Re: [tor-bugs] #23315 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please set up a Windows 10-64 QA machine for Tor Browser related things

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23315: Please set up a Windows 10-64 QA machine for Tor Browser related things
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by weasel):

 I have a VM now, running an updated windows.

 Which (admin) user should I create?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23315 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please set up a Windows 10-64 QA machine for Tor Browser related things

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23315: Please set up a Windows 10-64 QA machine for Tor Browser related things
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * cc: boklm (added)


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:1 weasel]:
 > I have a VM now, running an updated windows.

 Thanks!

 > Which (admin) user should I create?

 boklm: could you provide that info? Not sure what user(s) you'd like to
 have.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23350 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Website loads endlessly if connection went back then came, while other websites work just fine if they're loaded afterwards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23350: Website loads endlessly if connection went back then came, while other
websites work just fine if they're loaded afterwards
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-usability, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-
 regression


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23339 [Metrics/Metrics website]: adapt onionoo documentation to contain new search filter

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23339: adapt onionoo documentation to contain new search filter
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Onionoo-1.4.0
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * owner:  iwakeh => karsten


Comment:

 Reassign according off-trac communications.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23315 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please set up a Windows 10-64 QA machine for Tor Browser related things

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23315: Please set up a Windows 10-64 QA machine for Tor Browser related things
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Can we call it `administrator`?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23368 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add design and coding guidelines for using floating point

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23368: Add design and coding guidelines for using floating point
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, tor-safety  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by teor):

 4. Try to do as many of your calculations in integer precision as
 possible, and convert to floating point for display or transfer.

 It might also help to link to a general list of do's and don't's, like:
 * don't compare floating-point numbers using equals (comparing with 0.0 is
 an exception)
 * always check for division by zero, even if the inputs to a function are
 non-zero, the result can round to zero

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23297 [Metrics/Metrics website]: remove outdated beta fields from onionoo's protocol description

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23297: remove outdated beta fields from onionoo's protocol description
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Onionoo-1.4.0
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged with minor tweaks as indicated above. Closing. Thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23339 [Metrics/Metrics website]: adapt onionoo documentation to contain new search filter

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23339: adapt onionoo documentation to contain new search filter
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Onionoo-1.4.0
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged something that is very close to my
 [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21427#comment:1 initial
 suggestion in #21427]. Closing.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22618 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Downloading pdf file via file:/// is stalling if the external helper dialog is enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22618: Downloading pdf file via file:/// is stalling if the external helper 
dialog
is enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-e10s, TorBrowserTeam201708R, tbb-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression, tbb-e10s,
 TorBrowserTeam201708R =>
 tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression, tbb-e10s, TorBrowserTeam201708R, tbb-
 backport
 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:13 mcs]:
 > Here is a fixup patch for torbutton:
 >
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/torbutton.git/commit/?h=bug21766-fixup-01
 >
 > And here is one for the browser:
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug21766-fixup-01
 >
 > Kathy and I are not sure how best to handle the commit message. We did a
 `git commit --squash ...` but we then wrote the commit message that we
 think should be preserved when rebasing is done (when the three Bug 19273
 commits will be squashed together). Hopefully what we did will work, but
 please let us know if we should do something different.

 That's okay. I'll take that into account when rebasing (actually I guess
 af0ca6a886c7a9149602a6588cc4d44874f2fee9 should have been a `fixup` commit
 and not a `revert` one, but that should be no issue when rebasing either).

 Merge both, the Torbutton patch to `master` (commit
 8e5e391c71d6c5f3ae80c88e45d1e8522f981214) and the tor-browser one to `tor-
 browser-52.3.0esr-7.5-2` (commit
 9ecbfca98dc5488527495e3bfde0fabf75a8529a). Closing this and a bunch of
 related tickets, yay! + marking this as a potential backport candidate
 although it's a big patch.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #22471, #22610

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #22471, #22610 by gk:


Action: resolve

Comment:
Fixed by the patches in #22618.

--
Tickets URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22472 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Handle downloads via FTP better when external helper app dialog is shown

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22472: Handle downloads via FTP better when external helper app dialog is shown
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed by the patches in #22618.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23315 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please set up a Windows 10-64 QA machine for Tor Browser related things

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23315: Please set up a Windows 10-64 QA machine for Tor Browser related things
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by weasel):

 Apparently not.  Windows wants us to pick a different name.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23315 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please set up a Windows 10-64 QA machine for Tor Browser related things

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23315: Please set up a Windows 10-64 QA machine for Tor Browser related things
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 I think we can call it `tbb-admin` then.

 Is this an admin user that will be able to create other user accounts?
 I think we'll want to have other accounts after this one: one for running
 the testsuite, and one for each member of the team that want to test
 things on Windows.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22891 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add GitLab CI configs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22891: Add GitLab CI configs
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ci, continuous-integration,  |  Actual Points:
  testing, best-practice, unit-testing, new- |
  developers, review-group-22|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf, dgoulet |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by hiro):

 Ok I can try this and let you guys know.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23315 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please set up a Windows 10-64 QA machine for Tor Browser related things

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23315: Please set up a Windows 10-64 QA machine for Tor Browser related things
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by weasel):

 Replying to [comment:5 boklm]:
 > I think we can call it `tbb-admin` then.
 >
 > Is this an admin user that will be able to create other user accounts?

 That was the intention at least.  Credentials linked to on IRC.

 This should work for access:
 {{{
   ssh -o ControlPath=none -C -L 3392:woronowii:3389 -f -o
 ExitOnForwardFailure=yes people.torproject.org sleep 5 && xfreerdp
 /size:1600x900 +clipboard /drive:home,$HOME/tmp/woronowii /u:tbb-admin
 /v:localhost:3392
 }}}

 (Adapt/drop /drive and /size as needed.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23315 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please set up a Windows 10-64 QA machine for Tor Browser related things

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23315: Please set up a Windows 10-64 QA machine for Tor Browser related things
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by weasel):

 Replying to [comment:6 weasel]:
 > Credentials linked to on IRC.

 Except, you don't have a working PGP key. :(

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #23370 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please update key for boklm in ldap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23370: Please update key for boklm in ldap
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256

 Please update ldap key for user boklm.

 The old key was:

 pub   4096R/2067001B1B678A63 2011-08-04
   Key fingerprint = C9B8 CAC3 318B 9A9E 4883  5961 2067 001B 1B67 8A63
   uid   [ultimate] Nicolas Vigier (boklm) 
   uid   [ultimate] Nicolas Vigier (boklm)
 

 It should be replaced by this new key:

 pub   4096R/3E39CEABFC69F6F7 2015-09-24
   Key fingerprint = 6AB6 AEE9 776E 7827 23C8  ACE8 3E39 CEAB FC69 F6F7
   uid   [  full  ] Nicolas Vigier (boklm)
 
   uid   [  full  ] Nicolas Vigier (boklm) 
   sub   4096R/A0312B06D9535729 2016-04-23
   sub   4096R/07B7CFD7A0FBA062 2017-01-25 [expires: 2018-01-25]
   sub   4096R/6DB4024DAA111CE4 2017-01-25 [expires: 2018-01-25]

 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
 Version: GnuPG v2

 iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJZp94eAAoJECBnABsbZ4pjIX4P/0L3200H53xDAUn0VjcRwjJH
 RgyjIkn3fnFNv68H1h2N9n7fZIlUQnaAAhUJjq/7dhmZTE/YC+DPsSJ3j4XXZh0D
 DV/OCd/OOmxMlqXYhZ7O7m4vKYLX4PyTuBoxl2LPTVPYuGcOuhkSosVl8QK8SL1n
 dCYooggrbSdfh/1aIsU43vO02HxHdgCdxm1Pn+5RkOUzM4ZQ57uArauVqk+0tdzq
 95057BIn9HrRIRqK0o0MU5Y2bldpSaNU5Zw2UTX0TtlEMnOcxCPc1v3PZ3TrBtaD
 qKcKqG4jn6q8L8tqoYGQmF25vKD/elKzLpHdvo/CB/KjMcwARFR9Wtp4l7NylzRq
 1tS6bxpfeGQrs9I3U+xusj2PL2naz03xnnzloYGV428DZZdtGUiV8wt4c4rObr30
 qgb+A6GGvSP9/pwprD+S1rzqxqBqshjmx2A1WxNy62lzZnV0Md6JReyrDS+IJAbI
 MDdpsiJlfLLzsSH5JYpVxTt11C5wYU0rrMPH757RAfCJyA6Ctq9LJlzJw6LauU1C
 9Iq5JTR9YfUKy4yJNLSuZMTW34eD7jWqVr/m9fdl0yoFvyaBlRGrc3KSEk6rStPv
 9hv5/sSkKs39Pc8AYQDX7HQN+vGUVsttZdBued2tsfwUtXsmmCQh01hZoiu95dMs
 Iw9MJUM2NjFiVdkQlJX4
 =kRAL
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #23371 [Webpages/Website]: adding a short paragraph on how to protect themself anonymous on internet and outside of it to " Tips On Staying Anonymous » "

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23371: adding a short paragraph on how to protect themself anonymous on 
internet
and outside of it to " Tips On Staying Anonymous » "
---+
 Reporter:  throwable_account  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website   |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 I would add a preamble of "Tips On Staying Anonymous" would be something
 like:

 - First of all tor is not the only thing to be safe on internet. It would
 be dangerous to use the following advice while being unsafe in your
 internet behavior, outside and inside tor, and in this case your effort
 would be quite vain.

 - Second it is likely that being safe on internet is not enough if you are
 not safe away of the keyboard. So take care of yourself.

 Now the instruction to stay safe on tor. At the end of this instruction we
 will give you some pointer to do these both important thing.

 ...
 Instructions
 ...

 Either:
 - Two very short paragraph on how to stay safe online and offline. (That
 would be the best, but the instruction are already quite long.)
 - Two links toward longish explanations.

 as my nick imply it is a throwaway account, so little is expected that I
 will do the follow up of this bug. Hope that would help.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23315 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please set up a Windows 10-64 QA machine for Tor Browser related things

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23315: Please set up a Windows 10-64 QA machine for Tor Browser related things
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:7 weasel]:
 >
 > Except, you don't have a working PGP key. :(

 I made #23370 for updating my pgp key.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19056 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: Write, review, deploy the basket2 pluggable transport.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19056: Write, review, deploy the basket2 pluggable transport.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorS-
 |  must
-+-
Changes (by yawning):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 I gave up on basket2 a long time ago, and would do it considerably
 differently if I were to restart development, so this is essentially
 pointless.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17501 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: Design/implement obfsNG.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17501: Design/implement obfsNG.
--+-
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  huggable-transport, yolo, obfsNG  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by yawning):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 This eventually became basket2, that is abandoned.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23368 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add design and coding guidelines for using floating point

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23368: Add design and coding guidelines for using floating point
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, tor-safety  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by yawning):

 Replying to [comment:2 teor]:
 > 4. Try to do as many of your calculations in integer precision as
 possible, and convert to floating point for display or transfer.

 "No non-serialized floating point values on the wire."

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #5148 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: SIGHUP managed proxies when logs reopened

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5148: SIGHUP managed proxies when logs reopened
-+-
 Reporter:  twilde   |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-spec-change, needs-tor-change  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by yawning):

 * severity:   => Blocker
 * parent:  #16755 =>


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #5148 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: SIGHUP managed proxies when logs reopened

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5148: SIGHUP managed proxies when logs reopened
-+-
 Reporter:  twilde   |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-spec-change, needs-tor-change  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by yawning):

 * severity:  Blocker => Normal


Comment:

 Why does trac do that.  Sigh.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #10629 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: PT spec changes for better interoperability with other projects

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10629: PT spec changes for better interoperability with other projects
-+-
 Reporter:  infinity0|  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  SponsorS, pt-spec, pt-ng, pt-v2, |  Actual Points:
  tor-pt |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by yawning):

 * status:  assigned => new
 * parent:  #16755 =>


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #5483 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: managed pluggable transports should be able to pause Tor's circuit-building?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5483: managed pluggable transports should be able to pause Tor's circuit-
building?
+-
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-tor-change needs-spec-change  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by yawning):

 * severity:   => Normal
 * parent:  #16755 =>


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16755 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: Design a version 2 Pluggable Transport spec.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16755: Design a version 2 Pluggable Transport spec.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  SponsorS pt-spec |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by yawning):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 This didn't happen, and a bunch of other people are writing a "version 2"
 of the "spec" that has nothing to do with what I wanted or had in mind, so
 I'm closing this to avoid confusion in the future.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16755 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: Design a version 2 Pluggable Transport spec.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16755: Design a version 2 Pluggable Transport spec.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  yawning
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  SponsorS pt-spec |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by yawning):

 I had to unparent this ticket's children (#5148 #5483 #10629) so I could
 close this.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23370 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please update key for boklm in ldap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23370: Please update key for boklm in ldap
-+
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23315 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please set up a Windows 10-64 QA machine for Tor Browser related things

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23315: Please set up a Windows 10-64 QA machine for Tor Browser related things
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by weasel):

 credentials provided.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23315 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please set up a Windows 10-64 QA machine for Tor Browser related things

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23315: Please set up a Windows 10-64 QA machine for Tor Browser related things
-+
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

  weasel: I have been able to log in to woronowii

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22764 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: New TBB build machine?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22764: New TBB build machine?
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by weasel):

 boklm, you should be able to log into
  build-sunet-a.torproject.net
  build-sunet-b.torproject.net
 as root.
 256 SHA256:OkFmo+hrDeE42uTAgYxM6h3AS4UJzL0WHYzxoi9Ksqk root@build-sunet-a
 (ECDSA)
 256 SHA256:7nUyMJh/2bgQ6WllmvYnwguD9udRb+bWeeFCpnjZAZU root@build-sunet-a
 (ED25519)
 2048 SHA256:Bg8dZtLmX1Y2SSxIWb3EMciAWHhy32CM0cwIP5ob+kw root@build-sunet-a
 (RSA)

 256 SHA256:exXclItHafo/XUi5JuOWjhYsoIWmtY4JQLGqBGFUi7M root@build-sunet-b
 (ECDSA)
 256 SHA256:nQ5aY/c1NM5gL6qi/D18BNWAUP3uxqKyDOAa9VcZuII root@build-sunet-b
 (ED25519)
 2048 SHA256:pzv+RMG0V9J5GXpMNq0BdU5ec5tUGPiPp6SQEN7Lbrs root@build-sunet-b
 (RSA)

 It's a pristine, minimal installation, except that:
 - ssh is installed and root has some authkeys,
 - hoster's DNS sucks, so:
  - installed unbound
  - told dhcpclient to not believe other nameservers
 - set up lvm, mounted a volumne on /srv and bind mounted /home

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #23372 [Core Tor/Tor]: test: stack-use-after-scope in hs_service/build_update_descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23372: test: stack-use-after-scope in hs_service/build_update_descriptors
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-test, tor-hs
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Here is the libasan stacktrace:
 {{{
 ==32333==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-scope on address
 0x7ffd2c537fe8 at pc 0x55a25e624399 bp 0x7ffd2c537920 sp 0x7ffd2c537910
 READ of size 1 at 0x7ffd2c537fe8 thread T0
 #0 0x55a25e624398 in node_allows_single_hop_exits
 src/or/nodelist.c:984
 #1 0x55a25e708afb in router_choose_random_node
 src/or/routerlist.c:2815
 #2 0x55a25e5c2493 in pick_intro_point src/or/hs_service.c:1406
 #3 0x55a25e5c2493 in pick_needed_intro_points src/or/hs_service.c:1498
 #4 0x55a25e5c2493 in update_service_descriptor
 src/or/hs_service.c:1589
 #5 0x55a25e5c2493 in update_all_descriptors src/or/hs_service.c:1622
 #6 0x55a25e1337c6 in test_build_update_descriptors
 src/test/test_hs_service.c:1140
 #7 0x55a25e31f01a in testcase_run_bare_ src/ext/tinytest.c:106
 #8 0x55a25e31f989 in testcase_run_forked_ src/ext/tinytest.c:190
 #9 0x55a25e31f989 in testcase_run_one src/ext/tinytest.c:248
 #10 0x55a25e321013 in tinytest_main src/ext/tinytest.c:435
 #11 0x55a25dee3200 in main src/test/testing_common.c:319
 #12 0x7f11c6e08420 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libc.so.6+0x20420)
 #13 0x55a25dee5ee9 in _start (src/test/test+0x956ee9)
 }}}

 The issue seems to be that we use `routerinfo_t ri;` on the stack and then
 assign it to a `node_t` with `nodelist_set_routerinfo(&ri, NULL)`.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23366 [Core Tor/Tor]: test: test_options_validate__outbound_addresses is broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23366: test: test_options_validate__outbound_addresses is broken
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-test  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Branch: `bug23366_032_01`.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #14923 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Tor Launcher should have accessibility support.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14923: Tor Launcher should have accessibility support.
---+---
 Reporter:  Sherief|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * keywords:   => ux-team


Comment:

 It is surprising that this ticket wasn't taken into consideration for new
 Tor Launcher's design, was it?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18946 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate fingerprinting potential of lack of H.264 support (was: Investigate fingerprinting potential of enabling H.264 on Linux)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18946: Investigate fingerprinting potential of lack of H.264 support
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201605   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:5 arthuredelstein]:
 > One option might be to bundle H.264 support.
 Good idea. Most modern browsers support it
 http://html5test.com/compare/feature/video.codecs.mp4.h264.html
 And it also makes https://www.youtube.com/html5 happy.
 Not only Linux affected.
 Built-in support is much more better, than relying on systems' backends
 and 3rd-party codecs.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #8305 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Use clearer colors in the "Consumed bandwidth by Exit/Guard flag combination" graph

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8305: Use clearer colors in the "Consumed bandwidth by Exit/Guard flag
combination" graph
-+---
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:   => ux-team


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #6444 [Applications/Tor Browser]: custom firefox theme for TBB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6444: custom firefox theme for TBB
--+--
 Reporter:  greg  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #10399| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * severity:   => Minor
 * parent:   => #10399
 * keywords:  tbb-usability, needs-triage => tbb-usability, ux-team
 * owner:  greg => tbb-team
 * type:  task => enhancement


Comment:

 Read carefully comment:3.
 +1 for
 > Tor browser should be camouflaged by default

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #3667 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Toolbar icons non-deterministic?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3667: Toolbar icons non-deterministic?
--+---
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:   => tbb-usability, ux-team
 * severity:   => Minor
 * milestone:  TorBrowserBundle 2.3.x-stable =>


Comment:

 See comment:6.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #23373 [Webpages/Website]: Add new press clips to website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23373: Add new press clips to website
--+
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Add new clips from attached .csv to the press page. Link article titles to
 URLs and follow page formatting:
 ​https://www.torproject.org/press/press.html.en

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23373 [Webpages/Website]: Add new press clips to website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23373: Add new press clips to website
--+
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by steph):

 I cannot upload the file or link to a google spreadsheet: "Submission
 rejected as potential spam - Content contained blacklisted patterns"

 Will email the file.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22764 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: New TBB build machine?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22764: New TBB build machine?
-+
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks. I'm able to log into both VMs.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22752 [Core Tor/Tor]: Assertion failure in consensus_cache_entry_handle_get on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22752: Assertion failure in consensus_cache_entry_handle_get on Windows
--+
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+

Comment (by Vort):

 I have tested 0.3.1.5 + bug22752_031_simple in VM - works good (except for
 hang - but that is another problem).
 Now I will test it with real relay.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #23374 [Core Tor]: Circuit dirtiness is inconsistant with MaxCircuitDirtiness

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23374: Circuit dirtiness is inconsistant with MaxCircuitDirtiness
--+--
 Reporter:  Jaym  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Hi,

 I am experimenting some stuffs in Shadow and I am trying to have each
 circuit different for each begin cell sent. To achieve that, I have set up
 in my torrcs the following options:

 SocksPort 127.0.0.1:9000 IsolateDestAddr
 MaxCircuitDirtiness 1

 Which should pick a different circuit for each begin cell sent. However,
 sometimes a relay begin is sent over a previously used circuit. For
 example 2 begin cells sent over circuit 3592237881:

 {{{
 Jan 01 00:42:04.000 [info] int
 connection_handle_listener_read(connection_t *, int): New SOCKS connection
 opened from 127.0.0.1.
 Jan 01 00:42:04.000 [info] exit circ (length 3):
 $75E3C46989B7DFD95D6C2078660D1FC3F04C175E(open)
 $11D472A45E4F39A07E0827CE7FAEF259D97242E1(open)
 $89C224C7F82640AD07B390A74957C5BF34B0B1D9(open)
 Jan 01 00:42:04.000 [info] void link_apconn_to_circ(entry_connection_t *,
 origin_circuit_t *, crypt_path_t *): Looks like completed circuit to
 
 Jan 01 00:42:04.000 [info] int
 connection_ap_handshake_send_begin(entry_connection_t *): Sending relay
 cell 0 on circ 3592237881 to begin stream 30786 with 
 Jan 01 00:42:04.000 [info] int
 connection_ap_handshake_send_begin(entry_connection_t *): Address/port
 sent, ap socket 4393, n_circ_id 3592237881
 Jan 01 00:42:04.000 [info] int
 connection_edge_process_inbuf(edge_connection_t *, int): data from edge
 while in 'waiting for connect response' state. Leaving it on buffer.
 Jan 01 00:42:05.000 [info] int connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t
 *, circuit_t *, edge_connection_t *, crypt_path_t *): data cell dropped,
 unknown stream (streamid 14993).
 Jan 01 00:42:05.000 [info] int connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t
 *, circuit_t *, edge_connection_t *, crypt_path_t *): data cell dropped,
 unknown stream (streamid 14993).
 Jan 01 00:42:05.000 [info] int connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t
 *, circuit_t *, edge_connection_t *, crypt_path_t *): data cell dropped,
 unknown stream (streamid 14993).
 Jan 01 00:42:05.000 [info] int
 connection_edge_process_relay_cell_not_open(relay_header_t *, cell_t *,
 circuit_t *, edge_connection_t *, crypt_path_t *): 'connected' 
 Jan 01 00:42:05.000 [info] exit circ (length 3):
 $75E3C46989B7DFD95D6C2078660D1FC3F04C175E(open)
 $11D472A45E4F39A07E0827CE7FAEF259D97242E1(open)
 $89C224C7F82640AD07B390A74957C5BF34B0B1D9(open)
 Jan 01 00:42:06.000 [info] int connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t
 *, circuit_t *, edge_connection_t *, crypt_path_t *): 4393: end cell
 (closed normally) for stream 30786. Removing stream.
 Jan 01 00:42:13.000 [info] int
 connection_handle_listener_read(connection_t *, int): New SOCKS connection
 opened from 127.0.0.1.
 Jan 01 00:42:13.000 [info] exit circ (length 3):
 $75E3C46989B7DFD95D6C2078660D1FC3F04C175E(open)
 $11D472A45E4F39A07E0827CE7FAEF259D97242E1(open)
 $89C224C7F82640AD07B390A74957C5BF34B0B1D9(open)
 Jan 01 00:42:13.000 [info] void
 pathbias_count_use_attempt(origin_circuit_t *): Used circuit 53 is already
 in path state use succeeded. Circuit is a General-purpose client currently
 open.
 Jan 01 00:42:13.000 [info] void link_apconn_to_circ(entry_connection_t *,
 origin_circuit_t *, crypt_path_t *): Looks like completed circuit to
 
 Jan 01 00:42:13.000 [info] int
 connection_ap_handshake_send_begin(entry_connection_t *): Sending relay
 cell 0 on circ 3592237881 to begin stream 30787 with 
 Jan 01 00:42:13.000 [info] int
 connection_ap_handshake_send_begin(entry_connection_t *): Address/port
 sent, ap socket 4441, n_circ_id 3592237881
 }}}

 Several observations:

 - It happens only for 2 begin cells containing same IP
 - It happens only when the timing between them is close enough (here 9
 seconds)

 My guess is that function approx_time() used to setup the timestamp_dirty
 is very approximative (maybe related to Shadow?). circuit_is_acceptable()
 does not seems to reject this circuit as this code should do:
 {{{
   if (circ->timestamp_dirty &&
   circ->timestamp_dirty+get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness <= now)
 return 0;
 }}}

 variable "now" is containing the value returned by approx_time() instead
 of time(NULL) for performance reason.

 So, this is not very much a problem but in my case, it bothers me.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https:

[tor-bugs] #23375 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Create a chutney.git repository for user dgoulet

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23375: Create a chutney.git repository for user dgoulet
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 Please create git repository called `chutney.git` for user dgoulet.

 Thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22430 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add next gen HS support to chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22430: Add next gen HS support to chutney
+--
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs prop224 chutney  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I don't have a chutney repository on tpo for now so here is the format-
 patch.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22430 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add next gen HS support to chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22430: Add next gen HS support to chutney
+--
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs prop224 chutney  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * Attachment "0001-Introduce-hs-v3-network-file-and-temlate.patch" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23123 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cannibalized HS circuit don't have their timestamp_dirty updated

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23123: Cannibalized HS circuit don't have their timestamp_dirty updated
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-circuit  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Proposed fix: `bug23123_032_01`

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17690 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Control the number of HSDirs using a consensus parameter

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17690: prop224: Control the number of HSDirs using a consensus parameter
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20961   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This has been implemented by #20657.

 The consensus param are:

 {{{
 hsdir_n_replicas = 2
 hsdir_spread_store = 3
 }}}

 Which basically means 3 HSDir per replica that is 6 HSDir right now.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20700 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20700: prop224: Implement client authorization
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * parent:  #12424 =>
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


Comment:

 Not going in the initial release of prop224.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20524 [Core Tor/Tor]: Revise initial descriptor upload behavior for onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20524: Revise initial descriptor upload behavior for onion services
-+-
 Reporter:  twim |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs, research, tor-spec, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20657   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Current state of prop224 hidden service about descriptor upload.

 Service upload their descriptors (current and next for the overlap period)
 with:
 {{{
 #define HS_SERVICE_NEXT_UPLOAD_TIME_MIN (60 * 60)
 #define HS_SERVICE_NEXT_UPLOAD_TIME_MAX (120 * 60)
   desc->next_upload_time =
 (time(NULL) + crypto_rand_int_range(HS_SERVICE_NEXT_UPLOAD_TIME_MIN,
 HS_SERVICE_NEXT_UPLOAD_TIME_MAX));
 }}}

 Trying to answer the original questions of this ticket:

 > What is the threat model here?

 As a network observer or Guard of a tor with multiple hidden services, not
 uploading them at the same time can help hide the fact that A.onion and
 B.onion aren't necessarily on the same tor instance. Not perfect of course
 but it helps.

 > How exactly descriptors should be uploaded?

 I assume at least at a random interval that is inside the lifetime of the
 descriptor on the HSDir side which is 3 hours right now by default with
 prop224.

 > In what range delays should be set?

 The above I think answers it.

 > How this will work along with absent delays after #20082?

 At startup, the service establishes intro points and once they are set for
 a descriptor, it's immediately uploaded. So at startup, for reachability
 reasons, we upload as soon as we can. Adding any kind of random delay here
 could be really annoying for users and application type like Ricochet for
 instance.

 That being said, I'm closing the ticket so we can move on *BUT* if
 anything could be improved here or needs more clarification, I suggest we
 go through tor-dev@ for a discussion and then we can either patch the code
 or/and the spec according to the conclusions.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21509 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fuzz v3 hidden services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21509: Fuzz v3 hidden services
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fuzz, prop224, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  accepted => needs_revision


Comment:

 This has been merged upstream but then disabled because of a problem with
 how the HS API is used.

 Commit `97347b11` adds basic fuzzing for descriptors and disabled in
 `5ef656e7`

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22810 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Make the client/service extend properly to the IP/RP

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22810: prop224: Make the client/service extend properly to the IP/RP
---+
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224-extra  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, prop224 => tor-hs, prop224-extra
 * parent:  #21888 =>
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


Comment:

 Moving to prop224-extra. HS v3 works without this and we are too close to
 032 freeze to consider something that core.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21295 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow mixed anonymous and non-anonymous onion services in the same tor instance

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21295: Allow mixed anonymous and non-anonymous onion services in the same tor
instance
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, single-onion, prop224,   |  Actual Points:
  maybe-bad-idea |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 For the 032 release, prop224 will *not* allow mixed service. I'm still
 skeptical of this for the record.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22893 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Make intro point per-service and not per-descriptor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22893: prop224: Make intro point per-service and not per-descriptor
---+
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224-extra  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * cc: asn (removed)
 * keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, prop224-extra => tor-hs, prop224-extra
 * parent:  #20657 =>
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


Comment:

 This needs to happen but can't be before the 032 freeze.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23357 [Core Tor/Tor]: Build with non-Cross-DSO CFI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23357: Build with non-Cross-DSO CFI
+--
 Reporter:  shawn.webb  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  security, defence-in-depth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1.0
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by shawn.webb):

 * Attachment "tor-cfi-r02.patch" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21600 [Core Tor/Tor]: Hidden service introduction point retries occur at 1 second intervals

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21600: Hidden service introduction point retries occur at 1 second intervals
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.2.7.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, single-onion, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21446 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


Comment:

 Still worth considering!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23357 [Core Tor/Tor]: Build with non-Cross-DSO CFI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23357: Build with non-Cross-DSO CFI
+--
 Reporter:  shawn.webb  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  security, defence-in-depth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1.0
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by shawn.webb):

 I've just attached a new revision of the patch which enabled non-Cross-DSO
 CFI to more bits, including the unit test applications. Please let me know
 if I've forgotten something.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21621 [Core Tor/Tor]: Intro points can get stuck in CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21621: Intro points can get stuck in CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21446| Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_information
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22689 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Stop rend and intro points being used as single hop proxies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22689: prop224: Stop rend and intro points being used as single hop proxies
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, relay-safety  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17945 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Hrmm I think that should be in `needs_review`.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21888 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Groundwork for service implementation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21888: prop224: Groundwork for service implementation
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20657   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22781 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Unify link specifier API/ABI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22781: hs: Unify link specifier API/ABI
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-cell, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, prop224-extra => tor-cell, tor-relay
 * sponsor:  SponsorR-can =>
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23010 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: make sure the protocol handshakes are extensible

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23010: prop224: make sure the protocol handshakes are extensible
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, research  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  prop224 => tor-hs, research
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: unspecified


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23094 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Include hsdir_index in node_t instead of pointer

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23094: prop224: Include hsdir_index in node_t instead of pointer
+--
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, prop224-extra  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * parent:  #20657 =>


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23108 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Don't rotate all service descriptors at once

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23108: prop224: Don't rotate all service descriptors at once
---+
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224-extra, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  prop224 prop224-extra tor-hs => prop224-extra, tor-hs
 * sponsor:  SponsorR-can =>
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23109 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Do we need to re-encode HS desc everytime we upload it?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23109: prop224: Do we need to re-encode HS desc everytime we upload it?
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  prop224 prop224-extra tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 The reason we do that is because the intro point list might have changed
 in between uploads but that can be fixed with a "dirty" flag in the
 descriptor. The second reason it the revision counter that changes at
 every upload which forces us to re-encode which re-signs the whole blob.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23301 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Refactor connection_ap_handle_onion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23301: prop224: Refactor connection_ap_handle_onion
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23300   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23170 [Core Tor/Tor]: Include ed25519 relay id keys in the consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23170: Include ed25519 relay id keys in the consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224 tor-dirauth tor-hs ed25519   |  Actual Points:
  needs-proposal |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


Comment:

 No chance we can pull this off before the freeze.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23304 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Dump a malformed descriptor in a file and log_warn about it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23304: prop224: Dump a malformed descriptor in a file and log_warn about it
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23300   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 Simple fix, I dump the descriptor in the log as a warn if SafeLogging is
 set to scrub NONE.

 Branch: `ticket23304_032_01`.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12500 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add an option to upload hidden service descriptors some time after startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12500: Add an option to upload hidden service descriptors some time after 
startup
-+-
 Reporter:  andrea   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, easy, traffic-analysis   |  Actual Points:
  security   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * parent:  #20657 =>


Comment:

 prop224 hasn't implemented that for 032.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23159 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: Non-fatal assertion ei failed in launch_intro_point_circuits at src/or/hs_service.c:1784

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23159: Bug: Non-fatal assertion ei failed in launch_intro_point_circuits at
src/or/hs_service.c:1784
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * parent:  #20657 =>


Comment:

 FYI, I'm not seeing that bug anymore...

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22694 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Disable netflow padding if v3 single onion services are enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22694: prop224: Disable netflow padding if v3 single onion services are enabled
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, single-onion  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * parent:  #20657 =>


Comment:

 This is blocking on #17857

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20657 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement service support.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20657: prop224: Implement service support.
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, review-group-22  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #12424| Points:  6
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:  SponsorR-
  |  must
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 All child ticket have been triaged. End of an era!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20699 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Add control port events and commands

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20699: prop224: Add control port events and commands
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, needs-proposal,  |  Actual Points:
  prop224-extra, tor-control |
Parent ID:   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, needs-proposal, prop224-extra, tor-control =>
 tor-hs, needs-proposal, prop224-extra, tor-control
 * parent:  #12424 =>


Comment:

 Unparenting so we can maybe close #12424 because the minimal viable
 implementation has been merged.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18098 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement tor-genkey tool for offline HS key creation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18098: prop224: Implement tor-genkey tool for offline HS key creation
---+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224-extra  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  6
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
---+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, prop224-extra => tor-hs, prop224-extra
 * parent:  #12424 =>


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #14150 [Core Tor/Tor]: Dirauths should expose the value of `MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2` as a vote/consensus parameter

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14150: Dirauths should expose the value of `MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2` as a
vote/consensus parameter
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, tor-dirauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * parent:  #12424 =>


Comment:

 Not much to do with prop224...

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #14150 [Core Tor/Tor]: Dirauths should expose the value of `MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2` as a vote flag-threshold (was: Dirauths should expose the value of `MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14150: Dirauths should expose the value of `MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2` as a 
vote
flag-threshold
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, tor-dirauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
--+

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #14150 [Core Tor/Tor]: Dirauths should expose the value of `MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2` as a vote flag-threshold

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14150: Dirauths should expose the value of `MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2` as a 
vote
flag-threshold
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, tor-dirauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
--+

Old description:

> I think it's important that `MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2` is a public
> value for each directory authority, so that we can monitor which
> authorities have switched to the newest value (it used to be 26 hours,
> now it's 96 afaik).
>
> I suggest that this gets exposed in the `flag-thresholds` or `params`
> line of the vote documents. If other people think this is reasonable, it
> will require an easy torspec patch and a tor patch.

New description:

 I think it's important that `MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2` is a public
 value for each directory authority, so that we can monitor which
 authorities have switched to the newest value (it used to be 26 hours, now
 it's 96 afaik).

 I suggest that this gets exposed in the `flag-thresholds` line of the vote
 documents. If other people think this is reasonable, it will require an
 easy torspec patch and a tor patch.

--

Comment (by arma):

 (modified ticket body to pick the flag-thresholds line, not the param
 line.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23304 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Dump a malformed descriptor in a file and log_warn about it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23304: prop224: Dump a malformed descriptor in a file and log_warn about it
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23300   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
-+
Changes (by arma):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 {{{
 +if (get_options()->SafeLogging == SAFELOG_SCRUB_NONE) {
 }}}
 you want SafeLogging_ here. Remember,
 {{{
 config.c:  V(SafeLogging, STRING,   "1"),
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18101 [Applications/Tor Browser]: IP leak from Windows UI dialog with URI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18101: IP leak from Windows UI dialog with URI
-+-
 Reporter:  uileak   |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak, tbb-proxy-bypass, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201708R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  tbb-proxy-bypass, ip-leak, TorBrowserTeam201708R => tbb-disk-
 leak, tbb-proxy-bypass, TorBrowserTeam201708R


Comment:

 Why is so much attention being paid for this `NOTABUG`? Feature was
 requested and discussed in
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=711654. Pros and cons are
 well known for years.
 Is this ticket about protection for noobs who can't distinguish between
 shell and browser? If so, shouldn't we make this feature obey TBB's design
 requirements? Something like "Firefox should handle URLs (instead of
 system shell)".
 What is needed to pass URLs to Firefox, `FOS_ALLNONSTORAGEITEMS` and
 `FOS_SUPPORTSTREAMABLEITEMS` (with `FOS_FORCEFILESYSTEM` removed), from
 https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
 us/library/windows/desktop/dn457282(v=vs.85).aspx?
 There is no IP leak or proxy bypass. But there is `tbb-disk-leak` without
 `FOS_DONTADDTORECENT`.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23361 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: client can pick super old rendezvous points

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23361: prop224: client can pick super old rendezvous points
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
-+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Fixup branch pushed at `bug23361_032_01` in my repo!

 Contains two fixup commits: One fixes the hsv3 circuit detection, and the
 second regulates cannibalization for hsv3 rp circuits.

 Let me know if you have any questions. Thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23304 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Dump a malformed descriptor in a file and log_warn about it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23304: prop224: Dump a malformed descriptor in a file and log_warn about it
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23300   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Fixed!... My bad, I orginally used the one with `_` and somehow it got
 removed and failed to compile.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #23376 [Webpages/Website]: Build survey form for Onion Browser branding research

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23376: Build survey form for Onion Browser branding research
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 The UX team is helping the Onion Browser team with user research, we will
 be performing a survey around the branding of the app at Apple app store.

 This is a problem when users comes to the app store (which contains 20
 different apps that 'connects to Tor') and often are confuse and don't
 know which one Tor Project recommends (Onion Browser).

 Surveys will be something that the UX team will probably do more often and
 because we want to be very careful with people's data when giving us
 information, we would like to host our own form instead of using a 3rd
 party solution out there.

 However, this ticket will only talk about requirements for Onion Browser
 branding survey, not for a long term solution to scale the production and
 hosting of surveys :) but we would like to point out that this is not a
 'one time ask'.

 The survey mocks are available here: https://marvelapp.com/4h97d4g/

 general tech requirements:

  1. Should be hosted by tor
  1. Should have a .onion option
  1. Should  preserve user privacy (no ips logs etc)
  1. Should have an admin interface to browse answers
  1. Answers should include which set was shown on first question (see
 below) and if user filled up a form from a .onion address or tpo address
  1. Admin interface should have an option to download answers as .csv



 Greeting and Thank You screens are pretty straight forward so we won't be
 talking about those here at this ticket.

 Requirements for first survey 1st screen:
 https://marvelapp.com/4h97d4g/screen/31825745

  1. progress bar at the top with first 1/3 complete
  1. First question allows only 1 selection
  1. First question choices presentation:
1. We will present a set of 5 choices - where one will always be onion
 browser - to each user answering the survey
1. (pending) Full list of apps to be presented to user
1. (pending) logic for it so we are not bias (how to guarantee one
 isn't shown more often than the others etc)
1. Each choice thumbnail should have a link to their respective Apple
 app store page (should we do it like that or should we just have the page
 screenshot be presented in a larger format, like if you click on the
 thumbnail image you see the bigger version of it)
  1. (pending decision) Text box word count limitation or some limitation
 for input?
  1. Missing from the mock that should be included - after second question
 we should have a 'next' button so folks can move to the next screen :)

 Requirements for the end survey screen:
 https://marvelapp.com/4h97d4g/screen/31825746 1. Progress bar at the top
 now shows 2/3 completion
  1. Only one answer allowed on first question
  1. (pending decision) Text box word count limitation or some limitation
 for input?
  1. Missing from the mock that should be included - after second question
 we should have a 'next' button so folks can move to the next screen :)

 Requirements for 3rd survey screen:
 https://marvelapp.com/4h97d4g/screen/31825747


  1. Progress bar at the top now shows 3/3 completion
  1. Country list for drop-down menu could be standard ones (I believe you
 can easily get it from a l10n library or something)
  1. Second question should allow only one answer
  1. Submit button should save answers and take user to the 'thank you'
 screen

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23123 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cannibalized HS circuit don't have their timestamp_dirty updated

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23123: Cannibalized HS circuit don't have their timestamp_dirty updated
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-circuit, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, tor-circuit => tor-hs, tor-circuit, prop224


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23376 [Webpages/Website]: Build survey form for Onion Browser branding research

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23376: Build survey form for Onion Browser branding research
--+
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  assigned => new
 * type:  defect => task


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23376 [Webpages/Webtools]: Build survey form for Onion Browser branding research

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23376: Build survey form for Onion Browser branding research
---+--
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Webtools  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by isabela):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => hiro
 * component:  Webpages/Website => Webpages/Webtools


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23361 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: client can pick super old rendezvous points

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23361: prop224: client can pick super old rendezvous points
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 * `uncanibalizable` --> I think missing a `n`.

 * Not sure about this log info: `log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Getting v3 rp
 circuit!");`

 Rest lgtm;

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23361 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: client can pick super old rendezvous points

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23361: prop224: client can pick super old rendezvous points
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
-+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Doc fixes done, and force pushed branch.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23361 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: client can pick super old rendezvous points

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23361: prop224: client can pick super old rendezvous points
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 lgtm;

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23376 [Webpages/Webtools]: Build survey form for Onion Browser branding research

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23376: Build survey form for Onion Browser branding research
---+--
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  project| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Webtools  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by linda):

 * type:  task => project


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23359 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTTPS-Everywhere icon is not shown on first start but on restart

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23359: HTTPS-Everywhere icon is not shown on first start but on restart
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [ticket:23359 gk]:
 > WebExtensions-based HTTPS-Everywhere
 It is a legacy Embedded WebExtension, "Add-on SDK"-based. WebExtensions-
 based HTTPS-Everywhere will replace it for FF57.

 Do you think it's a TBB issue?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23368 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add design and coding guidelines for using floating point

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23368: Add design and coding guidelines for using floating point
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  doc, tor-safety  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * cc: catalyst (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16591 [Metrics/ExoneraTor]: Ask experts to review all text used on ExoneraTor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16591: Ask experts to review all text used on ExoneraTor
+
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/ExoneraTor  |Version:
 Severity:  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Actually, I did ask a lawyer to review the text a few years back when I
 worked on the redesign. We can of course always improve the text even
 more, but we can improve many things, and there's no need to keep this
 ticket open specifically for improving this text. Closing.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #14744 [Applications/GetTor]: Automate upload of latest Tor Browser to cloud services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14744: Automate upload of latest Tor Browser to cloud services
-+--
 Reporter:  ilv  |  Owner:  ilv
 Type:  defect   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by ilv):

 In deed, the different versions 7.0.2 and 7.0.3 confused the upload
 scripts. To my knowledge, this is the first it happens in almost 2-3
 years. However, the automation is broken. Right now I have to manually run
 the upload scripts, that's why the repository had older versions of Tor
 Browser.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23360 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Service has dead code which removed a feature

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23360: prop224: Service has dead code which removed a feature
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23328 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Uninitialized hsdir indices if requesting onion before bootstrap completes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23328: prop224: Uninitialized hsdir indices if requesting onion before 
bootstrap
completes
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23300   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by asn):

 Hmm, I haven't been getting this lately even when i request an onion
 before bootstrap completes.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22434 [Applications/Tor Browser]: drag and drop filter is ineffective in e10s mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22434: drag and drop filter is ineffective in e10s mode
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-e10s, tbb-7.0-issues,  |  worksforme
  tbb-regression |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 DevTools are also not happy with this Mozilla bug:
 {{{
 20:13:00.240 A promise chain failed to handle a rejection. Did you forget
 to '.catch', or did you forget to 'return'?
 See
 
https://developer.mozilla.org/Mozilla/JavaScript_code_modules/Promise.jsm/Promise

 Date: Thu Aug 31 2017 20:12:51 GMT+ (UTC)
 Full Message: TypeError: inspector.selection is undefined
 Full Stack:
 
nsContextMenu.prototype.inspectNode/<@chrome://browser/content/nsContextMenu.js:576:11
 Handler.prototype.process@resource://gre/modules/Promise.jsm ->
 resource://gre/modules/Promise-backend.js:932:23
 this.PromiseWalker.walkerLoop@resource://gre/modules/Promise.jsm ->
 resource://gre/modules/Promise-backend.js:813:7
 this.PromiseWalker.scheduleWalkerLoop/<@resource://gre/modules/Promise.jsm
 -> resource://gre/modules/Promise-backend.js:747:11
  1 nsContextMenu.js:576
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19730 [Metrics/Metrics website]: Metrics web java modules should use Java 7 throughout

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19730: Metrics web java modules should use Java 7 throughout
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Metrics website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * priority:  Medium => High
 * milestone:  Metrics 1.0.0 =>


Comment:

 Please review [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-
 web.git/log/?h=task-19730 my task-19730] commit. Raising priority a bit,
 because this is blocking other changes to the code base without risking a
 major merge mess. (Thanks!)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23347 [Core Tor/Tor]: Using bridges is not working anymore with tor on master

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23347: Using bridges is not working anymore with tor on master
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bootstrap, tor-bridge-client  |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  isis  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Forgot to change state after review.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22948 [Core Tor/Tor]: Padding, Keepalive and Drop cells should have random payloads

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22948: Padding, Keepalive and Drop cells should have random payloads
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18856| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by isis):

 * cc: isis (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs