Re: [tor-bugs] #21903 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Disable DNS in chutney by default, and add an option to enable it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21903: Disable DNS in chutney by default, and add an option to enable it
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19573| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 nickm]:
 > That commit seems plausible, though I do wonder why we're making DNS
 broken-by-default.  Would it be better instead to have DNS work by default
 for chutney started from a command line, and have it disabled specifically
 when running tests that won't use it?  (I'll believe  either answer)

 Due to Tor bug #21900, we have two choices:
 * make chutney work offline by default (but break DNS), or
 * allow DNS in chutney by default (but break offline use).

 I don't mind which default we choose, as long as there is a way to flip
 it.
 So I emailed tor-dev to see what other chutney users want.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20152 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update DirAuthority man entry for client begindir, no IPv6 DirPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20152: Update DirAuthority man entry for client begindir, no IPv6 DirPort
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, doc,   |  Actual Points:
  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:  #18892   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:5 kleft]:
 > According to
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/Tor/IPv6
 roadmaps/Tor/IPv6], 0.2.8-alpha-dev and newer are able to connect to
 DirAuthorities and FallbackDirs via v6, can anyone confirm that this is
 correct, implemented and working?

 Yes, it works, and it requires the ClientUseIPv6 and ClientPreferIPv6
 options to be set on the client, as documented in the man page.

 (This isn't really the place to discuss this question, if Tor doesn't
 behave how you expect, please open another ticket.)

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[tor-bugs] #22184 [Applications]: Clarify bittorrent advice re: smaller files (Zeronet)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22184: Clarify bittorrent advice re: smaller files (Zeronet)
--+
 Reporter:  torezen   |  Owner:
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:  bittorrent zeronet
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 The [https://zeronet.io/ Zeronet] project serves web pages via Bittorrent,
 meaning that users are torrenting relatively small files (typically <10
 MB). The default client offers optional Tor integration.

 This seems to bypass the two primary reasons for not using Tor with
 Bittorrent: (1) the client software is specifically designed to work with
 Tor, reducing the risk of leaking one's IP address (the torrent peers
 appear to be .onion addresses rather than IP addresses); and (2) the
 amount of data being transferred is more comparable to ordinary web
 browsing than to the multi-gigabyte files typical of Bittorrent usage,
 reducing the burden imposed on the network.

 It therefore ''seems'' from a lay perspective as though this is an
 exception to the usual principle against using Bittorrent with Tor, but
 there may be further issues that are not immediately apparent. It would be
 much appreciated if someone with relevant expertise could weigh in.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19449 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove --disable-transparent configure option?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19449: Remove --disable-transparent configure option?
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:7 yurivict271]:
 > Why not make it at least torrc-enabled?
 It is torrc-enabled as stated by the [https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-
 manual.html.en#TransPort manual] and it is disabled by default.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19449 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove --disable-transparent configure option?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19449: Remove --disable-transparent configure option?
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by yurivict271):

 Isn't this a security problem to have something rarely used, like
 TransPort, always on by default?

 Why not make it at least torrc-enabled?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22183 [- Select a component]: --disable-transparent option is gone without the ChangeLog record

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22183: --disable-transparent option is gone without the ChangeLog record
--+-
 Reporter:  yurivict271   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 It got removed with #19449 in 0.2.9.1-alpha which is documented in the
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/ChangeLog?id=9decf86711133acf7ed2679831b21e53c9cb92ca#n2514
 ChangeLog].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22183 [- Select a component]: --disable-transparent option is gone without the ChangeLog record

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22183: --disable-transparent option is gone without the ChangeLog record
--+-
 Reporter:  yurivict271   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by yurivict271):

 The de-facto new way of enabling of USE_TRANSPARENT is checking for both
 net/if.h and net/pfvar.h. This makes it always enabled even when not
 needed.

 FYI, the FreeBSD port has a special option TRANSPARENT, off by default,
 that is rendered broken now.

 Since transparent proxy is needed only by a small fraction of users, I
 suggest the behavior should be:
 1. there have to be --enable-transparent/--disable-transparent options
 2. --disable-transparent should be the default
 3. the above-mentioned headers should be checked only when the option is
 enabled

 Also, checking net/pfvar.h is questionable since transparent proxy can be
 used with other than pf firewalls.

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[tor-bugs] #22183 [- Select a component]: --disable-transparent option is gone without the ChangeLog record

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22183: --disable-transparent option is gone without the ChangeLog record
--+-
 Reporter:  yurivict271   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 It disappeared somewhere between 0.2.8.11 and 0.2.9.9.
 The last mention of transparent proxy in ChangeLog was for 0.2.7.6.

 ChangeLog should document all essential interface changes, both user-
 facing and build-facing.

 The configured define USE_TRANSPARENT is still present in code, but it's
 initialization has changed in undocumented way.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22175 [Metrics/Atlas]: link AS to compass.tpo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22175: link AS to compass.tpo
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:1 cypherpunks]:
 > alternatively you could link to atlas itself, since it can also search
 for ASes:
 > https://atlas.torproject.org/#search/as:AS395978
 I'd rather link to Atlas itself because Compass seems to be unmaintained.
 The last commit was in 2015 according to
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/compass.git.
 > (but atlas has a limitation on result entries, which compass has not)
 The limitation on the number of search result entries is a known issue
 (see #21186). A quick analysis of the Onionoo data shows that 19 out of
 1351 AS numbers are affected by this limitation. IMO these shouldn't block
 the implementation of this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22089 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Decentraleyes to stop tracking by large CDNs (resulting in slightly less traffic for exits) in the Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22089: Add Decentraleyes to stop tracking by large CDNs (resulting in slightly
less traffic for exits) in the Tor Browser
+--
 Reporter:  imageverif  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-performance  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by imageverif):

 * keywords:  tbb-usability => tbb-usability, tbb-performance


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorU
--+

Comment (by alecmuffett):

 Clipped from my comments on tor-dev:

 I am running a cluster of 12 "worker" tor daemons (0.3.0.6) across 6
 machines, under Onionbalance.

 So far, 2x of the worker-onion daemons have gone "stale" - are not
 publishing descriptors, are not reachable from the tor network - even
 though their Log.NOTICE-level logfiles show nothing weird. I've sent
 SIGUSR2 to one of them to enable more verbose logging.

 The only notable message is: `Diagnostic for issue 8387: Found 2 one-hop
 circuits more than 1800 seconds old! Logging 2...` - but all of the
 workers are doing that occasionally, whereas only 2x of them are stale.

 Also: in each case where there is a stale tor-daemon on a machine, the
 other daemon, in a separate directory, is not stale - so, it can't be a
 connectivity issue.

 I did `egrep '(for.some.of.our|now.have.enough)' */tor.log` on the fleet
 of workers; it turns out that **all 12x of the worker daemons** have at
 various points issued the following messages:

 `Our directory information is no longer up-to-date enough to build
 circuits: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards`

 ...and...

 `I learned some more directory information, but not enough to build a
 circuit: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards.`

 **HOWEVER the 2x STALE daemons** have not issued a subsequent:

 `We now have enough directory information to build circuits`

 ...so it appears that they, in particular, have given up trying to fetch
 directory information - a state which has persisted for **several days**
 now.

 Sample tor.conf follows

 {{{
 # -*- conf -*-
 # eotk (c) 2017 Alec Muffett

 # template note: here we use TOR_DIR not PROJECT_DIR because of the
 # relocation of Tor directories under `softmap`
 DataDirectory /home/pi/eotk/projects.d/projname.d/hs-2.d
 ControlPort unix:/home/pi/eotk/projects.d/projname.d/hs-2.d/tor-
 control.sock
 PidFile /home/pi/eotk/projects.d/projname.d/hs-2.d/tor.pid
 Log notice file /home/pi/eotk/projects.d/projname.d/hs-2.d/tor.log
 SafeLogging 1
 HeartbeatPeriod 60 minutes
 LongLivedPorts 80,443
 RunAsDaemon 1

 # use single onions
 SocksPort 0 # have to disable this for single onions
 HiddenServiceSingleHopMode 1 # yep, i want single onions
 HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode 1 # yes, really, honest, i swear

 # softmap
 HiddenServiceDir /home/pi/eotk/projects.d/projname.d/hs-2.d
 HiddenServicePort 80
 unix:/home/pi/eotk/projects.d/projname.d/hs-2.d/port-80.sock
 HiddenServicePort 443
 unix:/home/pi/eotk/projects.d/projname.d/hs-2.d/port-443.sock
 HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints 3
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22155 [Applications/Tor Browser]: move "Check for Tor Browser Updates" from Torbutton to the Firefox menu

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22155: move "Check for Tor Browser Updates" from Torbutton to the Firefox menu
--+--
 Reporter:  i139  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21183| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by i139):

 I understand your opinion, but what I'm saying is to make it possible to
 implement the changes said in #21183.

 two alternativa to my original purpose is, to put "check for updates"
 directory in the about:tor, I'm right there isn't anything more visible
 than this.

 other possibility is to put into the Firefox menu, and also put one
 indication to click there to make updates, like is made sometimes with
 Torbutton.

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[tor-bugs] #22182 [- Select a component]: Revision of perl script for updating mirror page on website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22182: Revision of perl script for updating mirror page on website
--+-
 Reporter:  Samdney   |  Owner:  Samdney
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #22150
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Revision of perl script which pulls in the entries from include/tor-
 mirrors.csv and put the entries on
 https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/mirrors

 In #22150 arma wrote:

 ''"A) We should think about ways to automate the script. Maybe we
 shouldn't  spend too much energy on this one until we've thought about how
 the  mirror pages will fit into the future website redo."''

 Script: https://gitweb.torproject.org/project/web/webwml.git/tree/update-
 mirrors.pl

 Topics after a first review of the existing script:

  1. I found several small perl bugs (or better, "not a nice coding style",
 not really bugs) in the existing script
  1. The current way how the script is checking the mirror sites, isn't the
 best (it is looking for existing .xpi, .dmg, .exe, .tar.gz files)
  1. The script has to be run manually at the moment. Can this be done
 automatically in the future (without creating security issues)? Have also
 attention here on the existing mailing list (https://lists.torproject.org
 /cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-mirrors)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20152 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update DirAuthority man entry for client begindir, no IPv6 DirPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20152: Update DirAuthority man entry for client begindir, no IPv6 DirPort
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, doc,   |  Actual Points:
  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:  #18892   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by kleft):

 !FallbackDir says:

   !FallbackDir !address:port orport=port id=fingerprint [weight=num]
 '''[ipv6=!address:orport]'''

 Are they capable of using v6?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20152 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update DirAuthority man entry for client begindir, no IPv6 DirPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20152: Update DirAuthority man entry for client begindir, no IPv6 DirPort
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, doc,   |  Actual Points:
  tor-03-unspecified-201612  |
Parent ID:  #18892   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by kleft):

 * cc: kleft (added)
 * parent:   => #18892


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21405 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clarify "address" in man page: IPv4, IPv6, hostname?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21405: Clarify "address" in man page: IPv4, IPv6, hostname?
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, easy, triaged-out-20170308  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18892   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by kleft):

 * cc: kleft (added)
 * parent:   => #18892


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22181 [Community]: What can we do for mirror operator community

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22181: What can we do for mirror operator community
---+-
 Reporter:  Samdney|  Owner:
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22150 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by Samdney):

 He is talking about the following mailing list:

 https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-mirrors

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22179 [Community/Tor Support]: Website redesign/Support portal: Instructions - Setting up a mirror

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22179: Website redesign/Support portal: Instructions - Setting up a mirror
---+-
 Reporter:  Samdney|  Owner:
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22150 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by Samdney):

 * type:  defect => task


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[tor-bugs] #22181 [Community]: What can we do for mirror operator community

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22181: What can we do for mirror operator community
---+
 Reporter:  Samdney|  Owner:
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #22150
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 Parent Ticket #22150

 arma wrote:


 ''"B) We should figure out how to handle the community of mirror operators
 better. There's a mailing list, tor-mirrors, where people send mail to
 sign up their mirrors, and then nobody does anything. I bet we can
 improve on that process. :)"''

  1. What can we do here for our mirror operator community?
  1. This ticket overlaps with the topics:
1. perl back-end script (automatisation) <-> website redesign/support
 portal: mirror sites

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[tor-bugs] #22180 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: trac still sends email to deleted accounts?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22180: trac still sends email to deleted accounts?
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Hi,

 I used to have an trac account. I used the trac interface to delete it. I
 expected that this would remove my account and email address from your
 system.

 I still get emails for tickets that I used to be subscribed to...
 that is annoying.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15178 [Metrics/Atlas]: Improve Atlas' error messages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15178: Improve Atlas' error messages
---+
 Reporter:  phw|  Owner:  phw
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  easy   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by kleft):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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[tor-bugs] #22179 [Community/Tor Support]: Website redesign/Support portal: Instructions - Setting up a mirror

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22179: Website redesign/Support portal: Instructions - Setting up a mirror
---+
 Reporter:  Samdney|  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #22150
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 Current site:

 https://www.torproject.org/docs/running-a-mirror

 Points to discuss for website redesign/support portal:

  1. Where should the instructions live?
  1. What should be the content of this site?
  1. Do we need a section on the support portal for people who are running
 a mirror?

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[tor-bugs] #22178 [User Experience/Website]: Website redesign: Mirror list site

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22178: Website redesign: Mirror list site
-+
 Reporter:  Samdney  |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #22150
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 For the current site:

 https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/mirrors

 it has to be discussed the following points for the future website:

  1. Where should it live?
  1. Content (the mirror list itself, Something else? What?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22150 [Applications/GetTor]: Our website mirror community needs some love

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22150: Our website mirror community needs some love
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  ilv
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Samdney):

 = Objective =
 => Making the mirror stuff better!

 Which includes the following topic:

  1. Website/Support portal content
  1. Mailing list
  1. Mirror community
  1. Back end script for generating the table of mirrors

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