Re: [tor-bugs] #21569 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate and neuter fingerprinting potential of Permissions API

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21569: Investigate and neuter fingerprinting potential of Permissions API
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * cc: arthuredelstein (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21930 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NSS libraries are missing from mar-tools archive

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21930: NSS libraries are missing from mar-tools archive
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-  |  Actual Points:
  alpha, TorBrowserTeam201704R   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:  tbb-gitian, ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-alpha, TorBrowserTeam201704
 => tbb-gitian, ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-alpha, TorBrowserTeam201704R
 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 mcs]:
 > I don't know for sure because I don't have `libfreeblpriv3.so` and
 `libsoftokn3.so`. I just started a build that will package them into the
 mar-tools archive, so I will check in the morning. Maybe you have a
 quicker way of checking though.

 My build progressed far enough for me to determine that signmar needs both
 libfreeblpriv3.so and libsoftokn3.so. Here is a patch:
  https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/commit/?h=bug21930-01
 I restarted my build with this patch in place and will check the results
 tomorrow morning my time.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21930 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NSS libraries are missing from mar-tools archive

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21930: NSS libraries are missing from mar-tools archive
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-  |  Actual Points:
  alpha, TorBrowserTeam201704|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:2 gk]:
 > Hm. So, maybe I tested not hard enough given that the MAR creation *is*
 working in our nightly builds? Like `mar` does not need those libs but
 `signmar` actually does? If so, sorry for the extra work.

 Yes, mar does not use any NSS stuff but signmar does.
 I don't know for sure because I don't have `libfreeblpriv3.so` and
 `libsoftokn3.so`. I just started a build that will package them into the
 mar-tools archive, so I will check in the morning. Maybe you have a
 quicker way of checking though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21931 [Applications/Tor Browser]: backport OSX SetupMacCommandLine updater fixes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21931: backport OSX SetupMacCommandLine updater fixes
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:   => ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704R


Comment:

 The most recent two commits from this branch are ready for review:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/log/?h=bug21931-01

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[tor-bugs] #21931 [Applications/Tor Browser]: backport OSX SetupMacCommandLine updater fixes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21931: backport OSX SetupMacCommandLine updater fixes
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 While testing the updater with an ad hoc (non-gitian) build, Kathy and I
 ran into https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1335916. With
 gitian-based builds (which are compiled and linked with an older OSX SDK
 than our ad hoc ones are), the code does not crash but it does emit a
 warning:
  WARNING: nextEventMatchingMask should only be called from the Main
 Thread! This will throw an exception in the future.

 We should backport the Mozilla fix for 1335916, as well as a follow up fix
 from https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1342887.

 I will create a branch that contains the cherry picked patches.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18862 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure the Presentation API is no risk for our users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18862: Make sure the Presentation API is no risk for our users
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-alpha, TorBrowserTeam201704 =>
 ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-alpha, TorBrowserTeam201704R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Setting this to Needs Review to check that someone else in the team agrees
 with my assessment that we don't need to do anything for the ESR52 alpha;
 if we want to rip out dom/presentation/* we can leave this ticket open and
 change the target release.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18862 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure the Presentation API is no risk for our users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18862: Make sure the Presentation API is no risk for our users
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 In ESR52, the Presentation API is still disabled by prefs
 (dom.presentation.enabled = false and similar). I manually confirmed,
 using the consoles, that window.PresentationRequest is not exposed in
 content or chrome javascript. I also searched on dxr.mozilla.org and
 didn't find any place where we would expect a PresentationRequest to be
 activated, except in tests.

 We could also potentially try to rip out the DOM Presentation code, but I
 already feel reasonably comfortable that the Presentation API code won't
 be running.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21915 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: Add a new directory authority: Nicholas Merrill

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21915: Add a new directory authority: Nicholas Merrill
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * cc: nick@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21340 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Identify and backport new patches from Firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21340: Identify and backport new patches from Firefox
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704R, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 I should also mention I attempted to rebase the implementation patch from
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1342178 but found that it
 didn't seem to fix the problem described on that ticket. So I'm leaving it
 out for now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21340 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Identify and backport new patches from Firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21340: Identify and backport new patches from Firefox
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704R, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21340 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Identify and backport new patches from Firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21340: Identify and backport new patches from Firefox
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704R, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704, tbb-7.0-must-alpha =>
 ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704R, tbb-7.0-must-alpha


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:18 gk]:
 > Arthur: where are we here given the previous comments? We have the HSTS
 /HPKP-related backport to consider. Something else as well?

 I have rebased what I had in comment:6 on top of tor/tor-
 browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-2, except I left out the SVG patches which I think
 we can postpone:

 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commits/21340+5

 These include the HSTS/HPKP-related patches, as well as these:
 {{{
 1315602 Remove the assertion of FirstPartyDomain should be empty in HTTP
 redirect
 1274020 Add a test to show that the DOM Cache is separated by origin
 attributes
 1282655 Add a test case to test whether site permissions are universal or
 isolated for each type of OriginAttribute
 1305144 Spoof referrer when leaving a .onion domain (Tor 17334)
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21930 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NSS libraries are missing from mar-tools archive

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21930: NSS libraries are missing from mar-tools archive
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-  |  Actual Points:
  alpha, TorBrowserTeam201704|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Hm. So, maybe I tested not hard enough given that the MAR creation *is*
 working in our nightly builds? Like `mar` does not need those libs but
 `signmar` actually does? If so, sorry for the extra work.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21915 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: Add a new directory authority: Nicholas Merrill

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21915: Add a new directory authority: Nicholas Merrill
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by tom):

 * cc: tom (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21222 [User Experience]: Redesigning torproject.org (was: Prepare to)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21222: Redesigning torproject.org
-+--
 Reporter:  linda|  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  website  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by linda):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * reporter:  lnl => linda
 * cc: hiro (removed)
 * priority:  Medium => Very High
 * owner:  lnl => linda


Old description:

> = Overview =
>
> We’re redesigning torproject.org to specifically be targeted for new Tor
> users and the public. Information targeted toward developers, relay
> operators, researchers, and other user personas will be moved to
> supplementary portals.
>
> * Goals: Make websites that are maximally useful for its visitors and
> effectively communicates our mission.
> * Timeline: One year, most likely to be March 2017 - March 2018 (assuming
> that the SIDA proposal is approved by march 2017).
> * Scope: torproject.org, dev.torproject.org, support.torproject.org,
> community.torproject.org; if information that belongs here is currently
> somewhere else (i.e. metrics.torproject.org has a ‘developer’ page), we
> need to redesign that too.
>
> There have been multiple efforts in the past to redesign torproject.org
> (see the appendix). We won’t start from zero, and use these past efforts
> when applicable.
>

> = Materials =
>
> * [https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B36YkvDtVNK_eWxGT3Vwbkl4YjA
> torproject.org] as of Jan 2017
> * an [https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B36YkvDtVNK_TVp3UTVEbkVwelk
> audit] of torproject.org as of Jan 2017

New description:

 This is the master ticket that keeps track of all tasks for redesigning
 torproject.org.

 = Project phases =

 Research:
 * sitemap old site
 * organize existing content
 * industry research
 * write user personas and stories
 * brainstorm new content requirements

 Design:
 * sitemap new site (navigational design)
 * organize content into new site structure (information architecting)
 * determine what we want users to do on each page  (interaction design)
 * prioritize important content on each page (interface design)
 * draw sketches of the various portals' pages (wireframing)

 Build:
 * branding, color, fonts (styling)
 * writing content
 * creating graphical content
 * choosing a framework
 * choosing which pages will be mirrored and which ones are not
 * start building the website (prototyping)

 Polish:
 * translate into different languages
 * localize layouts (right to left, for instance)
 * search engine optimization
 * debugging
 * testing
 * reviewing

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21930 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NSS libraries are missing from mar-tools archive

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21930: NSS libraries are missing from mar-tools archive
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-  |  Actual Points:
  alpha, TorBrowserTeam201704|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 The freebl one is different now. It's called `libfreeblpriv3.so` I think I
 tested whether the `mar` tool needed that one and the `libsoftokn3.so` lib
 and it worked for me without both. So, does adding `libfreeblpriv3.so` and
 `libsoftokn3.so` fix the problem for you? (Do we need both?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21914 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Create LDAP account for Nicholas Merrill

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21914: Create LDAP account for Nicholas Merrill
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Yes please!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18913 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:tor should not have chrome privileges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18913: about:tor should not have chrome privileges
--+-
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:   => ff52-esr
 * component:  Applications/Torbutton => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 Actual for e10s.

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[tor-bugs] #21930 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NSS libraries are missing from mar-tools archive

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21930: NSS libraries are missing from mar-tools archive
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-gitian, ff52-esr,
 Severity:  Normal   |  tbb-7.0-must-alpha,
 |  TorBrowserTeam201704
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor4 |
-+-
 While testing mar file generation on Linux, Kathy and I discovered that
 the `signmar` program from `mar-tools-linux64.zip` will not start. The
 error message displayed is:
  ERROR: Could not initialize NSS
 Trying to run `certutil` produces a more informative error message:
  certutil: function failed: PR_LOAD_LIBRARY_ERROR: Failure to load dynamic
 library
  libsoftokn3.so: cannot open shared object file: No such file or directory

 I think we probably need `libfreebl3.so` as well.

 Why were those two libraries removed from `NSS_LIBS` in `gitian-
 firefox.yml` as part of #21239? Are they not built at all, or maybe they
 are in a different location in ESR52?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20426 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Getting rbm-based Tor Browser builds reproducible for all platforms

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20426: Getting rbm-based Tor Browser builds reproducible for all platforms
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17379| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 The Windows `ar` bundle only hits #21837 which is good.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21887 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly with security slider being on "Medium" or "High"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21887: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly with security slider being on
"Medium" or "High"
-+--
 Reporter:  blockflare   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:
 ff52-esr, tbb-usability-website, tbb-security-slider,
 TorBrowserTeam201704R
 => ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704R


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21912 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Deal with the deprecation of the `hardened` channel.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21912: Deal with the deprecation of the `hardened` channel.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by yawning):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Ok, I think this is done.  Sorry I couldn't think of a good way to handle
 the transition beyond "make them reinstall if they're running an up to
 date `sandboxed-tor-browser`".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21928 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Force a reinstall if an existing hardened bundle is present.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21928: Force a reinstall if an existing hardened bundle is present.
--+--
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21912| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by yawning):

 * component:  Applications/Tor Browser => Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox


Comment:

 Whoops, the component was wrong, sorry for the noise.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21928 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Force a reinstall if an existing hardened bundle is present.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21928: Force a reinstall if an existing hardened bundle is present.
--+--
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21912| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by yawning):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser/sandboxed-tor-
 browser.git/commit/?id=aeb2c854b90370fce26e36188186efb48e2eb8e0

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21887 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly with security slider being on "Medium" or "High"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21887: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly with security slider being on
"Medium" or "High"
-+-
 Reporter:  blockflare   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability-website, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-security-slider, TorBrowserTeam201704R |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks. Fixed with commit 5d2f77c0c56a62199fab2034ba14686867808b82 on
 `master`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21883 [Metrics/Analysis]: One-off analysis for number of relays a bwauth decided the median for

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21883: One-off analysis for number of relays a bwauth decided the median for
--+--
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Replying to [comment:2 tom]:
 > So for the historical bwauth measuring graphs - I think i will generate
 historical data for them... What i do currently is place data into a
 sqlite database, and then every hour export the most recent 90 days worth
 of data in a csv for javascript graph generation. I think I will backfill
 the database... so I ought to be able to generate some one-off graphs like
 the ones you created showing historical data.

 That would be neat!

 > I'm wondering if/what is the best approach to let my consensus-health
 graphs get configurable and usable in metrics.tpo

 Fine question!  There's no easy answer, because so far we don't use
 externally provided .csv files for graphs on Tor Metrics.  But I could
 imagine doing this in the future, if the data reaches back to more than
 the past 90 days (ideally a few years back when bandwidth authorities
 became a thing).  We could simply fetch the .csv files as part of the
 cronjob that generates .csv files.  Though I'd say, for now, let's start
 with the graphs on consensus-health.tpo and see if they're as useful as we
 hope.  If they are, let's have this discussion again!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21912 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Deal with the deprecation of the `hardened` channel.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21912: Deal with the deprecation of the `hardened` channel.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by yawning):

 Replying to [comment:4 boklm]:
 > Replying to [comment:2 yawning]:
 > >  * It's not immediately obvious to me how to detect that a channel
 switch has happened from the update metadata
 (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Software_Update:updates.xml_Format).  This also
 applies to the bundle locale.
 >
 > Yes, it is not possible to detect it from the update metadata. You can
 detect it by looking at the file `Browser/defaults/pref/channel-prefs.js`.
 The switch will be done with a mar file updating this file and the
 `Browser/update-settings.ini` file only.

 On a somewhat tangential note, it would be nice if the architecture,
 channel, and locale for the currently installed bundle was stored in a
 consistent location across all releases, in a format that is easy to parse
 (and no, "Javascript Mozilla prefs" is not easy to parse).

 > The update modifying the channel preferences files should apply
 correctly, but assuming the sandbox updater is not looking at those files
 to know the current channel, nothing else will happen and users will stay
 on the last hardened version.

 Ah ok.  That may be less bad than "everything breaks".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21929 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Remove hardened/ASAN related code.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21929: Remove hardened/ASAN related code.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21912| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by yawning):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser/sandboxed-tor-
 browser.git/commit/?id=5d784358fcdbfad980b737824ed1565b237cc148

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[tor-bugs] #21929 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Remove hardened/ASAN related code.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21929: Remove hardened/ASAN related code.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #21912
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 More fallout from #21912.

 The places where the code does special things in the case of the
 `hardened` bundle (except for #21928) should be removed as they are no
 longer relevant.

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[tor-bugs] #21928 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Force a reinstall if an existing hardened bundle is present.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21928: Force a reinstall if an existing hardened bundle is present.
--+--
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #21912
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 More tasks related to #21912.

 Since there's no good way for `sandboxed-tor-browser` to handle channels
 being removed, the solution I'm going for is to force a re-install if an
 existing `hardened` bundle is present.

 Some minor UI work is probably required since this will obliterate user
 data.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21927 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Remove the ability to install/update the hardened bundle.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21927: Remove the ability to install/update the hardened bundle.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21912| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by yawning):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser/sandboxed-tor-
 browser.git/commit/?id=dc0ca5edeea0c9e17b9cd3d941502ac1d57f

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[tor-bugs] #21927 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Remove the ability to install/update the hardened bundle.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21927: Remove the ability to install/update the hardened bundle.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #21912
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Part of #21912, this is for removing the ability for new users to install
 or update a bundle series that is being removed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21883 [Metrics/Analysis]: One-off analysis for number of relays a bwauth decided the median for

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21883: One-off analysis for number of relays a bwauth decided the median for
--+--
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by tom):

 * owner:  metrics-team => tom
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 So for the historical bwauth measuring graphs - I think i will generate
 historical data for them... What i do currently is place data into a
 sqlite database, and then every hour export the most recent 90 days worth
 of data in a csv for javascript graph generation. I think I will backfill
 the database... so I ought to be able to generate some one-off graphs like
 the ones you created showing historical data.

 I'm wondering if/what is the best approach to let my consensus-health
 graphs get configurable and usable in metrics.tpo

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21221 [User Experience]: Perform usability testing for the mobile security slider

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21221: Perform usability testing for the mobile security slider
+
 Reporter:  lnl |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  orfox, tor browser, tbb-mobile  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by linda):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21221 [User Experience]: Perform usability testing for the mobile security slider

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21221: Perform usability testing for the mobile security slider
+--
 Reporter:  lnl |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  orfox, tor browser, tbb-mobile  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by linda):

 The testing has been completed; the summary of the experiment,
 recommendations on what to do next, and the next action items are here:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/UX/OrfoxSecuritySlider#Testing

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21221 [User Experience]: Perform usability testing for the mobile security slider

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21221: Perform usability testing for the mobile security slider
+--
 Reporter:  lnl |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  orfox, tor browser, tbb-mobile  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by linda):

 * owner:  lnl => linda
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21921 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Tor Messenger unable to change date/time format in chat

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21921: Tor Messenger unable to change date/time format in chat
+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-

Comment (by arlolra):

 Sorry for the pain.

 Looking at this briefly, the template is hardcoded in,
 https://github.com/mozilla/releases-comm-
 central/blob/master/im/themes/messages/simple/Status.html

 And it gets filled by `date.toLocaleTimeString()`,
 https://github.com/mozilla/releases-comm-
 central/blob/master/chat/modules/imThemes.jsm#L360-L365
 https://developer.mozilla.org/en-
 US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/Date/toLocaleTimeString

 There're probably a few configs preventing this from getting set from the
 system, such as,

 {{{
 intl.locale.matchOS;false
 javascript.use_us_english_locale;true
 privacy.use_utc_timezone;false
 }}}

 but that's still to be investigated.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20426 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Getting rbm-based Tor Browser builds reproducible for all platforms

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20426: Getting rbm-based Tor Browser builds reproducible for all platforms
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17379| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Does setting appropriate flags of ticket:10026#comment:21 help?

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[tor-bugs] #21926 [Core Tor/Tor]: Still had 1 address policies cached at shutdown

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21926: Still had 1 address policies cached at shutdown
--+-
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 On moria1, each time I do a controlled shutdown, I see:

 {{{
 Apr 12 11:17:49.154 [warn] Still had 1 address policies cached at
 shutdown.
 Apr 12 11:17:49.154 [warn]   1 [13]: reject *4:*
 }}}

 This is on git master (0.3.1.0-alpha-dev), but it's been happening for
 some months.

 See also #672 and #16539 for the previous instances of this bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21887 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly with security slider being on "Medium" or "High"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21887: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly with security slider being on
"Medium" or "High"
-+-
 Reporter:  blockflare   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability-website, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-security-slider, TorBrowserTeam201704R |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 r=mcs
 Looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21924 [Applications/Tor Browser]: With e10s enabled Trac says it is reading and transferring bytes (seemingly endlessly)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21924: With e10s enabled Trac says it is reading and transferring bytes 
(seemingly
endlessly)
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I've observed that today (TBB 6.5.1).

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[tor-bugs] #21925 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser based on ESR52 can't get built with ASan and FORTIFY_SOURCE

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21925: Tor Browser based on ESR52 can't get built with ASan and FORTIFY_SOURCE
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Similarly to #17508 ASan seems to be unhappy with FORTIFY_SOURCE when
 using `.mozconfig-asan`:
 {{{
 In file included from /usr/include/features.h:356:0,
  from /usr/include/limits.h:27,
  from /home/debian/install/gcc/lib/gcc/x86_64-unknown-
 linux-gnu/5.4.0/include-fixed/limits.h:168,
  from /home/debian/install/gcc/lib/gcc/x86_64-unknown-
 linux-gnu/5.4.0/include-fixed/syslimits.h:7,
  from /home/debian/install/gcc/lib/gcc/x86_64-unknown-
 linux-gnu/5.4.0/include-fixed/limits.h:34,
  from /home/debian/build/tor-browser/obj-x86_64-pc-linux-
 gnu/js/src/ctypes/libffi/include/ffi.h:76,
  from /home/debian/build/tor-
 browser/js/src/ctypes/libffi/src/x86/ffi64.c:30:
 /home/debian/build/tor-browser/js/src/ctypes/libffi/src/x86/ffi64.c: In
 function 'ffi_call':
 /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/string3.h:49:1: error: inlining failed
 in call to always_inline 'memcpy': function attribute mismatch
  __NTH (memcpy (void *__restrict __dest, __const void *__restrict __src,
  ^
 /home/debian/build/tor-browser/js/src/ctypes/libffi/src/x86/ffi64.c:485:4:
 error: called from here
 memcpy (argp, avalue[i], size);
 ^
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21924 [Applications/Tor Browser]: With e10s enabled Trac says it is reading and transferring bytes (seemingly endlessly)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21924: With e10s enabled Trac says it is reading and transferring bytes 
(seemingly
endlessly)
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 I should mention the ticket updates are working fine. It is just
 confusing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21924 [Applications/Tor Browser]: With e10s enabled Trac says it is reading and transferring bytes (seemingly endlessly)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21924: With e10s enabled Trac says it is reading and transferring bytes 
(seemingly
endlessly)
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Description changed by gk:

Old description:

> Creating tickets or modifying them with e10s enabled often results in an
> endlessly spinning icon on the tab and on the the bottom of the page one
> can read "Transferring data from trac.torproject.org..." or "Reading data
> from trac.torproject.org...". I am not sure but I think there are no
> bytes transferred/sent. I feel there is just connection weirdness going
> on.
>
> This change e.g. if I go to Trac in a new tab. Suddenly the icon on the
> former tab stops spinning and all is fine. This happens at least with a
> 64bit Linux.
>
> (Sorry for the vague bug report :) )

New description:

 Creating tickets or modifying them with e10s enabled often results in an
 endlessly spinning icon on the tab and on the the bottom of the page one
 can read "Transferring data from trac.torproject.org..." or "Read
 trac.torproject.org". I am not sure but I think there are no bytes
 transferred/sent. I feel there is just connection weirdness going on.

 This change e.g. if I go to Trac in a new tab. Suddenly the icon on the
 former tab stops spinning and all is fine. This happens at least with a
 64bit Linux.

 (Sorry for the vague bug report :) )

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21924 [Applications/Tor Browser]: With e10s enabled Trac says it is reading and transferring bytes (seemingly endlessly)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21924: With e10s enabled Trac says it is reading and transferring bytes 
(seemingly
endlessly)
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Description changed by gk:

Old description:

> Creating tickets or modifying them with e10s enabled often results in an
> endlessly spinning icon on the tab and on the the bottom of the page one
> can read "Transferring..." or "Reading". I am not sure but I think there
> are no bytes transferred/sent. I feel there is just connection weirdness
> going on.
>
> This change e.g. if I go to Trac in a new tab. Suddenly the icon on the
> former tab stops spinning and all is fine. This happens at least with a
> 64bit Linux.
>
> (Sorry for the vague bug report :) )

New description:

 Creating tickets or modifying them with e10s enabled often results in an
 endlessly spinning icon on the tab and on the the bottom of the page one
 can read "Transferring data from trac.torproject.org..." or "Reading data
 from trac.torproject.org...". I am not sure but I think there are no bytes
 transferred/sent. I feel there is just connection weirdness going on.

 This change e.g. if I go to Trac in a new tab. Suddenly the icon on the
 former tab stops spinning and all is fine. This happens at least with a
 64bit Linux.

 (Sorry for the vague bug report :) )

--

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[tor-bugs] #21924 [Applications/Tor Browser]: With e10s enabled Trac says it is reading and transferring bytes (seemingly endlessly)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21924: With e10s enabled Trac says it is reading and transferring bytes 
(seemingly
endlessly)
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff52-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Creating tickets or modifying them with e10s enabled often results in an
 endlessly spinning icon on the tab and on the the bottom of the page one
 can read "Transferring..." or "Reading". I am not sure but I think there
 are no bytes transferred/sent. I feel there is just connection weirdness
 going on.

 This change e.g. if I go to Trac in a new tab. Suddenly the icon on the
 former tab stops spinning and all is fine. This happens at least with a
 64bit Linux.

 (Sorry for the vague bug report :) )

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[tor-bugs] #21923 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allowing only HTTPS JavaScript on the medium security slider level is broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21923: Allowing only HTTPS JavaScript on the medium security slider level is
broken
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  noscript, tbb-
 Severity:  Normal   |  usability-website, ff52-esr
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 In
 {{{
 isGlobalHttps: function(win, /*optional */ s) {
 let allow = false;
 if (s && !this._isHttpsAndNotUntrusted(s)) return false;

 for (;; win = win.parent) {
   let site =
 this.getSite(this.getPrincipalOrigin(this.getPrincipal(win.document)));
   if (!(allow = s && site === s || this._isHttpsAndNotUntrusted(site))
 || win === win.parent)
 break;
   s = site;
 }

 return allow;
   },
 }}}
 {{{
 let site =
 this.getSite(this.getPrincipalOrigin(this.getPrincipal(win.document)));
 }}}
 breaks as `win` is `null`.

 This happens on a Tor Browser nightly with e10s enabled and based on ESR52
 (tested on Linux 64 bits). The result is that the NoScript icon does not
 get updated anymore and I guess all JS is disabled (I have not verified
 that).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21887 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly with security slider being on "Medium" or "High"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21887: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly with security slider being on
"Medium" or "High"
-+-
 Reporter:  blockflare   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability-website, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-security-slider, TorBrowserTeam201704R |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: mcs, brade (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21887 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly with security slider being on "Medium" or "High"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21887: Error pages are broken in TBB ff52 nightly with security slider being on
"Medium" or "High"
-+-
 Reporter:  blockflare   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability-website, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-security-slider, TorBrowserTeam201704R |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability-website, tbb-security-slider =>
 ff52-esr, tbb-usability-website, tbb-security-slider,
 TorBrowserTeam201704R
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 `bug_21887` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/commit/?h=bug_21887=5d2f77c0c56a62199fab2034ba14686867808b82)
 has a small fixup to address this problem.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21895 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Remove enc-key private key from hs_descriptor.h

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21895: hs: Remove enc-key private key from hs_descriptor.h
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+
Changes (by asn):

 * parent:  #21888 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21895 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Remove enc-key private key from hs_descriptor.h

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21895: hs: Remove enc-key private key from hs_descriptor.h
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21888   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 Closing this ticket since it's pretty intertwined with #21871. Development
 will continue in #21871.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21795 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser is crashing on github.com on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21795: Tor Browser is crashing on github.com on Windows
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704R, tbb-crash  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Pushed as commit fd67e2869611a961893a868fa0891cf4ded173eb to `tor-
 browser-45.8.0esr-6.5-2`. It seems that esr52 is somehow not affected as I
 can't get a nightly build to crash. So, I am holding off applying the fix
 to our upcoming alpha.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21891 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Refactoring of some part of the legacy code for prop224 usage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21891: hs: Refactoring of some part of the legacy code for prop224 usage
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21888   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+

Comment (by asn):

 Initial review done here. Nothing serious found.

 That pruning commit was kinda hard to go through as I was completely
 unfamiliar with the original mechanics.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21795 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser is crashing on github.com on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21795: Tor Browser is crashing on github.com on Windows
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704R, tbb-crash  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by mcs):

 r=brade,r=mcs
 This looks okay to us; I guess Mozilla may come up with a differemt fix
 but we can pick that up later.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21778 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Canvas prompt is not showing up anymore in Tor Browser based in ESR52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21778: Canvas prompt is not showing up anymore in Tor Browser based in ESR52
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-alpha  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * priority:  Medium => High


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21886 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Downloading of binary files stalls at 0/0 bytes in Tor Browser based on ESR52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21886: Downloading of binary files stalls at 0/0 bytes in Tor Browser based on
ESR52
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-7.0-must-alpha,   |  Actual Points:
  ff52-esr   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * priority:  Medium => High
 * keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-7.0-must, ff52-esr => tbb-usability,
 tbb-7.0-must-alpha, ff52-esr


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21920 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Revert locale selection dialog changes in Tor Launcher

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21920: Revert locale selection dialog changes in Tor Launcher
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-7.0-must-alpha,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 On its way with commit afb9893b7626ce819d7b2b571a847d44277971f6 on
 `master`, thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21920 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Revert locale selection dialog changes in Tor Launcher

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21920: Revert locale selection dialog changes in Tor Launcher
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-7.0-must-alpha,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 r=brade, r=mcs
 Ship it!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20426 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Getting rbm-based Tor Browser builds reproducible for all platforms (was: Getting rbm-based Tor Browser builds reproductible for all platforms)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20426: Getting rbm-based Tor Browser builds reproducible for all platforms
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17379| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Okay some preliminary results with commit
 cd08d1ab0fb638daed52ee5e7452dd78b07591c6. I just looked at the linux* `ar`
 files and compared them with the alphas found on
 http://f4amtbsowhix7rrf.onion/tor-browser-builds/2017-04-10/. The
 `omni.ja` files differ it seems (and that is the only difference for the
 `ar` bundles. More exactly some of the binary JS modules differ. I
 attached a binary diff for `FeedConverter.js`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21889 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Circuitmap changes for prop224

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21889: hs: Circuitmap changes for prop224
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21888   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+
Changes (by asn):

 * cc: asn (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21871 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Change descriptor format for legacy encryption key

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21871: prop224: Change descriptor format for legacy encryption key
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21888   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Thanks for the code here dgoulet!
 Did an initial review!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21922 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add our reasoning for dealing with the XPI signing to our design document

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21922: Add our reasoning for dealing with the XPI signing to our design 
document
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: mcs, brade (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21919 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Change trunnel prop224 cell's namespace

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21919: hs: Change trunnel prop224 cell's namespace
---+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, refactor, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21888 | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Pushed an extra commit to address that. Thanks! Moving to merge_ready.

 See branch: `ticket21919_031_01`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21795 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser is crashing on github.com on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21795: Tor Browser is crashing on github.com on Windows
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704R, tbb-crash  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21795 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser is crashing on github.com on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21795: Tor Browser is crashing on github.com on Windows
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704R, tbb-crash  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: mcs, brade (added)
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704, tbb-crash => TorBrowserTeam201704R, tbb-
 crash


Comment:

 I think I have a workaround that does not look awful: `bug_21795`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_21795=fd67e2869611a961893a868fa0891cf4ded173eb).
 Please review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21912 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Deal with the deprecation of the `hardened` channel.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21912: Deal with the deprecation of the `hardened` channel.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:2 yawning]:
 > Given the complexity of migrating users seamlessly, I'm going to opt for
 a forced reinstall, unless someone manages to convince me otherwise.
 >
 > Rationale:
 >  * It's not immediately obvious to me how to detect that a channel
 switch has happened from the update metadata
 (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Software_Update:updates.xml_Format).  This also
 applies to the bundle locale.

 Yes, it is not possible to detect it from the update metadata. You can
 detect it by looking at the file `Browser/defaults/pref/channel-prefs.js`.
 The switch will be done with a mar file updating this file and the
 `Browser/update-settings.ini` file only.

 >  * The `sandboxed-tor-browser` update code was not, and is not written
 to take into account things like channels changing, or locales
 disappearing.
 >  * It's cleaner in the long run.
 >
 > I do not know what will happen when the existing `sandboxed-tor-browser`
 has a hardened bundle installed and it encounters the update at the
 deprecation point.  My suspicion is that the update has a good chance of
 applying, but it will then fail to detect `libasan.so` and drop the user
 back to the config screen repeatedly.

 The update modifying the channel preferences files should apply correctly,
 but assuming the sandbox updater is not looking at those files to know the
 current channel, nothing else will happen and users will stay on the last
 hardened version.

 > There isn't anything I can do about this now, since code that's out
 there is code that's out there.

 Yes it seems difficult to do something.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20814 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Pick a more accurate name for the "hardened" Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20814: Pick a more accurate name for the "hardened" Tor Browser
--+---
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:18 gk]:
 > boklm: do you feel you can take a look at the Mozilla bug in the
 previous comment and figure out what we need to do on our side to get
 hardened users properly onto the alpha channel?

 Yes, I think I can do that.

 What they did was create a mar file that only updates the `update-
 settings.ini` and `defaults/pref/channel-prefs.js` files to switch them to
 the esr channel. So the update to the next version is done in two steps.

 I think we can do the same. After being switched to the alpha channel,
 hardened users will get an error with the incremental update (as we can't
 differentiate users of the alpha and hardened versions at that point, and
 the incremental mar files will only apply to the alpha version), but full
 update should work.

 I will make a mar file for this to try it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21919 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Change trunnel prop224 cell's namespace

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21919: hs: Change trunnel prop224 cell's namespace
---+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, refactor, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21888 | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
---+---

Comment (by asn):

 Patch LGTM.

 There is only one instance of `check-spaces` that should be addressed:
 ` Wide:./src/or/hs_intropoint.c:97`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21920 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Revert locale selection dialog changes in Tor Launcher

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21920: Revert locale selection dialog changes in Tor Launcher
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-7.0-must-alpha,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21920 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Revert locale selection dialog changes in Tor Launcher

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21920: Revert locale selection dialog changes in Tor Launcher
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-7.0-must-alpha,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_information
 * keywords:  tbb-7.0-must-alpha, TorBrowserTeam201704 => tbb-7.0-must-
 alpha, TorBrowserTeam201704R


Comment:

 `bug_21920_v4` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 
launcher.git/commit/?h=bug_21920_v4=afb9893b7626ce819d7b2b571a847d44277971f6)
 is up for review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21750 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: ntor handshake implementation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21750: prop224: ntor handshake implementation
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  task  | Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, review-group-17  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21888| Points:  6
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:  SponsorR-
  |  must
--+

Comment (by asn):

 ACK. Pushed another fixup commit to address your latest comments!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21912 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Deal with the deprecation of the `hardened` channel.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21912: Deal with the deprecation of the `hardened` channel.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by gk):

 Yeah, sorry for that but it seems you me the way you go is not a bad one.
 FWIW: we'd need a tag with all changes that should make it into the alpha
 in about 30 hours from now on (April 13 1600 UTC).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21920 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Revert locale selection dialog changes in Tor Launcher

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21920: Revert locale selection dialog changes in Tor Launcher
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-7.0-must-alpha,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 I am fine with either approach. We definitely want #17400 to get fixed
 properly some day (sooner than later). It's not clear to me yet whether we
 want to use the code in Tor Launcher for that, though. Probably, but who
 knows. Anyway, I am preparing a patch doing the easier change you
 suggested as we can back out the code later if we really don't want it.
 The additional code we need to carry around is not that much of a burden I
 guess.

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[tor-bugs] #21922 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add our reasoning for dealing with the XPI signing to our design document

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21922: Add our reasoning for dealing with the XPI signing to our design 
document
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-spec
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 We missed to explain how we deal with the code-signing requirement for our
 own extensions. We should have that in our design document I think.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21840 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: subdomain for test gitlab machine

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21840: subdomain for test gitlab machine
-+-
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by hiro):

 Ok, considering this was taking so long I bought a temporarily domain
 name: oniongit.eu (eu domains are cheap). I will keep this domain for the
 test until we will have a tpo or tpn subdomain.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21272 [Metrics]: Onionperf deployment

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21272: Onionperf deployment
-+--
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by hiro):

 I can confirm we do not have timeouts anymore. I have also deleted old
 corrupted measurements.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21907 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser nightly (based on ESR52) is not running on CentOS 6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21907: Tor Browser nightly (based on ESR52) is not running on CentOS 6
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704R, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good to me. Commit 4c6219dc621d139cd39e8aaca578dd69b9c063d0 on `tor-
 browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-2` has the fix.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20814 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Pick a more accurate name for the "hardened" Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20814: Pick a more accurate name for the "hardened" Tor Browser
--+---
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 boklm: do you feel you can take a look at the Mozilla bug in the previous
 comment and figure out what we need to do on our side to get hardened
 users properly onto the alpha channel?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21340 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Identify and backport new patches from Firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21340: Identify and backport new patches from Firefox
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201704,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => needs_information


Comment:

 Arthur: where are we here given the previous comments? We have the HSTS
 /HPKP-related backport to consider. Something else as well?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21875 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Modal dialogs are maximized in ESR52 nightly builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21875: Modal dialogs are maximized in ESR52 nightly builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must-alpha,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201704R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good. Included in `tor-browser-52.0.2esr-7.0-2` as commit
 9ee872b57e55ae672a30f087cf55bccef18f3646 and
 e761b3ca2087275c165fb67b7f876a55286d47dd.

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[tor-bugs] #21921 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Tor Messenger unable to change date/time format in chat

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21921: Tor Messenger unable to change date/time format in chat
+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+-
 * Tor Messenger Version: "0.4.0b2 (based on Instantbird 1.6a1pre)"

 * Platform: linux x64

 # Expected behavior:

 Set ISO date format in chat display. Date `%Y-%m-%d`, time `%H:%M:%S`. NO
 "AM"/"PM"!

 # Actual behavior:

 American-style date/time with AM/PM, etc. See attached screenshot. Note,
 screenshot is of view in settings; but it is consistent with what is seen
 in an actual chat (private, will not screenshot!).

 # Attempted fixes:

 * Customize system date/time format, with distro-provided luser GUI.

 * Set environment `$LC_ALL` and `$LC_TIME` to `en_DK`, `en_DK.UTF-8`

 * `localectl set-locale LANG=en_DK.UTF-8`

 * `gsettings set org.gnome.system.locale region en_DK.UTF-8`

 * Mash random stuff in Tor Messenger's `about:config` style widget
 (probably broke something)

 * `LC_ALL=en_DK.utf8 ./start-tor-messenger.desktop --UILocale en_DK.utf8`

 * Try all of the above with both `en_DK.UTF-8` and `en_DK.utf8`, because:

 `user@host:~/tor-messenger$ locale -a | grep en_DK`
 `en_DK`
 `en_DK.iso885915`
 `en_DK.utf8`

 * Ask `$SEARCH_ENGINE` for help.

 * `tar -xf` a fresh tor-messenger, with empty profile, after all the
 above.

 * Punch mattress, scream curse words into pillow.

 * Get lobotomy to make me like AM/PM (still did not take; NO ME GUSTA).

 Note: Setting this kind of thing on Linux is somehow always a mess. Please
 either respect `$LC_ALL`, `$LC_TIME`, etc., or at least grow a kludgey
 about:config setting which takes a `strftime(3)` format string. Thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21912 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: Deal with the deprecation of the `hardened` channel.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21912: Deal with the deprecation of the `hardened` channel.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by yawning):

 Given the complexity of migrating users seamlessly, I'm going to opt for a
 forced reinstall, unless someone manages to convince me otherwise.

 Rationale:
  * It's not immediately obvious to me how to detect that a channel switch
 has happened from the update metadata
 (https://wiki.mozilla.org/Software_Update:updates.xml_Format).  This also
 applies to the bundle locale.
  * The `sandboxed-tor-browser` update code was not, and is not written to
 take into account things like channels changing, or locales disappearing.
  * It's cleaner in the long run.

 I do not know what will happen when the existing `sandboxed-tor-browser`
 has a hardened bundle installed and it encounters the update at the
 deprecation point.  My suspicion is that the update has a good chance of
 applying, but it will then fail to detect `libasan.so` and drop the user
 back to the config screen repeatedly.

 There isn't anything I can do about this now, since code that's out there
 is code that's out there.

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