[tor-bugs] #22553 [- Select a component]: TOR 7 does not start on OS X 10.9.5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22553: TOR 7 does not start on OS X 10.9.5
--+-
 Reporter:  StefanK   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 After upgrading from 6.5.2 to 7.0, an error message about for-starter
 crashing displays when starting TOR 7.
 Removing and reinstalling TOR 7 from dmg shows same problem.

 After removing TOR 7 and reinstalling 6.5.2, this now also fails to start
 with same error message

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21321: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 I am not sure yet about how to deal with the various security indicators
 in the browser UI (like padlock icon) but it seems to me we could make
 sure that the scary password field warning does not show up anymore when
 being on an HTTP .onion site. Even if we might disagree about how secure
 exactly that mode is I feel it is sufficiently secure that the warning
 against plain-HTTP password fields is not warranted. Does that sound like
 a reasonable start?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22553 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TOR 7 does not start on OS X 10.9.5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22553: TOR 7 does not start on OS X 10.9.5
--+---
 Reporter:  StefanK   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * priority:  Immediate => Very High
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser
 * severity:  Blocker => Critical


Comment:

 What is "for-starter crashing displays"? could you give us the complete
 error message?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22553 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TOR 7 does not start on OS X 10.9.5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22553: TOR 7 does not start on OS X 10.9.5
--+--
 Reporter:  StefanK   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => assigned
 * owner:   => tbb-team


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22553 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TOR 7 does not start on OS X 10.9.5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22553: TOR 7 does not start on OS X 10.9.5
--+---
 Reporter:  StefanK   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => needs_information


Comment:

 Oh, and does a normal Firefox 52 ESR work on your system?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #5293 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Neuter fingerprinting with Battery API

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5293: Neuter fingerprinting with Battery API
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, ff52-esr-will-   |  Actual Points:
  have   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:14 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [comment:13 gk]:
 > > Good idea. Removed with commit
 885479878d591ce61fa573912eae4ea062dc54c6 and
 886808dc4e21eef3595fa1042f792927bb898193 on `tor-browser-52.1.0esr-7.0-2`
 and `tor-browser-52.1.1esr-7.0-1`.
 > Not removed in a clean new 7.0 stable.

 Actually, that bit got removed. What is happening is that we still have
 code in Torbutton that is messing with the preference. I have opened
 #22554 to address this.

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[tor-bugs] #22554 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove Battery API related bit in Torbutton

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22554: Remove Battery API related bit in Torbutton
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-torbutton
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 In #5293 we removed the Battery API preference (`dom.battery.enabled`)
 from our custom prefs file, `000-tor-browser.js`. The rationale was that
 Mozilla made the preference accessible only by non-webcontent (see:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1313580) and we therefore
 don't need to set it ourselves anymore.

 We missed that Torbutton is dealing with the pref as well. We should
 remove that bit, too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21321: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by yawning):

 Replying to [comment:13 gk]:
 > I am not sure yet about how to deal with the various security indicators
 in the browser UI (like padlock icon) but it seems to me we could make
 sure that the scary password field warning does not show up anymore when
 being on an HTTP .onion site. Even if we might disagree about how secure
 exactly that mode is I feel it is sufficiently secure that the warning
 against plain-HTTP password fields is not warranted. Does that sound like
 a reasonable start?

 As massively flawed and totally horrible as the CA system is, having a CA
 signed TLS cert serves to bind the address to an external identity.
 `.onion` address do not have this property.  What assurance is there that
 the address a user is entering their credentials to is the correct one?

 And yes, DV certs exist.  Normal FQDNs are not a UI disaster like the
 current (and prop-224) `.onion`s are.

 I'm open to being convinced otherwise, but I currently will be strongly
 against blurring the lines between "http over onions" and "https".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22554 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove Battery API related bit in Torbutton

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22554: Remove Battery API related bit in Torbutton
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201706R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-torbutton => tbb-torbutton, TorBrowserTeam201706R


Comment:

 See `bug_22554`
 
(https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/torbutton.git/commit/?h=bug_22554&id=5f81b55824ff783abba4052c66e7068279c23c7a)
 in my public Torbutton repo for a patch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22548 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Youtube downgrades VP9 videos to VP8 when can't find H.264

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22548: Youtube downgrades VP9 videos to VP8 when can't find H.264
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Interesting. Does that happen with a normal Firefox 52 ESR as well? If
 not, how can I reproduce that degradation?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22526 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB reloads nonstop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22526: TBB reloads nonstop
--+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:5 cypherpunks]:
 > 22530 looks related but is it really a duplicate?
 > Could this issue be used to track mitigations for websites that depend
 on Javascript, and 22530 for making sure that nothing on torproject.org
 depends on Javascript?

 So far it seems to me that our blog is the only website that exhibits this
 weird issue which is why I have marked this as a duplicate. If it turns
 out that there are a bunch of other websites showing the same problem,
 yes, let's reopen this ticket and think about ways to address it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22552 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable "recently bookmarked"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22552: Disable "recently bookmarked"
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 There is a `dateAdded` field in your bookmarks database on your disk.
 Thus, disabling "recently bookmarked" does not really help: the
 information is tied to bookmarking itself. Just solving one and keeping
 the other is not a thing we should so.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22554 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove Battery API related bit in Torbutton

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22554: Remove Battery API related bit in Torbutton
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201706R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:1 gk]:
 > See `bug_22554`
 
(https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/torbutton.git/commit/?h=bug_22554&id=5f81b55824ff783abba4052c66e7068279c23c7a)
 in my public Torbutton repo for a patch.
 (Maybe, then `thirdparty` -> `firstparty` and `sharedWorkers` -> `null` in
 the next function?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21982 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Fix Tor Browser testsuite tests on ESR52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21982: Fix Tor Browser testsuite tests on ESR52
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-7.0-must, TorBrowserTeam201706   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 To fix the `dom-objects-enumeration` test, the following names have been
 added to the list of known objects:
 {{{
 ImageBitmapRenderingContext
 WebKitCSSMatrix
 WebGLQuery
 MediaStreamTrackEvent
 Permissions
 FileSystem
 FileSystemFileEntry
 HTMLDetailsElement
 FileSystemEntry
 FileSystemDirectoryReader
 WebGLContextEvent
 DataTransferItemList
 DataTransferItem
 FileSystemDirectoryEntry
 PermissionStatus
 WebGLVertexArrayObject
 CSSKeyframeRule
 CSSKeyframesRule
 onabsolutedeviceorientation
 ondragexit
 onloadend
 onselectstart
 ontoggle
 onanimationend
 onanimationiteration
 onanimationstart
 ontransitionend
 onwebkitanimationend
 onwebkitanimationiteration
 onwebkitanimationstart
 onwebkittransitionend
 isSecureContext
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21982 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Fix Tor Browser testsuite tests on ESR52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21982: Fix Tor Browser testsuite tests on ESR52
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-7.0-must, TorBrowserTeam201706   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 To fix the `dom-objects-enumeration-worker` test, the following names have
 been added to the list of known objects:

 {{{
 Crypto
 CustomEvent
 Directory
 FileReader
 ImageBitmapRenderingContext
 SubtleCrypto
 crypto
 isSecureContext
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21321: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13410

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21321: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 This is Tor Browser, not Firefox. If you say HTTP .onion or HTTPS .onion
 is insecure, then you need to update your Tor manual and documentation to
 state .onion is dangerous.

 Tor Browser must accept HTTP .onion and HTTPS .onion as safe TLD.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21321: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > 1) Using .onion on plain Firefox is indeed NOT secure and I think it is
 smart if Firefox > users get this warning in case they've proxied their
 browser to use Tor.

 Tor user should use Tor Browser. No exception.
 Using native Firefox with Tor will do some level of harm to user's
 privacy(firefox telemetry, sending computer information to mozilla
 servers, etc).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13410 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable self-signed certificate warnings when visiting .onion sites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13410: Disable self-signed certificate warnings when visiting .onion sites
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 related https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21767

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22511 [Community]: Tor Code of Conduct

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22511: Tor Code of Conduct
---+-
 Reporter:  alison |  Owner:
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22079 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:2 arma]:
 > To be constructive: the right way to engage on this topic is to first do
 useful things for Tor and the Tor community, and then people will be
 excited to listen to your perspective when we are considering things like
 the code of conduct.


 Well, wasn't the obsession with the 'meritocracy'-thing one of the
 underlying reasons that lead to the *need* of a Code of Conduct, in the
 first place? Either way, I think it's fair to say, that 'cypherpunks' has
 been more helpful for than 'alison'...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22554 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove Battery API related bit in Torbutton

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22554: Remove Battery API related bit in Torbutton
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201706R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 r=mcs
 This oatch looks fine. Should we should also remove the battery status
 text from the security slider UI? It looks like it is mentioned in the
 `torbutton.prefs.resist_fingerprinting_tooltip` entity (within the
 torbutton.dtd files)

 Regarding comment:2, there are several other occurrences of
 `privacy.thirdparty.isolate` that also should be fixed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22451 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:cache is not useful anymore in ESR52-based Tor Browser (only wyciwyg-URIs if at all any)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22451: about:cache is not useful anymore in ESR52-based Tor Browser (only 
wyciwyg-
URIs if at all any)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201706,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201706, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-|
  regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 I filed https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1371651 as this is a
 Firefox issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12940 [Core Tor/Tor]: Separate configuration parameters for separate client ports

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12940: Separate configuration parameters for separate client ports
--+--
 Reporter:  brainchild|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Closed as duplicate of #6883

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Re: [tor-bugs] #6883 [Core Tor/Tor]: Separate configuration options for separate Socks/NATD/Trans/DNS ports (was: Roles for multiple Socks/NATD/Trans/DNS ports)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6883: Separate configuration options for separate Socks/NATD/Trans/DNS ports
-+-
 Reporter:  grarpamp |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.3.21-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client configuration torrc   |  Actual Points:
  options ports  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Closed #12940 as a duplicate of this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12970 [Core Tor/Tor]: dir-spec's a-line shouldn't mention portlists

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12970: dir-spec's a-line shouldn't mention portlists
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * severity:   => Normal
 * owner:   => nickm
 * points:   => 0
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
 * keywords:  tor-spec, needs-proposal, lorax => tor-spec


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13059 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create bad-relays file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13059: Create bad-relays file
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth bad-relays interface  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #12898| Points:  small
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-dirauth bad-relays interface


Comment:

 This is still a good idea, and I'd love us to pick it up again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13043 [Core Tor/Tor]: torspec lies about accepting both IPv4 and IPv6 for ORAddress lines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13043: torspec lies about accepting both IPv4 and IPv6 for ORAddress lines
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  massar
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => new
 * keywords:  torspec, bridgedb-parsers, lorax => tor-spec
 * points:   => .1
 * severity:   => Normal
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13078 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a ROUTERSET_ML config type, accept spaces in fingerprints?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13078: Add a ROUTERSET_ML config type, accept spaces in fingerprints?
-+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay tor-dirauth configuration  |  Actual Points:
  confparse  |
Parent ID:  #12898   | Points:  small
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-relay tor-dirauth configuration confparse
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13081 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix build with Visual Studio in Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13081: Fix build with Visual Studio in Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  NewEraCracker|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, msvc, lorax, intro,   |  Actual Points:
  029-proposed, windows, compiler|
Parent ID:   | Points:  medium
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, msvc, lorax, intro, 029-proposed => tor-relay,
 msvc, lorax, intro, 029-proposed, windows, compiler


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13082 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use a better default torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13082: Use a better default torrc
--+
 Reporter:  saint |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay torrc needs-design  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  SponsorZ => tor-relay torrc needs-design


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13112 [Core Tor/Tor]: Some things are probably broken when we advertise multiple ORPorts and only some are reachable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13112: Some things are probably broken when we advertise multiple ORPorts and 
only
some are reachable
-+-
 Reporter:  andrea   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay reachability self-testing  |  Actual Points:
  needs-design ipv6 tor-bridge   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  lorax => tor-relay reachability self-testing needs-design ipv6
 tor-bridge


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13129 [Core Tor/Tor]: Option for downgrading "Rejecting SOCKS request for anonymous connection to private address" log

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13129: Option for downgrading "Rejecting SOCKS request for anonymous 
connection to
private address" log
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:10 gk]:
 > Yes, I am fine with that unless you see a non-Tor Browser related reason
 to keep it open (I think Tor Messenger did the same https:// trick and
 might now need to switch as well. I'll check that).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13147 [Core Tor/Tor]: Curious debian hurd unit test failure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13147: Curious debian hurd unit test failure
-+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client test unit-test debian |  Actual Points:
  hurd needs-hurd|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-client test unit-test debian hurd needs-hurd
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13258 [Core Tor/Tor]: Keep stats on effectiveness of consensus diffs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13258: Keep stats on effectiveness of consensus diffs
-+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay metrics bandwidth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: ahf (added)
 * keywords:  low-bandwidth, sponsor4 => tor-relay metrics bandwidth
 * points:  medium => 3
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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[tor-bugs] #22555 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update to June GeoIP2 database

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22555: Update to June GeoIP2 database
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:
 Type:   | Status:  new
  enhancement|
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-client tor-relay 024-backport
 Severity:  Normal   |  025-backport 026-backport 027-backport
 |  028-backport 029-backport
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 ​[https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/tor.git/log/?h=geoip-jun2017
 geoip-jun2017] contains the updated `geoip` and `geoip6` files with IPv4
 and IPv6 ranges and is supposed to be merged into maint-0.2.4 and all
 other relevant branches.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13260 [Core Tor/Tor]: Transform code to cleaner c99 style

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13260: Transform code to cleaner c99 style
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  coccinelle, tor-client technical-|  Actual Points:
  debt   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: ahf, catalyst (added)
 * keywords:   => coccinelle, tor-client technical-debt
 * severity:   => Normal
 * priority:  Medium => Low


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22555 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update to June GeoIP2 database

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22555: Update to June GeoIP2 database
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client tor-relay 024-backport|  Actual Points:
  025-backport 026-backport 027-backport |
  028-backport 029-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13195 [Core Tor/Tor]: Collect aggregate stats around hidden service descriptor publishes and fetches

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13195: Collect aggregate stats around hidden service descriptor publishes and
fetches
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-hs metrics needs- |  Actual Points:
  design |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, tor-hs => tor-relay, tor-hs metrics needs-design


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13195 [Core Tor/Tor]: Collect aggregate stats around hidden service descriptor publishes and fetches

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13195: Collect aggregate stats around hidden service descriptor publishes and
fetches
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-hs metrics needs- |  Actual Points:
  design privcount-maybe |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, tor-hs metrics needs-design => tor-relay, tor-hs
 metrics needs-design privcount-maybe


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13194 [Core Tor/Tor]: Track time between ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS and RENDEZVOUS1 cell

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13194: Track time between ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS and RENDEZVOUS1 cell
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-hs, needs-design  |  Actual Points:
  privcount-maybe metrics performance|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, tor-hs => tor-relay, tor-hs, needs-design
 privcount-maybe metrics performance


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13155 [Core Tor/Tor]: I can use an extend cell to remotely determine whether two relays have a connection open

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13155: I can use an extend cell to remotely determine whether two relays have a
connection open
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-insight needs-design security  |  Actual Points:
  maybe-wontfix  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => needs-insight needs-design security maybe-wontfix
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13167 [Core Tor/Tor]: Export dirauth files via directory protocol

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13167: Export dirauth files via directory protocol
-+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics metrics-wants tor-dirauth|  Actual Points:
  tor-client needs-spec  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  metrics => metrics metrics-wants tor-dirauth tor-client needs-
 spec
 * points:   => 3
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Is this still an ongoing problem?  If so it's something we can prioritize.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13221 [Core Tor/Tor]: Misleading error messages about bind_ipv4_only and bind_ipv6_only?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13221: Misleading error messages about bind_ipv4_only and bind_ipv6_only?
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, easy, logging, message,  |  Actual Points:
  usability  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client, lorax => tor-client, easy, logging, message,
 usability
 * points:   => .1
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13231 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor(Windows) don't close ports when killed from service control

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13231: Tor(Windows) don't close ports when killed from service control
+--
 Reporter:  ikurua22|  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay windows win32 nt-service  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-relay windows win32 nt-service
 * priority:  High => Medium
 * type:  task => defect
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13234 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consensus Algorithm Causes Flip-Flopping

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13234: Consensus Algorithm Causes Flip-Flopping
-+-
 Reporter:  pipeep   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth sybil voting needs-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-dirauth => tor-dirauth sybil voting needs-spec
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Related to #8163 , I think.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13268 [Core Tor/Tor]: Hidden service Load balancing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13268: Hidden service Load balancing
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Onionbalance is the current best-so-far solution to this issue, though
 we'd like to have even more solutions in the future.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13297 [Core Tor/Tor]: compute_weighted_bandwidths() broken for dirauths

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13297: compute_weighted_bandwidths() broken for dirauths
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth routing weighting  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-dirauth routing weighting
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22555 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update to June GeoIP2 database

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22555: Update to June GeoIP2 database
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client tor-relay 024-backport|  implemented
  025-backport 026-backport 027-backport |  Actual Points:
  028-backport 029-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22541 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Support for Tor Browser without Tor?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22541: Support for Tor Browser without Tor?
--+--
 Reporter:  nido  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 FWIW: We still have plans to help other interested parties (like VPN
 companies) to ship a browser with all the privacy/security features Tor
 Browser has but without tor. But we won't do it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22541 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Support for Tor Browser without Tor?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22541: Support for Tor Browser without Tor?
--+--
 Reporter:  nido  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 (If "support" is meant to be merging patches if those other
 vendors/interested parties showed up, then, yes, we would do that.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19256 [Applications/Tor Browser]: remove more unused code (and related strings) from Torbutton

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19256: remove more unused code (and related strings) from Torbutton
--+---
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 mcs mentioned in comment:3:ticket:22554 that there are several other
 occurrences of `privacy.thirdparty.isolate` that should be fixed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22554 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove Battery API related bit in Torbutton

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22554: Remove Battery API related bit in Torbutton
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201706R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:3 mcs]:
 > r=mcs
 > This patch looks fine. Should we should also remove the battery status
 text from the security slider UI? It looks like it is mentioned in the
 `torbutton.prefs.resist_fingerprinting_tooltip` entity (within the
 torbutton.dtd files).

 Good idea, will do.

 > Regarding comment:2, there are several other occurrences of
 `privacy.thirdparty.isolate` that also should be fixed.

 Yes. I added that to our "catch-all"-ticket we currently have for clean-up
 (#19256).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21852 [Applications/Tor Browser]: update jemalloc?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21852: update jemalloc?
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 We don't want to update jemalloc4. Actually, we'll remove it as Mozilla
 won't ship it and the tiny bit of defense we currently use is gone
 upstream.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22451 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:cache is not useful anymore in ESR52-based Tor Browser (only wyciwyg-URIs if at all any)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22451: about:cache is not useful anymore in ESR52-based Tor Browser (only 
wyciwyg-
URIs if at all any)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201706,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201706, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-|
  regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:8 gk]:
 > I filed https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1371651 as this is
 a Firefox issue.
 That what I meant in comment:1.
 Also `about:memory` shows that isolated entries look like
 {{{
 │   │  ├───2,053,002 B (00.52%) ── memory-
 storage(O^privateBrowsingId=1&firstPartyDomain=torproject.org,p,/M)
 }}}
 Therefore, the `^` sign may be a problem for
 `chrome://global/content/aboutCache.js` parser.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21804 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser refuses to start with : Corrupt redzone 0 bytes after 0x7f0503ede9d0 (size 80), byte=0x0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21804: Tor Browser refuses to start with : Corrupt redzone 0 bytes 
after
0x7f0503ede9d0 (size 80), byte=0x0
--+--
 Reporter:  adrelanos |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:6 adrelanos]:
 > 6.5a6
 >
 > * Qubes Debian stretch based AppVM: works
 > * VirtualBox Debian stretch: works
 > * VirtualBox Whonix Debian stretch based VM: broken
 > * Qubes-Whonix Debian stretch based AppVM: broken
 >
 > "Some setting that Whonix changes or package that Whonix does (not)
 install is triggering this issue." (No recompiled packages.) Any advice on
 narrow it down more than that?

 Unfortunately, not. We won't ship Tor Browser with jemalloc4 anymore as
 Mozilla has indicated that they won't use it in the future. Thus, this bug
 is somewhat moot and I'll close it as WONTFIX. (Might still be interesting
 to understand why this happens in the first place at all)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22496 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Check that updater changes coming with Firefox 52.2.0esr are unproblematic for Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22496: Check that updater changes coming with Firefox 52.2.0esr are 
unproblematic
for Tor Browser
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201706  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Kathy and I finished our testing. We skipped testing Linux 32-bit since
 the code, system APIs, and behavior should be identical to Linux 64-bit
 (or nearly so). I think we are done here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22554 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove Battery API related bit in Torbutton

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22554: Remove Battery API related bit in Torbutton
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201706R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: arthuredelstein (added)


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 gk]:
 > Yes. I added that to our "catch-all"-ticket we currently have for clean-
 up (#19256).

 But shouldn't the code be fixed rather than removed? E.g.,
 `torbutton_update_thirdparty_prefs()` will never be called, but it seems
 like we want that functionality. But you or Arthur would know better than
 me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21852 [Applications/Tor Browser]: update jemalloc?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21852: update jemalloc?
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  ff52-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 For esr52 cycle it is possible to use jemalloc4, updated to 4.5 at least
 or later, or you are going to use better approaches?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22554 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove Battery API related bit in Torbutton

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22554: Remove Battery API related bit in Torbutton
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201706R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:5 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:4 gk]:
 > > Yes. I added that to our "catch-all"-ticket we currently have for
 clean-up (#19256).
 >
 > But shouldn't the code be fixed rather than removed?
 That what I wanted to ask in #19256 :)
 > E.g., `torbutton_update_thirdparty_prefs()` will never be called, but it
 seems like we want that functionality. But you or Arthur would know better
 than me.
 Try to change third-party cookies settings in Options ;)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13410 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable self-signed certificate warnings when visiting .onion sites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13410: Disable self-signed certificate warnings when visiting .onion sites
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by guido):

 * cc: guido@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21321: .onion HTTP is shown as non-secure in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-usability, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by guido):

 * cc: guido@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21767 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor CA - .onion SSL system

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21767: Tor CA - .onion SSL system
--+--
 Reporter:  ikurua22  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by guido):

 * cc: guido@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13590 [Core Tor/Tor]: Extend HiddenServicePort VIRTPORT semantics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13590: Extend HiddenServicePort VIRTPORT semantics
-+-
 Reporter:  grarpamp |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.5.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, shoot-self-in-foot honeypot  |  Actual Points:
  cfg|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => Low
 * keywords:  tor-hs, lorax => tor-hs, shoot-self-in-foot honeypot cfg
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13508 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add messaging protocol that is resistant to traffic analysis

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13508: Add messaging protocol that is resistant to traffic analysis
-+-
 Reporter:  Alan |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  messaging protocol store-and-|  Actual Points:
  forward traffic-analysis needs-proposal hard   |
  mixnet research-program|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:
 messaging protocol store-and-forward traffic-analysis needs-proposal
 hard
 =>
 messaging protocol store-and-forward traffic-analysis needs-proposal
 hard mixnet research-program
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13589 [Core Tor/Tor]: bridge authority could do bandwidth test along with reachability test

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13589: bridge authority could do bandwidth test along with reachability test
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, tor-bridgeauth,  |  Actual Points:
  measuring bandwidth|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-bridge => tor-bridge, tor-bridgeauth, measuring bandwidth
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13499 [Core Tor/Tor]: Generate usable coredumps when using ASAN.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13499: Generate usable coredumps when using ASAN.
--+--
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 The history on the code.google.com bug indicates that the correct fix was
 merged upstream to clang and gcc, so I'm going to suggest that the answer
 here is "worksforme."

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13494 [Core Tor/Tor]: Regression test about Hidden Service time synchronization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13494: Regression test about Hidden Service time synchronization
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tests, clock, clock-sync,|  Actual Points:
  ntp, needs-diagnosis   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, tests => tor-hs, tests, clock, clock-sync, ntp, needs-
 diagnosis


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13484 [Core Tor/Tor]: Do we have edge cases with rend_consider_descriptor_republication()? Can we refactor it to be cleaner?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13484: Do we have edge cases with rend_consider_descriptor_republication()? 
Can we
refactor it to be cleaner?
-+--
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
-+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: asn, dgoulet (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13466 [Core Tor/Tor]: Collect aggregate stats of ntor-using hidden service interactions vs tap-using interactions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13466: Collect aggregate stats of ntor-using hidden service interactions vs 
tap-
using interactions
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-hs, privcount-maybe   |  Actual Points:
  needs-design metrics   |
Parent ID:  #13195   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, tor-hs => tor-relay, tor-hs, privcount-maybe needs-
 design metrics


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13461 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add OS X Xcode Project to contrib

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13461: Add OS X Xcode Project to contrib
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, osx, build, tor-client needs-   |  Actual Points:
  osx-knowldge portability   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => new
 * keywords:  doc, osx, build, want-pony => doc, osx, build, tor-client
 needs-osx-knowldge portability


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13444 [Core Tor/Tor]: "GhostNode" - support relays that cannot accept incoming connections. (was: "GhostNode" - a new way to build IP-hidden networking)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13444: "GhostNode" - support relays that cannot accept incoming connections.
-+-
 Reporter:  ikurua22 |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  anomity, circuit, torrc, security,   |  Actual Points:
  needs-proposal research-program|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  anomity, circuit, torrc, security => anomity, circuit, torrc,
 security, needs-proposal research-program
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This is a complex enough design space that it's going to take a bunch of
 research to have a chance of working out right.  It seems to resemble
 stuff that various P2P designs do in order to support some nodes that have
 outgoing-only capabilities.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13386 [Core Tor/Tor]: "opening new log file" line goes to err-logfile despite being at loglevel notice

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13386: "opening new log file" line goes to err-logfile despite being at 
loglevel
notice
---+---
 Reporter:  toralf |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-design logging opening-file  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => needs-design logging opening-file


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13603 [Core Tor/Tor]: Many channels closing with "IOERROR" reason given on control port. (was: too much IOERRORS ?)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13603: Many channels closing with "IOERROR" reason given on control port.
-+-
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.5.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay needs-analysis networking  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-relay needs-analysis networking


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13605 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a client/relay-side ReducedExitPolicy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13605: Create a client/relay-side ReducedExitPolicy
-+
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  medium
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  tor-relay, easy, lorax => tor-relay, easy
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13605 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a client/relay-side ReducedExitPolicy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13605: Create a client/relay-side ReducedExitPolicy
-+
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  medium
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 Oh hey, there's a patch here!  We should review this for when the next
 merge window happens.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13621 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add example configuation file for relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13621: Add example configuation file for relays
-+-
 Reporter:  federico3|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay configuration torrc|  Actual Points:
  example tor-doc|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-relay configuration torrc example tor-doc
 * status:  new => needs_review
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13694 [Core Tor/Tor]: Ship with native build instructions for windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13694: Ship with native build instructions for windows
---+---
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  win32, build, lorax tor-build-doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  win32, build, lorax => win32, build, lorax tor-build-doc
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13697 [Core Tor/Tor]: Carry entropy across invocations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13697: Carry entropy across invocations
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay rng security  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-relay rng security
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13703 [Core Tor/Tor]: Adding doc/HARDENING

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13703: Adding doc/HARDENING
-+-
 Reporter:  mmcc |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  hardening, security, opsec, docs,|  Actual Points:
  lorax  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * severity:   => Normal
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


Comment:

 IMO we should take this, merge it, pull out anything that looks wrong,
 mark it as a working draft, and let people submit patches to it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13703 [Core Tor/Tor]: Adding doc/HARDENING

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13703: Adding doc/HARDENING
-+-
 Reporter:  mmcc |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  hardening, security, opsec, docs,|  Actual Points:
  lorax tor-relay tor-doc|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  hardening, security, opsec, docs, lorax => hardening,
 security, opsec, docs, lorax tor-relay tor-doc


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13705 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow relays to promise in their descriptor that their IP address won't change

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13705: Allow relays to promise in their descriptor that their IP address won't
change
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, needs-proposal, theft-|  Actual Points:
  resistance, intro  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, needs-proposal => tor-relay, needs-proposal, theft-
 resistance, intro
 * points:   => 5


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13737 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move circuit building crypto to worker

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13737: Move circuit building crypto to worker
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-hs, multicore,   |  Actual Points:
  performance, tor-dos, term-project-ideas   |
  intro  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorU-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-client, tor-hs, multicore, performance, tor-dos =>
 tor-client, tor-hs, multicore, performance, tor-dos, term-project-
 ideas intro


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13739 [Core Tor/Tor]: Optimize the functions called in circuit_launch_by_extend_info()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13739: Optimize the functions called in circuit_launch_by_extend_info()
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, performance, profile,|  Actual Points:
  optimization   |
Parent ID:  #15463   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, performance => tor-hs, performance, profile,
 optimization


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13755 [Core Tor/Tor]: Declare that Windows XP and earlier are not officially supported.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13755: Declare that Windows XP and earlier are not officially supported.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, windows, documentation,   |  Actual Points:
  deprecation|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, windows, documentation => tor-relay, windows,
 documentation, deprecation
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13792 [Core Tor/Tor]: HS statistics for private tor network to gather info on services, clients and relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13792: HS statistics for private tor network to gather info on services, 
clients
and relays
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, performance, metrics,|  Actual Points:
  privcount-maybe|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, performance => tor-hs, performance, metrics,
 privcount-maybe


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13800 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit does not close after hidden service is shutdown via control port

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13800: circuit does not close after hidden service is shutdown via control port
+--
 Reporter:  dawuud  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs hs-shutdown  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-hs hs-shutdown
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13753 [Core Tor/Tor]: Validate is_canonical more thoroughly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13753: Validate is_canonical more thoroughly
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, security, tor-sponsorS-   |  Actual Points:
  orphan |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorS-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => High
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13817 [Core Tor/Tor]: Untange kludgey library detection, particularly for SSL forks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13817: Untange kludgey library detection, particularly for SSL forks
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.2.6.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-build build library-detection  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #6311  | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  lorax => tor-build build library-detection
 * priority:  Medium => High
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13815 [Core Tor/Tor]: Attempt to port tor to Google's BoringSSL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13815: Attempt to port tor to Google's BoringSSL
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.6.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay openssl boringssl post-|  Actual Points:
  deprecation|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  lorax, tor-relay => tor-relay openssl boringssl post-
   deprecation
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13908 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make it safe to set NumDirectoryGuards=1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13908: Make it safe to set NumDirectoryGuards=1
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal, tor-client, needs-   |  Actual Points:
  design guards client-enumeration research- |
  program|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  needs-proposal, tor-client =>
 needs-proposal, tor-client, needs-design guards client-enumeration
 research-program
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13856 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure #9262 didn't introduce new OOM opportunities

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13856: Make sure #9262 didn't introduce new OOM opportunities
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  andrea
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tor-relay, oom, global-scheduler  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13837 [Core Tor/Tor]: Mitigate guard discovery by pinning middle node

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13837: Mitigate guard discovery by pinning middle node
+--
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-guard, guard-discovery  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, tor-guard => tor-hs, tor-guard, guard-discovery
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13837 [Core Tor/Tor]: Mitigate guard discovery by pinning middle node

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13837: Mitigate guard discovery by pinning middle node
+--
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-guard, guard-discovery  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #9001   | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * parent:   => #9001


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13828 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_dir and rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client to avoid duplicate code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13828: Refactor rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_dir and
rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client to avoid duplicate code
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, easy, refactor, technical-   |  Actual Points:
  debt   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, easy, refactor => tor-hs, easy, refactor, technical-
   debt


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Re: [tor-bugs] #9001 [Core Tor/Tor]: Slow Guard Discovery of Hidden Services and Clients

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9001: Slow Guard Discovery of Hidden Services and Clients
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, path-bias, guard-discovery,  |  Actual Points:
  needs-proposal, mike-can, prop247, tor-guard   |
Parent ID:  #5456| Points:  large
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, path-bias, needs-proposal, mike-can, prop247, tor-
 guard =>
 tor-hs, path-bias, guard-discovery, needs-proposal, mike-can, prop247,
 tor-guard


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15014 [Archived/general]: Socks5 and socks5t got changed and broke compatibility with privoxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15014: Socks5 and socks5t got changed and broke compatibility with privoxy
-+-
 Reporter:  johnakabean  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Archived/general |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.5.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  privoxy, socks5, socks5t, tor-   |  Actual Points:
  client |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * severity:   => Normal


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #16569, #18774

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #16569, #18774 by nickm:
milestone to 

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22546 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SocksListenAddress error Tor browser 7.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22546: SocksListenAddress error Tor browser 7.0
--+---
 Reporter:  torlongtimeuser   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by torlongtimeuser):

 Thank you so much! I follow the code '+SocksPort' it works now, and really
 help me a lot.

 Sorry, I didn't know this change before.

 Also, there have another way. That need install a software 'Privoxy' to
 configure socks port.
 Not really need 'SocksListenAddress', but edit torrc better than install
 more software.


 Why I need config to other socks port?

 eg: What if some website need you browser add on 'Adobe Flash
 Player'?

 I wouldn't like add on FlashPlayer on tor browser.
 Because install AdobeFlashPlayer need administrator type
 account.
 That's mean the FlashPlayer could connect internet not use
 browser custom proxy.

 So the problem is some plugins(like:FlashPlayer) connection
 internet with out tor.


 Here have an idea to fix this problem.

 -Creat 2 guests virtual machine on 'VirtualBox'.

 Guest 1: Tor.
 Guest 2: Firefox add on FlashPlayer.

 -After setup network config use 'Internal Network'.
 -Let Guest2(Firefox) over Guest1(Tor).

 The FlashPlayer connect internet only way is over custom proxy
 (Tor).
 Because Tor and Firefox in defferent system, config with a local
 aera network.

 This is simply how this idea works.


 I always have more than 2 guests to build multi-layer network.

 2 guests virtual machine.
 Guest 1: Service and Bridge-Network.
 Guest 2: Tor Browser.

 Tor Browser  -over-  Service(eg:SSH)
 -over-  Internet(ISP)

 This is like most tor user.

 3 guests virtual machine.
 Guest 1: Service and Bridge-Network.
 Guest 2: Tor.
 Guest 3: Browser. (I actually use TorBrowser
 removed 'tor-launcher.xpi')

 Browser  -over-  Tor  -over-
 Service(eg:SSH)  -over-  Internet(ISP)

 The Web server get IP address is Tor exit node IP,
 even add on FlashPlayer.

 even if TorBrowser send information to NSA by
 'EgotisticalGiraffe', isn't my real IP.


 What if some web service blocked Tor IP?

 eg: When you edit Wikipedia anonymously or you search Google.

 Because web server get you IP is Tor exit node IP.
 When you search google may display "IPv4 Error" or
 something like that.
 You can add a VPN or SSH server over Tor (most VPN not
 work to use a proxy, I was use 'SoftetherVPN' on a windows guest).

 Browser  -over-  Service(eg:SSL-VPN)  -over-  Tor
 -over-  Service(eg:SSH)  -over-  Internet(ISP)

 In this model, the web service get final ip address is VPN
 IP.

 So you can normally visit most website, but not onion
 server.


 My ISP block down lots of web servers, more bad news: many servers on
 attack, control or blocked by government.

 That's why how tor important for me.
 Again, Thanks so much tor team!

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[tor-bugs] #22556 [- Select a component]: TorBrowser 7.0: https everywhere does not upgrade to https automatically and NoScript allows all script by default

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22556: TorBrowser 7.0: https everywhere does not upgrade to https automatically
and NoScript allows all script by default
--+-
 Reporter:  maximol   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Just updated to TorBrowser 7.0 and noticed that NoScript allow all scripts
 and https everywhere does not upgrade every http request when possibile. I
 have to do it manually.
 Until TorBrowser 6.5.2 was working normally. What is happening?

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[tor-bugs] #22557 [Webpages/Blog]: Comment pagination links could go to `#comments` anchors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22557: Comment pagination links could go to `#comments` anchors
---+
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #22013
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 On a page like https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-
 browser-70-released#comments, the comment pagination links at the bottom
 could have `#comments` appended to them, so that the page scrolls directly
 to the comments and you don't have to scroll down over the article again.

 I mean these links at the bottom:
 {{{
 1 / 2 / 3 / Next ›  Last »
 }}}

 So, for example, clicking "Next" would take you to
 https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-70-released?page=1#comments.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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