Re: [tor-bugs] #8897 [Core Tor/Tor]: Faster curve25519 implementation for ntor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8897: Faster curve25519 implementation for ntor
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, performance, ntor,|  Actual Points:
  curve25519 crypto impl-shopping|
Parent ID:  #9662| Points:  large
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * cc: isis (added)


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[tor-bugs] #22456 [Applications]: Tor unexpectedly exited. New install on Windows 10.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22456: Tor unexpectedly exited. New install on Windows 10.
--+---
 Reporter:  greelyi   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  6.5.2
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 torbrowser-install-6.5.2_en-US.exe is the package that was used for
 install.

 At the end of installation TOR attempts to start and I get the following
 message.

 ==Start Message==
 Tor unexpectedly exited. This might be due to a bug in Tor itself, another
 program on your system, or faulty hardware. Until you restart Tor, the Tor
 Browser will not be able to reach any websites. If the problem persists,
 please send a copy of your Tor Log to the support team.

 Restarting Tor will not close your browser tabs.

 [Restart Tor]

 [Copy Tor Log to Clipboard] [Back][Next] [Exit]
 =End of message===

 Pressing the Copy Tor Log button gives a message "Copy Complete. 0 Tor log
 messages are ready to be pasted into a text editor or an email message"

 I deleted TOR, downloaded the latest version from the project home and
 installed again with identical results.

 The system is running with IPVanish VPN.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22156 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add Rust linting/formatting tools

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22156: Add Rust linting/formatting tools
--+--
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by hdevalence):

 `cargo clippy` is a great tool, but I don't think that it should be part
 of a CI run, and I don't think that it makes sense (or is worthwhile) to
 spend time deciding which rules should be included or not.

 The reason is that `cargo clippy` is meant to be **extremely
 enthusiastic** about giving suggestions.  Often, these suggestions are
 helpful, but sometimes, they aren't.  And, for a given rule, there's no
 way to know whether it will always be useful or not (i.e., there's no way
 to decide in advance whether it should be "required").  For instance,
 consider [https://github.com/Manishearth/rust-
 clippy/wiki#needless_range_loop `needless_range_loop`].  This is often a
 good warning, but sometimes it really does make more sense to use an
 explicit index.  There's no way to know, except by using context and
 judgement.

 I wonder whether a focus on requiring linting tools as part of a
 development/CI process is a legacy from C development.  Since `rustc`
 already includes quite extensive errors and warnings, is a required
 linting process beyond "no warnings on compilation" necessary?

 To put it another way, what errors are people hoping to catch using a
 linter that `rustc` wouldn't already warn about?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #9494 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove gratuitous newlines from log messages? (was: Log fix facility and lines)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9494: Remove gratuitous newlines from log messages?
--+--
 Reporter:  grarpamp  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.3.25
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #9494 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove gratuitous newlines from log messages?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9494: Remove gratuitous newlines from log messages?
+--
 Reporter:  grarpamp|  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.3.25
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay logging easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay => tor-relay logging easy
 * status:  reopened => new


Comment:

 The take-out-the-newlines part shouldn't be too hard...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #9494 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove gratuitous newlines from log messages?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9494: Remove gratuitous newlines from log messages?
--+--
 Reporter:  grarpamp  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.3.25
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  worksforme =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #9166 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write a UTP-based channel implementation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9166: Write a UTP-based channel implementation
---+--
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tor-relay utp  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #9165  | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by nickm):

 This development effort seems to be perma-stalled; but please reopen if
 anybody's still doing any work on it?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #9166 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write a UTP-based channel implementation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9166: Write a UTP-based channel implementation
---+--
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tor-relay utp  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #9165  | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8897 [Core Tor/Tor]: Faster curve25519 implementation for ntor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8897: Faster curve25519 implementation for ntor
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, performance, ntor,|  Actual Points:
  curve25519 crypto impl-shopping|
Parent ID:  #9662| Points:  large
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, performance, ntor => tor-relay, performance, ntor,
 curve25519 crypto impl-shopping


Comment:

 I also heard rumors that curve25519-dalek was nice...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8795 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make #8822 survivable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8795: Make #8822 survivable
+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.12-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-client, regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8908 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor systemd socket activation support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8908: Tor systemd socket activation support
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  intgr
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, systemd, lorax, easy-if-  |  Actual Points:
  you-know-systemd   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  small
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, systemd, lorax => tor-relay, systemd, lorax, easy-
 if-you-know-systemd


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8962 [Core Tor/Tor]: pathbias_count_use_attempt strange path state log lines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8962: pathbias_count_use_attempt strange path state log lines
--+
 Reporter:  jefnag|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor:
  |  0.2.5.8-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client logging annoyance  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_information => new
 * keywords:  tor-client => tor-client logging annoyance


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8954 [Core Tor/Tor]: Need a better convention for testing option variable names

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8954: Need a better convention for testing option variable names
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, testing, clarity, |  Actual Points:
  usability  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, testing, clarity => tor-relay, testing, clarity,
 usability
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #9001 [Core Tor/Tor]: Slow Guard Discovery of Hidden Services and Clients

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9001: Slow Guard Discovery of Hidden Services and Clients
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, path-bias, needs-proposal,   |  Actual Points:
  mike-can, prop247, tor-guard   |
Parent ID:  #5456| Points:  large
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


Comment:

 Optimistically hoping our June mini-meeting will lead to some near-term
 progress here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8787 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check return values for more unix functions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8787: Check return values for more unix functions
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client tor-relay posix easy  |  Actual Points:
  correctness safety |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client => tor-client tor-relay posix easy correctness
   safety
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8786 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add extra-info line that tracks the number of consensus downloads over each pluggable transport (was: Add extra-info line that tracks the number of consensus downl

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8786: Add extra-info line that tracks the number of consensus downloads over 
each
pluggable transport
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  pt, tor-bridge, metrics privcount|  Actual Points:
  needs-design   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorS-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: athena (removed)
 * keywords:  pt, tor-bridge, flashproxy => pt, tor-bridge, metrics
 privcount needs-design


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8782 [Core Tor/Tor]: Don't give up so easily on your guards if the consensus calls them Running

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8782: Don't give up so easily on your guards if the consensus calls them 
Running
---+---
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-guards-revamp  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  4.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorU-can
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Under prop271, guards no longer act as described here: we don't want for a
 new consensus before retrying a guard.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8766 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor never recovers when started with skewed clock

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8766: Tor never recovers when started with skewed clock
--+--
 Reporter:  proper|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-client|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  small
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Calling the actual reported bug fixed here in 0.2.7. We should still fix
 other time issues as we encounter them, but this ticket isn't really about
 that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8749 [Core Tor/Tor]: Return information about the leaking application

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8749: Return information about the leaking application
+--
 Reporter:  bastik  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client usability logging intro  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client => tor-client usability logging intro
 * points:   => 3
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8727 [Core Tor/Tor]: ServerTransportListenAddr validation should validate that transport-name is well-formed (was: ServerTransportListenAddr validation could be better)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8727: ServerTransportListenAddr validation should validate that transport-name 
is
well-formed
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, pt, torrc, usability |  Actual Points:
  easy   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-bridge, pt => tor-bridge, pt, torrc, usability easy
 * priority:  Medium => Low
 * points:   => .2
 * severity:   => Minor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #9024 [Core Tor/Tor]: add supplementary groups when changing uid

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9024: add supplementary groups when changing uid
-+-
 Reporter:  baccala  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  group, android, tor-client setuid|  Actual Points:
  setgid posix   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  group, android, tor-client => group, android, tor-client
 setuid setgid posix
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8593 [Core Tor/Tor]: Circuit build timeout not respected?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8593: Circuit build timeout not respected?
+
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.9-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client cbt timeout  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client => tor-client cbt timeout
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Any updates here? Is this still a thing we should do?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8494 [Core Tor/Tor]: Does MaxAdvertisedBandwidth do anything useful and if not, can we deprecate it?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8494: Does MaxAdvertisedBandwidth do anything useful and if not, can we 
deprecate
it?
-+-
 Reporter:  alphawolf|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.11-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consensus, bandwidth,|  Actual Points:
  MaxAdvertisedBandwidth tor-relay tor-dirauth   |
  needs-insight  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Sebastian):

 This option is used on the bwauth measurement relays and dirauths, which
 have huge bandwidthrates but low advertised bandwidth. They get measured
 well, but only according to their self-selected bw tier which is enough to
 keep their utilization low.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8564 [Core Tor/Tor]: Newnym - HS is unavailable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8564: Newnym - HS is unavailable
--+--
 Reporter:  grarpamp  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.3.25
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 We did a lot of work since 0.2.4 to improve HS reliability; whatever was
 causing this is probably fixed now.  (Of course, if still might not be
 working, but if so, that's a new bug.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8494 [Core Tor/Tor]: Does MaxAdvertisedBandwidth do anything useful and if not, can we deprecate it? (was: Relay bandwidth in consensus should not exceed MaxAdvertisedBandwidth)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8494: Does MaxAdvertisedBandwidth do anything useful and if not, can we 
deprecate
it?
-+-
 Reporter:  alphawolf|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.11-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consensus, bandwidth,|  Actual Points:
  MaxAdvertisedBandwidth tor-relay tor-dirauth   |
  needs-insight  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  consensus, bandwidth, MaxAdvertisedBandwidth tor-relay =>
 consensus, bandwidth, MaxAdvertisedBandwidth tor-relay tor-dirauth
 needs-insight
 * priority:  Medium => Low
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8486 [Core Tor/Tor]: Introduce ExitNode country code per listener

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8486: Introduce ExitNode country code per listener
-+-
 Reporter:  bastik   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client per-listener torrc|  Actual Points:
  configuration refactor |
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client => tor-client per-listener torrc configuration
 refactor
 * points:   => 5
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This makes sense as part of a more general refactoring of different
 options to apply to different listeners.  It sure wouldn't be a small
 project, though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8391 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sudden Server Speed Change -- IP in Wrong Country.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8391: Sudden Server Speed Change -- IP in Wrong Country.
-+--
 Reporter:  spiffytexan  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tor-relay geoip  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #8225| Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 I don't think we ever found out enough here to figure out which of the
 theories above were correct. Let's reopen if there are insights?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8415 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use event_set_mem_functions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8415: Use event_set_mem_functions
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay easy backend libevent  |  Actual Points:
  malloc |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay => tor-relay easy backend libevent malloc
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22406 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor hangs when I try to access guardian.com Cartoons with 5 tabs open (cartoon page + 4 cartoons)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22406: Tor hangs when I try to access guardian.com Cartoons with 5 tabs open
(cartoon page + 4 cartoons)
--+---
 Reporter:  mwolfe|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by mwolfe):

 When I try to read comics (gocomics.com and comickingdom.com) the old
 Torbrowser crashed if I had my display set to default resolution and
 opened three or four tabs. So I set my default to a rather low pixel rate,
 down to 1024 x 768, and I could open three of four tabs, but no more.

 Now at default resolution (many more pixels) I can open 7 or 8 tabs
 without a crash. So the alpha seems to have fixed the basic Torbrowser
 crash from prohibiting discrete graphics. Many thanks for all your help.

 I asked what I could do about the graphics chip. The answer was to spend
 $300 and send off my computer for a couple of weeks, and, since it's 7
 years old, it's not clear if it's worth putting in another $300 when more
 things might go wrong. Plus I'd have a hard time giving up my computer for
 two weeks.

 So many thanks for what seems to be a fix (except for the Guardian
 website).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22440 [Applications/Tor Browser]: wrap long lines not working in view source mode in TBB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22440: wrap long lines not working in view source mode in TBB
+--
 Reporter:  gapegas7uftp|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-e10s, TorBrowserTeam201705  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201705 => tbb-e10s, TorBrowserTeam201705
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 This only means your patch is broken in e10s.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22255 [Core Tor/Tor]: Frequent OOM kills of tor process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22255: Frequent OOM kills of tor process
--+
 Reporter:  DeS   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:42 DeS]:
 > Netstat
 >
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/22255/Screenshot_2017-05-30_23-15-37.png

 The graph is still in log scale.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22451 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:cache is not useful anymore in ESR52-based Tor Browser (only wyciwyg-URIs if at all any)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22451: about:cache is not useful anymore in ESR52-based Tor Browser (only 
wyciwyg-
URIs if at all any)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201705,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201705  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Direct link `about:cache?storage=memory=p,` shows cached images
 which are not isolated by #22327.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Upgrade Go to 1.7.6 / 1.8.3 (was: Upgrade Go to 1.8.3)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22398: Upgrade Go to 1.7.6 / 1.8.3
--+
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian TorBrowserTeam201705R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dcf):

 * keywords:  tbb-gitian => tbb-gitian TorBrowserTeam201705R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Old description:

> Minor release notes:
> https://golang.org/doc/devel/release.html#go1.8.minor
>
> This also should include: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/20040
>
> Certain parts of our code do use P-256, but it's probably not
> exploitable.  Updating is still a good idea.

New description:

 Minor release notes: https://golang.org/doc/devel/release.html#go1.7
 https://golang.org/doc/devel/release.html#go1.8.minor

 This also should include: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/20040

 Certain parts of our code do use P-256, but it's probably not exploitable.
 Updating is still a good idea.

--

Comment:

 The P-256 fix from 1.8.2 was also backported to 1.7.6.

 Here is a patch for current maint-6.5 that upgrades to 1.7.6. I tested a
 build on all platforms but only tested running on GNU/Linux.

 attachment:0001-Bug-22398-Upgrade-go-to-1.7.6.patch

 I'll start another build for 1.8.3 on the master branch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22255 [Core Tor/Tor]: Frequent OOM kills of tor process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22255: Frequent OOM kills of tor process
--+
 Reporter:  DeS   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by DeS):

 Pages/sec in/out
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/22255/Screenshot_2017-05-30_23-14-02.png

 Netstat
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/22255/Screenshot_2017-05-30_23-15-37.png

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22255 [Core Tor/Tor]: Frequent OOM kills of tor process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22255: Frequent OOM kills of tor process
--+
 Reporter:  DeS   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:40 DeS]:
 > Replying to [comment:39 cypherpunks]:
 > > looks like a significant increase in connections when the memory
 spikes happen please change the netstat graphs to non-log scale by adding
 this to your munin.conf (in your host's section somewhere after
 [localhost])
 > > {{{
 > > netstat.graph_args -l 0 --base 1000
 > > }}}
 > > so we can have a better look.
 >
 > Done.

 Please upload the netstat graph again (the change should take effect once
 the graphs are regenerated, happens every 5min and works retroactively)


 > Swap is enabled. The picture is in the Link
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/22255/munin.tar.gz

 I see the swap partition file "ubuntu_vg_swap_1-day.png", but I don't see
 a swap-day.png (Pages per seconds in/out)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20328 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No cookies are visible, except...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20328: No cookies are visible, except...
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:   => tbb-linkability


Comment:

 This has the same underlying bug as #19921.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22432 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser doesn't stop "loading" when Tor gave up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22432: Tor Browser doesn't stop "loading" when Tor gave up
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-usability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability => ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-usability


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22255 [Core Tor/Tor]: Frequent OOM kills of tor process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22255: Frequent OOM kills of tor process
--+
 Reporter:  DeS   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by DeS):

 Replying to [comment:39 cypherpunks]:
 > looks like a significant increase in connections when the memory spikes
 happen please change the netstat graphs to non-log scale by adding this to
 your munin.conf (in your host's section somewhere after [localhost])
 > {{{
 > netstat.graph_args -l 0 --base 1000
 > }}}
 > so we can have a better look.

 Done.

 >
 > This is kind of obvious:
 > - when you system was knocked off (i/o wait was extremely high probably
 due to swaping)
 >
 > please enable the swap munin plugin so we can see swap i/o

 Swap is enabled. The picture is in the Link
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/22255/munin.tar.gz

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19921 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser: improper handling of 404 Not Found images

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19921: Tor Browser: improper handling of 404 Not Found images
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 TBB 7.0a4
 {{{
 [05-30 20:37:03] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://trac.torproject.org/images/tor-logo.png via
--unknown--:a0984f2ed414df7f3d596845e189ce00
 NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE: Component returned failure code: 0x80040111
 (NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE) [nsIHttpChannel.getResponseHeader] content-
 policy.js:112
 [05-30 20:37:04] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/chrome/common/topbar_gradient.png
 via
--unknown--:a0984f2ed414df7f3d596845e189ce00
 [05-30 20:37:04] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/chrome/common/trac_logo_mini.png
 via
--unknown--:a0984f2ed414df7f3d596845e189ce00
 [05-30 20:37:04] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/chrome/common/editedticket.png
 via
--unknown--:a0984f2ed414df7f3d596845e189ce00
 [05-30 20:37:04] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/chrome/common/closedticket.png
 via
--unknown--:a0984f2ed414df7f3d596845e189ce00
 [05-30 20:37:04] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/chrome/common/wiki.png via
--unknown--:a0984f2ed414df7f3d596845e189ce00
 NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE: Component returned failure code: 0x80040111
 (NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE) [nsIHttpChannel.getResponseHeader] content-
 policy.js:112
 [05-30 20:37:04] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/chrome/common/changeset.png via
--unknown--:a0984f2ed414df7f3d596845e189ce00
 [05-30 20:37:04] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/chrome/common/attachment.png via
--unknown--:a0984f2ed414df7f3d596845e189ce00
 [05-30 20:37:04] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/chrome/common/newticket.png via
--unknown--:a0984f2ed414df7f3d596845e189ce00
 [05-30 20:37:04] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/chrome/common/batchmodify.png via
--unknown--:a0984f2ed414df7f3d596845e189ce00
 NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE: Component returned failure code: 0x80040111
 (NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE) [nsIHttpChannel.getResponseHeader]  content-
 policy.js:112
 [05-30 20:37:05] Torbutton INFO: tor SOCKS:
 https://trac.torproject.org/images/extlink.gif via
--unknown--:a0984f2ed414df7f3d596845e189ce00
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21924 [Applications/Tor Browser]: With e10s enabled Trac says it is reading and transferring bytes (seemingly endlessly)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21924: With e10s enabled Trac says it is reading and transferring bytes 
(seemingly
endlessly)
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr => ff52-esr, tbb-e10s


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16010 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Get a working content process sandbox for Tor Browser on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16010: Get a working content process sandbox for Tor Browser on Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-gitian,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201705,|
  GeorgKoppen201705  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:
 ff52-esr, tbb-gitian, tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201705,
 GeorgKoppen201705
 =>
 ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-gitian, tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201705,
 GeorgKoppen201705


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22445 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: Remove bof@

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22445: Remove bof@
---+
 Reporter:  ln5|  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by qbi):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22255 [Core Tor/Tor]: Frequent OOM kills of tor process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22255: Frequent OOM kills of tor process
--+
 Reporter:  DeS   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 looks like a significant increase in connections when the memory spikes
 happen please change the netstat graphs to non-log scale by adding this to
 your munin.conf (in your host's section somewhere after [localhost])
 {{{
 netstat.graph_args -l 0 --base 1000
 }}}
 so we can have a better look.

 This is kind of obvious:
 - when you system was knocked off (i/o wait was extremely high probably
 due to swaping)

 please enable the swap munin plugin so we can see swap i/o

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18069 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: "General SOCKS server failure" prevents TBB launch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18069: "General SOCKS server failure" prevents TBB launch
---+---
 Reporter:  johndoegreeneville |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 These `Tor WARN: Proxy Client: unable to connect to
 %several_bridges%:%ports% ("general SOCKS server failure") ` every 5 mins
 are really boring. But there is nothing related in this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22255 [Core Tor/Tor]: Frequent OOM kills of tor process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22255: Frequent OOM kills of tor process
--+
 Reporter:  DeS   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by DeS):

 Here are the graphics.
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/22255/munin.tar.gz
 At this slot today 12:00 it seems not very out of the ordinary.

 As said. Once the real problem starts - munin fails.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20125 [Webpages/Website]: Tor Mirror Update as of 9/9/2016

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20125: Tor Mirror Update as of 9/9/2016
--+-
 Reporter:  aquintex  |  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor mirror|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by arma):

 * cc: Samdney (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22452 [Applications/Tor Browser]: favicons in tab drop down list are not first-party isolated

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22452: favicons in tab drop down list are not first-party isolated
+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein |  Owner:
|  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-7.0-must TorBrowserTeam201705R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 (And it is not being reported in browser console by default now, like
 getFirstPartyFailed by torbutton before.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21850 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update #16940 patch for e10s

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21850: Update #16940 patch for e10s
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705, tbb-7.0-must |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201705, tbb-7.0-must => ff52-esr, tbb-
 e10s, TorBrowserTeam201705, tbb-7.0-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22255 [Core Tor/Tor]: Frequent OOM kills of tor process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22255: Frequent OOM kills of tor process
--+
 Reporter:  DeS   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 When these extreme spikes in memory usage happen (example: before
 2017-05-30 12:00) how do the load/CPU/bandwidth/established connections
 look like at that point in time?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21999 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The "request English language web pages"-prompt is not working in 7.0a3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21999: The "request English language web pages"-prompt is not working in 7.0a3
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705, tbb-7.0-must |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Why is this prompt at all? Shouldn't it ask the opposite "Do you want to
 request web pages of your locale (reduces antifingerprinting protection)?"
 if should?
 (Never seen that switching GUI language affects some program's behavior.)

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[tor-bugs] #22455 [Core Tor/Tor]: Enumerate cases where we want to retry circuits, and correctly balance retry robustness with guard discovery

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22455: Enumerate cases where we want to retry circuits, and correctly balance
retry robustness with guard discovery
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  needs-proposal prop224-extra
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 In Tor, and especially in the onion service subsystem, we have a bunch of
 situations where a circuit could fail and we ought to retry:

 * the onion service attempting to connect to the rendezvous point
 * the onion service attempting to publish an hsdesc to the hsdir
 * the client attempts to reach the intro point to send its intro1 cell

 If we retry too many times, we open ourselves up to new guard discovery
 attacks (see prop 247). If we retry too few times, we end up with
 robustness or reachability problems ("Tor doesn't work").

 It would be nice to just design the single best retry algorithm, and then
 apply it to all cases. That way we do the hard design and analysis work
 once, and we don't end up with extra complexity when we combine multiple
 retry designs. But I think a single best design might not be possible --
 compare the hsdir case, where it might be best to wait a while before
 retrying, to the rend point case, where waiting a while before retrying is
 not so good. Maybe that argues that we can get away with two best designs,
 one in the "online, somebody's waiting on me" case, and the other in the
 "offline, let's get this done reliably but there's no immediate rush"
 case?

 Suggested next step: We should write a proposal, with a section
 enumerating all of the retry situations that tor has; and a section
 enumerating what we can learn about where the circuit failures are, and
 how, and how reliable each is (network failure? last hop faillure? guard
 failure?); and then a section trying to produce the smallest possible
 number of good designs such that every retry situation is handled well.

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[tor-bugs] #22454 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make switch to e10s separate from the switch to esr52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22454: Make switch to e10s separate from the switch to esr52
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-e10s
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 This has a lot of benefits (which are so obvious that they don't require
 to be listed).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22255 [Core Tor/Tor]: Frequent OOM kills of tor process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22255: Frequent OOM kills of tor process
--+
 Reporter:  DeS   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by DeS):

 So after I got Munin installed I waited.
 Yesterday two other OOMs occured:
 {{{
 Mon Mai 29 16:06:07 CEST 2017 Process tor1 is not running -> starting
 Mon Mai 29 17:20:01 CEST 2017 Process tor2 is not running -> starting
 }}}

 Syslog:
 {{{
 May 29 16:05:51 tor1 kernel: [502910.776183] Out of memory: Kill process
 53045 (tor) score 32 or sacrifice child
 May 29 17:17:07 tor1 kernel: [507187.634566] Out of memory: Kill process
 53165 (tor) score 25 or sacrifice child
 }}}
 Unfortunatley munin was not too successfull. It died when things got
 interessting and just lived very shortly between both occurences.
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/22255/Screenshot_2017-05-30_20-11-49.png

 But I got you the logs from SMEM and cat /proc/meminfo.
 SMEM
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/22255/SMEM_Mo.log
 cat /proc/meminfo
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/22255/PROC_MEMINFO_Mon.log

 Hope this helps.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #6892 [Core Tor/Tor]: improve torify manpage to say different connections may be over the same circuit.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6892: improve torify manpage to say different connections may be over the same
circuit.
--+
 Reporter:  weasel|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.3.21-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  tor-client documentation  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged. I took some of the suggestions from cypherpunks above (but not all
 of them, because some of them were mistaken). Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22453 [Core Tor/Tor]: We should rip out the bandwidth self-test

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22453: We should rip out the bandwidth self-test
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 The competing proposal here would be to raise the 500KB number (the total
 bandwidth we push in our self-test) by an order of magnitude. That way
 relays who test well would publish a respectable 5000/10 = 500 in their
 self-declared consensus weight.

 But I think, so long as we keep the bwauths, that self-declared numbers
 aren't worth the extra code and design hassle.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22452 [Applications/Tor Browser]: favicons in tab drop down list are not first-party isolated

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22452: favicons in tab drop down list are not first-party isolated
+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein |  Owner:
|  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-7.0-must TorBrowserTeam201705R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:  tbb-7.0-must TorBrowserTeam201705 => tbb-7.0-must
 TorBrowserTeam201705R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Here's my current fix. It depends on my #22327 fix which unfortunately as
 a debug assert right now that I am still trying to track down. But I think
 this patch is a workable solution.

 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commits/22452

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21762 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Check new Firefox favicon code for first-party isolation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21762: Check new Firefox favicon code for first-party isolation
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201705,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:10 gk]:
 > We need a new patch for the issue fixed in #16983 it seems.

 I opened #22452 for this issue.

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[tor-bugs] #22453 [Core Tor/Tor]: We should rip out the bandwidth self-test

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22453: We should rip out the bandwidth self-test
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Inspired by #8247 ("In sum. a vestigial tiny bw self-test seems silly to
 keep around"), I wonder if we're at the point where we can just take out
 all the bandwidth self-test infrastructure.

 In favor of ripping it out: there's some complexity at relay startup where
 we try to delay publishing our descriptor until we've done the self-test,
 since we know we'll have a newer bandwidth number to include soon. We've
 had bugs in this delay step.

 In favor of ripping it out: in the current design we try to build 4
 separate circuits, without using our guards in order to have actually
 independent paths, for pushing our 500KB. Relays that aren't reachable end
 up with hundreds or thousands of connections open, because they keep
 making new circuits and each one probably is to a new relay. Not a big
 deal but kind of unfortunate.

 In favor of ripping it out: 50KB, which is the most that the current
 bandwidth test can tell you, is super tiny compared to current descriptor
 bandwidths and current consensus weights. In fact, as prophesied in #8247,
 the threshold for the Fast flag is now above 50KB, so publishing 0 vs 50
 is essentially just moving you around within the "don't use, they're too
 slow" bucket.

 In favor of keeping it: maybe the bandwidth authorities have some sort of
 psychotic behavior in the face of relays that have a 0 in their
 descriptor? Like, they multiply the 0 by a factor for how much better than
 the other 0's they are? I have no idea. In case they do, I propose that we
 proceed with ripping out the self-test, and simply replace it with the
 number "20KB" to guard against psychotic bwauth behavior. (I picked that
 number because the directory authorities already use the number 20 when
 assigning a weight to a relay that (A) is unmeasured and (B) self-declares
 at least 20KB in its descriptor.)

 But what about bridges, you might ask? Public relays might have the
 bwauths to measure them remotely, but bridges don't have that. I think
 nothing uses the bandwidths in bridge descriptors. Are there any plans for
 that to change in the future? Even if there are, I think raising the floor
 from 0 to 20, and retaining the behavior where we publish a bigger number
 if we actually see a bigger number due to client load, should make us
 compatible with whatever these plans might be.

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[tor-bugs] #22452 [Applications/Tor Browser]: favicons in tab drop down list are not first-party isolated

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22452: favicons in tab drop down list are not first-party isolated
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-7.0-must
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201705
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 gk noticed that the ESR52-based first-party isolation is not yet working
 with the tab dropdown list. See #16983 for our old fix.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22413 [Core Tor/Tor]: build fails with libzstd-0.5.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22413: build fails with libzstd-0.5.1
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-needs |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged; thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22413 [Core Tor/Tor]: build fails with libzstd-0.5.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22413: build fails with libzstd-0.5.1
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by catalyst):

 Thanks.  Updated with a changes file.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22447 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: HSDir do not accept v3 descriptors properly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22447: hs: HSDir do not accept v3 descriptors properly
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged to {maint,release}-0.3.0; used an "ours" merge to avoid taking in
 master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8351 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor our controller-command/torrc-option processing logic into a data-driven function

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8351: Refactor our controller-command/torrc-option processing logic into a 
data-
driven function
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, refactoring, nickm-  |  Actual Points:
  patch torrc|
Parent ID:   | Points:  medium
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * cc: catalyst (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22413 [Core Tor/Tor]: build fails with libzstd-0.5.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22413: build fails with libzstd-0.5.1
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 lgtm but needs a changes file?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22413 [Core Tor/Tor]: build fails with libzstd-0.5.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22413: build fails with libzstd-0.5.1
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 Proposed patch in https://gitlab.com/argonblue/tor/merge_requests/14

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8369 [Core Tor/Tor]: Option to limit information Tor's control port discloses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8369: Option to limit information Tor's control port discloses
+--
 Reporter:  proper  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tor-client tor-control  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 (actually closing as wontfix :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8369 [Core Tor/Tor]: Option to limit information Tor's control port discloses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8369: Option to limit information Tor's control port discloses
+--
 Reporter:  proper  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client tor-control  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8111 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor our checking of whether we should be reading/writing on a connection to use a set of reason-flags

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8111: Refactor our checking of whether we should be reading/writing on a
connection to use a set of reason-flags
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay mainloop refactor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay => tor-relay mainloop refactor
 * priority:  Medium => High
 * points:   => 5
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8247 [Core Tor/Tor]: Some day soon, a 50KB bandwidth test will be too low for the Fast flag

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8247: Some day soon, a 50KB bandwidth test will be too low for the Fast flag
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tor-relay |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 arma]:
 > Well, the bwauths sure are messed up these days, but alas I don't think
 it's the fault of this ticket.
 >
 > I'm still inclined to close.

 Done

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8276 [Core Tor/Tor]: Accounting for Relays only

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8276: Accounting for Relays only
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  medium
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 This feels pretty huge, and might not be possible given how we've built
 things in Tor.  It's probably a better idea to just run two separate Tor
 instances with different settings.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8278 [Core Tor/Tor]: Wrap conditionally-compiled C files in #ifdefs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8278: Wrap conditionally-compiled C files in #ifdefs
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, easy, style,  |  Actual Points:
  compilation, build |
Parent ID:   | Points:  small
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, lorax => tor-relay, easy, style, compilation, build


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8297 [Core Tor/Tor]: Do not start reading connection if any blocking reason still present

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8297: Do not start reading connection if any blocking reason still present
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  easy, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  medium
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Closing as fixed; remaining part is a duplicate of #8111

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22413 [Core Tor/Tor]: build fails with libzstd-0.5.1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22413: build fails with libzstd-0.5.1
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-needs |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * owner:   => catalyst
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8298 [Core Tor/Tor]: Do not start write to connection if blocked on bw

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8298: Do not start write to connection if blocked on bw
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_revision
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  kludgy, tor-relay, nickm-patch  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8323 [Core Tor/Tor]: Missing 'GETINFO md/all'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8323: Missing 'GETINFO md/all'
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client tor-control microdesc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client => tor-client tor-control microdesc
 * type:  defect => enhancement
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8369 [Core Tor/Tor]: Option to limit information Tor's control port discloses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8369: Option to limit information Tor's control port discloses
+--
 Reporter:  proper  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-client tor-control  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client => tor-client tor-control
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This is partially solved by the various filtering proxies that different
 people have written to sit on top of the control port.  I think a full
 solution would involve a really careful control-port design analysis.  See
 the thread starting at https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 dev/2017-April/012141.html for some good discussion.

 I'm closing this one as "wontfix", but that doesn't mean the effort is
 doomed, or that there's no further work to do -- just that it's much
 bigger than a matter of "limiting getinfo replies".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8351 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor our controller-command/torrc-option processing logic into a data-driven function

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8351: Refactor our controller-command/torrc-option processing logic into a 
data-
driven function
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, refactoring, nickm-  |  Actual Points:
  patch torrc|
Parent ID:   | Points:  medium
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client, refactoring, nickm-patch => tor-client,
 refactoring, nickm-patch torrc
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8387 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unbuilt one-hop circuits sometimes hang around forever

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8387: Unbuilt one-hop circuits sometimes hang around forever
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, 2016-bug-retrospective,  |  Actual Points:
  needs-insight needs-analysis maybe-logs-   |
  would-help |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client, 2016-bug-retrospective =>
 tor-client, 2016-bug-retrospective, needs-insight needs-analysis
 maybe-logs-would-help
 * status:  needs_information => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22383 [Webpages/Blog]: Upcoming events are not showing up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22383: Upcoming events are not showing up
---+
 Reporter:  anadahz|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22393 [Webpages/Blog]: Commenter names are duplicated and inconsistent

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22393: Commenter names are duplicated and inconsistent
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22383 [Webpages/Blog]: Upcoming events are not showing up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22383: Upcoming events are not showing up
---+--
 Reporter:  anadahz|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22383 [Webpages/Blog]: Upcoming events are not showing up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22383: Upcoming events are not showing up
---+--
 Reporter:  anadahz|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by hiro):

 Events have been restored.
 Check https://blog.torproject.org/events/upcoming
 More work to do on how events are displayed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22369 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Increase of users in Ukraine due to block of Russia-based services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22369: Increase of users in Ukraine due to block of Russia-based services
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block ua  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by darkk):

 * cc: leon@… (added)


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[tor-bugs] #22451 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:cache is not useful anymore in ESR52-based Tor Browser (only wyciwyg-URIs if at all any)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22451: about:cache is not useful anymore in ESR52-based Tor Browser (only 
wyciwyg-
URIs if at all any)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  ff52-esr,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201705,
 |  GeorgKoppen201705
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 I wanted to investigate #21689 and started to look at `about:cache` output
 to check for isolation keys. But to my surprise there is only garbage in
 it (in e10s mode), meaning all URLs start with the wyciwyg scheme, or
 nothing at all (in non-e10s-mode).

 After re-reading #9336 I suspect the cached elements are basically not
 showing up in e10s mode either but instead some weird wyciwyg
 incarnations.

 Now, I tested manually that things are still cached and that cache
 isolation seems to be working which is a good thing. But we should
 investigate and fix this issue as it is highly confusing and might conceal
 bugs we would otherwise see.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22433 [Core Tor/Tor]: Options for hidden services to choose nodes.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22433: Options for hidden services to choose nodes.
+---
 Reporter:  NorbertSzczybelski  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-guard   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by catalyst):

 * priority:  Very High => Medium
 * keywords:   => tor-hs, tor-guard
 * status:  new => needs_information
 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 I believe a hidden service can set `EntryNodes`.  If that is not
 sufficient, could you please explain why?

 I think you already got some answers on IRC about the 10 000 relays
 question.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8093 [Core Tor/Tor]: Jan 29 23:32:20.066 [Warning] Bug/attack: unexpected sendme cell from client. Closing circ.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8093: Jan 29 23:32:20.066 [Warning] Bug/attack: unexpected sendme cell from
client. Closing circ.
-+-
 Reporter:  Gravitas |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.9-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  spammy-warnings, tor-client, needs-  |  Actual Points:
  insight|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:45 arma]:
 > Ok to close? It's been a long time.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8159 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consolidate thresholds for path build bias and use bias

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8159: Consolidate thresholds for path build bias and use bias
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, path-bias, mike-0.2.5,   |  Actual Points:
  needs-design   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client, path-bias, mike-0.2.5 => tor-client, path-bias,
 mike-0.2.5, needs-design
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8160 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create separate pending counters during circuit construction

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8160: Create separate pending counters during circuit construction
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client pathbias cleanup  |  Actual Points:
  refactor   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client => tor-client pathbias cleanup refactor
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 mike, can you say more about the impact here and give an example of the
 fix you have in mind?  This sounds like a cleanup that would improve
 clarity.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8163 [Core Tor/Tor]: It is no longer deterministic which Sybils we omit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8163: It is no longer deterministic which Sybils we omit
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.10-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth sybil voting needs-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-dirauth => tor-dirauth sybil voting needs-spec
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8170 [Core Tor/Tor]: get independent from host clock time / insecure NTP

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8170: get independent from host clock time / insecure NTP
--+--
 Reporter:  proper|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tor-client|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 This is important, but it's not something to do inside Tor.  Rather than
 do our own secure NTP replacement as part of Tor, we should just recommend
 other people's secure NTP replacements as part of a Tor deployment.
 Roughtime, anyone?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8185 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit_package_relay_cell(): Bug: outgoing relay cell has n_chan==NULL. Dropping.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8185: circuit_package_relay_cell(): Bug: outgoing relay cell has n_chan==NULL.
Dropping.
--+
 Reporter:  mr-4  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor:
  |  0.2.4.9-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay logging needs-analysis  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  3
 Reviewer:  isis  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay => tor-relay logging needs-analysis
 * status:  needs_information => new
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


Comment:

 Kicking this into 0.3.2.  The fix may be to edit the log message so it
 only logs above PROTOCOL_WARN if our favorite theory turns out to be
 false.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8190 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relays should publish number of refill intervals where the token bucket went dry

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8190: Relays should publish number of refill intervals where the token bucket
went dry
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay metrics statistics |  Actual Points:
  bandwidth performance  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay metrics statistics => tor-relay metrics statistics
 bandwidth performance


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8190 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relays should publish number of refill intervals where the token bucket went dry

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8190: Relays should publish number of refill intervals where the token bucket
went dry
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay metrics statistics  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: teor (added)
 * keywords:  tor-relay => tor-relay metrics statistics
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8214 [Core Tor/Tor]: "getinfo address" should work more consistently soon after startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8214: "getinfo address" should work more consistently soon after startup
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay tor-control address-   |  Actual Points:
  detection  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => Low
 * keywords:  tor-client => tor-relay tor-control address-detection
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8215 [Core Tor/Tor]: Simple Relay: random unknown UDP port in listen mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8215: Simple Relay: random unknown UDP port in listen mode
---+--
 Reporter:  elgo   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  tor-relay dns  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8069 [Core Tor/Tor]: NNTP SSL broken?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8069: NNTP SSL broken?
--+--
 Reporter:  proper|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tor-client|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8051 [Core Tor/Tor]: Broken check for empty "bridge-ips" line in validate_bridge_stats()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8051: Broken check for empty "bridge-ips" line in validate_bridge_stats()
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, easy correctness |  Actual Points:
  parsing|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-bridge, easy => tor-bridge, easy correctness parsing


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Re: [tor-bugs] #8001 [Core Tor/Tor]: obfsproxy makes tor warn when one bridge is down

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8001: obfsproxy makes tor warn when one bridge is down
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-bridge, tor-pt,  |  Actual Points:
  logging easy   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorS-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client, tor-bridge, tor-pt => tor-client, tor-bridge, tor-
 pt, logging easy


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Re: [tor-bugs] #7986 [Core Tor/Tor]: Lengthen the consensus validity interval

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7986: Lengthen the consensus validity interval
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, nickm-patch, low-|  Actual Points:
  bandwidth, sponsor4 needs-analysis stability   |
Parent ID:  #2681| Points:  medium
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client, nickm-patch, low-bandwidth, sponsor4 =>
 tor-client, nickm-patch, low-bandwidth, sponsor4 needs-analysis
 stability


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Re: [tor-bugs] #7971 [Core Tor/Tor]: review address lists in tor_addr_is_internal_()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7971: review address lists in tor_addr_is_internal_()
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client internal-addrs needs- |  Actual Points:
  design needs-spec  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client => tor-client internal-addrs needs-design needs-
   spec
 * points:   => 5
 * severity:   => Normal


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