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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Trac email verification for user: metal_...@me.com

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18628 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Devise some way for the browser proxy to forward metadata to the bridge before the OR data

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18628: Devise some way for the browser proxy to forward metadata to the bridge
before the OR data
---+
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I added support for `client_ip` to the JavaScript proxy in the bug18628
 branch:
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/dcf/snowflake.git/diff/?h=bug18628&id=b2be72724a1924bace6af18904a9e53f9094a5fd&id2=1d6109a9eddd4e2d967efbde8aba89b4226aefc2
 Comment is welcome. It uses the same technique of parsing
 RTCPeerConnection.remoteDescription.sdp, because I couldn't find a better
 way.

 cmm32, reminder that we're looking for a few revisions from comment:8,
 particularly making the tests pass for remoteIPFromSDP.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13855 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Use known onions for XMPP servers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13855: Use known onions for XMPP servers
+-
 Reporter:  arlolra |  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  UX  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by sukhbir):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Enabled again in [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-messenger-
 build.git/commit/?id=bbded9cef95914552735e0fa4c8779bc07b15911 bbded9c]
 (and rebased for ESR52).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23077 [Core Tor/Tor]: Channelpadding tests rely on actual time; can fail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23077: Channelpadding tests rely on actual time; can fail
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  unittest, channelpadding  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 No branch; sorry.  I just used monotime_enable_test_mocking() at the start
 of the function, and made sure that the test function was running inside a
 TT_FORK

 Having the tests depend on actual time is really fragile and we should
 avoid it.  Not only does it slow down the tests, but there's _always_ a
 machine out there more slow than we had imagined.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23077 [Core Tor/Tor]: Channelpadding tests rely on actual time; can fail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23077: Channelpadding tests rely on actual time; can fail
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  unittest, channelpadding  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Is there a branch for what you tried?

 My guess is that the mocked time is messing with the timerwheel code and
 that we need to advance time in the timerwheel while waiting for the
 callback to fire. But this is just a guess..

 We could also boost this timeout value (the assignment to
 chan->next_padding_time_ms on line 399 and possibly elsewhere), but that
 will of course slow the tests down, since we actually wait for the
 callbacks...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23249 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser DNS security: hosts file bypassed when "Proxy DNS when using SOCKS v5" is enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23249: Tor Browser DNS security: hosts file bypassed when "Proxy DNS when using
SOCKS v5" is enabled
--+---
 Reporter:  lux+tor@… |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 @lux Your ticket was closed by the user {{{cypherpunks}}} who is an open
 multi-user, it isn't used by Tor Project employees.

 If you want this to be seen by Tor Project employees then I may reopen it
 but I'm reluctant to since **that the hosts file should be bypassed is
 expected behavior**. Otherwise it becomes easy to censor sites for the Tor
 Browser, and since some users use hosts file to block ads (Peter's hosts
 file for example) then they will become easier for fingerprint. Without
 even mentioning what proxy bypasses and whatnot may result from such a
 move.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22671 [Webpages/Blog]: Implement design changes to blog.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22671: Implement design changes to blog.torproject.org
---+---
 Reporter:  linda  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by hiro):

 Thanks Linda!

 I do not have a design eye, so sometimes I need a bit of extra help to
 implement things that I miss :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23251 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Parsing a networkstatus-bridges with flags only causes BridgeDB to hang

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23251: Parsing a networkstatus-bridges with flags only causes BridgeDB to hang
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-parsers  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorM-can
--+--

Comment (by atagar):

 Ahhh, got it. Thanks Isis. :P

 If ya need anything from me just let me know.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13410 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable self-signed certificate warnings when visiting .onion sites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13410: Disable self-signed certificate warnings when visiting .onion sites
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by yawning):

 * cc: yawning (added)


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:13 linda]:
 > After triaging, the ux team agrees that this warning should be removed.

 In the event that the warning is removed, the sandboxing team, requests
 that the removal be feature gated via a pref, so the new behavior can be
 disabled.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23251 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Parsing a networkstatus-bridges with flags only causes BridgeDB to hang

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23251: Parsing a networkstatus-bridges with flags only causes BridgeDB to hang
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-parsers  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorM-can
--+--

Comment (by isis):

 Replying to [comment:1 atagar]:
 > Hi Isis. Added a quick test to see if that line's problematic for Stem.
 Seems to be just fine...
 >
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=30990ab
 >

 Right, that should be fine for Stem. Also, BridgeDB's parsers actually
 skip the flags/headers entirely and tell Stem to start reading after them,
 so it wouldn't be a Stem issue anyway. :)

 > As for Stem not being 'async aware' I'm not sure what you mean or why
 that's relevant. You're just using Stem as a descriptor parser. That has
 nothing to do with its controller functionality.

 Oh, I mean that BridgeDB is Twisted python, so it's main loop is
 asynchronous. But while BridgeDB is doing it's
 `bridgedb.parse.descriptors.*` functions (which call Stem) the handling of
 the file isn't done in the way that Twisted is happy with because it's
 blocking (see the `FileWriter(proto.Protocol)` class in the
 `bridgedb.git/scripts/get-tor-exits` script for an exmaple of how Twisted
 wants IO to be done). So because this IO is all blocking, and because of
 the hang bug, it never returns to BridgeDB's main loop, which is where the
 handlers for the SIGUSR1 and SIGHUPs signals are, which are required to
 restart BridgeDB when it receives new descriptors from the BridgeAuth.

 To be clear, none of this is a bug in Stem. It's all BridgeDB.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23250 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor-0.3.0.10: test failure on NetBSD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23250: tor-0.3.0.10: test failure on NetBSD
--+
 Reporter:  wiz   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23251 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Parsing a networkstatus-bridges with flags only causes BridgeDB to hang

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23251: Parsing a networkstatus-bridges with flags only causes BridgeDB to hang
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-parsers  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorM-can
--+--

Comment (by atagar):

 Hi Isis. Added a quick test to see if that line's problematic for Stem.
 Seems to be just fine...

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=30990ab

 As for Stem not being 'async aware' I'm not sure what you mean or why
 that's relevant. You're just using Stem as a descriptor parser. That has
 nothing to do with its controller functionality.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21961 [Applications/Tor Browser]: should torbrowser enable network.IDN_show_punycode by default?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21961: should torbrowser enable network.IDN_show_punycode by default?
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Everything messed https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1380617

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[tor-bugs] #23254 [Core Tor/Tor]: BridgeAuth offline key mode seems broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23254: BridgeAuth offline key mode seems broken
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.10
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-dirauth, tor-bridgeauth, tor-
 Severity:  Normal   |  ed25519-keys, tor-offline-keys
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:  3|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  SponsorM-can   |
-+-
 Yesterday I renewed the signing keys for the Bifröst (see #23253) but the
 machine still couldn't join the network. This is my best understanding of
 the problem, which I repeatedly witnessed trying to fix the machine:

 {{{
 19:29 isis+ | so it seems the bridgeauth was still down,
 even though i "fixed" the expired signing keys yesterday
 19:30 isis+ | which apparently it doesn't even need
 signing keys, so why i wasted an afternoon fixing it when i'm supposed to
 be preparing for a talk is a bit annoying
 19:30 isis+ | but nobody runs this code so hey, what
 should i expect
 19:31 isis+ | this time it was not in the consensus
 because the other dirauths didn't recognise it because it "had new keys"
 19:33 isis+ | which, upon inspection, seemed to mean that,
 even though i have always specified "OfflineKeys 1", the bridgeauth
 somehow generated a ed25519_master_id_secret_key (??) however it kept the
 old
   ed25519_master_id_public_key, and then it
 used this new ed25519_master_id_secret_key to sign the
 ed25519_signing_cert (which had already been signed by the real
 ed25519_master_id_secret_key which
   is kept…
 19:33 isis+ | …offline)
 19:33 isis+ | this resulted in a complete clusterfuck of
 mismatched and mis-signed keys
 19:35 isis+ | and even though the ed25519_signing_cert was
 already generated offline (afaict correctly) it was the bridgeauth's
 insistence on making a new ed25519_master_id_secret_key that was causing
 the
   problem
 19:37 isis+ | the only way i could think of, without
 fixing all these probable bugs, to fix this, was to go back to the offline
 machine and use the correct ed25519_master_id_secret_key to regenerate new
   keypairs with "OfflineKeys 0" and no
 signing_cert expiration, and then transfer all the keys to lapsedpacifist
 19:37 isis+ | so the bridgeauth no longer has "offline
 keys" but i guess it never really did, and it wouldn't even be useful even
 if it could
 }}}

 Sorry, I'll clean up the IRC paste mess into a proper description later, I
 seriously have to go prepare my slides for my talk. :(

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[tor-bugs] #23253 [Core Tor/Tor]: BridgeAuth goes offline when it has an expired ed25519_signing_cert

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23253: BridgeAuth goes offline when it has an expired ed25519_signing_cert
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-bridgeauth, tor-dirauth, tor-
 Severity:  Normal   |  ed25519-keys
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  SponsorM-can   |
-+-
 However, Roger says in IRC that the BridgeAuth doesn't use (or shouldn't
 be using) this key, since it's only for v3 DirAuths.

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[tor-bugs] #23252 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: The Trac ticket "nsa" bot in #tor-bots is unhappy after Trac upgrade?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23252: The Trac ticket "nsa" bot in #tor-bots is unhappy after Trac upgrade?
--+-
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 It's printing some MIME headers in the ticket subjects:

 {{{
 19:33  nsa+ | or: [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] #22671 was
 updated:  --===5927778188332522610== MIME-Version: 1.0
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
 #22671:
   Implement design changes to
 blog.torproject.org -
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22671#comment:14
 19:33  nsa+ | or: Changes (by hiro):
 19:33  nsa+ | or:  * status:  reopened =>
 needs_information
 19:33  nsa+ | or: [...]
 19:41  nsa+ | or: [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] #22671 was
 updated:  --===6969881877577624700== MIME-Version: 1.0
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
 #22671:
   Implement design changes to
 blog.torproject.org -
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22671#comment:15
 19:41  nsa+ | or: Comment (by linda):
 19:41  nsa+ | or:  Hiro:
 19:42  nsa+ | or: [...]
 19:55  nsa+ | or: [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] #23251 filed by
 isis:  --===5055900324193280329== MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-
 Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit  #23251:
   Parsing a networkstatus-bridges with flags
 only causes BridgeDB to hang -
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23251
 19:55  nsa+ | or:  The following file:
 19:55  nsa+ | or:  {{{
 19:55  nsa+ | or:  bridgedb@polyanthum
 /srv/bridges.torproject.org/from-bifroest
 19:55  nsa+ | or:   % cat networkstatus-bridges[...]
 19:55  nsa+ | or: [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] #23249 was
 updated:  --===7353148152514419240== MIME-Version: 1.0
 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
 #23249: Tor
   Browser DNS security: hosts file bypassed
 when "Proxy DNS when using SOCKS v5" is enabled -
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23249#comment:2
 19:55  nsa+ | or: Comment (by lux+tor@…):
 19:55  nsa+ | or:  This ticket has been closed and marked
 as solved under the pretext of
 19:55  nsa+ | or:  "''not a bug''". IMHO, it is an
 undeserved fate ...[...]
 }}}

 Apologies, I think this isn't really a "Trac" component ticket, but I have
 no idea where that bot or its code lives.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23249 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser DNS security: hosts file bypassed when "Proxy DNS when using SOCKS v5" is enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23249: Tor Browser DNS security: hosts file bypassed when "Proxy DNS when using
SOCKS v5" is enabled
--+---
 Reporter:  lux+tor@… |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by lux+tor@…):

 This ticket has been closed and marked as solved under the pretext of
 "''not a bug''". IMHO, it is an undeserved fate ...

 I don't know what is the policy for this bug tracking tool, so maybe I am
 mistaken. However:

  1. When I sayd "''This is not a bug''", I meant "''Tor Browser does not
 crash''", and '''not '''"''Tor Browser works as it should''".
  1. Some tickets are marked as "''enhancement''" and are not closed:
 [[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21961
 1]][[https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/664 2]]. If my ticket
 should not have a "''defect''" type but rather a "''enhancement''" type,
 correcting the type would have been a more appropriate treatment than just
 closing it. I am new to this tool so, excuse me for the mistake.
  1. I have just found a ~similar~ issue, which has been marked as "''MAJOR
 BUG''" in Mozilla support website (https://support.mozilla.org/en-
 US/questions/1011327).
  1. I spent '''1h30 '''to write this full bug report, with a particular
 care to readability in order '''to help your team'''. At least, just to
 show some respect, I would have appreciated some explanation as why, even
 if some may qualify this as a bug, it will not be considered a bug nor
 converted into an enhancement nor even tested just to check if the problem
 is duplicable.

 I suspect your team to be quite busy, but still ...

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[tor-bugs] #23251 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Parsing a networkstatus-bridges with flags only causes BridgeDB to hang

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23251: Parsing a networkstatus-bridges with flags only causes BridgeDB to hang
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Major |   Keywords:  bridgedb-parsers
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorM-can  |
--+--
 The following file:

 {{{
 bridgedb@polyanthum /srv/bridges.torproject.org/from-bifroest
  % cat networkstatus-bridges
 published 2017-08-15 18:58:10
 flag-thresholds stable-uptime=0 stable-mtbf=0 fast-speed=0 guard-
 wfu=0.000% guard-tk=0 guard-bw-inc-exits=0 guard-bw-exc-exits=0 enough-
 mtbf=1 ignoring-advertised-bws=0
 }}}

 causes the bridgedb process to hang. The last log lines output are:

 {{{
 bridgedb@polyanthum ~ % tail -f
 /srv/bridges.torproject.org/log/bridgedb.log
 19:46:33 INFO L465:Bridges.insert() BridgeSplitter placing
 bridge $$C44836BF2F42DB5B1AD3CF6085626056593D846A~Shizuokalibelous into
 hashring https (via n=5, pos=0).
 19:46:33 DEBUGL547:Bridges.insert() Inserting
 $$C44836BF2F42DB5B1AD3CF6085626056593D846A~Shizuokalibelous into
 hashring...
 19:46:33 DEBUG L78:geo.getCountryCode() Looked up country code: NL
 19:46:33 INFO L465:Bridges.insert() BridgeSplitter placing
 bridge $$2CC6A05D7F52D7B936ABEE13C782780E4B23B64F~conglutinatoreri into
 hashring email (via n=14, pos=1).
 19:46:33 DEBUGL547:Bridges.insert() Inserting
 $$2CC6A05D7F52D7B936ABEE13C782780E4B23B64F~conglutinatoreri into
 hashring...
 19:46:33 INFO L174:Main.load()  Done inserting 1959
 bridges into hashring.
 19:46:33 DEBUGL208:persistent.save()Saving state to:
 '/srv/bridges.torproject.org/run/bridgedb.state'
 19:46:33 INFO  L80:Main.load()  Processing descriptors in
 ../from-bifroest directory...
 19:46:33 INFO  L86:Main.load()  Opening networkstatus
 file: /srv/bridges.torproject.org/from-bifroest/networkstatus-bridges
 19:46:33 INFO L124:descriptors.parseNetwo() Parsing networkstatus
 file: /srv/bridges.torproject.org/from-bifroest/networkstatus-bridges
 }}}

 Further, and this might be a separate issue, but when BridgeDB hangs in
 this state, the cronjob which calls `bridgedb --reload` launches an
 entirely new process of bridgedb, without killing the old one, since the
 old one is locked while doing blocking IO, and the signal handlers are in
 the async code that it's supposed to come back to. I think there's not
 really any way to fix this, since Stem is doing the IO there, and Stem
 isn't async aware/capable.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22671 [Webpages/Blog]: Implement design changes to blog.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22671: Implement design changes to blog.torproject.org
---+---
 Reporter:  linda  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by linda):

 Hiro:

 You're right-- the banner is an example of something that we wanted, and
 demonstrating a way that we can use that space. I was not suggesting that
 you should put those banners there. Sorry about the confusion.

 The intention was to remove the left column as a left column, but not
 necessarily the content from the left column. I think that it's okay to
 use the right column to display the top posts and recent updates from the
 Tor project.

 I am do prefer the original logo, but I assumed that this was changed with
 other people and was fine with the changes. Let's see what Isabela says.
 I'll ask antonela for the images that she used for the blog page, and for
 her to put the images in this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22671 [Webpages/Blog]: Implement design changes to blog.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22671: Implement design changes to blog.torproject.org
---+---
 Reporter:  linda  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  reopened => needs_information


Comment:

 I thought the banner on the right was an example not something that should
 be added. I am happy to add it if that's the case. Is that what we want?

 This also reopen the question regarding the posts on the left. I was under
 the impression that we wanted to remove them and leave only the events.
 Are we not? Would we like to have most-reads posts?

 The Tor Project blog text was decided on a separate thread, again I'd be
 happy to remove it if that's what we want. Isabela could you clarify this?

 Linda can you clarify regarding the font size and the banner? The invision
 page has a sketch file, but I can't open it. Is there any way we could
 export it? Also if we want to change the tor blog logo could we get that
 in png on the invision assets page?

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[tor-bugs] #23250 [- Select a component]: tor-0.3.0.10: test failure on NetBSD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23250: tor-0.3.0.10: test failure on NetBSD
--+
 Reporter:  wiz   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 When running the self tests on NetBSD, there is one problem:

 {{{
 ===> Testing for tor-0.3.0.10
 /usr/bin/make  check-TESTS check-local
 PASS: src/test/test
 PASS: src/test/test-slow
 PASS: src/test/test-memwipe
 PASS: src/test/test_workqueue
 PASS: src/test/test_keygen.sh
 PASS: src/test/test-timers
 SKIP: src/test/fuzz_static_testcases.sh
 PASS: src/test/test_zero_length_keys.sh
 PASS: src/test/test_workqueue_cancel.sh
 SKIP: src/test/test_workqueue_efd.sh
 SKIP: src/test/test_workqueue_efd2.sh
 PASS: src/test/test_workqueue_pipe.sh
 PASS: src/test/test_workqueue_pipe2.sh
 PASS: src/test/test_workqueue_socketpair.sh
 SKIP: src/test/test_switch_id.sh
 PASS: src/test/test_ntor.sh
 FAIL: src/test/test_bt.sh
 
 Testsuite summary for tor 0.3.0.10
 
 # TOTAL: 17
 # PASS:  12
 # SKIP:  4
 # XFAIL: 0
 # FAIL:  1
 # XPASS: 0
 # ERROR: 0
 
 See ./test-suite.log
 
 }}}

 The test log:
 {{{
 # less ./src/test/test_bt.sh.log
 OK
 [1]   Abort trap (core dumped) "${builddir:-.}/... |
   Done"${PYTHON:-pytho...
 BAD

  T= 1502824395
 Tor died: Caught signal 11
 0x73c0a4bd  at ./src/test/test-bt-cl
 [1]   Abort trap (core dumped) "${builddir:-.}/... |
   Done(1) "${PYTHON:-pytho...
 -158318
 FAIL src/test/test_bt.sh (exit status: 1)
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22671 [Webpages/Blog]: Implement design changes to blog.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22671: Implement design changes to blog.torproject.org
---+--
 Reporter:  linda  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #11973 [Core Tor/Tor]: Should relays stop making unencrypted directory connections?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11973: Should relays stop making unencrypted directory connections?
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-design tor-relay directory-|  Actual Points:
  protocol needs-proposal|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by ilf):

 * cc: ilf@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23246 [Webpages/Website]: blocked url name DNS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23246: blocked url name DNS
+
 Reporter:  paleophrenocarpe@…  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:2 paleophrenocarpe@…]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 cypherpunks]:
 > > No. They (atheologie.ca) blocks Tor access.
 >
 > They ? Which they?  Certainly not the target server! I think this is one
 or more of the many ISP or the European community that run DNS who blocks
 this URL.

 It is the server blocking connections from Tor exits. You can add these
 domains to [[org/doc/ListOfServicesBlockingTor]].

 It may not be a deliberate decision by the webmasters; rather a decision
 by their cPanel hosting provider. Through reverse DNS we see that
 atheology.ca is hosted on a panelboxmanager.com domain. And
 http://panelboxmanager.com/ also blocks Tor access.
 {{{
 $ dig +short atheology.ca
 184.107.100.87
 $ dig +short -x 184.107.100.87
 s117.panelboxmanager.com.
 }}}
 You might contact the server admins and ask them if they are aware they
 are blocking Tor users, and if they can do anything to change it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23249 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser DNS security: hosts file bypassed when "Proxy DNS when using SOCKS v5" is enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23249: Tor Browser DNS security: hosts file bypassed when "Proxy DNS when using
SOCKS v5" is enabled
--+---
 Reporter:  lux+tor@… |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


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[tor-bugs] #23249 [- Select a component]: Tor Browser DNS security: hosts file bypassed when "Proxy DNS when using SOCKS v5" is enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23249: Tor Browser DNS security: hosts file bypassed when "Proxy DNS when using
SOCKS v5" is enabled
--+
 Reporter:  lux+tor@… |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Major |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 This is not a bug, rather an ''unexpected behavior,'' which might expose
 the user to more or less severe security concerns.

 == host table ==
 Operating systems provide a primitive mechanism, called "''host table''",
 which is a static lookup table for hostnames, the ancestor of DNS (`bind`
 software). Through a configuration file (`/etc/hosts`on Linux,
 `%systemroot%\system32\drivers\etc\hosts` on Windows), a system
 administrator is able to manually set associations of (hostname ;
 IP_address).

 When a user performs a DNS lookup ("''I give you a hostname, give me its
 IP address.''"), by default, the following procedure occurs (this behavior
 can be changed on Linux by editing `/etc/nsswitch.conf`file):

  1. look for hostname in host table
  1. is it here?
1. yes: return IP address set by administrator
1. no: perform a "standard" DNS lookup

 The host table can be used for security purposes. For instance, if
 `example.org` is a domain known for its dangerous behavior (user tracking
 for instance), a system administrator can block the malicious website by
 using this`/etc/hosts`file:

 {{{
 127.0.0.1 example.org # both IPv4
 ::1   example.org # and IPv6 must be set!

 }}}
 The host table is ''widely'' used by programmers and power users to easily
 block websites, without having to configure heavier local DNS or firewall.

 For more information, please refer to
 [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_%28file%29 Wikipedia - Hosts (file)]

 == Tor Browser option "Proxy DNS" ==
 Tor Browser provides the option:

   "''Advanced''" → "''Network''" → "''Settings''" → "''Proxy DNS when
 using SOCKS v5''"

 which is equivalent to the "`about:config`" option:

   "`network.proxy.socks_remote_dns`"

 By default, the value is "`true`" (as I think it should be).

 == Expected behavior ==
 When typing a hostname (for instance `example.org`) in the location bar
 and then pressing the "''Go''" button (or the "enter" key), Tor Browser
 will look up for the IP address of `example.org`.

 What is to be expected: the procedure as explained above with the added
 value of Tor Browser, which is performing the DNS lookup through Tor:

  1. look for hostname in host table
  1. is it here?
1. yes: return IP address set by administrator
1. no: perform a "standard" DNS lookup '''through Tor'''

 == Actual behavior ==
 What I got with "''Tor Browser 7.0.4 (based on Mozilla Firefox 52.3.0)
 (64-bit)''":

  1. perform a "standard" DNS lookup '''through Tor'''

 The host table is __'''completely bypassed'''__ … Users are exposed to
 malicious websites.

 == Actual behavior with "false" ==
 If I set "`network.proxy.socks_remote_dns`" to "`false`" and reboot Tor
 Browser, then I got the procedure as first explained:

  1. look for hostname in host table
  1. is it here?
1. yes: return IP address set by administrator
1. no: perform a "standard" DNS lookup (''not through Tor '''as asked
 and expected')

 This proves that Tor Browser is able to look up in the host table!
 However, it is able to do it only when not using Tor for DNS.

 == Conclusion ==
 I agree that, blocking a website by its hostname is not completely secure,
 as a website can own several hostnames. However, it is:

  * a low-cost high-benefit (partial) solution
  * widely used by advanced users (just search for "''hosts file''" in your
 search engine)
  * a protection against potentially-severely-malicious-website (containing
 malwares or spywares)
  * a configure-once-works-for-every-browsers solution

 Therefore, I choose a "''Major''" severity for this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22557 [Webpages/Blog]: Comment pagination links could go to `#comments` anchors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22557: Comment pagination links could go to `#comments` anchors
---+--
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  reopened => needs_review


Comment:

 The drupal paginator is independent from comments or blog posts. So the
 anchor works if you want to build links to comments not on the first page
 but cannot be included in the current pagination links.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23248 [Webpages/Website]: Add templates to media.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23248: Add templates to media.torproject.org
--+
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by steph):

 *7 files. The Pages templates were too large to attach, but they are
 likely low use anyway.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23248 [Webpages/Website]: Add templates to media.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23248: Add templates to media.torproject.org
--+
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by steph):

 * Attachment "Tor_Project_Letterhead_Template.docx" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23248 [Webpages/Website]: Add templates to media.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23248: Add templates to media.torproject.org
--+
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by steph):

 * Attachment "Tor-Project-Presentation-Template.pptx" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23248 [Webpages/Website]: Add templates to media.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23248: Add templates to media.torproject.org
--+
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by steph):

 * Attachment "Tor_Project_Document_Template.docx" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23248 [Webpages/Website]: Add templates to media.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23248: Add templates to media.torproject.org
--+
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by steph):

 * Attachment "Tor_Project_Report_Template.odt" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23248 [Webpages/Website]: Add templates to media.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23248: Add templates to media.torproject.org
--+
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by steph):

 * Attachment "Tor_Project_Report_Template.docx" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23248 [Webpages/Website]: Add templates to media.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23248: Add templates to media.torproject.org
--+
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by steph):

 * Attachment "Tor-Project-Presentation-Template.odp" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23248 [Webpages/Website]: Add templates to media.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23248: Add templates to media.torproject.org
--+
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by steph):

 * Attachment "Tor_Project_Document_Template.odt" added.


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[tor-bugs] #23248 [Webpages/Website]: Add templates to media.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23248: Add templates to media.torproject.org
--+
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Add new section to media.torproject.org:
 templates/

 Add 9 files.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21303 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: monitor our fastly usage for early warning of overage charges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21303: monitor our fastly usage for early warning of overage charges
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 Sorry for missing this ticket for a long time. Could I get access to the
 API key? I'd like to improve a tiny bit on pastly code to consider the
 current date in the status output.

 Also I can follow up to have this running on a cron job.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22443 [Webpages/Blog]: Direct links to comments (old style) no longer work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22443: Direct links to comments (old style) no longer work
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  reopened => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22443 [Webpages/Blog]: Direct links to comments (old style) no longer work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22443: Direct links to comments (old style) no longer work
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by hiro):

 The anchor works if the comment is on the 1st page. Otherwise the other
 permalink form to reach the comment has to be used.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23164 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Install tor on crispum

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23164: Install tor on crispum
-+
 Reporter:  tom  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22443 [Webpages/Blog]: Direct links to comments (old style) no longer work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22443: Direct links to comments (old style) no longer work
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I confirm, still not fixed :(

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22443 [Webpages/Blog]: Direct links to comments (old style) no longer work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22443: Direct links to comments (old style) no longer work
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 Where?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23242 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Can't open tor browser not a bug. I'm just dumb.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23242: Can't open tor browser not a bug. I'm just dumb.
--+---
 Reporter:  idithere@…|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22671 [Webpages/Blog]: Implement design changes to blog.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22671: Implement design changes to blog.torproject.org
---+
 Reporter:  linda  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:11 hiro]:
 > This has now been implemented
 What about the "Internet was blocked today in #egypt. It can be your
 country. Help us protect your privacy and anonymity. DONATE NOW" banner in
 the right?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23242 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Can't open tor browser not a bug. I'm just dumb.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23242: Can't open tor browser not a bug. I'm just dumb.
--+--
 Reporter:  idithere@…|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23097 [Core Tor/Tor]: The circuit timeout prediction is not working properly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23097: The circuit timeout prediction is not working properly
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  031-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Ok I ran that branch (off of main-0.3.1) overnight with an idle hidden
 service and did not observe that logline from the patch, nor 1x/sec
 circuit building. Is that enough?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22557 [Webpages/Blog]: Comment pagination links could go to `#comments` anchors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22557: Comment pagination links could go to `#comments` anchors
---+--
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 Replying to [ticket:22557 dcf]:
 > So, for example, clicking "Next" would take you to
 https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-70-released?page=1#comments.
 No #comments

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23022 [Webpages/Blog]: Increase leading image margin-bottom

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23022: Increase leading image margin-bottom
---+
 Reporter:  steph  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23007 [Webpages/Blog]: Get a second blog maintainer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23007: Get a second blog maintainer
---+--
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 The issue was solved on pantheon side. It was some chron process hanging
 in there. I am ok on having a second blog maintainer. Although in this
 case pantheon people can do most of the things as we can't even access the
 machine where the blog lives.

 Another discussion would be if we actually like this setup in which we
 have a bit less control on the infrastructure we use, but also a server
 less to maintain. There are pro and cons.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23008 [Webpages/Blog]: Possible low disk space on tor blog server

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23008: Possible low disk space on tor blog server
---+
 Reporter:  snoek  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This was fixed on pantheon side.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13410 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable self-signed certificate warnings when visiting .onion sites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13410: Disable self-signed certificate warnings when visiting .onion sites
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * keywords:  #ux-team => ux-team
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 No. See https://j6uhdvbhz74oefxf.onion/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22443 [Webpages/Blog]: Direct links to comments (old style) no longer work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22443: Direct links to comments (old style) no longer work
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23246 [Webpages/Website]: blocked url name DNS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23246: blocked url name DNS
+
 Reporter:  paleophrenocarpe@…  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > Using the IP returns a general page of the server saying you are at a
 wrong place ...

 Connecting to 184.107.100.87 by Tor Browser time-outs for me, the server
 doesn't accept connections initiated by Tor exits.

 > They ? Which they? Certainly not the target server! I think this is one
 or more of the many ISP or the European community that run DNS who blocks
 this URL.

 Ask them why they blocks Tor.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22784 [Webpages/Blog]: Check for external resource being loaded by the tor-bootstrap template

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22784: Check for external resource being loaded by the tor-bootstrap template
---+
 Reporter:  hiro   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 No external resources are loaded into blog.tpo. Fonts icons have also been
 replaced for images.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22671 [Webpages/Blog]: Implement design changes to blog.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22671: Implement design changes to blog.torproject.org
---+
 Reporter:  linda  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This has now been implemented

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23246 [Webpages/Website]: blocked url name DNS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23246: blocked url name DNS
+
 Reporter:  paleophrenocarpe@…  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by paleophrenocarpe@…):

 Replying to [comment:1 cypherpunks]:

 > > Cannot reach domains atheologie.ca
 >
 > You can't connect by IP addr (184.107.100.87) too.
 >

 This is normal with or without Tor because a server hosts many Virtual
 hosts. One IP connects one server hosting many hosts so you must use the
 URL. Using the IP returns a general page of the server saying you are at a
 wrong place ...

 > > I wonder if there is any name blocking (atheism, atheology,
 atheologie...) through the DNS chain or elsewhere???
 >
 > No. They (atheologie.ca) blocks Tor access.

 They ? Which they?  Certainly not the target server! I think this is one
 or more of the many ISP or the European community that run DNS who blocks
 this URL.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22591 [Webpages/Blog]: Clicking on a comment does not directly jump to it (although the blog seems to try)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22591: Clicking on a comment does not directly jump to it (although the blog 
seems
to try)
---+
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22591 [Webpages/Blog]: Clicking on a comment does not directly jump to it (although the blog seems to try)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22591: Clicking on a comment does not directly jump to it (although the blog 
seems
to try)
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by hiro):

 This is now implemented.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22557 [Webpages/Blog]: Comment pagination links could go to `#comments` anchors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22557: Comment pagination links could go to `#comments` anchors
---+
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This is now implemented.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22549 [Webpages/Blog]: Put more comments per page?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22549: Put more comments per page?
---+
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This was fixed. There are now 30 comments per page (if i am not mistaken).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8686 [Applications/Tor Browser]: padlock or colored url bar for connections to hidden services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8686: padlock or colored url bar for connections to hidden services
-+-
 Reporter:  proper   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-usability, ux-|  duplicate
  team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by linda):

 Oops, I meant #23247.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8686 [Applications/Tor Browser]: padlock or colored url bar for connections to hidden services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8686: padlock or colored url bar for connections to hidden services
-+-
 Reporter:  proper   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-usability, ux-|  duplicate
  team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by linda):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 We're working on displaying appropriate icons and messages for different
 http/https and onion site combinations here: #8686.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23247 [Applications/Tor Browser]: creating padlock states for .onion services on tool bar

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23247: creating padlock states for .onion services on tool bar
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by linda):

 Related old ticket: #8686

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[tor-bugs] #23247 [Applications/Tor Browser]: creating padlock states for .onion services on tool bar

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23247: creating padlock states for .onion services on tool bar
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ux-team
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Firefox (and other browsers) have created a set of states a site can have
 in relationship with ssl certificates, and how to communicate that to the
 user.

 Tor Browser has a particular state related to the padlock at the toolbar
 when it comes to .onion services.

 This is something that was discussed under this ticket:

 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21321

 Based on that discussion, we decided that the best solution would be treat
 .onion sites different when we are communicating these states for .onion
 sites at Tor Browser.

 The work on this ticket is to map all the current states Firefox has for
 ssl certificates on the padlock, and from there start to build a new way
 to communicate these states when they are related to a .onion sites.

 We start mapping them here:

 
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1KHkj2DpmFMB0mjHEfehD5ztY2L0lQzKNtZqct1TXbmg/edit

 Is still pending the most difficult part of the work, which is to define
 what to do for .onion sites on those states.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21952 [Webpages]: Increasing the use of onion services through automatic redirects and aliasing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21952: Increasing the use of onion services through automatic redirects and
aliasing
-+-
 Reporter:  linda|  Owner:  linda
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by linda):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 I am the one who suggested it, but I feel weird about this suggestion.

 I think that I am convinced that automatic redirects are not really safe
 and freak some people out. Yet I think that without redirecting
 automatically, it's really really really not going to be used by the
 masses.

 BUT this is be okay. We want people to use Tor browser and browse things,
 and using onion services should be a decision that they actively make.The
 security implications are unclear, and it can easily politically be
 construed to us pushing an agenda, the security benefits are much less
 clear than with http vs https.  I personally wouldn't mind an average Tor
 user browsing on regular sites and using .onion sites rarely for special
 cases.

 I am also convinced that there are other projects all taking stabs at the
 whole naming-onion-sites, and that may provide a better solution.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19199 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow user to completely disable canvas content and related warning popup from a checkbox in TorButton's "Privacy Settings"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19199: Allow user to completely disable canvas content and related warning 
popup
from a checkbox in TorButton's "Privacy Settings"
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by linda):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Relevant parent

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13410 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable self-signed certificate warnings when visiting .onion sites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13410: Disable self-signed certificate warnings when visiting .onion sites
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  #ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by linda):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 It turns out this is being addressed already, see: #21321

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23246 [Webpages/Website]: blocked url name DNS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23246: blocked url name DNS
+
 Reporter:  paleophrenocarpe@…  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > Cannot reach domains atheologie.ca

 You can't connect by IP addr (184.107.100.87) too.

 > I wonder if there is any name blocking (atheism, atheology,
 atheologie...) through the DNS chain or elsewhere???

 No. They (atheologie.ca) blocks Tor access.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Trac email verification for user: antonela

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Please visit the following URL to confirm your email address.

Verification URL: 

Username: antonela
Verification Token: KhdcysFY

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[tor-bugs] #23246 [Webpages/Website]: blocked url name DNS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23246: blocked url name DNS
+
 Reporter:  paleophrenocarpe@…  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+
 Cannot reach domains atheologie.ca and atheology.ca using Tor-Firefox.

 I get a timeout with the following message (in french)

 Le délai d’attente est dépassé

 Le serveur à l’adresse www.atheology.ca met trop de temps à répondre.

 Le site est peut-être temporairement indisponible ou surchargé.
 Réessayez plus tard ;
 Si vous n’arrivez à naviguer sur aucun site, vérifiez la connexion au
 réseau de votre ordinateur ;
 Si votre ordinateur ou votre réseau est protégé par un pare-feu ou un
 proxy, assurez-vous que Navigateur Tor est autorisé à accéder au Web.

 I wonder if there is any name blocking (atheism, atheology, atheologie...)
 through the DNS chain or elsewhere???

 With Tor I can reach other atheists sites without problem but their URL
 don't have any explicit reference to atheism
 (http://atunion.free.fr/index.html, http://www.cilalp.org/,
 http://www.libresansdieu.org/).

 I reach those domains easily through normal Firefox.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23150 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Re-evaluating the tor browser toolbar

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23150: Re-evaluating the tor browser toolbar
--+---
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20843| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by linda):

 Relevant ticket: #19199

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23150 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Re-evaluating the tor browser toolbar

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23150: Re-evaluating the tor browser toolbar
--+---
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20843| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by linda):

 * keywords:   => ux-team


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23151 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser toolbar design

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23151: Tor Browser toolbar design
--+--
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23150| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by linda):

 Related: #19199

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19199 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow user to completely disable canvas content and related warning popup from a checkbox in TorButton's "Privacy Settings"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19199: Allow user to completely disable canvas content and related warning 
popup
from a checkbox in TorButton's "Privacy Settings"
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by linda):

 We'll take this into consideration when we're working on #23151.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23151 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser toolbar design

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23151: Tor Browser toolbar design
--+--
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23150| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by linda):

 * keywords:   => ux-team


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23240 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: do not show progress bar at zero when bootstrap progress is greater than zero

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23240: do not show progress bar at zero when bootstrap progress is greater than
zero
---+--
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201708R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
---+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: linda (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13410 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable self-signed certificate warnings when visiting .onion sites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13410: Disable self-signed certificate warnings when visiting .onion sites
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  #ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by linda):

 After triaging, the ux team agrees that this warning should be removed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22935 [Applications/Orbot]: Disable SSL alert when visiting .onion HTTPS.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22935: Disable SSL alert when visiting .onion HTTPS.
+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by linda):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 see #13410

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23240 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: do not show progress bar at zero when bootstrap progress is greater than zero

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23240: do not show progress bar at zero when bootstrap progress is greater than
zero
---+--
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201708R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
---+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:2 dcf]:
 > comment:1 looks like an effective workaround, but I suspect it can be
 addressed in a more direct way. I think the root of the problem is that
 progressMeter.value is reset to 0 every time the progress bar dialog is
 shown. I added some logging:
 > ...
 > Notice that when initDialog is called the second time, meter.value is
 reset to 0, rather than remembering its previous value of 90. Maybe this
 is because [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 launcher.git/tree/src/chrome/content/network-settings.js?h=0.2.12.3#n1252
 openProgressDialog] creates a brand new dialog from scratch? Perhaps
 instead, it could keep the same dialog in memory, and show or hide it as
 appropriate, so that meter.value retains its state.

 Thanks for looking at this problem. Kathy and I considered but decided
 against caching the current value.  We think it is more elegant — and
 safer — for Tor Launcher to be stateless with respect to the progress
 value.  For example, even if tor needs to reset its notion of progress due
 to a restart or because of radical reconfiguration, the Tor Launcher
 progress bar will never show an incorrect value.

 > I ''don't'' think the usability problem from #22266 is an initial jump
 from 0% to 80%. That's normal and expected with an up-to-date consensus
 cache.

 Agreed, although I think it is better to hide that jump (progress isn't
 really zero so why show it as zero?)

 Other opinions?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23088 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: >Please note that you must send the email using an address from one of the following email providers: Riseup, Gmail or Yahoo.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23088: >Please note that you must send the email using an address from one of 
the
following email providers: Riseup, Gmail or Yahoo.
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:7 cypherpunks]:
 > @cypherpunks_poster_from_comment6, this is unacceptable.
 >
 > Please, read this sentence:
 > >the tool claiming it provides its users with anonymity requires them to
 use NSA-controlled companies services and identify themselves with mobile
 phone.

 Yes, by design. Otherwise all bridges can be easily enumerated leaving
 censored users unhappy.

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[tor-bugs] #23245 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser can't launch Tor or modify torrc when there's another Tor Browser instance running in another session on Linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23245: Tor Browser can't launch Tor or modify torrc when there's another Tor
Browser instance running in another session on Linux
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 How to reproduce:

 1. Open user account 1
 2. Launch Tor Browser and let it bootstrap and stuff (used sandboxed-tor-
 browser but I guess same results will happen with the regular stuff)
 3. Switch to another user account 2
 4. Open Tor Browser there.

 Can something be done in this case?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23205 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Grant hiro access to civi

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23205: Grant hiro access to civi
-+-
 Reporter:  jselon   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * owner:  (none) => tpa
 * component:  - Select a component => Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22192 [Webpages/Website]: Update tor-mirrors.csv / mirror site

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22192: Update tor-mirrors.csv / mirror site
--+---
 Reporter:  Samdney   |  Owner:  Sebastian
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by Samdney):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23096 [Internal Services/Blog]: Request to investigate solution for permanent link of newsletter letters + archive

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23096: Request to investigate solution for permanent link of newsletter 
letters +
archive
+--
 Reporter:  isabela |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by steph):

 Hi hiro, have you gotten a chance to check out Civi?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23088 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: >Please note that you must send the email using an address from one of the following email providers: Riseup, Gmail or Yahoo.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23088: >Please note that you must send the email using an address from one of 
the
following email providers: Riseup, Gmail or Yahoo.
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by yawning):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23244 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Onionoo documents should be the same accross all tp.o instances

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23244: Onionoo documents should be the same accross all tp.o instances
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Other differences might be due to different update times, from
 '''details''':

 {{{
 h>
 
{"nickname":"mrkoolltor","fingerprint":"92808CA58D8F32CA34A34C547610869BF4E2A6EC","or_addresses":["77.120.94.233:9001"],"last_seen":"2017-08-15
 
08:00:00",...,"consensus_weight_fraction":3.3634333E-6,"guard_probability":0.0,"middle_probability":8.677337E-6,"exit_probability":0.0,"recommended_version":false,"measured":true}
 m>
 
{"nickname":"mrkoolltor","fingerprint":"92808CA58D8F32CA34A34C547610869BF4E2A6EC","or_addresses":["77.120.94.233:9001"],"last_seen":"2017-08-15
 
07:00:00",...,"consensus_weight_fraction":3.3669173E-6,"guard_probability":0.0,"middle_probability":8.666976E-6,"exit_probability":0.0,"recommended_version":false,"measured":true},
 ^^^
 ^
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23244 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Onionoo documents should be the same accross all tp.o instances

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23244: Onionoo documents should be the same accross all tp.o instances
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 The '''details documents''' have geoip related differences (data retrieved
 on 2017-08-15), i.e., coordinates changes and spelling
 {{{
 h>
 
"region_name":"Pennsylvania","city_name":"Lansdale","latitude":40.2262,"longitude":-75.2931,
 m>
 
"region_name":"Pennsylvania","city_name":"Lansdale","latitude":40.2415,"longitude":-75.2838,
   ^^^
 ^^^
 h> "region_name":"Stockholm","city_name":"Norrtaelje",
 m> "region_name":"Stockholm","city_name":"Norrtalje",
 ^^^
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #23244 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Onionoo documents should be the same accross all tp.o instances

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23244: Onionoo documents should be the same accross all tp.o instances
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 Investigate current differences and define the prerequisites for achieving
 this goal.

 I'll add examples for differences in comments, as this allows for
 different discussion threads.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23088 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: >Please note that you must send the email using an address from one of the following email providers: Riseup, Gmail or Yahoo.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23088: >Please note that you must send the email using an address from one of 
the
following email providers: Riseup, Gmail or Yahoo.
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  reopened => needs_information


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23088 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: >Please note that you must send the email using an address from one of the following email providers: Riseup, Gmail or Yahoo.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23088: >Please note that you must send the email using an address from one of 
the
following email providers: Riseup, Gmail or Yahoo.
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  invalid =>


Comment:

 @cypherpunks_poster_from_comment6, this is unacceptable.

 Please, read this sentence:
 >the tool claiming it provides its users with anonymity requires them to
 use NSA-controlled companies services and identify themselves with mobile
 phone.

 Don't you feel something odd and suspicious? In my opinion it looks like
 Tor Project is secretly working for NSA!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23243 [Metrics/Metrics website]: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23243: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by karsten):

 Replying to [ticket:23243 iwakeh]:
 > This document should answer the following questions:

 Good idea to start such a document! I'll start filling information below.

 > * What will the raw input data look like?
 >  - compressed logs

 Very likely, though compression shouldn't be a strict requirement.

 >  - varying dates in log-lines despite the file being tagged with a
 single date

 Yes, to a certain degree. We'll have to ask the admins for details, but I
 believe that the date in the file name is put in when rotating logs and
 that the date per line is when the host started processing a request. Now,
 it's possible that some requests are received before midnight and
 completed after midnight. And depending on when the log is rotated it's
 possible that some requests are started on the day before the log was
 rotated and finished after rotating the log.

 >  - are there only GET log-lines of 200 responses to be expected?

 No, there might be other methods and other response codes.

 >  - size could be huge (in future)

 Yes.

 >  - exact input format (if possible to define)

 Good question. We should ideally support Apache's Combined Log Format,
 even though we'd currently only receive Tor's privacy* log formats:

 {{{
 LogFormat "0.0.0.0 - %u %{[%d/%b/%Y:00:00:00 %z]}t \"%r\" %>s %b
 \"%{Referer}i\" \"-\" %{Age}o" privacy
 LogFormat "0.0.0.1 - %u %{[%d/%b/%Y:00:00:00 %z]}t \"%r\" %>s %b
 \"%{Referer}i\" \"-\" %{Age}o" privacyssl
 LogFormat "0.0.0.2 - %u %{[%d/%b/%Y:00:00:00 %z]}t \"%r\" %>s %b
 \"%{Referer}i\" \"-\" %{Age}o" privacyhs
 }}}

 And there's already the first contradiction: The `%{Age}o` part is not
 contained in the Combined Log Format:

 {{{
 LogFormat "%h %l %u %t \"%r\" %>s %b \"%{Referer}i\" \"%{User-agent}i\""
 combined
 }}}

 Maybe we require lines to start with the Common Log Format and ignore any
 further fields? Needs discussion.

 >  - meta-data is provided in paths and filenames

 Yep.

 >  - ...
 > * What will sanitized stored (on disk) logs look like?
 >  - cleaned log-lines, define exact format, give examples (as this might
 deviate from the current python sanitation)
 >  - meta-data is provided in paths and filenames
 >  - should files be reassembled, i.e., only log lines of a given date in
 a descriptor for that log date?

 Yes! That's important! Otherwise we'll leak information of lines contained
 for a given date before/after rotating logs. That's a much shorter time
 frame than 24 hours then. We'll have to do this.

 >  - should storage (on disk) be in compressed files (opposed to storing
 other descriptors uncompressed)?

 Yes. Configurable by the application, but yes.

 >  - Should such log be stored (on disk) in reasonably sized chunks (once
 a GB size is reached)?

 No, compression should already reduce the size enough so that we'll never
 run into such sizes. Never!

 >  - ...
 >
 > Please add more.

 Looks like a good start! Will add more as more comes to mind.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22983 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: add a descriptor interface and implementation for web-logs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22983: add a descriptor interface and implementation for web-logs
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 2.1.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Replying to [comment:22 karsten]:
 > Alright, I looked at the remaining commits (in
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/metrics-
 lib.git/log/?h=task-22983-3 ​my task-22983-3 branch]). I'll start with the
 major issues/questions in no specific order:
 >
 >  1. Why do we compress previously uncompressed log files? I see the
 point of saving memory, but we'd be doing that by sacrificing CPU time.
 And if we later change to leaving file contents on disk and only storing
 offsets and lengths into files, it would be wasteful to store a compressed
 copy of the file in memory just in case the application might need it
 later. Ideally, we'd just store a reference to the `byte[]` in whatever
 compression we're given, including uncompressed.
 >
 >  2. I already brought this up in
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22983#comment:12 comment
 12] above but didn't see a response: "Shouldn't `getRawDescriptorBytes()`
 return the uncompressed bytes and a separate method `getCompressedBytes()`
 return the compressed bytes? Thinking of being consistent with other
 descriptors where `getRawDescriptorBytes()` returns uncompressed bytes,
 too. Not sure about this one." Related to this, should
 `getRawDescriptorLength()` return the length of the ''uncompressed'' byte
 array? (This possibly requires uncompressing the file on first invocation
 and storing the length in an attribute.) What do you think about changing
 this for the sake of library consistency?


 Here and in 1. I noticed that I had some implicit assumptions about log
 descriptors that led to the chosen implementation.  Once #23243 is
 answered these concerns can be addressed in a better way.


 >
 >  3. Why do sanitized log lines contain a trailing `-`, as in: `... 403
 294 \"-\" \"-\" -\n`? I know that the
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/webstats.git/tree/src/sanitize.py Python
 script] also added that trailing dash, so I'm asking if you think there's
 a reason to keep that. The [https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/logs.html
 Combined Log Format] does not specify one. If you think it can go away we
 should quickly check with Sebastian and then take it out.

 Also a discussion for the spec ticket #23243.  But in general I don't see
 a need for the trailing dash, I only reproduced the log-lines from the
 python implementation.

 >
 >  4. From the tests it seems like `POST` requests are kept, too. However,
 we should only keep `GET` and `HEAD` requests, just like the
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/webstats.git/tree/src/sanitize.py Python
 script]. Likewise, `400` and `404` requests should be discarded. Maybe
 check for other deviations from the script yourself. And in the next
 review round we should compare the two sanitizers (Python and Java) using
 some real logs. Or do you still have logs to run some tests yourself?

 I did run such tests and some of the test files are taken from the real
 vs. python-cleaned logs (the real ones without pi info).  In #23234 we
 should craft the input and target formats; once that is done change
 implementation and tests accordingly.

 >
 >  5. `LogDescriptorImpl` should not sort logs by default as part part of
 the sanitizing step. That's a specific sanitizing technique for web server
 logs. It might be that a future log format only requires removing certain
 fields but not re-ordering log lines. Maybe there should be a second
 method `cleanLines(List)` in `InternalLogDescriptor.Sanitizer`,
 and the existing method should be renamed to `cleanLine(String)`. The
 default sanitizer should keep the order unchanged and simply return the
 list it gets.

 True, the re-ordering is web-server-access-log specific and should be
 moved.

 >
 > I also found a few minor issues where it might be easiest if I fix them
 myself. I'll do that in the next review round as one or more suggested
 commits, and if you agree with those changes, I'll squash them, and maybe
 we can include them in the coding conventions afterwards.

 Ok, if these are 'orthogonal' to the above topics, but please give #23234
 a higher priority.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22983 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: add a descriptor interface and implementation for web-logs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22983: add a descriptor interface and implementation for web-logs
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 2.1.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Replying to [comment:23 iwakeh]:
 > Hmm, when looking through your comment:22 I notice many
 questions/concerns that are due to not having an explicit webserver-
 access-log specification.  As we need that anyway I'll open a ticket for
 writing such spec and add all the open assumptions about 'real' and
 sanitized web-server-access-logs there.  I think, from such an explicit
 spec it will be easier to find solution for the implementational/design
 details.
 >

 See ticket #23243 for more.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23243 [Metrics/Metrics website]: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23243: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Added to metrics-web as the spec will likely also face the public there.
 This is the basis for metrics-lib ticket #22983.

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[tor-bugs] #23243 [Metrics/Metrics website]: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23243: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 This document should answer the following questions:

 * What will the raw input data look like?
  - compressed logs
  - varying dates in log-lines despite the file being tagged with a single
 date
  - are there only GET log-lines of 200 responses to be expected?
  - size could be huge (in future)
  - exact input format (if possible to define)
  - meta-data is provided in paths and filenames
  - ...
 * What will sanitized stored (on disk) logs look like?
  - cleaned log-lines, define exact format, give examples (as this might
 deviate from the current python sanitation)
  - meta-data is provided in paths and filenames
  - should files be reassembled, i.e., only log lines of a given date in a
 descriptor for that log date?
  - should storage (on disk) be in compressed files (opposed to storing
 other descriptors uncompressed)?
  - Should such log be stored (on disk) in reasonably sized chunks (once a
 GB size is reached)?
  - ...

 Please add more.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22983 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: add a descriptor interface and implementation for web-logs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22983: add a descriptor interface and implementation for web-logs
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 2.1.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Hmm, when looking through your comment:22 I notice many questions/concerns
 that are due to not having an explicit webserver-access-log specification.
 As we need that anyway I'll open a ticket for writing such spec and add
 all the open assumptions about 'real' and sanitized web-server-access-logs
 there.  I think, from such an explicit spec it will be easier to find
 solution for the implementational/design details.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22983 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: add a descriptor interface and implementation for web-logs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22983: add a descriptor interface and implementation for web-logs
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 2.1.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Alright, I looked at the remaining commits (in
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/metrics-
 lib.git/log/?h=task-22983-3 ​my task-22983-3 branch]). I'll start with the
 major issues/questions in no specific order:

  1. Why do we compress previously uncompressed log files? I see the point
 of saving memory, but we'd be doing that by sacrificing CPU time. And if
 we later change to leaving file contents on disk and only storing offsets
 and lengths into files, it would be wasteful to store a compressed copy of
 the file in memory just in case the application might need it later.
 Ideally, we'd just store a reference to the `byte[]` in whatever
 compression we're given, including uncompressed.

  2. I already brought this up in
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/22983#comment:12 comment
 12] above but didn't see a response: "Shouldn't `getRawDescriptorBytes()`
 return the uncompressed bytes and a separate method `getCompressedBytes()`
 return the compressed bytes? Thinking of being consistent with other
 descriptors where `getRawDescriptorBytes()` returns uncompressed bytes,
 too. Not sure about this one." Related to this, should
 `getRawDescriptorLength()` return the length of the ''uncompressed'' byte
 array? (This possibly requires uncompressing the file on first invocation
 and storing the length in an attribute.) What do you think about changing
 this for the sake of library consistency?

  3. Why do sanitized log lines contain a trailing `-`, as in: `... 403 294
 \"-\" \"-\" -\n`? I know that the
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/webstats.git/tree/src/sanitize.py Python
 script] also added that trailing dash, so I'm asking if you think there's
 a reason to keep that. The [https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/logs.html
 Combined Log Format] does not specify one. If you think it can go away we
 should quickly check with Sebastian and then take it out.

  4. From the tests it seems like `POST` requests are kept, too. However,
 we should only keep `GET` and `HEAD` requests, just like the
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/webstats.git/tree/src/sanitize.py Python
 script]. Likewise, `400` and `404` requests should be discarded. Maybe
 check for other deviations from the script yourself. And in the next
 review round we should compare the two sanitizers (Python and Java) using
 some real logs. Or do you still have logs to run some tests yourself?

  5. `LogDescriptorImpl` should not sort logs by default as part part of
 the sanitizing step. That's a specific sanitizing technique for web server
 logs. It might be that a future log format only requires removing certain
 fields but not re-ordering log lines. Maybe there should be a second
 method `cleanLines(List)` in `InternalLogDescriptor.Sanitizer`,
 and the existing method should be renamed to `cleanLine(String)`. The
 default sanitizer should keep the order unchanged and simply return the
 list it gets.

 I also found a few minor issues where it might be easiest if I fix them
 myself. I'll do that in the next review round as one or more suggested
 commits, and if you agree with those changes, I'll squash them, and maybe
 we can include them in the coding conventions afterwards.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23242 [- Select a component]: Can't open tor browser not a bug. I'm just dumb.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23242: Can't open tor browser not a bug. I'm just dumb.
--+
 Reporter:  idithere@…|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > I'm just to dumb

 I doubt it. You somehow registered gmail and trac accounts. Are you
 trolling us?

 > The browser takes me the place where I find two buttons, one Connect

 Press Connect button.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22983 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: add a descriptor interface and implementation for web-logs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22983: add a descriptor interface and implementation for web-logs
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 2.1.0
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by karsten):

 Replying to [comment:20 iwakeh]:
 > Replying to [comment:19 karsten]:
 > > That's quite a few commits there, more than I can handle in a single
 chunk. But let me start going through them and put reviews here as I
 finish them.
 >
 > Yes, thanks for starting!
 >
 > >
 > > e0c5774 and e224680 look good. Already merged to master.
 > >
 > > Some suggestions for 77b143d:

 Fixes look good, squashed and merged to master.

 > > d687f44 looks good.

 Merged to master.

 > > I didn't finish my review of 76ae1e7, but here's some early feedback:

 Fixes so far look good, though I might have more thoughts on the
 compression part. I assumed that you wouldn't work on this branch without
 new input, so I went ahead and squashed the fixup commits and pushed
 everything to [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/metrics-
 lib.git/log/?h=task-22983-3 my task-22983-3 branch] which I'll refer to
 from now on. Stay tuned! :)

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