[tor-bugs] #22153 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Showing feeds in Tor Browser 7.0a3 is broken with security slider set to medium

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22153: Showing feeds in Tor Browser 7.0a3 is broken with security slider set to
medium
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,
 Severity:  Normal   |  tbb-security-slider
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Setting the security slider to medium and visiting e.g.
 https://www.fxsitecompat.com/en-CA/index.xml does not show the feed in Tor
 Browser 7.0a3 anymore. JavaScript is forbidden despite the https://.

 That got reported on our blog: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-
 browser-70a3-released#comment-263144

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22153 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Showing feeds in Tor Browser 7.0a3 is broken with security slider set to medium

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22153: Showing feeds in Tor Browser 7.0a3 is broken with security slider set to
medium
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must, tbb- |  Actual Points:
  security-slider|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 I wonder if we need to add another item to the NoScript whitelist.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21555 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Twitter like button not working on 6.5

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21555: Twitter like button not working on 6.5
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201703R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by isis):

 Replying to [comment:23 cypherpunks]:
 > This ticket was linked to on twitter, where users like me found it and
 applied the workaround.
 >
 > I am not a developer but I correctly inferred out that the config change
 Isis mentioned would allow me to retweet. Seems like a workaround to me.

 I'm not sure why you're so insistent on blaming me for your genius idea to
 use random about:config settings mentioned on twitter, when I'm not even
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21555?replyto=23#comment:2
 the person who first mentioned it].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20333 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: add descriptor digest to vote and streamline method name

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20333: add descriptor digest to vote and streamline method name
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.7.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * milestone:  metrics-lib 2.0.0 => metrics-lib 1.7.0


Comment:

 Alright, I worked on a possible patch to move this discussion forward:
  - All methods returning the digest of a given descriptor use a common
 scheme, `getDigestAlgEnc()`, for example, `getDigestSha1Hex()`.
  - All methods returning a digest referencing another descriptor contain a
 word or two explaining what other descriptor they are referencing, but
 they also use `AlgEnc`, for example, `getVoteDigestSha1Hex()`.

 I also added a digest method to votes.

 I did not switch to `digest()`, `digestAlgEnc()`, or `getDigest(Alg)`,
 because I found those names not in line with the other methods.  Let me
 know if you disagree, and why, and let's discuss.

 Assigning to metrics-lib 1.7.0, because this is a backward-compatible
 change that doesn't seem to be too hard to make.

 Please review [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/metrics-
 lib.git/log/?h=task-20333 my task-20333 branch].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22140 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: Store raw descriptor contents as UTF-8 encoded Strings rather than byte[]

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22140: Store raw descriptor contents as UTF-8 encoded Strings rather than 
byte[]
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Uhm, after working on #20333, I realized that we'll need to process raw
 bytes for calculating descriptor digests.  That defeats the plans above to
 some extent.  We'll need to work with raw bytes at least until files are
 split up into descriptors.  This doesn't mean that storing strings rather
 than raw bytes wouldn't still be beneficial.  But unfortunately this
 change won't give us the more complete toolbox that I was hoping for.
 Hmm.

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[tor-bugs] #22154 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: Remove code that was deprecated in the 1.x series

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22154: Remove code that was deprecated in the 1.x series
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 2.0.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+---
 When we release version 2.0.0 we should remove all (?) code that was
 deprecated in the 1.x series.

 Really all?  What about code that we deprecated in the very last 1.x
 version just a few days before releasing 2.0.0?  I believe even that,
 because whoever updates from 1.x to 2.x knows that things might break.
 And even if they update from an earlier 1.x, they'll need to watch out for
 changes.  But I could be convinced otherwise.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18718 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: remove last impl. dependency from api

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#18718: remove last impl. dependency from api
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 2.0.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 I don't think that removing this specific deprecated code is any different
 from removing other deprecated code when putting out 2.0.0.  See #22154
 for a general ticket for removing deprecated code.  Closing as duplicate
 rather than re-purposing it, because I don't think we need the comment
 history above for removing deprecated code.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21886 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Downloading of binary files stalls at 0/0 bytes in Tor Browser based on ESR52 with e10s off

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21886: Downloading of binary files stalls at 0/0 bytes in Tor Browser based on
ESR52 with e10s off
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-7.0-must-alpha,   |  Actual Points:
  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201705,|
  GeorgKoppen201705  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 FWIW: modal dialogs are forbidden. And what's happened with
 https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 esr52/source/uriloader/exthandler/nsExternalHelperAppService.cpp#753?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18797 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: create a DescriptorGenerator?

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#18797: create a DescriptorGenerator?
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 2.0.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * cc: atagar (added)


Comment:

 I'm copying atagar on this ticket who just recently
 [https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2017-May/012237.html added
 the ability for Stem to create descriptors].

 atagar, can you give us some background on why you added this ability now,
 what you expect it will be used for, how much code this adds to the
 overall codebase, etc.?  Like, can you recommend it?  Or do you think it's
 sufficient to have this ability in one Tor descriptor-parsing library and
 not in all of them?  Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19622 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: use java 8 in DescripTor

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#19622: use java 8 in DescripTor
-+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19617   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * milestone:  metrics-lib 2.0.0 =>


Comment:

 I'd like to put this on hold until Java 8 is available in Debian stable,
 not just in backports, and that might still take a couple of months.  (If
 Java 8 had any critical features or fixes that we'd rely on, we could use
 backports, but it seems that's not the case, so why rush this.)  And once
 Java 8 is in Debian stable we'll have to wait until all projects depending
 on metrics-lib have upgraded, which may take another month or so.  The
 2.0.0 milestone seems too optimistic for all this, so I'm removing the
 milestone for now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19078 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable RtspMediaResource stuff in OrFox

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#19078: Disable RtspMediaResource stuff in OrFox
+
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, ff52-esr-will-have  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * keywords:  tbb-mobile => tbb-mobile, ff52-esr-will-have
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 This is done with the RTSP removal in

 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1295885
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1291629

 .

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21871 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Change descriptor format for legacy encryption key

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21871: prop224: Change descriptor format for legacy encryption key
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21888   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Did a review and added some nitpicks to gitlab. I think we are almost
 there.

 I'm setting this to `needs_revision` but feel free to set it back to
 `merge_ready` if you think none of my comments are worth addressing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22006 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Validate ed25519 pubkeys to remove torsion component

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22006: prop224: Validate ed25519 pubkeys to remove torsion component
+
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs prop224 ed25519  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21888  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 OK, since Ian no longer has review comments for this branch, I'm pushing a
 squashed `bug22006_v3` branch and marking it as `needs_review`.

 Gitlab review here: https://gitlab.com/asn/tor/merge_requests/15

 The only thing I don't like here is that in `60ed3d0e2` there is no way to
 know that we are actually checking all ed25519 keys from the network. I
 scanned the codebase to find places where we receive ed25519 keys, and I
 think I identified all the high-level places in the code that accept such
 keys but I don't know if I found all of them.

 I did this because Ian suggested it here:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2017-April/012230.html

 If we want to take this seriously and ensure that we do it for all keys
 received on the net, we could add a `int key_is_validated` flag to
 `ed25519_public_key_t`, and throw a BUG() (or return -1) if we ever try to
 verify a signature with a non-validated pubkey.

 What do you guys think? FWIW, for most cases this is not a life-or-death
 validation, but more like a nice thing to do to avoid any edge-case
 esoteric attacks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22117 [User Experience/Website]: Dev portal tasks (tor project website redesign)

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22117: Dev portal tasks (tor project website redesign)
-+---
 Reporter:  linda|  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * component:  - Select a component => User Experience/Website


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21650 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop140: Clients request diffs and handle diffs in replies

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21650: prop140: Clients request diffs and handle diffs in replies
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop140   |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:  #13339| Points:  4
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I made most of the requested changes, and I hope that the conflicts are
 easy to solve.  How does it look now?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22143 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement May 3 updates to diff format in prop140

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22143: Implement May 3 updates to diff format in prop140
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201705  |  Actual Points:  .3
Parent ID:  #13339 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor4-must
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed those and merged.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21649 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop140: Caches serve diffs on request

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21649: prop140: Caches serve diffs on request
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  prop140   |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:  #13339| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21650 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop140: Clients request diffs and handle diffs in replies

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21650: prop140: Clients request diffs and handle diffs in replies
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  prop140   |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:  #13339| Points:  4
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 ahf says it looks okay.  Rebased onto master after a #22143 merge, fixed
 the s not already listed in #22148, and merged.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22129 [Applications/Tor Browser]: the new youtube layout dosen't work with high security setting

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22129: the new youtube layout dosen't work with high security setting
--+---
 Reporter:  i139  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 As I know, even the old one doesn't work. So what were your expectations?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21320 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Glyphs/Dingbats in uBlock Origin TBB not displaying in Gnu+Linux

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21320: Glyphs/Dingbats in uBlock Origin TBB not displaying in Gnu+Linux
--+--
 Reporter:  vegansalad|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18364| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Don't use uBlock in TBB.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22106 [Core Tor/Tor]: Initial Rust support

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22106: Initial Rust support
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * cc: asn (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16225 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: Unify exception/error handling in metrics-lib

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#16225: Unify exception/error handling in metrics-lib
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.7.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by karsten):

 Here's a related question from #16151 (discussion around
 `DescriptorCollector`) that was the sole reason for keeping that ticket
 open: "When receiving something other than a 200 response code while
 fetching the directories or files shouldn't that be reported in some way?
 Things like redirects, bad requests, not authorized, or others might be
 important for the caller?"

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16151 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: Add new descriptor source to fetch descriptors from CollecTor via https

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#16151: Add new descriptor source to fetch descriptors from CollecTor via https
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:13 karsten]:
 > Good question.  I just opened the more general ticket #16225 to come up
 with an answer.  Let's leave this ticket open until we have one.

 While going through all open metrics-lib tickets I found that keeping
 tickets open that have lots of comments doesn't really serve us well.  The
 question above is still a good one, but it's unnecessary to read the bulk
 of the discussion above to find an answer to it.  I copied over the
 question to #16225, so that we don't miss it, and now I'm finally closing
 this ticket as implemented.

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[tor-bugs] #22155 [- Select a component]: move "Check for Tor Browser Updates" from Torbutton to the Firefox menu

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22155: move "Check for Tor Browser Updates" from Torbutton to the Firefox menu
--+
 Reporter:  i139  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #21183
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 this is a simple design improvement.

 using a "update" icon will make this more visible and TBB will be more
 organized.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18797 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: create a DescriptorGenerator?

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#18797: create a DescriptorGenerator?
-+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * milestone:  metrics-lib 2.0.0 =>


Comment:

 This might be too much for version 2.0.0 if we still want to put that out
 before end of June.  Pessimistically removing the milestone for now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20405 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: create metrics-tools with all of the index.json processing code as first content

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#20405: create metrics-tools with all of the index.json processing code as first
content
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * milestone:  metrics-lib 2.0.0 =>


Comment:

 Regardless of whether or not we're creating a new library, this change
 seems unrelated to the metrics-lib 2.0.0 release, so I'm removing the
 milestone.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21934 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: Allow extra arguments in lines containing comma-separated key-value lists

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21934: Allow extra arguments in lines containing comma-separated key-value 
lists
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.7.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * milestone:   => metrics-lib 1.7.0


Comment:

 Assigning to the 1.7.0 milestone, which seems realistic.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19607 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: avoid repeated keyword strings

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#19607: avoid repeated keyword strings
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.7.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * milestone:  metrics-lib 2.0.0 => metrics-lib 1.7.0


Comment:

 This doesn't seem to be too difficult for the 1.7.0 release.  Let's try!

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[tor-bugs] #22156 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add Rust linting/formatting tools

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22156: Add Rust linting/formatting tools
--+--
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  rust
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 We need this as another initial step to support Rust development in tor.

 Work will involve adding rustfmt, Clippy, and determining rules we
 want/don't want.

 See conversation in #22106

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19616 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: Consider renaming metrics-lib

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#19616: Consider renaming metrics-lib
-+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * milestone:  metrics-lib 2.0.0 =>


Comment:

 While I see the benefit of doing the renaming before putting out 2.0.0, I
 don't think we're ready to pick a new name at this point.  When we rename
 metrics-lib, we should considering doing the same with the other metrics-
 related tools.  What we should avoid is rename metrics-lib now and then
 once again six or twelve months later.  But on the other hand the plan to
 rename metrics-lib shouldn't block the 2.0.0 release, so I'm removing that
 milestone.

 My suggestion is that we keep the two names metrics-lib and DescripTor for
 the moment and use either both or just metrics-lib name whenever we have
 the choice.  We should not, however, change explicit mentions of
 DescripTor to metrics-lib.  For example, we're using the name DescripTor
 for releases and for .jar files, and we should keep doing that.  But when
 we announce 2.0.0 in a blog post of some sort we could prefer the name
 metrics-lib and only mention very briefly that it's also known under the
 name DescripTor, so that people downloading the release won't be too
 confused.

 Oh well, sometimes writing code is easier than writing about code.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22151 [Applications/Tor Browser]: use security Vs usability scheme in security settings

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22151: use security Vs usability scheme in security settings
-+-
 Reporter:  i139 |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-security-slider,  |  duplicate
  tbb-usability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by linda):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Like blockflare has mentioned, we've already studied the tradeoff between
 usability and security here:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/UX/OrfoxSecuritySlider.
 Specifically, we tell them how some features will break as security
 increases, and label the options "safe, safer, safest" to indicate
 security levels.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22119 [User Experience/Website]: Community portal tasks (tor project website redesign)

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22119: Community portal tasks (tor project website redesign)
-+---
 Reporter:  linda|  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by alison):

 * cc: alison (added)


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[tor-bugs] #22157 [- Select a component]: create one security central

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22157: create one security central
--+
 Reporter:  i139  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #21183
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 I propose one "security central" in TBB, well, let's see.

 one security central on my view is one local that we can control all the
 possible security settings and options in TBB.

 this can be acess at:
 about:preferences#security
 or
 about:security (unused)

 and also will have a standalone icon for itself, not hosted at  Torbutton
 like security settings is hosted now, another point is use this icon for
 replace the noscript icon, noscript will stay there but they options will
 be accessed at the security central icon not the noscript icon.

 some examples; where I use in consideration TBB with security per first
 party domain (e10s), here I use high security in the default for all
 sites, and have one list of some exceptions like

 {{{
 https://a.com/ <\> low
 http://b.com/  <\> high \allow_JS
 }}}

 a.com will use low settings,
 b.com will use high settings but with JS

 and also some conditions

 {{{
 https://*/ <\> low
 http://*/  <\> midium
 ftp://*/   <\> high
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #22158 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor browser core dump on Arch Linux

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22158: Tor browser core dump on Arch Linux
--+--
 Reporter:  jb.1234abcd   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Full core dump file captured (*.lz4) is available as 60MB file on request.

 $ coredumpctl info 2186
PID: 2186 (firefox)
UID: 1000 (jb)
GID: 1000 (jb)
 Signal: 11 (SEGV)
  Timestamp: Thu 2017-05-04 01:04:48 CEST (16h ago)
   Command Line: ./firefox --class Tor Browser -profile
 TorBrowser/Data/Browser/profile.default
 Executable: /home/jb/Downloads/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/firefox
  Control Group: /
  Slice: -.slice
Boot ID: edc04a8c98944494b203b06fb397dde0
PID: 2186 (firefox)
UID: 1000 (jb)
GID: 1000 (jb)
 Signal: 11 (SEGV)
  Timestamp: Thu 2017-05-04 01:04:48 CEST (16h ago)
   Command Line: ./firefox --class Tor Browser -profile
 TorBrowser/Data/Browser/profile.default
 Executable: /home/jb/Downloads/tor-browser_en-US/Browser/firefox
  Control Group: /
  Slice: -.slice
Boot ID: edc04a8c98944494b203b06fb397dde0
 Machine ID: e464cf23e765494294ab3515a8e2efd0
   Hostname: myhost
Storage:
 
/var/lib/systemd/coredump/core.firefox.1000.edc04a8c98944494b203b06fb397dde0.2186.1493852688.lz4
Message: Process 2186 (firefox) of user 1000 dumped core.

 Stack trace of thread 5626:
 #0  0x7f8418598ea0 raise (libpthread.so.0)
 #1  0x7f84141a319c n/a (libxul.so)
 #2  0x7f8414c78c36 n/a (libxul.so)
 #3  0x7f8418598fe0 __restore_rt (libpthread.so.0)
 #4  0x7f841419f0b7 n/a (libxul.so)
 #5  0x7f8418989568 n/a (/home/jb/Downloads/tor-
 browser_en-US/Browser/libnspr4.so)
 #6  0x7f841858e2e7 start_thread (libpthread.so.0)
 #7  0x7f841760a54f __clone (libc.so.6)

 Stack trace of thread 2198:
 #0  0x7f8418594756 pthread_cond_wait@@GLIBC_2.3.2
 (libpthread.so.0)
 #1  0x7f8418983fc0 PR_WaitCondVar (/home/jb/Downloads
 /tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libnspr4.so)
 #2  0x7f8414a55fbd n/a (libxul.so)
 #3  0x7f8418989568 n/a (/home/jb/Downloads/tor-
 browser_en-US/Browser/libnspr4.so)
 #4  0x7f841858e2e7 start_thread (libpthread.so.0)
 #5  0x7f841760a54f __clone (libc.so.6)

 Stack trace of thread 2186:
 #0  0x7f8418594756 pthread_cond_wait@@GLIBC_2.3.2
 (libpthread.so.0)
 #1  0x7f8418983fc0 PR_WaitCondVar (/home/jb/Downloads
 /tor-browser_en-US/Browser/libnspr4.so)
 #2  0x7f8412b76285 n/a (libxul.so)
 #3  0x7f8412b77a50 n/a (libxul.so)
 #4  0x7f8412b7a16d n/a (libxul.so)
 #5  0x7f8412b960aa n/a (libxul.so)
 #6  0x7f8412b7b77e n/a (libxul.so)
 #7  0x7f8412cf47e4 n/a (libxul.so)
 #8  0x7f8412cf4827 n/a (libxul.so)
 #9  0x7f8412b5be0d n/a (libxul.so)
 #10 0x7f8412b5beb6 n/a (libxul.so)
 #11 0x7f8412b9099b n/a (libxul.so)
 #12 0x7f84141a5ed1 n/a (libxul.so)
 #13 0x7f84141a5ef6 n/a (libxul.so)
 #14 0x7f84141aa723 n/a (libxul.so)
 #15 0x7f84141aa8e3 XRE_main (libxul.so)
 #16 0x563c4b93659b _start (firefox)
 #17 0x563c4b935dff n/a (firefox)
 #18 0x7f841753e511 __libc_start_main (libc.so.6)
 #19 0x563c4b935f11 _start (firefox)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22148 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop140: conformance to proposal, unhandled corner cases

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22148: prop140: conformance to proposal, unhandled corner cases
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #13339| Points:  .5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 note to self: prop140_aftermath_url is done but needs more testing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22155 [Applications/Tor Browser]: move "Check for Tor Browser Updates" from Torbutton to the Firefox menu

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22155: move "Check for Tor Browser Updates" from Torbutton to the Firefox menu
--+--
 Reporter:  i139  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21183| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by blockflare):

 * owner:   => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser
 * type:  defect => enhancement


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22155 [Applications/Tor Browser]: move "Check for Tor Browser Updates" from Torbutton to the Firefox menu

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22155: move "Check for Tor Browser Updates" from Torbutton to the Firefox menu
--+--
 Reporter:  i139  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21183| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by blockflare):

 > move "Check for Tor Browser Updates" from Torbutton to the Firefox menu

 It already - kind of - exists for the Tor Browser, go to Menu > Help Menu
 > About Tor Browser and it will automatically check for the update (same
 as with Firefox).

 > using a "update" icon will make this more visible

 It would be less visible in that case, people click on the onion icon (to
 change identity, change circuit, change security settings...) more than
 they do on the menu one.

 Moreover, the Tor Browser already has some mechanisms to make the user
 aware of the need to update.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22157 [- Select a component]: create one security central

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22157: create one security central
--+---
 Reporter:  i139  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21183| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by blockflare):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Seems like a duplicate:  Per site security settings?
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21034 Also related:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21065

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22148 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop140: conformance to proposal, unhandled corner cases

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22148: prop140: conformance to proposal, unhandled corner cases
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #13339| Points:  .5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 note to self: prop140_aftermath_cfg is done

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21943 [Core Tor/Tor]: (Sandbox) Caught a bad syscall attempt (syscall getpid)

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21943: (Sandbox) Caught a bad syscall attempt (syscall getpid)
-+-
 Reporter:  ageisp0lis   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sandbox seccomp2 getpid  |  Actual Points:  .1
  029-backport 030-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21668 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prop278: Update cached_dir_t and related types to no longer assume single compresison method

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21668: Prop278: Update cached_dir_t and related types to no longer assume 
single
compresison method
+--
 Reporter:  ahf |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201703, prop278  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
+--
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  accepted => assigned
 * owner:  nickm => ahf


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22106 [Core Tor/Tor]: Initial Rust support

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22106: Initial Rust support
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by chelseakomlo):

 * keywords:   => rust


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22159 [Core Tor/Tor]: Hidden service f3oap63t7u7hfnki exceeded launch limit with 11 intro points in the last 77 seconds

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22159: Hidden service f3oap63t7u7hfnki exceeded launch limit with 11 intro 
points
in the last 77 seconds
--+-
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by arma):

 A) Holy cow, does it really need to tell me about every further second?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22159 [Core Tor/Tor]: Hidden service f3oap63t7u7hfnki exceeded launch limit with 11 intro points in the last 77 seconds

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22159: Hidden service f3oap63t7u7hfnki exceeded launch limit with 11 intro 
points
in the last 77 seconds
--+-
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by arma):

 B) I wonder if this is a side effect of the "if you need an intro point,
 launch two and use whichever finishes first" logic. If we even still use
 that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21303 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: monitor our fastly usage for early warning of overage charges

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21303: monitor our fastly usage for early warning of overage charges
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Attaching a script for this.

 I don't know how $$$ translates to bytes, so I leave it up to someone else
 to fix the limits (50MiB+ in a day is WARNING, 100MiB+ in a day is
 CRITICAL currently and I'm sure those are way off).

 Just do `curl [...] | ./21303.py > out.txt`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22159 [Core Tor/Tor]: Hidden service f3oap63t7u7hfnki exceeded launch limit with 11 intro points in the last 77 seconds

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22159: Hidden service f3oap63t7u7hfnki exceeded launch limit with 11 intro 
points
in the last 77 seconds
--+-
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 FWIW, I added logging when exceeding the limit in proposal 224
 implementation (#20657) today and I log rate limited it. Thus, we should
 definitely rate limit this.

 Furthermore, I think the maximum number of retries is also too low imo...
 It should take into consideration how much retries we allow per IP instead
 of just a factor of 2. But that's another ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22159 [Core Tor/Tor]: Hidden service f3oap63t7u7hfnki exceeded launch limit with 11 intro points in the last 77 seconds

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22159: Hidden service f3oap63t7u7hfnki exceeded launch limit with 11 intro 
points
in the last 77 seconds
--+-
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by arma):

 Actually, check this one out:

 {{{
 $ grep remove_invalid_intro_points debug-log
 May 04 02:53:23.178 [info] remove_invalid_intro_points(): Attempting to
 retry on $F82BA843BEDCCF71A57FCA0E4640649B1607E244~SHOSolutionsLtdTOR1 at
 139.59.41.197 as intro point for f3oap63t7u7hfnki (circuit disappeared).
 May 04 02:53:23.178 [info] remove_invalid_intro_points(): Attempting to
 retry on $7CAD31FDBB32BA97AB7AD1889370E761AE7A57A3~ornery at
 138.68.150.168 as intro point for f3oap63t7u7hfnki (circuit disappeared).
 May 04 02:53:23.178 [info] remove_invalid_intro_points(): Attempting to
 retry on $C46D3A8317F5450E500B75F0708E89DA3A2C9073~frcy at 46.4.128.62 as
 intro point for f3oap63t7u7hfnki (circuit disappeared).
 May 04 14:17:56.178 [info] remove_invalid_intro_points(): Attempting to
 retry on $F82BA843BEDCCF71A57FCA0E4640649B1607E244~SHOSolutionsLtdTOR1 at
 139.59.41.197 as intro point for f3oap63t7u7hfnki (circuit disappeared).
 May 04 14:17:56.178 [info] remove_invalid_intro_points(): Attempting to
 retry on $7CAD31FDBB32BA97AB7AD1889370E761AE7A57A3~ornery at
 138.68.150.168 as intro point for f3oap63t7u7hfnki (circuit disappeared).
 May 04 14:17:56.178 [info] remove_invalid_intro_points(): Attempting to
 retry on $C46D3A8317F5450E500B75F0708E89DA3A2C9073~frcy at 46.4.128.62 as
 intro point for f3oap63t7u7hfnki (circuit disappeared).
 May 04 14:17:57.178 [info] remove_invalid_intro_points(): Attempting to
 retry on $F82BA843BEDCCF71A57FCA0E4640649B1607E244~SHOSolutionsLtdTOR1 at
 139.59.41.197 as intro point for f3oap63t7u7hfnki (circuit disappeared).
 May 04 14:17:57.178 [info] remove_invalid_intro_points(): Attempting to
 retry on $7CAD31FDBB32BA97AB7AD1889370E761AE7A57A3~ornery at
 138.68.150.168 as intro point for f3oap63t7u7hfnki (circuit disappeared).
 May 04 14:17:57.178 [info] remove_invalid_intro_points(): Attempting to
 retry on $C46D3A8317F5450E500B75F0708E89DA3A2C9073~frcy at 46.4.128.62 as
 intro point for f3oap63t7u7hfnki (circuit disappeared).
 May 04 14:17:58.178 [info] remove_invalid_intro_points(): Attempting to
 retry on $F82BA843BEDCCF71A57FCA0E4640649B1607E244~SHOSolutionsLtdTOR1 at
 139.59.41.197 as intro point for f3oap63t7u7hfnki (circuit disappeared).
 May 04 14:17:58.178 [info] remove_invalid_intro_points(): Attempting to
 retry on $C46D3A8317F5450E500B75F0708E89DA3A2C9073~frcy at 46.4.128.62 as
 intro point for f3oap63t7u7hfnki (circuit disappeared).
 May 04 14:17:58.178 [info] remove_invalid_intro_points(): Attempting to
 retry on $7CAD31FDBB32BA97AB7AD1889370E761AE7A57A3~ornery at
 138.68.150.168 as intro point for f3oap63t7u7hfnki (circuit disappeared).
 May 04 14:18:02.178 [info] remove_invalid_intro_points(): Attempting to
 retry on $A068D47F30BFD1C47B1030B2446ABFDED7914171~ProstoHome at
 37.153.41.51 as intro point for f3oap63t7u7hfnki (circuit disappeared).
 May 04 14:18:03.178 [info] remove_invalid_intro_points(): Attempting to
 retry on $A068D47F30BFD1C47B1030B2446ABFDED7914171~ProstoHome at
 37.153.41.51 as intro point for f3oap63t7u7hfnki (circuit disappeared).
 May 04 14:18:04.178 [info] remove_invalid_intro_points(): Attempting to
 retry on $A068D47F30BFD1C47B1030B2446ABFDED7914171~ProstoHome at
 37.153.41.51 as intro point for f3oap63t7u7hfnki (circuit disappeared).
 May 04 14:18:05.178 [info] remove_invalid_intro_points(): Attempting to
 retry on $A068D47F30BFD1C47B1030B2446ABFDED7914171~ProstoHome at
 37.153.41.51 as intro point for f3oap63t7u7hfnki (circuit disappeared).
 May 04 14:18:06.178 [info] remove_invalid_intro_points(): Attempting to
 retry on $A068D47F30BFD1C47B1030B2446ABFDED7914171~ProstoHome at
 37.153.41.51 as intro point for f3oap63t7u7hfnki (circuit disappeared).
 May 04 14:18:07.178 [info] remove_invalid_intro_points(): Attempting to
 retry on $A068D47F30BFD1C47B1030B2446ABFDED7914171~ProstoHome at
 37.153.41.51 as intro point for f3oap63t7u7hfnki (circuit disappeared).
 May 04 14:18:08.177 [info] remove_invalid_intro_points(): Attempting to
 retry on $A068D47F30BFD1C47B1030B2446ABFDED7914171~ProstoHome at
 37.153.41.51 as intro point for f3oap63t7u7hfnki (circuit disappeared).
 May 04 14:18:09.178 [info] remove_invalid_intro_points(): Attempting to
 retry on $A068D47F30BFD1C47B1030B2446ABFDED7914171~ProstoHome at
 37.153.41.51 as intro point for f3oap63t7u7hfnki (circuit disappeared).
 May 04 14:18:10.178 [info] remove_invalid_intro_points(): Attempting to
 retry on $A068D

Re: [tor-bugs] #22147 [Metrics/Atlas]: add exit_addresses onionoo field

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22147: add exit_addresses onionoo field
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by nusenu):

 Replying to [comment:2 cypherpunks]:
 > This means exit relays that use the same address(es) for both OR and
 exiting have no `exit_addresses` field. Showing the field as empty (or
 `none` as is common for empty fields in Atlas) is confusing IMO.
 I disagree, there is a distinction between OR address and exit_address.

 > I plan to solve this confusion by merging the `or_addresses` and
 `exit_addresses` field and using the result for displaying the exit
 addresses.

 Please do not merge them.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22147 [Metrics/Atlas]: add exit_addresses onionoo field

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22147: add exit_addresses onionoo field
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by nusenu):

 Replying to [comment:4 cypherpunks]:
 > From the wording of the Onionoo description i assumed the OR address is
 always an exit address. Is this not correct?

 No this is not correct.
 See also:
 https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en#OutboundBindAddressExit

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22147 [Metrics/Atlas]: add exit_addresses onionoo field

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22147: add exit_addresses onionoo field
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by nusenu):

 Onionoo is rather clear about exit_addresses:
 > Only those addresses are listed that are different from onion-routing
 addresses

 the same level of clearness should be on the atlas page displaying
 exit_addresses.

 Empty exit_addresses for exits that exit with their OR IP address are
 clear in the context of the above statement.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21949 [User Experience/Website]: Identifying the requirements of the four torproject.org portals

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21949: Identifying the requirements of the four torproject.org portals
-+--
 Reporter:  linda|  Owner:  linda
 Type:  defect   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by linda):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>
 * parent:  #22120 =>


Old description:

> = Objective =
>
> Write user stories for all four portals to define the content
> requirements for each page.
>
> = Definition =
>
> * A user story describes the type of user, what they want and why. A user
> story helps to create a simplified description of a requirement. It is a
> description of a software feature from an end-user perspective.
>
> = Methodology =
>
> Talk with stakeholders of each portal, write user stories.
>
> = Results =
>
> '''torproject.org'''
> * Audience: first-time Tor users, people curious about Tor, press
> * Purpose: host critical first-user information and redirect people to
> the appropriate portals
>
> '''dev.torproject.org'''
> * Audience: TPI devs, contract/volunteer devs, people who want to
> volunteer
> * Purpose: sync all the high-level information about work being done on
> Tor
>
> '''support.torproject.org'''
> * Audience: first-time Tor users, relay operators, Tor users with issues
> * Purpose: help install Tor Browser, resolve common questions,
> troubleshoot common errors
>
> '''outreach.torproject.org'''
> * Audience: Tor trainers, Tor speakers, Tor-evangelists on the ground
> * Purpose: give people excited about Tor what they need to energize more
> people about Tor

New description:

 = Objective =

 Write user stories for all four portals to define the content requirements
 for each page.

 = Definition =

 * A user story describes the type of user, what they want and why. A user
 story helps to create a simplified description of a requirement. It is a
 description of a software feature from an end-user perspective.

 = Methodology =

 Talk with stakeholders of each portal, write user stories.

 This is a brainstormed list of all the potential users that would visit
 Tor. We're picking user persons from this set and targeting them in
 specific portals.

 * Casual visitor: a person who wants to know a bit about Tor (i.e. Tor
 Browser users/sponsors).
 * Curious outsider: a person who is affected by Tor users (i.e. website
 operators, police).
 * Journalist: a person who wants to write about Tor (i.e. internet freedom
 activist).
 * Researcher: a person who has a lot of technical skills and knowledge
 (i.e. academics).
 * Relay operator: a person who runs Tor relays and bridges.
 * Tor developer: a person who works on Tor (i.e. devs on the network
 team).
 * Tor authority: a person who runs a core part of Tor network
 infrastructure (i.e. directory authority/BridgeDB operators).
 * Funder: a person that gives Tor money.

 = Results =

 '''torproject.org'''
 * Audience: first-time Tor users, people curious about Tor, press
 * Purpose: host critical first-user information and redirect people to the
 appropriate portals

 '''dev.torproject.org'''
 * Audience: TPI devs, contract/volunteer devs, people who want to
 volunteer
 * Purpose: sync all the high-level information about work being done on
 Tor

 '''support.torproject.org'''
 * Audience: first-time Tor users, relay operators, Tor users with issues
 * Purpose: help install Tor Browser, resolve common questions,
 troubleshoot common errors

 '''outreach.torproject.org'''
 * Audience: Tor trainers, Tor speakers, Tor-evangelists on the ground
 * Purpose: give people excited about Tor what they need to energize more
 people about Tor

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22120 [User Experience/Website]: Research tasks (tor project website redesign)

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22120: Research tasks (tor project website redesign)
-+
 Reporter:  linda|  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by linda):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21949 [User Experience/Website]: Identifying the requirements of the four torproject.org portals

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21949: Identifying the requirements of the four torproject.org portals
-+
 Reporter:  linda|  Owner:  linda
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22120   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by linda):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * parent:   => #22120


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22120 [User Experience/Website]: Research tasks (tor project website redesign)

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22120: Research tasks (tor project website redesign)
-+--
 Reporter:  linda|  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by linda):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22147 [Metrics/Atlas]: add exit_addresses onionoo field

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22147: add exit_addresses onionoo field
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:7 nusenu]:
 > Onionoo is rather clear about exit_addresses:
 > > Only those addresses are listed that are different from onion-routing
 addresses
 >
 > the same level of clearness should be on the atlas page displaying
 exit_addresses.
 >
 > Empty exit_addresses for exits that exit with their OR IP address are
 clear in the context of the above statement.
 Okay, I'll not merge the two fields and add emphasis to the distinction in
 a tooltip.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22147 [Metrics/Atlas]: add exit_addresses onionoo field

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22147: add exit_addresses onionoo field
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by nusenu):

 thanks.
 The title for the list of exit_addresses could be
 "Not-announced Exit IP Addresses"

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18797 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: create a DescriptorGenerator?

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#18797: create a DescriptorGenerator?
-+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by atagar):

 * cc: isis (added)


Comment:

 Hi Karsten - interesting! I didn't realize you were considering this too.
 Adding Isis too since she's interested in this topic as well.

 Descriptor creation has been on my radar for quite a few years (#10227).
 Stem and BridgeDB need it for their unit tests. Stem filled this need with
 test helpers, and Isis did so with her own library called
 [https://pypi.python.org/pypi/leekspin leekspin].

 Descriptor generation fits nicely into Stem's API so I'm adding it now so
 we can deduplicate this effort. So TL;DR is...

 * At present the only use of descriptor generation I'm aware of is
 testing. That said, we might find other uses too.

 * There's two parts to descriptor generation: creating valid descriptors
 and signing it. Stem presently supports the former but not the later
 (however, leekspin can). I'm looking into that next.

 Cheers! -Damian

 PS. Once again kinda sad we keep duplicating each other's efforts. Seems
 like a waist to keep repeating each other's work... :/

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[tor-bugs] #22160 [Metrics/Atlas]: Display address lists better

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22160: Display address lists better
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 With the addition of the exit addresses field in #22147 some relays now
 have address fields with more than two addresses. For example
 https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/D5D6DBED4BEB90DB089AC1E57EA3A13B9B8AA769
 has four exit addresses. These are displayed on one line which makes them
 almost run into the second column.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22147 [Metrics/Atlas]: add exit_addresses onionoo field

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22147: add exit_addresses onionoo field
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:9 nusenu]:
 > thanks.
 > The title for the list of exit_addresses could be
 > "Not-announced Exit IP Addresses"
 I kept the title similar to existing fields by simply naming it `Exit
 Addresses`.

 I've opened #22160 for improving the address list style because some
 relays have more than two exit addresses which leads to styling issues.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22147 [Metrics/Atlas]: add exit_addresses onionoo field

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22147: add exit_addresses onionoo field
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by nusenu):

 Also note that this list can be rather long (biggest entry I've seen so
 fare was 297 chars long).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22160 [Metrics/Atlas]: Display address lists better

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22160: Display address lists better
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Using paragraphs (with `p` tags) for each address does not work because
 paragraphs have a bottom margin which separates them from each other.

 Using separate `dd` tags for each address (which is allowed according to
 [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTML/Element/dd MDN]) has a
 similar issue that is caused by custom styling. A patch to remove the
 custom styling was added to #21752 but didn't pass the first review. I
 hope it passes the second review because it would make using multiple `dd`
 tags possible and make the fix for this ticket easier.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21752 [Metrics/Atlas]: put "Current Status" under an Android Browser on top

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#21752: put "Current Status" under an Android Browser on top
---+--
 Reporter:  toralf |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 See ticket:22160#comment:1 for an instance where the custom styling
 prevents an easy solution from being used.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22147 [Metrics/Atlas]: add exit_addresses onionoo field

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22147: add exit_addresses onionoo field
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:11 nusenu]:
 > Also note that this list can be rather long (biggest entry I've seen so
 fare was 297 chars long).
 > That is why I suggested to use a vertical style like the fingerprints in
 family blocks.
 Can you give the fingerprint so i can use it while working on #22160?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22147 [Metrics/Atlas]: add exit_addresses onionoo field

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22147: add exit_addresses onionoo field
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by nusenu):

 this one is 173 chars long:

 
https://onionoo.torproject.org/details?fingerprint=8ED43EC3683D7E261BB8FEA4EA8122952968CF8E&;
 fields=exit_addresses

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22159 [Core Tor/Tor]: Hidden service f3oap63t7u7hfnki exceeded launch limit with 11 intro points in the last 77 seconds

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22159: Hidden service f3oap63t7u7hfnki exceeded launch limit with 11 intro 
points
in the last 77 seconds
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:   => tor-hs
 * owner:   => dgoulet
 * status:  new => accepted
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22101 [Core Tor/Tor]: Can't have relative DataDirectory with CookieAuthentication enabled

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22101: Can't have relative DataDirectory with CookieAuthentication enabled
--+
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by Jigsaw52):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 I wrote a patch to make get_datadir_fname() always returns an absolute
 path.
 I save the current directory in the tor_init function and use it to create
 the absolute path.

 Here is my branch:
 https://github.com/Jigsaw52/tor/tree/relative_path_fix_22101

 Also, I believe this is also causing #20456.

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[tor-bugs] #22161 [- Select a component]: check.torproject.org false report

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22161: check.torproject.org false report
--+---
 Reporter:  desci |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  check
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 This exit have been reported as "not using Tor" by the ip check tool:
 https://atlas.torproject.org/#search/198.211.103.26

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22101 [Core Tor/Tor]: Can't have relative DataDirectory with CookieAuthentication enabled

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22101: Can't have relative DataDirectory with CookieAuthentication enabled
--+
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by Jigsaw52):

 * cc: danielpinto52@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16337 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate whether Animations(Player) API provides new high resolution timestamp

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#16337: Investigate whether Animations(Player) API provides new high resolution
timestamp
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-fingerprinting-time-   |  Actual Points:
  highres, tbb-7.0-must-alpha,   |
  TorBrowserTeam201705R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:
 ff52-esr, tbb-fingerprinting-time-highres, tbb-7.0-must-alpha,
 TorBrowserTeam201705
 =>
 ff52-esr, tbb-fingerprinting-time-highres, tbb-7.0-must-alpha,
 TorBrowserTeam201705R


Comment:

 Here's a patch for review:
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commit/16337

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22159 [Core Tor/Tor]: Hidden service f3oap63t7u7hfnki exceeded launch limit with 11 intro points in the last 77 seconds

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22159: Hidden service f3oap63t7u7hfnki exceeded launch limit with 11 intro 
points
in the last 77 seconds
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * cc: teor (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16337 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate whether Animations(Player) API provides new high resolution timestamp

2017-05-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#16337: Investigate whether Animations(Player) API provides new high resolution
timestamp
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-fingerprinting-time-   |  Actual Points:
  highres, tbb-7.0-must-alpha,   |
  TorBrowserTeam201705R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by tom):

 Does this need to get added to the in-progress Mozilla patch?

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