Re: [tor-bugs] #21704 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Warn users when installing Tor Browser based on ESR 52 on not SSE2 capable Windows machines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21704: Warn users when installing Tor Browser based on ESR 52 on not SSE2 
capable
Windows machines
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201706R, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201706, tbb-7.0-must => ff52-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201706R, tbb-7.0-must
 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22485 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add non-javascript versions of DuckDuckGo to Omnibox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22485: Add non-javascript versions of DuckDuckGo to Omnibox
--+--
 Reporter:  f55jwk4f  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 f55jwk4f]:
 > I agree that the JS-required versions can provide a better search
 experience. But for those of us who have JS disabled, the versions that
 don't require redirection are faster. (sometimes up to a few seconds
 faster on my network) In my patch, I only added the non-JS versions as an
 alternative. The default is still the JS-required version. So those of us
 who disabled JS manually can change to the non-JS versions of DuckDuckGo.

 Hm. It's pretty confusing to have three or four (if you want to do the
 same for the .onion search engine we ship) slightly different DuckDuckGo
 search engines shipped by default. I think adding the redirect-free one
 manually to your Tor Browser if you want it sounds not unreasonable to me.
 Especially as it stays in your profile when updating.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22481 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Should TorBrowser preserve cookies across opening a new, different size window for same site?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22481: Should TorBrowser preserve cookies across opening a new, different size
window for same site?
-+-
 Reporter:  joebt|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  cookies, resized windows, new|  worksforme
  circuits   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 I think that behavior is okay. If you are concerned about the differently
 sized windows and tracking identifiers persisting across them (cookies are
 just one of those!) then you should get you a `New Identity` to make sure
 you really got all the concerning tracking mechanisms reset. Trying to
 fiddle with a single one (here: cookies) is likely to give you not the
 results you want.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22478 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser fails to load Google Docs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22478: Tor Browser fails to load Google Docs
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 cypherpunks]:
 > > I just tried it with Tor Browser 7.0a4 and I did not experience this
 issue.
 >
 > I think it might be latency related.
 >
 > I'm using Tor Browser 6.5.2 in High Security Mode (with a JS exception
 for Google Docs) on macOS from Australia.

 I see the same with this setup (not being in Australia, though). I suspect
 you are not excepting enough from your JS ban or some other high level
 setting is interfering because it works fine for me with a clean 6.5.2 on
 the default security level. Could you try that scenario?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21657 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Test to make sure we isolate or disable all speculative connects

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21657: Test to make sure we isolate or disable all speculative connects
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, ff52-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201706   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-linkability, ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201705 => tbb-
 linkability, ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201706


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #6119, #16010, #16341, #18599, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #6119, #16010, #16341, #18599, #21756, #21982, #17380, 
#18925, #21286, #21689, #21850, #21851, #21863, #21999, #22000, #22003, #22282, 
#22341, #22451 by gk:
keywords to TorBrowserTeam201706

Comment:
Moving our tickets to June.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16010 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Get a working content process sandbox for Tor Browser on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16010: Get a working content process sandbox for Tor Browser on Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-gitian,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-security, GeorgKoppen201705,   |
  TorBrowserTeam201706   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * priority:  High => Very High
 * severity:  Normal => Major


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #16010, #21249, #22282, #22451

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #16010, #21249, #22282, #22451 by gk:
keywords to GeorgKoppen201706

Comment:
Moving my tickets to June

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22451 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:cache is not useful anymore in ESR52-based Tor Browser (only wyciwyg-URIs if at all any)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22451: about:cache is not useful anymore in ESR52-based Tor Browser (only 
wyciwyg-
URIs if at all any)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201706,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201706  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * cc: tbb-team (added)
 * owner:  tbb-team => gk


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21249 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Tor Browser release process document

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21249: Update Tor Browser release process document
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201706,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201706   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  GeorgKoppen201706 => GeorgKoppen201706, TorBrowserTeam201706


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21249 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Tor Browser release process document

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21249: Update Tor Browser release process document
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201706,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201706   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: tbb-team (added)
 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  tbb-team => gk


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Re: [tor-bugs] #14205 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Closely review all uses of IsCallerChrome() for e10s

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14205: Closely review all uses of IsCallerChrome() for e10s
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-e10s, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  rebase, ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,|
  TorBrowserTeam201706   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-e10s, tbb-rebase, ff52-esr,
 tbb-7.0-must =>
 tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-e10s, tbb-rebase, ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,
 TorBrowserTeam201706


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21484 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove or hide "What's New" link from About dialog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21484: Remove or hide "What's New" link from About dialog
+--
 Reporter:  brade   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201706  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201702 => ff52-esr,
   TorBrowserTeam201706


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21905 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow third-party cookies as we are isolating them to the first party in ESR52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21905: Allow third-party cookies as we are isolating them to the first party in
ESR52
-+--
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website, ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by gk):

 I was tempted to move this into our first 7.5 alpha build but it seems to
 me we might want to have some easy way to inspect the cookie isolation. Or
 do we have that already and I am just not aware of that? The browser UI is
 still broken it seems (see: #10353).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21256 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update tor browser spec for Tor Browser 7.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21256: Update tor browser spec for Tor Browser 7.0
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-spec, TorBrowserTeam201706,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201706  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-spec => tbb-spec, TorBrowserTeam201706, GeorgKoppen201706


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #21674, #21727, #22070, #22125

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #21674, #21727, #22070, #22125 by gk:
keywords to TorBrowserTeam201706

Comment:
Adding to our TorBrowserTeam2016 agenda

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Re: [tor-bugs] #6119 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Create our own instance of Panopticlick

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6119: Create our own instance of Panopticlick
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201706   |
Parent ID:  #5292| Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  cypherpunks => boklm
 * cc: mcs (removed)
 * cc: tbb-team (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser freezes when loading https://www.facebook.com/tr/ on a website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22362: Tor Browser freezes when loading https://www.facebook.com/tr/ on a 
website
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Major   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript, TorBrowserTeam201706  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  noscript => noscript, TorBrowserTeam201706


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[tor-bugs] #22493 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix TROVE-2017-004

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22493: Fix TROVE-2017-004
--+-
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-


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[tor-bugs] #22494 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix TROVE-2017-005

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22494: Fix TROVE-2017-005
--+-
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22494 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix TROVE-2017-005

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22494: Fix TROVE-2017-005
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22493 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix TROVE-2017-004

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22493: Fix TROVE-2017-004
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22490 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop using GeoIP country after buf has gone out of scope

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22490: Stop using GeoIP country after buf has gone out of scope
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  memory-safety 029-backport   |  Actual Points:
  030-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  memory-safety => memory-safety 029-backport 030-backport


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22477 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add -Wl, --large-address-aware to tor-for-Windows build chain

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22477: Add -Wl,--large-address-aware to tor-for-Windows build chain
--+
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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[tor-bugs] #22495 [Core Tor/Tor]: Partial write in key-pinning-journal results in corrupted line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22495: Partial write in key-pinning-journal results in corrupted line
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  easy tor-dirauth
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Tor sees a corrupted line in its `key-pinning-journal` because of a
 truncated line:

 {{{
 @opened-at 2016-08-07 20:49:24
 wyD2E2ZG/fDQFbiQbz63VcvSKFo TNh6rQcairXqej0dOoRWOF93Zra+o+x+9b0VbiAG8zI
 DahGjy7upvyovkp1sJ1C+/wKmT4 TNh6rQcairXqej0dOoRWOF93Zra+o+x+9b0VbiAG8zI
 ...
 wyD2E2ZG/fDQFbiQbz63VcvSKFo TNh6rQcairXqej0dOoRWOF93Zra+o+x+9b0VbiAG8zI
 DahGjy7upvyovkp1sJ1C+/wKmT4 TNh6rQcairXq
 @opened-at 2016-10-05 20:02:15
 DahGjy7upvyovkp1sJ1C+/wKmT4 TNh6rQcairXqej0dOoRWOF93Zra+o+x+9b0VbiAG8zI
 }}}

 Nick says Tor uses fwrite()` when it should be using `write()` to write to
 that file.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22495 [Core Tor/Tor]: Partial write in key-pinning-journal results in corrupted line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22495: Partial write in key-pinning-journal results in corrupted line
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy tor-dirauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Description changed by asn:

Old description:

> Tor sees a corrupted line in its `key-pinning-journal` because of a
> truncated line:
>
> {{{
> @opened-at 2016-08-07 20:49:24
> wyD2E2ZG/fDQFbiQbz63VcvSKFo TNh6rQcairXqej0dOoRWOF93Zra+o+x+9b0VbiAG8zI
> DahGjy7upvyovkp1sJ1C+/wKmT4 TNh6rQcairXqej0dOoRWOF93Zra+o+x+9b0VbiAG8zI
> ...
> wyD2E2ZG/fDQFbiQbz63VcvSKFo TNh6rQcairXqej0dOoRWOF93Zra+o+x+9b0VbiAG8zI
> DahGjy7upvyovkp1sJ1C+/wKmT4 TNh6rQcairXq
> @opened-at 2016-10-05 20:02:15
> DahGjy7upvyovkp1sJ1C+/wKmT4 TNh6rQcairXqej0dOoRWOF93Zra+o+x+9b0VbiAG8zI
> }}}
>
> Nick says Tor uses fwrite()` when it should be using `write()` to write
> to that file.

New description:

 Tor sees a corrupted line in its `key-pinning-journal` because of a
 truncated line:

 {{{
 @opened-at 2016-08-07 20:49:24
 wyD2E2ZG/fDQFbiQbz63VcvSKFo TNh6rQcairXqej0dOoRWOF93Zra+o+x+9b0VbiAG8zI
 DahGjy7upvyovkp1sJ1C+/wKmT4 TNh6rQcairXqej0dOoRWOF93Zra+o+x+9b0VbiAG8zI
 ...
 wyD2E2ZG/fDQFbiQbz63VcvSKFo TNh6rQcairXqej0dOoRWOF93Zra+o+x+9b0VbiAG8zI
 DahGjy7upvyovkp1sJ1C+/wKmT4 TNh6rQcairXq
 @opened-at 2016-10-05 20:02:15
 DahGjy7upvyovkp1sJ1C+/wKmT4 TNh6rQcairXqej0dOoRWOF93Zra+o+x+9b0VbiAG8zI
 }}}

 Nick says Tor uses `fwrite()` when it should be using `write()` to write
 to that file.

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22460 [Core Tor/Tor]: Link handshake trouble: certificates and keys can get out of sync

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22460: Link handshake trouble: certificates and keys can get out of sync
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay certs handshake ed25519|  Actual Points:  1
  needs-analysis 030-backport 029-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Thanks for the reviews!  Except as noted, I've made the requested changes.
 George, you successfully found a major bug in the "bug22460_case2_029_01"
 branch: I should have been calling SSL_get_certificate(), not
 SSL_get_peer_certificate().

 Replying to [comment:33 dgoulet]:

 > Second thing, maybe `tor_x509_cert_dup()` should be unit test only for
 now? It's dead code if no unit tests.

 Good catch.  If you don't mind, I'd like to leave it in: there are a few
 other places where we should be using it IIRC where we have silly kludges
 instead.

 Replying to [comment:34 asn]:
 > Are we sure that there is no chance we will leave own_link_cert
 uninitialized?

 Take another look at add_ed25519_cert(): it is a no-op if cert is NULL.
 I'll update the documentation comment to make the behavior explicit, and
 add a tor_assert_nonfatal().

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22460 [Core Tor/Tor]: Link handshake trouble: certificates and keys can get out of sync

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22460: Link handshake trouble: certificates and keys can get out of sync
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay certs handshake ed25519|  Actual Points:  1
  needs-analysis 030-backport 029-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22478 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser fails to load Google Docs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22478: Tor Browser fails to load Google Docs
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_information => new


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:2 teor]:
 > > Replying to [comment:1 cypherpunks]:
 > > > I just tried it with Tor Browser 7.0a4 and I did not experience this
 issue.
 > >
 > > I think it might be latency related.
 > >
 > > I'm using Tor Browser 6.5.2 in High Security Mode (with a JS exception
 for Google Docs) on macOS from Australia.
 >
 > I see the same with this setup (not being in Australia, though). I
 suspect you are not excepting enough from your JS ban or some other high
 level setting is interfering because it works fine for me with a clean
 6.5.2 on the default security level. Could you try that scenario?

 Yes, this works for me on 6.5.2 when I start in Medium security mode, and
 Low security mode.

 So this is a NoScript bug: I expect that "Temporarily allow all this page"
 actually does allow all the scripts needed for the google docs page.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22466 [Core Tor/Tor]: "Crosscert is expired" warnings: RSA->Ed25519 identity crosscertifice apparently made in 1970?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22466: "Crosscert is expired" warnings: RSA->Ed25519 identity crosscertifice
apparently made in 1970?
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  030-backport tor-relay certificate   |  Actual Points:
  expired 1970   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final => Tor: 0.3.0.x-final


Comment:

 Merged the mitigation branch to maint-0.3.0 and forward; merged the
 diagnostic branch to master only.

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[tor-bugs] #22496 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Check that updater changes coming with Firefox 52.2.0esr are unproblematic for Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22496: Check that updater changes coming with Firefox 52.2.0esr are 
unproblematic
for Tor Browser
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
  |  TorBrowserTeam201706
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 There are a bunch of code changes regarding the updater code that are not
 in Firefox 52.1.xesr but Firefox 52.2.0esr (or code that could become that
 version).

 Here are some of the changesets we should double check:

 https://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-
 esr52/rev/e72789cd4486e5d309a127b6790398ca4689f44b
 https://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-
 esr52/rev/fe41acbfab790675cee9f7305b7ca0db2ca6637b

 https://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-
 esr52/rev/61066f53c6e0234c2f55ae43329d4b8d2b7b3b57
 https://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-
 esr52/rev/c15b2a5abf1ca5c4169ef6340be56a25b5ec4f45

 https://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-
 esr52/rev/3a49fe1696720a9586e37ab5d37d886987820b46

 There might be more. Skimming over them I think we should be unaffected as
 they are maintenance service related which we disable. But I might have
 missed other changesets or read the code wrongly. mcs: I have access to
 the two security bugs. If you need further information, let me know.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22494 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix TROVE-2017-005

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22494: Fix TROVE-2017-005
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => High


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22490 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop using GeoIP country after buf has gone out of scope

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22490: Stop using GeoIP country after buf has gone out of scope
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  memory-safety 024-backport   |  Actual Points:  0
  025-backport 026-backport 027-backport |
  028-backport 029-backport 030-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  memory-safety 029-backport 030-backport =>
 memory-safety 024-backport 025-backport 026-backport 027-backport
 028-backport 029-backport 030-backport
 * actualpoints:   => 0


Comment:

 Looks like this was introduced in a refactoring patch at 6a241ff3ffe7dc1.

 Branch bug22490_024 is a minimal fix.

 Shall we backport this all the way to 0.2.4?  It _is_ undefined behavior,
 and the fix _does_ seem pretty simple.

 (This is not IMO sufficient to force new releases)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10024 [Core Tor/Tor]: Close and open sockets on IP change, tracking

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10024: Close and open sockets on IP change, tracking
+--
 Reporter:  grarpamp|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.3.25
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client roaming network  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-client roaming network
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10027 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor Windows service should be installed with the NetworkService account

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10027: Tor Windows service should be installed with the NetworkService account
+--
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay win32 nt-service  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay => tor-relay win32 nt-service


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10052 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor Windows service should reload its configuration on SERVICE_CONTROL_PARAMCHANGE control code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10052: Tor Windows service should reload its configuration on
SERVICE_CONTROL_PARAMCHANGE control code
-+-
 Reporter:  GITNE|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Windows, service, nt-service win32   |  Actual Points:
  config, configuration, paramchange, SIGHUP,|
  tor-control|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:
 Windows, service, config, configuration, paramchange, SIGHUP, tor-
 control
 =>
 Windows, service, nt-service win32 config, configuration, paramchange,
 SIGHUP, tor-control
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10059 [Core Tor/Tor]: capture tor log messages before control connection is opened

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10059: capture tor log messages before control connection is opened
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, extdev-interview, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-wants  |
Parent ID:  #9675| Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Low => Medium
 * points:   => 3
 * type:  defect => enhancement
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


Comment:

 If this is still tbb-wants, we can do it in 0.3.2.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10121 [Core Tor/Tor]: [DNSPort] Don't query local network IP via Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10121: [DNSPort] Don't query local network IP via Tor
-+-
 Reporter:  ikurua22 |  Owner:
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, DNSPort, needs-  |  worksforme
  proposal, dns  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client, DNSPort, needs-proposal => tor-client, DNSPort,
 needs-proposal, dns
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 I think that looking up A records for IP addresses is still not something
 to support at all, no matter what the IP address is.

 For PTR records for private networks, I think we already reject those on
 the relay side, but we should indeed reject them client-side too... and I
 believe we do, based on simple testing.

 Closing as worksforme?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10168 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use monotonic clocks for time as appropriate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10168: Use monotonic clocks for time as appropriate
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay time monotonic intro   |  Actual Points:
  large  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay => tor-relay time monotonic intro large
 * points:   => 10
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 We have an implementation of monotonic time in Tor, but we aren't using it
 everywhere we could be.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10186 [Core Tor/Tor]: Backtrace support for windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10186: Backtrace support for windows
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, windows, intro,  |  Actual Points:
  SponsorS-deferred, win32   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => Very High
 * keywords:  tor-client, windows, intro, SponsorS-deferred => tor-client,
 windows, intro, SponsorS-deferred, win32
 * points:  medium => 5


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10221 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement BGP malicious route checks before publishing descriptor in consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10221: Implement BGP malicious route checks before publishing descriptor in
consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  anon |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  BGP needs-design tor-dirauth |  Actual Points:
  badrelays  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  BGP needs-proposal => BGP needs-design tor-dirauth badrelays
 * priority:  Medium => High
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10307 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow Tor relays to configure bandwidth limits around peak usage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10307: Allow Tor relays to configure bandwidth limits around peak usage
--+
 Reporter:  anon  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay bandwidth needs-design  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  relay bandwidth => tor-relay bandwidth needs-design
 * priority:  Medium => Low
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 calling this low-priority because you can already do it with a control-
 port script, or a torrc that you reload.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10747 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support alternate DNS such as Namecoin/OpenNIC/etc (was: Support alternate DNS such as Namecoin/OpenNIC)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10747: Support alternate DNS such as Namecoin/OpenNIC/etc
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  alt-dns tor-client tor-relay needs-  |  Actual Points:
  design prop279 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  alt-dns needs-proposal => alt-dns tor-client tor-relay needs-
 design prop279
 * points:   => 10


Comment:

 See proposal 279 for the start of a design here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10629 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: PT spec changes for better interoperability with other projects

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10629: PT spec changes for better interoperability with other projects
-+-
 Reporter:  infinity0|  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorS, pt-spec, pt-ng, pt-v2, |  Actual Points:
  tor-pt |
Parent ID:  #16755   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  SponsorS, pt-spec => SponsorS, pt-spec, pt-ng, pt-v2, tor-pt
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10416 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor won't start on Windows when path contains non-ascii characters

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10416: Tor won't start on Windows when path contains non-ascii characters
-+-
 Reporter:  iktsuarpok   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.25
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, windows, unicode, win32  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client, windows, unicode => tor-client, windows, unicode,
 win32
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10476 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reattach non open streams if circuit destroyed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10476: Reattach non open streams if circuit destroyed
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client reliability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client => tor-client reliability
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10478 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use prepend_policy or similar in preference to mark_circuit_unusable_for_new_conns

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10478: Use prepend_policy or similar in preference to
mark_circuit_unusable_for_new_conns
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client reliability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #7870   | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client => tor-client reliability
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10481 [Core Tor/Tor]: connection_mark_unattached_ap_: checking always true edge_has_sent_end

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10481: connection_mark_unattached_ap_:  checking always true edge_has_sent_end
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client cleanup refactor  |  Actual Points:
  technical-debt |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client => tor-client cleanup refactor technical-debt
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10510 [Core Tor/Tor]: Getting a lot of system clock jumped messages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10510: Getting a lot of system clock jumped messages
-+-
 Reporter:  LoneRanger1012   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.18-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay tor-client sponsor8-maybe  |  Actual Points:
  timekeeping wakeup |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-relay tor-client sponsor8-maybe timekeeping wakeup
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10519 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor uses default IP for dirport instead of the one defined in DirPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10519: tor uses default IP for dirport instead of  the one defined in DirPort
-+-
 Reporter:  torland  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.18-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay usability torrc needs- |  Actual Points:
  design |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-relay usability torrc needs-design
 * priority:  Medium => Low


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10542 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug when certificate expired: Generated a networkstatus consensus we couldn't parse. (was: Bug: Generated a networkstatus consensus we couldn't parse.)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10542: Bug when certificate expired: Generated a networkstatus consensus we
couldn't parse.
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth dont-do-that-then|  Actual Points:
  usability logging  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-dirauth => tor-dirauth dont-do-that-then usability logging
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10566 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor relay hangs for 20 seconds periodically if domain from Address can not be resolved

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10566: tor relay hangs for 20 seconds periodically if domain from Address can 
not
be resolved
---+--
 Reporter:  erchewin   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay nonblocking dns  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-relay nonblocking dns
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10583 [Core Tor/Tor]: connection_bucket_write_limit reveals used link protocol

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10583: connection_bucket_write_limit reveals used link protocol
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22490 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop using GeoIP country after buf has gone out of scope

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22490: Stop using GeoIP country after buf has gone out of scope
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  memory-safety 024-backport   |  Actual Points:  0
  025-backport 026-backport 027-backport |
  028-backport 029-backport 030-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 This fix looks good, and I think it should be backported to 0.2.4.

 I also don't think it needs a new release, because we're not actually
 overwriting country with the geoip_add_entry() stack. But we get within 6
 bytes of overwriting it.

 If the IPv6 addresses were both short, then the geoip_add_entry() stack
 could overwrite `country`, and leak pointer values: it allocates 3
 pointers on the stack (24 bytes on x86_64, 12 bytes on i386).

 But the shortest line is 32 characters (did we have shorter lines in
 earlier files?), which means that the earliest country could start is at
 buf+30.

 Ah, but wait: pointers must be aligned on word boundaries, and we've added
 a call to geoip_add_entry() to the stack, as well as any registers we've
 saved, and any stack smashing protection, any any other compiler
 bookkeeping.

 But I haven't been able to reproduce it locally using clang, macOS,
 x86_64, and my diagnostic branch `assert-country` with the command
 `src/or/tor DisableNetwork 1 GeoIPv6File src/config/geoip6`, even with two
 2-character IPv6 addresses.

 So I think this could trigger in rare circumstances, but common configs
 are safe.

 But remember those weird countries we were getting in some relay
 descriptors?
 Did we ever track that down?
 This could be it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22003 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Redirect Linux and OSX update URLs from update_2 to update_3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22003: Redirect Linux and OSX update URLs from update_2 to update_3
+
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-7.0-must, TorBrowserTeam201706  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I added the following lines at the top of the `.htaccess` file:
 {{{
 RewriteRule ^downloads.json
 https://aus1.torproject.org/torbrowser/update_3/release/downloads.json
 RewriteRule ^Linux_x86-gcc3/(.*)
 https://aus1.torproject.org/torbrowser/update_3/release/Linux_x86-gcc3/$1
 [last]
 RewriteRule ^Linux_x86_64-gcc3/(.*)
 https://aus1.torproject.org/torbrowser/update_3/release/Linux_x86_64-gcc3/$1
 [last]
 RewriteRule ^Darwin_x86-gcc3/(.*)
 https://aus1.torproject.org/torbrowser/update_3/release/Darwin_x86-gcc3/$1
 [last]
 RewriteRule ^Darwin_x86_64-gcc3/(.*)
 https://aus1.torproject.org/torbrowser/update_3/release/Darwin_x86_64-gcc3/$1
 [last]
 }}}

 I checked that the following URLs are now redirected from `update_2` to
 `update_3`:
 
https://aus1.torproject.org/torbrowser/update_2/release/Linux_x86_64-gcc3/6.5.1/pl
 https://aus1.torproject.org/torbrowser/update_2/release/Linux_x86-gcc3/6.5.1/pl
 
https://aus1.torproject.org/torbrowser/update_2/release/Darwin_x86-gcc3/6.5.1/pl
 
https://aus1.torproject.org/torbrowser/update_2/release/Darwin_x86_64-gcc3/6.5.1/pl
 https://aus1.torproject.org/torbrowser/update_2/release/downloads.json

 The following URL is not redirected:
 https://aus1.torproject.org/torbrowser/update_2/release/WINNT_x86-gcc3/6.5.1/pl

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22478 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser fails to load Google Docs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22478: Tor Browser fails to load Google Docs
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider, tbb-usability-  |  Actual Points:
  website|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-security-slider, tbb-usability-website


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > > Replying to [comment:2 teor]:
 > > > Replying to [comment:1 cypherpunks]:
 > > > > I just tried it with Tor Browser 7.0a4 and I did not experience
 this issue.
 > > >
 > > > I think it might be latency related.
 > > >
 > > > I'm using Tor Browser 6.5.2 in High Security Mode (with a JS
 exception for Google Docs) on macOS from Australia.
 > >
 > > I see the same with this setup (not being in Australia, though). I
 suspect you are not excepting enough from your JS ban or some other high
 level setting is interfering because it works fine for me with a clean
 6.5.2 on the default security level. Could you try that scenario?
 >
 > Yes, this works for me on 6.5.2 when I start in Medium security mode,
 and Low security mode.

 Good.

 > So this is a NoScript bug: I expect that "Temporarily allow all this
 page" actually does allow all the scripts needed for the google docs page.

 Might be something else that is interfering on the high level. Worth
 investigating.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22478 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser fails to load Google Docs with security slider set to "high" (was: Tor Browser fails to load Google Docs)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22478: Tor Browser fails to load Google Docs with security slider set to "high"
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider, tbb-usability-  |  Actual Points:
  website|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22490 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop using GeoIP country after buf has gone out of scope

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22490: Stop using GeoIP country after buf has gone out of scope
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  memory-safety 024-backport   |  Actual Points:  0
  025-backport 026-backport 027-backport |
  028-backport 029-backport 030-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Oh, fine point!  Yes, I think this indeed might be the cause of that.

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[tor-bugs] #22497 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clean-up tt_assert() usage in our tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22497: Clean-up tt_assert() usage in our tests
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Often when refactoring code I stumble upon places in our test code where
 we use `tt_assert()` instead of the `tt_$type_op` equivalent function to
 do the various checks. It would be nice to clean this somewhat up to get
 better test case failure messages.

 This should ideally be done using Coccinelle with semantical patches.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22497 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clean-up tt_assert() usage in our tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22497: Clean-up tt_assert() usage in our tests
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * owner:   => ahf
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22490 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop using GeoIP country after buf has gone out of scope

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22490: Stop using GeoIP country after buf has gone out of scope
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  memory-safety 024-backport   |  Actual Points:  0
  025-backport 026-backport 027-backport |
  028-backport 029-backport 030-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final => Tor: 0.2.4.x-final


Comment:

 Merged to maint-0.2.4 and forwards.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22497 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clean-up tt_assert() usage in our tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22497: Clean-up tt_assert() usage in our tests
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22497 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clean-up tt_assert() usage in our tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22497: Clean-up tt_assert() usage in our tests
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Very low priority, but slightly large patch, can be found here:
 https://gitlab.com/ahf/tor/merge_requests/16

 Please keep this ticket open if this lands, since I have a couple of more
 things I'd like to clean up when I have some spare time for it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22484 [Applications/TorBirdy]: TB 52+ leaks installed dictionary

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22484: TB 52+ leaks installed dictionary
---+-
 Reporter:  Fleming|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by sukhbir):

 This is interesting. Have you been able to reproduce this bug? (I will try
 shortly but I thought I should ask you as well.)

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[tor-bugs] #22498 [Core Tor/Tor]: Offline directory authorities need a way to post their certificate to other authorities

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22498: Offline directory authorities need a way to post their certificate to 
other
authorities
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: very long term
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-auth, tor-auth-offline
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  5 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We have wanted to be able to run (the signing parts of) a directory
 authority offline for a while, because it's more secure.

 So I have been experimenting with an offline (ORPort and DirPort
 unreachable) directory authority on the test net.

 Almost everything works: it posts votes, downloads votes from other
 authorities, signs consensuses, and posts its signature. It could easily
 do these things using a 3-hop Tor path.

 But once its authority certificate expires, it has no way to post it to
 the other authorities.

 A workaround is to overwrite another authority's cached-certs file with
 the missing authority certificate file. But this is nasty.

 We should make authorities accept certificate posts, and post their
 certificates to one another.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22498 [Core Tor/Tor]: Offline directory authorities need a way to post their certificate to other authorities

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22498: Offline directory authorities need a way to post their certificate to 
other
authorities
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  very long term
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-auth, tor-auth-offline, needs-   |  Actual Points:
  proposal   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  tor-auth, tor-auth-offline => tor-auth, tor-auth-offline,
 needs-proposal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22484 [Applications/TorBirdy]: TB 52+ leaks installed dictionary

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22484: TB 52+ leaks installed dictionary
---+-
 Reporter:  Fleming|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 That's not a bug, it a feature! If you receive an email (or reedit a
 draft), Thunderbird 52 uses the `Content-Language` header field to pick
 the right dictionary if installed.

 On my machine it's reproducible, every email I send (except gpg emails)
 have the header field `Content-Language:` with the language option
 depending on the uses dictionary, eg. `en-US`.

`Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8`
`Content-Language: en-US`
`Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10767 [Core Tor/Tor]: Override geoip relay location with declared location

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10767: Override geoip relay location with declared location
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tor-relay, needs-proposal, geoip  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client, needs-proposal => tor-relay, needs-proposal, geoip
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10812 [Core Tor/Tor]: CryptReleaseContext missed for windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10812: CryptReleaseContext missed for windows
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, win32, tor-crypto  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => Low
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10915 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tool to find unused functions in Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10915: Tool to find unused functions in Tor
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay technical-debt tooling |  Actual Points:
  analysis   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay => tor-relay technical-debt tooling analysis
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10817 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write instructions for using valgrind with the debian tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10817: Write instructions for using valgrind with the debian tor
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, lorax, SponsorS-deferred  |  Actual Points:
  valgrind debug debian  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  small
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, lorax, SponsorS-deferred => tor-relay, lorax,
 SponsorS-deferred valgrind debug debian
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22407 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support HTTP CONNECT tunnels as an alternative to SOCKS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22407: Support HTTP CONNECT tunnels as an alternative to SOCKS
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client pt-v2 application-|  Actual Points:
  support http-connect needs-design prop229  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Closed #10848 as a duplicate of this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10957 [Core Tor/Tor]: Be more aggressive about enabling Extended ORPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10957: Be more aggressive about enabling Extended ORPort
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, tor-bridge, needs-design,|  Actual Points:
  SponsorS-deferred extorport|
Parent ID:   | Points:  small
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-pt, tor-bridge, needs-design, SponsorS-deferred => tor-pt,
 tor-bridge, needs-design, SponsorS-deferred extorport
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10848 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should be an HTTP proxy server

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10848: Tor should be an HTTP proxy server
--+--
 Reporter:  ben   |  Owner:
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Closing as duplicate of #22407.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10922 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor connected to bwauth produces lots of pathbias_count_use_attempt BUG messages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10922: tor connected to bwauth produces lots of pathbias_count_use_attempt BUG
messages
-+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.4.20
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, bwauth, regression bug-  |  Actual Points:
  message pathbias   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client, bwauth, regression => tor-client, bwauth,
 regression bug-message pathbias
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10837 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop giving out version 2-style routerstatuses to controllers (was: Stop giving out version 2 descriptors to controllers)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10837: Stop giving out version 2-style routerstatuses to controllers
--+--
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 The proper fix is not to stop providing the new format, but rather to add
 support for providing the new format.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10968 [Core Tor/Tor]: Authorities should use past consensuses to decide how to vote on relay flags (was: Authorities should use past consensuses to assign relay flags)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10968: Authorities should use past consensuses to decide how to vote on relay
flags
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth needs-design |  Actual Points:
  reliability|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-dirauth => tor-dirauth needs-design reliability
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10871 [Core Tor/Tor]: Download more microdescriptors with a shorter request

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10871: Download more microdescriptors with a shorter request
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, directory, microdesc,|  Actual Points:
  needs-proposal, low-bandwidth, sponsor4|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


Comment:

 If we decide to do this, 0.3.2 is the place.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10848 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should be an HTTP proxy server

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10848: Tor should be an HTTP proxy server
--+--
 Reporter:  ben   |  Owner:
 Type:  task  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by ben):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  duplicate =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22407 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support HTTP CONNECT tunnels as an alternative to SOCKS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22407: Support HTTP CONNECT tunnels as an alternative to SOCKS
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client pt-v2 application-|  Actual Points:
  support http-connect needs-design prop229  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ben):

 Normally, the new bug is closed as DUP of the old one. #10848 is clearly
 stated, and clean.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22422 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add noise to PaddingStatistics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22422: Add noise to PaddingStatistics
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => High


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Re: [tor-bugs] #11151 [Core Tor/Tor]: Drop support for 0.2.2 clients

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11151: Drop support for 0.2.2 clients
---+--
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay deprecation  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #9476  | Points:  medium
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay => tor-relay deprecation
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10969 [Core Tor/Tor]: Set of guard nodes can act as a linkability fingerprint

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10969: Set of guard nodes can act as a linkability fingerprint
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-guard, XKEYSCORE,|  Actual Points:
  prop259, SponsorU-deferred |
Parent ID:   | Points:  large
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Prop271 and its predecessors have made progress here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #11010 [Core Tor/Tor]: add ClientConnectPolicy config option

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11010: add ClientConnectPolicy config option
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client interface plaintextports  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client => tor-client interface plaintextports
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22476 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: Replace ImplementationNotAccessibleException with RuntimeException

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22476: Replace ImplementationNotAccessibleException with RuntimeException
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.8.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Metrics-lib provides an API and an implementation.
 When there are more implementations (either by a third party or less
 likely by Metrics) the runtime exception
 `ImplementationNotAccessibleException` could be used to access another
 implementation.

 I know there are not that many implementations out there, but this is a
 useful distinction from a generic runtime exception.  So, I would like to
 keep this tiny exception.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #11044 [Core Tor/Tor]: No consensus results in empty 'GETINFO ns/name/*' responses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11044: No consensus results in empty 'GETINFO ns/name/*' responses
-+-
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-control empty-   |  Actual Points:
  getinfo|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * keywords:  tor-client, tor-control => tor-client, tor-control empty-
   getinfo
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Above, I think we decided on wontfix.  But if I'm wrong let's reopen.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #11059 [Core Tor/Tor]: Nodes' country codes should be "definite" and "possible"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11059: Nodes' country codes should be "definite" and "possible"
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client geoip  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * type:  defect => enhancement
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #11059 [Core Tor/Tor]: Nodes' country codes should be "definite" and "possible"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11059: Nodes' country codes should be "definite" and "possible"
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client geoip intro  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client geoip => tor-client geoip intro


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Re: [tor-bugs] #11121 [Core Tor/Tor]: Revocation process for authority keys

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11121: Revocation process for authority keys
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal, tor-dirauth needs-   |  Actual Points:
  design term-project-ideas  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  needs-proposal, tor-dirauth => needs-proposal, tor-dirauth
 needs-design term-project-ideas
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #11138 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improve code handling SOCKS connection in tor daemon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11138: Improve code handling SOCKS connection in tor daemon
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  refactor, technical-debt,|  Actual Points:
  codethulhu, trunnel, tor-client|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  trunnel, tor-client => refactor, technical-debt, codethulhu,
 trunnel, tor-client
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #11138 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improve code handling SOCKS connection in tor daemon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11138: Improve code handling SOCKS connection in tor daemon
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  refactor, technical-debt,|  duplicate
  codethulhu, trunnel, tor-client|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Closing as duplicate of #3569

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Re: [tor-bugs] #3569 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor socks parsing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3569: Refactor socks parsing
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client intro trunnel prop229 |  Actual Points:
  refactor code-quality  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  4
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Closed #11138 as a duplicate of this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #11146 [Core Tor/Tor]: cov-diff utility should handle new source files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11146: cov-diff utility should handle new source files
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, coverage, tools, |  Actual Points:
  testing, SponsorS-deferred |
Parent ID:   | Points:  small
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client, coverage, SponsorS-deferred => tor-client,
 coverage, tools, testing, SponsorS-deferred
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #11145 [Core Tor/Tor]: coverage utility should merge multiple output files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11145: coverage utility should merge multiple output files
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, coverage, tools, |  Actual Points:
  testing, SponsorS-deferred |
Parent ID:   | Points:  small
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client, coverage, SponsorS-deferred => tor-client,
 coverage, tools, testing, SponsorS-deferred
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #11325 [Core Tor/Tor]: RFE: Adhere to XDB base directory specification

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11325: RFE: Adhere to XDB base directory specification
-+-
 Reporter:  jamielinux   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client xdg-compliance intro  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client xdg-compliance => tor-client xdg-compliance intro
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21621 [Core Tor/Tor]: Intro points can get stuck in CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21621: Intro points can get stuck in CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21446| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * owner:  dgoulet => teor
 * status:  needs_information => assigned
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


Comment:

 This introduces many thing to HS that could not play well now that we've
 freeze 031. Furthermore, I don't think we do *need* to fix that asap if my
 previous comment is accurate.

 Deferring and back to teor as requested by him.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #11327 [Core Tor/Tor]: Dir auths should choose Fast and Guard flags by consensus weight if they don't measure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11327: Dir auths should choose Fast and Guard flags by consensus weight if they
don't measure
+--
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  TvdW
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal tor-dirauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  4
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  SponsorU-can
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-guards-revamp, tor-dirauth => needs-proposal tor-dirauth
 * points:  2 => 4


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Re: [tor-bugs] #11327 [Core Tor/Tor]: Dir auths should choose Fast and Guard flags by consensus weight if they don't measure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11327: Dir auths should choose Fast and Guard flags by consensus weight if they
don't measure
+--
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  TvdW
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal tor-dirauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  4
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  SponsorU-can
+--

Comment (by nickm):

 See also #8435 , where some progress was made.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #11307 [Core Tor/Tor]: connection_handle_event_cb() should handle orconns correctly even when not in OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11307: connection_handle_event_cb() should handle orconns correctly even when 
not
in OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING
--+
 Reporter:  andrea|  Owner:  andrea
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.5.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * severity:   => Normal
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #11312 [Core Tor/Tor]: reuse introduction circuit as rendezvous circuit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11312: reuse introduction circuit as rendezvous circuit
+--
 Reporter:  dave2008|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  needs-proposal  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * severity:   => Normal


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