Re: [tor-bugs] #22396 [Applications/Tor Browser]: What does "never for this site" for the canvas warning really mean?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22396: What does "never for this site" for the canvas warning really mean?
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I also never touch the popup for fear of it recording a preference.  Why
 not randomize the low bits of the pixel values to avoid profiling?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22070 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Check whether we need to update our font whitelist for ESR52

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22070: Check whether we need to update our font whitelist for ESR52
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must, tbb- |  Actual Points:
  fingerprinting-fonts, TorBrowserTeam201706 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 There are 11 unsupported languages https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nutmeg

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22550 [Core Tor/Tor]: pkg-config fails to find static library for zstd

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22550: pkg-config fails to find static library for zstd
--+
 Reporter:  yurivict271   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by yurivict271):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 It wasn't a problem of pkg-config or Tor. It was a faulty build that
 somehow produced libzstd.a with stripped symbols.

 I will update the FreeBSD port.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21794 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clear dynamic pin preloads as well on New Identity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21794: Clear dynamic pin preloads as well on New Identity
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-torbutton, tbb-newnym  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Do you mean SecurityPreloadState.txt?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22570 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript's Whitelist is still missing error pages in Tor Browser 7 for higher security levels

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22570: NoScript's Whitelist is still missing error pages in Tor Browser 7 for
higher security levels
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 7.0-7.0.1 update didn't help too. But some things were found:
 extension-overrides.js is OK, but
 there are prefs-x.js files (where x = from 1 to 8), all zero, except the
 last, and
 Telemetry.FailedProfileLocks.txt file exists.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22550 [Core Tor/Tor]: pkg-config fails to find static library for zstd

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22550: pkg-config fails to find static library for zstd
--+
 Reporter:  yurivict271   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by yurivict271):

 It doesn't seem like pkgconfig supports static libraries. Since tor
 supports static build, pkgconfig appears to be a bad choice.

 Why don't you just use AC_SEARCH_LIBS from autotools to search for
 libraries instead?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22524 [Applications/TorBirdy]: clear download history

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22524: clear download history
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Seems like `browser.download.manager.retention 1` has had no function for
 years.

 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=838663
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=838681

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15516 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider dropping INTRODUCE2 cells when under load

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15516: Consider dropping INTRODUCE2 cells when under load
+--
 Reporter:  special |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorU-deferred, tor-dos, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  medium
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by sjmurdoch):

 * cc: sjmurdoch (removed)


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[tor-bugs] #22639 [Applications/TorBirdy]: process to bring changes from tbb to torbridy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22639: process to bring changes from tbb to torbridy
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 I'm aware that just by turning javascript (and other features) in
 thunderbird off  the attack surface is reduced. But wouldn't it make sense
 to have process to bring the changes from tor browser's `about:config` to
 thunderbird? (like asking gk, mikeperry etc to add to all relevant changes
 a torbirdy tag, eg in the categpory: keywords, so that the ''might be
 relevant'' changes could be reviewed?)

 Like ticket:22318, or other changes in tbb like `reader.parse-on-
 load.enabled false` ticket:18950 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=esr24&id=1344de9d3c90e3eac02dd13433ef8412a450df5a)
 or `dom.webaudio.enabled false` ticket:13017
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=esr24&id=ff923c1609c6bc4d9dd3a8b60f684d7c410a7399)

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[tor-bugs] #22638 [Core Tor/Tor]: Typo in compress_none.c header comment

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22638: Typo in compress_none.c header comment
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  easy comment
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 The file name is wrong:
 {{{
  * \file compress_lzma.c
  * \brief Compression backend for identity compression.
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15272 [Core Tor/Tor]: Think of more research questions that we can answer with statistics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15272: Think of more research questions that we can answer with statistics
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  research, privcount-maybe tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
  |  medium/large
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-
  |  can
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [ticket:15272 asn]:
 > ...
 > Such research questions could be:
 > * Is 6 HSDirs the best number of HSDirs?
 > * How long should HSDirs cache descriptors?

 We may be able to answer these questions using PrivCount HSDir statistics
 (late 2017).

 > * Are IPs stable or are they subject to churn? How often do HSes change
 IPs?

 We may be able to answer this question using PrivCount HSDir statistics,
 but it might require unique counting, which is easier and safer to do in
 the next iteration of the protocol, coming in 2018.

 > * Do we want more preemptive circuits on hidden services?
 > * Do hidden services fail easily because their sole guard fails?

 We can't answer these questions using PrivCount, because it only runs on
 relays.

 > ...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15421 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relay crash when reloading and resolv.conf is empty

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15421: Relay crash when reloading and resolv.conf is empty
+--
 Reporter:  TvdW|  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  0.2.7.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay resolv.conf  dns  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21900  | Points:  small
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #21900


Comment:

 I'll collect all the cases under #21900 so we fix them all at once.
 (Or at least we document which are fixed and which are not.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #9990 [Core Tor/Tor]: Internal error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9990: Internal error
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.3.25
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21900| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #9990 [Core Tor/Tor]: Internal error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9990: Internal error
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.3.25
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21900| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  chiiph =>
 * component:  Archived/Vidalia => Core Tor/Tor
 * severity:   => Normal
 * parent:   => #21900


Comment:

 This is one of the cases that triggers the crash in #21900.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22629 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_compress_impl() ignores trailing input garbage when decompressing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22629: tor_compress_impl() ignores trailing input garbage when decompressing
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22502| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 There is a fix for this in the branch in #22502, but I'd like someone to
 review it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22628 [Core Tor/Tor]: ZSTD_decompressStream doesn't ever say TOR_COMPRESS_BUFFER_FULL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22628: ZSTD_decompressStream doesn't ever say TOR_COMPRESS_BUFFER_FULL
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22502| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 There is a fix for this in the branch in #22502, but it's not complete: it
 only works for some inputs (and possibly a different set of inputs to the
 original).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22626 [Core Tor/Tor]: Missing stream NULL check in tor_compress_impl

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22626: Missing stream NULL check in tor_compress_impl
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  memory-safety  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22502 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 Also, there is a fix for this in the branch in #22502, but it's not the
 tor_assert() fix.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22626 [Core Tor/Tor]: Missing stream NULL check in tor_compress_impl

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22626: Missing stream NULL check in tor_compress_impl
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  memory-safety  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22502 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 I wonder if it would be best to tor_assert() on UNKNOWN_METHOD, or BUG(),
 and then return a non-NULL state. An edge case where we don't check state
 correctly before calling could easily turn into a DoS bug.
 {{{
 case UNKNOWN_METHOD:
   goto err;
   }

   atomic_counter_add(&total_compress_allocation,
  sizeof(tor_compress_state_t));
   return state;

  err:
   tor_free(state);
   return NULL;
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22377 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rip out AUTHDIR_NEWDESCS event?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22377: Rip out AUTHDIR_NEWDESCS event?
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by atagar):

 Hi Nick. Nope, feel free to deprecate and/or remove. That said, I'd
 appreciate a note saying the tor version where it's gone (stem makes an
 effort to provide nice exception messages when an event doesn't exist due
 to your version).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22400 [Core Tor/Tor]: We bootstrap from different primary guards when we start with a non-live consensus and not enough guards in the state file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22400: We bootstrap from different primary guards when we start with a non-live
consensus and not enough guards in the state file
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:   => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22489 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bridge oftenly reports Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path. Discarding this circuit.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22489: Bridge oftenly reports Failed to find node for hop 0 of our path.
Discarding this circuit.
+--
 Reporter:  s7r |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  0.3.1.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client tor-bridge 030-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-client tor-bridge 030-backport


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22616 [Applications/Tor Browser]: On higher security levels videos can't be downloaded anymore with "Save Video As..."

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22616: On higher security levels videos can't be downloaded anymore with "Save
Video As..."
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I had few minutes to look at it again, I can get it to fail now. These are
 the steps I followed in a fresh tor-browser:

 1. Set the security level to high.
 2. Open https://ftp.acc.umu.se/pub/debian-meetings/2016/debconf/
 3. Find 'Long_Term_Support_LTS.webm' and open it in a new tab. Right click
 on the blocked object and select 'Save Link As...'. Accept the warning and
 choose where to save it. You can close the tab now.
 4. Open 'about:downloads' and verify that it's downloading.
 5. Find 'Surviving_the_Next_23_Years_of_Free_Software.webm' and open it as
 well. Right click and select 'Save Link As..', choose where to save it.
 6. If the first file was still downloading the second download shouldn't
 have commenced.
 7. Cancel the first download and try step 5 again, it should work now.

 I then deleted the tor-browser_en-US folder and unpacked the tarball again
 for a fresh profile. That time I left the security level at low. When I
 repeated the steps, step 5 didn't display the save as dialog, I clicked a
 couple of times. I then tried to download it by right clicking on the link
 at ftp.acc.umu.se instead of right clicking on the blocked object, again
 nothing showed up. However, when I went to cancel the first download all
 the dialogs appeared. I can't remember if it was the external-app-helper
 or the save as dialogs.

 Something to note is that I chose both of those files on purpose because
 they exist in the same server: https://saimei.acc.umu.se/pub/debian-
 
meetings/2016/debconf/{Long_Term_Support_LTS.webm,Surviving_the_Next_23_Years_of_Free_Software.webm}.
 When I tried other files that existed in different servers I could
 download them.

 And finally, when a download failed I checked the browser console and I
 got 'unsave CPOW usage forbidden' failures. That's as far as I got, good
 luck!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22356 [Core Tor/Tor]: [warn] assign_to_cpuworker failed. Ignoring.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22356: [warn] assign_to_cpuworker failed. Ignoring.
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:   => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22377 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rip out AUTHDIR_NEWDESCS event?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22377: Rip out AUTHDIR_NEWDESCS event?
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: atagar (added)


Comment:

 Damian, would anything go wrong if we deprecated this and/or just took it
 out?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22371 [Core Tor/Tor]: Always send AUTHDIR_NEWDESC events in response to new descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22371: Always send AUTHDIR_NEWDESC events in response to new descriptors
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  030-backport-maybe, 029-backport-|  Actual Points:  0.2
  maybe  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #22628, #21206

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #22628, #21206 by nickm:


Action: reassign

Comment:
ahf, I'm assigning you these compression tickets, but please let me know if 
you'd like me to take any of them on. cheers!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22535 [Applications/Tor Browser]: searching from about:tor brings me to duckduckgo but my query is discarded

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22535: searching from about:tor brings me to duckduckgo but my query is 
discarded
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-7.0-issues,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-regression, tbb-usability, |
  TorBrowserTeam201706   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  tbb-team => mcs


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21948 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Going back to about:tor page gives a "The address isn’t valid"-error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21948: Going back to about:tor page gives a "The address isn’t valid"-error
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-7.0-issues,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-regression, TorBrowserTeam201706   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * owner:  tbb-team => mcs
 * status:  new => assigned
 * keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression =>
 ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression,
 TorBrowserTeam201706
 * cc: tbb-team (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18913 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:tor should not have chrome privileges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18913: about:tor should not have chrome privileges
+-
 Reporter:  mcs |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201706  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr => ff52-esr, TorBrowserTeam201706


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22535 [Applications/Tor Browser]: searching from about:tor brings me to duckduckgo but my query is discarded

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22535: searching from about:tor brings me to duckduckgo but my query is 
discarded
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-7.0-issues,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-regression, tbb-usability, |
  TorBrowserTeam201706   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: tbb-team (added)
 * keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression, tbb-
 usability =>
 ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression, tbb-usability,
 TorBrowserTeam201706


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22635 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Run tor's make test-stem in Jenkins

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22635: Run tor's make test-stem in Jenkins
-+
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by atagar):

 Gotcha. Actually, I do like the idea of adding test coverage for this but
 I suspect Jenkins isn't the right way to go. Maybe we should wrap stem's
 run_tests.py with a shell script invoking 'env -i' to avoid any accidental
 dependencies on environment variables?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22616 [Applications/Tor Browser]: On higher security levels videos can't be downloaded anymore with "Save Video As..."

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22616: On higher security levels videos can't be downloaded anymore with "Save
Video As..."
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I just tested it a bunch of times, with a fresh tor-browser, and could
 only get it to fail once, which is embarrassing. I haven't been able to
 replicate it since. When I made the comment on the blog I could get it to
 fail consistently.

 When it did fail external-app-helper popped up and the file didn't make it
 into about:downloads, not even as failed download, nor did it appear on
 the filesystem.

 Multiprocess windows are enabled, and for what it's worth, I'm running
 tor-browser within a vm with a single cpu. If it happens again I'll take a
 closer look in the browser and the web console... sorry.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15582 [Core Tor/Tor]: compile warning in test_util.c: In function 'test_util_sscanf'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15582: compile warning in test_util.c: In function 'test_util_sscanf'
---+---
 Reporter:  sysfu  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.6.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  compile, test, lorax, openbsd  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  medium
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22172 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop140: What to do when a diff fails to apply?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22172: prop140: What to do when a diff fails to apply?
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22347 [Core Tor/Tor]: document key-pinning-journal file in man page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22347: document key-pinning-journal file in man page
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22347 [Core Tor/Tor]: document key-pinning-journal file in man page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22347: document key-pinning-journal file in man page
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 a73d0fe9a87d fixes this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15582 [Core Tor/Tor]: compile warning in test_util.c: In function 'test_util_sscanf'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15582: compile warning in test_util.c: In function 'test_util_sscanf'
---+---
 Reporter:  sysfu  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.6.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  compile, test, lorax, openbsd  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  medium
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  worksforme =>


Comment:

 The builders on https://buildbot.pixelminers.net/ still show these
 warnings (among other warnings).

 Latest build on OpenBSD-amd64:
 https://buildbot.pixelminers.net/#/builders/5/builds/688
 Latest build on OpenBSD-i386:
 https://buildbot.pixelminers.net/#/builders/9/builds/699

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22502 [Core Tor/Tor]: Investigate Zstandard decompression error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22502: Investigate Zstandard decompression error
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Putting this in needs_review to try to review and merge what there is,
 under the assumption it's an improvement and will help us isolate the
 remaining problems.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12931 [Core Tor/Tor]: TOR_PT_SERVER_TRANSPORT_OPTIONS are not escaped according to pt-spec.txt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12931: TOR_PT_SERVER_TRANSPORT_OPTIONS are not escaped according to pt-spec.txt
+--
 Reporter:  yawning |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  pluggable, transports, pt-spec  |  Actual Points:  0
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0


Comment:

 Proposed patch as bug12931 in my torspec repository; needs review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15157 [Core Tor/Tor]: Spec issues with consensus' new 'package' field

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15157: Spec issues with consensus' new 'package' field
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I've cleaned up the incorrectness wrt the specification of DIGESTVAL and
 DIGESTTYPE in 5b7a7d6264f24c

 It's not a mistake that DIGEST is mandatory; it is indeed required.

 The future-proofing can be handled by adding new k=v entries that don't
 have to be digests.

 A digesttype needs to be unique -- it is something like "sha1" or
 "sha256".  We can't have more than one of each type for a given object.

 I've also sent an email to tor-dev asking if we intend to use these at
 all.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22635 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Run tor's make test-stem in Jenkins

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22635: Run tor's make test-stem in Jenkins
-+
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by catalyst):

 I think you're right that there are environmental dependencies for those
 issues, but I think they're not uncommon ones.  I think to make this
 reproduce the observed failures, we would have to make sure there isn't a
 system tor binary installed in the Jenkins environment that runs this
 test.

 As I recall, the issues in #22301 depended on both the lack of a tor
 binary in the default PATH and running `make test-stem` in the tor source
 tree (instead of running `run_tests.py` in the stem source tree).  This is
 not an unusual combination, especially for a (possibly new) developer who
 has no reason to install a system tor.  (Note at least 3 developers
 independently experienced those bugs while attempting to follow the
 guidelines in `CodingStandards.md`.)

 Now that I think about it more, it's also useful to make sure that the
 stem tests don't unintentionally run the system tor (thereby producing
 invalid or misleading results).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12970 [Core Tor/Tor]: dir-spec's a-line shouldn't mention portlists

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12970: dir-spec's a-line shouldn't mention portlists
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed in 7209e26ca9c5db

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22204 [Core Tor/Tor]: I can't list a relay in my EntryNodes if it doesn't have the Guard flag

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22204: I can't list a relay in my EntryNodes if it doesn't have the Guard flag
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  030-backport regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22516 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor fails to start with 'Sandbox 1'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22516: tor fails to start with 'Sandbox 1'
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  seccomp Sandbox 029-backport |  Actual Points:  .1
  030-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => .1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22516 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor fails to start with 'Sandbox 1'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22516: tor fails to start with 'Sandbox 1'
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  seccomp Sandbox 029-backport |  Actual Points:
  030-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:   => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22516 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor fails to start with 'Sandbox 1'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22516: tor fails to start with 'Sandbox 1'
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  seccomp Sandbox 029-backport |  Actual Points:
  030-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  seccomp Sandbox => seccomp Sandbox 029-backport 030-backport


Comment:

 `bug22516_029` has a fix.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22619 [Core Tor/Tor]: SessionGroup = Reading config failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22619: SessionGroup = Reading config failed
-+-
 Reporter:  acceleraTor  |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SessionGroup configuration   |  Actual Points:
  SocksPort option   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * version:   => Tor: 0.2.7.2-alpha


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22619 [Core Tor/Tor]: SessionGroup = Reading config failed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22619: SessionGroup = Reading config failed
-+-
 Reporter:  acceleraTor  |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SessionGroup configuration   |  Actual Points:
  SocksPort option   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * owner:   => catalyst
 * status:  needs_information => accepted
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


Comment:

 Reproduced on master.  It does seem that the `!allow_no_stream_options`
 test is backwards, but I'll need to stare at it a bit more.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15918 [Core Tor/Tor]: Investigate using the EVP interface for non-oneshot hash calls.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15918: Investigate using the EVP interface for non-oneshot hash calls.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-crypto, openssl, evp, lorax, |  Actual Points:
  sponsor8-maybe performance cpu |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-crypto, openssl, evp, lorax => tor-crypto, openssl, evp,
 lorax, sponsor8-maybe performance cpu
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15938 [Core Tor/Tor]: HS descriptor cache leaks timing information to local users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15938: HS descriptor cache leaks timing information to local users
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-client needs-design  |  Actual Points:
  maybe-bad-idea |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, tor-client => tor-hs, tor-client needs-design maybe-
 bad-idea


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22635 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Run tor's make test-stem in Jenkins

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22635: Run tor's make test-stem in Jenkins
-+
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by atagar):

 Hi catalyst, not sure I follow. Tor's 'test-stem' target should simply be
 an alias for stem's 'run_tests.py --all --target RUN_ALL' which is
 presently run in jenkins for every tor or stem push...

 https://jenkins.torproject.org/job/stem-tor-ci/

 Issues you ran into were with peculiarities of your environment. Fine
 things to fix certainly, but they wouldn't have been caught by jenkins.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15785 [Core Tor/Tor]: New proxy settings don't close old TLS connections

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15785: New proxy settings don't close old TLS connections
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client proxy setting |  Actual Points:
  configuration torrc consistency|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-client proxy setting configuration torrc consistency
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15765 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor doesn't reconnect automatically when tun/tap device goes down.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15765: Tor doesn't reconnect automatically when tun/tap device goes down.
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client reconnect network needs-  |  Actual Points:
  design |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-client reconnect network needs-design


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15729 [Core Tor/Tor]: Proposal: Hidden Service Revocation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15729: Proposal: Hidden Service Revocation
-+-
 Reporter:  Nathaniel|  Owner:
 |  Nathaniel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-spec stalled security|  Actual Points:
  revocation |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, tor-spec => tor-hs, tor-spec stalled security
   revocation


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15721 [Core Tor/Tor]: mmdb-convert.py do not work on windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15721: mmdb-convert.py do not work on windows
--+--
 Reporter:  cntor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.6.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  lorax |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 We've got no plans to fix this, but if somebody wants to, they can submit
 a patch.  (This doesn't need to work on windows because we're the only
 ones who run it.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15720 [Core Tor/Tor]: Some country code can not be recognized

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15720: Some country code can not be recognized
--+--
 Reporter:  cntor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.6.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15715 [Core Tor/Tor]: spurious "Network is unreachable" error after setting DisableNetwork=1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15715: spurious "Network is unreachable" error after setting DisableNetwork=1
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.6.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-wants tor-client bootstrap   |  Actual Points:
  sponsor8-maybe disablenetwork  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  small
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tbb-wants => tbb-wants tor-client bootstrap sponsor8-maybe
 disablenetwork


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15713 [Core Tor/Tor]: toggling DisableNetwork during bootstrap causes delay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15713: toggling DisableNetwork during bootstrap causes delay
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.6.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-wants tor-client bootstrap   |  Actual Points:
  delay sponsor8-maybe   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tbb-wants => tbb-wants tor-client bootstrap delay
   sponsor8-maybe


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15692 [Core Tor/Tor]: 'GETINFO config-file' command on ControlPort returns the standard torrc file when it was overridden in the command line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15692: 'GETINFO config-file' command on ControlPort returns the standard torrc
file when it was overridden in the command line
--+
 Reporter:  yurivict271   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.6.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control correctness easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  small
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-control correctness easy
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15661 [Core Tor/Tor]: Same "non-loopback address" notice is printed twice

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15661: Same "non-loopback address" notice is printed twice
-+-
 Reporter:  yurivict271  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, intro, usability tor-relay |  Actual Points:
  torrc configuration bootstrap  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  small
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  easy, intro => easy, intro, usability tor-relay torrc
 configuration bootstrap


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22227 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Netmonitor Shows the Wrong Remote Address (was: Netmonitor Gives the Wrong Remote Address)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7: Netmonitor Shows the Wrong Remote Address
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15660 [Core Tor/Tor]: [feature suggestion] Need signal to totally switch to the new set of circuits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15660: [feature suggestion] Need signal to totally switch to the new set of
circuits
--+
 Reporter:  yurivict271   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  security needs-design tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  small
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  security => security needs-design tor-client


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15622 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow hyphens in hidden service names?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15622: Allow hyphens in hidden service names?
+--
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  needs-proposal  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15645 [Core Tor/Tor]: Document PublishServerDescriptor better

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15645: Document PublishServerDescriptor better
--+
 Reporter:  qbi   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.6.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  docs easy |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  docs => docs easy
 * points:  small => .1
 * severity:   => Normal
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15621 [Core Tor/Tor]: Kill the pre-version 3 intro protocol code with fire.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15621: Kill the pre-version 3 intro protocol code with fire.
---+---
 Reporter:  yawning|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs technical-debt deprecation  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #6418  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn|Sponsor:  SponsorR-
   |  must
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs => tor-hs technical-debt deprecation


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15618 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit with purpose Acting as rendevous (pending)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15618: Tried to establish rendezvous on non-OR circuit with purpose Acting as
rendevous (pending)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs needs-insight needs-  |  Actual Points:
  diagnosis  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs => tor-hs needs-insight needs-diagnosis


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15582 [Core Tor/Tor]: compile warning in test_util.c: In function 'test_util_sscanf'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15582: compile warning in test_util.c: In function 'test_util_sscanf'
---+---
 Reporter:  sysfu  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.6.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  compile, test, lorax, openbsd  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  medium
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This doesn't appear to be happening on openbsd today according to the
 buildbots. Closing as worksforme, but please reopen if I'm wrong.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15607 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor log dates imprecise

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15607: Tor log dates imprecise
-+-
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client tor-relay log usability   |  Actual Points:
  needs-design   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-client tor-relay log usability needs-design


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15593 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: Bring sanity to the tor side of the PT shutdown process.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15593: Bring sanity to the tor side of the PT shutdown process.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  pt-wants tor-pt process-management   |  Actual Points:
  technical-debt |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  pt-wants => pt-wants tor-pt process-management technical-debt
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15557 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improve relaunch logic for failed rendezvous circuits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15557: Improve relaunch logic for failed rendezvous circuits
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-client, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17242   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15554 [Core Tor/Tor]: Put some actual hsdescs in the unit tests for parsing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15554: Put some actual hsdescs in the unit tests for parsing
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  small/medium
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => new
 * cc: dgoulet, asn (added)
 * sponsor:   => SponsorR-can
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


Comment:

 I believe this might already be done in master, but if not, we should
 consider it critical.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #9001 [Core Tor/Tor]: Slow Guard Discovery of Hidden Services and Clients

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9001: Slow Guard Discovery of Hidden Services and Clients
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, path-bias, guard-discovery,  |  Actual Points:
  needs-proposal, mike-can, prop247, tor-guard   |
Parent ID:  #5456| Points:  large
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Also see #15540

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15516 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider dropping INTRODUCE2 cells when under load

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15516: Consider dropping INTRODUCE2 cells when under load
+--
 Reporter:  special |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorU-deferred, tor-dos, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  medium
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  SponsorU-deferred, tor-dos => SponsorU-deferred, tor-dos, tor-
   hs
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15540 [Core Tor/Tor]: Increase the capacity of a HS server by using bridges after we implement Prop 188

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15540: Increase the capacity of a HS server by using bridges after we implement
Prop 188
-+-
 Reporter:  s7r  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop188, tor-bridge, |  Actual Points:
  prop247, vanguards |
Parent ID:  #15463   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, prop188, tor-bridge => tor-hs, prop188, tor-bridge,
 prop247, vanguards
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Also see prop247.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15518 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor considers routers in the same IPv6 /16 to be "in the same subnet"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15518: Tor considers routers in the same IPv6 /16 to be "in the same subnet"
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, path, path-bias, tor-client|  Actual Points:
  easy   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  ipv6, path, path-bias => ipv6, path, path-bias, tor-client
   easy
 * priority:  Medium => High


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15458 [Core Tor/Tor]: StrongSocksIsolation option (w/ virtual circuits?)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15458: StrongSocksIsolation option (w/ virtual circuits?)
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-wants, tor-client, needs-|  Actual Points:
  design, mike-can, intro, isolation |
Parent ID:   | Points:  medium
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tbb-wants, tor-client, needs-proposal, mike-can, intro => tbb-
 wants, tor-client, needs-design, mike-can, intro, isolation
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15463 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor deals poorly with a very large number of incoming connection requests.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15463: Tor deals poorly with a very large number of incoming connection 
requests.
--+--
 Reporter:  alberto   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.5.11
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, performance, dos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, performance => tor-hs, performance, dos
 * sponsor:   => SponsorR-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21900 [Core Tor/Tor]: evdns fails when resolv.conf is missing, but succeeds when resolv.conf is empty

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21900: evdns fails when resolv.conf is missing, but succeeds when resolv.conf 
is
empty
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, dns, crash, tor- |  Actual Points:
  relay, macos   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 See also #15421

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15421 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relay crash when reloading and resolv.conf is empty

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15421: Relay crash when reloading and resolv.conf is empty
+--
 Reporter:  TvdW|  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  0.2.7.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay resolv.conf  dns  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  small
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-relay resolv.conf  dns
 * cc: teor (added)


Comment:

 See also #21900

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15380 [Core Tor/Tor]: log messages are doubled and unclear

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15380: log messages are doubled and unclear
-+-
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.6.5-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay accounting log-message |  Actual Points:
  usability  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-relay accounting log-message usability


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15333 [Core Tor/Tor]: Minor control-spec.txt corrections.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15333: Minor control-spec.txt corrections.
--+
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, tor-control, doc, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-spec, tor-control => tor-spec, tor-control, doc, easy
 * owner:   => nickm
 * points:   => 0.1
 * status:  new => accepted
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15251 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make tor support starting with 10.000 Tor Hidden Service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15251: Make tor support starting with 10.000 Tor Hidden Service
--+
 Reporter:  naif  |  Owner:
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, scalability, tor-dos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  10
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => Low


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[tor-bugs] #22637 [Webpages/Website]: Find a more maintainable approach for the signing-keys page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22637: Find a more maintainable approach for the signing-keys page
--+-
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Right now we have this page:
 https://www.torproject.org/docs/signing-keys
 which is supposed to provide an official set of keys that have signed
 various Tor packages in the past.

 We pointed to it from
 https://www.torproject.org/docs/verifying-signatures
 among other places.

 But people keep generating new subkeys, so the text on that page goes out
 of date after a month or so.

 We should come up with a better way to distribute these keys, in a way
 that provides good enough authenticity while being easy to automate.

 Maybe that's a script that gets run every so often to generate the page
 automatically? Maybe that's creating a gpg keyring with the right keys on
 it, and getting rid of the webpage?

 We can think of this as part of the grand website redo, but also we can
 think of it as a bitesized improvement that needs to be made and can be
 independent of the grand website redo.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15272 [Core Tor/Tor]: Think of more research questions that we can answer with statistics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15272: Think of more research questions that we can answer with statistics
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  research, privcount-maybe tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
  |  medium/large
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-
  |  can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: teor (added)
 * keywords:  research => research, privcount-maybe tor-hs
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13932 [Core Tor/Tor]: Some way for multiple Tor processes to share directory information

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13932: Some way for multiple Tor processes to share directory information
-+-
 Reporter:  grarpamp |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client needs-design bandwidth-   |  Actual Points:
  savings|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Closed #15243 as duplicate of this.

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[tor-bugs] #22636 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add Travis configs so GitHub forks get CI coverage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22636: Add Travis configs so GitHub forks get CI coverage
--+-
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 It would be useful to have Travis configs for tor so GitHub users can have
 CI coverage for changes in their forks.  This should probably run `make
 check` or whatever more strict level of tests we converge on later.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15243 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow multiple Tor instances to share directory info, guards, and who knows what else?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15243: Allow multiple Tor instances to share directory info, guards, and who 
knows
what else?
-+--
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  hard tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15243 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow multiple Tor instances to share directory info, guards, and who knows what else?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15243: Allow multiple Tor instances to share directory info, guards, and who 
knows
what else?
-+--
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  hard tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Closing as duplicate of #13932.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15232 [Core Tor/Tor]: Specify a potential TLS-replacing protocol for future use in Tor.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15232: Specify a potential TLS-replacing protocol for future use in Tor.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorZ, needs-proposal, spec   |  Actual Points:
  sponsor3-maybe |
Parent ID:   | Points:  large
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  SponsorZ, needs-proposal, spec => SponsorZ, needs-proposal,
 spec sponsor3-maybe
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15214 [Core Tor/Tor]: networkstatus_compute_consensus() is unreasonably large and should be refactored

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15214: networkstatus_compute_consensus() is unreasonably large and should be
refactored
-+-
 Reporter:  andrea   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client refactor technical-debt   |  Actual Points:
  intro  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor-client refactor technical-debt intro
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15199 [Core Tor/Tor]: Build, Release, Distribute a Tor2web enabled version of Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15199: Build, Release, Distribute a Tor2web enabled version of Tor
--+--
 Reporter:  naif  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15186 [Core Tor/Tor]: Can we do HSDesc fetches using PIR, so HSDir can't learn popularity?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15186: Can we do HSDesc fetches using PIR, so HSDir can't learn popularity?
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs pir research-program  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  large
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs => tor-hs pir research-program


Comment:

 Prop224 obsoletes this to some extent for non-publicly-known hidden
 services, but it's still an interesting thoguht.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15157 [Core Tor/Tor]: Spec issues with consensus' new 'package' field

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15157: Spec issues with consensus' new 'package' field
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:   => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted
 * points:   => .1
 * severity:   => Normal
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15061 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support Ed25519 identities in controller interface

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15061: Support Ed25519 identities in controller interface
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal, prop220, needs-  |  Actual Points:
  design tor-client tor-control  |
Parent ID:  #15054   | Points:  medium
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  needs-proposal, prop220, SponsorU-deferred => needs-proposal,
 prop220, needs-design tor-client tor-control
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15060 [Core Tor/Tor]: Decide the fate of MyFamily

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15060: Decide the fate of MyFamily
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal, needs-design |  Actual Points:
  myfamily tor-relay |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  needs-proposal, SponsorU-deferred => needs-proposal, needs-
 design myfamily tor-relay
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15043 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use acx_pthread.m4 to find pthreads library

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15043: Use acx_pthread.m4 to find pthreads library
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy tor-relay build autoconf|  Actual Points:
  pthreads   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => easy tor-relay build autoconf pthreads
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15019 [Core Tor/Tor]: Most FooStatistics entries in the man page don't mention ExtraInfo descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15019: Most FooStatistics entries in the man page don't mention ExtraInfo
descriptors
+--
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay doc easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-relay => tor-relay doc easy
 * points:   => .2
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15017 [Core Tor/Tor]: Experiment: does BIO_f_buffer help performance with read/write syscalls?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15017: Experiment: does BIO_f_buffer help performance with read/write syscalls?
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  performance tor-relay needs- |  Actual Points:
  investigation openssl nagle|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => performance tor-relay needs-investigation openssl nagle


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15015 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor --verify-config should not bind to ports

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15015: tor --verify-config should not bind to ports
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, intro, startup,   |  Actual Points:
  configuration, torrc, bootstrap, refactor, |
  technical-debt |
Parent ID:   | Points:  small
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => High
 * keywords:  tor-relay, intro =>
 tor-relay, intro, startup, configuration, torrc, bootstrap, refactor,
 technical-debt


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15008 [Core Tor/Tor]: Design an opt-in Hidden Service Public Directory Submission system

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15008: Design an opt-in Hidden Service Public Directory Submission system
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs needs-design research-|  Actual Points:
  program|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs needs-design => tor-hs needs-design research-program


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