Re: [tor-bugs] #20680 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20680: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:63 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [comment:62 arthuredelstein]:
 > > Replying to [comment:61 cypherpunks]:
 > >
 > > > All these 8 patches are (squashed?) present in
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/commit/?h=tor-
 browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-2&id=6623ae8f65bba3e7c1f117d2b4915584709af891, even
 with regression tests in https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/log/?h=tor-browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-2&ofs=100 and refs to their
 bug numbers.
 > >
 > > I see. Are you suggesting these settings should be removed?
 > Should you remove settings that do nothing, duplicate upstream or are
 wrong?

 I have opened a ticket to look into this: #21916

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21916 [Applications/Tor Browser]: possible obsolete or incorrect pref settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21916: possible obsolete or incorrect pref settings
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-7.0
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 A cypherpunks user has
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20680#comment:30
 suggested] that a number of our prefs may be obsolete or incorrect. Let's
 examine them and change any that need changing:

 > O [removed in esr17] Bug #6210: set plugin.expose_full_path to false
 > O [removed in esr38] Bug #9012: Do not display the missing plugin
 information bar
 > D [broken] Bug #9867: Flash is not click-to-play
 > O* [removed in esr31] Bug #10703: Fallback charset enables
 fingerprinting of bundle localization
 > O [FF has] Bug #11253: Turn on TLS 1.1 and 1.2 in TorBrowser
 > O [removed in esr31] Bug #12212: Disable deprecated Audio Data API
 > O [removed in esr38] Bug #15029: Tor Browser 4.5a4 prompts to install
 Flash
 > O [FF has] Bug #17369: The RC4 cipher flags in TBB must be set to
 "false" by default

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21710 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Upgrade Go to 1.8.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21710: Upgrade Go to 1.8.1
--+
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian TorBrowserTeam201704R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dcf):

 * keywords:  tbb-gitian => tbb-gitian TorBrowserTeam201704R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Hi, two patches for review:
  * attachment:0001-Bump-SANDBOX_TAG-to-
 35fb3e0cebd73c9a93bee68e1a12a596.patch: "Fix compilation with Go 1.8."
  * attachment:0002-Bug-21710-Upgrade-Go-to-1.8.1.patch: Upgrades GO_VER
 and GO_HASH and removes a workaround.

 There's no tag of sandboxed-tor-browser that has the Go 1.8 fix yet (the
 first patch). I don't know if you want to wait for a new tag before
 merging this.

 I tested this with `make alpha` on top of
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/commit/?h=bug_21753_v3&id=d0465e4ce9e9fa13a46faae8c7401b5fb78582f8
 bug_21753_v3] from #21753. I only tested running it on linux-amd64
 (bootstrapping with obfs4).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21913 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "No package 'alsa' found" during "torbrowser-linux for wheezy i386"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21913: "No package 'alsa' found" during "torbrowser-linux for wheezy i386"
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 My mistake. I was using `make alpha`. I think that means the patches from
 #21710 are ready for review now.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21914 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create LDAP account for Nicholas Merrill

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21914: Create LDAP account for Nicholas Merrill
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 +1

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21915 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: Add a new directory authority: Nicholas Merrill

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21915: Add a new directory authority: Nicholas Merrill
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 This ticket is to add Nicholas Merrill (#21914) relay as a new directory
 authority. At this time, his candidate relay has been running in the test
 network for many months and Nick is working at transitioning it to the
 real network.

 We've requested of Nick to also run a bandwidth authority.

 Once Nick has completed the setup, he will be adding the needed
 information on this ticket so we can then create a `DirServer` line that
 current dirauth can add to their configuration.

 Once that is complete and working, a `config.c` patch will be provided
 (GPG signed) and hopefully confirmed by others.

 Putting in the 031 milestone and we'll handle the backport in time.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21914 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create LDAP account for Nicholas Merrill

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21914: Create LDAP account for Nicholas Merrill
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256

 Please create an LDAP account for Nick who will be running a new directory
 authority in the near future to bring the number to 9.

 Name: Nicholas Merrill
 Address: n...@calyx.com
 PGP Fingerprint: BC2C B9C4 993C 086F FDAD  8D20 5905 C9C7 4693 488B
 Username: NickCalyx

 Thanks!
 David
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJY6/F4AAoJEELoaioR9I026PcH/10bGJp/E+mKO5lNMs9sXrcA
 Vzy37ui+l7cGwrCq/RDes/CKoDeTkKS1riv/s+BqYYEgW8ZM1mLOfXG0dS4Jzsuw
 mCX6dBuOPAqiIi4Efw81BezlbYED617xdxlpkwNsvqqIgiQNITzpgwdHxjD0Xp/E
 w1TOOLGF3ytaCoBkDP0az5DzfG9az8tEspckwp5p0OAsz5PdmuowTz1QNIvtyCEu
 zqzcTsmr6Z7rP7lYTNZ+NKhTqFBQfSwQMN5UQEkgrXa5TSjqBC+jVzPz+Es6LwDV
 T1OqZb13fzmEPffTYHd2Oa2sF/99pkc+nITGst6jMuIalUDXL5ljD3PIEqSGiVc=
 =vCEZ
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21876 [Applications/Tor Browser]: e10s is not enabled on Linux (and probably OS X) by default in ESR 52 based nightlies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21876: e10s is not enabled on Linux (and probably OS X) by default in ESR 52 
based
nightlies
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-alpha, TorBrowserTeam201704 =>
 ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-alpha, TorBrowserTeam201704R


Comment:

 Here is a patch that will cause e10s to be enabled by default, except on
 Windows XP (where Mozilla does not enable it by default either):
  https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug21876-01&id=b9af94a7458e111efa474c32bb0a6955bb5dbc8f

 Since it looks like the fix for
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1348576 is not going to be
 backported to the ESR, Kathy and I like the simple approach we used in
 this patch: treat all update channels as if they are esr for e10s-related
 things.

 We also reviewed the e10srollout system extension code as well as the code
 inside `toolkit/mozapps/extensions/internal/E10SAddonsRollout.jsm`. We did
 not see anything that we are concerned about: the e10srollout extension
 sets preferences that are then used by other parts of the Firefox code.
 The "esrA" policy that we will be using consists of:
  * Windows: Don't enable e10s if accessibility APIs were used recently.
  * Windows: Don't enable e10s on WindowsXP.
  * Don't enable e10s if any incompatible add-ons are installed.
 There are also prefs that users can set to change the behavior, e.g., set
 `browser.tabs.remote.force-enable` to `true`.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21432 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make a plan on how to deploy e10s in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21432: Make a plan on how to deploy e10s in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:8 gk]:
 > We might want to have a FAQ entry or something explaining when e10s is
 not enabled. There are multiple multiProcessStatus.* items in
 `aboutSupport.properties` explaining reasons for enabling/disabling e10s.

 Some of the strings are no longer used. See: https://dxr.mozilla.org
 /mozilla-esr52/source/toolkit/xre/nsAppRunner.cpp#4826 (or search for
 `about:support` within nsAppRunner.cpp).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21876 [Applications/Tor Browser]: e10s is not enabled on Linux (and probably OS X) by default in ESR 52 based nightlies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21876: e10s is not enabled on Linux (and probably OS X) by default in ESR 52 
based
nightlies
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:13 cypherpunks]:
 > mcs, what do you think about
 > {{{
 > [...] Torbutton WARN: DocShell is null for:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/timeline
 > }}}
 > during NEWNYM?

 I cannot reproduce this on OSX. What platform do you see this on? Please
 open a new ticket if this is consistently reproducible.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21912 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Deal with the deprecation of the `hardened` channel.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21912: Deal with the deprecation of the `hardened` channel.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: gk (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21913 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "No package 'alsa' found" during "torbrowser-linux for wheezy i386"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21913: "No package 'alsa' found" during "torbrowser-linux for wheezy i386"
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 Which makefile target are you using?

 The torbrowser descriptior has the changes to build esr52, but commit
 0d331f7aee2e13f56dfd91d343b5d45966b331c4 only made the switch of nightly
 to ESR52, which might be why it fails if you try to build an alpha.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21913 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "No package 'alsa' found" during "torbrowser-linux for wheezy i386"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21913: "No package 'alsa' found" during "torbrowser-linux for wheezy i386"
--+
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-gitian
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 I encountered a build failure in `Building torbrowser-linux for wheezy
 i386` while testing patches for #21710. I had applied two patches on top
 of [https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/log/?id=10f7b535456382823aaaece31fdd302ef7791fb5 10f7b53545]
 (the patches shouldn't have changed anything related to the torbrowser
 descriptor).

 I had previously tested the two patches on top of
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/commit/?h=bug_21753_v3&id=d0465e4ce9e9fa13a46faae8c7401b5fb78582f8
 bug_21753_v3] from #21753, and did not encounter an error. It only
 happened after I rebased the patches onto master.

 {{{
 checking __attribute__ ((aligned ())) support... trying 64
 64
 checking for alsa... Package alsa was not found in the pkg-config search
 path.
 Perhaps you should add the directory containing `alsa.pc'
 to the PKG_CONFIG_PATH environment variable
 No package 'alsa' found
 -- config.log --
 configure: error: Need alsa for audio output on Linux. (On Ubuntu, you
 might try installing the package libasound2-dev.)
 configure:20201: checking _PANGOCHK_CFLAGS
 configure:20206: checking _PANGOCHK_LIBS
 configure:20286: checking for pango >= 1.22.0 pangoft2 >= 1.22.0
 pangocairo >= 1.22.0
 configure:20293: checking MOZ_PANGO_CFLAGS
 configure:20298: checking MOZ_PANGO_LIBS
 configure:20405: checking for gtk+-2.0 >= 2.14
 configure:20412: checking _GTKCHECK_CFLAGS
 configure:20417: checking _GTKCHECK_LIBS
 configure:20497: checking for gio-2.0 >= 2.22
 configure:20504: checking MOZ_GIO_CFLAGS
 configure:20509: checking MOZ_GIO_LIBS
 configure:20623: checking for gconf-2.0 >= 1.2.1 gobject-2.0
 configure:20630: checking MOZ_GCONF_CFLAGS
 configure:20635: checking MOZ_GCONF_LIBS
 configure:21013: checking for dbus-1 >= 0.60
 configure:21020: checking MOZ_DBUS_CFLAGS
 configure:21025: checking MOZ_DBUS_LIBS
 configure:21104: checking for dbus-glib-1 >= 0.60
 configure:2: checking MOZ_DBUS_GLIB_CFLAGS
 configure:21116: checking MOZ_DBUS_GLIB_LIBS
 configure:21449: gcc -c -frandom-seed=tor -std=gnu99 -fgnu89-inline -fno-
 strict-aliasing -fno-math-errno -pthread  conftest.c 1>&5
 configure:21706: checking __attribute__ ((aligned ())) support
 configure:21723: gcc -c -frandom-seed=tor -std=gnu99 -fgnu89-inline -fno-
 strict-aliasing -fno-math-errno -pthread -Werror  conftest.c 1>&5
 configure:22643: checking for alsa
 configure: error: Need alsa for audio output on Linux. (On Ubuntu, you
 might try installing the package libasound2-dev.)
 *** Fix above errors and then restart with\
"make -f client.mk build"
 make: *** [configure] Error 1
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20814 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Pick a more accurate name for the "hardened" Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20814: Pick a more accurate name for the "hardened" Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by yawning):

 I went and filed #21912 to track sandbox related changes that are required
 by this.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21912 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Deal with the deprecation of the `hardened` channel.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21912: Deal with the deprecation of the `hardened` channel.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Per: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20814#comment:11

 The `hardened` channel for Tor Browser is going away.  The sandbox will
 need updates for this.

 Easy changes:
  * Make it impossible to install the `hardened` channel.
  * The selfrando specific "disable AESNI in NSS" workaround should apply
 to the `alpha` channel.

 Release after the `hardened` removal:
  * Remove ASAN specific workarounds.
  * Purge the remnants of `hardened` except for the migration path
 (Can/should be done immediately if the migration path for sandboxed users
 is a reinstall).

 How the actual migration from `hardened` to `alpha` is handled on the
 sandboxing end is currently an open question.  The easy thing to do would
 be to force a reinstall, but people probably don't realize that a
 `reinstall` will obliterate all existing preferences and bookmarks.  The
 more involved fix would be to modify the updater to handle channel
 migration.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21340 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Identify and backport new patches from Firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21340: Identify and backport new patches from Firefox
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/8664b032a330

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21865 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update security slider to take JIT preference changes into account

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21865: Update security slider to take JIT preference changes into account
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-security-slider,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Why should we remove `javascript.options.typeinference`? Looking at JIT
 code it seems still to be there.
 Updating the tooltip and removing "asm.js" seems to be a good idea.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20814 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Pick a more accurate name for the "hardened" Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20814: Pick a more accurate name for the "hardened" Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by yawning):

 > Users will get updated to the alpha which will hopefully have selfrando
 included then (depends on getting #20683 fixed in time).

 How's this going to work?  (In detail from the perspective of the
 updater.)

 Or more to the point, is it still just "download an XML file, download +
 apply a MAR"?  Where's the channel change notification?  If possible I'd
 like to mimic Tor Browser's behavior for the existing sandboxed-tor-
 browser + hardened users (Though "too bad, the alpha is now forcing you to
 reinstall, hope you backed up your bookmarks" is easy.).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21865 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update security slider to take JIT preference changes into account

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21865: Update security slider to take JIT preference changes into account
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-security-slider,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 This patch looks good, perhaps with the comment:3 suggestion. Should we
 update the text of `torbutton.prefs.sec_jit_desc_tooltip` as well?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20814 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Pick a more accurate name for the "hardened" Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20814: Pick a more accurate name for the "hardened" Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201703 => TorBrowserTeam201704


Comment:

 To move things forward and following our discussion on tbb-dev we decided
 to drop the hardened series as-is with the update next week. For users
 that looked for a hardened setup on Linux64 we'll point to the sandboxed-
 tor-browser. For those that want to help with debugging we make sure that
 we get a replacement into our new build tool, rbm, which we need to do
 anyway as we have some related deliverable for Tor Browser later this
 year.

 Users will get updated to the alpha which will hopefully have selfrando
 included then (depends on getting #20683 fixed in time).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21837 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix reproducibility issues in Firefox 52 accessibility code for Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21837: Fix reproducibility issues in Firefox 52 accessibility code for Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704R, tbb-7.0   |  Actual Points:
  -must-alpha, GeorgKoppen201704 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks. This is commit f13a2dae1ca038a448483dc6b25f17e40c8f3c9b on
 `master` now.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21837 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix reproducibility issues in Firefox 52 accessibility code for Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21837: Fix reproducibility issues in Firefox 52 accessibility code for Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704R, tbb-7.0   |  Actual Points:
  -must-alpha, GeorgKoppen201704 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:7 gk]:
 > `bug_21837` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/commit/?h=bug_21837&id=c948e11060b32861d046304db607bfd673b57087)
 in my public tor-browser-bundle repo has a fix for review.

 This patch looks good to me.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21783 [Applications/TorBirdy]: TorBirdy doesn't work with GMail (because it blocks the JavaScript required by OAuth?)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21783: TorBirdy doesn't work with GMail (because it blocks the JavaScript 
required
by OAuth?)
---+-
 Reporter:  sajolida   |  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Have you tried to set an App password for Thunderbird on Gmail?


   When you sign up for 2-Step Verification, we normally send you
 verification codes.
   However, these codes do not work with some apps and devices, like
 Outlook. Instead,
   you’ll need to authorize the app or device the first time you use it to
 sign in to
   your Google Account by generating and entering an App password.


 1. Visit your App passwords page. You may be asked to sign in to your
 Google Account.
 2. At the bottom, click Select app and choose the app you’re using.
 3. Click Select device and choose the device you’re using.
 4. Select Generate.
 5. Follow the instructions to enter the App password (the 16 character
 code in the yellow bar) on your device.
 6. Select Done.

 https://support.google.com/mail/answer/185833?hl=en

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20426 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Getting rbm-based Tor Browser builds reproductible for all platforms

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20426: Getting rbm-based Tor Browser builds reproductible for all platforms
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17379| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:5 boklm]:
 >
 > I tried, but it did not fix the problem. Maybe I did not do it
 correctly, so I will try again to make sure.

 I probably made an error when I tried to use libfaketime the previous
 time. After adding libfaketime (in commit
 8cc61d29d348e154f43474b47a0b0746301602a9) and setting timestamp on files
 (commit 2a15e10d49e437dd3637136692a86a9473c78e6d) the Windows builds are
 now reproductible.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20680 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20680: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:62 arthuredelstein]:
 > Replying to [comment:61 cypherpunks]:
 >
 > > All these 8 patches are (squashed?) present in
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/commit/?h=tor-
 browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-2&id=6623ae8f65bba3e7c1f117d2b4915584709af891, even
 with regression tests in https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/log/?h=tor-browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-2&ofs=100 and refs to their
 bug numbers.
 >
 > I see. Are you suggesting these settings should be removed?
 Should you remove settings that do nothing, duplicate upstream or are
 wrong?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21286 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Have some nightly builds using the new build process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21286: Have some nightly builds using the new build process
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17379| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 The machine where I was making those nightly builds has been down.

 I have now set up a new VM to make those nightly builds. The new URL to
 download them is:
 http://f4amtbsowhix7rrf.onion/

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20680 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20680: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:61 cypherpunks]:

 > All these 8 patches are (squashed?) present in
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/commit/?h=tor-
 browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-2&id=6623ae8f65bba3e7c1f117d2b4915584709af891, even
 with regression tests in https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/log/?h=tor-browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-2&ofs=100 and refs to their
 bug numbers.

 I see. Are you suggesting these settings should be removed?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21155 [Core Tor/Tor]: Similar to #14917: Client's choice of rend point can leak info about guard(s) of misconfigured hidden services with EntryNodes option

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21155: Similar to #14917: Client's choice of rend point can leak info about
guard(s) of misconfigured hidden services with EntryNodes option
---+
 Reporter:  Jaym   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-guard  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 See branch: `bug21155_031_02`.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21911 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser / Firefox degrades into resourse hog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21911: Tor Browser / Firefox degrades into resourse hog
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-performance
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Bugzilla is full of similar bugs
 {{{
 CC(T+206349.0) max pause: 1891ms, total time: 2105ms, slices: 39,
 suspected: 457, visited: 32356 RCed and 273549 GCed, collected: 8121 RCed
 and 57395 GCed (57395|0|304 waiting for GC)
 ForgetSkippable 19 times before CC, min: 0 ms, max: 47 ms, avg: 8 ms,
 total: 157 ms, max sync: 0 ms, removed: 6522
 }}}
 Some guys suspect NoScript, others - HTTPSE, but it's worth testing from
 the Tor Browser's side too.
 (It happens with an ordinary browsing of Trac and Bugzilla.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #13802 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add general trace-event logging instrumentation to Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13802: Add general trace-event logging instrumentation to Tor
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-03-unspecified-201612, review-   |  Actual Points:
  group-15   |
Parent ID:  #13792   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * owner:  pastly => dgoulet
 * status:  needs_revision => accepted


Comment:

 Taking over the ticket.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #21888, #21715, #21509, #20575

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #21888, #21715, #21509, #20575 by dgoulet:


Action: accept

Comment:
Taking those ticket for patches.

--
Tickets URL: 

Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21875 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Modal dialogs are maximized in ESR52 nightly builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21875: Modal dialogs are maximized in ESR52 nightly builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * owner:  tbb-team => arthuredelstein
 * status:  new => accepted


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20680 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20680: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:60 arthuredelstein]:
 > Replying to [comment:59 cypherpunks]:
 > > Replying to [comment:58 arthuredelstein]:
 > > > Replying to [comment:57 cypherpunks]:
 > > > > So you've ignored my comment:30. OK.
 > > >
 > > > Can you please explain what you are trying to say there? I don't
 understand it.
 > > - O [removed in esr38] Bug #9012: Do not display the missing plugin
 information bar:
 > > O - obsolete patch, because it is for something which was removed in
 esrXX.
 > > - D [broken] Bug #9867: Flash is not click-to-play
 > > D - drop this patch, because it's broken.
 > > - O* [removed in esr31] Bug #10703: Fallback charset enables
 fingerprinting of bundle localization
 > > O* - the same as O, but the new proper fix is needed.
 >
 > These patches are already not in our current branch, at
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/log/?h=tor-
 browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-2
 All these 8 patches are (squashed?) present in
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/commit/?h=tor-
 browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-2&id=6623ae8f65bba3e7c1f117d2b4915584709af891, even
 with regression tests in https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/log/?h=tor-browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-2&ofs=100 and refs to their
 bug numbers.
 > Are you requesting some further action?
 For needs proper fix?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20680 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20680: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:59 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [comment:58 arthuredelstein]:
 > > Replying to [comment:57 cypherpunks]:
 > > > So you've ignored my comment:30. OK.
 > >
 > > Can you please explain what you are trying to say there? I don't
 understand it.
 > - O [removed in esr38] Bug #9012: Do not display the missing plugin
 information bar:
 > O - obsolete patch, because it is for something which was removed in
 esrXX.
 > - D [broken] Bug #9867: Flash is not click-to-play
 > D - drop this patch, because it's broken.
 > - O* [removed in esr31] Bug #10703: Fallback charset enables
 fingerprinting of bundle localization
 > O* - the same as O, but the new proper fix is needed.

 These patches are already not in our current branch, at
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/commit/?h=tor-
 browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-2

 Are you requesting some further action?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21756 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTTP Authentication data is still sent to third parties with ESR 52 based Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21756: HTTP Authentication data is still sent to third parties with ESR 52 
based
Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:6 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:2 arthuredelstein]:
 > > In the #20680 branch, I dropped our #13900 patch because ESR52 is
 supposed to isolate HTTP Auth by first party. There is an automated test
 in ESR52 from https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/1301523. So I think the http
 ://ip-check.info site is detecting that the HTTP Auth credentials are
 being saved to the third party, but it isn't testing if these credentials
 are shared by with first party.
 >
 > I am not so sure about that. They are saved in Tor Browser 6.5.1 as well
 but still the test passes with it. We are stripping the third party
 headers when we are doing a request.

 You're right, I misspoke here. I should have said, the ip-check site is
 detecting if third-party credentials are sent back at all, but it isn't
 testing if these credentials are sent back under a different first party.

 > Now, the most likely explanation is that the test is showing a red
 outcome just in case it gets any third party headers back. Then this would
 be indeed no issue for us. What it actually does is implementing:
 >
 > http://blog.jeremiahgrossman.com/2007/04/tracking-users-without-
 cookies.html
 >
 > using things like http://Session:483452...@ipcheck.info/auth.css.php in
 a stylesheet link from ip-check.info to work without JS as well.
 >
 > Do you think you could come up with a test for that scenario, too, to be
 extra sure that nothing is sneaking in?

 So my test from comment:2 is already testing if any third-party headers
 are received back under a new first party. Are you interested in testing
 the silent authentication scenario (with and without JS), or is there some
 other characteristic of that demo you would like to test?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16706 [Core Tor/Tor]: Too many connection_edge_process_relay_cell warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16706: Too many connection_edge_process_relay_cell warnings
-+-
 Reporter:  s7r  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.6.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs, nickm-deferred-20161017, |  Actual Points:
  triage-out-030-201612  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merging!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20680 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20680: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:58 arthuredelstein]:
 > Replying to [comment:57 cypherpunks]:
 > > So you've ignored my comment:30. OK.
 >
 > Can you please explain what you are trying to say there? I don't
 understand it.
 - O [removed in esr38] Bug #9012: Do not display the missing plugin
 information bar:
 O - obsolete patch, because it is for something which was removed in
 esrXX.
 - D [broken] Bug #9867: Flash is not click-to-play
 D - drop this patch, because it's broken.
 - O* [removed in esr31] Bug #10703: Fallback charset enables
 fingerprinting of bundle localization
 O* - the same as O, but the new proper fix is needed.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20680 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20680: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:57 cypherpunks]:
 > So you've ignored my comment:30. OK.

 Can you please explain what you are trying to say there? I don't
 understand it.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21910 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor connection_edge_process_relay_cell()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21910: Refactor connection_edge_process_relay_cell()
--+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  refactor, easy
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Ticket #16706 is one of the possible many issues we had and will have with
 this function.

 It is quite big with many many return callsite and it is confusing on how
 it behaves. For instance, if `-reason` is returned, the caller should
 teardown the circuit and log warn but yet this functions already does many
 `LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN` in that case.

 One thing we could do is maybe return a different error code (or set an
 error code) depending on what's happening (should close circ, cell
 dropped, error). For instance, currently, returning 0 can either mean that
 a cell was dropped or successfully relayed.

 Auditing every callsite of this function would be important to understand
 how it is actually used so we can properly improve it and make it less
 error prone with dubious logging (or improved logging).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16706 [Core Tor/Tor]: Too many connection_edge_process_relay_cell warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16706: Too many connection_edge_process_relay_cell warnings
-+-
 Reporter:  s7r  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.6.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, nickm-deferred-20161017, |  Actual Points:
  triage-out-030-201612  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [comment:24 nickm]:
 > If you open a ticket for the refactoring, I'm okay with merging this.
 (Maybe add some  comments too?)

 Done here #21910

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16861 [Core Tor/Tor]: Pad Tor connections to collapse netflow records

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16861: Pad Tor connections to collapse netflow records
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  028-triage, 028-triaged, |  Actual Points:
  pre028-patch, 201511-deferred, |
  201512-deferred, tor-guard, TorCoreTeam-   |
  postponed-201604, nickm-deferred-20160905, |
  review-group-9, nickm-deferred-20161005|
Parent ID:   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * points:  2 => 6


Comment:

 Made comments on the gitlab. Nothing show stopper but there are multiple
 things I would like addressed before merge so we don't end up forgetting
 it in the void of Tor Unspecified trac refactoring ticket.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17868 [Core Tor/Tor]: base64_decode_nopad() destination buffer length problem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17868: base64_decode_nopad() destination buffer length problem
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  nikkolasg
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  review-group-12  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19531   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 LGTM but needed a changes file.  I've merged this to master, and added a
 changes file as aebd72a2f07dbb.  Thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18002 [Archived/operations]: move away from OFTC to new functional, Tor-friendly IRC network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18002: move away from OFTC to new functional, Tor-friendly IRC network
-+---
 Reporter:  adrelanos|  Owner:
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Archived/operations  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  None
-+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 dwfreed said, golden collection oftc's ir.cop:
 >  besides, what is against the rules is whatever the opers say
 is

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21909 [Metrics/Onionoo]: add metadata about used geoip data

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21909: add metadata about used geoip data
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 Hi,

 I'm analyzing the tor network by looking at (historic) onionoo details
 documents.

 When I see that a relay changed AS over time there are multiple reasons
 for that:
 1) onionoo updated its maxmind geoip file
 2) the relay actually changed to another AS or IP range was relocated to
 another AS

 For this reason it would be great if you could add a metadata field to the
 onionoo document in which you publish the geoip timestamp or hash, so we
 can tell (1) and (2) apart.

 thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21907 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser nightly (based on ESR52) is not running on CentOS 6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21907: Tor Browser nightly (based on ESR52) is not running on CentOS 6
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 A build with this patch now fails with:
 {{{
 XPCOMGlueLoad error for file /home/boklm/tb/rbm-nightly/tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/libxul.so:
 /home/boklm/tb/rbm-nightly/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libxul.so: undefined
 symbol: g_unichar_fully_decompose
 Couldn't load XPCOM.
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21887 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly with security slider being on "Medium" or "High"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21887: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly with security slider being on
"Medium" or "High"
-+-
 Reporter:  blockflare   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability-website, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-security-slider|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by blockflare):

 Replying to [comment:9 cypherpunks]:
 > Allow JS on `about:neterror`?

 Indeed, adding `about:neterror` in the NoScript whitelist solves the
 problem in both Medium and High.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21907 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser nightly (based on ESR52) is not running on CentOS 6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21907: Tor Browser nightly (based on ESR52) is not running on CentOS 6
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 I attached a patch backing out `hb_glib_blob_create()` in all cases. I am
 now making a build with this patch to confirm that it fixes the problem.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21887 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly with security slider being on "Medium" or "High"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21887: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly with security slider being on
"Medium" or "High"
-+-
 Reporter:  blockflare   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability-website, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-security-slider|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Allow JS on `about:neterror`?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21908 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser breaks response headers sometimes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21908: Tor Browser breaks response headers sometimes
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-security
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 There are
 {{{
 Public-Key-Pins: An unknown error occurred processing the header specified
 by the site.
 }}}
 on
 https://check.torproject.org/torcheck/img/tor-on.png
 or
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21886
 sometimes.
 The reason seems to be related to #21627.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21887 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly with security slider being on "Medium" or "High" (was: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly with secu

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21887: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly with security slider being on
"Medium" or "High"
-+-
 Reporter:  blockflare   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability-website, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-security-slider|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21887 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly with security slider not being on "Low" (was: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21887: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly with security slider not 
being
on "Low"
-+-
 Reporter:  blockflare   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability-website, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-security-slider|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability-website => ff52-esr, tbb-usability-
 website, tbb-security-slider
 * status:  needs_information => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21907 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser nightly (based on ESR52) is not running on CentOS 6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21907: Tor Browser nightly (based on ESR52) is not running on CentOS 6
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr => ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704, tbb-7.0-must-alpha


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21907 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser nightly (based on ESR52) is not running on CentOS 6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21907: Tor Browser nightly (based on ESR52) is not running on CentOS 6
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 boklm: can you come up with a smart fix for us? Maybe just backing out
 `hb_glib_blob_create()` as the reporter in
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1324780 mentioned? Or just
 tweaking the fixup a bit so that it works for us?. I assume we don't want
 to switch to centos6 for building the Linux bundles.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21907 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser nightly (based on ESR52) is not running on CentOS 6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21907: Tor Browser nightly (based on ESR52) is not running on CentOS 6
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 According to https://developer.mozilla.org/en-
 US/Firefox/Linux_compatibility_matrix Debian Wheezy ships with glib 2.32
 and RHEL6 with 2.28 and `g_bytes_unref` first appeared in 2.32. So, yeah.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21907 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser nightly (based on ESR52) is not running on CentOS 6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21907: Tor Browser nightly (based on ESR52) is not running on CentOS 6
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 The error seems to be related to those 2 commits:
 https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/ea39ecf49414
 https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/384f988caf6e

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21907 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser nightly (based on ESR52) is not running on CentOS 6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21907: Tor Browser nightly (based on ESR52) is not running on CentOS 6
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff52-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Starting Tor Browser nightly on CentOS 6.9 gives me the following error:
 {{{
 XPCOMGlueLoad error for file /home/boklm/tb/nightly/tor-
 browser/Browser/libxul.so:
 /home/boklm/tb/nightly/tor-browser/Browser/libxul.so: undefined symbol:
 g_bytes_unref
 Couldn't load XPCOM.
 }}}

 Version 7.0a2 is starting correctly on CentOS 6.9.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21899 [Core Tor/Tor]: Address setting ignoring IPv6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21899: Address setting ignoring IPv6
---+--
 Reporter:  ItsNannerpuss  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  ipv6   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.7.x-final => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 Address appears to not support IPv6 (see `resolve_my_address()`).

 What you want here is probably `ORPort [address:]PORT|auto [flags]` and
 make sure to set the flag `IPv6Only`. I think that would resolve your
 issue. Give it a try!

 Ex: `ORPort [1234:5678::01:1234]:auto IPv6Only`

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21887 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21887: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly
-+-
 Reporter:  blockflare   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability-website  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by blockflare):

 Replying to [comment:4 gk]:
 > blockflare: this does not happen with the security slider set to "low",
 right?

 Yes, only Medium and High are affected.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21272 [Metrics]: Onionperf deployment

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21272: Onionperf deployment
-+--
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by hiro):

 I am letting onionperf generate the files each day together with the log
 rotation. But when I generate the tpf in the midlde of the day to test I
 am just running:
 onionperf analyze --torperf --tgen tgen-client/onionperf.tgen.log --torctl
 tor-client/onionperf.tor.log -p /home/cloud/onionperf/onionperf-data

 Which is why you might see the source address empty in this case. If you
 check a tpf generated at midnight though, the source address is present,
 e.g.: https://op-nl.onionperf.torproject.net/op-nl-1048576-2017-04-09.tpf

 Attaching newly generated measurements just now to check if it's
 connecting to the right port.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21906 [User Experience/Website]: Make 64bit instructions default for Linux on signature verification page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21906: Make 64bit instructions default for Linux on signature verification page
-+
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21272 [Metrics]: Onionperf deployment

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21272: Onionperf deployment
-+--
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by robgjansen):

 Hmm, OK, so it seems like OnionPerf should be producing correct
 SOURCEADDRESS lines. Are you running the `onionperf analyze` mode by some
 external script to regenerate the `.tpf` files and ignore the ones that
 OnionPerf produces? If so, you need to use something like
 {{{
 onionperf analyze --address=37.218.247.40 --name=op-nl --date=2017-04-10
 -t --tgen ... --torctl ...
 }}}
 This will ensure that the correct SOURCE and SOURCEADDRESS appear in the
 `.tpf.` output files, and that only downloads for the given date are
 included.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21898 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Problems over night (france-time) with rocket.chat at chat4free.de

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21898: Problems over night (france-time) with rocket.chat at chat4free.de
--+-
 Reporter:  Botanikerin   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  tbb-testcase  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:4 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > > Replying to [comment:2 cypherpunks]:
 > > > Despite the content of user's provided sites, chat's code is a good
 testcase for e.g. #16333, because #18619 is still observable ;)
 > > > Funny "feature" is: when you open
 https://webchat.erotikchat4free.de/home, you get `InvalidStateError` and
 failed connection to wss, but if you open Network tab of Developer Tools,
 site begins to work!
 > >
 > > Sounds like a different bug than the one in this ticket. Could you
 open a new ticket? Thanks.
 > I'm not sure what strange games you're playing here, but proposed
 solution seems to solve the user's problem (script is doing something
 weird with UTC).

 I am not playing games. Have a look at the bug description: "I can use it
 with TorBrowser over the day
 but in the night (france-time) connections error only". So, if you are
 having connection issues *right now* this is seems to me a different bug
 than the reported one.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21898 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Problems over night (france-time) with rocket.chat at chat4free.de

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21898: Problems over night (france-time) with rocket.chat at chat4free.de
--+-
 Reporter:  Botanikerin   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  tbb-testcase  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:2 cypherpunks]:
 > > Despite the content of user's provided sites, chat's code is a good
 testcase for e.g. #16333, because #18619 is still observable ;)
 > > Funny "feature" is: when you open
 https://webchat.erotikchat4free.de/home, you get `InvalidStateError` and
 failed connection to wss, but if you open Network tab of Developer Tools,
 site begins to work!
 >
 > Sounds like a different bug than the one in this ticket. Could you open
 a new ticket? Thanks.
 I'm not sure what strange games you're playing here, but proposed solution
 seems to solve the user's problem (script is doing something weird with
 UTC).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21272 [Metrics]: Onionperf deployment

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21272: Onionperf deployment
-+--
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by hiro):

 Hi Rob,
 Updated the VMs so issue 1 should be live now.

 Regarding issue 2:


 $ python
 >>> from onionperf import util
 >>> util.get_ip_address()
 '37.218.247.40'

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20680 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20680: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 So you've ignored my comment:30. OK.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21898 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Problems over night (france-time) with rocket.chat at chat4free.de

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21898: Problems over night (france-time) with rocket.chat at chat4free.de
--+-
 Reporter:  Botanikerin   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  tbb-testcase  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 cypherpunks]:
 > Despite the content of user's provided sites, chat's code is a good
 testcase for e.g. #16333, because #18619 is still observable ;)
 > Funny "feature" is: when you open
 https://webchat.erotikchat4free.de/home, you get `InvalidStateError` and
 failed connection to wss, but if you open Network tab of Developer Tools,
 site begins to work!

 Sounds like a different bug than the one in this ticket. Could you open a
 new ticket? Thanks.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21905 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow third-party cookies as we are isolating them to the first party in ESR52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21905: Allow third-party cookies as we are isolating them to the first party in
ESR52
-+--
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website, ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 tbb-nightly: TBB throws an error in error console when you switch "3rd-
 party cookies" in Options on Windows.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21898 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Problems over night (france-time) with rocket.chat at chat4free.de

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21898: Problems over night (france-time) with rocket.chat at chat4free.de
--+--
 Reporter:  Botanikerin   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-testcase  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * keywords:   => tbb-testcase
 * resolution:  invalid =>


Comment:

 Despite the content of user's provided sites, chat's code is a good
 testcase for e.g. #16333, because #18619 is still observable ;)
 Funny "feature" is: when you open https://webchat.erotikchat4free.de/home,
 you get `InvalidStateError` and failed connection to wss, but if you open
 Network tab of Developer Tools, site begins to work!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21875 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Modal dialogs are maximized in ESR52 nightly builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21875: Modal dialogs are maximized in ESR52 nightly builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:6 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:5 cypherpunks]:
 > > Whether and where to write tbb-nightly review?
 >
 > Not sure what you mean by "review", but if you want to report bugs
 please do so in this bug tracker by opening one ticket per issue. Thanks.
 I meant discussion-style ticket, like #20680, from which decisions about
 opening new tickets were made.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21672 [User Experience/Website]: Update Matt's description

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21672: Update Matt's description
-+
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21906 [User Experience/Website]: Make 64bit instructions default for Linux on signature verification page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21906: Make 64bit instructions default for Linux on signature verification page
-+--
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 We still treat 32bit Linux users as the default Linux user group on our
 signature verification page. We should change that to write for 64bit
 Linux users instead. Reported on tor-talk:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2017-April/043102.html

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16285 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure EME is no tracking risk in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16285: Make sure EME is no tracking risk in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-linkability,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201605, TorBrowserTeam201606|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 There have been quite some changes in EME-land since esr45. macOS and
 Linux have now DRM support as well and it seems EME is treated differently
 build-wise: now it is only disabled by pref:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1300654. That might be
 related to clearkey getting built now even if we specify --disable-eme` in
 the .mozconfig file (adding exposure to security vulnerabilities:
 https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2016-77/). And there
 is a different download path available in case AUS is down:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1267495.

 That's just mentioning the "top highlights". We need to have a close look
 at EME for esr52.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21875 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Modal dialogs are maximized in ESR52 nightly builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21875: Modal dialogs are maximized in ESR52 nightly builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:5 cypherpunks]:
 > Whether and where to write tbb-nightly review?

 Not sure what you mean by "review", but if you want to report bugs please
 do so in this bug tracker by opening one ticket per issue. Thanks.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21887 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21887: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly
-+-
 Reporter:  blockflare   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability-website  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr => ff52-esr, tbb-usability-website


Comment:

 Interestingly the error page is actually a different one with "low", huh.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21887 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21887: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly
--+---
 Reporter:  blockflare|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 blockflare: this does not happen with the security slider set to "low",
 right?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21896 [Applications/Tor Browser]: CAPTCHA challenge not displaying on a news website when trying to post a comment

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21896: CAPTCHA challenge not displaying on a news website when trying to post a
comment
-+-
 Reporter:  laurus   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr-will-have, tbb-usability-   |  Actual Points:
  website|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr-will-have => ff52-esr-will-have, tbb-usability-
   website
 * severity:  Major => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21896 [Applications/Tor Browser]: CAPTCHA challenge not displaying on a news website when trying to post a comment

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21896: CAPTCHA challenge not displaying on a news website when trying to post a
comment
--+--
 Reporter:  laurus|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr-will-have|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => ff52-esr-will-have


Comment:

 Works in the esr52-based nightly build for me. This will then be fixed in
 our next alpha as well.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21904 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bump mingw-w64 commit we use to 98e5b4930a717eafddd8ca0f0dfeb7c57c6b026a

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21904: Bump mingw-w64 commit we use to 98e5b4930a717eafddd8ca0f0dfeb7c57c6b026a
-+--
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
-+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks. Commit 2b565b9f4125d0cd54e705b2f54719e2b0f4db40 on tor-browser-
 bundle `master` has the change.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21795 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser is crashing on github.com on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21795: Tor Browser is crashing on github.com on Windows
-+--
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704, tbb-crash  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704 => TorBrowserTeam201704, tbb-crash


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21904 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bump mingw-w64 commit we use to 98e5b4930a717eafddd8ca0f0dfeb7c57c6b026a

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21904: Bump mingw-w64 commit we use to 98e5b4930a717eafddd8ca0f0dfeb7c57c6b026a
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:1 gk]:
 > `bug_21904` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/commit/?h=bug_21904&id=2b565b9f4125d0cd54e705b2f54719e2b0f4db40)
 in my public tor-browser-bundle repo has a proposed fix for review.

 This looks good to me.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20680 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20680: Rebase Tor Browser patches to 52 ESR
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 We are done, thanks all.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21712 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Is our patch for #19212 still necessary in ESR52?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21712: Is our patch for #19212 still necessary in ESR52?
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20680| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks, this is ef5d0175d652406190334a77bde5c1ccf492a9a7 on `tor-
 browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-2`.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21712 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Is our patch for #19212 still necessary in ESR52?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21712: Is our patch for #19212 still necessary in ESR52?
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20680| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201704R


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:3 arthuredelstein]:
 > > So, like Georg, I was able to reproduce the crash using an earlier
 version of Tor Browser. I also could reproduce it reverting the #19212
 patch in the latest TBB/ESR45.
 > >
 > > But now I realize that in our TBB/ESR52 branch, the game shows an
 error message: "Failed to download game data!" This message seems to
 happen, I think, before the crash in the TBB/ESR45 version.
 >
 > I don't think so? comment:5:ticket:19212 seems to indicate the opposite
 if I am reading it right. And comment:7:ticket:19212 seems to indicate
 that those things are not related at all. If either of those is the case
 and we are reaching this message without our rebased fix and without a
 crash then let's get rid of it.

 Yeah, oddly I don't see the "Failed to download game data!" message in
 TBB/ESR45. Not sure why that is. But my subsequent experiment (comment:5)
 is also consistent with them being separate issues.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #10353 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Cookie Protection dialog is empty in FF24

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10353: Cookie Protection dialog is empty in FF24
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff24-esr, tbb-usability, tbb-|  Actual Points:
  helpdesk-frequent, tbb-torbutton,  |
  AffectsTails   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:
 ff24-esr, tbb-usability, tbb-helpdesk-frequent, tbb-torbutton,
 AffectsTails, ff52-esr-will-have
 =>
 ff24-esr, tbb-usability, tbb-helpdesk-frequent, tbb-torbutton,
 AffectsTails


Comment:

 Indeed. I wonder what is still wrong.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21905 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow third-party cookies as we are isolating them to the first party in ESR52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21905: Allow third-party cookies as we are isolating them to the first party in
ESR52
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-usability-website,
 Severity:  Normal   |  ff52-esr
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Now that 3rd-party cookies get isolated as well we should relax our cookie
 handling and allow 3rd-party cookies again.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21712 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Is our patch for #19212 still necessary in ESR52?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21712: Is our patch for #19212 still necessary in ESR52?
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20680| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 OK, so in TBB/ESR52 with #19212 reverted, if I set "dom.indexeddb.enabled"
 to true, then the app seems to work correctly without crashing.

 Whereas in TBB/ESR45 with #19212 reverted, we still get a crash. So I am
 confident now we can revert #19212 in TBB/ESR52.

 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commit/21712

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21904 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bump mingw-w64 commit we use to 98e5b4930a717eafddd8ca0f0dfeb7c57c6b026a

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21904: Bump mingw-w64 commit we use to 98e5b4930a717eafddd8ca0f0dfeb7c57c6b026a
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704 => ff52-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201704R


Comment:

 `bug_21904` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/commit/?h=bug_21904&id=2b565b9f4125d0cd54e705b2f54719e2b0f4db40)
 in my public tor-browser-bundle repo has a proposed fix for review.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #21904 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Bump mingw-w64 commit we use to 98e5b4930a717eafddd8ca0f0dfeb7c57c6b026a

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21904: Bump mingw-w64 commit we use to 98e5b4930a717eafddd8ca0f0dfeb7c57c6b026a
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  ff52-esr,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201704
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor4 |
-+-
 We should bump the mingw-w64 commit we use for our ESR52 builds to
 98e5b4930a717eafddd8ca0f0dfeb7c57c6b026a as this fixes an issue with
 building Firefox's sandbox.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs