Re: [tor-bugs] #23061 [Core Tor/Tor]: crypto_rand_double() should produce all possible outputs on platforms with 32-bit int

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23061: crypto_rand_double() should produce all possible outputs on platforms 
with
32-bit int
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.2.14-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, security-low, privcount,  |  Actual Points:  0.5
  031-backport, 030-backport, 029-backport, 028  |
  -backport-maybe, 027-backport-maybe, 026   |
  -backport-maybe|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-

Comment (by yawning):

 Replying to [comment:15 nickm]:

 > Here are some goals I think we probably care about, but I could be
 wrong:

 If that's what you want:
 {{{
 double uint64_to_dbl_0_1(uint64_t x) {
   /* Can't merely check for __STDC_IEC_559__ because not every compiler we
 care about defines it. */
 #if FLT_RADIX != 2
 #error FLT_RADIX != 2, your system is the most special of them all.
 #endif
   x >>= (sizeof(double) * CHAR_BIT) - DBL_MANT_DIG;
   return (DBL_EPSILON/2) * x;
 }}}

 >* We should return a number uniformly at random in the range [0,
 1.0).  (That is, for all "suitable" x* Return outputs with at least some minimum granularity. (i.e, for
 some granularity delta, if x is a possible output, and x ± delta is in
 [0.0, 1.0), then there exists a possible output between x and x ± delta
 other than x.)

 Check.

 >* Run with reasonable efficiency.

 Check.

 >* Run in constant time.

 Check.

 >* Use the whole mantissa, or almost the whole mantissa.

 Check.

 >* Provide at least some number of bits of entropy in the output.

 Check.

 >* Work at least to a minimal degree on all c99 platforms.

 If people want to run tor on something that is exotic to the point where
 this sort of approach breaks, they can send patches.

 Yes this still leaves out "possible" values, but it trivially accomplishes
 uniform, fast, and constant time.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23115 [Applications/Tor Browser]: If "Tor is not working in this browser", don't download an update

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23115: If "Tor is not working in this browser", don't download an update
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:2 gk]:
 > Was it really not working and it downloaded bypassing Tor? That would be
 a serious bug. Or was that just the `about:tor` page that was misleading
 but the updater did do the correct thing?

 I don't know: I was concerned that these conflicting messages could
 happen. I didn't check which one was correct.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #11444 [Core Tor/Tor]: Drop support for long-obsolete versions of Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11444: Drop support for long-obsolete versions of Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, windows, cleanup, |  Actual Points:
  technical-debt |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by Vort):

 * cc: vvort@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22752 [Core Tor/Tor]: Assertion failure in consensus_cache_entry_handle_get on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22752: Assertion failure in consensus_cache_entry_handle_get on Windows
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+

Comment (by Vort):

 > I think this bug might be caused by the fact that (I think!) on windows,
 you can't unlink a file that's in use.

 Yes, adding of `consensus_cache_entry_unmap` call hides "unlink" warnings:
 attachment:unmap_hack.patch
 But adds other ones, of course.

 > But our code tries to unlink these files while they are still mapped.

 Using of deleted file is a strange thing for me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22752 [Core Tor/Tor]: Assertion failure in consensus_cache_entry_handle_get on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22752: Assertion failure in consensus_cache_entry_handle_get on Windows
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+
Changes (by Vort):

 * cc: vvort@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23138 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorButton don't let people to change proxy settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23138: TorButton don't let people to change proxy settings
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Connection Settings

 O - Manual Proxy configuration:

 HTTP Proxy: :
 SSL Proxy: :
 FTP Proxy: :
 SOCKS Host: (both empty)
 O - SOCKS v5

 No proxy for:
 localhost

 [-] Do not prompt
 [V] Proxy DNS WHEN using S5
 --

 When TorButton is disabled:
 TB use HTTP proxy for http/https access as expected.

 When TorButton enabled:
 TB refuse to connect. Above settings are not modified.
 If I disable the addon again, it works as expected.

 So consider add a checkbox to TorButton to allow custom proxy.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23127 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resource URI Leak!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23127: Resource URI Leak!
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23138

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23138 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorButton don't let people to change proxy settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23138: TorButton don't let people to change proxy settings
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * owner:   => tbb-team
 * component:  Applications/Torbutton => Applications/Tor Browser


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[tor-bugs] #23138 [Applications/Torbutton]: TorButton don't let people to change proxy settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23138: TorButton don't let people to change proxy settings
+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+-
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23127

 Comment.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23138 [Applications/Torbutton]: TorButton don't let people to change proxy settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23138: TorButton don't let people to change proxy settings
+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 ThisIsABug = 120% YES

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22845 [Webpages/Blog]: make new blog posts default to 'comments open', not 'comments closed'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22845: make new blog posts default to 'comments open', not 'comments closed'
---+--
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by arma):

 * cc: gk (added)


Comment:

 Something like half of our blog posts have comments disabled -- including
 ones from gk that I bet were intending to allow comments.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22845 [Webpages/Blog]: make new blog posts default to 'comments open', not 'comments closed'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22845: make new blog posts default to 'comments open', not 'comments closed'
---+--
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by arma):

 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/270205#comment-270205 is a user
 complaining about this issue today.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23137 [Metrics/Atlas]: sort column by bandwidth doesn't consider units

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23137: sort column by bandwidth doesn't consider units
---+---
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Agreed. Closing as duplicate. Thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15508 [Metrics/Atlas]: bandwidth sorting should be numeric and take the actual unit into account

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15508: bandwidth sorting should be numeric and take the actual  unit into 
account
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  phw
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by arma):

 #23137 was a duplicate of this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12892 [Core Tor/Tor]: Run KIST on some fast live relays, measure congestion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12892: Run KIST on some fast live relays, measure congestion
-+-
 Reporter:  robgjansen   |  Owner:
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay kist simulation analysis   |  Actual Points:
  research-program   |
Parent ID:  #12541   | Points:  large
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pastly):

 > We've had issues reproducing the results with a 4 week total collection
 period and are trying to find time to look into it a little more.
 Frustratingly, it could be many things outside our control.

 See the attachments prefixed with '4week'

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23137 [Metrics/Atlas]: sort column by bandwidth doesn't consider units

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23137: sort column by bandwidth doesn't consider units
---+-
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Sounds like a duplicate of #15508.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18768 [Metrics/Analysis]: Calculate the fraction of dist.torproject.org traffic for Tor Browser downloads and updates

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18768: Calculate the fraction of dist.torproject.org traffic for Tor Browser
downloads and updates
--+
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Analysis  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I believe this ticket is obsolete with the [https://metrics.torproject.org
 /webstats-tb.html application statistics] added to Tor Metrics earlier
 this year. Closing.

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[tor-bugs] #23137 [Metrics/Atlas]: sort column by bandwidth doesn't consider units

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23137: sort column by bandwidth doesn't consider units
---+-
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 Go to
 https://atlas.torproject.org/#search/freebogatov
 and then click on the "bandwidth" column. In fact, click twice to make it
 descending order.

 The first entry is 922.54KB/s. The second entry is 9.91 MB/s. The third
 entry is 9.89 MB/s. The fourth entry is 85.06KB/s.

 This is a very weird sorting order. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22651 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove redirects for torbrowser-launcher

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22651: Remove redirects for torbrowser-launcher
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201708  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 Fedora is also still using version 0.2.7:
 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1463869

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12541 [Core Tor/Tor]: Integrate KIST socket/circuit scheduling

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12541: Integrate KIST socket/circuit scheduling
-+-
 Reporter:  robgjansen   |  Owner:  pastly
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  performance, tcp, kist, scheduling,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-relay, term-project-ideas  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Oniongit: https://oniongit.eu/network/tor/merge_requests/4

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12541 [Core Tor/Tor]: Integrate KIST socket/circuit scheduling

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12541: Integrate KIST socket/circuit scheduling
-+-
 Reporter:  robgjansen   |  Owner:  pastly
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  performance, tcp, kist, scheduling,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-relay, term-project-ideas  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * cc: dgoulet (removed)
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


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Re: [tor-bugs] #12541 [Core Tor/Tor]: Integrate KIST socket/circuit scheduling

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12541: Integrate KIST socket/circuit scheduling
-+-
 Reporter:  robgjansen   |  Owner:  pastly
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  performance, tcp, kist, scheduling,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-relay, term-project-ideas  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pastly):

 * cc: dgoulet (added)
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 See

 - https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/pastly/tor.git/?h=kist-fortor-02 or
 - https://oniongit.eu/pastly/tor/tree/kist-fortor-02

 Adding dgoulet who wants to review KIST.

 The difference between -01 and -02 is just rebasing from master ~4w ago to
 master today.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22651 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove redirects for torbrowser-launcher

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22651: Remove redirects for torbrowser-launcher
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201708  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 The patch updating the URL has been merged upstream:
 https://github.com/micahflee/torbrowser-launcher/pull/279

 However, it seems the debian package has not been updated with this new
 version yet. I will send an email to Ulrike to check the status on this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23136 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: moat integration (fetch bridges for the user)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23136: moat integration (fetch bridges for the user)
---+--
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor4


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22582 [Applications/Tor Browser]: www.nexusmods.com not working properly in TOR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22582: www.nexusmods.com not working properly in TOR
---+--
 Reporter:  WalrusInAnus   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website, cloudflare  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  tbb-usabiliity-website, cloudflare => tbb-usability-website,
 cloudflare


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18101 [Applications/Tor Browser]: IP leak from Windows UI dialog with URI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18101: IP leak from Windows UI dialog with URI
-+-
 Reporter:  uileak   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-proxy-bypass, ip-leak,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201708, GeorgKoppen201708|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-proxy-bypass, ip-leak, TorBrowserTeam201702,
 GeorgKoppen201702 => tbb-proxy-bypass, ip-leak, TorBrowserTeam201708,
 GeorgKoppen201708
 * priority:  High => Very High


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[tor-bugs] #23136 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: moat integration (fetch bridges for the user)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23136: moat integration (fetch bridges for the user)
---+---
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 Tor Launcher needs to be enhanced to fetch bridges using moat.
 Dependencies include #22871 and #21951.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22343 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Save as... in the context menu results in using the catch-all circuit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22343: Save as... in the context menu results in using the catch-all circuit
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, ff52-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |
  tbb-7.0-frequent, TorBrowserTeam201708 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * keywords:
 tbb-linkability, ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-
 regression, tbb-7.0-frequent, TorBrowserTeam201708R
 =>
 tbb-linkability, ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-
 regression, tbb-7.0-frequent, TorBrowserTeam201708


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:25 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:23 arthuredelstein]:
 > > Replying to [comment:21 mcs]:

 > > I don't seem to be able to reproduce this exception in 22343+5 or
 22343+6. Is there a specific image URL and/or procedure I should try?
 >
 > If I remember correctly, I loaded
 https://pearlcrescent.com/tor/19273.html, placed the mouse over the
 w3schools.com image, and then I chose "Save Image As…" from the context
 menu.

 Thanks. Indeed this is failing. Right-click to Save As also fails if I
 load https://www.w3schools.com/html/img_logo.gif directly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15473 [Applications/Tor Browser]: JS Date object reveals OS type

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15473: JS Date object reveals OS type
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-os |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by peterlinss):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Spent some time looking at this and there doesn't seem to be a good fix.
 The root problem is that toLocaleFormat() is eventually calling strftime
 with a "%c" format, using the system dependent date/time locale format
 which obviously varies per platform.

 Potential fixes that I see are:
 1) call nsIDateTimeFormat to get a proper Unicode CLDR locale dependent
 date time string that's platform independent. The problem with this
 approach is that it introduces a dependency from the JS engine to the i18n
 library, which I expect would be frowned upon (and probably introduces
 another set of problems or two).
 2) re-create the CLDR date time format strings in the JS engine.
 Introduces a lot of complexity to fix a relatively small issue, not to
 mention having a parallel locale system that needs to be maintained
 independently of the main one in the i18n library.
 3) hard-code a single date time format string. While this would fix the
 underlying issue, it also causes the locale dependent date time output to
 be wrong for a large percentage of users, which can be quite bad (though
 it has the advantage of hiding the user's locale at this API surface, not
 sure if that's desirable in the end).
 4) hard-code a set of locale based date time format strings keyed off the
 C++ std::time_get::date_order. Still results in a wrong locale date time
 format for many users, but not as many as option 3. It at least covers the
 fundamental issue of dmy vs mdy vs ymd etc, but doesn't handle proper date
 and time separators, 12/24 hour time, month/day/year indicator text, etc
 (though a reasonable guess can be made for most users). While not ideal,
 the output should at least be parsable for most users.
 5) some variant of option 4 but also add a user preference to set a proper
 date time format string. Not a good user experience and provides an
 additional fingerprinting surface (and may also introduce another
 dependency from the js engine to the prefs system, though I didn't
 investigate this).
 6) do some heuristic analysis of the output of strftime("%c") (with a
 static time) to make some inferences about what the platform date time
 format string is, and then massage from that into a standardized format
 string. Seems fragile and error-prone.

 Unfortunately there don't appear to be good platform APIs on linux to get
 better locale information from the OS to do much better than option 4
 (that I'm aware of anyway).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23135 [Webpages/Website]: Edit Contact > Support page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23135: Edit Contact > Support page
--+-
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by steph):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23135 [Webpages/Website]: Edit Contact > Support page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23135: Edit Contact > Support page
--+
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => needs_revision


Comment:

 This is going live now. Please close if it works for you.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12892 [Core Tor/Tor]: Run KIST on some fast live relays, measure congestion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12892: Run KIST on some fast live relays, measure congestion
-+-
 Reporter:  robgjansen   |  Owner:
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay kist simulation analysis   |  Actual Points:
  research-program   |
Parent ID:  #12541   | Points:  large
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pastly):

 I will attach the graphs I shared at Wilmington after this comment.

 The data was collected over 48 total hours: 1 day of KIST, 1 day of
 vanilla Tor ("AMAP" or As Much As Possible).

 We've had issues reproducing the results with a 4 week total collection
 period and are trying to find time to look into it a little more.
 Frustratingly, it could be many things outside our control.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23128 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When right clicking on a webm and clicking on open with -> Torbrowser it opens TorBrowser even though it is not set up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23128: When right clicking on a webm and clicking on open with -> Torbrowser it
opens TorBrowser even though it is not set up
--+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  assigned => needs_information


Comment:

 This is a known issue for which we do not have a fix. In additiom to a
 browser window that contains the file for which you chose "Open With Tor
 Browser", the "The "Tor Network Settings" wizard should open when the
 browser starts. Unfortunately, currently we do not  have a way to block
 opening of the local file while the setup wizard is open. The good news is
 that no network access should be possible because the browser is
 configured by default to proxy everything through tor, and network access
 is disabled in tor until after the initial configuration is completed.

 My inclination is to close this as "won't fix" unless something bad is
 happening from a security or privacy perspective.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22343 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Save as... in the context menu results in using the catch-all circuit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22343: Save as... in the context menu results in using the catch-all circuit
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, ff52-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |
  tbb-7.0-frequent, TorBrowserTeam201708R|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:25 mcs]:
 > 50MB.zip (speedtest.tele2.net FTP download; no access via Tor)
 ftp://ftp.adobe.com/pub/adobe/reader/win/11.x/11.0.20/misc/AdbeRdrUpd11020.msp
 access via Tor
 but see how awful the Tor Network works: every exit node without FTP
 allowed ends up with {{{REASON=TIMEOUT}}}, and you need a lot of attempts
 to get to FTP, ignoring {{{425}}} errors.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22416 [Metrics/Atlas]: Replace the status icons with CSS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22416: Replace the status icons with CSS
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22191 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged. Thanks. (:

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #21368, #22147

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #21368, #22147 by irl:


Action: needs_revision

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21368 [Metrics/Atlas]: add number of effective family members to search output page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21368: add number of effective family members to search output page
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by irl):

 I think this is fine if we don't add 1. I'm sure you can just mentally add
 the 1 for your use case, it's not going to cause discrepancies for you in
 your use of the number, they'll all just be one less than you're used to.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12891 [Core Tor/Tor]: Simulate KIST - global scheduling (#9262) and socket write limits (#12890)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12891: Simulate KIST - global scheduling (#9262) and socket write limits 
(#12890)
-+-
 Reporter:  robgjansen   |  Owner:
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-relay kist simulation analysis   |  Actual Points:
  research-program   |
Parent ID:  #12541   | Points:  large
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 As discussed in Wilmington, Shadow results look good. Will attach graphs
 after this comment.

 The shadow network used had 2000 relays, ~50k clients, and 5000 servers.
 Load was varied by adding/removing ~20k clients. Packet loss was varied
 from 0%, 1.5%, 3%.

 The TL;DR is the worse the network conditions, the better KIST does
 relative to vanilla Tor (AKA "AMAP" in the graphs).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22147 [Metrics/Atlas]: add exit_addresses onionoo field

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22147: add exit_addresses onionoo field
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  cypherpunks
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by irl):

 Sorry, could these patches be rebased against the current master?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23064 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor doesn't open on OS X anymore

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23064: Tor doesn't open on OS X anymore
--+---
 Reporter:  nirvanh   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by mcs):

 As far as I know, we have not received other bug reports like this one.
 One possibility is that there is an incompatibility with macOS 10.10.5.
 Unfortunately, I do not have access to a Mac that is running that OS.
 Another possibility is that even when McAfee is disabled, it interferes
 with Tor Browser and causes a crash. We have had reports of that kind of
 behavior on Windows with antivirus software; I am not sure about OSX.
 Would it be possible for you to uninstall McAfee temporarily?

 Also, the stack trace that you copied from you system's crash reporter
 does not seem to be accurate (e.g., functions such as
 `vpx_reset_mmx_state` are repeated a lot with large code offsets). I am
 not sure why it is not more accurate, but if you are willing to install a
 debugger such as lldb, you could try running Tor Browser under a debugger
 and see if we can get a better stack trace.

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[tor-bugs] #23135 [Webpages/Website]: Edit Contact > Support page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23135: Edit Contact > Support page
--+-
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Edit section a. under support:
 https://www.torproject.org/about/contact.html.en#support

 from:
 Read through the FAQ and the documentation.

 to:
 Check our https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/CommunityTeam/Support;>support
 wiki for answers to some of the most frequently asked questions about
 Tor.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22307 [Metrics/Atlas]: Atlas shows duplicates shown when a bridge changes to a publicly listed node.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22307: Atlas shows duplicates shown when a bridge changes to a publicly listed
node.
---+--
 Reporter:  entry  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I believe this was fixed in 40426f09f37ff84f93f20f156ab638ce27ff977a to be
 deployed shortly. Please reopen if this is still a problem, and provide
 some example fingerprints to test.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21615 [Metrics/Atlas]: Use hashed fingerprint in all lookups

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21615: Use hashed fingerprint in all lookups
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22307 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged. Thanks. (:

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22379 [Metrics/Atlas]: Remove titles from the family members

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22379: Remove titles from the family members
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged. Thanks. (:

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[tor-bugs] #23134 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Unable to connect - bug or not?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23134: Unable to connect - bug or not?
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 When
 {{{
 [08-07 15:04:27] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 1201 FAILED 276
 trac.torproject.org:443 REASON=DESTROY
 }}}
 Tor Browser immediately gives standard:

 Unable to connect

 Firefox can’t establish a connection to the server at trac.torproject.org.

 The site could be temporarily unavailable or too busy. Try again in a
 few moments.
 If you are unable to load any pages, check your computer’s network
 connection.
 If your computer or network is protected by a firewall or proxy, make
 sure that Tor Browser is permitted to access the Web.
 Try Again

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22752 [Core Tor/Tor]: Assertion failure in consensus_cache_entry_handle_get on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22752: Assertion failure in consensus_cache_entry_handle_get on Windows
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 I think this bug might be caused by the fact that (I think!) on windows,
 you can't unlink a file that's in use.  But our code tries to unlink these
 files while they are still mapped.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22618 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Downloading pdf file via file:/// is stalling if the external helper dialog is enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22618: Downloading pdf file via file:/// is stalling if the external helper 
dialog
is enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-e10s, TorBrowserTeam201708 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression, tbb-e10s,
 TorBrowserTeam201708R => tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression, tbb-e10s,
 TorBrowserTeam201708
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Alright, I think I am done with testing and code review. Very nice work!
 Here are some nits which should be fixed:

 in the torbutton patch:

 1) not sure what "may be opened by another or application" means to be
 honest.

 in the tor browser patch:

 2) `nsExternalLoadURIHandler(nsIInterfaceRequestor * aWindowContext,` ->
 `nsExternalLoadURIHandler(nsIInterfaceRequestor *aWindowContext,`

 3) `// if we are not supposed to ask` <- s/if/If/ (I know it was just
 copied and pasted, but...)

 4)
 {{{
 +  // Break our reference cycle with the download warning dialog (set up
 in
 +  // OnStartRequest)
 }}}
 missing "." at the end of the sentence (twice)

 5) Could you add all the bugs that get fixed by this patch in the commit
 message of the follow-up bugfix? (and then doing a `git commit --squash`
 or something similar so that this information gets preserved during
 rebasing)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23116 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor stops responding to Ctrl-C and circuits while in infinite descriptor download loop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23116: tor stops responding to Ctrl-C and circuits while in infinite descriptor
download loop
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 (You'll need to set DisableDebuggerAttachment 0)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23116 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor stops responding to Ctrl-C and circuits while in infinite descriptor download loop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23116: tor stops responding to Ctrl-C and circuits while in infinite descriptor
download loop
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Does it work when you try to attach a gdb (or lldb, since it's a mac) to
 the process?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22605 [Core Tor/Tor]: sandbox_intern_string(): Bug: No interned sandbox parameter found for /etc/tor/torrc.d/

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22605: sandbox_intern_string(): Bug: No interned sandbox parameter found for
/etc/tor/torrc.d/
-+
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sandbox, regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 Yeah; for now, I think the best we can do is to declare that sandbox +
 include + reload is not going to work, and warn the user if they try to do
 it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22343 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Save as... in the context menu results in using the catch-all circuit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22343: Save as... in the context menu results in using the catch-all circuit
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, ff52-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-must, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |
  tbb-7.0-frequent, TorBrowserTeam201708R|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:23 arthuredelstein]:
 > Replying to [comment:21 mcs]:
 > > - `Save Image As` is still not working for us. about:downloads shows
 "Failed" and Kathy and I see the following on the browser console:
 > > {{{
 > > 15:14:58.300 [Exception... "Component returned failure code:
 0x80004005 (NS_ERROR_FAILURE) [nsIWebBrowserPersist.savePrivacyAwareURI]"
 nsresult: "0x80004005 (NS_ERROR_FAILURE)"  location: "JS frame ::
 chrome://global/content/contentAreaUtils.js :: internalPersist :: line
 580"  data: no] 1 (unknown)
 > > internalPersist chrome://global/content/contentAreaUtils.js:580:5
 > > continueSave chrome://global/content/contentAreaUtils.js:489:5
 > > internalSave/< chrome://global/content/contentAreaUtils.js:451:7
 > > Handler.prototype.process resource://gre/modules/Promise-
 backend.js:932:23
 > > this.PromiseWalker.walkerLoop resource://gre/modules/Promise-
 backend.js:813:7
 > > bound  self-hosted:913:17
 > > bound bound  self-hosted:913:17
 > > this.PromiseWalker.scheduleWalkerLoop/< resource://gre/modules
 /Promise-backend.js:747:11
 > > }}}
 >
 > I don't seem to be able to reproduce this exception in 22343+5 or
 22343+6. Is there a specific image URL and/or procedure I should try?

 If I remember correctly, I loaded
 https://pearlcrescent.com/tor/19273.html, placed the mouse over the
 w3schools.com image, and then I chose "Save Image As…" from the context
 menu.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23127 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resource URI Leak!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23127: Resource URI Leak!
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:13 cypherpunks]:
 > Ok I enabled "Tor Button" and restart the browser.
 > It now greets me with "Unable to find the proxy server".
 >
 > I've look at network settings. My proxy settings are there, but TB
 stopped using it anymore.
 >
 > That's why I had to disable it to use other Tor proxy. Do you
 understand?

 I think so. But then this is a different bug and you should figure out
 what's wrong with the non-standard Tor Browser configuration. If you
 believe that's because of a bug please file a different ticket.

 > "Tor Button" - Security = High.
 >
 > "Tor Button" could split into two.
 > 1. "Tor Button" to control Tor
 > 2. "Tor Security" to enahance/configure extra security

 Torbutton is not starting/stopping Tor the controller in the browser is
 Tor Launcher.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23127 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resource URI Leak!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23127: Resource URI Leak!
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Ok I enabled "Tor Button" and restart the browser.
 It now greets me with "Unable to find the proxy server".

 I've look at network settings. My proxy settings are there, but TB stopped
 using it anymore.

 That's why I had to disable it to use other Tor proxy. Do you understand?

 "Tor Button" - Security = High.

 "Tor Button" could split into two.
 1. "Tor Button" to control Tor
 2. "Tor Security" to enahance/configure extra security

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23127 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resource URI Leak!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23127: Resource URI Leak!
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 And I'm TBB user since v6. I am using Tor Browser.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23127 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resource URI Leak!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23127: Resource URI Leak!
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  invalid =>


Comment:

 Did you tried above step? If you enable TorButton, Tor browser simply
 won't run.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20657 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement service support.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20657: prop224: Implement service support.
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #12424   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Almost done; back into needs_revision.  Just a few cleanups to make,
 comments to add, or tickets to open left. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23131 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser should use onion domain instead of torproject.org domain(clearnet)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23131: Tor Browser should use onion domain instead of torproject.org
domain(clearnet)
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #17216.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17216 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make Tor Browser's updater work over Hidden Services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17216: Make Tor Browser's updater work over Hidden Services
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs tbb-security   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  medium
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 #23131 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23127 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resource URI Leak!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23127: Resource URI Leak!
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 Ah, you are not using Tor Browser. So, this is not a Tor Browser bug then.
 Our defense against URI leaks is currently implemented in Torbutton. That
 said you can still use Torbutton and point your Tor Browser to a different
 Tor instance.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23127 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resource URI Leak!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23127: Resource URI Leak!
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23127 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resource URI Leak!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23127: Resource URI Leak!
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Tor Browser with ADDON:

 Summary
 Platform Detection  × No
 Default Locale  × No
 Update Locale   × No
 Tor Browser × No
 Firefox Build
 Firefox Official Build  × No
 Firefox Release Build   × No
 Firefox ESR Channel × No
 Firefox Beta Channel× No
 Firefox Developer Edition   × No
 Firefox Nightly Build   × No
 Firefox GTK Build   × No
 PDF.js  × No
 Default Preferences
 FilenameItems   Hash
 × firefox.js–   –
 × firefox-branding.js   –   –
 × firefox-l10n.js   –   –
 × webide-prefs.js   –   –
 × greprefs.js   –   –
 × services-sync.js  –   –
 × 000-tor-browser.js–   –
 Total   –   –


 Hell yeah!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23127 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resource URI Leak!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23127: Resource URI Leak!
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > extensions.torbutton.

 Hmm, since I don't use "TorButton"(because I use my network's Tor), this
 addon can't help me.

 Suggestion:
 1. Can you split the torbutton to "tor info button"(which I'll disable)
 and "tor security"(which I'll keep, doesn't interfere with tor.exe)?
 2. Or add this config to TBB's firefox directly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23127 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resource URI Leak!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23127: Resource URI Leak!
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 1. Install TBB on a fresh Windows.
 2. COnnect to Tor(1st time).
 3. When the TBB opened, go to add-ons and disable 2 Tor Addons.
 4. Close TBB.

 5. Open TBB's firefox.exe
 6. "about:preferences#advanced" -> Network -> Settings.
 Set a Tor proxy(in my case, my own tor hosted on network).
 (by the way, many people use my method to use their own proxy such as
 Privoxy)
 7. Visit some .onion to make sure Tor is working.
 8. Then, try test above.


 @cypherpunks
 "about:config ->
 extensions.torbutton.resource_and_chrome_uri_fingerprinting"
 Above name is not found on my config.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23127 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resource URI Leak!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23127: Resource URI Leak!
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Set `extensions.torbutton.resource_and_chrome_uri_fingerprinting` to
 `true` and now spamming this?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23127 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resource URI Leak!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23127: Resource URI Leak!
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 ^ ADDON settings.

 Block access to resource:// CHECKED
 Block web-exposed chrome:// CHECKED
 Uniformly filter redirCHECKED

 Exposed res:// EMPTY
 Exposed chr:// EMPTY

 Restrict about: CHECKED
 Enable debug: NOT CHECKED

 Update button: PRESSED

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23127 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resource URI Leak!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23127: Resource URI Leak!
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 And here's a report of MozillaFirefox+ADDON(above);

 Summary
 Platform Detection  × No
 Default Locale  × No
 Update Locale   × No
 Tor Browser × No
 Firefox Build
 Firefox Official Build  × No
 Firefox Release Build   × No
 Firefox ESR Channel × No
 Firefox Beta Channel× No
 Firefox Developer Edition   × No
 Firefox Nightly Build   × No
 Firefox GTK Build   × No
 PDF.js  × No
 Default Preferences
 FilenameItems   Hash
 × firefox.js–   –
 × firefox-branding.js   –   –
 × firefox-l10n.js   –   –
 × webide-prefs.js   –   –
 × greprefs.js   –   –
 × services-sync.js  –   –
 × 000-tor-browser.js–   –
 Total   –   –

 
 Summary:
 Tor Browser should include this add-on to internal level to eliminate all
 data reading.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23127 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resource URI Leak!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23127: Resource URI Leak!
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Try latest TB on Windows, then go to ​https://browserleaks.com/firefox .
 What I see is this:


 Summary
 Platform Detection  ✔Windows
 Default Locale  ✔ en-US – English (US)
 Update Locale   × No
 Tor Browser ✔7.0.2
 Firefox Build
 Firefox Official Build  × No
 Firefox Release Build   ✔ Yes
 Firefox ESR Channel × No
 Firefox Beta Channel× No
 Firefox Developer Edition   × No
 Firefox Nightly Build   × No
 Firefox GTK Build   × No
 PDF.js  × No


 Default Preferences
 FilenameItems   Hash
 ✔ firefox.js581 XX
 ✔ firefox-branding.js   11  XX
 ✔ firefox-l10n.js   2   XX
 ✔ webide-prefs.js   25  XX
 ✔ greprefs.js   1912XX
 ✔ 000-tor-browser.js224 XX
 × 000-tor-browser.js–   –
 Total   2755XX


 (No script = allow only browserleaks.com)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22397 [Internal Services/Blog]: Add a (single) onion service for the new tor blog

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22397: Add a (single) onion service for the new tor blog
+-
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Now how difficult is this? All major browser have SNI support.

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[tor-bugs] #23133 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Use .onion more. Redirect traffic to .onion if the user come from Tor.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23133: Use .onion more. Redirect traffic to .onion if the user come from Tor.
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 onion.torproject.org/

 I had a hard time finding your official onion.
 Why not use it actively?

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[tor-bugs] #23132 [Internal Services/Blog]: Add blog.torproject.org to onion.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23132: Add blog.torproject.org to onion.torproject.org
+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+-
 Ok, where can I find a .onion for your blog?

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[tor-bugs] #23131 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser should use onion domain instead of torproject.org domain(clearnet)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23131: Tor Browser should use onion domain instead of torproject.org
domain(clearnet)
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 https://onion.torproject.org/

 Why not use .onion for update check? Debian and some other OS
 now provide .onion access to their repository. It's a shame that
 TorProject itself don't use onion protocol actively.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #9924 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Firefox bug - TBB queries the A record of the hostname of the machine it is running on.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9924: Firefox bug - TBB queries the A record of the hostname of the machine it 
is
running on.
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-firefox-patch,tbb-proxy-bypass  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  needs_information => new


Comment:

 Tor Browser does this during every startup. You can disable DNS Client
 service to make Tor Browser do DNS requests instead of IPC calls.

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[tor-bugs] #23130 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Synchronize spec with implementation (August 2017)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23130: prop224: Synchronize spec with implementation (August 2017)
--+-
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  prop224 tor-hs tor-spec
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #17242
   Points:  0.4   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorR-can  |
--+-
 During implementation and reviewing we noticed a few more deviations of
 the implementation from the spec, and also some spec errors.

 Here is a list:

 1) `RENDEZVOUS2` is not identical to `RENDEZVOUS1` since rend points
 strips out the rend cookie.

 2) We use a replaycache for the rendcookie when parsing intro2 on the
 service-side

 3) No legacy INTRODUCE cell anymore since that was not needed.

 4) We can have multiple intro onion keys with different types on the HS
 desc (see #22979)

 5) We need to mention the ed25519 base point in the spec since we use it
 hardcoded in the code.

 We might get more items here as client-side review moves forward.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20657 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement service support.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20657: prop224: Implement service support.
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #12424   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Addressed all pending review comments again!
 Let me know what else is missing!

 I will be testing in the meanwhile.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23128 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When right clicking on a webm and clicking on open with -> Torbrowser it opens TorBrowser even though it is not set up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23128: When right clicking on a webm and clicking on open with -> Torbrowser it
opens TorBrowser even though it is not set up
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: mcs, brade (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23128 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When right clicking on a webm and clicking on open with -> Torbrowser it opens TorBrowser even though it is not set up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23128: When right clicking on a webm and clicking on open with -> Torbrowser it
opens TorBrowser even though it is not set up
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  yawning => tbb-team
 * status:  new => assigned
 * component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23129 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The support link on about:support links to support.mozilla.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23129: The support link on about:support links to support.mozilla.org
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 * owner:   => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


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[tor-bugs] #23129 [- Select a component]: The support link on about:support links to support.mozilla.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23129: The support link on about:support links to support.mozilla.org
--+-
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 The support link on about:support links to support.mozilla.org even though
 it says.

 This page contains technical information that might be useful when you’re
 trying to solve a problem. If you are looking for answers to common
 questions about '''Tor Browser''', check out our support website.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23128 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: When right clicking on a webm and clicking on open with -> Torbrowser it opens TorBrowser even though it is not set up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23128: When right clicking on a webm and clicking on open with -> Torbrowser it
opens TorBrowser even though it is not set up
--+-
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 I tested this on macOS 10.12.6 (16G29)
 And it also occurs with .gif files.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23128 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: When right clicking on a webm and clicking on open with -> Torbrowser it opens TorBrowser even though it is not set up (was: When right clicki

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23128: When right clicking on a webm and clicking on open with -> Torbrowser it
opens TorBrowser even though it is not set up
--+-
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

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[tor-bugs] #23128 [Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox]: When right clicking on a webm and clicking on open with -> Torbrowser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23128: When right clicking on a webm and clicking on open with -> Torbrowser
--+-
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser Sandbox  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 1. Delete TorBrowser-Data folder
 2. Right clicking on a webm and clicking on open with -> Tor browser , it
 will open Tor browser even though tor is not set up yet
 Doing step 2 when you already setup Tor Browser caused 2 browser windows
 to open up.
 Tested on Tor browser 7.5a2

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Re: [tor-bugs] #9924 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Firefox bug - TBB queries the A record of the hostname of the machine it is running on.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9924: Firefox bug - TBB queries the A record of the hostname of the machine it 
is
running on.
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-firefox-patch,tbb-proxy-bypass  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:6 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [comment:5 gk]:
 > > cypherpunks: Is that still an issue? If so, do you have logs (pcaps)
 for that? A couple of days ago I checked Tor Browser start-up on a Windows
 machine and no DNS resolution outside of Tor showed up
 > It was done by DNS Client service, and Tor Browser got it through IPC
 from the DNS Client cache.

 Do you have steps to reproduce that behavior? That would allow us to
 figure out what is going on and whether we need to fix that behavior.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23115 [Applications/Tor Browser]: If "Tor is not working in this browser", don't download an update

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23115: If "Tor is not working in this browser", don't download an update
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Was it really not working and it downloaded bypassing Tor? That would be a
 serious bug. Or was that just the `about:tor` page that was misleading but
 the updater did do the correct thing?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23117 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Link Tor Browser Bundle statically against musl libc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23117: Link Tor Browser Bundle statically against musl libc
--+--
 Reporter:  robotanarchy  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  musl,libc,tbb |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 I don't think we want to do that anytime soon if at all.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22989 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB Size 1000x610 Mac

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22989: TBB Size 1000x610 Mac
-+-
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  torbutton  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => assigned
 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution => tbb-fingerprinting-
 resolution, tbb-torbutton
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final =>


Comment:

 Okay, thanks. So, the Torbutton extension is causing this, interesting.
 Probably as it inserts the button into the toolbar after the window got
 rounded which makes it larger. Hrm.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10355 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Pipeline defense interferes with twitter and flickr photostreams

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10355: Pipeline defense interferes with twitter and flickr photostreams
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website, tbb-  |  worksforme
  testcase, tbb-firefox-patch|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10355 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Pipeline defense interferes with twitter and flickr photostreams

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10355: Pipeline defense interferes with twitter and flickr photostreams
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  testcase, tbb-firefox-patch|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:12 cypherpunks]:
 > What is the current status of this ticket?

 I think WORKSFORME. (If not, please reopen with steps to reproduce)

 > > reducing network.http.pipelining.max-optimistic-requests to 10
 > Now it is set to 3. Is this randomization level enough for defense?
 As far as this experimental defense goes I think so, yes. But keep in mind
 this still needs thorough evaluation.

 > What is the way to go in esr59 where pipelining is removed?

 If we want to have an (additional) in-browser defense then adapting HTTP/2
 to our needs might be a good strategy.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22577 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB ask you to reset settings if your HTTPS connection fails.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22577: TBB ask you to reset settings if your HTTPS connection fails.
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  tbb-7.0-issues|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:2 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 gk]:
 > > Do you have an example where this gets triggered with a clean, new Tor
 Browser?
 > It's impossible.

 Actually, no. I see the problem with the STR in
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1303286.

 > > Looking at https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1252068 it
 seems that gets only triggered if you modify some SSL related preferences?
 But somewhat surprisingly I can't reproduce this issue on my Linux box
 even when trying to follow the steps for the Q people in that Mozilla
 bug.
 > Because of the other bugs ;)
 > > But maybe you are hitting any of the follow-up bugs. Anyway, I guess
 hiding that button is a good idea.
 > No. It's a very helpful feature for noobs like in STR
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1303286, as it resets "SSL
 related preferences" to Tor Browser defaults.

 Oh, that's a good point. Thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21074 [Core Tor/Tor]: setrlimit fails OSX Sierra

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21074: setrlimit fails OSX Sierra
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.6.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  OSX Sierra setrlimit, tbb-wants  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: celticninja (added)


Comment:

 #23124 is a duplicate

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23124 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor 7 not starting on OS X Sierra

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23124: tor 7 not starting on OS X Sierra
--+--
 Reporter:  celticninja   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 You could try to install Tor Browser on your Desktop to see if that fixes
 your problem. Or you could remove your `TorBrowser-Data` folder (BUT back
 it up first in case you want to save your bookmarks etc.; it should get
 created again during a new Tor Browser start).

 Ultimately I think this is a duplicate of #21074.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23127 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Resource URI Leak!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23127: Resource URI Leak!
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 How can I reproduce this? I just took a clean Tor Browser on Linux and
 there are no leaks visible on the browserleaks website.

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