Minor|  problem
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 = Tor Messenger Profile Problem =
 === ''tormessenger-install-0.4.0b2_en-US.exe'' ===

 I installed Tor Messenger on Windows 10 as administrator. I created a
 profile and exited Tor Messenger. When reopening TorChat as regular
 user/administrator (not "run as administrator") I get error message "Tor
 Messenger Profile Problem" -- "Tor Messenger does not have permission to
 access the profile. Please adjust your file system permissions and try
 again."

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21868 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Code landed after FIREFOX_52_0_2esr_RELEASE breaks Tor Browser build for Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21868: Code landed after FIREFOX_52_0_2esr_RELEASE breaks Tor Browser build for
Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201704, tbb-7.0-must-alpha  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by tom):

 Replying to [comment:1 cypherpunks]:
 > Yep, just another one buggy esr :) Will be fixed by 52.2 ;)
 > https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1299500#c35

 I opened https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1353765 for this

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13017 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Determine if AudioBuffers/OfflineAudioContext are a fingerprinting vector

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13017: Determine if AudioBuffers/OfflineAudioContext are a fingerprinting 
vector
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-os,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201702, ff52-esr |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by lessgo):

 Based on 418 fingerprints of the Tor Browser only from FPCentral
 https://fpcentral.irisa.fr/customStats :

 ||=N°=||=Count=||=Percentage=||=User-
 Agent=||=pxi_full_buffer_hash=||=vc_output.ac-sampleRate=||=ac-
 maxChannelCount=||
 ||1||163||39.00%||"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101
 Firefox/45.0"||158e8189a3551fe4f2e564ac377b0f1e588a1ab3||44100||2||
 ||2||104||24.88%||"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101
 Firefox/45.0"||-||-||-
 ||3||28||6.70%||"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101
 Firefox/45.0"||89cad797b11193226dd0d1e580c3e94578d71130||48000||2||
 ||4||26||6.22%||"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101
 Firefox/45.0"||e8a01ccac064d752db0ae902529124d13313b336||44100||2||
 ||5||21||5.02%||"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101
 Firefox/45.0"||a79e5e1e31619aee22a69786bc8cb6265fb30a0c||44100||2||
 ||6||16||3.83%||"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101
 Firefox/45.0"||158e8189a3551fe4f2e564ac377b0f1e588a1ab3||48000||2||
 ||7||14||3.35%||"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101
 Firefox/45.0"||4baefb2460306064e9f6482daa4031c2d0680077||44100||2||
 ||8||12||2.87%||"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101
 Firefox/45.0"||89cad797b11193226dd0d1e580c3e94578d71130||44100||2||
 ||9||10||2.39%||"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101
 Firefox/45.0"||158e8189a3551fe4f2e564ac377b0f1e588a1ab3||44100||0||
 ||10||4||0.96%||"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101
 Firefox/45.0"||4baefb2460306064e9f6482daa4031c2d0680077||44100||1||

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20114 [Applications/Tor Check]: Tor Browser v6.0.4 on Linux reported that exiting via node 162.243.117.41 was "not connected through tor" on check.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20114: Tor Browser v6.0.4 on Linux reported that exiting via node 
162.243.117.41
was "not connected through tor" on check.torproject.org
+-
 Reporter:  6h72Q484AddGha8H|  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Check  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 again:
 {{{
 Sorry. You are not using Tor.
 Your IP address appears to be: 138.197.4.77
 }}}

 https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/5EC13C778A9EE85A054B7BEB98C8B19BA9F75B55
 https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/D5D6DBED4BEB90DB089AC1E57EA3A13B9B8AA769

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21834 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ExcludeExitNodes settings ignored

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21834: ExcludeExitNodes settings ignored
--+---
 Reporter:  JoeDiFostar   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: mcs (added)
 * status:  assigned => needs_information


Comment:

 The screen capture that you attached to this ticket does not show a CA
 exit node. I am not an expert on all things related to hidden/onion
 services, but in that case the Canadian node is an interior node that is
 being used as part of the path to the onion service. See
 https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#ChooseEntryExit, specifically
 the following paragraph:
  Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic outside of
 the Tor network. It is normal to see non-exit circuits (such as those used
 to connect to hidden services, those that do directory fetches, those used
 for relay reachability self-tests, and so on) that end at a non-exit node.
 To keep a node from being used entirely, see ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes
 in the manual.
 Are you actually seeing US and CA nodes used as exits to the Internet? If
 not, then this bug is invalid.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21868 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Code landed after FIREFOX_52_0_2esr_RELEASE breaks Tor Browser build for Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21868: Code landed after FIREFOX_52_0_2esr_RELEASE breaks Tor Browser build for
Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201704, tbb-7.0-must-alpha  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Yep, just another one buggy esr :) Will be fixed by 52.2 ;)
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1299500#c35

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21778 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Canvas prompt is not showing up anymore in Tor Browser based in ESR52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21778: Canvas prompt is not showing up anymore in Tor Browser based in ESR52
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-alpha  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr => ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-alpha


Comment:

 This is a regression. Unless we plan to disable e10s, we should try to fix
 this for the alpha.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21869 [Core Tor/Tor]: Labeled storage backend for consensus docs and diffs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21869: Labeled storage backend for consensus docs and diffs
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  2
Parent ID:  #21647| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor4
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


Comment:

 Please see branch 'storage_labeled' in my public repository.

 Also available to review in gitlab at
 https://gitlab.com/nickm_tor/tor/merge_requests/15

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[tor-bugs] #21869 [Core Tor/Tor]: Labeled storage backend for consensus docs and diffs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21869: Labeled storage backend for consensus docs and diffs
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:  2 |  Parent ID:  #21647
   Points:  2 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 As part of #21647, we need a way to store consensus documents and
 consensus diffs persistently.  The storagedir backend is mostly there, but
 it lacks a way to store metadata, or to manage reading/freeing/deleting
 documents on demand.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21869 [Core Tor/Tor]: Labeled storage backend for consensus docs and diffs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21869: Labeled storage backend for consensus docs and diffs
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  2
Parent ID:  #21647| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:   => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18831 [Applications/Tor Browser]: We need Yasm >= 1.2.0 to build ESR 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18831: We need Yasm >= 1.2.0 to build ESR 52
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-gitian,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704R, GeorgKoppen201703,  |
  tbb-7.0-must-nightly   |
Parent ID:  #21240   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:7 gk]:
 > `bug_18831_v3` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/commit/?h=bug_18831_v3=6a2363caf530f0cdb11e879010c553c390e711b9)
 in my public tor-browser-bundle repo has a fix up for review.

 This patch looks good to me.

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[tor-bugs] #21868 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Code landed after FIREFOX_52_0_2esr_RELEASE breaks Tor Browser build for Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21868: Code landed after FIREFOX_52_0_2esr_RELEASE breaks Tor Browser build for
Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  ff52-esr,
 Severity:  Major|  TorBrowserTeam201704,
 |  GeorgKoppen201704, tbb-7.0-must-
 |  alpha
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor4 |
-+-
 Building ESR 52 with mingw-w64 at least is broken using
 https://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-esr52/rev/e8651b7e41c8. Doing so
 with https://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-esr52/rev/afa66bcf9203
 (FIREFOX_52_0_2esr_RELEASE) is still fine.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21864 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support Bridges setting MyFamily to include Relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21864: Support Bridges setting MyFamily to include Relays
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  intro, 15min  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 Setting a milestone. Please change if a patch comes in or we really want
 that in a soon-next version.

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[tor-bugs] #21867 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update selfrando commit in hardened series

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21867: Update selfrando commit in hardened series
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704,
 Severity:  Normal   |  GeorgKoppen201704
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 The selfrando commit we use in the hardened series is pretty old. The
 patch for #20683 is much newer and the code should be more robust. We
 should update it trying e.g. current master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20680 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20680: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => assigned


Comment:

 Arthur, could you look at the child tickets so we are done here for when
 the alpha is due?

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[tor-bugs] #21866 [User Experience/Website]: Download links for Tor Browser in other languages don't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21866: Download links for Tor Browser in other languages don't work
-+--
 Reporter:  xinxin   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 After you change the language below the download button in this page
 https://www.torproject.org/download/download-easy.html.en, the download
 file when you click on the download button is all the time en-US.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #21741, #21837, #20685

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #21741, #21837, #20685 by gk:
keywords to GeorgKoppen201704

Comment:
Putting tickets on my plate for the alpha.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #16010, #18925, #19048, #21249

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #16010, #18925, #19048, #21249 by gk:
keywords to GeorgKoppen201704

Comment:
Moving my tickets to April

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16010 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Get a working content process sandbox for Tor Browser on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16010: Get a working content process sandbox for Tor Browser on Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-gitian, tbb-security,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201703, TorBrowserTeam201704,   |
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 FWIW: is this the right place to discuss SEH? If so, it seems better to
 start with https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft-
 specific_exception_handling_mechanisms and go UCRT way.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12426 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make use of HeapEnableTerminationOnCorruption in Tor Browser on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12426: Make use of HeapEnableTerminationOnCorruption in Tor Browser on Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-firefox-patch, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-hardened, tbb-easy, TorBrowserTeam201704R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:7 gk]:
 > FWIW: We want to test it an alpha but think harder if we should pick
 that one for the 7.0 stable in case we don't get the sandbox compiled
 properly in time.
 ???
 It has been tested in stable since 2012 when Win 8 was released which
 terminated all processes on heap corruption by default without any need
 for asking it through HeapSetInformation() calls. It is needed only for
 Win 7 or earlier. Would be nice to see it in 6.5 (in tor.exe near
 SetProcessDEPPolicy() too).
 FWIW: we should also add EnableLowFragmentationHeap() modified from
 https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 esr24/source/ipc/chromium/src/base/process_util_win.cc#867, but it's not
 so easy.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13339 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prop140: Complete Consensus diffs / Merge GSoC project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13339: Prop140: Complete Consensus diffs / Merge GSoC project
-+-
 Reporter:  mvdan|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gsoc, merge, tor-client, prop140,|  Actual Points:
  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged, pre028-patch,   |
  tor-dos, low-bandwidth, nickm- |
  deferred-20160905, tor-03-unspecified-201612,  |
  sponsor4, TorCoreTeam201703|
Parent ID:   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by mvdan):

 Oh, that's very interesting. I read that blog post. Though I have to say
 I'm a Go person these days ;)

 Kidding aside, this sounds like a good idea. I'm sure the code will be
 much more readable with all the slicing and vectors.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21865 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update security slider to take JIT preference changes into account

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21865: Update security slider to take JIT preference changes into account
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-security-slider,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 So since ESR31 we have just been switching off optimizations which don't
 exist. Unbelievable :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13339 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prop140: Complete Consensus diffs / Merge GSoC project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13339: Prop140: Complete Consensus diffs / Merge GSoC project
-+-
 Reporter:  mvdan|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gsoc, merge, tor-client, prop140,|  Actual Points:
  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged, pre028-patch,   |
  tor-dos, low-bandwidth, nickm- |
  deferred-20160905, tor-03-unspecified-201612,  |
  sponsor4, TorCoreTeam201703|
Parent ID:   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by Sebastian):

 We're doing a Rust experiment and the consdiff code is fairly self-
 contained and seemed to be a decent chunk of code to actually show that
 Rust can work for us.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13339 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prop140: Complete Consensus diffs / Merge GSoC project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13339: Prop140: Complete Consensus diffs / Merge GSoC project
-+-
 Reporter:  mvdan|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gsoc, merge, tor-client, prop140,|  Actual Points:
  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged, pre028-patch,   |
  tor-dos, low-bandwidth, nickm- |
  deferred-20160905, tor-03-unspecified-201612,  |
  sponsor4, TorCoreTeam201703|
Parent ID:   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by mvdan):

 Yeah, I agree that the docs aren't very clear. Out of curiosity, what is
 the reimplementation for? Performance, safety?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13339 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prop140: Complete Consensus diffs / Merge GSoC project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13339: Prop140: Complete Consensus diffs / Merge GSoC project
-+-
 Reporter:  mvdan|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gsoc, merge, tor-client, prop140,|  Actual Points:
  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged, pre028-patch,   |
  tor-dos, low-bandwidth, nickm- |
  deferred-20160905, tor-03-unspecified-201612,  |
  sponsor4, TorCoreTeam201703|
Parent ID:   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by Sebastian):

 Ok. I was just confused by the docs of the calc_changes function I think.
 I did a reimplementation that I want to be compatible, so I'll be sure to
 match the C version you provided :) Thank you.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21779 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Non-admin users can't access Tor Browser on macOS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21779: Non-admin users can't access Tor Browser on macOS
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201704


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21723 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix inconsistent generation of MOZ_MACBUNDLE_ID

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21723: Fix inconsistent generation of MOZ_MACBUNDLE_ID
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17670| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 The tor-browser-bundle part is on `master` and `hardened-builds` (commit
 50b6e6fff4a535044f9b506854535df757125267 and
 84f386e0783e1972db72b94df755766a5eb6e9ce).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21833 [Applications/Tor Browser]: libvirt Changes in 16.10 bust check-prequisites.py

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21833: libvirt Changes in 16.10 bust check-prequisites.py
---+--
 Reporter:  tom|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, TorBrowserTeam201704R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks for the patch. Looks good to me. This got fixed on `master`,
 `maint-6.5`, and `hardened-builds` (with commit
 c95c5d1b57685c2eff102f809ec2cf9c865a6215,
 667a61b60c9caf3feb1d96d4c19b4a3d7f2d6ca5, and
 676200bdfeb1c8550082c16639ac952ff514db9c).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21709 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Upgrade Go to 1.7.5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21709: Upgrade Go to 1.7.5
---+--
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, TorBrowserTeam201704R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This is commit 1942f7b2f6e5f82c64dcfeab82713604866cb26f on `master` and
 b26f04ec07d3de68cc1db8d71935e208415b08fa on `hardened-builds`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13339 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prop140: Complete Consensus diffs / Merge GSoC project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13339: Prop140: Complete Consensus diffs / Merge GSoC project
-+-
 Reporter:  mvdan|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gsoc, merge, tor-client, prop140,|  Actual Points:
  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged, pre028-patch,   |
  tor-dos, low-bandwidth, nickm- |
  deferred-20160905, tor-03-unspecified-201612,  |
  sponsor4, TorCoreTeam201703|
Parent ID:   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by mvdan):

 Another thought - could be that calc_changes is buggy somewhere, causing
 it to end up with diffs that are correct but not the optimal it would find
 if it were doing divide-and-conquer properly. Perhaps
 optimal_column_to_split is wrong, or perhaps we should use its return
 value plus one or minus one instead of as-is.

 In my head, divide and conquer should be able to come up with your version
 just fine. Then again, the version it finds is just as optimal given its
 "number of lines added+deleted" heuristic.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21328 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Move to clang 3.8.0 for Tor Browser's clang-based macOS toolchain

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21328: Move to clang 3.8.0 for Tor Browser's clang-based macOS toolchain
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, ff52-esr,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201703, tbb-7.0-must-nightly,   |
  TorBrowserTeam201704R  |
Parent ID:  #21147   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This is commit cd4465477ac10d2b740d5a32505cdab5a197e405 on `master`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21754 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Switch to OS X 10.7 SDK everywhere in our OS X descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21754: Switch to OS X 10.7 SDK everywhere in our OS X descriptors
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201703, tbb-gitian,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704R  |
Parent ID:  #21328   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This is commit 11780c5d6d84c860cc9fa389cb08e1bf4680d7de on `master`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19783 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Typo in build helpers: `MAXOSX_DEPLOYEMENT_TARGET`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19783: Typo in build helpers: `MAXOSX_DEPLOYEMENT_TARGET`
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, ff52-esr,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704R  |
Parent ID:  #21328   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This is commit d744cac29e8df0efaf1a6bb3a626be90e930c118 on `master`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10369 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Building the Utils component in OS X TBBs is broken with the new cross-compiler

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10369: Building the Utils component in OS X TBBs is broken with the new cross-
compiler
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  gitian, tbb-3.0, tbb-gitian, |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201703, TorBrowserTeam201704R   |
Parent ID:  #21328   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This is commit e32cc7890a13d1707e9f3109fd8e888ac8623537 on `master`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21753 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Get rid of old GCC toolchain in pluggable transports macOS descriptor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21753: Get rid of old GCC toolchain in pluggable transports macOS descriptor
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam21703R,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201703, tbb-gitian  |
Parent ID:  #21328   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This is commit 2fe7170ac1f07b051fa69183b7dc852a62d4f9be on `master`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13339 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prop140: Complete Consensus diffs / Merge GSoC project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13339: Prop140: Complete Consensus diffs / Merge GSoC project
-+-
 Reporter:  mvdan|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  gsoc, merge, tor-client, prop140,|  Actual Points:
  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged, pre028-patch,   |
  tor-dos, low-bandwidth, nickm- |
  deferred-20160905, tor-03-unspecified-201612,  |
  sponsor4, TorCoreTeam201703|
Parent ID:   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by mvdan):

 Hi Sebastian,

 I had to re-read my own docs because I completely forgot what
 calc_changes() even was :)

 > According to the documentation of calc_changes() I would think that the
 proper result would be unchanged, changed, unchanged, changed.

 Admitting that I don't fully remember how this thing worked, I think
 you're assuming too much.

 For example, having [a a a a] and [a b a b], and the bits [0 1 1 0] and [0
 1 0 1], what we will do is:

 * change the second and third elements [a a] with [b]: [a b a]
 * add a fourth element [b]: [a b a b]

 The ed diff, if I recall correctly, should be something like (doing this
 in my head, so could be wrong):

 1,2cb
 .
 3ab
 .

 I understand you were expecting the bits to be [0 1 0 1] and [0 1 0 1].
 Then, the diff would be something like:

 2cb
 .
 4cb
 .

 Note that the two are valid. Yours is a bit smaller as far as bytes used,
 but it's still the same number of operations.

 If I remember correctly, calc_changes optimizes for number of lines
 added/deleted in the diff, not for the size of the ed diff. This is
 because it doesn't do an ed diff at all - it is done at a higher level, in
 a func that calls it. It ended up with this result just like it could have
 ended with yours - both mean four lines changed (deleted+added) in total.
 In other words, the number of bits set to "1" across both bit vectors is
 4.

 Perhaps a way to get slightly smaller ed diffs would be to get
 calc_changes to prefer the operator 'c' over 'a' and 'd'. But remember
 that this operation should only be used in very small pieces of the
 consensus, so I don't expect you'd be saving much at the cost of
 complexity.

 So TL;DR: the expected values are correct. Not the smallest ed diff nor
 the one that a human would do, but one that is almost as small.

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[tor-bugs] #21865 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update security slider to take JIT preference changes into account

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21865: Update security slider to take JIT preference changes into account
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-
 Severity:  Normal   |  security-slider,
 |  TorBrowserTeam201704
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 For a while there were different JIT prefs for content and chrome. That
 changed with bug 939562. We need to adapt the slider to reflect that.

 Suggested prefs for disabling now are
 {{{
 javascript.options.ion
 javascript.options.baselinejit
 javascript.options.native_regexp
 }}}
 asm.js is already off due to other reasons (#19417)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21862 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make rust code in ESR 52 proxy safe

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21862: Make rust code in ESR 52 proxy safe
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Then what rust code is in ESR52?

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #21625, #16010, #21741, #21756, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #21625, #16010, #21741, #21756, #21837, #18530, #19048, 
#19316, #20685, #21340, #21432, #21611, #21685, #21850, #21851, #21852 by gk:
keywords to tbb-7.0-must-alpha

Comment:
Getting this on our radar for alpha release in less than two weeks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16010 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Get a working content process sandbox for Tor Browser on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16010: Get a working content process sandbox for Tor Browser on Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-gitian, tbb-security,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must, GeorgKoppen201703,   |
  TorBrowserTeam201704   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * parent:  #21147 =>


Comment:

 Not strictly needed for getting Tor Browser based on ESR52 compiled.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18530 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider dropping support for Mac OS 10.6, 10.7, and 10.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18530: Consider dropping support for Mac OS 10.6, 10.7, and 10.8
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * parent:  #21147 =>


Comment:

 Not strictly needed for getting Tor Browser based on ESR52 compiled.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19181 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Firefox >= 48 ships with an ICU pre-compiled blob

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19181: Firefox >= 48 ships with an ICU pre-compiled blob
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * parent:  #21147 =>


Comment:

 Not strictly needed for getting Tor Browser on ESR 52 compiled.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #21766, #19048, #20680

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #21766, #19048, #20680 by gk:
keywords to tbb-7.0-must-alpha

Comment:
Things to tag for the alphas (as the remaining tasks in the tickets are no 
nightly bloclers).

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #21766, #21147, #18831, #19048, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #21766, #21147, #18831, #19048, #20680, #21239, #21240, 
#21328 by gk:
keywords to tbb-7.0-must

Comment:
No need to use somewhat duplicated keywords.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #6119, #21795, #20905, #17380, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #6119, #21795, #20905, #17380, #18530, #18925, #21286, 
#21627, #21657, #21684, #21824 by gk:
keywords to TorBrowserTeam201704

Comment:
Remmove remaining tickets over to April

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #21625, #21766, #10286, #16010, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #21625, #21766, #10286, #16010, #21147, #21741, #21837, 
#16404, #19048, #19316, #20680, #20685, #21340, #21432, #21569, #21611, #21685, 
#21689, #21742 by gk:
keywords to TorBrowserTeam201704

Comment:
Moving tickets over to April

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16010 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Get a working content process sandbox for Tor Browser on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16010: Get a working content process sandbox for Tor Browser on Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-gitian, tbb-security,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must, TorBrowserTeam201703,|
  GeorgKoppen201703  |
Parent ID:  #21147   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 For posterity from Monday's meeting:
 {{{
 18:19:03  I successfully built and ran a mingw build built off
 mozilla's esr52 with GeKo's patches from bug_21240 and the moz changeset
 used in that branch; then I did it again with an updated esr52 branch
 (which merged in the RegisterIdlePeriod commit). I had to add a single
 line patch to add an include to the up to date branch for some reason.
 18:19:10  Then I took the same branch and compiled it with the
 sandbox. I used all the non-__try patches from
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1230910 (including the one
 that just annihilates SmartStub) AND I commented out all __try blocks so
 it should just crash immediately.
 18:19:16  It turns out e10s was not enabled, so sandboxing (I
 believe) wasn't doing anything. youtube.com showed some messed up
 rendering on the homepage even without e10s/sbox though:
 http://imgur.com/a/7X8ZP
 18:19:30  When I enabled it, the browser did not work at all. So
 something is breaking with regards to the sandbox. The debug build is
 blocked on the std::__throw issue
 (https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1332747). I will investigate
 a fix for that.
 18:19:39  I also made a build trying out mingw's __try1 construct.
 This does not have the youtube artifact! But when I enable e10s it also
 doesn't work.
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18831 [Applications/Tor Browser]: We need Yasm >= 1.2.0 to build ESR 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18831: We need Yasm >= 1.2.0 to build ESR 52
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-gitian, tbb-7.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704R, GeorgKoppen201703,  |
  tbb-7.0-must-nightly   |
Parent ID:  #21240   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 ff52-esr, tbb-gitian, tbb-7.0-must, TorBrowserTeam201703,
 GeorgKoppen201703R, tbb-7.0-must-nightly
 =>
 ff52-esr, tbb-gitian, tbb-7.0-must, TorBrowserTeam201704R,
 GeorgKoppen201703, tbb-7.0-must-nightly


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21240 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create patches to fix mingw-w64 compilation of Firefox ESR 52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21240: Create patches to fix mingw-w64 compilation of Firefox ESR 52
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704R, GeorgKoppen201703,  |
  tbb-7.0-must-nightly   |
Parent ID:  #21147   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must, TorBrowserTeam201703, GeorgKoppen201703R,
 tbb-7.0-must-nightly
 =>
 ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must, TorBrowserTeam201704R, GeorgKoppen201703,
 tbb-7.0-must-nightly


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Re: [tor-bugs] #12426 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make use of HeapEnableTerminationOnCorruption in Tor Browser on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12426: Make use of HeapEnableTerminationOnCorruption in Tor Browser on Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-firefox-patch, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-hardened, tbb-easy, TorBrowserTeam201704R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 FWIW: We want to test it an alpha but think harder if we should pick that
 one for the 7.0 stable in case we don't get the sandbox compiled properly
 in time.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12426 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make use of HeapEnableTerminationOnCorruption in Tor Browser on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12426: Make use of HeapEnableTerminationOnCorruption in Tor Browser on Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-firefox-patch, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-hardened, tbb-easy, TorBrowserTeam201704R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Okay, I cherry-picked that patch from `gecko-dev/master`. It is commit
 `49d21424d9d25b47a263bacec751742ac7370683` on `tor-
 browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-2`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21862 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make rust code in ESR 52 proxy safe

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21862: Make rust code in ESR 52 proxy safe
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 No.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20680 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20680: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201703, tbb-7.0-must-nightly |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:49 arthuredelstein]:
 > Replying to [comment:46 gk]:
 > > Thanks, I prepared `tor-browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-1` which I am going to
 push once I have proper Internet again (in about 4 hours). I'll add #21849
 as a child ticket as this is rebase related.
 >
 > Thanks. Note there is an extra fixup here (thanks to mcs and brade for
 noticing this error):
 > https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-
 browser/commit/3d38cd9dd7596872778c6e6573ac748650e31598

 Included into the rebased `tor-browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-2`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20680 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20680: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201703, tbb-7.0-must-nightly |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:48 arthuredelstein]:
 > Replying to [comment:47 gk]:
 > > Arthur, one thing I forgot: what happend to our DNS leak prevention
 patch? It seems it did not get rebased? Looking above you seem to imply it
 got upstreamed. I found you pointing to bug 751465 but what is the other
 commit you had in mind.
 >
 > Turns out I inadvertently deleted the first digit in the hash (I edited
 the comment above to fix this). I intended to point to the test for 751465
 you provided at `ef52c3bbf96f317d461ad652970f817e78923531`. Do these two
 patches cover the problem reported in #5741, or do we need the Tor Browser
 patch as well?

 That specific problem should be fixed by that, yes. However, the patch we
 had so far is more general than that as it prevents any DNS leaks not only
 the WebSocket related one.

 >
 > > I think I am inclined to take that patch again until we can be sure
 Mozilla is taking our proxy bypass safety requirements pretty seriously.
 >
 > Here's a rebased version, in case we still need it:
 > https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commit/20680+10_5741

 Thanks, I picked that one and applied it on `tor-browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-2`
 (e81b5bba67dd3c08f76b4d8e76d04743db202011).

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