Re: [tor-bugs] #22395 [Webpages/Blog]: find a way to present the comment threading more intuitively

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22395: find a way to present the comment threading more intuitively
---+--
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [comment:5 arma]:
 > Something interesting that we can make use of here that is probably
 nonstandard for this situation: everybody who has a blog account is a Tor
 person, and is thus (from our perspective) inherently more worth listening
 to.

 For one idea, see the white boxes around comments by the author of the
 blog post:
 https://web.archive.org/web/20170514015915/https://blog.torproject.org/blog
 /transparency-openness-and-our-2015-financials

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #22532 [Core Tor/Tor]: ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig defaults to 1, but TestingTorNetwork overrides it to...1.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22532: ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig defaults to 1, but TestingTorNetwork 
overrides
it to...1.
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 {{{
 config.c:  V(ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig,  BOOL, "1"),
 config.c:  V(ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig,  BOOL, "1"),
 }}}

 Are there other lines in testing_tor_network_defaults[] that are
 redundant?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21989 [Core Tor/Tor]: Should we tell Exits to reject all traffic if DNS fails?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21989: Should we tell Exits to reject all traffic if DNS fails?
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  dns, tor-exit  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21900 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by arma):

 For chutney, see also
 {{{
   if (!get_options()->ServerDNSDetectHijacking)
 return;
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22531 [Applications/Tor Browser]: New identity and ctrl shift U close all tabs instead of just resetting window size

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22531: New identity and ctrl shift U close all tabs instead of just resetting
window size
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 Is this a change in behavior compared to Tor Browser 6.5.x?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #13410 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable self-signed certificate warnings when visiting .onion sites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13410: Disable self-signed certificate warnings when visiting .onion sites
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 See also https://blog.torproject.org/comment/268891#comment-268891 where a
 user (maybe the same user) has the same problem.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #13410 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable self-signed certificate warnings when visiting .onion sites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13410: Disable self-signed certificate warnings when visiting .onion sites
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Before TBB 7.0, user can bypass this check by installing "SkipCertError"
 addon.
 Now it is not possible.

 I want TBB to say "secure" when I visit HTTPS on .onion websites.

 "Connection is not secure" is just wrong.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22530 [Webpages/Blog]: Tor Browser 7.0 can't post on https://blog.torproject.org unless security slider is lowered

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22530: Tor Browser 7.0 can't post on https://blog.torproject.org unless 
security
slider is lowered
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by arma):

 If somebody could identify what exactly is the setting that makes it not
 work, that will help move this ticket forward.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #22531 [Applications/Tor Browser]: New identity and ctrl shift U close all tabs instead of just resetting window size

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22531: New identity and ctrl shift U close all tabs instead of just resetting
window size
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Observation: When click new identity or pressing ctrl shift U all of the
 tabs are closed and a new window is opened.

 Expectation: window size is reset to default without closing anything

 Reproduction: click new identity or press ctrl shift U

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #22530 [Webpages/Blog]: Tor Browser 7.0 can't post on https://blog.torproject.org unless security slider is lowered

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22530: Tor Browser 7.0 can't post on https://blog.torproject.org unless 
security
slider is lowered
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 For several years everyone was able to post on https://blog.torproject.org
 without enabling JavaScript and other dangerous things.

 Observed behaviour: can not post unless slider set to medium or low
 Expected behaviour: high security supported
 Steps to reproduce: try to post at https://blog.torproject.org with
 security slider on high

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #22529 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Find in Page is shared with Firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22529: Find in Page is shared with Firefox
--+
 Reporter:  ononvsdno |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.7
 Severity:  Major |   Keywords:  search
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Hi,

 I notice a problem in Tor Browser 6.0 and 7.0 Final, if I Find in page
 (CMD+F in OSX, CTRL+F in Windows) the word I type is shared with Find in
 page in Firefox directly!

 I updated both Tor Browser & Firefox to latest stable, and problem is
 still appear.


 open Tor & Firefox, and type anything in "Find in Page" in Tor, then
 switch to Firefox and open "Find in Page" an you will find what type in
 Tor, like you type in both Tor & Firefox in same time!

 System: Mac OS X 10.12.5

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #22528 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 6.5.2 "Refresh Profile" has black window, copies profile to desktop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22528: Tor Browser 6.5.2 "Refresh Profile" has black window, copies profile to
desktop
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 When I quit Tor Browser multiple times on start (trying to test #22503),
 it asked me if I wanted to "Refresh Tor Browser".

 So I said yes, and the following happened:
 * It started and presented a black window for a few seconds titled
 "Refresh Tor Browser". This is ugly and confusing.
 * It copied my former profile to the desktop. This could potentially leak
 files or expose the fact someone was using Tor Browser. But it's minor.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22503 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser crash when quit during bootstrap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22503: Tor Browser crash when quit during bootstrap
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:1 gk]:
 > Is that reproducible?

 I could not reproduce it.
 It might require issuing a quit event at just the right time.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21989 [Core Tor/Tor]: Should we tell Exits to reject all traffic if DNS fails?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21989: Should we tell Exits to reject all traffic if DNS fails?
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  dns, tor-exit  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21900 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:2 arma]:
 > I think we think we already have exits refuse to be exits if their dns
 isn't working.
 >
 > See check_dns_honesty_callback() and the dns_launch_correctness_checks()
 that it calls.

 Well, maybe we try, but it doesn't work consistently right now.

 In fact, chutney's upcoming offline mode (#21903) will rely on the fact
 that exits without DNS still allow exiting to IP addresses.

 > It looks like it could be improved.

 If we fix this, we need to make sure AllowBrokenDNSConfig actually works.
 Or we need to add an option that maintains the current behaviour, because
 chutney relies on it.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22527 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Add new operators to fallback directory whitelist

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22527: Add new operators to fallback directory whitelist
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22271 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by teor):

 We need to add this relay to the whitelist:
 {{{
   IPv4: 199.184.246.250
   IPv6: 2620:124:1009:1::171
   Fingerprint: 1F6ABD086F40B890A33C93CC4606EE68B31C9556
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #22527 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Add new operators to fallback directory whitelist

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22527: Add new operators to fallback directory whitelist
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  fallback
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #22271
   Points:  0.5|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 I will keep a list here, and do them all at once.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22321 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Update fallback directory whitelist based on relay changes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22321: Update fallback directory whitelist based on relay changes
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22271 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #22271


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22517 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: task: new bandwidth measurement list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22517: task: new bandwidth measurement list
---+-
 Reporter:  micah  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by teor):

 Let's phrase the description of the list so we don't get a bunch of relay
 operators asking for more bandwidth allocation. I suggest:

 "Discussion about Designing and Running Tor Bandwidth Measurements"

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser freezes when loading https://www.facebook.com/tr/ on a website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22362: Tor Browser freezes when loading https://www.facebook.com/tr/ on a 
website
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript, TorBrowserTeam201706R, |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201706  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by jiminycricket):

 Is this the same issue persisting in Tor Browser 7.0? The Guardian also
 crashes on this page:

 https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/jun/07/oldest-homo-sapiens-bones-
 ever-found-shake-foundations-of-the-human-story

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #22526 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB reloads nonstop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22526: TBB reloads nonstop
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.7
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Set Tor browser security settings to high. Tor Browser bundle 7
 go to https://blog.torproject.org/ and reply to a comment and when you
 click the "return" button on your keyboard to post the reply, the reply
 will be posted and tor browser will go back to the main post and reload
 nonstop.
 macOS 10.12.5

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12020 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bootstrap gets stuck at 20% when connecting through a bridge.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12020: Bootstrap gets stuck at 20% when connecting through a bridge.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.5.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, pt, sponsor8-maybe   |  Actual Points:
  bootstrap  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11966 [Core Tor/Tor]: "Bootstrapped 20%: Asking for networkstatus consensus" is a lie for bridge users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11966: "Bootstrapped 20%: Asking for networkstatus consensus" is a lie for 
bridge
users
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge sponsor8-maybe bootstrap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  arma |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21627 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTTP 304 responses not handled correctly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21627: HTTP 304 responses not handled correctly
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201706R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:5 cypherpunks]:
 > Why have you left
 > {{{
 > 16:11:36.613 NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI: Component returned failure code:
 0x804b000a (NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI) [nsIIOService.newURI] 1 content-
 policy.js:157
 > }}}

 Because we did not see that error.

 I was able to reproduce this problem by visiting http://httpstat.us/304,
 but the error is actually unrelated to the 304 response code. What happens
 in this case is that a relative URL is returned in the Location header
 when a `GET http://httpstat.us/favicon.ico` is done, and the code at
 content-policy.js:157 does not handle relative URLs. The response code is
 a 302. I opened #22525 for this issue.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #22525 [Applications/Tor Browser]: content policy filter does not handle relative Locations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22525: content policy filter does not handle relative Locations
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201706
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 This is a spinoff from #21627.

 If you visit a page that returns a Location header whose value is a
 relative URL, the following appears on the browser console:
  NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI: Component returned failure code: 0x804b000a
 (NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI) [nsIIOService.newURI] content-policy.js:157

 An URL that demonstrates the problem is http://httpstat.us/no-such-page

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #22524 [Applications/TorBirdy]: clear download history

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22524: clear download history
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 Maybe it's a good idea to clear Thunderbird's download history (ctrl + j)
 at closing.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22141 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: Deprecate `DescriptorFile` and add relevant information to `Descriptor`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22141: Deprecate `DescriptorFile` and add relevant information to `Descriptor`
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.9.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 It would be great, if the functionality in `readDescriptorFiles` could be
 broken down into
 smaller and testable units.  I know that there are other places like this
 in the code, but
 we should rather work toward nicer code with new additions like this. (and
 then apply this
 to improve the legacy code)

 There are some checkstyle warnings about unused imports and javadoc.

 Should the parts concerning #16225 be mentioned there for reference?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22255 [Core Tor/Tor]: Frequent OOM kills of tor process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22255: Frequent OOM kills of tor process
--+
 Reporter:  DeS   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by DeS):

 O.k. Good News I added all the parameters to my skript and today - we had
 two OOMs.
 Now bad news. If you will look at the relevant time you will see the logs
 start to be strange.

 Very easy explaination. The skript which collects the stats needs more
 than a minute to run. And cron fires the next one. So we have several
 outputs in the files at the same time.

 Stupid me - I did not put an lock file in - but wait. If the machine is
 that slow - what good would it be to have disk access - so no real
 solution as well. As well not running it via cron would not really help.
 The server has not even reseources to execute date and put it into an
 file.

 The fact is i can try some things but to have clean logs about a
 completely dying machine is like  sending a probe into a black hole and
 expect pictures back.


 But now. Lets step back a little and think.

 a) We see the tor process use around 250-400 MB normally.
 b) When they get killed they are bigger 550 - 600 MB
 c) We have a machine with 3877580 MB (3.8~ GB)

 We can not try to have logfiles from everything but if you ask me this
 will not help. All you would see is the memory usage of tor going up to
 600 MB. So what.
 The Question is - where are around 1-2 Gig of Memory gone?
 Even in the messed up logs you will no monster process consuming this
 memory. The biggest user and growing process is tor. And the question is
 why does it behave like this.
 I do not belive a 25% rise of tcp connection will swallow up all the
 memory so the problem must be somewhere else - if you ask me - in tor

 any chance tor has debug features (memory allocation ...)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21171 [Metrics/Onionoo]: write a test for NodeDetailsStatusUpdater

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21171: write a test for NodeDetailsStatusUpdater
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-help |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by kiki201):

 * cc: kiki201 (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22519 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Browser window on Windows 10 is not rounded properly (1000 x 1001)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22519: Browser window on Windows 10 is not rounded properly (1000 x 1001)
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by tom):

 I can confirm that browserleaks shows 1000px and 1000/1000

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #22523 [Webpages/Website]: Please deactive Comms Director job posting on website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22523: Please deactive Comms Director job posting on website
--+---
 Reporter:  ewyatt|  Owner:  linda
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 Please deactivate the Comms Director job posting on the website, as we've
 filled the position. Thanks! :)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22519 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Browser window on Windows 10 is not rounded properly (1000 x 1001)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22519: Browser window on Windows 10 is not rounded properly (1000 x 1001)
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Double-check it with https://browserleaks.com/css
 No problems found on different screens on Windows 10 (except "orientation"
 field may leak).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12572 [Core Tor/Tor]: Proposal for __OwningControllerTimeout option

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12572: Proposal for __OwningControllerTimeout option
---+---
 Reporter:  yarong |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client needs-design lorax  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client => tor-client needs-design lorax
 * severity:   => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12661 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: Some directory authorities reject IP ranges long after we ask them to stop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12661: Some directory authorities reject IP ranges long after we ask them to 
stop
--+---
 Reporter:  tmpname0901   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.22
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified =>


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12799 [Core Tor/Tor]: fingerprints - descriptor Space removal, case normalization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12799: fingerprints - descriptor Space removal, case normalization
--+--
 Reporter:  grarpamp  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.22
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay needs-proposal  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => Very Low
 * keywords:   => tor-relay needs-proposal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12891 [Core Tor/Tor]: Simulate KIST - global scheduling (#9262) and socket write limits (#12890)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12891: Simulate KIST - global scheduling (#9262) and socket write limits 
(#12890)
-+-
 Reporter:  robgjansen   |  Owner:
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay kist simulation analysis   |  Actual Points:
  research-program   |
Parent ID:  #12541   | Points:  large
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay => tor-relay kist simulation analysis research-
   program
 * severity:   => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12890 [Core Tor/Tor]: Design and implement optimizations for socket write limits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12890: Design and implement optimizations for socket write limits
---+---
 Reporter:  robgjansen |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay kist networking tcp  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #12541 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay => tor-relay kist networking tcp


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12892 [Core Tor/Tor]: Run KIST on some fast live relays, measure congestion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12892: Run KIST on some fast live relays, measure congestion
-+-
 Reporter:  robgjansen   |  Owner:
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay kist simulation analysis   |  Actual Points:
  research-program   |
Parent ID:  #12541   | Points:  large
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-relay kist simulation analysis research-program


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12898 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove naming support from Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12898: Remove naming support from Tor
-+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:
 |  Sebastian
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop235, tor-client, feature-|  Actual Points:
  removal naming |
Parent ID:   | Points:  medium
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  prop235, tor-client => prop235, tor-client, feature-removal
 naming


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12900 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove config related naming stuff

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12900: Remove config related naming stuff
-+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:
 |  Sebastian
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client feature-removal naming|  Actual Points:
  torrc  |
Parent ID:  #12898   | Points:  small
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-client feature-removal naming torrc


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12901 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove client-related naming stuff (was: Remove client related naming stuff)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12901: Remove client-related naming stuff
---+---
 Reporter:  Sebastian  |  Owner:  Sebastian
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client feature-removal naming  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #12898 | Points:
   |  small/medium
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-client feature-removal naming


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12931 [Core Tor/Tor]: TOR_PT_SERVER_TRANSPORT_OPTIONS are not escaped according to pt-spec.txt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12931: TOR_PT_SERVER_TRANSPORT_OPTIONS are not escaped according to pt-spec.txt
+--
 Reporter:  yawning |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  pluggable, transports, pt-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:   => nickm
 * severity:   => Normal
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12377 [Core Tor/Tor]: get_interface_address6() behaviour iff all interface addresses are internal

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12377: get_interface_address6() behaviour iff all interface addresses are 
internal
-+-
 Reporter:  rl1987   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay address-detection  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  tor-relay => tor-relay address-detection


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12389 [Core Tor/Tor]: Should we warn when exit nodes are using opendns or google dns?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12389: Should we warn when exit nodes are using opendns or google dns?
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay dns configuration  |  Actual Points:
  libevent-help  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  small
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay => tor-relay dns configuration libevent-help
 * priority:  Medium => High


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12399 [Core Tor/Tor]: "Hash of session info was not as expected" should be log_protocol_warn (was: Hash of session info was not as expected)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12399: "Hash of session info was not as expected" should be log_protocol_warn
-+--
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs easy logging  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-hs easy logging
 * points:   => .1
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 The right fix, given the timeline, is probably "log_protocol_warn".

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12401 [Core Tor/Tor]: Document EntryGuardPathBias in doc/state-contents.txt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12401: Document EntryGuardPathBias in doc/state-contents.txt
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-guard, tor-docs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Low => High


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12446 [Core Tor/Tor]: OutboundBindAddress should imply expected Address, ORBindAddress, and ORPort settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12446: OutboundBindAddress should imply expected Address, ORBindAddress, and
ORPort settings
--+--
 Reporter:  anon  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * severity:   => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12478 [Core Tor/Tor]: Ownership error on hidden service dir encountered on config reload kills Tor process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12478: Ownership error on hidden service dir encountered on config reload kills
Tor process
--+--
 Reporter:  andrea|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.20
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 This is a general case of the property where if you HUP into a bad
 configuration, Tor will stop.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12500 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add an option to upload hidden service descriptors some time after startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12500: Add an option to upload hidden service descriptors some time after 
startup
-+-
 Reporter:  andrea   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, easy, traffic-analysis   |  Actual Points:
  security   |
Parent ID:  #20657   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, easy => tor-hs, easy, traffic-analysis security


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12541 [Core Tor/Tor]: Integrate KIST socket/circuit scheduling

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12541: Integrate KIST socket/circuit scheduling
-+-
 Reporter:  robgjansen   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  performance, tcp, kist, scheduling,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-relay, term-project-ideas  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  performance, tcp, scheduling, tor-relay, term-project-ideas =>
 performance, tcp, kist, scheduling, tor-relay, term-project-ideas
 * severity:   => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12559 [Core Tor/Tor]: DirPort can't fetch router status entries by fingerprint

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12559: DirPort can't fetch router status entries by fingerprint
--+--
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21627 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTTP 304 responses not handled correctly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21627: HTTP 304 responses not handled correctly
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201706R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Why have you left
 {{{
 16:11:36.613 NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI: Component returned failure code:
 0x804b000a (NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI) [nsIIOService.newURI] 1 content-
 policy.js:157
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11973 [Core Tor/Tor]: Should relays stop making unencrypted directory connections?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11973: Should relays stop making unencrypted directory connections?
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-design tor-relay directory-|  Actual Points:
  protocol needs-proposal|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  needs-proposal => needs-design tor-relay directory-protocol
 needs-proposal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12020 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bootstrap gets stuck at 20% when connecting through a bridge.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12020: Bootstrap gets stuck at 20% when connecting through a bridge.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.5.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, pt, sponsor8-maybe   |  Actual Points:
  bootstrap  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-bridge, pt => tor-bridge, pt, sponsor8-maybe bootstrap
 * severity:   => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12062 [Core Tor/Tor]: Audit DisableNetwork, we_are_hibernating usage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12062: Audit DisableNetwork, we_are_hibernating usage
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client technical-debt quiet- |  Actual Points:
  mode sponsor8-maybe|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client => tor-client technical-debt quiet-mode
 sponsor8-maybe
 * severity:   => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12138 [Core Tor/Tor]: No IPv6 support when suggesting a bindaddr to a PT

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12138: No IPv6 support when suggesting a bindaddr to a PT
-+--
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, tor-bridge ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-pt, tor-bridge => tor-pt, tor-bridge ipv6
 * type:  defect => enhancement
 * severity:   => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12169 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improve speed by fixing tor_memeq performance, bottleneck(s)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12169: Improve speed by fixing tor_memeq performance, bottleneck(s)
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, performance maybe-|  Actual Points:
  irrelevant |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, performance => tor-relay, performance maybe-
 irrelevant


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12184 [Core Tor/Tor]: Circuit on detached list which I had no reason to mark

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12184: Circuit on detached list which I had no reason to mark
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.5.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay needs-insight  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_information => new
 * keywords:   => tor-relay needs-insight


Comment:

 #19721 was also closed as a duplicate of this; it has happened as recently
 as 0.2.7.6.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12201 [Core Tor/Tor]: Don't weight by bandwidth when selecting among bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12201: Don't weight by bandwidth when selecting among bridges
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, tor-guard, needs-design  |  Actual Points:
  fairness   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-bridge, tor-guard => tor-bridge, tor-guard, needs-design
 fairness
 * severity:   => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12204 [Core Tor/Tor]: Revisit flags passed to entry_is_live() around entrynodes.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12204: Revisit flags passed to entry_is_live() around entrynodes.c
--+--
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tor-guard |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 entry_is_live is dead as of the prop271 merge in 0.2.9.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12220 [Core Tor/Tor]: Give a better warning on header/library mismatch for openssl

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12220: Give a better warning on header/library mismatch for openssl
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay build library mismatch |  Actual Points:
  easy-if-you-know-build-systems |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-relay build library mismatch easy-if-you-know-build-
 systems
 * severity:   => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12254 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bridge authority should sign its bridge networkstatus doc? Or maybe change format to v3-style vote? (was: Tonga should sign its bridge networkstatus doc? Or maybe

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12254: Bridge authority should sign its bridge networkstatus doc? Or maybe 
change
format to v3-style vote?
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-parsers, metrics-db,|  Actual Points:
  bridgeauth, tor-bridges|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  bridgedb-parsers, metrics-db, bridgeauth, => bridgedb-parsers,
 metrics-db, bridgeauth, tor-bridges
 * severity:   => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11595 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use smarter data structures for keeping track of circuit IDs per channel

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11595: Use smarter data structures for keeping track of circuit IDs per channel
-+-
 Reporter:  andrea   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.5.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay data-structure maybe-not-  |  Actual Points:
  good-idea  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-relay data-structure maybe-not-good-idea
 * priority:  Medium => Low
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 It's not 100% clear to me that this solves a problem which it's important
 to solve.  If we can make circuit lookup _faster_, though, that would
 rule.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11600 [Core Tor/Tor]: Strange nameserver fail warning in Tor log

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11600: Strange nameserver fail warning in Tor log
+--
 Reporter:  s7r |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.2.6.10
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  eventdns, libevent  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #1936

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #1238 [Core Tor/Tor]: Exit flag assigned can be assigned to nodes that don't really exit.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1238: Exit flag assigned can be assigned to nodes that don't really exit.
-+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 |  0.2.2.7-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  None
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth exit-flag flags voting   |  Actual Points:
  needs-design   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Closed #11624 as duplicate of this.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11624 [Core Tor/Tor]: Malicious relays may be able to be assigned Exit flag without exiting anywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11624: Malicious relays may be able to be assigned Exit flag without exiting
anywhere
-+-
 Reporter:  tom  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  needs-proposal, tor-dirauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  4
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Closed as duplicate of #1238.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11625 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor DNSPORT returns NXDOMAIN for AAAA records?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11625: Tor DNSPORT returns NXDOMAIN for  records?
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.5.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, dns, exit-node-choice,   |  Actual Points:
  ipv6   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client, dns, exit-node-choice => tor-client, dns, exit-
 node-choice, ipv6


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11625 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor DNSPORT returns NXDOMAIN for AAAA records?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11625: Tor DNSPORT returns NXDOMAIN for  records?
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.2.5.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, dns, exit-node-choice  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: teor (added)
 * keywords:  tor-client, dns, lorax => tor-client, dns, exit-node-choice
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 See also #10468 ; is this still happening?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11660 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make tor_spawn_background and related interfaces work the same on windows and *nix

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11660: Make tor_spawn_background and related interfaces work the same on 
windows
and *nix
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-pt , tor-fw-helper   |  Actual Points:
  windows unix compatibility |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client, pt => tor-client, tor-pt , tor-fw-helper windows
 unix compatibility


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11743 [Core Tor/Tor]: nodelist_add_microdesc: assign md to all appropriate nodes properly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11743: nodelist_add_microdesc: assign md to all appropriate nodes properly
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, crash, tor-relay,|  Actual Points:
  needs-design, 2016-bug-retrospective   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, needs-proposal, 2016-bug-retrospective => tor-
 client, crash, tor-relay, needs-design, 2016-bug-retrospective


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11922 [Core Tor/Tor]: Launching tor-fw-helper should untangle stderr for control, stdout for data?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11922: Launching tor-fw-helper should untangle stderr for control, stdout for
data?
---+--
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-fw-helper  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: ahf (added)
 * severity:   => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11966 [Core Tor/Tor]: "Bootstrapped 20%: Asking for networkstatus consensus" is a lie for bridge users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11966: "Bootstrapped 20%: Asking for networkstatus consensus" is a lie for 
bridge
users
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge sponsor8-maybe bootstrap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  arma |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: catalyst (added)
 * keywords:  tor-bridge => tor-bridge sponsor8-maybe bootstrap


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11967 [Core Tor/Tor]: TestingServerDownloadSchedule et al imply they're for TestingTorNetwork but actually they're sometimes not

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11967: TestingServerDownloadSchedule et al imply they're for TestingTorNetwork 
but
actually they're sometimes not
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Closed as duplicate of #8954.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #8954 [Core Tor/Tor]: Need a better convention for testing option variable names

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8954: Need a better convention for testing option variable names
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, testing, clarity, |  Actual Points:
  usability  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 #11967 was a duplicate of this.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11970 [Core Tor/Tor]: `[err] sandbox_getaddrinfo(): Bug: (Sandbox) failed to get address localhost!`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11970: `[err] sandbox_getaddrinfo(): Bug: (Sandbox) failed to get address
localhost!`
-+-
 Reporter:  alphawolf|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.5.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sandbox tor-relay needs-insight  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  sandbox => sandbox tor-relay needs-insight
 * severity:   => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11328 [Core Tor/Tor]: Dir auths should compute Guard WFU using the consensus, not private history

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11328: Dir auths should compute Guard WFU using the consensus, not private 
history
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth needs-proposal maybe-|  Actual Points:
  bad-idea needs-analysis|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-dirauth => tor-dirauth needs-proposal maybe-bad-idea
 needs-analysis
 * severity:   => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11360 [Core Tor/Tor]: Listen on IPv6 by default for SocksPort *:Port (was: Listen on IPv6 by default for SocksPort)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11360: Listen on IPv6 by default for SocksPort *:Port
+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, ipv6, torrc, ui, intro  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17811  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client, ipv6 => tor-client, ipv6, torrc, ui, intro


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11397 [Core Tor/Tor]: Keep using too-dirty circuits if no new circuit can be built?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11397: Keep using too-dirty circuits if no new circuit can be built?
-+-
 Reporter:  evandro  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client needs-design security-|  Actual Points:
  relevant circuit-usage not-sure-if-good-idea   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   =>
 tor-client needs-design security-relevant circuit-usage not-sure-if-
 good-idea
 * severity:   => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11444 [Core Tor/Tor]: Drop support for long-obsolete versions of Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11444: Drop support for long-obsolete versions of Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, windows, cleanup, |  Actual Points:
  technical-debt |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, windows, cleanup, lorax => tor-relay, windows,
 cleanup, technical-debt
 * severity:   => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11445 [Core Tor/Tor]: Drop support for Windows XP

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11445: Drop support for Windows XP
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, windows, cleanup, |  Actual Points:
  deprecate technical-debt   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, windows, cleanup, lorax => tor-relay, windows,
 cleanup, deprecate technical-debt
 * severity:   => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11448 [Core Tor/Tor]: Dirauths must support multiple relay identity keys at once

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11448: Dirauths must support multiple relay identity keys at once
-+-
 Reporter:  rransom  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop231, tor-dirauth key-agility |  Actual Points:
  key-migration  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  prop231, tor-dirauth => prop231, tor-dirauth key-agility key-
 migration
 * priority:  High => Low
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Alternatively, dirauths should just keep their ed25519 master identity
 keys offline.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11458 [Core Tor/Tor]: A newer signing cert should innoculate us against older ones?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11458: A newer signing cert should innoculate us against older ones?
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal tor-client tor-   |  Actual Points:
  dirauth security certificates  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  needs-proposal => needs-proposal tor-client tor-dirauth
 security certificates
 * severity:   => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11462 [Core Tor/Tor]: Re-promote "We stalled too much while trying to write" warning if it happens too much

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11462: Re-promote "We stalled too much while trying to write" warning if it
happens too much
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client networking backend  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client => tor-client networking backend
 * severity:   => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11542 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a new logging domain for transport proxies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11542: Add a new logging domain for transport proxies
--+--
 Reporter:  wfn   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt intro logging  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  small
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorT
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-pt => tor-pt intro logging
 * severity:   => Normal


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #11462 [Core Tor/Tor]: Re-promote "We stalled too much while trying to write" warning if it happens too much

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11462: Re-promote "We stalled too much while trying to write" warning if it
happens too much
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client networking backend|  Actual Points:
  logging diagnostic |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client networking backend => tor-client networking backend
 logging diagnostic


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #22522 [Webpages/Website]: Fix broken links

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22522: Fix broken links
--+---
 Reporter:  Fleming   |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en

 This page is crucial to understand user cases.
 It contains links to external resources, some of them are dead.
 One way to fix it, I guess, is to use WaybackMachine’s copies.

 == Journalists and their audience use Tor ==
 Citizens and journalists in [Internet black holes]

 == Activists & Whistleblowers use Tor ==
 [Canadian ISP blocked access to a union website used by their own
 employees] to help organize a strike.

 == Bloggers use Tor ==
 Frequently we hear about bloggers who are [sued]

 == Bottom of the page ==
 [adoption services]

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22518 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create email alias for Stephanie

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22518: Please create email alias for Stephanie
-+-
 Reporter:  ewyatt   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 |  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Clarified that this is a request for an alias rather than for an ldap
 account.  Alias added; should be live within a couple of hours.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22141 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: Deprecate `DescriptorFile` and add relevant information to `Descriptor`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22141: Deprecate `DescriptorFile` and add relevant information to `Descriptor`
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 1.9.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Please find [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/metrics-
 lib.git/log/?h=task-22141 my branch task-22141] with an initial attempt
 towards implementing this change.  (This ticket somewhat overlaps with
 #16225, and I wasn't sure where to put this branch.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #22521 [Core Tor/Tor]: use offsetof() instead of rolling our own

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22521: use offsetof() instead of rolling our own
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 `src/common/util.h` defines a `STRUCT_OFFSET()` macro that effectively
 duplicates `offsetof()`, which has been available in `stddef.h` since C89.
 The non-GCC version of `STRUCT_OFFSET()` does pointer arithmetic on null
 pointers, which is undefined behavior.

 We should use the standard `offsetof()` macro instead, unless there's some
 reason we still need to support platforms that lack it.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22513 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser connects to the same circuit even after CONNRESET received

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22513: Tor Browser connects to the same circuit even after CONNRESET received
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 The main issue of this ticket is
 > Tor Browser connects to the same circuit even after CONNRESET received.
 That ends with "Secure Connection Failed" page.
 Without that no error would occur.
 The second issue, like in comment:3, is that
 > "New Tor Circuit for this Site" should indeed change the circuit for it
 and not the catch-all one
 (it has no relevance to `CONNRESET`)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22516 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor fails to start with 'Sandbox 1'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22516: tor fails to start with 'Sandbox 1'
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  seccomp Sandbox  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


Comment:

 It appears we have no `fchmod` filter.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22343 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Save as... in the context menu results in using the catch-all circuit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22343: Save as... in the context menu results in using the catch-all circuit
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, ff52-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must, TorBrowserTeam201706 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-linkability, ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must, TorBrowserTeam201706R
 => tbb-linkability, ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must, TorBrowserTeam201706
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Loading torproject.org and doing a right-click and choosing "Save Page
 As..." gives me a ton of errors like:
 {{{
 [06-07 13:02:38] Torbutton NOTE: tor domain isolator error:
 channel.loadInfo is null
 loadInfo is null for channel
 https://www.torproject.org/images/military.jpg
 Handler function threw an exception: TypeError: channel.loadInfo is null
 Stack:
 
NetworkMonitor.prototype._createNetworkEvent@resource://gre/modules/commonjs/toolkit/loader.js
 -> resource://devtools/shared/webconsole/network-monitor.js:1077:9
 
NetworkMonitor.prototype._onRequestHeader@resource://gre/modules/commonjs/toolkit/loader.js
 -> resource://devtools/shared/webconsole/network-monitor.js:1154:5
 
NetworkMonitor.prototype.observeActivity<@resource://gre/modules/commonjs/toolkit/loader.js
 -> resource://devtools/shared/webconsole/network-monitor.js:1014:7
 exports.makeInfallible/<@resource://gre/modules/commonjs/toolkit/loader.js
 -> resource://devtools/shared/ThreadSafeDevToolsUtils.js:101:14
 Line: 1077, column: 9
 }}}
 and it does not download anything (while default 7.0 at least downloads
 the website) I built a custom build with the patch in comment:5 applied on
 top. But that was the only difference to our usual nightly builds.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser freezes when loading https://www.facebook.com/tr/ on a website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22362: Tor Browser freezes when loading https://www.facebook.com/tr/ on a 
website
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript, TorBrowserTeam201706R, |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201706  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review
 * keywords:  noscript, TorBrowserTeam201706 => noscript,
 TorBrowserTeam201706R, GeorgKoppen201706


Comment:

 `bug_22326` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/commit/?h=bug_22362=e8178d1373d6ce2599ef58eca4d52d1b6817263f)
 has a patch for the workaround in comment:17 up for review.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22346 [Metrics/Metrics website]: tor browser update URL change and the update ping metrics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22346: tor browser update URL change and the update ping metrics
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:4 karsten]:
 > boklm, gk, any ideas what we're missing?

 I don't see what is missing, or if something is missing.

 Would it be possible to run the same request, for the days January 24, 25,
 26 (when the update pings dropped), and April 4, 5, 6 (when they
 increased), to try to understand what changed? Maybe seeing which type of
 URL dropped or increased on those days can tell us if we are missing
 something.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22346 [Metrics/Metrics website]: tor browser update URL change and the update ping metrics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22346: tor browser update URL change and the update ping metrics
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:4 karsten]:
 > boklm, gk, any ideas what we're missing?

 Not yet. How are we dealing with redirects we have/had in place? Do/did we
 double-count requests that get/got redirected?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #22520 [Core Tor/Tor]: Incorrect encoding for error message

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22520: Incorrect encoding for error message
--+--
 Reporter:  Vort  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.2-alpha
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:  encoding windows russian
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 When you try to run "tor --service install" in russian Windows 7 x64 SP1
 without administrative priviliges, you will get following error:
 "OpenSCManager() failed : ╬Єърчрэю т фюёЄєях."
 But this is incorrect. Correct message should be "OpenSCManager() failed :
 Отказано в доступе.".

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22513 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser connects to the same circuit even after CONNRESET received

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22513: Tor Browser connects to the same circuit even after CONNRESET received
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:3 cypherpunks]:
 > Here is the way to test this reliably https://pinning-test.badssl.com/

 Thanks, that's helpful. So, what is the scope of this bug then? Is it:
 Clicking on the "Try Again" button should change the circuit when
 `CONNRESET` is received? Or is it: "New Tor Circuit for this Site" should
 indeed change the circuit for it and not the catch-all one? Or is it both?

 (FWIW: I think it should be the second option).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22503 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser crash when quit during bootstrap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22503: Tor Browser crash when quit during bootstrap
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-crash
 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Is that reproducible?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22504 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change update_2 to update_3 in ReleaseProcess

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22504: Change update_2 to update_3 in ReleaseProcess
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201706R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks, applied to `master` (commit
 d54a2790500269d6f9f02c7af0a2e83c23ddd918).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22501 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Requests via javascript: violate FPI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22501: Requests via javascript: violate FPI
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:3 cypherpunks]:
 > You were asking about new issues so persistently on tor-qa (as if you
 lack them :) that I couldn't pass by :) How many new issues will be enough
 for you? What are you going to do with all of them?

 We'll try to get them fixed. Just let them coming.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser freezes when loading https://www.facebook.com/tr/ on a website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22362: Tor Browser freezes when loading https://www.facebook.com/tr/ on a 
website
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Major   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript, TorBrowserTeam201706  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by gk):

 After thinking a while about how to mitigate that problem in Tor Browser
 while we are waiting for a new NoScript release it seems to me we don't
 want to just whitelist that particular tracker. The risk is that a week
 after release a different one hits the same bug and we start playing
 whack-a-mole. I think we should disable the XSS protection for now until
 it can't be used as a DoS tool anymore.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20732 [Applications/Tor Browser]: https://www.bittrex.com/home/markets does not work in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20732: https://www.bittrex.com/home/markets does not work in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 And it still does not do so in 6.5.2. But this is "fixed" in 7.0 and the
 alphas based on Firefox ESR 52 the same way as #22364: The Cloudflare
 CAPTCHA is shown right at the beginning and solving it gives access.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs