Re: [tor-bugs] #22591 [Webpages/Blog]: Clicking on a comment does not directly jump to it (although the blog seems to try)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22591: Clicking on a comment does not directly jump to it (although the blog 
seems
to try)
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22013 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by gk):

 Doing the daily comment approval thing makes me believe that this issue is
 even more easily reproducible with being logged in (but it might be
 slightly different one, see comment:24).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18660 [Core Tor/Stem]: OSX's man command lacks '--encoding' argument

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18660: OSX's man command lacks '--encoding' argument
---+
 Reporter:  Sebastian  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  utils  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by ewong):

 * cc: cc@… (added)


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[tor-bugs] #23476 [Core Tor/Tor]: buf_t is in kernel_types.h on macOS (and maybe BSD)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23476: buf_t is in kernel_types.h on macOS (and maybe BSD)
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.2   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Let's consider using some other name?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23476 [Core Tor/Tor]: buf_t is in kernel_types.h on macOS (and maybe BSD)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23476: buf_t is in kernel_types.h on macOS (and maybe BSD)
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => nickm


Comment:

 Assigning so it stays in 0.3.2

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18660 [Core Tor/Stem]: OSX's man command lacks '--encoding' argument

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18660: OSX's man command lacks '--encoding' argument
---+
 Reporter:  Sebastian  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  utils  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by ewong):

 nope.. my bad.. https://github.com/ewongbb/stem/tree/t18660_3  really
 sorry for this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23475 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Chutney logs a lot of "Failed to find node for hop #1 of our path"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23475: Chutney logs a lot of "Failed to find node for hop #1 of our path"
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 It's noisy, but it also hides failure information.
 So maybe this isn't a good idea?

 But chutney also logs a message saying how to get detailed logs when it
 fails.

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[tor-bugs] #23475 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Chutney logs a lot of "Failed to find node for hop #1 of our path"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23475: Chutney logs a lot of "Failed to find node for hop #1 of our path"
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We need to hide this message using the ignore file.

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[tor-bugs] #23474 [Core Tor/Tor]: Avoid constant initial download delays in download schedules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23474: Avoid constant initial download delays in download schedules
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core  |Version:
  Tor/Tor |
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  fingerprint-resistance, tor-client
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 When a download schedule has a non-zero initial delay, the delay is used
 as-is. We use this to delay the initial authority consensus download (so
 fallbacks get used), and bridge descriptor re-downloads.

 But these constant delays produce an obvious traffic pattern, so we should
 work out how to randomise them. Using a random value from [delay/2,
 delay*3/2] would be a good start.

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[tor-bugs] #23473 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Add support for ed25519 fallbacks ids to the fallback script

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23473: Add support for ed25519 fallbacks ids to the fallback script
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-ed25519,
   |  fallback
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #23471
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23471 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add ed25519 ids to torrc relay configs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23471: Add ed25519 ids to torrc relay configs
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ed25519, tor-auth, tor-bridge,   |  Actual Points:
  fallback   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * type:  defect => enhancement


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[tor-bugs] #23472 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add support for ed25519 authorities and bridges to chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23472: Add support for ed25519 authorities and bridges to chutney
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type: | Status:  new
  enhancement  |
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core   |Version:
  Tor/Chutney  |
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-ed25519, tor-auth, tor-bridge
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #23471
   Points:  1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 There is no fallback support in chutney yet.

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[tor-bugs] #23471 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add ed25519 ids to torrc relay configs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23471: Add ed25519 ids to torrc relay configs
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-ed25519, tor-auth, tor-bridge,
 Severity:  Normal   |  fallback
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:  2|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Tor relays have ed25519 keys, but there is no way to add them to the torrc
 (or the hard-coded configs compiled into tor).

 Tor accepts at least 3 types of hard-coded relay lists in its configs:
 * Directory Authorities
 * Fallback Directory Mirrors
 * Bridges

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23170 [Core Tor/Tor]: Include ed25519 relay id keys in the consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23170: Include ed25519 relay id keys in the consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224 tor-dirauth tor-hs ed25519   |  Actual Points:
  needs-proposal |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 If this is an issue on the live network, we could increase the spread to
 compensate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23456 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build go and go pluggable transports for Windows 64

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23456: Build go and go pluggable transports for Windows 64
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709, tbb-rbm  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20636 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * cc: dcf (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23116 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor stops responding to Ctrl-C and circuits while in infinite descriptor download loop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23116: tor stops responding to Ctrl-C and circuits while in infinite descriptor
download loop
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-insight needs-analysis  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #16844| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


Comment:

 I suspect that #23470 might fix this issue, or at least make it less
 pathological, but I haven't tested it yet. And I'm not sure I'll have time
 to in 0.3.2.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15967 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Separate BridgeDB's CAPTCHA into another service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15967: Separate BridgeDB's CAPTCHA into another service
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-https captcha tor-launcher  |  Actual Points:  2
  ooni-probe |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorM
-+-

Comment (by isis):

 Replying to [comment:7 iry]:
 > Thank you very much for your work!
 >
 > anon-connection-wizard which is the Python-clone of Tor launcher is
 looking forward to the implementation of this BridgeDB API, too!

 You're welcome!

 This API won't be publicly accessible though, it'll be reachable through
 the API for #22871, and even then it's only reachable through a special
 meek reflector as part of #16650.

 Is anon-connection-wizard what Tails uses now? I'd be happy to support
 Tails as well (but I'd strongly prefer the connection to go through the
 meek reflector).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23470 [Core Tor/Tor]: Avoid relays resolving their own address on every download status check

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23470: Avoid relays resolving their own address on every download status check
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #21789| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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[tor-bugs] #23470 [Core Tor/Tor]: Avoid relays resolving their own address on every download status check

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23470: Avoid relays resolving their own address on every download status check
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:  0.2   |  Parent ID:  #21789
   Points:  0.2   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 My branch 21789-mitigate has a fix that avoids relays doing useless
 resolves every time they check a download status. (And clients never do
 those resolves, because they're clients.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21394 [Core Tor/Tor]: connection timeouts are affecting Tor Browser usability

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21394: connection timeouts are affecting Tor Browser usability
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance, tbb-usability,  |  Actual Points:
  performance|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:18 cypherpunks]:
 > {{{
 > [08-04 17:35:24] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 6240 DETACHED
 798 trac.torproject.org:443 REASON=TIMEOUT
 > [08-04 17:35:31] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 6240 DETACHED
 802 trac.torproject.org:443 REASON=END REMOTE_REASON=RESOLVEFAILED
 > [08-04 17:35:32] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 6241 DETACHED
 798 trac.torproject.org:443 REASON=TIMEOUT
 > [08-04 17:35:34] Torbutton INFO: controlPort >> 650 STREAM 6241 REMAP
 804 [2a01:4f8:172:39ca:0:dad3:3:1]:443 SOURCE=EXIT
 > }}}
 > It looks like trac.tpo is always resolved as IPv6 address, and Tor
 switches through the exit nodes until one with IPv6 support found.

 #21310 and #21311 may fix this, but we might also need a fix on the client
 side.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20423 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clock jumps on relay due to hostname lookup timeouts

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20423: Clock jumps on relay due to hostname lookup timeouts
--+
 Reporter:  Felixix   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.10
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 029-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21789| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #21789


Comment:

 #21789 may mitigate this issue

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23116 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor stops responding to Ctrl-C and circuits while in infinite descriptor download loop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23116: tor stops responding to Ctrl-C and circuits while in infinite descriptor
download loop
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-insight needs-analysis  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #16844| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 #21789 may mitigate this issue

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22430 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add next gen HS support to chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22430: Add next gen HS support to chutney
+-
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs prop224 chutney  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22437  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor|Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #22437


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23354 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove deterministic download schedule code and configs (was: Remove redundant items from download schedules)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23354: Remove deterministic download schedule code and configs
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bootstrap  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Description changed by teor:

Old description:

> Under exponential backoff, download schedules contain the maximum time we
> will wait, even if the random amount is larger.
>
> But in most cases, the random amount is much smaller than the maximum, so
> we could replace the item with the actual maximum, or delete it from the
> schedule altogether. (On the public network, the maximum is 4x the last
> entry, on test networks, it's 3x.)
>
> We should make these changes based on the schedules in #23347.

New description:

 Under exponential backoff, download schedules contain the ~~maximum time
 we will wait, even if the random amount is larger.~~ initial time we will
 wait, and everything else is random exponential from that point onwards.

 ~~But in most cases, the random amount is much smaller than the maximum,
 so we could replace the item with the actual maximum, or delete it from
 the schedule altogether. (On the public network, the maximum is 4x the
 last entry, on test networks, it's 3x.)~~

 So once we're sure that we will never revert to deterministic schedules,
 we should make each schedule into a single initial value, and remove the
 deterministic code.

 We should make these changes based on the schedules in #23347.

--

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #23323, #23414, #23415, #23416

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #23323, #23414, #23415, #23416 by teor:


Action: reassign

Comment:
I'll do these in 0.3.2, some of them are security-low.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22437 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add HSv3 chutney networks to tor's make test-network-all

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22437: Add HSv3 chutney networks to tor's make test-network-all
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => teor


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #17945, #20916, #20942, #21310, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #17945, #20916, #20942, #21310, #22271, #22321, #22527, 
#22688, #22689, #22759, #22760 by teor:
milestone to Tor: 0.3.3.x-final

Comment:
I'm not going to get time to do these in 0.3.2.
Moving them to 0.3.3.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22527 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Add new operators to fallback directory whitelist

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22527: Add new operators to fallback directory whitelist
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22271 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by teor):

 Posted on IRC, and confirmed whitelisting via contact info email:
 {{{
  Not sure if I qualify anymore, but my relay can be removed
 from the fallback.blacklist 1C90D3AEADFF3BCD079810632C8B85637924A58E
  Feel free to use my contact info to verify
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23347 [Core Tor/Tor]: Using bridges is not working anymore with tor on master

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23347: Using bridges is not working anymore with tor on master
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bootstrap, tor-bridge-client  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  isis  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * actualpoints:  0.5 => 1


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23347 [Core Tor/Tor]: Using bridges is not working anymore with tor on master

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23347: Using bridges is not working anymore with tor on master
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bootstrap, tor-bridge-client  |  Actual Points:  0.5
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  isis  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I updated the branch with a new design that:
 * runs quick checks when we don't know any bridge descriptors
 * when we get a (new/uncached) bridge descriptor, don't check that
 descriptor again for a few hours

 This splits the standard bridge schedule into a Bridge and a
 BridgeBootstrap schedule.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23312 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Please create tor-browser-bundle repo under user/isis on git.tpo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23312: Please create tor-browser-bundle repo under user/isis on git.tpo
-+
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 nickm]:
 > Isis, do you still want this repo, or something different?

 Nope! At some point when I start making patches to the new thing I'll ask
 for one of those to be made.

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[tor-bugs] #23469 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Please create /user/isis/farfetchd.git repo for the new captcha server

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23469: Please create /user/isis/farfetchd.git repo for the new captcha server
-+
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 I think the official copy of stuff in production should live on git.tpo
 instead of github, so it would be good to make a repo for it soon. Thank
 you!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22805 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove or_circuit_t.is_first_hop, because it's not accurate any more

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22805: Remove or_circuit_t.is_first_hop, because it's not accurate any more
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, security-review, |  Actual Points:  .3
  review-group-23|
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => asn


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23457 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Service descriptor uploads race condition

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23457: prop224: Service descriptor uploads race condition
-+
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 OK, please see my branch `bug23457_032_01` from my repo for the fix here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23462 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit: Add a log_info() when marking a circuit for close.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23462: circuit: Add a log_info() when marking a circuit for close.
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 sure; merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22446 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix GCC7 -Wimplicit-fallthrough warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22446: Fix GCC7 -Wimplicit-fallthrough warnings
+
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-client warning gcc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22446 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix GCC7 -Wimplicit-fallthrough warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22446: Fix GCC7 -Wimplicit-fallthrough warnings
+
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-client warning gcc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by nickm):

 Backporting to 0.2.9.x; GCC 7 is ... spreading. :/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23468 [Applications/TorBirdy]: TorBirdy 0.2.3: Custom setting for protected headers lost after reboot

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23468: TorBirdy 0.2.3: Custom setting for protected headers lost after reboot
---+-
 Reporter:  jankowitsch|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by jankowitsch):

 Environment: Thunderbird 52.2.1 (64-Bit), Enigmail 1.9.8.2, Linux

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[tor-bugs] #23468 [Applications/TorBirdy]: TorBirdy 0.2.3: Custom setting for protected headers lost after reboot

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23468: TorBirdy 0.2.3: Custom setting for protected headers lost after reboot
---+-
 Reporter:  jankowitsch|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 TorBirdy 0.2.3 added the feature to enable protected headers by default.

 If I override this settings in the torbirdy config dialog, everything
 works as expected (protected headers are disabled, I can re-enable them on
 per-message basis). Yet after I reboot my machine, this settings is lost.

 Any ideas how to fix this?

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[tor-bugs] #23467 [Metrics/Onionoo]: running parameter vs. field mismatch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23467: running parameter vs. field mismatch
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/metrics-
 team/2017-September/000456.html
 {{{
 It might be that we're using two different definitions for "running":

  - The "running=false" parameter checks whether a bridge is contained in
 the latest known status *and* has the "Running" flag assigned.

 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/onionoo.git/tree/src/main/java/org/torproject/onionoo/writer/SummaryDocumentWriter.java#n83

  - The "running" field in details documents only checks whether a bridge
 is contained in the latest known status but ignores whether it got the
 "Running" flag there or not.

 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/onionoo.git/tree/src/main/java/org/torproject/onionoo/updater/NodeDetailsStatusUpdater.java#n866

 We should probably use the first definition and also require the
 "Running" flag before calling a bridge "running".
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23097 [Core Tor/Tor]: The circuit timeout prediction is not working properly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23097: The circuit timeout prediction is not working properly
---+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  031-backport, review-group-22  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Ok, dgoulet says this should be fine for v3, too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23097 [Core Tor/Tor]: The circuit timeout prediction is not working properly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23097: The circuit timeout prediction is not working properly
---+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  031-backport, review-group-22  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Ack. We are done here then.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #10831 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Captchas are not accessible for blind users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10831: Captchas are not accessible for blind users
-+-
 Reporter:  PZajda   |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-reportbug, isis2015Q3Q4,|  Actual Points:
  isisExB, isisExC, bridgedb-ui  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * severity:  Blocker => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10831 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Captchas are not accessible for blind users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10831: Captchas are not accessible for blind users
-+-
 Reporter:  PZajda   |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-reportbug, isis2015Q3Q4,|  Actual Points:
  isisExB, isisExC, bridgedb-ui  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  assigned => new
 * severity:   => Blocker


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[tor-bugs] #23466 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: v3 client descriptor cache entry should be indexed by blinded key

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23466: hs: v3 client descriptor cache entry should be indexed by blinded key
--+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-client, prop224
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:  asn
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 We currently index `hs_cache_client_descriptor_t` by service identity key
 in the `hs_cache_v3_client` but imagine this scenario (that our mad bug
 hunter armadev stumbled upon):

 Day 0: You fetch the descriptor for service S with rev counter 8 (blinded
 key: BK0)

 Day 1: Computer in suspend mode to tor is sleepy-sleepy.

 Day 2: Wake up, and try to access the descriptor of blinded key BK2 so you
 lookup the cache for service S and get the descriptor you fetched on Day 0
 (yes because lifetime is ridiculously long that is 72h). It happens that
 the revision counter at that time is 5. Because 8 > 5, you won't keep the
 descriptor and trigger this log info:

 {{{
 if (cache_entry->desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter >
 client_desc->desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter) {
   log_info(LD_REND, "We already have fresher descriptor. Ignoring.");
 }}}

 ... and end up using the descriptor of Day 0 which is just unusable.

 There are several issues here:

 1. The lifetime of a descriptor in our cache is just insanely too big. In
 reality, a descriptor blinded key has a lifetime of 24h maximum so it
 really doesn't make sense for a client to keep a descriptor more than that
 in its cache. Furthermore, because the hashring is computed using the
 consensus valid_after time, we don't need to add some buffer for clock
 skewed client. Thus, let bring it down to 24h only. We could be clever and
 put its expire time up to the next time period where the client will fetch
 a descriptor using a different blinded key.

 2. We need to index the client descriptor cache entries by blinded key
 which is what the HSDir do.

 3. I kind of want to turn this `log_info()` into a `BUG()` because we
 should never be triggering directory fetches for a blinded key for which
 we already have a valid descriptor. Rev counter for a specific blinded key
 can NOT go backward directory side nor client side. And can't be reused
 either over time.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23464 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When I try to quit Tor browser alpha after I get the error "Tor exited during startup" and try to quit it nothing happens.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23464: When I try to quit Tor browser alpha after I get the error "Tor exited
during startup" and try to quit it nothing happens.
--+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Replying to [comment:4 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:3 Dbryrtfbcbhgf]:
 > > I right click on the tor browser icon in the macOS dock and click the
 quit button there.
 >
 > Sorry I was not clear. I understand how to reproduce this issue. I was
 asking whether the Quit buttons within the startup dialogs are working or
 not (because I want to make sure there is at least one way to exit cleanly
 on OSX without using Activity Monitor).
 The quit button in the Tor dialog works correctly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17521 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support capsicum(4) on FreeBSD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17521: Support capsicum(4) on FreeBSD
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:
 |  shawn.webb
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, security, sandboxing, |  Actual Points:
  BSD, capsicum  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by shawn.webb):

 * owner:  (none) => shawn.webb
 * status:  new => assigned
 * cc: shawn.webb@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23097 [Core Tor/Tor]: The circuit timeout prediction is not working properly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23097: The circuit timeout prediction is not working properly
---+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  031-backport, review-group-22  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by mikeperry):

 dgoulet - your version of the patch looks fine. I have no idea how to tell
 if the behavior is OK for v3 services though. I'm also not sure what
 you're saying. Is prediction disabled for them?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23464 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When I try to quit Tor browser alpha after I get the error "Tor exited during startup" and try to quit it nothing happens.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23464: When I try to quit Tor browser alpha after I get the error "Tor exited
during startup" and try to quit it nothing happens.
--+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 Dbryrtfbcbhgf]:
 > I right click on the tor browser icon in the macOS dock and click the
 quit button there.

 Sorry I was not clear. I understand how to reproduce this issue. I was
 asking whether the Quit buttons within the startup dialogs are working or
 not (because I want to make sure there is at least one way to exit cleanly
 on OSX without using Activity Monitor).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17521 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support capsicum(4) on FreeBSD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17521: Support capsicum(4) on FreeBSD
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, security, sandboxing, |  Actual Points:
  BSD, capsicum  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by shawn.webb):

 I've started work on this on behalf of HardenedBSD.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23465 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Downgrade client log warn to info

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23465: hs: Downgrade client log warn to info
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 b719fa7efe8678

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[tor-bugs] #23465 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Downgrade client log warn to info

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23465: hs: Downgrade client log warn to info
--+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, tor-client
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 {{{
   log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "We would fetch a v3 hidden service descriptor
 "
"but we already have a usable descriptor.");
 }}}

 ... this should be at INFO level.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21448 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Identify what build flags we should be using for security, and use them

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21448: Identify what build flags we should be using for security, and use them
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Try to use `-fno-plt` on all platforms and check the difference.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23455 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ_client_side() doesn't consider REND_JOINED purpose

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23455: hs: hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ_client_side() doesn't consider 
REND_JOINED
purpose
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-client, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Confirmed. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23455 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ_client_side() doesn't consider REND_JOINED purpose

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23455: hs: hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ_client_side() doesn't consider 
REND_JOINED
purpose
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-client, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 merged that; please confirm I merged the right thing :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23464 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When I try to quit Tor browser alpha after I get the error "Tor exited during startup" and try to quit it nothing happens.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23464: When I try to quit Tor browser alpha after I get the error "Tor exited
during startup" and try to quit it nothing happens.
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Replying to [comment:2 mcs]:


 > I assume the Quit button within the "Tor Status" or "Tor Network
 Settings" window is working correctly? This issue is very similar to
 #20321.
 I right click on the tor browser icon in the macOS dock and click the quit
 button there.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23464 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When I try to quit Tor browser alpha after I get the error "Tor exited during startup" and try to quit it nothing happens.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23464: When I try to quit Tor browser alpha after I get the error "Tor exited
during startup" and try to quit it nothing happens.
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 I assume the Quit button within the "Tor Status" or "Tor Network Settings"
 window is working correctly? This issue is very similar to #20321.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23243 [Metrics/Website]: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23243: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 (I believe you meant #22983 above, not #22836.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21074 [Core Tor/Tor]: setrlimit fails OSX Sierra

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21074: setrlimit fails OSX Sierra
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.6.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  OSX Sierra setrlimit, tbb-wants, |  Actual Points:
  031-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Okay; it looks like the underlying issue was indeed probably #22797.
 Please  re-open if this bug appears in 0.2.9.12, 0.3.0.11, 0.3.1.7-??,
 0.3.2.1-alpha, or later.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23243 [Metrics/Website]: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23243: write a spec for web-server-access log descriptors
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Did you mean #22836 above, or some other ticket?

 Regarding the timing of asking for feedback, I could see us sending the
 request now or later. Do you think the implementation will reveal any
 important changes that would require sending an updated request for
 feedback? If not, we could send now (well, tomorrow). But we could as well
 wait a few more days or even a week if we have to.

 When we ask for feedback, should we simply put what we have on the Metrics
 website together with a visible "beta" notice? Might be easier than
 sending out a PDF.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22797 [Core Tor/Tor]: macOS should use ULIMIT_BUFFER for open files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22797: macOS should use ULIMIT_BUFFER for open files
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  macOS, file-limits, 029-backport,|  Actual Points:
  030-backport   |
Parent ID:  #21074   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Backporting to 0.2.9 and forward; marking parent closed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22281 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prevent pattern of bugs caused by calling get_options() within options_validate() etc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22281: Prevent pattern of bugs caused by calling get_options() within
options_validate() etc
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  review-group-23  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 done!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23463 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Javascript based clocks can tick backwards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23463: Javascript based clocks can tick backwards
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  time javascript clock |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 It is surprising to me that our patches to reduce time precision would
 cause a clock to move backwards, but there must be some difference in Tor
 Browser that is causing this. Can you point to a web page that
 demonstrates the problem? Otherwise it may be impossible to make the
 correct fix.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23455 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ_client_side() doesn't consider REND_JOINED purpose

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23455: hs: hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ_client_side() doesn't consider 
REND_JOINED
purpose
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-client, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Good changes are in my branch so I confirm :).

 `bug23455_032_01`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23455 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ_client_side() doesn't consider REND_JOINED purpose

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23455: hs: hs_circuitmap_get_rend_circ_client_side() doesn't consider 
REND_JOINED
purpose
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-client, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 dgoulet: confirm you like asn's revisions, and I'm glad to merge them.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22281 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prevent pattern of bugs caused by calling get_options() within options_validate() etc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22281: Prevent pattern of bugs caused by calling get_options() within
options_validate() etc
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-23  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 lgtm;

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23304 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Dump a malformed descriptor in a file and log_warn about it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23304: prop224: Dump a malformed descriptor in a file and log_warn about it
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
  |  implemented
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, review-group-23  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23300| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:  SponsorR-
  |  can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 squashed + merging!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22836 [Metrics/Website]: Parse CollecTor's index.json and provide our own directory listing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22836: Parse CollecTor's index.json and provide our own directory listing
-+
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:11 iwakeh]:
 > I'm wondering about the [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-
 
web.git/tree/website/src/main/java/org/torproject/metrics/web/CollecTorServlet.java?h=task-22836=59fa501ea830504534b3b309ed6280719edc1b9d#n60
 wait-construct] when no index is available:
 > The thread could be interrupted for any reason a short time (e.g. 5ms)
 after calling wait and the index preparation might not be done.  And, more
 likely, it is not interrupted and then there is a wait of 10 seconds, but
 I'd guesstimate index creation takes way less than one second.  Thus, it
 might be useful to 1) embed the wait in a loop checking if the waiting
 time elapsed or if there is an index available.
 > 2) Secondly, the actual call to wait should use only 200 ms (or some
 other amount way smaller than 1) as value.

 Agreed about the loop.

 But keep in mind that the timeout is for the time between sending a
 request for an `index.json` file until receiving and processing the
 response. If this were a local operation I'd say 200 ms are enough, but
 with the possible network delay I'd say we need to give it at least a few
 seconds. If 1 ms are too much, how about 2000 ms?

 > There are three `format*` methods together with
 `extractDirectoryListings`, which do not depend on the actual object and
 should be made static.  As these `format*` plus `extractDirectoryListings`
 methods prepare the output, I really would like to see tests here.  This
 is not an empty exercise, but facilitates easier maintenance in future and
 enables review in first place.

 Agreed.

 This is on my list now. Will post a revised branch once I have one.
 (Thanks!)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22281 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prevent pattern of bugs caused by calling get_options() within options_validate() etc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22281: Prevent pattern of bugs caused by calling get_options() within
options_validate() etc
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-23  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Seems reasonable.  I've updated the `ticket22281` branch to try to be
 consistent across all the paths. I find that it has to exclude
 set_options() generally.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23461 [Core Tor/Tor]: test: Unit tests memleaks in nodelist/ed_id and hs_common/client_service_hsdir_set_sync

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23461: test: Unit tests memleaks in nodelist/ed_id and
hs_common/client_service_hsdir_set_sync
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  test-unit |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This has been merged upstream with commit
 `59072d20277fe6250d0e9b6cf90bf41a75ad651c`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23462 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit: Add a log_info() when marking a circuit for close.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23462: circuit: Add a log_info() when marking a circuit for close.
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 See branch: `ticket23462_032_01`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23464 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When I try to quit Tor browser alpha after I get the error "Tor exited during startup" and try to quit it nothing happens.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23464: When I try to quit Tor browser alpha after I get the error "Tor exited
during startup" and try to quit it nothing happens.
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 I tested this bug on macOS.

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[tor-bugs] #23464 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When I try to quit Tor browser alpha after I get the error "Tor exited during startup" and try to quit it nothing happens.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23464: When I try to quit Tor browser alpha after I get the error "Tor exited
during startup" and try to quit it nothing happens.
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Open Tor browser stable and then open tor browser alpha, when The alpha
 opens it says that another tor process is running, click the OK button.
 Then right click on Tor browser alpha icon and click quit. nothing
 happens. This occurs every time

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18163 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: Consensus health doesn't track direct connection timings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18163: Consensus health doesn't track direct connection timings
--+-
 Reporter:  micah |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  consensus, faravahar  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * cc: dgoulet (removed)
 * owner:  (none) => tom
 * component:  Core Tor/DirAuth => Metrics/Consensus Health


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20896 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: Remove 0.2.9.4-alpha as a recommended version due to stale consensus bug?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20896: Remove 0.2.9.4-alpha as a recommended version due to stale consensus 
bug?
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21327 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: remove versions vulnerable to TROVE-2017-001 from "recommended versions"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21327: remove versions vulnerable to TROVE-2017-001 from "recommended versions"
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22378 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: remove 0.3.1.1-alpha from Recommended versions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22378: remove 0.3.1.1-alpha from Recommended versions
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Been removed for a while.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22430 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add next gen HS support to chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22430: Add next gen HS support to chutney
+-
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs prop224 chutney  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor|Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


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[tor-bugs] #23463 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Javascript based clocks can tick backwards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23463: Javascript based clocks can tick backwards
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  time javascript
  |  clock
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 In Tor Browser, pages with a clock or timer sometimes appear to count
 backwards, which can cause problems. Firefox does not have the same
 behavior. I suspect this is caused by patches to reduce timer precision.
 Please provide a pref or way to disable this behavior and obtain
 monotonically increasing time with full precision.

 I understand the original reasons for the patch(es) in question, but the
 reduced precision is not good for all purposes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22772 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: lets remove tor versions vulnerable to TROVE-2017-006 from recommended versions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22772: lets remove tor versions vulnerable to TROVE-2017-006 from recommended
versions
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This has been done few weeks ago.

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[tor-bugs] #23462 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit: Add a log_info() when marking a circuit for close.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23462: circuit: Add a log_info() when marking a circuit for close.
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 This doesn't happened too often and would be extremely useful to be able
 to track a circuit id from its creation and closing in the info logs.

 Basically adding it in `circuit_mark_for_close_()` with its reason value,
 file and line.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23383 [Metrics/Website]: Apply Tor style guide to redesigned Tor Metrics website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23383: Apply Tor style guide to redesigned Tor Metrics website
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 antonela, sorry for bothering you yet once more, but I'm not sure how I'd
 use the versions without padding that you made. Do you mind making a
 white-on-purple version with roughly half as much padding as previously?
 Like [https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/23383
 /tor-metrics-vertical-purple-250.png attached this one], but based on a
 version with much higher resolution or based on an SVG and then scaled
 down to the five resolutions listed above (310^2^, 196^2^, 152^2^, 150^2^,
 70^2^)?

 Oh, and here's another ask: Can you also make a new `widetile.png` with
 resolution 310 x 150 which probably uses the horizontal logo and text that
 we also put on the website? (Turns out I totally forgot this format
 earlier, but we'll need it, too.)

 Thanks so much!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23031 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: lets remove tor versions 0.2.[467] from 'recommended version' after their EOL date (2017-08-01)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23031: lets remove tor versions 0.2.[467] from 'recommended version' after 
their
EOL date (2017-08-01)
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Done.

 Current set of versions:

 {{{
 client-versions 0.2.5.14, 0.2.8.14, 0.2.9.11, 0.3.0.9, 0.3.0.10,
 0.3.1.5-alpha, 0.3.1.6-rc
 server-versions 0.2.5.14, 0.2.8.14, 0.2.9.11, 0.3.0.9, 0.3.0.10,
 0.3.1.5-alpha, 0.3.1.6-rc
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23038 [- Select a component]: Failure to install via my mirror/ISP???

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23038: Failure to install via my mirror/ISP???
--+---
 Reporter:  Birdclaw  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23079 [Core Tor/Tor]: Support 80-bit Onion Model In Perpetuity

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23079: Support 80-bit Onion Model In Perpetuity
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:   => tor-hs
 * component:  Core Tor => Core Tor/Tor


Comment:

 As nickm stated, it will be a while before legacy onion service stop
 working.

 But, chances are VERY SLIM to maintain it forever.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23333 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Leekspin bug hunting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#2: Leekspin bug hunting
--+--
 Reporter:  Samdney   |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * owner:  (none) => isis
 * component:  - Select a component => Obfuscation/BridgeDB


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23334 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: BridgeDB bug hunting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23334: BridgeDB bug hunting
--+--
 Reporter:  Samdney   |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * owner:  (none) => isis
 * component:  - Select a component => Obfuscation/BridgeDB


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23374 [Core Tor/Tor]: Circuit dirtiness is inconsistant with MaxCircuitDirtiness

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23374: Circuit dirtiness is inconsistant with MaxCircuitDirtiness
--+
 Reporter:  Jaym  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>
 * component:  Core Tor => Core Tor/Tor
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23388 [Applications/Tor Browser]: [Tor] GUI loaded only half

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23388: [Tor] GUI loaded only half
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 Maybe provide more information here like what "GUI" and what version of
 tor and what OS and ... ?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23398 [Core Tor/Tor]: My relay Consensus Weight went from around 11000 to 20

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23398: My relay Consensus Weight went from around 11000 to 20
---+-
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 Relay is down from ~6 days ago so not sure here. Maybe come in #tor on IRC
 or tor-relays@ mailing list for help.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23418 [- Select a component]: orweb/tor not recognised

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23418: orweb/tor not recognised
--+---
 Reporter:  flufflepuff   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 I would start with https://guardianproject.info/apps/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23440 [Core Tor/Tor]: Enhancement: Replace CookieAuthFileGroupReadable option with flag for CookieAuthFile

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23440: Enhancement: Replace CookieAuthFileGroupReadable option with flag for
CookieAuthFile
--+
 Reporter:  Ralph |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.10
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23434 [Core Tor/DirAuth]: Review bridgeauth glue/admin scripts and make as much public as possible

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23434: Review bridgeauth glue/admin scripts and make as much public as possible
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/DirAuth  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgeauth|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * component:  Core Tor/Tor => Core Tor/DirAuth


Comment:

 There is a DirAuth component ;).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23441 [Core Tor/Tor]: make test: fgets_eagain FAILED

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23441: make test: fgets_eagain FAILED
---+
 Reporter:  svengo |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.10
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  portability tor-tests  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10969 [Core Tor/Tor]: Set of guard nodes can act as a linkability fingerprint

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10969: Set of guard nodes can act as a linkability fingerprint
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-guard, XKEYSCORE,|  Actual Points:
  prop259, SponsorU-deferred, QUICKANT   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  large
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  tor-client, tor-guard, XKEYSCORE, prop259, SponsorU-deferred
 => tor-client, tor-guard, XKEYSCORE, prop259, SponsorU-deferred,
 QUICKANT


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23445 [Core Tor/Tor]: dir-spec: "protocols" line has been remove (past not future)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23445: dir-spec: "protocols" line has been remove (past not future)
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21454 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor_version_compare and version spec comparison order are inconsistent

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21454: tor_version_compare and version spec comparison order are inconsistent
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21449| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => Low
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23460 [HTTPS Everywhere/HTTPS Everywhere: Chrome]: Webpages on www.wunderground.com load incorrectly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23460: Webpages on www.wunderground.com load incorrectly
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  jsha
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/HTTPS Everywhere:   |Version:
  Chrome |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * owner:  (none) => jsha
 * component:  HTTPS Everywhere => HTTPS Everywhere/HTTPS Everywhere: Chrome


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23458 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Check if the pic-executable flag and setting the entry point can force mingw's ld to keep the reloc section

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23458: Check if the pic-executable flag and setting the entry point can force
mingw's ld to keep the reloc section
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 These flags are for .exe only (not .dll).
 `--pic-executable` is a long name of `-pie`.
 Your binutils patch could be replaced with `-q` (if it works on Windows).

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[tor-bugs] #23460 [HTTPS Everywhere]: Webpages on www.wunderground.com load incorrectly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23460: Webpages on www.wunderground.com load incorrectly
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 The Weather Underground site pages simply do not load correctly. The
 format gets completely skewed & some sub-pages won't load at all. i'm not
 sure if HTTPS Everywhere causes the problem though it does note
 parenthetically in the rules menu that the site is "buggy." i never had a
 problem loading this site's pages before i installed https everywhere. i'm
 not a coder so i don't have a clue how to fix it.
 Thanks in advance if you can figure anything out--or offer a way to
 disable https everywhere for specific sites where it causes problems. i'm
 running chromium browser on the ubuntu linux platform.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23232 [Core Tor/Tor]: misleading log message related to used SSL vendor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23232: misleading log message related to used SSL vendor
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.5-alpha
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by yawning):

 > Why should LibreSSL include more than one ECDH implementation?

 Ask the LibreSSL developers that question, they ship several.

 As far as I can tell, if the  tor warning message is getting displayed on
 a LibreSSL system, the library isn't using any of the fast EC
 implementations that are present in the source tree (agl's or
 Gueron/Krasnov's).

 https://github.com/libressl-
 portable/openbsd/tree/master/src/lib/libcrypto/ec

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