Re: [tor-bugs] #22103 [Core Tor/Tor]: confparse.c checks pointer instead of value (!ok)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22103: confparse.c checks pointer instead of value (!ok)
--+
 Reporter:  nullius   |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * component:  Core Tor => Core Tor/Tor
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22106 [Core Tor/Tor]: Initial Rust support

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22106: Initial Rust support
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by chelseakomlo):

 * cc: ckomlo (removed)
 * cc: chelseakomlo (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22052 [Core Tor/Tor]: Synchronize prop224 key blinding spec with implementation

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22052: Synchronize prop224 key blinding spec with implementation
+
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs prop224 ed25519  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21888  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by asn):

 Another thing we should fix:

 In prop224 we actually don't need `KH` as part of the key expansion
 procedure. In the legacy design we used KH as a key confirmation of the
 key expansion, however in prop224 we have a whole mac just for this
 `AUTH_INPUT_MAC`. So we actually don't need KH in the following paragraph:

 {{{
The hidden service and its client need to derive crypto keys from the
NTOR_KEY_SEED part of the handshake output. To do so, they use the KDF
construction as follows:

K = KDF(NTOR_KEY_SEED | m_hsexpand,HASH_LEN * 3 + S_KEY_LEN *
 2)

The first HASH_LEN bytes of K form KH; the next HASH_LEN form the
 forward
digest Df; the next HASH_LEN bytes form the backward digest Db; the
 next
S_KEY_LEN bytes form Kf, and the final S_KEY_LEN bytes form Kb.  Excess
bytes from K are discarded.
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22102 [Core Tor/Tor]: Can't HUP with a relative path in Log line

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22102: Can't HUP with a relative path in Log line
--+
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22101 [Core Tor/Tor]: Can't have relative DataDirectory with CookieAuthentication enabled

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22101: Can't have relative DataDirectory with CookieAuthentication enabled
--+
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21564 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Regenerate fallback list for 0.3.1 or 0.3.2

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21564: Regenerate fallback list for 0.3.1 or 0.3.2
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  3
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by teor):

 This isn't needed in 0.3.1, see #21283 for removing broken fallbacks,
 which we'll do first. But we don't need to do either yet.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21283 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove broken fallback directory mirrors

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21283: Remove broken fallback directory mirrors
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, 028-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  029-backport, TorCoreTeam201703|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I also need to remove F80FDE27EFCB3F6A7B4E2CC517133DBFFA78BA2D and
 4FEE77AFFD157BBCF2D896AE417FBF647860466C as they have been shut down.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21283 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove broken fallback directory mirrors

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21283: Remove broken fallback directory mirrors
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, 028-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  029-backport, TorCoreTeam201703|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


Comment:

 This won't make the 0.3.1 freeze, and isn't needed yet, because 90% of the
 fallback directories are still running, which gives us 99.9% client
 success when trying 3 fallbacks.

 https://consensus-health.torproject.org/graphs.html#fallbackdirgraphs

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[tor-bugs] #22108 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: Bandwidth scanner page chooses yellow for moria1

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22108: Bandwidth scanner page chooses yellow for moria1
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 When I go to the graph:
 https://consensus-health.torproject.org/graphs.html#bwauthgraphs

 I see a light yellow as the colour for moria1.
 That makes it hard to see.

 Can you make it a more visible colour?
 Can we do something to identify the lines for colour-blind people?

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[tor-bugs] #22109 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test that own version passes directory authority checks

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22109: Test that own version passes directory authority checks
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We recently made the directory authority version checks stricter.

 In the unit tests, we should check that both our short and long versions
 pass the directory authority version checks. (The short is put in our
 descriptor, the long is sent over the control port. Maybe we should
 document this.)

 Before a relay posts a descriptor, we should check that directory
 authorities will accept our version, and warn if we think they won't.

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[tor-bugs] #22110 [Core Tor/Tor]: Defining TOR_BUILD_TAG and tor_git_revision violates the version spec

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22110: Defining TOR_BUILD_TAG and tor_git_revision violates the version spec
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:  easy
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 When we removed the git revision in #2988, we allowed vendors to specify
 TOR_BUILD_TAG instead. But if we specify both TOR_BUILD_TAG and
 tor_git_revision, get_version() returns a string like this:
 {{{
 Tor 0.2.9.9 (TOR_BUILD_TAG) (git-tor_git_revision)
 }}}

 This violates the version spec, which only allows one set of brackets for
 EXTRA_INFO.
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/version-spec.txt#n22

 So instead, we should use:
 {{{
 Tor 0.2.9.9 (TOR_BUILD_TAG,git-tor_git_revision)
 }}}

 (We can't use spaces in the EXTRA_INFO.)

 We should also write a unit test that checks that our own version passes
 the directory authority checks.

 This isn't serious, because the only programmatic interface that uses this
 is GETINFO version.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22110 [Core Tor/Tor]: Defining TOR_BUILD_TAG and tor_git_revision violates the version spec

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22110: Defining TOR_BUILD_TAG and tor_git_revision violates the version spec
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 (See #22109 for testing our own version.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22110 [Core Tor/Tor]: Defining TOR_BUILD_TAG and tor_git_revision violates the version spec

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22110: Defining TOR_BUILD_TAG and tor_git_revision violates the version spec
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Somewhat related to #20982 which is also about the version string.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22106 [Core Tor/Tor]: Initial Rust support

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22106: Initial Rust support
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [ticket:22106 Sebastian]:
 > Here's the question: We're preventing cargo from contacting the internet
 during build/tests (and I think we definitely should do that). That means
 we will have to vendor the dependencies we're relying on. I see three
 possible options:

 Interesting... so Rust is also a thing with a separate "package manager".
 My main worry about this is how we are going to handle security updates
 (or even just updates) with Rust code dependencies shipped with Tor. How
 does that work once we ship a tor and a Rust dependency update is needed?
 We need to make a new stable or we can just tell our operators "$ rust
 upgrade" or "$ apt upgrade" (whatever the command) ?

 More information to understand how that will play out would be appreciated
 because seems whatever option we choose here, we'll have this potential
 problem of doing a new stable release?
 >
 > 1) Just commit them along with the Rust and C source code
 > 2) Use a separate repository with a git submodule to have them in an
 external repository, but have a somewhat tight coupling as well as a
 consistent path inside the source tree for builds from git/builds from a
 tarball
 > 3) Use a separate repository, no git submodule. Use configure magic to
 ensure we have the dependencies available (either via educated guess next
 to the tor.git repo, via env variable or - if building from a tarball -
 inside the tree)

 Uncertain here... I would go with git submodule (2) before having it
 outside (3), that's for sure but it is my personal preference. We should
 avoid (1) if we can imo (for Rust dependencies ofc), git history is
 important :).

 [snip]

 > Once this branch is reviewed, potentially amended and merged, we're
 ready to have two more branches to base on top of this work. A partial
 reimplementation of the protover code, and a complete reimplementation of
 the consdiff code. Both make use of the rust_str_t/RustString API we're
 introducing here. Next up is a document of the "so you want to use Rust
 for Tor hacking?" variety.

 About this (and taking protover for the sake of the example but it applies
 to the other reimplementation). I strongly believe that we should either
 have Rust code do protover or the C code but not both. Maintaining two
 code base for one single feature won't be fun and adds much more work on
 the maintainer/testing/bugs side of things.

 IMO, if we embrace Rust for a subsystem, let's go 100% with it and dump
 the C one. Having two implementations for the same thing is not bad as a
 concept but I think it's bad when both are maintained and put in
 production in the same code base. So having a subsystem in Rust thus
 implies that to build/run Tor, Rust is needed, period. I'm aware of the
 transition period between C and Rust making it unavoidable for maintaining
 two code base but that's the price to pay for any scenarios but my point
 is really about not having the C one released once we transition, only
 maintained for LTS.

 My two cents.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22106 [Core Tor/Tor]: Initial Rust support

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22106: Initial Rust support
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_revision


Comment:

 > 1) Just commit them along with the Rust and C source code

 We typically have tightly-bound dependencies in src/ext, this would be a
 good place for tor_util and maybe tiny_keccak (as we already have a C
 keccak in ext).

 I think it's ok to expect people to install rust's libc: we already do
 this with libevent and {open,libre,*}SSL. They'll have to install rust, so
 installing libc is a reasonable ask.

 The code looks reasonable to me, but I have only known rust for a few
 weeks.

 Specific commits:

 9a96733a2dab56342d6b3de1f2c2915429b21725

 Should we run the following rust tests during make check?
 * tiny_keccak (yes, if we include it in ext)
 * libc (no, but we might want to run it on platforms with poor rust
 support, so let's say that in the instructions)

 57838056b20eb2fc555ff8dc9148fca1e22be3d3

 src/or/config.c:

 This violates the version-spec, which allows a single EXTRA_INFO with no
 spaces in brackets.
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/version-spec.txt#n22

 This matters for get_version(), because it's sent in response to GETINFO
 version. This will at least break stem's version parsing, see:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/tree/stem/version.py#n168

 (Also see #22110 for a rare case where we break the version spec already,
 and #22109 for adding unit tests for parsing our own version.)

 (It would also matter for get_short_version(), which is in the descriptor,
 but we're not adding "rust" to that.)

 I'd prefer get_version add "(rust-*version*)", if possible.
 But maybe it doesn't matter than much, we don't give C compiler versions.

 In tor_int in main.c, we have existing code that does:
 {{{
 if (strstr(version, "alpha") || strstr(version, "beta"))
   log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "This version is not a stable Tor release. "
  "Expect more bugs than usual.");
 }}}
 Do we want to log some message about rust being experimental as well?

 src/test/test_rust.c:

 I'd tt_assert() the string is non-null before taking its length.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22106 [Core Tor/Tor]: Initial Rust support

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22106: Initial Rust support
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Sebastian):

 Replying to [comment:4 dgoulet]:
 > Replying to [ticket:22106 Sebastian]:
 > > Here's the question: We're preventing cargo from contacting the
 internet during build/tests (and I think we definitely should do that).
 That means we will have to vendor the dependencies we're relying on. I see
 three possible options:
 >
 > Interesting... so Rust is also a thing with a separate "package
 manager". My main worry about this is how we are going to handle security
 updates (or even just updates) with Rust code dependencies shipped with
 Tor. How does that work once we ship a tor and a Rust dependency update is
 needed? We need to make a new stable or we can just tell our operators "$
 rust upgrade" or "$ apt upgrade" (whatever the command) ?
 >
 > More information to understand how that will play out would be
 appreciated because seems whatever option we choose here, we'll have this
 potential problem of doing a new stable release?

 We link Rust statically, any required updates to a shipped library will
 require a rebuild at least. We're intentionally limiting our dependencies
 on external crates dramatically to make this less of a problem, but yes -
 if one of the libraries we ship has a security update, we'll need to ship
 a new version. Note that the same is true for a few C dependencies we ship
 as well. It's annoying, but with the current state of Rust crates in linux
 distributions a different model seems not feasible at all.

 To make it clear: Yes, security updates in Rust dependencies require a new
 stable version.

 > > Once this branch is reviewed, potentially amended and merged, we're
 ready to have two more branches to base on top of this work. A partial
 reimplementation of the protover code, and a complete reimplementation of
 the consdiff code. Both make use of the rust_str_t/RustString API we're
 introducing here. Next up is a document of the "so you want to use Rust
 for Tor hacking?" variety.
 >
 > About this (and taking protover for the sake of the example but it
 applies to the other reimplementation). I strongly believe that we should
 either have Rust code do protover or the C code but not both. Maintaining
 two code base for one single feature won't be fun and adds much more work
 on the maintainer/testing/bugs side of things.
 >
 > IMO, if we embrace Rust for a subsystem, let's go 100% with it and dump
 the C one. Having two implementations for the same thing is not bad as a
 concept but I think it's bad when both are maintained and put in
 production in the same code base. So having a subsystem in Rust thus
 implies that to build/run Tor, Rust is needed, period. I'm aware of the
 transition period between C and Rust making it unavoidable for maintaining
 two code base but that's the price to pay for any scenarios but my point
 is really about not having the C one released once we transition, only
 maintained for LTS.
 >
 > My two cents.

 We're not ready to rely on Rust. This would immediately make Tor
 unbuildable on a bunch of architectures in Debian, for example. This is
 supposed to be an experiment that we can stop if it doesn't work out for
 us, or embrace fully later. We're not planning to perpetually maintain two
 implementations in the same codebase.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20761 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Tor Browser 6.5a4 is ignoring additional SocksPorts

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20761: Tor Browser 6.5a4 is ignoring additional SocksPorts
---+
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
---+
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22106 [Core Tor/Tor]: Initial Rust support

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22106: Initial Rust support
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Sebastian):

 Replying to [comment:5 teor]:
 > > 1) Just commit them along with the Rust and C source code
 >
 > We typically have tightly-bound dependencies in src/ext, this would be a
 good place for tor_util and maybe tiny_keccak (as we already have a C
 keccak in ext).

 I am not sure about that. if we want to use cargo for this (and I think we
 do, otherwise we have to mirror all the dependencies etc in our make
 system), there's a support to have a local crates.io "mirror". Having that
 in a separate location seems good (maybe ext/rust/ would be good).

 > I think it's ok to expect people to install rust's libc: we already do
 this with libevent and {open,libre,*}SSL. They'll have to install rust, so
 installing libc is a reasonable ask.

 I don't know what you mean with install rust'c libc. It's a crate that
 needs to be available during building, not a dynamic library you can link
 to or something. The crate provides bindings for different host libc
 implementations.

 > Specific commits:
 >
 > 9a96733a2dab56342d6b3de1f2c2915429b21725
 >
 > Should we run the following rust tests during make check?
 > * tiny_keccak (yes, if we include it in ext)
 > * libc (no, but we might want to run it on platforms with poor rust
 support, so let's say that in the instructions)

 often, crates have more dependencies for running their tests or might even
 require an unstable version of the compiler to run them. Maybe we should
 add a new make target to run tests for rust dependencies?

 > 57838056b20eb2fc555ff8dc9148fca1e22be3d3
 >
 > src/or/config.c:
 >
 > This violates the version-spec, which allows a single EXTRA_INFO with no
 spaces in brackets.
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/version-spec.txt#n22
 >
 > This matters for get_version(), because it's sent in response to GETINFO
 version. This will at least break stem's version parsing, see:
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/tree/stem/version.py#n168
 >
 > (Also see #22110 for a rare case where we break the version spec
 already, and #22109 for adding unit tests for parsing our own version.)
 >
 > (It would also matter for get_short_version(), which is in the
 descriptor, but we're not adding "rust" to that.)
 >
 > I'd prefer get_version add "(rust-*version*)", if possible.
 > But maybe it doesn't matter than much, we don't give C compiler
 versions.
 >
 > In tor_int in main.c, we have existing code that does:
 > {{{
 > if (strstr(version, "alpha") || strstr(version, "beta"))
 >   log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "This version is not a stable Tor release.
 "
 >  "Expect more bugs than usual.");
 > }}}
 > Do we want to log some message about rust being experimental as well?

 Great catch, thanks! Perhaps rust_welcome_string() should instead just
 give a line of its own that we only emit if we're building with Rust, and
 we don't reflect it in the version at all?

 > src/test/test_rust.c:
 >
 > I'd tt_assert() the string is non-null before taking its length.

 Thanks, fixup pushed.

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[tor-bugs] #22111 [Core Tor/Tor]: lzma and zstd configure options have the same description

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22111: lzma and zstd configure options have the same description
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 When I run ./configure, I get:
 {{{
   --enable-lzma   enable support for the Zstandard compression
 scheme.
   --enable-zstd   enable support for the Zstandard compression
 scheme.
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22111 [Core Tor/Tor]: lzma and zstd configure options have the same description

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22111: lzma and zstd configure options have the same description
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * cc: catalyst (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22106 [Core Tor/Tor]: Initial Rust support

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22106: Initial Rust support
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:7 Sebastian]:
 > Replying to [comment:5 teor]:
 > > > 1) Just commit them along with the Rust and C source code
 > >
 > > We typically have tightly-bound dependencies in src/ext, this would be
 a good place for tor_util and maybe tiny_keccak (as we already have a C
 keccak in ext).
 >
 > I am not sure about that. if we want to use cargo for this (and I think
 we do, otherwise we have to mirror all the dependencies etc in our make
 system), there's a support to have a local crates.io "mirror". Having that
 in a separate location seems good (maybe ext/rust/ would be good).
 >
 > > I think it's ok to expect people to install rust's libc: we already do
 this with libevent and {open,libre,*}SSL. They'll have to install rust, so
 installing libc is a reasonable ask.
 >
 > I don't know what you mean with install rust'c libc. It's a crate that
 needs to be available during building, not a dynamic library you can link
 to or something. The crate provides bindings for different host libc
 implementations.

 Oh, ok, then yes, a local crates mirror seems sensible.
 And a make target to set it up. I can't quite work out how to do it!

 > > Specific commits:
 > >
 > > 9a96733a2dab56342d6b3de1f2c2915429b21725
 > >
 > > Should we run the following rust tests during make check?
 > > * tiny_keccak (yes, if we include it in ext)
 > > * libc (no, but we might want to run it on platforms with poor rust
 support, so let's say that in the instructions)
 >
 > often, crates have more dependencies for running their tests or might
 even require an unstable version of the compiler to run them. Maybe we
 should add a new make target to run tests for rust dependencies?

 Seems like a good idea.

 Is there a linter (?) or style checker (make check-spaces) that we might
 want to run?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22106 [Core Tor/Tor]: Initial Rust support

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22106: Initial Rust support
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Sebastian):

 Replying to [comment:8 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:7 Sebastian]:
 > > > I think it's ok to expect people to install rust's libc: we already
 do this with libevent and {open,libre,*}SSL. They'll have to install rust,
 so installing libc is a reasonable ask.
 > >
 > > I don't know what you mean with install rust'c libc. It's a crate that
 needs to be available during building, not a dynamic library you can link
 to or something. The crate provides bindings for different host libc
 implementations.
 >
 > Oh, ok, then yes, a local crates mirror seems sensible.
 > And a make target to set it up. I can't quite work out how to do it!

 There's a subcommand for cargo called vendor (not installed automatically)
 that can do that. I can add a make target for it once we decided which of
 the options for mirroring we're taking.

 > > > Specific commits:
 > > >
 > > > 9a96733a2dab56342d6b3de1f2c2915429b21725
 > > >
 > > > Should we run the following rust tests during make check?
 > > > * tiny_keccak (yes, if we include it in ext)
 > > > * libc (no, but we might want to run it on platforms with poor rust
 support, so let's say that in the instructions)
 > >
 > > often, crates have more dependencies for running their tests or might
 even require an unstable version of the compiler to run them. Maybe we
 should add a new make target to run tests for rust dependencies?
 >
 > Seems like a good idea.
 >
 > Is there a linter (?) or style checker (make check-spaces) that we might
 want to run?

 There's both, clippy (a linter, requires Rust nightly) and rustfmt. Not
 yet sure how to best integrate them. Both are rapidly evolving.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22100 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Mozilla's FPI suxx

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22100: Mozilla's FPI suxx
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 What do I have to do to trigger those? Especially the many, many other
 ones.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22104 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adjust #19837 for ff52-esr

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22104: Adjust #19837 for ff52-esr
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 How can I reproduce this: Which operating system are you using and which
 website are you trying to load?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22087 [Applications/Tor Browser]: emoji not display correctly

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22087: emoji not display correctly
+--
 Reporter:  joel2017|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
|  duplicate
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-fingerprinting-fonts  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #18172.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18172 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Emoji support is broken in Tor Browser 5.5

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#18172: Emoji support is broken in Tor Browser 5.5
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-fonts, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  usability-website, tbb-5.5-regression, |
  TorBrowserTeam201603   |
Parent ID:  #18097   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: joel2017 (added)


Comment:

 #22087 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22089 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adding Decentraleyes to stop tracking by large CDNs (with slightly less traffic for exits) in the TBB

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22089: Adding Decentraleyes to stop tracking by large CDNs (with slightly less
traffic for exits) in the TBB
--+--
 Reporter:  imageverif|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by tokotoko):

 * cc: fdsfgs@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22067 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript Click-to-Play bypass with embedded videos and audios

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22067: NoScript Click-to-Play bypass with embedded videos and audios
--+--
 Reporter:  samantharis   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, noscript|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by tokotoko):

 * cc: fdsfgs@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22092 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Start porting Tor Browser on Servo

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22092: Start porting Tor Browser on Servo
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by tokotoko):

 * cc: fdsfgs@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22103 [Core Tor/Tor]: confparse.c checks pointer instead of value (!ok)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22103: confparse.c checks pointer instead of value (!ok)
--+
 Reporter:  nullius   |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by catalyst):

 Do we want to fix this for 0.2.9.x?  This is a quite old bug, dating back
 to code in `config.c` (8acaf8e1872f711898e850687ccf55a196dc1312) that
 later got moved to `confparse.c`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22103 [Core Tor/Tor]: confparse.c checks pointer instead of value (!ok)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22103: confparse.c checks pointer instead of value (!ok)
--+
 Reporter:  nullius   |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 +1 for backport up to 029.

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[tor-bugs] #22112 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Replace torperf.csv with onionperf.csv

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22112: Replace torperf.csv with onionperf.csv
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 We recently switched from Torperf to OnionPerf for measuring Tor
 performance.  But we're only using half of OnionPerf's measurements,
 namely those that exit the Tor network to the public internet and fetch
 files from ourselves.  We should also include measurements made to the
 onion server that OnionPerf sets up and runs locally.

 The torperf.csv data format does not support this second data set in a
 forward-compatible way, and it's about time to rewrite the code that is
 part of the legacy data-processing module that produces this file anyway.

 I wrote an onionperf module that produces an onionperf.csv file quite
 similar to torperf.csv but with an additional column for public vs. onion
 server.  I went ahead and [https://gitweb.torproject.org/metrics-
 web.git/commit/?id=917cc649b2012ea409fea1b73a7b5715e5ecb78a pushed that
 code to master], but I marked the data format as beta, mentioning that it
 may change or disappear without prior notice.

 Next steps are:
  - Get this code reviewed and possibly improved.  Remove the beta warning,
 and add a deprecation notice to torperf.csv.  Don't remove the code for
 producing torperf.csv just yet.
  - One month or so later, remove the code for updating torperf.csv and
 mention on stats.html that the file does not get updated anymore.  Don't
 remove it just yet.
  - Another month or so later, remove the torperf.csv file and data format
 specification.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22112 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Replace torperf.csv with onionperf.csv

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22112: Replace torperf.csv with onionperf.csv
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review the patch linked from the description above.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22048 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Find search phrase is preserved between sessions

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22048: Find search phrase is preserved between sessions
--+---
 Reporter:  bugreporter69 |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by brade):

 dup of #14139?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22111 [Core Tor/Tor]: lzma and zstd configure options have the same description

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22111: lzma and zstd configure options have the same description
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Patch in https://gitlab.com/argonblue/tor/merge_requests/6.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22104 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adjust #19837 for ff52-esr

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22104: Adjust #19837 for ff52-esr
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  needs_information => new


Comment:

 STR: https://ia600201.us.archive.org/1/items/OrsonWellesMrBruns/381030.ogg
 If you don't see OS, test it on Windoze ;)

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[tor-bugs] #22113 [Internal Services/Service - deb.tpo]: update debian packages to tor v0.3.0.6

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22113: update debian packages to tor v0.3.0.6
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - deb.tpo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-announce/2017-April/000128.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22100 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Mozilla's FPI suxx

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22100: Mozilla's FPI suxx
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  needs_information => new


Comment:

 You have to start testing your product ;), browsing the web with opened
 console and watching torbutton's INFOs in different circumstances. You
 don't like similar, but separate issues in one ticket, so some of them are
 in other tickets, blogs, remarks - all tests for "previous version" of FPI
 are also actionable. Why didn't you test Mozilla's FPI as yours - that's
 the question.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22111 [Core Tor/Tor]: lzma and zstd configure options have the same description

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22111: lzma and zstd configure options have the same description
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 lgtm ; merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22103 [Core Tor/Tor]: confparse.c checks pointer instead of value (!ok)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22103: confparse.c checks pointer instead of value (!ok)
--+
 Reporter:  nullius   |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 patch above looks fine. Does anybody have a few minutes to write a changes
 file?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21109 [Core Tor/Tor]: apparent inconsistency in prop264

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21109: apparent inconsistency in prop264
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  torspec   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21665 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prop278: Establish an upper-bound for LZMA2 memory usage

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21665: Prop278: Establish an upper-bound for LZMA2 memory usage
+--
 Reporter:  ahf |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  task| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201703, prop278  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
+--

Comment (by nickm):

 sure!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22103 [Core Tor/Tor]: confparse.c checks pointer instead of value (!ok)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22103: confparse.c checks pointer instead of value (!ok)
--+
 Reporter:  nullius   |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by catalyst):

 Based on IRC discussion this might not even be a bug.  In that case, it
 would make more sense to just delete the offending lines.  It will take me
 a little more time for me to grok enough config parsing stuff to make a
 test case.  (It might be faster to do a manual test.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20532 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure directory_initiate_request handles pluggable transports correctly (was: Make sure directory_initiate_command_rend handles pluggable transports correctly

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20532: Make sure directory_initiate_request handles pluggable transports 
correctly
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridge-client, bridge-bypass,|  Actual Points:
  triage-out-030-201612  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 So hrm, that function name doesn't exists anymore so renaming to the new
 one.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22100 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Mozilla's FPI suxx

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22100: Mozilla's FPI suxx
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 cypherpunks]:
 > You have to start testing your product ;), browsing the web with opened
 console and watching torbutton's INFOs in different circumstances.

 I am doing that for weeks now. If you file a bug just dropping that log
 snippet into the description as you did what are we supposed to do with
 it? And how are we supposed to deal with "and many, many others..." in
 this bug?

 So, again, how can I reproduce the problem you reported?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21205 [Core Tor/Tor]: Instrument clients to measure directory usage

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21205: Instrument clients to measure directory usage
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  project  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sponsor4, TorCoreTeam201703  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Just want to point out that #13208 has been merged so the `src/trace/`
 framework can be used to add tracing event although if this is to be
 shipped in production, I would personally want to avoid using `--enable-
 event-tracing` (even though no events exists yet) :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21787 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure exposing the calendar information does not leak the locale

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21787: Make sure exposing the calendar information does not leak the locale
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff59-esr, tbb-fingerprinting,|  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must-alpha, TorBrowserTeam201705R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-7.0-must-alpha =>
 ff59-esr, tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-7.0-must-alpha,
 TorBrowserTeam201705R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 In ESR52, I confirmed in the code and by manual observation that this
 functionality is not exposed in content. The getCalendarInfo function can
 be used from chrome code like this:

 {{{
 const mozIntl = Components.classes["@mozilla.org/mozintl;1"]
   .getService(Components.interfaces.mozIMozIntl);
 let x = {};
 mozIntl.addGetCalendarInfo(x);
 let calendarInfo = x.getCalendarInfo();
 }}}

 The only place in ESR52 where this is done is in a test:
 https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 esr52/source/toolkit/components/mozintl/test/test_mozintl.js

 But this is not possible from a content script. So I think we should
 postpone this ticket to ff59-esr.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21621 [Core Tor/Tor]: Intro points can get stuck in CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21621: Intro points can get stuck in CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21446| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * owner:   => dgoulet
 * status:  assigned => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22113 [Internal Services/Service - deb.tpo]: update debian packages to tor v0.3.0.6

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22113: update debian packages to tor v0.3.0.6
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - deb.tpo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 Wrong ticketing system for requests about the tor debian package.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21787 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure exposing the calendar information does not leak the locale

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21787: Make sure exposing the calendar information does not leak the locale
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff59-esr, tbb-fingerprinting  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => assigned
 * keywords:
 ff59-esr, tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-7.0-must-alpha,
 TorBrowserTeam201705R
 => ff59-esr, tbb-fingerprinting


Comment:

 Thanks, moving to esr59.

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[tor-bugs] #22114 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix wrong comments in doc/torrc_format.txt

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22114: Fix wrong comments in doc/torrc_format.txt
--+-
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 I had the pleasure to look at the `torrc` format recently and while
 reading about it in more depth in `torrc_format.txt` and playing with the
 test, I realized two of the comments in that .txt file need to get updated
 as the value shown in them is wrong.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21824 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate using runc instead of docker

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21824: Investigate using runc instead of docker
--+---
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17379| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by boklm):

 Branch `bug_21824_v2` has a commit doing that:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_21824_v2&id=099f6bcff717bb59c6e9f00a00857df2b2d91063

 In this branch we are now using `runc.io` instead of `docker`. We are
 starting with an Ubuntu 17.04 image which we download from
 cdimage.ubuntu.com, and use it in a runc container to generate with
 `debootstrap` the Ubuntu and Debian images that we need.

 With this change we are now able to run i386 containers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22114 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix wrong comments in doc/torrc_format.txt

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22114: Fix wrong comments in doc/torrc_format.txt
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 The attached patch is up for review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22114 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix wrong comments in doc/torrc_format.txt

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22114: Fix wrong comments in doc/torrc_format.txt
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


Comment:

 Merged!

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[tor-bugs] #22115 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use i386 containers for building Tor Browser on linux32 and win32

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22115: Use i386 containers for building Tor Browser on linux32 and win32
--+
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  TorBrowserTeam201704
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #17379
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Docker did not allow us to run i386 containers. After fixing #21824, we
 will be able to use i386 containers.

 We should should switch to i386 containers for the linux32 and Windows
 builds, to simplify some parts of the build. This should also help fix the
 build of snowflake on linux32.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22113 [Internal Services/Service - deb.tpo]: update torproject debian packages to tor v0.3.0.6 (was: update debian packages to tor v0.3.0.6)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22113: update torproject debian packages to tor v0.3.0.6
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - deb.tpo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  invalid =>


Comment:

 This ticket is about debian (the format) packages provided by the
 torproject at
 https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org/dists/
 as
 described here
 https://www.torproject.org/docs/debian.html.en

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22103 [Core Tor/Tor]: confparse.c checks pointer instead of value (!ok)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22103: confparse.c checks pointer instead of value (!ok)
--+
 Reporter:  nullius   |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  assigned => accepted


Comment:

 I am almost certain this is not a bug for reasons dgoulet and I discussed
 in IRC.  With this config line
 {{{
 HeartbeatPeriod 21 snarks
 }}}
 I get
 {{{
 May 01 13:45:21.694 [notice] Tor 0.3.0.5-rc (git-5eb2786600014d02) running
 on Darwin with Libevent 2.0.22-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.2k and Zlib 1.2.5.
 }}}
 {{{
 May 01 13:45:44.865 [warn] Unknown unit 'snarks'.
 May 01 13:45:44.865 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Interval
 'HeartbeatPeriod 21 snarks' is malformed or out of bounds.
 }}}
 Deleting the offending 4 lines of code makes more sense so it won't be
 doing useless checks that "look wrong", so I'll do that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22100 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Mozilla's FPI suxx

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22100: Mozilla's FPI suxx
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  needs_information => new


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:2 cypherpunks]:
 > > You have to start testing your product ;), browsing the web with
 opened console and watching torbutton's INFOs in different circumstances.
 >
 > I am doing that for weeks now.
 And? Don't you see FPI violations (except for retrying downloads)?
 > If you file a bug just dropping that log snippet into the description as
 you did what are we supposed to do with it?
 Maybe, fix it? No?
 > And how are we supposed to deal with "and many, many others..." in this
 bug?
 Make this ticket parent for all regressions in FPI?
 > So, again, how can I reproduce the problem you reported?
 Open http://hpr.dogphilosophy.net/test on Medium settings (notice that
 DevTools suxx too), click "(click to try it)" near ""wave" file(".wav")".
 Isn't it easy?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22115 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use i386 containers for building Tor Browser on linux32 and win32

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22115: Use i386 containers for building Tor Browser on linux32 and win32
--+---
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201704  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17379| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by boklm):

 I started doing that for the linux32 build in the `bug_22115` branch:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_22115&id=49c194b81195eb3b76a15a9ba2380fd9553ffea9

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22113 [Internal Services/Service - deb.tpo]: update torproject debian packages to tor v0.3.0.6

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22113: update torproject debian packages to tor v0.3.0.6
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - deb.tpo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21993 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: Consensus Health: are an authority's measurements higher or lower than others?

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21993: Consensus Health: are an authority's measurements higher or lower than
others?
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by tom):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  duplicate =>


Comment:

 Reopening this to track the addition of a table (not just graphs)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22103 [Core Tor/Tor]: confparse.c checks pointer instead of value (!ok)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22103: confparse.c checks pointer instead of value (!ok)
--+
 Reporter:  nullius   |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 Patch at https://gitlab.com/argonblue/tor/merge_requests/7.  Does anyone
 think I should make a unit test for the failure mode that was suspected to
 occur (but didn't)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22116 [- Select a component]: Torproject home portal (was: torproject main portal)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22116: Torproject home portal
--+---
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

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[tor-bugs] #22116 [- Select a component]: torproject main portal

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22116: torproject main portal
--+
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #21222
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 This is the ticket that keeps track of all tasks for work specific to the
 home portal, torproject.org.

 The (not quite well maintained) project page is
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/UX/HomePage here].

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[tor-bugs] #22117 [- Select a component]: Tor project dev portal

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22117: Tor project dev portal
--+
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #21222
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 This is the ticket that keeps track of all tasks for work specific to the
 dev portal, dev.torproject.org.

 The (not quite well maintained) project page is
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/UX/DevPage here].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22116 [- Select a component]: Torproject home portal

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22116: Torproject home portal
--+---
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by linda):

 * type:  defect => project


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[tor-bugs] #22118 [- Select a component]: Tor project support portal

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22118: Tor project support portal
--+
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #21222
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 This is the ticket that keeps track of all tasks for work specific to the
 support portal, support.torproject.org.

 The (not quite well maintained) project page is
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/UX/SupportPage here].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22116 [- Select a component]: Tor project home portal (was: Torproject home portal)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22116: Tor project home portal
--+---
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

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[tor-bugs] #22119 [- Select a component]: Tor project community portal

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22119: Tor project community portal
--+
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #21222
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 This is the ticket that keeps track of all tasks for work specific to the
 community portal, community.torproject.org.

 The (not quite well maintained) project page is
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/UX/CommunityPage here].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22118 [- Select a component]: Tor project support portal

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22118: Tor project support portal
--+--
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by linda):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:   => linda


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21942 [User Experience/Website]: Sitemapping the current site layout

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21942: Sitemapping the current site layout
-+
 Reporter:  linda|  Owner:  linda
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22120   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by linda):

 * parent:  #21222 => #22120


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[tor-bugs] #22120 [- Select a component]: Research phase of the website design project

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22120: Research phase of the website design project
--+
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #21222
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 This ticket groups together the work we did to prepare for designing
 torproject.org and its portals.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21946 [User Experience/Website]: Architecting a torproject.org with portals with the subsite design pattern

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21946: Architecting a torproject.org with portals with the subsite design 
pattern
-+
 Reporter:  linda|  Owner:  linda
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22120   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by linda):

 * parent:  #21222 => #22120


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21949 [User Experience/Website]: Identifying the requirements of the four torproject.org portals

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21949: Identifying the requirements of the four torproject.org portals
-+
 Reporter:  linda|  Owner:  linda
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22120   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by linda):

 * parent:  #21222 => #22120


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21950 [User Experience/Website]: Organize, brainstorm and prioritize content to meet portal requirements

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21950: Organize, brainstorm and prioritize content to meet portal requirements
-+
 Reporter:  linda|  Owner:  linda
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22120   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by linda):

 * parent:  #21222 => #22120


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[tor-bugs] #22121 [- Select a component]: Design tasks for the website redesign project

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22121: Design tasks for the website redesign project
--+
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #21222
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 This ticket keeps track of all the design work we do for designing
 torproject.org and its portals.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22077 [User Experience/Website]: Wireframes for the landing pages of torproject.org portals

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22077: Wireframes for the landing pages of torproject.org portals
-+--
 Reporter:  linda|  Owner:  linda
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22121   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by linda):

 * parent:  #21222 => #22121


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22117 [- Select a component]: Dev portal tasks (tor project website redesign) (was: Tor project dev portal)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22117: Dev portal tasks (tor project website redesign)
--+---
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22116 [- Select a component]: Tor project home portal tasks (was: Tor project home portal)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22116: Tor project home portal tasks
--+---
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22118 [- Select a component]: Support portal tasks (tor project website redesign) (was: Tor project support portal)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22118: Support portal tasks (tor project website redesign)
--+--
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22116 [- Select a component]: Home portal tasks (tor project website redesign) (was: Tor project home portal tasks)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22116: Home portal tasks (tor project website redesign)
--+---
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22119 [- Select a component]: Community portal tasks (tor project website redesign) (was: Tor project community portal)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22119: Community portal tasks (tor project website redesign)
--+---
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22120 [- Select a component]: Research tasks (tor project website redesign) (was: Research phase of the website design project)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22120: Research tasks (tor project website redesign)
--+---
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22121 [- Select a component]: Design tasks (tor project website redesign) (was: Design tasks for the website redesign project)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22121: Design tasks (tor project website redesign)
--+---
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22120 [- Select a component]: Research tasks (tor project website redesign)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22120: Research tasks (tor project website redesign)
--+
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by linda):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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[tor-bugs] #22122 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: Add support for six new key-value pairs added by OnionPerf

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22122: Add support for six new key-value pairs added by OnionPerf
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.7.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+---
 OnionPerf adds six new key-value pairs to the .tpf format that
 Torperf/CollecTor did not produce: `ENDPOINTLOCAL`, `ENDPOINTPROXY`,
 `ENDPOINTREMOTE`, `HOSTNAMELOCAL`, `HOSTNAMEREMOTE`, and `SOURCEADDRESS`.
 We should add support for these keys to metrics-lib, so that we can start
 using their values.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21222 [User Experience]: Redesigning torproject.org

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21222: Redesigning torproject.org
-+--
 Reporter:  linda|  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  website  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by linda):

 * cc: antonela (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22122 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: Add support for six new key-value pairs added by OnionPerf

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22122: Add support for six new key-value pairs added by OnionPerf
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.7.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/metrics-
 lib.git/log/?h=task-22122 my task-22122 branch].  (Note to self: before
 merging, need to reformat JavaDocs a little and include `@since` tags.)

 robgjansen, feel free to ignore the Java parts, but would you mind looking
 at the comments [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/metrics-
 
lib.git/tree/src/main/java/org/torproject/descriptor/TorperfResult.java?h=task-22122&id=d62a9bb0aa669b21d9838cc347c0a5a373e0e75e#n215
 here] and maybe suggest how to improve them?  Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22100 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Triggering the external helper dialog leads sometimes to requests going over the catch-all circuit (was: Mozilla's FPI suxx)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22100: Triggering the external helper dialog leads sometimes to requests going
over the catch-all circuit
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * priority:  Medium => High


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > > Replying to [comment:2 cypherpunks]:
 > > > You have to start testing your product ;), browsing the web with
 opened console and watching torbutton's INFOs in different circumstances.
 > >
 > > I am doing that for weeks now.
 > And? Don't you see FPI violations (except for retrying downloads)?
 > > If you file a bug just dropping that log snippet into the description
 as you did what are we supposed to do with it?
 > Maybe, fix it? No?
 > > And how are we supposed to deal with "and many, many others..." in
 this bug?
 > Make this ticket parent for all regressions in FPI?

 This is no regression, see below. But that said #20685 seems to be the
 parent ticket you are looking for (in case there isn't already a more
 specific fitting your bug). Feel free to open child tickets for issues you
 find with steps to reproduce them. Thanks.

 > > So, again, how can I reproduce the problem you reported?
 > Open http://hpr.dogphilosophy.net/test on Medium settings (notice that
 DevTools suxx too), click "(click to try it)" near ""wave" file(".wav")".
 Isn't it easy?

 Yes, with steps to reproduce it is. FWIW: I see this in 6.5.2 as well, so
 this has nothing to do with Mozilla's First Party Isolation code.

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[tor-bugs] #22123 [Core Tor/Tor]: baseXX API strictness

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22123: baseXX API strictness
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #19531
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We should think about how strict to make decoders for our baseXX APIs.  In
 some situations, it improves security to only have a single canonical
 encoding for any particular value.  We should see where this is true in
 our code.

 == Base16 ==
 * case sensitivity (currently case-insensitive)

 == Base32 ==
 * case sensitivity (currently case-insensitive -- also the standard
 default is uppercase and we use lowercase)
 * padding strictness (currently no padding at all, even with odd lengths?)
 * trailing bits strictness (in an odd-length decode, there might be
 leftover bits in the final non-padding character. for a canonical
 encoding, they should all be zero)

 == Base64 ==
 * padding strictness
  * padding `=` characters only at end (currently any padding characters
 terminate decoding)
  * correct number of padding characters (currently not checked)
 * whitespace? (maybe only if explicitly allowed?) currently we allow any
 whitespace
 * trailing bits strictness (in an odd-length decode, there might be
 leftover bits in the final non-padding character. for a canonical
 encoding, they should all be zero)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22116 [User Experience/Website]: Home portal tasks (tor project website redesign)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22116: Home portal tasks (tor project website redesign)
-+---
 Reporter:  linda|  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by linda):

 * component:  - Select a component => User Experience/Website


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22118 [User Experience/Website]: Support portal tasks (tor project website redesign)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22118: Support portal tasks (tor project website redesign)
-+--
 Reporter:  linda|  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by linda):

 * component:  - Select a component => User Experience/Website


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22119 [User Experience/Website]: Community portal tasks (tor project website redesign)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22119: Community portal tasks (tor project website redesign)
-+---
 Reporter:  linda|  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by linda):

 * component:  - Select a component => User Experience/Website


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22121 [User Experience/Website]: Design tasks (tor project website redesign)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22121: Design tasks (tor project website redesign)
-+---
 Reporter:  linda|  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by linda):

 * component:  - Select a component => User Experience/Website


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22120 [User Experience/Website]: Research tasks (tor project website redesign)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22120: Research tasks (tor project website redesign)
-+
 Reporter:  linda|  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by linda):

 * component:  - Select a component => User Experience/Website


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22098 [Applications/Tor Browser]: PulseAudio alert banner leads to a 404 page

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22098: PulseAudio alert banner leads to a 404 page
--+---
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 dcf: What do you think we should fix? The link? Or should we do anything
 else (in addition)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22103 [Core Tor/Tor]: confparse.c checks pointer instead of value (!ok)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22103: confparse.c checks pointer instead of value (!ok)
--+
 Reporter:  nullius   |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 it might be nice to do that -- it's generally good to err on the side of
 more tests.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22103 [Core Tor/Tor]: confparse.c checks pointer instead of value (!ok)

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22103: confparse.c checks pointer instead of value (!ok)
--+
 Reporter:  nullius   |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 (otherwise, this looks fine. let me know if you decide to add a test or
 not?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22100 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Triggering the external helper dialog leads sometimes to requests going over the catch-all circuit

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22100: Triggering the external helper dialog leads sometimes to requests going
over the catch-all circuit
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:5 gk]:
 > This is no regression, see below. But that said #20685 seems to be the
 parent ticket you are looking for (in case there isn't already a more
 specific fitting your bug). Feel free to open child tickets for issues you
 find with steps to reproduce them. Thanks.
 I didn't write it's a regression. But you don't mind that Mozilla's FPI
 suxx, right? You just didn't analyze it yet, according to #20685.
 > FWIW: I see this in 6.5.2 as well, so this has nothing to do with
 Mozilla's First Party Isolation code.
 And why does ext helper trigger here instead of playing wav in the browser
 (as others)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21665 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prop278: Establish an upper-bound for LZMA2 memory usage

2017-05-01 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21665: Prop278: Establish an upper-bound for LZMA2 memory usage
+--
 Reporter:  ahf |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201703, prop278  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged and renamed it to x-tor-lzma.

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