Re: [tor-bugs] #23312 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Please create tor-browser-bundle repo under user/isis on git.tpo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23312: Please create tor-browser-bundle repo under user/isis on git.tpo
-+
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by gk):

 Just in case it matters: we are about to switch to `rbm` for reproducible
 builds and use the code in `tor-browser-build` for building Tor Browser
 (starting with the next alphas). It is expected that the `gitian`-based
 build system (i.e. `tor-browser-bundle`) becomes deprecated next week.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20375 [Applications/Tor Browser]: warn users when entering fullscreen

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20375: warn users when entering fullscreen
-+-
 Reporter:  fem  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-torbutton, TorBrowserTeam201708R   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 What (new) code is here for review? It landed already on `master`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20375 [Applications/Tor Browser]: warn users when entering fullscreen

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20375: warn users when entering fullscreen
-+-
 Reporter:  fem  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-torbutton, TorBrowserTeam201708R   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  reopened => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20375 [Applications/Tor Browser]: warn users when entering fullscreen

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20375: warn users when entering fullscreen
-+-
 Reporter:  fem  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-torbutton, TorBrowserTeam201708R   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


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[tor-bugs] #23313 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: The trac "reply/edit/delete" comment buttons now require JavaScript

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23313: The trac "reply/edit/delete" comment buttons now require JavaScript
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 This seems to have happened in the recent upgrade.
 If we can revert the change that caused this, that would be great.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23299 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Crash when trying to save a PDF in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23299: Crash when trying to save a PDF in Tor Browser
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:1 gk]:
 > Did that happen with the built-in pdf viewer? Or did you get an external
 helper app warning dialog? If so, did it crash when clicking on a button?

 It was open in the built-in viewer, I clicked on the "open in external
 app", because it had forms, and there was no warning dialog. I did get a
 download dialog, but the download didn't transfer anything. And then some
 time after, the app crashed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23166 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Felix's obfs4 bridges to Tor Browser's defaults

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23166: Add Felix's obfs4 bridges to Tor Browser's defaults
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-bridges   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorM-can
--+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Diff looks good; the TB devs will want the commit message to start with
 "Bug 23166".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19281 [Core Tor/Tor]: Potential heap corruption via `write_escaped_data` in control.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19281: Potential heap corruption via `write_escaped_data` in control.c
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bug-bounty, heap-correctness,|  Actual Points:
  disaster-waiting-to-happen, review-group-22|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


Comment:

 If by some miracle someone is able to pass a string that is of SIZE_MAX,
 then I can assert my tor through the control port... Hmmm, I would say
 unlikely that is possible because it would mean a string that has the
 length of basically my entire RAM (?) ;).

 {{{
 +  tor_assert(len < SIZE_MAX - 9);
 }}}

 lgtm;

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23106 [Core Tor/Tor]: Audit code for swapped ntoh*/hton* calls

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23106: Audit code for swapped ntoh*/hton* calls
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-22  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 ack.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23261 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: implement configuration portion of new Tor Launcher UI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23261: implement configuration portion of new Tor Launcher UI
---+--
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21951 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
---+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:8 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:6 cypherpunks]:
 > > Replying to [ticket:23261 mcs]:
 > > > This ticket tracks implementation of the configuration portion of
 the new Tor Launcher configuration UI, as found here:
 https://marvelapp.com/3f6102d/
 > > Hangs on password submission.
 >
 > What hangs? Tor Browser? And does "password submission" refer to
 marvelapp.com, or to the Tor Launcher proxy configuration? If this is a
 Tor Browser problem, please provide steps to reproduce.
 "password submission" refers to marvelapp.com through Tor Browser with
 High Security:
 {{{
 19:14:49.691 Project with id '3f6102d' requires a password. 1 prototype-
 bundle.c6c8b4bddefe245de0fd.js:113
 }}}

 Tor Launcher without port selection and copying log to clipboard - is this
 intended?
 "provide a bridge I know" -> "use my bridges"

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23149 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor buffer.c: split and rename functions.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23149: Refactor buffer.c: split and rename functions.
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-22  |  Actual Points:  .2
Parent ID:  #22342   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 The git diff I get is: ` 37 files changed, 2676 insertions(+), 2470
 deletions(-)`

 If it's the case, maybe a Gitlab MR ?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22976 [Core Tor/Tor]: disallow tor exec'ing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22976: disallow tor exec'ing
--+
 Reporter:  dawuud|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  sandbox, review-group-22  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 >  This isn't fundamentally about seccomp; it's about disabling
 functionality. Our sandbox already disables all exec calls.

 Not sure it does... All the exeve() calls are disabled by `#if 0`.

 The changes file has this weird sentence:

 {{{
 - Added a new NoExec option to . When this option is set to 1,
 }}}

 Apart from that, lgtm;

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22779 [Core Tor/Tor]: choose_good_entry_server() is no longer used to choose entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22779: choose_good_entry_server() is no longer used to choose entry guards
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  maybe-030-backport, review-group-22  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 ack.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22677 [Core Tor/Tor]: Document that Sandbox 1 requires linux and seccomp2.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22677: Document that Sandbox 1 requires linux and seccomp2.
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  documentation, trivial, review-  |  Actual Points:
  group-22   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 ack.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22348 [Core Tor/Tor]: 16 relays have mismatched rsa/ed keys currently

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22348: 16 relays have mismatched rsa/ed keys currently
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-22  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 I'm wondering, shouldn't we tell the user what to actually do if this
 message happens? Could we complement the message with a small guideline on
 what to do?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20657 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement service support.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20657: prop224: Implement service support.
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, review-group-22  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #12424| Points:  6
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:  SponsorR-
  |  must
--+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [comment:31 asn]:
 > For some reason I can't close the ticket. ~~Trac just gives me a comment
 preview instead of closing it...
 > If someone else can close it, please do.~~
 >
 > Seems like children ticket are still open. I wonder what should we do
 with these.

 So the implementation is done and merged so I propose we unparent all
 child ticket and treat them as "normal ticket" affecting a tor subsystem
 so we can close this and move on.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23166 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Felix's obfs4 bridges to Tor Browser's defaults

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23166: Add Felix's obfs4 bridges to Tor Browser's defaults
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-bridges   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorM-can
--+--
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Patch is in my `bug23166` [https://github.com/isislovecruft/tor-browser-
 bundle/tree/bug23166 branch].

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[tor-bugs] #23312 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Please create tor-browser-bundle repo under user/isis on git.tpo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23312: Please create tor-browser-bundle repo under user/isis on git.tpo
-+
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 I've been using my github for it, for like 10 tickets, and I probably
 shouldn't do that.

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20375 [Applications/Tor Browser]: warn users when entering fullscreen

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20375: warn users when entering fullscreen
-+-
 Reporter:  fem  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-torbutton, TorBrowserTeam201708R   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > Looks good. Applied to `master` (commit
 f6b52b8d7f26277569211946248307996d12099c). Could be a candidate for
 backporting to the stable series.

 I think backporting would be a good idea, because currently Tor Browser
 does not show a warning at all when the user clicks on the maximize window
 button in the title bar. That's because macOS (at least in the latest
 versions) seems to always use window.STATE_FULLSCREEN instead of
 window.STATE_MAXIMIZE.

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[tor-bugs] #23311 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Spammy intro point logs in v2

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23311: prop224: Spammy intro point logs in v2
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #20657
   Points:  0.3   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 With the #17242 branch, when I start an hsv2 service, there are good
 chances it will start spamming the logs like this:

 {{{
 Aug 21 14:59:02.000 [warn] Hidden service yfqspegde4a6pkt5 exceeded launch
 limit with 9 intro points in the last 31 seconds. Intro circuit launches
 are limited to 8 per 300 seconds.
 Aug 21 14:59:02.000 [warn] Service configured in "/home/f/tmp/hsv2":
 Aug 21 14:59:02.000 [warn]   Intro point 0 at [scrubbed]: circuit is open
 Aug 21 14:59:02.000 [warn]   Intro point 1 at [scrubbed]: circuit is open
 Aug 21 14:59:02.000 [warn]   Intro point 2 at [scrubbed]: circuit is
 waiting to see how other guards perform
 Aug 21 14:59:02.000 [warn]   Intro point 3 at [scrubbed]: circuit is open
 Aug 21 14:59:03.000 [warn] Hidden service yfqspegde4a6pkt5 exceeded launch
 limit with 9 intro points in the last 32 seconds. Intro circuit launches
 are limited to 8 per 300 seconds.
 Aug 21 14:59:03.000 [warn] Service configured in "/home/f/tmp/hsv2":
 Aug 21 14:59:03.000 [warn]   Intro point 0 at [scrubbed]: circuit is open
 Aug 21 14:59:03.000 [warn]   Intro point 1 at [scrubbed]: circuit is open
 Aug 21 14:59:03.000 [warn]   Intro point 2 at [scrubbed]: circuit is open
 Aug 21 14:59:04.000 [warn] Hidden service yfqspegde4a6pkt5 exceeded launch
 limit with 9 intro points in the last 33 seconds. Intro circuit launches
 are limited to 8 per 300 seconds.
 Aug 21 14:59:04.000 [warn] Service configured in "/home/f/tmp/hsv2":
 Aug 21 14:59:04.000 [warn]   Intro point 0 at [scrubbed]: circuit is open
 Aug 21 14:59:04.000 [warn]   Intro point 1 at [scrubbed]: circuit is open
 Aug 21 14:59:04.000 [warn]   Intro point 2 at [scrubbed]: circuit is open
 Aug 21 14:59:05.000 [warn] Hidden service yfqspegde4a6pkt5 exceeded launch
 limit with 9 intro points in the last 34 seconds. Intro circuit launches
 are limited to 8 per 300 seconds.
 Aug 21 14:59:05.000 [warn] Service configured in "/home/f/tmp/hsv2":
 Aug 21 14:59:05.000 [warn]   Intro point 0 at [scrubbed]: circuit is open
 Aug 21 14:59:05.000 [warn]   Intro point 1 at [scrubbed]: circuit is open
 Aug 21 14:59:05.000 [warn]   Intro point 2 at [scrubbed]: circuit is open
 Aug 21 14:59:06.000 [warn] Hidden service yfqspegde4a6pkt5 exceeded launch
 limit with 9 intro points in the last 35 seconds. Intro circuit launches
 are limited to 8 per 300 seconds.
 Aug 21 14:59:06.000 [warn] Service configured in "/home/f/tmp/hsv2":
 Aug 21 14:59:06.000 [warn]   Intro point 0 at [scrubbed]: circuit is open
 Aug 21 14:59:06.000 [warn]   Intro point 1 at [scrubbed]: circuit is open
 Aug 21 14:59:06.000 [warn]   Intro point 2 at [scrubbed]: circuit is open
 }}}

 We need to figure out if this was caused by the prop224 patches and fix it
 if so.

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[tor-bugs] #23310 [Core Tor/Tor]: test: prop224 client unit tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23310: test: prop224 client unit tests
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, test-unit
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #23300
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We need to a LOT more client unit tests.

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[tor-bugs] #23309 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: We need to get rid of a descriptor when entering non-overlap mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23309: hs: We need to get rid of a descriptor when entering non-overlap mode
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 From the discussion here:
 https://oniongit.eu/asn/tor/merge_requests/3#note_905

 It seems the solution is to set the next descriptor as the current one
 when entering the non-overlap mode.

 This is v3 service side thus affecting upstream code.

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[tor-bugs] #23308 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement note_connection_attempt_succeeded() in the client code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23308: prop224: Implement note_connection_attempt_succeeded() in the client 
code
---+
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #23300
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorR-must  |
---+
 #17242 has gone over many review rounds so implement this once we get it
 upstream.

 This function should do the job that
 `rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended()` does that is purging the
 hsdir request cache.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22747 [Webpages/Website]: Pls document relay with restricted socket count

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22747: Pls document relay with restricted socket count
-+---
 Reporter:  tmpname0901  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Webpages/Website |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.8
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Documentation tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * keywords:  Documentation => Documentation tor-relay
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.0.x-final => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 Did you see the documentation for the ConnLimit option?  Did it make
 sense?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23053 [Core Tor/Tor]: Memory leak of unix_socket_path when validating multiple unix sockets

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23053: Memory leak of unix_socket_path when validating multiple unix sockets
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport coverity 030-backport   |  Actual Points:
  memory-leak|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19537 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cryptic description for download GETINFO options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19537: Cryptic description for download GETINFO options
-+-
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, docs, spec,  |  implemented
  TorCoreTeam201705  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by atagar):

 Looks good - thanks Nick!

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[tor-bugs] #23307 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Don't bruteforce every pending connection when we get a RENDEZVOUS ack

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23307: hs: Don't bruteforce every pending connection when we get a RENDEZVOUS 
ack
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #23300
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorR-can  |
--+
 In the v2 subsystem, we have this:

 {{{
   /* ++ This is a pretty brute-force approach. It'd be better to
* attach only the connections that are waiting on this circuit, rather
* than trying to attach them all. See comments bug 743. */
   /* If we already have the introduction circuit built, make sure we send
* the INTRODUCE cell _now_ */
connection_ap_attach_pending(1);
 }}}

 And v3 is also doing that (#17242) so we should find another approach to
 this instead of scanning the entire set of pending connections.

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[tor-bugs] #23306 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Use the state of a directory connection instead of the HAS_FETCHED purpose

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23306: hs: Use the state of a directory connection instead of the HAS_FETCHED
purpose
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #23300
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorR-can  |
--+
 Hidden service client directory connection switch their purpose to
 `DIR_PURPOSE_HAS_FETCHED_RENDDESC_V2` and `DIR_PURPOSE_HAS_FETCHED_HSDESC`
 (with #17242) to indicate when the descriptor has arrived.

 Let's find another solution here, like looking at the state. Using
 purposes here seems very kludgy.

 Suggestion from nickm: Can we use the DIR_CONN_STATE_CLIENT_FINISHED
 state? If the documentation for that state is correct, it should be usable
 for what we want.

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[tor-bugs] #23305 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Maybe don't use REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 as the length for a base32 relay digest id

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23305: hs: Maybe don't use REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 as the length for a 
base32
relay digest id
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs, easy, refactor
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Function `hs_lookup_last_hid_serv_request()` defines an HSDir identity
 digest in base32 as:

 {{{
   char hsdir_id_base32[REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + 1];
 }}}

 Although the length is correct, semantically this is bad to use the base32
 descriptor ID length for this.

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[tor-bugs] #23304 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Dump a malformed descriptor in a file and log_warn about it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23304: prop224: Dump a malformed descriptor in a file and log_warn about it
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #23300
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorR-can  |
--+
 Once a client fetches a descriptor, it could be unparseable thus
 malformed. Dump it in a file and warn about it so the user can report it
 properly to us and we also don't have a 50kb blob of text in the logs.

 Worth thinking if we might want that only with `SafeLogging 0` since
 leaving HS descriptors on disk client side might not be ideal?

 As for v2 subsystem, the onion address is in the descriptor so I would be
 very careful to put that on disk.

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[tor-bugs] #23303 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Explain why we reset the directory connection timestamp client side

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23303: hs: Explain why we reset the directory connection timestamp client side
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #23300
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorR-can  |
--+
 In the v2 HS subsystem we have this in rendclient.c in
 `rend_client_desc_trynow()`:

 {{{
   /* restart their timeout values, so they get a fair shake at
* connecting to the hidden service. */
   base_conn->timestamp_created = now;
   base_conn->timestamp_lastread = now;
   base_conn->timestamp_lastwritten = now;

 }}}

 We've taken the same thing into the v3 client in #17242 but we need a
 comment that explains *why* we do that because `get a fair shake` is not
 very helpful :).

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[tor-bugs] #23302 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor all connection_*_list_*() to use CONN_GET_ALL_TEMPLATE

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23302: Refactor all connection_*_list_*() to use CONN_GET_ALL_TEMPLATE
--+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  refactor
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 #17242 will introduce the `CONN_GET_ALL_TEMPLATE()` macro which could
 benefit a bunch of function to use.

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[tor-bugs] #23301 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Refactor connection_ap_handle_onion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23301: prop224: Refactor connection_ap_handle_onion
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #23300
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 That function has two big blocks from an if/else for v2 and v3 address
 handling. We should refactor this into something cleaner and more modular.

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[tor-bugs] #23300 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: General client side issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23300: prop224: General client side issues
---+
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorR-must  |
---+
 This is a parent ticket for a series of client side issues that have been
 identified during the review of #17242 and that we felt it would be better
 to fix in a separate ticket because some include changes to the HS v2
 subsystem.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17242 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement client support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17242: prop224: Implement client support
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, review-group-22  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #12424| Points:  parent
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:  SponsorR-
  |  must
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I've pushed and fixed the comment of nickm's second pass.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23275 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consensus diffs are generated even if DirCache and DirPort are 0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23275: Consensus diffs are generated even if DirCache and DirPort are 0
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  031-backport  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
 * actualpoints:   => .1


Comment:

 This was very simple; I think we can take it in 0.3.1.  needs_review

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20375 [Applications/Tor Browser]: warn users when entering fullscreen

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20375: warn users when entering fullscreen
-+-
 Reporter:  fem  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-torbutton, TorBrowserTeam201708R   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good. Applied to `master` (commit
 f6b52b8d7f26277569211946248307996d12099c). Could be a candidate for
 backporting to the stable series.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19537 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cryptic description for download GETINFO options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19537: Cryptic description for download GETINFO options
-+-
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, docs, spec,  |  implemented
  TorCoreTeam201705  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  .2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 675c470fe61d23 should improve this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18140 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update dir-spec for "reasonably live" consensuses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18140: Update dir-spec for "reasonably live" consensuses
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  tor-spec, doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  .1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Done in 85d7c57bbdf549.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15333 [Core Tor/Tor]: Minor control-spec.txt corrections.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15333: Minor control-spec.txt corrections.
--+
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-spec, tor-control, doc, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 d92fc8b17b207c fixes this.

 The INFOVALUE thing was left over from control-spec-v0.txt

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20522 [Core Tor/Tor]: Enable DISABLE_DISABLING_ED25519

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20522: Enable DISABLE_DISABLING_ED25519
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ed25519-proto  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorZ
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


Comment:

 The logical time to do this is when we finally deprecate 0.2.8 next May.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14948 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clarify in control-spec which relays have ns and md entries and which don't

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14948: Clarify in control-spec which relays have ns and md entries and which 
don't
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 3cc3b86299329f fixes this, and corrects the source of the ns/* info.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23261 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: implement configuration portion of new Tor Launcher UI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23261: implement configuration portion of new Tor Launcher UI
---+--
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21951 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
---+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:6 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [ticket:23261 mcs]:
 > > This ticket tracks implementation of the configuration portion of the
 new Tor Launcher configuration UI, as found here:
 https://marvelapp.com/3f6102d/
 > Hangs on password submission.

 What hangs? Tor Browser? And does "password submission" refer to
 marvelapp.com, or to the Tor Launcher proxy configuration? If this is a
 Tor Browser problem, please provide steps to reproduce.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14312 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor-spec says additional fields in exitpolicy response are "optional" when they're not

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14312: tor-spec says additional fields in exitpolicy response are "optional" 
when
they're not
---+
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-spec easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 0a4a064de27e59980474b687c4eb8ff89da19477 fixes this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22173 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support looking up node by ed25519 identity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22173: Support looking up node by ed25519 identity
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 I added some tests on ed25519_lookup, and started working on the front-end
 code, but I realized we hadn't actually settled on a UI format.  Hex seems
 too long; base64 seems maybe better, but there are issues with squeezing
 base64 into browsers and getting it in a nice-to-select format.  Teor
 suggested that I look at Y64 on
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Base64#Implementations_and_history , and
 maybe other variants as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22543 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 7.0 shows window resize warning on every new window for a few seconds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22543: Tor Browser 7.0 shows window resize warning on every new window for a 
few
seconds
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  regression, TorBrowserTeam201708   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression => ff52-esr,
 tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression, TorBrowserTeam201708


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22543 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 7.0 shows window resize warning on every new window for a few seconds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22543: Tor Browser 7.0 shows window resize warning on every new window for a 
few
seconds
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed on Torbutton `master` and `maint-1.9.7` (commit
 97380447e4ab66a44abed4ec0aeb5eeabf86404e and
 6aa6d6ef1355179d7198f0eb09405ac0968ba4e7) by the patch for #22989.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22989 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB Size 1000x610 Mac

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22989: TBB Size 1000x610 Mac
-+-
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  torbutton, TorBrowserTeam201708R,  |
  tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution, tbb-torbutton,
 TorBrowserTeam201708R =>
 tbb-fingerprinting-resolution, tbb-torbutton, TorBrowserTeam201708R,
 tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression
 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Okay, the patch for this issue looks good and testing on Linux and Windows
 (I currently don't have a macOS system handy) show no regressions. I
 applied it to `master` and `maint-1.9.7` (commit
 97380447e4ab66a44abed4ec0aeb5eeabf86404e and
 6aa6d6ef1355179d7198f0eb09405ac0968ba4e7).

 I added a link for the patch for #20735 to the respective ticket setting
 it to `needs_review`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20375 [Applications/Tor Browser]: warn users when entering fullscreen

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20375: warn users when entering fullscreen
-+-
 Reporter:  fem  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-torbutton, TorBrowserTeam201708R   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: arthuredelstein (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20375 [Applications/Tor Browser]: warn users when entering fullscreen

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20375: warn users when entering fullscreen
-+-
 Reporter:  fem  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-torbutton, TorBrowserTeam201708R   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-torbutton =>
 tbb-usability, tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-torbutton,
 TorBrowserTeam201708R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 See:
 
https://github.com/arthuredelstein/torbutton/commit/d2e35dd0177e7314fb223ee0e05b1c33e3119352
 for a patch up for review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23231 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error in STL wrappers when building Firefox 64-bit for Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23231: Error in STL wrappers when building Firefox 64-bit for Windows
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23229| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 This is https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1392604. boklm: Could
 you test whether a fix along the idea glandium had is working for us?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23244 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Onionoo documents should be the same accross all tp.o instances

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23244: Onionoo documents should be the same accross all tp.o instances
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Resolved as 'implemented' b/c the ticket was about investigation of
 differences and defining measures to resolve these.  One measure was to
 use identical geoip dbs, which is now deployed on both hosts.  The other
 steps are the two tickets named.  So, this is no duplicate, but done ;-)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23244 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Onionoo documents should be the same accross all tp.o instances

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23244: Onionoo documents should be the same accross all tp.o instances
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  duplicate =>


Comment:

 Only opening to close it with an appropriate solution.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23299 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Crash when trying to save a PDF in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23299: Crash when trying to save a PDF in Tor Browser
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Potentially duplicate of: #22610 waiting for confirmation :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18101 [Applications/Tor Browser]: IP leak from Windows UI dialog with URI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18101: IP leak from Windows UI dialog with URI
-+-
 Reporter:  uileak   |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-proxy-bypass, ip-leak,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201708R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 Arthur: What do we want to do for XP (see comment:10)? And could you
 verify that other Tor Browser platforms are unaffected? comment:7 seems to
 point this out for Linux. See comment:9 for macOS.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15813 [Metrics/Onionoo]: onionoo instances have distinct contact string encoding

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15813: onionoo instances have distinct contact string encoding
-+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Onionoo-1.4.0
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 The tct is gone now, and with the soon to be rotating two tp.o backends
 there is no difference anymore. (also see #23244)

 Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23261 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: implement configuration portion of new Tor Launcher UI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23261: implement configuration portion of new Tor Launcher UI
---+--
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21951 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: gk (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23299 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Crash when trying to save a PDF in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23299: Crash when trying to save a PDF in Tor Browser
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * keywords:   => tbb-crash


Comment:

 Did that happen with the built-in pdf viewer? Or did you get an external
 helper app warning dialog? If so, did it crash when clicking on a button?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22287 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Switch from custom CollecTor downloader to metrics-lib's DescriptorCollector

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22287: Switch from custom CollecTor downloader to metrics-lib's
DescriptorCollector
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Onionoo-1.4.0
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Please find the
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/onionoo.git/log/?h=task-22287
 rebased branch] with two fixup commits.

 The tests and checks on
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/onionoo.git/log/?h=task-22287
 my task-22287 branch] pass fine and Onionoo uses metrics-lib for
 retrieving descriptors.

 Merge ready, but maybe give it another local test round.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23292 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Noscript does not stop a web video's audio from playing even though it is blocked

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23292: Noscript does not stop a web video's audio from playing even though it 
is
blocked
--+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 Yes, I think NoScript playing a file from a trusted location is not a bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23298 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 7 on macOS 10.12 has an empty item at the end of the Help menu

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23298: Tor Browser 7 on macOS 10.12 has an empty item at the end of the Help 
menu
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #22942.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22942 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Empty menuitem below "About Tor Browser"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22942: Empty menuitem below "About Tor Browser"
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: teor (added)


Comment:

 #23298 is a duplicate.

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[tor-bugs] #23299 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Crash when trying to save a PDF in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23299: Crash when trying to save a PDF in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 I was trying to save a PDF in Tor Browser and got this crash. I can't
 reproduce it:

 {{{
 Process:   firefox [47500]
 Path:  /Applications/TorBrowser.app/Contents/MacOS/firefox
 Identifier:org.torproject.torbrowser
 Version:   7.0.4 (5217.2.2)
 Code Type: X86-64 (Native)
 Parent Process:??? [1]
 Responsible:   firefox [47500]
 User ID:   ...

 Date/Time: 2017-08-23 ...
 OS Version:Mac OS X 10.12.6 (16G29)
 Report Version:12
 Anonymous UUID:...

 Sleep/Wake UUID:   ...

 Time Awake Since Boot: 140 seconds
 Time Since Wake:   16 seconds

 System Integrity Protection: enabled

 Crashed Thread:0  Dispatch queue: com.apple.main-thread

 Exception Type:EXC_BAD_ACCESS (SIGSEGV)
 Exception Codes:   KERN_INVALID_ADDRESS at 0x
 Exception Note:EXC_CORPSE_NOTIFY

 Termination Signal:Segmentation fault: 11
 Termination Reason:Namespace SIGNAL, Code 0xb
 Terminating Process:   exc handler [0]

 VM Regions Near 0:
 -->
 __TEXT 0001075ac000-0001075af000 [   12K]
 r-x/rwx SM=COW  /Applications/TorBrowser.app/Contents/MacOS/firefox

 Thread 0 Crashed:: Dispatch queue: com.apple.main-thread
 0   libmozglue.dylib0x0001075b6190
 mozalloc_abort(char const*) + 48

 Thread 1:: Gecko_IOThread
 0   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff8f779d96 kevent + 10
 1   XUL 0x0001085d4f7c 0x10818a000 +
 4501372

 Thread 2:: Socket Thread
 0   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff8f778eb6 __select + 10
 1   libnss3.dylib   0x0001079a00a5 0x10780 +
 1704101

 Thread 3:: JS Watchdog
 0   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff8f778bf2 __psynch_cvwait
 + 10
 1   libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x7fff8f8647fa
 _pthread_cond_wait + 712

 Thread 4:: JS Helper
 0   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff8f778bf2 __psynch_cvwait
 + 10
 1   libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x7fff8f8647fa
 _pthread_cond_wait + 712
 2   XUL 0x00010acb2d61 0x10818a000 +
 45256033
 3   ??? 0x434f4e44 0 + 1129270852

 (duplicate threads)

 Thread 12:
 0   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff8f77134a mach_msg_trap +
 10
 1   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff8f770797 mach_msg + 55
 2   XUL 0x00010b274b0e 0x10818a000 +
 51292942
 3   ??? 0x0001 0 + 65536

 Thread 13:: Hang Monitor
 0   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff8f778bf2 __psynch_cvwait
 + 10
 1   libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x7fff8f8647fa
 _pthread_cond_wait + 712
 2   libnss3.dylib   0x0001079b50fd PR_WaitCondVar
 + 253

 Thread 14:: Timer
 0   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff8f778bf2 __psynch_cvwait
 + 10
 1   libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x7fff8f8647fa
 _pthread_cond_wait + 712
 2   libnss3.dylib   0x0001079b50e3 PR_WaitCondVar
 + 227

 Thread 15:: Cache2 I/O
 0   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff8f778bf2 __psynch_cvwait
 + 10
 1   libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x7fff8f8647fa
 _pthread_cond_wait + 712
 2   libnss3.dylib   0x0001079b50fd PR_WaitCondVar
 + 253

 Thread 16:: DataStorage
 0   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff8f778bf2 __psynch_cvwait
 + 10
 1   libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x7fff8f8647fa
 _pthread_cond_wait + 712
 2   libnss3.dylib   0x0001079b50fd PR_WaitCondVar
 + 253

 (duplicate threads)

 Thread 18:: IPDL Background
 0   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff8f778bf2 __psynch_cvwait
 + 10
 1   libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x7fff8f8647fa
 _pthread_cond_wait + 712
 2   libnss3.dylib   0x0001079b50fd PR_WaitCondVar
 + 253

 Thread 19:: GMPThread
 0   libsystem_kernel.dylib  0x7fff8f778bf2 __psynch_cvwait
 + 10
 1   libsystem_pthread.dylib 0x7fff8f8647fa
 _pthread_cond_wait + 712
 2   libnss3.dylib   0x0001079b50fd PR_WaitCondVar
 + 253

 Thread 20:: 

Re: [tor-bugs] #23115 [Applications/Tor Browser]: If "Tor is not working in this browser", don't download an update

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23115: If "Tor is not working in this browser", don't download an update
--+---
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by teor):

 It was reproducible by re-launching the copy of 7.5a1 that I hadn't
 updated.
 It went away when I updated.

 The Tor check failure might have be due to the increased latency I had on
 a wireless broadband link (in Australia, outside a major east coast city).

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[tor-bugs] #23298 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 7 on macOS 10.12 has an empty item at the end of the Help menu

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23298: Tor Browser 7 on macOS 10.12 has an empty item at the end of the Help 
menu
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 I only noticed it in 7.0.4, but it might be there in earlier versions.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22033 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Remove extraneous (BETA) fields from clients objects

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22033: Remove extraneous (BETA) fields from clients objects
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Onionoo-1.4.0
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 I'd rather close this and have a reminder ticket in metrics-web #23297.

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[tor-bugs] #23297 [Metrics/Metrics website]: remove outdated beta fields from onionoo's protocol description

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23297: remove outdated beta fields from onionoo's protocol description
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Onionoo-1.4.0
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+---
 as soon as the new onionoo release is out.
 Added to Onionoo 1.4.0 milestone to keep this in mind.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23243 [Metrics/Metrics website]: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23243: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 The status change somehow didn't 'arrive' at trac yesterday.  Here it is.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23212 [Applications/Tor Browser]: [WARN] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 20%: Asking for networkstatus consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23212: [WARN] Problem bootstrapping. Stuck at 20%: Asking for networkstatus
consensus
--+---
 Reporter:  bo0od |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * status:  new => closed
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 Thanks. I guess there is some issue with updating your newtorkstatus
 consensus. Maybe you get censored from time to time? Or the server you try
 to reach is down? Anyway, so far it seems not be a Tor Browser bug to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23267 [- Select a component]: Cross-platform brand and features consistency: make Android and iOS browsers as good as TBB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23267: Cross-platform brand and features consistency: make Android and iOS
browsers as good as TBB
--+
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: gk (added)


Comment:

 What component should that be in?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22033 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Remove extraneous (BETA) fields from clients objects

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22033: Remove extraneous (BETA) fields from clients objects
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Onionoo-1.4.0
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by karsten):

 Merged to master. Leaving this ticket open so that we remember to update
 the website once we put out the release.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22591 [Webpages/Blog]: Clicking on a comment does not directly jump to it (although the blog seems to try)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22591: Clicking on a comment does not directly jump to it (although the blog 
seems
to try)
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by gk):

 It's enough for me to open that link in a new tab if I am logged in into
 the blog. I am using Tor Browser on a low slider level.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22591 [Webpages/Blog]: Clicking on a comment does not directly jump to it (although the blog seems to try)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22591: Clicking on a comment does not directly jump to it (although the blog 
seems
to try)
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 Hm, that still does not work for me in all cases. For instance I logged in
 and looked at the comment queue, scrolled down until I found
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/270924#comment-270924 and clicked on
 it. The blog seems to try jumping to it but fails.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23280 [Core Tor/Tor]: Censorship resistant onion sites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23280: Censorship resistant onion sites
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal tor-hs censorship  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I don't think that running BM is practical for that. It is too heavy. My
 proposed implementation is lighter. Also it is unlikely that BM will be
 shipped together with tor, so this option will only be used by a subset of
 users, reducing their anonymity. So I believe any solution of the problem
 should be a part of the official tor software.

 To those who thing that there is no ''problem'' here and that the current
 implementation is censorship resistant: it is not! Many countries have
 laws powerful enough to block torrent trackers, who serve the same
 function for torrent protocol that hsdirs serve for tor hidden services
 protocol. The official reason for shutdown of torrent trackers: those
 trackers could block torrents with copyrighted content, but failed to do
 so. Anybody can send registered letters to all hsdir owners in the world
 informing them about a "bad" site and then try to shutdown all of them who
 didn't remove the site.

 Also many countries have laws criminalizing situations when a person could
 prevent some other crime and was informed about it, but knowingly didn't
 do it. That is why it is so important to change the hidden sites protocol
 in such a way that no participant (including hsdirs) has a technical
 possibility to blacklist sites.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23295 [Core Tor/Tor]: Detect AES-NI hw encryption also if no cpu flags for AES-NI is present

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23295: Detect AES-NI hw encryption also if no cpu flags for AES-NI is present
--+--
 Reporter:  naif  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by yawning):

 Replying to [comment:2 naif]:
 > Isn't possible to execute the AES-NI asm in a try/catch __asm__
 statement to evaluate if it's present or not?

 To add detail to what nickm said, when an illegal instruction is
 encountered, the CPU generates an interrupt (`Invalid Opcode - 0x06`).
 What happens then is OS dependent (because control is passed to the
 kernel's ISR), but on Linux this gets translated to a `SIGILL` in the
 responsible process.

 With that in mind, there's two ways to do what you want.

 The portable approach:

  * `fork()`
  * Exercise the AES-NI instructions (all of them, make sure it spits out
 coherent output) in the child.
  * If the child doesn't get killed AND the tests succeed, think about
 force enabling AES-NI support.

 The fancy approach (What nickm was alluding to):

  * `setjmp()`, if this returns `0`, it means we `longjmp()`ed from the
 `SIGILL` handler and can't use AES-NI.
  * Install a `SIGILL` handler that will `longjmp()`.
  * Exercise the AES-NI instructions (tests, etc etc etc).
  * If the tests succeed, then think about force enabling AES-NI support.

 From past experience, I don't think the portability situation for the
 signal handler based approach is horrific (and I've abused non-local gotos
 with signal handlers a decent amount), but there's no benefit to that
 approach over something `fork()` based.

 That said, personally I would be against doing either, and recommend
 `WONTFIX`ing this ticket.

 The correct way to test for CPU feature support on Intel systems is via
 `CPUID`.  If the environment is such that `CPUID` is misreporting it's
 capabilities, then the environment should be fixed.  Just because things
 happen to appear to work does not mean that features the CPU claims to not
 support should be enabled.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23292 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Noscript does not stop a web video's audio from playing even though it is blocked

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23292: Noscript does not stop a web video's audio from playing even though it 
is
blocked
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Replying to [comment:1 cypherpunks]:
 > Why should it be blocked if it's a local file?
 I was not sure if this just effected local files or webm videos hosted on
 websites.
 I just tested some webm videos hosted on some websites and the audio does
 not play, it only effects local files from what I can tell. So if it is
 not a issue then you can close this ticket.

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