Re: [tor-bugs] #16926 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Multiple OS: Tor Browser leaks domains to system DNS management.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16926: Multiple OS: Tor Browser leaks domains to system DNS management.
--+--
 Reporter:  DrMikeTwiddle |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Any updates on whether this bug can be resolved?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22789 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.3.1.4-alpha crash on OpenBSD-current

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22789: Tor 0.3.1.4-alpha crash on OpenBSD-current
--+
 Reporter:  fredzupy  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor:
  |  0.3.1.4-alpha
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor crash inet_pton ???-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 What architecture are you on?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19001 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Tor Browser with Snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19001: Tor Browser with Snowflake
---+--
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:
 Type:  project| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by arlolra):

 Replying to [comment:32 dcf]:
 > I would like someone to please try building
 >   https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/dcf/tor-browser-
 bundle.git/log/?h=snowflake&id=e084e834184d5ff61aef4c7f172ec883e266bdf7
 > and comparing the sha256sums to
 >   https://people.torproject.org/~dcf/pt-
 bundle/snowflake/20170630-7.5a1-e084e834184d/

 Yup, they match.

 https://paganini.erinn.org/~arlolra/snowflake/7.5a1-e084e834184d/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22788 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser rendering hangs when downloading large PDFs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22788: Tor Browser rendering hangs when downloading large PDFs
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:1 cypherpunks]:
 > Isn't this expected since JIT is disabled in those higher security
 settings? Or should there be a whitelist for anything `pdf.js` (at least
 for the Medium security setting)?

 No, this seems to happen to *other* tabs only while the PDF is
 downloading, and not once it's loaded. I don't see why other tabs should
 be affected in 7.0.1 / multiprocess at all. But it seems worse than the
 6.0 series, not better.

 > I agree with you teor, loading PDFs in those security settings can be
 annoyingly slow, especially PDFs containing scans of books. Hopefully with
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7501#comment:19 FF59esr
 and their switch to Chromium's PDFium we wont get such problems (although
 it's written in C++ = memory unsafe)].

 Could be a while before that happens. And it seems Google has fixed some
 issues in that code and dependent libraries, but they never find them all.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22792 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add an option to ignore self-signed certificate error for .onion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22792: Add an option to ignore self-signed certificate error for .onion
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 There are 2 types of selg-sign:

 1) signed by = issued by
 2) signed by = self root CA

 We are using type #2. Can't you just allow us to use HTTPS on .onion!?

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[tor-bugs] #22792 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add an option to ignore self-signed certificate error for .onion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22792: Add an option to ignore self-signed certificate error for .onion
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Hey, when will you add an option to ignore .onion's HTTPS certificate
 error?

 Before TBB 7 series, I was using "SkipCert Error" add-on to ignore self-
 signed certificate on TBB.

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[tor-bugs] #22791 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prop 224 encrypted public key

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22791: Prop 224 encrypted public key
---+
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 In prop 224 the "HS-DESC-FIRST-LAYER" is  is encrypted to prevent a
 attacker from discovering the  onion address of the hidden service, but
 even though it is encrypted  it may still be possible to log the
 ciphertext of the "HS-DESC-FIRST-LAYER"  every single time someone visits
 The hidden service.  Through that they can determine how many people are
 visiting the hidden service,  using that information on how many people
 are visiting the service, a attacker may be able to determine what type of
 site it is or use there nodes "researchers have set up nodes to capture
 the .onion addresses of hidden services" that they own to block traffic to
 any of those hidden services. The HS-DESC-FIRST-LAYER  " Ciphertext" needs
 to be padded/obfuscated so it is different every single time a new user
 tries to decrypt it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22789 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.3.1.4-alpha crash on OpenBSD-current

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22789: Tor 0.3.1.4-alpha crash on OpenBSD-current
--+
 Reporter:  fredzupy  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor:
  |  0.3.1.4-alpha
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor crash inet_pton ???-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 Does this happen repeatedly? Can you induce it?

 It looks like it's an ipv6 address that is upsetting it -- maybe one
 you're getting from the exit relay as part of the connected cell.

 Do you get a core? If so, can you get us a backtrace with gdb?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21838 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Gitian VM creation fails on Ubuntu 16.x machines in the unmount step

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21838: Gitian VM creation fails on Ubuntu 16.x machines in the unmount step
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arlolra):

 Replying to [comment:1 boklm]:
 > As a temporary workaround, I uploaded VM images that you can be copied
 to the `gitian-builder` directory:

 Don't I need the ssh keys as well?

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[tor-bugs] #22790 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Stem jenkins tests unable to invoke tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22790: Stem jenkins tests unable to invoke tor
-+
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 Hi wonderful sysadmin folks. Starting yesterday
 [https://jenkins.torproject.org/job/stem-tor-ci/ stem's jenkins tests]
 have started failing with...

 {{{
 18:06:57
 ==
 18:06:57  INITIALISING
 18:06:57
 ==
 18:06:57
 18:06:57   checking stem version... 1.5.4-dev
 18:06:57   checking tor version...  failed
 18:06:57
 18:06:57 ./RESULT/tor --version returned exit status 127
 }}}

 I just compiled tor's latest commit but can't repro a failure to invoke
 'tor --version' which leaves me wondering if something recently changed
 with regard to our jenkins setup. If there's anything I can troubleshoot
 on my end don't hesitate to let me know.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22788 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser rendering hangs when downloading large PDFs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22788: Tor Browser rendering hangs when downloading large PDFs
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Isn't this expected since JIT is disabled in those higher security
 settings? Or should there be a whitelist for anything `pdf.js`?

 I agree with you teor, loading PDFs in those security settings can be
 annoyingly slow, especially PDFs containing scans of books. Hopefully with
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7501#comment:19 FF59esr
 and their switch to Chromium's PDFium we wont get such problems (although
 it's written in C++ = memory unsafe)].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22789 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.3.1.4-alpha crash on OpenBSD-current

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22789: Tor 0.3.1.4-alpha crash on OpenBSD-current
--+
 Reporter:  fredzupy  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor:
  |  0.3.1.4-alpha
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor crash inet_pton ???-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => tor crash inet_pton ???-backport
 * priority:  Medium => High
 * severity:  Normal => Major
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final


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[tor-bugs] #22789 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.3.1.4-alpha crash on OpenBSD-current

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22789: Tor 0.3.1.4-alpha crash on OpenBSD-current
--+
 Reporter:  fredzupy  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Hi,

 After a few hours running, my new freshly compiled Tor 0.3.1.4-alpha has
 crashed with this message in log :

  Jul  1 05:06:47 ethnao Tor[94685]: tor_assertion_failed_(): Bug:
 src/common/compat.c:2597: tor_inet_pton: Assertion next != src failed;
 aborting. (on Tor 0.3.1.4-alpha fab91a290ded3e74)
  Jul  1 05:06:47 ethnao Tor[94685]: Bug: Assertion next != src failed in
 tor_inet_pton at src/common/compat.c:2597. (Stack trace not available) (on
 Tor 0.3.1.4-alpha fab91a290ded3e74)

 Things I've done before :
  $ ./configure
  $ make
  $ make test
  $ doas src/or/tor -f /etc/tor/torrc

 Then put some load on the Tor process with some random http request.

 Logs with context :

  Jul  1 05:06:02 ethnao Tor[94685]: We tried for 15 seconds to connect to
 '[scrubbed]' using exit
 $0DA9BD201766EDB19F57F49F1A013A8A5432C008~PhantomTrain4 at 65.19.167.131.
 Retrying on a new circuit.
  Jul  1 05:06:03 ethnao Tor[94685]: We tried for 15 seconds to connect to
 '[scrubbed]' using exit
 $0DA9BD201766EDB19F57F49F1A013A8A5432C008~PhantomTrain4 at 65.19.167.131.
 Retrying on a new circuit.
  Jul  1 05:06:04 ethnao Tor[94685]: We tried for 15 seconds to connect to
 '[scrubbed]' using exit
 $0DA9BD201766EDB19F57F49F1A013A8A5432C008~PhantomTrain4 at 65.19.167.131.
 Retrying on a new circuit.
  Jul  1 05:06:07 ethnao Tor[94685]: We tried for 15 seconds to connect to
 '[scrubbed]' using exit $379FB450010D17078B3766C2273303C358C3A442~aurora
 at 176.126.252.12. Retrying on a new circuit.
  Jul  1 05:06:11 ethnao Tor[94685]: We tried for 15 seconds to connect to
 '[scrubbed]' using exit $379FB450010D17078B3766C2273303C358C3A442~aurora
 at 176.126.252.12. Retrying on a new circuit.
  Jul  1 05:06:12 ethnao Tor[94685]: We tried for 15 seconds to connect to
 '[scrubbed]' using exit $379FB450010D17078B3766C2273303C358C3A442~aurora
 at 176.126.252.12. Retrying on a new circuit.
  Jul  1 05:06:15 ethnao Tor[94685]: We tried for 15 seconds to connect to
 '[scrubbed]' using exit $379FB450010D17078B3766C2273303C358C3A442~aurora
 at 176.126.252.12. Retrying on a new circuit.
  Jul  1 05:06:17 ethnao Tor[94685]: We tried for 15 seconds to connect to
 '[scrubbed]' using exit $379FB450010D17078B3766C2273303C358C3A442~aurora
 at 176.126.252.12. Retrying on a new circuit.
  Jul  1 05:06:17 ethnao Tor[94685]: Tried for 133 seconds to get a
 connection to [scrubbed]:80. Giving up.
  Jul  1 05:06:18 ethnao Tor[94685]: We tried for 15 seconds to connect to
 '[scrubbed]' using exit $379FB450010D17078B3766C2273303C358C3A442~aurora
 at 176.126.252.12. Retrying on a new circuit.
  Jul  1 05:06:18 ethnao Tor[94685]: Tried for 125 seconds to get a
 connection to [scrubbed]:80. Giving up.
  Jul  1 05:06:19 ethnao Tor[94685]: We tried for 15 seconds to connect to
 '[scrubbed]' using exit $379FB450010D17078B3766C2273303C358C3A442~aurora
 at 176.126.252.12. Retrying on a new circuit.
  Jul  1 05:06:21 ethnao Tor[94685]: We tried for 15 seconds to connect to
 '[scrubbed]' using exit $14F92FF956105932E9DEC5B82A7778A0B1BD9A52~hessel0
 at 109.163.234.2. Retrying on a new circuit.
  Jul  1 05:06:22 ethnao Tor[94685]: We tried for 15 seconds to connect to
 '[scrubbed]' using exit $14F92FF956105932E9DEC5B82A7778A0B1BD9A52~hessel0
 at 109.163.234.2. Retrying on a new circuit.
  Jul  1 05:06:22 ethnao Tor[94685]: We tried for 15 seconds to connect to
 '[scrubbed]' using exit $14F92FF956105932E9DEC5B82A7778A0B1BD9A52~hessel0
 at 109.163.234.2. Retrying on a new circuit.
  Jul  1 05:06:26 ethnao Tor[94685]: We tried for 15 seconds to connect to
 '[scrubbed]' using exit $14F92FF956105932E9DEC5B82A7778A0B1BD9A52~hessel0
 at 109.163.234.2. Retrying on a new circuit.
  Jul  1 05:06:27 ethnao Tor[94685]: We tried for 15 seconds to connect to
 '[scrubbed]' using exit $14F92FF956105932E9DEC5B82A7778A0B1BD9A52~hessel0
 at 109.163.234.2. Retrying on a new circuit.
  Jul  1 05:06:30 ethnao Tor[94685]: We tried for 15 seconds to connect to
 '[scrubbed]' using exit $14F92FF956105932E9DEC5B82A7778A0B1BD9A52~hessel0
 at 109.163.234.2. Retrying on a new circuit.
  Jul  1 05:06:34 ethnao Tor[94685]: We tried for 15 seconds to connect to
 '[scrubbed]' using exit $14F92FF956105932E9DEC5B82A7778A0B1BD9A52~hessel0
 at 109.163.234.2. Retrying on a new circuit.
  Jul  1 05:06:36 ethnao Tor[94685]: We tried for 15 seconds to connect to
 '[scrubbed]' using exit
 $E444FE133F55B6FFD338337AA42BA199581E2C4B~spacitospacito2 at 51.15.52.230.
 Retrying on a 

[tor-bugs] #22788 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser rendering hangs when downloading large PDFs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22788: Tor Browser rendering hangs when downloading large PDFs
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 When downloading a large PDF, such as
 https://www.alchemistowl.org/pocorgtfo/pocorgtfo08.pdf , other tabs failed
 to render, open, or close correctly.

 In particular:
 * tabs would be slow to load,
 * the visible area would be rendered, but scrolling outside the visible
 area would show white space,
 * reloads of Google Docs when activating JavaScript using NoScript opened
 new tabs, rather than reloading existing tabs, and
 * closing tabs by clicking the x in the tab header would sometimes work
 particularly if I held the trackpad down for a while. But a quick click
 would often fail to close tabs.

 I think this is new behaviour in Tor Browser 7.0.1 in high security mode
 on macOS 10.12.5. (I have done similar things in the 6.0 series, and it
 was ok.)

 This is reproducible in high security mode. The only issues reproducible
 in low security mode are:
 * tabs would be slow to load,
 which I believe to be an expected behabviour when downloading a large file
 over the same guard connection.

 It does not happen in Firefox 54.0.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17669 [Webpages/Website]: Old links to outdated versions of Tor Browser should redirect to a page with the latest version of Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17669: Old links to outdated versions of Tor Browser should redirect to a page
with the latest version of Tor Browser
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  assigned => needs_information


Comment:

 At the moment we are using a rewrite rule for to serve downloads from
 dist. So that 404 page is served actually from dist. Maybe we shouldn't
 solve this issue with a rewrite rule in .htaccess, instead we should
 handle the request on apache config. If the request goes through we serve
 it w the redirect to the file, if it fails w/ a 404 we serve the 404 page
 instead.

 Would that work?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22334 [Webpages/Blog]: Missing top-right links in blog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22334: Missing top-right links in blog
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:5 linda]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 arma]:
 > > Worthwhile to do, but not critical for getting things working. We
 might even leave this one for when we have a uniform style across
 websites. But it would be sad to leave it for a year if it takes a year to
 have that uniform style.
 > ...
 > I agree that Teor makes a good point that people who come to the blog
 should be able to download, install, and check out other pages of
 torproject.org. And for this reason, I am a fan of styling the blog
 consistently with the website and linking from tpo/to tpo (by including it
 in the header, and the header being the same on the tor blog too)--when
 the new website launches.
 >
 > Thoughts?

 I think users should be able to download Tor Browser from the blog.
 And go to other parts of the website.
 Some links somewhere on the blog template would be good.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22786 [Webpages/Blog]: The blog's search box is hard to find, particularly on high security mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22786: The blog's search box is hard to find, particularly on high security 
mode
---+--
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by hiro):

 This is partially related to ticket:
 #[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22783 22783]

 The fontawesome set that was included in this template is creating all
 sort of issues and it is going to be replaced.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22335 [Webpages/Blog]: Please remove "The" from the blog title

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22335: Please remove "The" from the blog title
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by hiro):

 * cc: isabela (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22334 [Webpages/Blog]: Missing top-right links in blog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22334: Missing top-right links in blog
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by hiro):

 Linda left a comment a few weeks ago to which no one replied, suggesting
 to leave it as it is. So I guess we could either close this ticket or wait
 to review the status of this issue.

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