Re: [tor-bugs] #22561 [Applications/Tor Browser]: New York Times site not only crashes Tor browser but powers down Ubuntu laptop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22561: New York Times site not only crashes Tor browser but powers down Ubuntu
laptop
--+--
 Reporter:  TorontoBoy|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arma):

 * owner:   => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 My theory is that you are hitting #22362, which spikes your cpu, and then
 your cpu overheats and the laptop turns itself off because of internal
 temperature.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22562 [- Select a component]: New York Times site not only crashes Tor browser but powers down Ubuntu laptop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22562: New York Times site not only crashes Tor browser but powers down Ubuntu
laptop
--+---
 Reporter:  TorontoBoy|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Closing as duplicate of #22561.

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[tor-bugs] #22562 [- Select a component]: New York Times site not only crashes Tor browser but powers down Ubuntu laptop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22562: New York Times site not only crashes Tor browser but powers down Ubuntu
laptop
--+-
 Reporter:  TorontoBoy|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 I have been using Tor for about 6 months to read the New York Times, and
 it has worked very well so far. I have noticed recently that the NYT has
 done something to their web site that really slows down the Tor Browser.
 The index page loads, then freezes, but eventually returns. I can then
 browse their pages properly.

 Today I tried to go to www.nytimes.com/pages/world/asia/index.html. The
 index page loads, but then freezes. Tor browser goes dark. The next thing
 that happens is that my Ubuntu 17.04 system powers itself down, then turns
 off. It did this twice, so I can repeat the behaviour.

 This is very odd, and a bit scary that the Tor browser has this
 capability. I am using Tor Browser 6.5.2

 I am running a Lenovo W510 laptop with Ubuntu 16.04 LTS. The NYT page
 loads quickly and well in Opera using VPN.

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[tor-bugs] #22561 [- Select a component]: New York Times site not only crashes Tor browser but powers down Ubuntu laptop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22561: New York Times site not only crashes Tor browser but powers down Ubuntu
laptop
--+-
 Reporter:  TorontoBoy|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 I have been using Tor for about 6 months to read the New York Times, and
 it has worked very well so far. I have noticed recently that the NYT has
 done something to their web site that really slows down the Tor Browser.
 The index page loads, then freezes, but eventually returns. I can then
 browse their pages properly.

 Today I tried to go to www.nytimes.com/pages/world/asia/index.html. The
 index page loads, but then freezes. Tor browser goes dark. The next thing
 that happens is that my Ubuntu 17.04 system powers itself down, then turns
 off. It did this twice, so I can repeat the behaviour.

 This is very odd, and a bit scary that the Tor browser has this
 capability. I am using Tor Browser 6.5.2

 I am running a Lenovo W510 laptop with Ubuntu 16.04 LTS. The NYT page
 loads quickly and well in Opera using VPN.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22089 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Decentraleyes to stop tracking by large CDNs (resulting in slightly less traffic for exits) in the Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22089: Add Decentraleyes to stop tracking by large CDNs (resulting in slightly
less traffic for exits) in the Tor Browser
+--
 Reporter:  imageverif  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-performance  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  needs_information => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13260 [Core Tor/Tor]: Transform code to cleaner c99 style

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13260: Transform code to cleaner c99 style
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  coccinelle, tor-client technical-|  Actual Points:
  debt   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:8 ahf]:
 > We should probably figure out what we want to do here:
 >
 > First two things I can think of:
 >
 > - Convert functions that returns 0 or 1 to return `bool`
 (`true`/`false`) from ``?

 We also want to make the crypto API return 0 and 1 rather than 0 and -1.
 (I think there's a ticket for this already.)
 Then we could convert it to use bool as well.

 > - Lift `for` loop variables declarations into their loop initialiser?
 >
 > Additionally, It might be interesting to figure out when/if we can start
 using `C11` features?

 When all supported compilers on all supported OSs support C11 (or whatever
 C11 features we want). Sometimes the Microsoft compilers are the slowest
 here.

 Are there any particular features you have in mind?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17670 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Mac OSX mistakes Tor as Firefox default browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17670: Mac OSX mistakes Tor as Firefox default browser
--+--
 Reporter:  patrickbateman|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by torlongtimeuser):

 I don't know how fix this bug on tor.

 but I know another way:
 (if you would create multiple guest virtual machine.)

 || my network set:
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22546#comment:2 #22546]
 ||

 It's mean GuestA(all system application) over GuestB(tor), of course all
 links you opened won't send info about you real IP.
 would like try it?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21617 [Applications/Tor Browser]: RWX page observed on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21617: RWX page observed on Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201706R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:  tbb-security => tbb-security, TorBrowserTeam201706R
 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 Here's my Mozilla patch, rebased onto tor-browser-52.2.0esr-7.5-1, for
 review:

 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commit/21617

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21321: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mrphs):

 Ditto the last 2 comments by 'cypherpunks'. And also ditto on what geko
 said about on removing the password warning as a first step. (how I wish
 we had 'like' or '+1' buttons on trac)

 I've explained how I think about this issue to some extent on #22545. As
 someone who directly works with people at immediate risk and as someone
 with UX background, I believe this warning has actually became a security
 issue as it misleads people to take far less secure route.

 I happen to believe while debating the security features of 'HTTPS' vs
 'HTTP .onion' vs 'HTTPS .onion' is healthy and necessary to have, it's
 outside of the urgent needs of this ticket.

 To help you understand where I come from... People in various movements
 and situations are adopting using Tor Browser and .onion as their most
 reliable and secure way of communicating, and this is the result of a
 greater community pushing for this for a long period of time. Building
 trust relationship with often-exploited communities is extremely
 difficult. Now after they've learned to trust Tor Browser to do the right
 thing, and they see this warning, that affects both their trust with Tor
 in general (for being inconsistent) and then the person who taught them
 how to use Tor. I don't want to vent too much here so I think these are
 the actionable items we have for this problem:

 1- Remove the password warning. (this is immediate)
 2- Remove the padlock warning. (also immediate, preferably at the same
 time with 1)
 3- Improve our messaging with user about .onion URLs in Tor Browser to
 make sure we're consistent (more long-term but prevents us from situations
 like this)

 then at the same time we can also have two conversations:

 - What's the way we want to recommend people to use .onion
 - And how do we convince Mozilla and others to adopt based on our decision
 on that

 I guess the reason I'm leaving this comment is that we don't get into a
 rabbit hole that gets us away from fixing this immediate need.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13410 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable self-signed certificate warnings when visiting .onion sites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13410: Disable self-signed certificate warnings when visiting .onion sites
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  #ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mrphs):

 * keywords:   => #ux-team
 * cc: mrphs (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22558 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OSX 10.7.5 Auto updated 6.5.1 to incompatible 7

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22558: OSX 10.7.5 Auto updated 6.5.1 to incompatible 7
--+--
 Reporter:  dehv  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:4 gk]:
 > I just took my old OS X 10.6 out and I still had a 7.0a2 on it. While it
 showed me a 7.0a4 is available when trying to update I just got a "You can
 not perform further updates on this system"-message and a windows popped
 up that my system is unsupported.

 Replying to [comment:4 gk]:
 > I just took my old OS X 10.6 out and I still had a 7.0a2 on it. While it
 showed me a 7.0a4 is available when trying to update I just got a "You can
 not perform further updates on this system"-message and a windows popped
 up that my system is unsupported.

 That is because our update manifest has minSupportedOSVersion="10.9" and
 the Darwin version for 10.6.8 happens to be 10.8. I don't have a macOS
 10.7 or 10.8 system to test with, but on a macOS 10.12.5 system
 `osVersion` is 16.6.0 after the following statement is executed:
  let osVersion = Services.sysinfo.getProperty("version");

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22558 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OSX 10.7.5 Auto updated 6.5.1 to incompatible 7

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22558: OSX 10.7.5 Auto updated 6.5.1 to incompatible 7
--+--
 Reporter:  dehv  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 The same happened with 6.5.2 on that machine fwiw.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22558 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OSX 10.7.5 Auto updated 6.5.1 to incompatible 7

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22558: OSX 10.7.5 Auto updated 6.5.1 to incompatible 7
--+--
 Reporter:  dehv  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 I just took my old OS X 10.6 out and I still had a 7.0a2 on it while it
 showed me a 7.0a4 is available when trying to update I just got a "You can
 not perform further updates on this system"-message and a windows popped
 up that my system is unsupported.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22558 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OSX 10.7.5 Auto updated 6.5.1 to incompatible 7

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22558: OSX 10.7.5 Auto updated 6.5.1 to incompatible 7
--+--
 Reporter:  dehv  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:2 mcs]:
 > I did some debugging, and it seems like the problem is that the
 `minSupportedOSVersion` in the XML update manifest needs to use the Darwin
 version number instead of the macOS one. For 10.9, we should use 13.0.0.
 See:
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darwin_(operating_system)#Release_history

 Really? That's surprising. We had `10.8` for osx32 for years now and did
 not get a single bug report IIRC.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22558 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OSX 10.7.5 Auto updated 6.5.1 to incompatible 7

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22558: OSX 10.7.5 Auto updated 6.5.1 to incompatible 7
--+--
 Reporter:  dehv  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 I did some debugging, and it seems like the problem is that the
 `minSupportedOSVersion` in the XML update manifest needs to use the Darwin
 version number instead of the macOS one. For 10.9, we should use 13.0.0.
 See:
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darwin_(operating_system)#Release_history

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22554 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove Battery API related bit in Torbutton

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22554: Remove Battery API related bit in Torbutton
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201706R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:5 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:4 gk]:
 > > Yes. I added that to our "catch-all"-ticket we currently have for
 clean-up (#19256).
 >
 > But shouldn't the code be fixed rather than removed? E.g.,
 `torbutton_update_thirdparty_prefs()` will never be called, but it seems
 like we want that functionality. But you or Arthur would know better than
 me.

 Good point. I think we should fix that, although the default we ship
 works. I opened #22560 for that.

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[tor-bugs] #22560 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update privacy.thirdparty.isolate preference in Torbutton

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22560: Update privacy.thirdparty.isolate preference in Torbutton
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-7.0-issues
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 `privacy.thirdparty.isolate` is gone with the switch to ESR52, yet we
 still try to use it in Torbutton. We should get rid of the preferences in
 `torbutton_update_thirdparty_prefs()` that we don't need anymore and adapt
 `privacy.thirdparty.isolate` for the remaining ones (it is
 `privacy.firstparty.isolate` now).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21916 [Applications/Tor Browser]: possible obsolete or incorrect pref settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21916: possible obsolete or incorrect pref settings
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-7.0-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-7.0 => tbb-7.0-must


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22551 [Applications/Tor Browser]: F-Droid's Orfox APK file not updated to Tor Browser 7.0 yet

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22551: F-Droid's Orfox APK file not updated to Tor Browser 7.0 yet
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-mobile
 * cc: n8fr8, amoghbl1 (added)


Comment:

 No, there is no Orfox component because the Tor Project is not
 distributing and developing it. That said we plan to work on a Tor Browser
 for mobile later this year with the aim to have a version on mobile that
 is in parity with the desktop version. Thus, we can leave it here for now.
 Adding mobile folks, though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20785 [Metrics/Censorship analysis]: Block of some direct users in Saudi Arabia, 2016-11-20

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20785: Block of some direct users in Saudi Arabia, 2016-11-20
-+--
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Censorship analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block sa  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Description changed by dcf:

Old description:

> On 2016-11-20, the number of direct users dropped from about 8000 to
> about 5500. There was a simultaneous increase in bridge users from about
> 500 to over 1200.
>
> [[Image(userstats-relay-country-sa-2016-08-28-2016-11-26-off.png)]]
> [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
> country.html?start=2016-08-28=2016-11-26=sa=off link]
>
> [[Image(userstats-bridge-country-sa-2016-08-28-2016-11-26.png)]]
> [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
> country.html?start=2016-08-28=2016-11-26=sa link]
>
> [[Image(userstats-bridge-combined-sa-2016-08-28-2016-11-26.png)]]
> [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
> combined.html?start=2016-08-28=2016-11-26=sa link]

New description:

 On 2016-11-20, the number of direct users dropped from about 8000 to about
 5500. There was a simultaneous increase in bridge users (mostly obfs4)
 from about 500 to over 1200.

 One month later, on 2016-12-22, the number of bridge users dropped again,
 almost back to where it was before.

 [[Image(userstats-relay-country-sa-2016-08-28-2017-06-01-off.png)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-
 country.html?start=2016-08-28=2017-06-01=sa=off link]

 [[Image(userstats-bridge-country-sa-2016-08-28-2017-06-01.png)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 country.html?start=2016-08-28=2017-06-01=sa link]

 [[Image(userstats-bridge-combined-sa-2016-08-28-2017-06-01.png)]]
 [https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 combined.html?start=2017-06-01=2016-11-26=sa link]

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21617 [Applications/Tor Browser]: RWX page observed on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21617: RWX page observed on Windows
--+---
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 I submitted a patch here:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1344034#c4

 I expect it will be straightforward to backport to TBB/ESR52. I'll wait
 for Mozilla's review before doing that.

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[tor-bugs] #22559 [Webpages]: Please add to good/bad ISPs page: bad experience, Turnkey Internet

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22559: Please add to good/bad ISPs page: bad experience, Turnkey Internet
-+---
 Reporter:  Theia|  Owner:  linda
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+---
 USA, Turnkey Internet (turnkeyinternet.net):

 Does not support Tor: "It does not sound like your intended use is a good
 fit for our network, we would kindly suggest you consider another hosting
 company"

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22556 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser 7.0: https everywhere does not upgrade to https automatically and NoScript allows all script by default

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22556: TorBrowser 7.0: https everywhere does not upgrade to https automatically
and NoScript allows all script by default
--+---
 Reporter:  maximol   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  assigned => needs_information


Comment:

 FWIW, MCB allows insecure passive content (i.e. images) on HTTPS sites.
 https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/viewMyClient.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22556 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser 7.0: https everywhere does not upgrade to https automatically and NoScript allows all script by default

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22556: TorBrowser 7.0: https everywhere does not upgrade to https automatically
and NoScript allows all script by default
--+---
 Reporter:  maximol   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 NoScript allows scripts by default in Tor Browser. Could you give an
 example for HTTPS Everywhere not upgrading every request when possible?
 Clicking at the HTTPS-Everywhere icon in the toolbar on different sides
 seems to indicate that it indeed is doing upgrades...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22556 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorBrowser 7.0: https everywhere does not upgrade to https automatically and NoScript allows all script by default

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22556: TorBrowser 7.0: https everywhere does not upgrade to https automatically
and NoScript allows all script by default
--+--
 Reporter:  maximol   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => assigned
 * owner:   => tbb-team


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22558 [Applications/Tor Browser]: OSX 10.7.5 Auto updated 6.5.1 to incompatible 7

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22558: OSX 10.7.5 Auto updated 6.5.1 to incompatible 7
--+--
 Reporter:  dehv  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: boklm (added)
 * owner:   => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 boklm: Is there something we can do server-side to fix that? IIRC the plan
 was to update users to 6.5.2 and don't offer further upgrades (which
 sounds like a good plan to me).

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[tor-bugs] #22558 [- Select a component]: OSX 10.7.5 Auto updated 6.5.1 to incompatible 7

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22558: OSX 10.7.5 Auto updated 6.5.1 to incompatible 7
--+-
 Reporter:  dehv  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Shouldn't the updater detect that doing so would break the install,
 forcing the user to uninstall, track down old version and re-install?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13260 [Core Tor/Tor]: Transform code to cleaner c99 style

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13260: Transform code to cleaner c99 style
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  coccinelle, tor-client technical-|  Actual Points:
  debt   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ahf):

 We should probably figure out what we want to do here:

 First two things I can think of:

 - Convert functions that returns 0 or 1 to return `bool` (`true`/`false`)
 from ``?
 - Lift `for` loop variables declarations into their loop initialiser?

 Additionally, It might be interesting to figure out when/if we can start
 using `C11` features?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22548 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Youtube downgrades VP9 videos to VP8 when can't find H.264

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22548: Youtube downgrades VP9 videos to VP8 when can't find H.264
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 It's unbelievable, but youtube removed VP9 version of my favorite videos
 (which were uploaded 8 years ago)! Sorry for the noise.

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[tor-bugs] #22557 [Webpages/Blog]: Comment pagination links could go to `#comments` anchors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22557: Comment pagination links could go to `#comments` anchors
---+
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #22013
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 On a page like https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-
 browser-70-released#comments, the comment pagination links at the bottom
 could have `#comments` appended to them, so that the page scrolls directly
 to the comments and you don't have to scroll down over the article again.

 I mean these links at the bottom:
 {{{
 1 / 2 / 3 / Next ›  Last »
 }}}

 So, for example, clicking "Next" would take you to
 https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-70-released?page=1#comments.

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[tor-bugs] #22556 [- Select a component]: TorBrowser 7.0: https everywhere does not upgrade to https automatically and NoScript allows all script by default

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22556: TorBrowser 7.0: https everywhere does not upgrade to https automatically
and NoScript allows all script by default
--+-
 Reporter:  maximol   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Just updated to TorBrowser 7.0 and noticed that NoScript allow all scripts
 and https everywhere does not upgrade every http request when possibile. I
 have to do it manually.
 Until TorBrowser 6.5.2 was working normally. What is happening?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22546 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SocksListenAddress error Tor browser 7.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22546: SocksListenAddress error Tor browser 7.0
--+---
 Reporter:  torlongtimeuser   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by torlongtimeuser):

 Thank you so much! I follow the code '+SocksPort' it works now, and really
 help me a lot.

 Sorry, I didn't know this change before.

 Also, there have another way. That need install a software 'Privoxy' to
 configure socks port.
 Not really need 'SocksListenAddress', but edit torrc better than install
 more software.


 Why I need config to other socks port?

 eg: What if some website need you browser add on 'Adobe Flash
 Player'?

 I wouldn't like add on FlashPlayer on tor browser.
 Because install AdobeFlashPlayer need administrator type
 account.
 That's mean the FlashPlayer could connect internet not use
 browser custom proxy.

 So the problem is some plugins(like:FlashPlayer) connection
 internet with out tor.


 Here have an idea to fix this problem.

 -Creat 2 guests virtual machine on 'VirtualBox'.

 Guest 1: Tor.
 Guest 2: Firefox add on FlashPlayer.

 -After setup network config use 'Internal Network'.
 -Let Guest2(Firefox) over Guest1(Tor).

 The FlashPlayer connect internet only way is over custom proxy
 (Tor).
 Because Tor and Firefox in defferent system, config with a local
 aera network.

 This is simply how this idea works.


 I always have more than 2 guests to build multi-layer network.

 2 guests virtual machine.
 Guest 1: Service and Bridge-Network.
 Guest 2: Tor Browser.

 Tor Browser  -over-  Service(eg:SSH)
 -over-  Internet(ISP)

 This is like most tor user.

 3 guests virtual machine.
 Guest 1: Service and Bridge-Network.
 Guest 2: Tor.
 Guest 3: Browser. (I actually use TorBrowser
 removed 'tor-launcher.xpi')

 Browser  -over-  Tor  -over-
 Service(eg:SSH)  -over-  Internet(ISP)

 The Web server get IP address is Tor exit node IP,
 even add on FlashPlayer.

 even if TorBrowser send information to NSA by
 'EgotisticalGiraffe', isn't my real IP.


 What if some web service blocked Tor IP?

 eg: When you edit Wikipedia anonymously or you search Google.

 Because web server get you IP is Tor exit node IP.
 When you search google may display "IPv4 Error" or
 something like that.
 You can add a VPN or SSH server over Tor (most VPN not
 work to use a proxy, I was use 'SoftetherVPN' on a windows guest).

 Browser  -over-  Service(eg:SSL-VPN)  -over-  Tor
 -over-  Service(eg:SSH)  -over-  Internet(ISP)

 In this model, the web service get final ip address is VPN
 IP.

 So you can normally visit most website, but not onion
 server.


 My ISP block down lots of web servers, more bad news: many servers on
 attack, control or blocked by government.

 That's why how tor important for me.
 Again, Thanks so much tor team!

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #16569, #18774

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #16569, #18774 by nickm:
milestone to 

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15014 [Archived/general]: Socks5 and socks5t got changed and broke compatibility with privoxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15014: Socks5 and socks5t got changed and broke compatibility with privoxy
-+-
 Reporter:  johnakabean  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Archived/general |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.5.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  privoxy, socks5, socks5t, tor-   |  Actual Points:
  client |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #9001 [Core Tor/Tor]: Slow Guard Discovery of Hidden Services and Clients

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9001: Slow Guard Discovery of Hidden Services and Clients
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, path-bias, guard-discovery,  |  Actual Points:
  needs-proposal, mike-can, prop247, tor-guard   |
Parent ID:  #5456| Points:  large
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, path-bias, needs-proposal, mike-can, prop247, tor-
 guard =>
 tor-hs, path-bias, guard-discovery, needs-proposal, mike-can, prop247,
 tor-guard


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13828 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_dir and rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client to avoid duplicate code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13828: Refactor rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_dir and
rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client to avoid duplicate code
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, easy, refactor, technical-   |  Actual Points:
  debt   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, easy, refactor => tor-hs, easy, refactor, technical-
   debt


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13837 [Core Tor/Tor]: Mitigate guard discovery by pinning middle node

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13837: Mitigate guard discovery by pinning middle node
+--
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-guard, guard-discovery  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #9001   | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * parent:   => #9001


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13837 [Core Tor/Tor]: Mitigate guard discovery by pinning middle node

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13837: Mitigate guard discovery by pinning middle node
+--
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-guard, guard-discovery  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, tor-guard => tor-hs, tor-guard, guard-discovery
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13856 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure #9262 didn't introduce new OOM opportunities

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13856: Make sure #9262 didn't introduce new OOM opportunities
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  andrea
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tor-relay, oom, global-scheduler  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13908 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make it safe to set NumDirectoryGuards=1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13908: Make it safe to set NumDirectoryGuards=1
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal, tor-client, needs-   |  Actual Points:
  design guards client-enumeration research- |
  program|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  needs-proposal, tor-client =>
 needs-proposal, tor-client, needs-design guards client-enumeration
 research-program
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13815 [Core Tor/Tor]: Attempt to port tor to Google's BoringSSL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13815: Attempt to port tor to Google's BoringSSL
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.6.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay openssl boringssl post-|  Actual Points:
  deprecation|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  lorax, tor-relay => tor-relay openssl boringssl post-
   deprecation
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13817 [Core Tor/Tor]: Untange kludgey library detection, particularly for SSL forks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13817: Untange kludgey library detection, particularly for SSL forks
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.2.6.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-build build library-detection  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #6311  | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  lorax => tor-build build library-detection
 * priority:  Medium => High
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13753 [Core Tor/Tor]: Validate is_canonical more thoroughly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13753: Validate is_canonical more thoroughly
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, security, tor-sponsorS-   |  Actual Points:
  orphan |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorS-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => High
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13800 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit does not close after hidden service is shutdown via control port

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13800: circuit does not close after hidden service is shutdown via control port
+--
 Reporter:  dawuud  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs hs-shutdown  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-hs hs-shutdown
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13792 [Core Tor/Tor]: HS statistics for private tor network to gather info on services, clients and relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13792: HS statistics for private tor network to gather info on services, 
clients
and relays
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, performance, metrics,|  Actual Points:
  privcount-maybe|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, performance => tor-hs, performance, metrics,
 privcount-maybe


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13755 [Core Tor/Tor]: Declare that Windows XP and earlier are not officially supported.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13755: Declare that Windows XP and earlier are not officially supported.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, windows, documentation,   |  Actual Points:
  deprecation|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, windows, documentation => tor-relay, windows,
 documentation, deprecation
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13739 [Core Tor/Tor]: Optimize the functions called in circuit_launch_by_extend_info()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13739: Optimize the functions called in circuit_launch_by_extend_info()
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, performance, profile,|  Actual Points:
  optimization   |
Parent ID:  #15463   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, performance => tor-hs, performance, profile,
 optimization


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13737 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move circuit building crypto to worker

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13737: Move circuit building crypto to worker
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-hs, multicore,   |  Actual Points:
  performance, tor-dos, term-project-ideas   |
  intro  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client, tor-hs, multicore, performance, tor-dos =>
 tor-client, tor-hs, multicore, performance, tor-dos, term-project-
 ideas intro


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13705 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow relays to promise in their descriptor that their IP address won't change

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13705: Allow relays to promise in their descriptor that their IP address won't
change
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, needs-proposal, theft-|  Actual Points:
  resistance, intro  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, needs-proposal => tor-relay, needs-proposal, theft-
 resistance, intro
 * points:   => 5


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13703 [Core Tor/Tor]: Adding doc/HARDENING

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13703: Adding doc/HARDENING
-+-
 Reporter:  mmcc |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  hardening, security, opsec, docs,|  Actual Points:
  lorax tor-relay tor-doc|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  hardening, security, opsec, docs, lorax => hardening,
 security, opsec, docs, lorax tor-relay tor-doc


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13703 [Core Tor/Tor]: Adding doc/HARDENING

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13703: Adding doc/HARDENING
-+-
 Reporter:  mmcc |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  hardening, security, opsec, docs,|  Actual Points:
  lorax  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * severity:   => Normal
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


Comment:

 IMO we should take this, merge it, pull out anything that looks wrong,
 mark it as a working draft, and let people submit patches to it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13694 [Core Tor/Tor]: Ship with native build instructions for windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13694: Ship with native build instructions for windows
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  win32, build, lorax tor-build-doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  win32, build, lorax => win32, build, lorax tor-build-doc
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13697 [Core Tor/Tor]: Carry entropy across invocations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13697: Carry entropy across invocations
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay rng security  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-relay rng security
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13621 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add example configuation file for relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13621: Add example configuation file for relays
-+-
 Reporter:  federico3|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay configuration torrc|  Actual Points:
  example tor-doc|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-relay configuration torrc example tor-doc
 * status:  new => needs_review
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13605 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a client/relay-side ReducedExitPolicy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13605: Create a client/relay-side ReducedExitPolicy
-+
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  medium
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 Oh hey, there's a patch here!  We should review this for when the next
 merge window happens.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13605 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a client/relay-side ReducedExitPolicy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13605: Create a client/relay-side ReducedExitPolicy
-+
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  medium
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  tor-relay, easy, lorax => tor-relay, easy
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13603 [Core Tor/Tor]: Many channels closing with "IOERROR" reason given on control port. (was: too much IOERRORS ?)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13603: Many channels closing with "IOERROR" reason given on control port.
-+-
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.5.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay needs-analysis networking  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-relay needs-analysis networking


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13386 [Core Tor/Tor]: "opening new log file" line goes to err-logfile despite being at loglevel notice

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13386: "opening new log file" line goes to err-logfile despite being at 
loglevel
notice
---+---
 Reporter:  toralf |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-design logging opening-file  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => needs-design logging opening-file


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13444 [Core Tor/Tor]: "GhostNode" - support relays that cannot accept incoming connections. (was: "GhostNode" - a new way to build IP-hidden networking)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13444: "GhostNode" - support relays that cannot accept incoming connections.
-+-
 Reporter:  ikurua22 |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anomity, circuit, torrc, security,   |  Actual Points:
  needs-proposal research-program|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  anomity, circuit, torrc, security => anomity, circuit, torrc,
 security, needs-proposal research-program
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This is a complex enough design space that it's going to take a bunch of
 research to have a chance of working out right.  It seems to resemble
 stuff that various P2P designs do in order to support some nodes that have
 outgoing-only capabilities.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13461 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add OS X Xcode Project to contrib

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13461: Add OS X Xcode Project to contrib
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, osx, build, tor-client needs-   |  Actual Points:
  osx-knowldge portability   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => new
 * keywords:  doc, osx, build, want-pony => doc, osx, build, tor-client
 needs-osx-knowldge portability


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13466 [Core Tor/Tor]: Collect aggregate stats of ntor-using hidden service interactions vs tap-using interactions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13466: Collect aggregate stats of ntor-using hidden service interactions vs 
tap-
using interactions
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-hs, privcount-maybe   |  Actual Points:
  needs-design metrics   |
Parent ID:  #13195   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, tor-hs => tor-relay, tor-hs, privcount-maybe needs-
 design metrics


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13484 [Core Tor/Tor]: Do we have edge cases with rend_consider_descriptor_republication()? Can we refactor it to be cleaner?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13484: Do we have edge cases with rend_consider_descriptor_republication()? 
Can we
refactor it to be cleaner?
-+--
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
-+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: asn, dgoulet (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13494 [Core Tor/Tor]: Regression test about Hidden Service time synchronization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13494: Regression test about Hidden Service time synchronization
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tests, clock, clock-sync,|  Actual Points:
  ntp, needs-diagnosis   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, tests => tor-hs, tests, clock, clock-sync, ntp, needs-
 diagnosis


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13499 [Core Tor/Tor]: Generate usable coredumps when using ASAN.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13499: Generate usable coredumps when using ASAN.
--+--
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 The history on the code.google.com bug indicates that the correct fix was
 merged upstream to clang and gcc, so I'm going to suggest that the answer
 here is "worksforme."

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13589 [Core Tor/Tor]: bridge authority could do bandwidth test along with reachability test

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13589: bridge authority could do bandwidth test along with reachability test
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, tor-bridgeauth,  |  Actual Points:
  measuring bandwidth|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-bridge => tor-bridge, tor-bridgeauth, measuring bandwidth
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13508 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add messaging protocol that is resistant to traffic analysis

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13508: Add messaging protocol that is resistant to traffic analysis
-+-
 Reporter:  Alan |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  messaging protocol store-and-|  Actual Points:
  forward traffic-analysis needs-proposal hard   |
  mixnet research-program|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:
 messaging protocol store-and-forward traffic-analysis needs-proposal
 hard
 =>
 messaging protocol store-and-forward traffic-analysis needs-proposal
 hard mixnet research-program
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13590 [Core Tor/Tor]: Extend HiddenServicePort VIRTPORT semantics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13590: Extend HiddenServicePort VIRTPORT semantics
-+-
 Reporter:  grarpamp |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.5.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, shoot-self-in-foot honeypot  |  Actual Points:
  cfg|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => Low
 * keywords:  tor-hs, lorax => tor-hs, shoot-self-in-foot honeypot cfg
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21767 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor CA - .onion SSL system

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21767: Tor CA - .onion SSL system
--+--
 Reporter:  ikurua22  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by guido):

 * cc: guido@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21321: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by guido):

 * cc: guido@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13410 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable self-signed certificate warnings when visiting .onion sites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13410: Disable self-signed certificate warnings when visiting .onion sites
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by guido):

 * cc: guido@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22554 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove Battery API related bit in Torbutton

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22554: Remove Battery API related bit in Torbutton
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201706R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:5 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:4 gk]:
 > > Yes. I added that to our "catch-all"-ticket we currently have for
 clean-up (#19256).
 >
 > But shouldn't the code be fixed rather than removed?
 That what I wanted to ask in #19256 :)
 > E.g., `torbutton_update_thirdparty_prefs()` will never be called, but it
 seems like we want that functionality. But you or Arthur would know better
 than me.
 Try to change third-party cookies settings in Options ;)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21852 [Applications/Tor Browser]: update jemalloc?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21852: update jemalloc?
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 For esr52 cycle it is possible to use jemalloc4, updated to 4.5 at least
 or later, or you are going to use better approaches?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22554 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove Battery API related bit in Torbutton

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22554: Remove Battery API related bit in Torbutton
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201706R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: arthuredelstein (added)


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 gk]:
 > Yes. I added that to our "catch-all"-ticket we currently have for clean-
 up (#19256).

 But shouldn't the code be fixed rather than removed? E.g.,
 `torbutton_update_thirdparty_prefs()` will never be called, but it seems
 like we want that functionality. But you or Arthur would know better than
 me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22496 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Check that updater changes coming with Firefox 52.2.0esr are unproblematic for Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22496: Check that updater changes coming with Firefox 52.2.0esr are 
unproblematic
for Tor Browser
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201706  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Kathy and I finished our testing. We skipped testing Linux 32-bit since
 the code, system APIs, and behavior should be identical to Linux 64-bit
 (or nearly so). I think we are done here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21804 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser refuses to start with : Corrupt redzone 0 bytes after 0x7f0503ede9d0 (size 80), byte=0x0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21804: Tor Browser refuses to start with : Corrupt redzone 0 bytes 
after
0x7f0503ede9d0 (size 80), byte=0x0
--+--
 Reporter:  adrelanos |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:6 adrelanos]:
 > 6.5a6
 >
 > * Qubes Debian stretch based AppVM: works
 > * VirtualBox Debian stretch: works
 > * VirtualBox Whonix Debian stretch based VM: broken
 > * Qubes-Whonix Debian stretch based AppVM: broken
 >
 > "Some setting that Whonix changes or package that Whonix does (not)
 install is triggering this issue." (No recompiled packages.) Any advice on
 narrow it down more than that?

 Unfortunately, not. We won't ship Tor Browser with jemalloc4 anymore as
 Mozilla has indicated that they won't use it in the future. Thus, this bug
 is somewhat moot and I'll close it as WONTFIX. (Might still be interesting
 to understand why this happens in the first place at all)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21852 [Applications/Tor Browser]: update jemalloc?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21852: update jemalloc?
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 We don't want to update jemalloc4. Actually, we'll remove it as Mozilla
 won't ship it and the tiny bit of defense we currently use is gone
 upstream.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22451 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:cache is not useful anymore in ESR52-based Tor Browser (only wyciwyg-URIs if at all any)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22451: about:cache is not useful anymore in ESR52-based Tor Browser (only 
wyciwyg-
URIs if at all any)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201706,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201706, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-|
  regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:8 gk]:
 > I filed https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1371651 as this is
 a Firefox issue.
 That what I meant in comment:1.
 Also `about:memory` shows that isolated entries look like
 {{{
 │   │  ├───2,053,002 B (00.52%) ── memory-
 storage(O^privateBrowsingId=1=torproject.org,p,/M)
 }}}
 Therefore, the `^` sign may be a problem for
 `chrome://global/content/aboutCache.js` parser.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22554 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove Battery API related bit in Torbutton

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22554: Remove Battery API related bit in Torbutton
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201706R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:3 mcs]:
 > r=mcs
 > This patch looks fine. Should we should also remove the battery status
 text from the security slider UI? It looks like it is mentioned in the
 `torbutton.prefs.resist_fingerprinting_tooltip` entity (within the
 torbutton.dtd files).

 Good idea, will do.

 > Regarding comment:2, there are several other occurrences of
 `privacy.thirdparty.isolate` that also should be fixed.

 Yes. I added that to our "catch-all"-ticket we currently have for clean-up
 (#19256).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19256 [Applications/Tor Browser]: remove more unused code (and related strings) from Torbutton

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19256: remove more unused code (and related strings) from Torbutton
--+---
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 mcs mentioned in comment:3:ticket:22554 that there are several other
 occurrences of `privacy.thirdparty.isolate` that should be fixed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22541 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Support for Tor Browser without Tor?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22541: Support for Tor Browser without Tor?
--+--
 Reporter:  nido  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 (If "support" is meant to be merging patches if those other
 vendors/interested parties showed up, then, yes, we would do that.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22541 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Support for Tor Browser without Tor?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22541: Support for Tor Browser without Tor?
--+--
 Reporter:  nido  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 FWIW: We still have plans to help other interested parties (like VPN
 companies) to ship a browser with all the privacy/security features Tor
 Browser has but without tor. But we won't do it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22555 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update to June GeoIP2 database

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22555: Update to June GeoIP2 database
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client tor-relay 024-backport|  implemented
  025-backport 026-backport 027-backport |  Actual Points:
  028-backport 029-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13297 [Core Tor/Tor]: compute_weighted_bandwidths() broken for dirauths

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13297: compute_weighted_bandwidths() broken for dirauths
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth routing weighting  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-dirauth routing weighting
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13268 [Core Tor/Tor]: Hidden service Load balancing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13268: Hidden service Load balancing
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Onionbalance is the current best-so-far solution to this issue, though
 we'd like to have even more solutions in the future.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13234 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consensus Algorithm Causes Flip-Flopping

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13234: Consensus Algorithm Causes Flip-Flopping
-+-
 Reporter:  pipeep   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth sybil voting needs-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-dirauth => tor-dirauth sybil voting needs-spec
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Related to #8163 , I think.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13231 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor(Windows) don't close ports when killed from service control

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13231: Tor(Windows) don't close ports when killed from service control
+--
 Reporter:  ikurua22|  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay windows win32 nt-service  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-relay windows win32 nt-service
 * priority:  High => Medium
 * type:  task => defect
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13221 [Core Tor/Tor]: Misleading error messages about bind_ipv4_only and bind_ipv6_only?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13221: Misleading error messages about bind_ipv4_only and bind_ipv6_only?
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, easy, logging, message,  |  Actual Points:
  usability  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client, lorax => tor-client, easy, logging, message,
 usability
 * points:   => .1
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13167 [Core Tor/Tor]: Export dirauth files via directory protocol

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13167: Export dirauth files via directory protocol
-+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics metrics-wants tor-dirauth|  Actual Points:
  tor-client needs-spec  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  metrics => metrics metrics-wants tor-dirauth tor-client needs-
 spec
 * points:   => 3
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Is this still an ongoing problem?  If so it's something we can prioritize.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13155 [Core Tor/Tor]: I can use an extend cell to remotely determine whether two relays have a connection open

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13155: I can use an extend cell to remotely determine whether two relays have a
connection open
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-insight needs-design security  |  Actual Points:
  maybe-wontfix  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => needs-insight needs-design security maybe-wontfix
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13194 [Core Tor/Tor]: Track time between ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS and RENDEZVOUS1 cell

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13194: Track time between ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS and RENDEZVOUS1 cell
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-hs, needs-design  |  Actual Points:
  privcount-maybe metrics performance|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, tor-hs => tor-relay, tor-hs, needs-design
 privcount-maybe metrics performance


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13195 [Core Tor/Tor]: Collect aggregate stats around hidden service descriptor publishes and fetches

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13195: Collect aggregate stats around hidden service descriptor publishes and
fetches
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-hs metrics needs- |  Actual Points:
  design privcount-maybe |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, tor-hs metrics needs-design => tor-relay, tor-hs
 metrics needs-design privcount-maybe


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13195 [Core Tor/Tor]: Collect aggregate stats around hidden service descriptor publishes and fetches

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13195: Collect aggregate stats around hidden service descriptor publishes and
fetches
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-hs metrics needs- |  Actual Points:
  design |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, tor-hs => tor-relay, tor-hs metrics needs-design


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22555 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update to June GeoIP2 database

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22555: Update to June GeoIP2 database
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client tor-relay 024-backport|  Actual Points:
  025-backport 026-backport 027-backport |
  028-backport 029-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13260 [Core Tor/Tor]: Transform code to cleaner c99 style

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13260: Transform code to cleaner c99 style
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  coccinelle, tor-client technical-|  Actual Points:
  debt   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: ahf, catalyst (added)
 * keywords:   => coccinelle, tor-client technical-debt
 * severity:   => Normal
 * priority:  Medium => Low


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[tor-bugs] #22555 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update to June GeoIP2 database

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22555: Update to June GeoIP2 database
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:
 Type:   | Status:  new
  enhancement|
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-client tor-relay 024-backport
 Severity:  Normal   |  025-backport 026-backport 027-backport
 |  028-backport 029-backport
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 ​[https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/tor.git/log/?h=geoip-jun2017
 geoip-jun2017] contains the updated `geoip` and `geoip6` files with IPv4
 and IPv6 ranges and is supposed to be merged into maint-0.2.4 and all
 other relevant branches.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13258 [Core Tor/Tor]: Keep stats on effectiveness of consensus diffs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13258: Keep stats on effectiveness of consensus diffs
-+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay metrics bandwidth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: ahf (added)
 * keywords:  low-bandwidth, sponsor4 => tor-relay metrics bandwidth
 * points:  medium => 3
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13147 [Core Tor/Tor]: Curious debian hurd unit test failure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13147: Curious debian hurd unit test failure
-+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client test unit-test debian |  Actual Points:
  hurd needs-hurd|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-client test unit-test debian hurd needs-hurd
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13129 [Core Tor/Tor]: Option for downgrading "Rejecting SOCKS request for anonymous connection to private address" log

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13129: Option for downgrading "Rejecting SOCKS request for anonymous 
connection to
private address" log
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:10 gk]:
 > Yes, I am fine with that unless you see a non-Tor Browser related reason
 to keep it open (I think Tor Messenger did the same https:// trick and
 might now need to switch as well. I'll check that).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13112 [Core Tor/Tor]: Some things are probably broken when we advertise multiple ORPorts and only some are reachable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13112: Some things are probably broken when we advertise multiple ORPorts and 
only
some are reachable
-+-
 Reporter:  andrea   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay reachability self-testing  |  Actual Points:
  needs-design ipv6 tor-bridge   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  lorax => tor-relay reachability self-testing needs-design ipv6
 tor-bridge


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13082 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use a better default torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13082: Use a better default torrc
--+
 Reporter:  saint |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay torrc needs-design  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  SponsorZ => tor-relay torrc needs-design


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