Re: [tor-bugs] #23541 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: OpenStreetMap.org-tiles not visible on some websites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23541: OpenStreetMap.org-tiles not visible on some websites
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  jsha
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  httpse-ruleset-bug |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 http://punatraffic.com/ is another page broken by the openstreetmap rule.
 It appears to be causing CORS errors.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23663 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ESR52 codebase is incompatible with anything below Universal C Runtime (CRT) in Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23663: ESR52 codebase is incompatible with anything below Universal C Runtime
(CRT) in Windows
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:6 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [comment:5 gk]:
 > > Replying to [comment:4 cypherpunks]:
 > > > Don't you see that Jacek's patch activated compat shims for mingw?
 They were removed later as useless for UCRT (but needed for <=
 `msvcr120.dll`!).
 > >
 > > Oh, okay. You are just concerned about https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 central/rev/5680a55b2ec1?
 > Of course, no.
 > > I thought about cases in the other patches as well as you posted them
 in the description. But as I said they are guarded by `_MSC_VER` defines
 which are not used by mingw-w64 anyway.
 > But they should have been adapted to mingw where it's about CRT bugs.

 Why? Removing those patches does not change anything with respect to
 mingw-w64. Those code parts did not get used for it before code removal
 either.

 > > So it seems
 > > {{{
 > > -if CONFIG['OS_ARCH'] == 'WINNT':
 > > -SOURCES += [
 > > -'../compat/strtod.c'
 > > }}}
 > > is the thing that is bothering you. Back then this got introduced to
 fix compilation with mingw-w64. But that's not an issue anymore without
 this particular code.
 > They, probably, don't use CRT then.
 > > So, what exactly is the problem with that removal for our mingw-w64
 builds as they are building fine now?
 > Building fine, but working?

 What is not working due to those code changes?

 > > And could you point to the security problematic that you think is
 obvious with removing those three code lines? (the one you mentioned in
 comment:2 does not seem to be it)
 > No, the security problematic is that ESR52 was never tested with
 anything below UCRT and in general:

 It was, we shipped alpha releases before we switched Tor Browser stable
 users to ESR 52.

 > > It makes it very expensive for us to fix bugs in already-released
 versions of the libraries because we are no longer actively working in the
 codebases for those versions, so fixes must be individually backported and
 tested. The result is that we usually fix only serious security
 vulnerabilities in old versions of the libraries. Other bugs are generally
 fixed only for the next major version. (M$)

 Where is this quote from?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22501 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Requests via javascript: violate FPI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22501: Requests via javascript: violate FPI
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: ma1 (added)
 * status:  assigned => needs_information
 * keywords:  tbb-linkability => tbb-linkability, noscript


Comment:

 Thanks for tracking this down. Giorgio: could you have a look at that one?
 I guess the intended behavior is: *if* we need to issue a request due to
 clicking on a `javascript:` link then it should adhere to our first-party
 isolation. That probably means NoScript itself should not issue that
 request as this is treated as a browser internal request which gets put
 onto the catch-all circuit (due to lack of URL bar domain information).

 Does that make sense to you, Giorgio?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22501 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Requests via javascript: violate FPI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22501: Requests via javascript: violate FPI
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by ma1):

 It's the "Attempt to fix Javascript links" ('''noscript.fixLinks''' in
 ''!about:config'') feature.

 Do you need me to modify the HEAD XHR preflight request in order to fit
 into your navigation restrictions, or to omit it outright? Or would it be
 better for you to just flip the preference?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21222 [Webpages/Website]: Redesigning torproject.org: cleanup and update, content organization, and creating themed portals

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21222: Redesigning torproject.org: cleanup and update, content organization, 
and
creating themed portals
--+--
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:15 Pari]:
 > Hey! I am an applicant for outreachy who is a user experience designer.
 I would love to take this up! would it be okay?

 Have a look at #22077 ;)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23671 [Core Tor/Tor]: Say how many other nodes we're missing descriptors for

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23671: Say how many other nodes we're missing descriptors for
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21969 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by asn):

 +1 +1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22501 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Requests via javascript: violate FPI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22501: Requests via javascript: violate FPI
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => assigned


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:9 ma1]:
 > It's the "Attempt to fix Javascript links" ('''noscript.fixLinks''' in
 ''!about:config'') feature.
 >
 > Do you need me to modify the HEAD XHR preflight request in order to fit
 into your navigation restrictions, or to omit it outright? Or would it be
 better for you to just flip the preference?

 It seems to me flipping the preference might not be that bad. Richard: can
 you take a look whether that could be a viable way for solving our issue
 (without introducing other unintended ones)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23670 [Core Tor/Tor]: Say how many primary entry guards we're missing descriptors for

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23670: Say how many primary entry guards we're missing descriptors for
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21969 | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by asn):

 +1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23016 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Print to File" does not create the expected file in non-English locales

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23016: "Print to File" does not create the expected file in non-English locales
-+-
 Reporter:  intrigeri|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by intrigeri):

 This feels like basic functionality to me, but I understand that the TBB
 team has probably higher priority items on their plate. Fine :)

 Any hint you folks can share, in case I want to look deeper myself?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23653 [Core Tor/Tor]: When accessing onion service with no fetchable descriptor, Tor sits around until timeout rather than hanging up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23653: When accessing onion service with no fetchable descriptor, Tor sits 
around
until timeout rather than hanging up
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression backport?  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by asn):

 I think this approach makes sense for v3.

 I pushed my own `bug23653_032_01` with an added fixup which does:
 - Fixes a comment typo.
 - Renames `close_all_conn_wait_desc()` since it was not only doing that
 (it was also cleaning up the HSDir request cache)
 - Made it clean the HSDir request cache even if we don't kill any SOCKS
 connections, because you never know, and we always want to be able to
 retry if the application-layer asks us to.

 BTW the branch now will also fix this for v2, and leave #15937 open. I'm
 fine with this. Maybe we can open a ticket about fixing #15937 for v2
 properly?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23016 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Print to File" does not create the expected file in non-English locales

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23016: "Print to File" does not create the expected file in non-English locales
-+-
 Reporter:  intrigeri|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  regression, tbb-e10s   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression => AffectsTails,
 tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-regression, tbb-e10s
 * status:  new => needs_information
 * cc: pospeselr (added)


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 intrigeri]:
 > This feels like basic functionality to me, but I understand that the TBB
 team has probably higher priority items on their plate. Fine :)

 Indeed we have a sponsor deadline in a couple of weeks and most of us are
 picking items so we meet that one.

 > Any hint you folks can share, in case I want to look deeper myself?

 Are you sure this is a non-en-US-issue? It seems that printing to a file
 does not work with en-US bundles either for me on Linux. That said does it
 start working if you disable multiprocess mode by flipping
 `browser.tabs.remote.autostart.2`? (It does for me)

 Given that it seems to be a multiprocess issue then this might be a good
 ticket for Richard to work on to get more familiar with another important
 browser concept and related bugs/issues. (And he is not as bound to the
 sponsor deadline as other folks from the team)

 Richard: Do you think you could put that one onto your plate?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23653 [Core Tor/Tor]: When accessing onion service with no fetchable descriptor, Tor sits around until timeout rather than hanging up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23653: When accessing onion service with no fetchable descriptor, Tor sits 
around
until timeout rather than hanging up
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression backport?  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 We will also need a changes file.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21528 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser freezes when I click on button

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21528: Tor Browser freezes when I click on button
-+--
 Reporter:  Sevemiyen|  Owner:  ma1
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website, noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * owner:  tbb-team => ma1


Comment:

 ping

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21528 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser freezes when I click on button

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21528: Tor Browser freezes when I click on button
-+--
 Reporter:  Sevemiyen|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website, noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: ma1 (added)
 * owner:  ma1 => tbb-team


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23493 [Core Tor/Tor]: IPv6 v3 Single Onion Services fail with a bug warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23493: IPv6 v3 Single Onion Services fail with a bug warning
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6  |  Actual Points:  0.7
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Sorry for the slow responses here. We've been very busy with testing and
 bugfixing. Here are some thoughts:

 My main concerns with the current patch is that it's a bit brutal.
 Ideally, I'd like SoS to be a beautiful feature with a well designed
 interface and very specific call-sites around the codebase. I don't think
 that's the case currently. I'm afraid that we started developing the
 prop224 SoS feature too late in 0.3.2 and we don't have enough time to
 make it nice and well-tested. I personally take the blame here as well,
 since we added the SoS feature in the first place, when IMO we should have
 waited till we have the time to actually design it properly.

 Anyhow, right now I mainly dislike the `hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()`
 changes and the fact that we have no tests for the new features/bugfixes:

 - I '''really''' don't like the patch to
 `hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()`. It's already a hard to digest
 function, and it becomes even harder. I have trouble even understanding
 the function documentation, with so many cases and IPv6 interactions with
 the SoS feature.

 - Furthermore, on `hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()` I don't like any of
 the added `direct_conn` stuff. `direct_conn_inout` is a variable that
 carries a value and also gets overwritten by the func? That's a new
 interface for Tor I think and it seems like a bad idea. Especially since
 it gets used and written all over the function.

   Ideally I'd like 2-3 SoS-specific functions that do SoS-specific stuff
 only when needed and they are clearly labeled as such. I don't want any
 direct_conn stuff casually laying around the codebase.

 - Case in point:
 {{{
 +
 +  if (ei == NULL && direct_conn) {
 +/* Try again as an indirect connection */
 +direct_conn = 0;
 +ei = get_extend_info_from_intro_point(ip, direct_conn);
 +  }
 +
if (ei == NULL) {
 -if (!direct_conn) {
  /* In case of a multi-hop connection, it should never happen that
 we
   * can't get the extend info from the node. Avoid connection and
   * remove intro point from descriptor in order to recover from
 this
   * potential bug. */
  tor_assert_nonfatal(ei);
 -}
 }}}

   The block of code added is quite confusing to someone who is not an
 expert with the SoS feature. IMO, the "retry with 3-hops" SoS logic should
 be well-documented and abstracted in an SoS-function and not just a `Try
 again as an indirect connection` comment in the middle of that func.

   Also, why was the `if (!direct_conn)` block removed, but not the
 comment? Are we sure it's a multi-hop connection at that point? If yes,
 let's add an assert or sth.

 I'm not sure what to suggest here, since fixing the interface issues above
 and writing unittests is not an easy task.

 Here are a few options:

 a) We merge teor's patch now and hope that nothing breaks (ideally with
 some improvements to the issues above). We then address the added
 technical debt in 0.3.3 with a proper refactoring of the SoS feature.

 b) We don't merge teor's patch right now , and keep things simple with
 less code added during the bugfix period. We also add a log message when
 SoS+prop224 is enabled to say that this feature is super experimental.

 c) We rip out SoS entirely from prop224 codebase, and implement it
 properly in 0.3.3 .

 I'm personally leaning towards (a) right now, especially if teor helps us
 address the technical issues pointed out above, and with
 maintaining/debugging the added features. Otherwise we could go with the
 (b) or (c) direction.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709R => TorBrowserTeam201709


Comment:

 There is no such define available. I guess you could check for the
 existence of `TOR_BROWSER_VERSION` to make sure the replacement code only
 kicks in in the Tor Browser case. However, I think we could just make sure
 an empty string is returned unconditionally right now and ask Mozilla what
 changes they would like to see to get the patch upstreamed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16678 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Enhance KeyboardEvent fingerprinting protection for unusual characters

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16678: Enhance KeyboardEvent fingerprinting protection for unusual characters
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201709R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, TorBrowserTeam201709 => tbb-
 fingerprinting, TorBrowserTeam201709R


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23646 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Undefined References to Panning functions (for Tom Ritter)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23646: Undefined References to Panning functions (for Tom Ritter)
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Hrm, does this notify Tom?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23493 [Core Tor/Tor]: IPv6 v3 Single Onion Services fail with a bug warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23493: IPv6 v3 Single Onion Services fail with a bug warning
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6  |  Actual Points:  0.7
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Thanks for this comment asn and your great work teor.

 I do share these concerns as well. I'll also take blame here on adding
 half of a SoS feature while we were re-writing the entire HS subsystem, we
 shouldn't have done that as we see now that it is much more complicated in
 terms of interface, algorithm and integration.

 I've been silent in the last week about this because I've been thinking
 about it on what is best. My initial idea was to sit down at the Montreal
 meeting and discuss what would be best to go forward.

 I propose we do that in any case but in the meantime, I'm slightly tempted
 to actually go with (c) here so we do not go in the direction of
 accumulating technical debt that we are unhappy with in the hope of
 refactoring in a later version. It usually doesn't work that smoothly...
 The only thing we must be sure of is for a 032 client to be able to reach
 a SoS which it should by design because it doesn't behave differently in
 the case of a SoS or non-SoS service in theory.

 Then, in 033 we introduce the service functionality in a clean well
 discussed interface and for which we all agree about how to proceed with a
 SoS. The number of conditions to switch from one hop to 3 hop or v4 vs v6
 is not that simple, we should nail it down in a spec or doc before we do
 anything more. Sprinkling `direct_conn` in many places of the code
 honestly worries me and I would like us to take a step back and sit down
 together so we can all be on the same page.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23631 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Improve sudo need

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23631: Improve sudo need
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 I think an other option would be to use the `user namespace` (if
 available), which should allow us to create containers without requiring
 root access. I have not yet looked in details how to do that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23641 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Fake client auth lines do not actually provide obfuscation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23641: prop224: Fake client auth lines do not actually provide obfuscation
+
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224 tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [comment:3 asn]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 nickm]:
 > > One thing that these fake lines do hide is the _number_ of real auth-
 client lines?
 >
 > That's true. We should probably continue adding fake lines if auth is
 actually enabled.
 > But they offer nothing if auth is disabled.

 Is it really true for (a) here? We do padding by multiple of 10k bytes so
 if the normal descriptor is lets say 23k, it is padded to 30k. But if
 client auth is enabled, it could go to something like 32k thus 40k padded.

 If I don't have an onion address for that descriptor, I can still say that
 "oh this descriptor here as client auth" just because the size compared to
 the majority of them is different. Any descriptor diverging in size either
 has *many* IPs or/and client auth basically. Maybe that unknown is enough
 to justify not adding fake client, unsure.

 Thus, I kind of think having this concept of fake client for every
 descriptor is useful because it makes them "look all alike" in terms of
 size for observers who don't have the .onion.

 If you *do* have the .onion, the number of valid client will be obfuscated
 so I do see a gain for both situations?

 I do agree on the change of `T0N()` so we have more room for change.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22324 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow JS on `about:tabcrashed` on higher security levels

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22324: Allow JS on `about:tabcrashed` on higher security levels
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff52-esr, tbb-7.0-must,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201705R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * cc: cypherpunks (added)


Comment:

 Relevant noscript.net forum thread:
 https://forums.informaction.com/viewtopic.php?f=10&t=22131

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[tor-bugs] #23672 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: With multiple SOCKS connection to the same .onion, don't trigger a descriptor fetch for each connection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23672: hs-v3: With multiple SOCKS connection to the same .onion, don't trigger 
a
descriptor fetch for each connection
--+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-client, prop224
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 This comes out of #23653 for a v3 only fix because a patch for v2 requires
 more refactoring.

 We should only have one descriptor fetch at a time to an HSDir and not
 open one for each SOCKS connection. Because of how the client hsdir
 request cache works, you can't request the same .onion to the same HSDir
 inside a 15 minutes time frame (woa that is big). Thus, if we open 6 SOCKS
 requests and they all trigger a fetch, all HSDir are put in the cache and
 we can't query any of them while they are opened or until an error
 happened or until we can ultimately connect to the service.

 Thus comes a bug where the 7th SOCKS connection (opened rapidly after the
 6) will always fail because no HSDir can be used (#15937)

 What we should do:

 1. At each SOCKS connection, check if we have a pending directory fetch
 for the .onion and if so, wait on it.

 2. On a fetch internal error, not allowed because of
 `FetchHidServDescriptors 0` or no more HSDir are usable, close all pending
 SOCKS connections instead of making them timeout (#23653).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23653 [Core Tor/Tor]: When accessing onion service with no fetchable descriptor, Tor sits around until timeout rather than hanging up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23653: When accessing onion service with no fetchable descriptor, Tor sits 
around
until timeout rather than hanging up
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression backport?  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => new
 * reviewer:  asn =>


Comment:

 Ok thanks asn! Moving the v3 fix to #23672 and let's leave this ticket for
 v2 only now.

 I think the bottom line for the v2 fix is do the same as #23672 which
 would require a slight refactoring for v2.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23672 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: With multiple SOCKS connection to the same .onion, don't trigger a descriptor fetch for each connection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23672: hs-v3: With multiple SOCKS connection to the same .onion, don't trigger 
a
descriptor fetch for each connection
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-client, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 See branch: `bug23672_032_01`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23653 [Core Tor/Tor]: When accessing onion service with no fetchable descriptor, Tor sits around until timeout rather than hanging up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23653: When accessing onion service with no fetchable descriptor, Tor sits 
around
until timeout rather than hanging up
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression backport? tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  regression backport? => regression backport? tor-hs


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_information
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorU
---+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Wow! Tor-client failed for the first time since 2014 for me! Without any
 reason! Up-time was over 5 days. Unmodified TBB is the same as in #23620
 (probably, duplicate), but on Windows. Normal browsing was halted
 suddenly, and the logs were the same as in comment:36, starting from
 `[notice] {DIR}`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23672 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs-v3: With multiple SOCKS connection to the same .onion, don't trigger a descriptor fetch for each connection

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23672: hs-v3: With multiple SOCKS connection to the same .onion, don't trigger 
a
descriptor fetch for each connection
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-client, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good to me! This should fix the v3 side of #23653.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21969 [Core Tor/Tor]: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21969: We're missing descriptors for some of our primary entry guards
---+---
 Reporter:  asn|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_information
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1.5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorU
---+---
Changes (by asn):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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[tor-bugs] #23673 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Trac and mod_wsgi errors in apache

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23673: Trac and mod_wsgi errors in apache
--+-
 Reporter:  hiro  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 I have been seing a wsgi error in apache triggering from trac:

 {{{
 mod_wsgi (pid=23506): Exception occurred processing WSGI script
 '/srv/trac.torproject.org/wsgi/trac.wsgi'.
 Traceback (most recent call last):
 File "/srv/trac.torproject.org/wsgi/trac.wsgi", line 9, in application
 return trac.web.main.dispatch_request(environ, start_response)
 File "/usr/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/trac/web/main.py", line 581, in
 dispatch_request
 return _dispatch_request(req, env, env_error)
 File "/usr/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/trac/web/main.py", line 620, in
 _dispatch_request
 send_internal_error(env, req, sys.exc_info())
 File "/usr/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/trac/web/main.py", line 751, in
 send_internal_error
 req.send_error(exc_info, status=500, env=env, data=data)
 File "/usr/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/trac/web/api.py", line 732, in
 send_error
  exc_info)
 File "/usr/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/trac/web/main.py", line 613, in
 _dispatch_request
 dispatcher.dispatch(req)
 File "/usr/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/trac/web/main.py", line 253, in
 dispatch
 resp = chosen_handler.process_request(req)
 File "/usr/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/trac/ticket/query.py", line 994, in
 process_request
 format, filename=filename)
 File "/usr/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/trac/mimeview/api.py", line 1066,
 in send_converted
 req.write(content)
 File "/usr/lib/python2.7/dist-packages/trac/web/api.py", line 833, in
 write
 self._write(''.join(buf))
 IOError: Apache/mod_wsgi failed to write response data: Broken pipe
 }}}

 Investigating this as a trac error but it could be also a mod_wsgi problem
 in apache.

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[tor-bugs] #23674 [- Select a component]: Symbolic link not allowed error in apache/trac

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23674: Symbolic link not allowed error in apache/trac
--+
 Reporter:  hiro  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 {{{
 AH00037: Symbolic link not allowed or link target not accessible:
 /srv/trac.torproject.org/htdocs/edit_toolbar.png, referer:
 https://trac.torproject.org/tor.css
 }}}
 This might be a reference error in tor.css.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23674 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Symbolic link not allowed error in apache/trac

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23674: Symbolic link not allowed error in apache/trac
--+--
 Reporter:  hiro  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by hiro):

 * owner:  (none) => hiro
 * status:  new => assigned
 * component:  - Select a component => Internal Services/Service - trac


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16936 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Circuit display should show original circuit for each tab

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16936: Circuit display should show original circuit for each tab
+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-circuit-display  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 It looks like a nonsense. Why do we need the original circuit instead of
 the current one for the first party?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12990 [Core Tor/Tor]: route certificate errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12990: route certificate errors
--+--
 Reporter:  saint |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * owner:  tbb-team => (none)
 * keywords:  certificate => tor-client
 * status:  new => assigned
 * component:  Applications/Tor Browser => Core Tor/Tor
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20805 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Circuit display does not honor or use the UI font.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20805: Circuit display does not honor or use the UI font.
--+--
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-circuit-display  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  ux, tbb-circuit-display => ux-team, tbb-circuit-display
 * severity:  Normal => Minor


Comment:

 And not only font.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19335 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor circuit display shows example circuit instead of real (was: Tor circuit not displayed)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19335: Tor circuit display shows example circuit instead of real
-+-
 Reporter:  axdoomer |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-circuit-display, tbb-6.0-issues  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23662 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Service edge-case where it re-uploads descriptor with same rev counter

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23662: prop224: Service edge-case where it re-uploads descriptor with same rev
counter
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 See branch: `ticket23662_032_01`

 First commit is a big refactoring of `connection_ap_expire_beginning()` so
 we can make sense out of it and introduce a function that checks if we
 should retry the connection on timeout.

 Second commit adds a callback in the HS subsystem for any directory
 connection linked to the AP one that has timed out so the retry can be
 handled properly.

 This whole thing might be over the top but if we think it is a good idea,
 lets put it back in `needs_revision` so I can add a unit test for
 `connection_ap_expire_beginning()` for which none exists right now. If
 that is too much for 032, I can try to do a minimal change but at the cost
 of technical debt of course :).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23646 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Undefined References to Panning functions (for Tom Ritter)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23646: Undefined References to Panning functions (for Tom Ritter)
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by tom):

 It does, sorry I missed the detail in this ticket the other day.  Thanks
 for showing me the root cause!

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[tor-bugs] #23675 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Trigger deletion of associated OTR keys when account is deleted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23675: Trigger deletion of associated OTR keys when account is deleted
+
 Reporter:  sukhbir |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+
 Create an account for which OTR is configured and the keys are generated
 in the background automatically.

 On removing the account, the keys not shown in the `OTR Preferences` menu
 but are still present in the `otr.private_key` file.

 We should make sure that when an account is deleted, all OTR-related
 information for that account is cleared as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23675 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Trigger deletion of associated OTR keys when account is deleted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23675: Trigger deletion of associated OTR keys when account is deleted
+
 Reporter:  sukhbir |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Description changed by sukhbir:

Old description:

> Create an account for which OTR is configured and the keys are generated
> in the background automatically.
>
> On removing the account, the keys not shown in the `OTR Preferences` menu
> but are still present in the `otr.private_key` file.
>
> We should make sure that when an account is deleted, all OTR-related
> information for that account is cleared as well.

New description:

 Create an account for which OTR is configured and the keys are generated
 in the background automatically.

 On removing the account, the keys are not shown in the `OTR Preferences`
 menu but are still present in the `otr.private_key` file.

 We should make sure that when an account is deleted, all OTR-related
 information for that account is cleared as well.

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23646 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Undefined References to Panning functions (for Tom Ritter)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23646: Undefined References to Panning functions (for Tom Ritter)
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Just for clarification, what comment does (first/second)? Or both?
 So, does adding `extern "C"` (`extern "C" BeginPanningFeedback(hWnd)`,
 etc) fix the problem?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23675 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Trigger deletion of associated OTR keys when account is deleted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23675: Trigger deletion of associated OTR keys when account is deleted
+
 Reporter:  sukhbir |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by arlolra):

 Relatedly, https://github.com/arlolra/ctypes-otr/issues/47

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23016 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Print to File" does not create the expected file in non-English locales

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23016: "Print to File" does not create the expected file in non-English locales
-+-
 Reporter:  intrigeri|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  regression, tbb-e10s   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Yeah sure!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23016 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Print to File" does not create the expected file in non-English locales

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23016: "Print to File" does not create the expected file in non-English locales
-+-
 Reporter:  intrigeri|  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  regression, tbb-e10s   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * owner:  tbb-team => pospeselr
 * status:  needs_information => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23016 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Print to File" does not create the expected file in non-English locales

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23016: "Print to File" does not create the expected file in non-English locales
-+-
 Reporter:  intrigeri|  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  regression, tbb-e10s   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: mcs (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22501 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Requests via javascript: violate FPI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22501: Requests via javascript: violate FPI
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by pospeselr):

 So the noscript.fixLinks will disable the custom onclick handler (which is
 what does the above described behaviour) but also disables a custom
 onchange handler (for select and option elements).

 However, for Tor Browser that's a good thing, as it has a similar feature
 whereby it will automatically try to navigate to a selected option if it
 looks like a URL (the threshold for 'looks like a URL' is even lower
 though: value contains '/' or '.' and does not contain '@').  This URL
 will try to be navigated through the same code-path, so would have the
 same browser internal request gk mentioned.

 Updating TorButton to set turn off the noscript.fixLinks option should
 work, will have a patch up in a bit.

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[tor-bugs] #23676 [Core Tor/Tor]: relay running 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev wedged: kist bug?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23676: relay running 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev wedged: kist bug?
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 moria1 running "0.3.2.1-alpha-dev (git-a1f31c0671c82f95)" last wrote to
 its info-level log this morning at 05:15:
 {{{
 Sep 27 05:15:09.482 [info] connection_close_immediate(): fd 334, type OR,
 state open, 146672 bytes on outbuf.
 }}}

 That was 9 hours ago.

 The process is still alive, and it's using 100% cpu.

 I did a gdb attach, and it looks like it is doing...stuff. Here are three
 snapshots:
 {{{
 #0  channel_flush_some_cells (chan=0x7f2e04c84c80, num_cells=1)
 at src/or/channel.c:2355
 #1  0x7f2df60bd915 in kist_scheduler_run () at
 src/or/scheduler_kist.c:589
 #2  0x7f2df60bb7e2 in scheduler_evt_callback (fd=,·
 events=, arg=)
 at src/or/scheduler.c:215
 #3  0x7f2df6201040 in event_process_active_single_queue ()
 #4  0x7f2df6201610 in event_process_active ()
 #5  0x7f2df6201d74 in event_base_loop ()
 #6  0x7f2df60530dd in run_main_loop_once () at src/or/main.c:2631
 #7  run_main_loop_until_done () at src/or/main.c:2685
 #8  do_main_loop () at src/or/main.c:2598
 #9  0x7f2df605421d in tor_main (argc=,·
 argv=) at src/or/main.c:3780
 #10 0x7f2df604fd99 in main (argc=,·
 argv=) at src/or/tor_main.c:34
 }}}

 {{{
 #0  channel_more_to_flush (chan=0x7f2e04c84c80) at src/or/channel.c:2609
 #1  0x7f2df60bd868 in kist_scheduler_run () at
 src/or/scheduler_kist.c:600
 #2  0x7f2df60bb7e2 in scheduler_evt_callback (fd=,·
 events=, arg=)
 at src/or/scheduler.c:215
 #3  0x7f2df6201040 in event_process_active_single_queue ()
 #4  0x7f2df6201610 in event_process_active ()
 #5  0x7f2df6201d74 in event_base_loop ()
 #6  0x7f2df60530dd in run_main_loop_once () at src/or/main.c:2631
 #7  run_main_loop_until_done () at src/or/main.c:2685
 #8  do_main_loop () at src/or/main.c:2598
 #9  0x7f2df605421d in tor_main (argc=,·
 argv=) at src/or/main.c:3780
 #10 0x7f2df604fd99 in main (argc=,·
 argv=) at src/or/tor_main.c:34
 }}}

 {{{
 #0  0x7f2df60bd42e in socket_table_s_HT_FIND_P_ (
 chan=, table=0x7f2df64f0ee0)
 at src/or/scheduler_kist.c:50
 #1  socket_table_s_HT_FIND (chan=,
 table=0x7f2df64f0ee0)
 at src/or/scheduler_kist.c:51
 #2  socket_table_search (chan=, table=0x7f2df64f0ee0)
 at src/or/scheduler_kist.c:168
 #3  0x7f2df60bd4a9 in socket_can_write (chan=,
 table=0x7f2df64f0ee0) at src/or/scheduler_kist.c:372
 #4  0x7f2df60bd968 in kist_scheduler_run () at
 src/or/scheduler_kist.c:630
 #5  0x7f2df60bb7e2 in scheduler_evt_callback (fd=,
 events=, arg=)
 at src/or/scheduler.c:215
 #6  0x7f2df6201040 in event_process_active_single_queue ()
 #7  0x7f2df6201610 in event_process_active ()
 #8  0x7f2df6201d74 in event_base_loop ()
 #9  0x7f2df60530dd in run_main_loop_once () at src/or/main.c:2631
 #10 run_main_loop_until_done () at src/or/main.c:2685
 #11 do_main_loop () at src/or/main.c:2598
 #12 0x7f2df605421d in tor_main (argc=,
 argv=) at src/or/main.c:3780
 #13 0x7f2df604fd99 in main (argc=,
 argv=) at src/or/tor_main.c:34
 }}}

 David suggested that I try {{{strace -f -p PID -o /tmp/strace.log}}}, and
 I ran it for 30 seconds or so, and it produced this file:
 {{{
 13376 futex(0x7f2dff2de65c, FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE, 755787, NULL 
 13375 futex(0x7f2dff2de65c, FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE, 755787, NULL 
 13374 futex(0x7f2dff2de65c, FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE, 755787, NULL 
 13373 futex(0x7f2dff2de65c, FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE, 755787, NULL 
 13372 futex(0x7f2dff2de65c, FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE, 755787, NULL 
 13371 futex(0x7f2dff2de65c, FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE, 755787, NULL 
 13370 futex(0x7f2dff2de65c, FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE, 755787, NULL 
 13369 futex(0x7f2dff2de65c, FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE, 755787, NULL 
 13368 futex(0x7f2dff2de65c, FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE, 755787, NULL 
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23676 [Core Tor/Tor]: relay running 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev wedged: kist bug?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23676: relay running 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev wedged: kist bug?
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 {{{
 (gdb) break scheduler_kist.c:589
 Breakpoint 1 at 0x7f2df60bd908: file src/or/scheduler_kist.c, line 589.
 (gdb) continue
 Continuing.

 Breakpoint 1, kist_scheduler_run () at src/or/scheduler_kist.c:589
 589   flush_result = (int)channel_flush_some_cells(chan, 1); // 1
 for num cells
 (gdb) next
 591   if (flush_result > 0) {
 (gdb) print flush_result
 $1 = 0
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23016 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Print to File" does not create the expected file in non-English locales

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23016: "Print to File" does not create the expected file in non-English locales
-+-
 Reporter:  intrigeri|  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  regression, tbb-e10s   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23676 [Core Tor/Tor]: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush a conn that's closed (was: relay running 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev wedged: kist bug?)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23676: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush 
a
conn that's closed
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22501 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Requests via javascript: violate FPI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22501: Requests via javascript: violate FPI
---+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "22501-pospeselr0.patch" added.

 disables NoScript's fixLinks feature

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22501 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Requests via javascript: violate FPI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22501: Requests via javascript: violate FPI
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, noscript,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201709R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * keywords:  tbb-linkability, noscript => tbb-linkability, noscript,
 TorBrowserTeam201709R


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23676 [Core Tor/Tor]: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush a conn that's closed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23676: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush 
a
conn that's closed
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 {{{
 (gdb) break channel_flush_some_cells
 Breakpoint 1 at 0x7f2df60cbd60: file src/or/channel.c, line 2347.
 (gdb) continue
 Continuing.

 Breakpoint 1, channel_flush_some_cells (chan=0x7f2e04c84c80, num_cells=1)
 at src/or/channel.c:2347
 2347{
 (gdb) print chan->state
 $1 = CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23676 [Core Tor/Tor]: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush a conn that's closed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23676: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush 
a
conn that's closed
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, cpu  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => regression, cpu
 * cc: pastly, dgoulet (added)
 * priority:  Medium => High


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23676 [Core Tor/Tor]: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush a conn that's closed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23676: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush 
a
conn that's closed
+--
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, cpu, tor-sched  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * cc: dgoulet (removed)
 * keywords:  regression, cpu => regression, cpu, tor-sched


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[tor-bugs] #23677 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should log what it thinks the time is sometime(s)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23677: Tor should log what it thinks the time is sometime(s)
--+
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Many issues come from incorrect time/date/timezone settings. And not all
 the time does Tor log about how it believes the user's clock is wrong but
 X hours and Y minutes.

 For many linux/macos users we can ask them to tell us the output of `date
 -u` as a huge troubleshooting help. But not everyone is capable of that. A
 maybe shouldn't be expected to be.

 Two ideas:

 1. Log what Tor thinks the UTC time, local time, and configured timezone
 are at startup once

 2. Log periodically (say, every HeartbeatPeriod) what Tor thinks[... all
 the above ...]

 Bonus idea:

 Can we put the timezone in the log line's time stamp? Would that be
 enough? Is that dangerous for users? Do we make promises about parse-
 ability that we'd be breaking?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22501 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Requests via javascript: violate FPI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22501: Requests via javascript: violate FPI
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, noscript,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201709   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  tbb-linkability, noscript, TorBrowserTeam201709R => tbb-
 linkability, noscript, TorBrowserTeam201709
 * status:  assigned => needs_revision


Comment:

 No, that's for Security Slider options only.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23677 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should log what it thinks the time is sometime(s)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23677: Tor should log what it thinks the time is sometime(s)
--+
 Reporter:  pastly|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Description changed by pastly:

Old description:

> Many issues come from incorrect time/date/timezone settings. And not all
> the time does Tor log about how it believes the user's clock is wrong but
> X hours and Y minutes.
>
> For many linux/macos users we can ask them to tell us the output of `date
> -u` as a huge troubleshooting help. But not everyone is capable of that.
> A maybe shouldn't be expected to be.
>
> Two ideas:
>
> 1. Log what Tor thinks the UTC time, local time, and configured timezone
> are at startup once
>
> 2. Log periodically (say, every HeartbeatPeriod) what Tor thinks[... all
> the above ...]
>
> Bonus idea:
>
> Can we put the timezone in the log line's time stamp? Would that be
> enough? Is that dangerous for users? Do we make promises about parse-
> ability that we'd be breaking?

New description:

 Many issues come from incorrect time/date/timezone settings. And not all
 the time does Tor log about how it believes the user's clock is wrong by X
 hours and Y minutes.

 For many linux/macos users we can ask them to tell us the output of `date
 -u` as a huge troubleshooting help. But not everyone is capable of that. A
 maybe shouldn't be expected to be.

 Two ideas:

 1. Log what Tor thinks the UTC time, local time, and configured timezone
 are at startup once

 2. Log periodically (say, every HeartbeatPeriod) what Tor thinks [... all
 the above ...]

 Bonus idea:

 Can we put the timezone in the log line's timestamp? Would that be enough?
 Is that dangerous for users? Do we make promises about parse-ability that
 we'd be breaking?

--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22501 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Requests via javascript: violate FPI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22501: Requests via javascript: violate FPI
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, noscript,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201709   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Replying to [comment:13 cypherpunks]:
 > No, that's for Security Slider options only.

 What else needs to be modified?  NoScript settings don't seem to be
 currently set in torbrowser's 000-tor-browser.js config file.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23676 [Core Tor/Tor]: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush a conn that's closed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23676: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush 
a
conn that's closed
+--
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, cpu, tor-sched  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 `bug23676_032_01` on https://github.com/pastly/public-tor.git

 Needs code review and for a couple people to try it (arma and me,
 probably).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23651 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ADDONS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23651: ADDONS
--+---
 Reporter:  dmeek94@… |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by dmeek94@…):

 Ehttps everywhere has disappeared now, its still in the folder but wont
 open. The new identity button i have come across thst before but cant
 rememmber where, is that in orbot?
 Im sorry but i cant find any customize button.
 Theres a lot of sites that have a grey icon one is
 ://zqktlwi4fecvo6ri.onion/wiki/index.php/Main_Page6
 Sorry if im not giving the right information, im not very tech minded.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22501 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Requests via javascript: violate FPI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22501: Requests via javascript: violate FPI
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, noscript,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201709   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "22501-tor-browser-build-0.patch" added.

 Put noscript.fixLinks option override in per-platform extension-
 overrides.js rather than torbutton (since it does not change)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22501 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Requests via javascript: violate FPI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22501: Requests via javascript: violate FPI
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, noscript,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201709   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Verifying works as intended with rbm build.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "13398-pospeselr6.patch" added.

 #fdef ESR59 -> #ifndef TOR_BROWSER_VERSION

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+--
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709 => TorBrowserTeam201709R


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23651 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ADDONS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23651: ADDONS
--+---
 Reporter:  dmeek94@… |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by dmeek94@…):

 Located the new identity button, when pressed it gave a new identity but
 didnt change anything to do with https everywhere.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23677 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should log what it thinks the time is sometime(s)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23677: Tor should log what it thinks the time is sometime(s)
-+
 Reporter:  pastly   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bootstrap clock-skew ux  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * keywords:   => bootstrap clock-skew ux
 * cc: catalyst (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22501 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Requests via javascript: violate FPI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22501: Requests via javascript: violate FPI
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, noscript,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201709R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  tbb-linkability, noscript, TorBrowserTeam201709 => tbb-
 linkability, noscript, TorBrowserTeam201709R
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 LGTM

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23676 [Core Tor/Tor]: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush a conn that's closed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23676: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush 
a
conn that's closed
+--
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, cpu, tor-sched  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by pastly):

 If you're picky like arma, and thus want the new function in one commit
 and the bugfix in another, you will enjoy `bug23676_032_02`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23651 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ADDONS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23651: ADDONS
--+---
 Reporter:  dmeek94@… |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by dmeek94@…):

 I also get a triangle icon, when i click it says partmof this page are not
 secure (such as images)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23646 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Undefined References to Panning functions (for Tom Ritter)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23646: Undefined References to Panning functions (for Tom Ritter)
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 No need to track this in our bug tracker I think. Jacek has a patch for
 this mingw-w64 bug which should make it into the repository pretty soon:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402385#c4.

 Resolving this as duplicate of Mozilla's 1402385.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23651 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ADDONS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23651: ADDONS
--+---
 Reporter:  dmeek94@… |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 So, do you still see it if you enter "about:addons" in your URL bar and
 hit the Return key?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23651 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ADDONS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23651: ADDONS
--+---
 Reporter:  dmeek94@… |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 In which folder is it still available?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709R => TorBrowserTeam201709
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 {{{
 return *XXX ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
 }}}
 for "" ? o_0
 `#if TOR_BROWSER_VERSION` -> `#ifndef TOR_BROWSER_VERSION`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23262 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: implement integrated progress bar for new Tor Launcher UI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23262: implement integrated progress bar for new Tor Launcher UI
---+--
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201709  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21951 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
---+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * Attachment "overlaid-error.png" added.

 an example of an overlaid error

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23676 [Core Tor/Tor]: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush a conn that's closed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23676: kist on 0.3.2.1-alpha-dev beats its head against a wall trying to flush 
a
conn that's closed
+--
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, cpu, tor-sched  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by pastly):

 I hit the new log line once already. With an open channel. Interesting.

 I wonder if the bad bug only appears when the channel is closing, it's the
 only channel pending, and it has cells to send. That could explain why we
 never had a relay lock up before.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by pospeselr):

 I'm not sure I'm following.  In each instance XXX is type char^^*^^* or
 wchar^^*^^*.

 Sure if we fail to allocate the 1 (or 2) bytes needed for the empty
 string's null terminator we probably have bigger problems and the error
 handling isn't *technically* needed since we're bound to crash soon
 anyway, but seems sloppy to omit it.

 Fixing the text replacement fail.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "13398-pospeselr7.patch" added.

 fixed #if -> #ifndef issue in nsUserInfoMac.mm

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23262 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: implement integrated progress bar for new Tor Launcher UI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23262: implement integrated progress bar for new Tor Launcher UI
---+--
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201709  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21951 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
---+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Work-in-progress patches are available on the newui branch within the
 brade tor-launcher repo, here: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade
 /tor-launcher.git/log/?h=newui

 Note that we have rebased that branch a few times so far and we may do so
 again.

 The implementation is now close to Linda's latest specification, minus the
 fancy progress bar with icons. We did make an enhancement that is not part
 of Linda's specification: some errors that previously generated separate
 alert windows are now displayed using an overlay, like this:

 [[Image(overlaid-error.png)]]

 We did this as part of a general effort to reduce Tor Launcher's use of
 alert windows; while trying to fix #21542 we found that they cause
 problems (that ticket is on hold for now, but we plan to come back to it).

 If you want to try the new Tor Launcher experience without building from
 source, follow the instructions in ticket:23261#comment:3 (we replaced the
 .xpi file on people.torproject.org with a new one). We still have some
 loose ends to address, but comments and bug reports are welcome.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23261 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: implement configuration portion of new Tor Launcher UI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23261: implement configuration portion of new Tor Launcher UI
---+-
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201709  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21951 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
---+-

Comment (by mcs):

 For some info about the latest iteration of this, please see
 ticket:23262#comment:3.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23651 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ADDONS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23651: ADDONS
--+---
 Reporter:  dmeek94@… |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:7 dmeek94@…]:
 > Im sorry but i cant find any customize button.

 You can find it here:

 [[Image(https://1.bp.blogspot.com/-_Tx50DHDnWw/WQ8iTOzs3bI/KUA
 /KJJPdr-
 
xbYY9tH50ncPGpeto_qPFlF4XACEw/s1600/Screenshot%2Bfrom%2B2017-05-07%2B20-32-37.png)]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23651 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ADDONS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23651: ADDONS
--+---
 Reporter:  dmeek94@… |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by dmeek94@…):

 Its still in the addons folder, not showing in the browser tab with the 3
 dots

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23651 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ADDONS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23651: ADDONS
--+---
 Reporter:  dmeek94@… |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by dmeek94@…):

 My setup doesnt look like that. I have no customize button

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23651 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ADDONS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23651: ADDONS
--+---
 Reporter:  dmeek94@… |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by dmeek94@…):

 * Attachment "2017-09-27 22.08.17.jpg" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22501 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Requests via javascript: violate FPI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22501: Requests via javascript: violate FPI
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, noscript,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201709R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Confirmed, noscript.fixLinks now set to 'false' by default in Linux rbm
 build, --unknown-- domain no longer sent when clicking links on provided
 page, and URL redirect vulnerability no longer occurs when clicking on
 javascript:XXX links.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13398 [Applications/Tor Browser]: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from O/S

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13398: at startup, browser gleans user FULL NAME (real name, given name) from 
O/S
--+--
 Reporter:  zinc  |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201709 => TorBrowserTeam201709R


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23016 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Print to File" does not create the expected file in non-English locales

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23016: "Print to File" does not create the expected file in non-English locales
-+-
 Reporter:  intrigeri|  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails, tbb-7.0-issues, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  regression, tbb-e10s   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Works on my machine (Ubuntu 17.04, french locale) for both possible value
 for that property.  Will spin up a VM with Debian unstable and see if I
 can repro there.

 intrigeri: can you point me to what page you're trying to print?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13605 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a client/relay-side ReducedExitPolicy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13605: Create a client/relay-side ReducedExitPolicy
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:
  |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, easy, review-group-18  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  medium
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by neel):

 * cc: neel@… (added)


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[tor-bugs] #23678 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor kinda _is_ an http proxy now...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23678: Tor kinda _is_ an http proxy now...
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 When we added HTTPTunnelPort, the answer that we give when you try to use
 your SOCKSPort as an HTTP proxy became wrong. We should fix it and explain
 that, Tor sorta _is_ an HTTP proxy... but this port isn't.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23678 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor kinda _is_ an http proxy now...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23678: Tor kinda _is_ an http proxy now...
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 (If anybody wants to fix this up, the string to revise is
 `SOCKS_PROXY_IS_NOT_AN_HTTP_PROXY_MSG` in `proto_socks.c`)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22840 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement protover in Rust

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22840: Implement protover in Rust
--+--
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo  |  Owner:  chelseakomlo
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust protover rust-pilot  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  3
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorZ
--+--

Comment (by chelseakomlo):

 See `g...@github.com:chelseakomlo/tor_patches.git`, branch `protover-rust-
 impl`

 Some considerations:

 1. Changes to protover.c

 src/or/protover.c was rearranged in order to have functionality defined
 based on conditional definitions. These fall into two categories: 1)
 functions that should only be defined when Rust is not enabled are guarded
 by HAVE_RUST, and 2) functions that are used in src/test/test_protover.c
 are guarded by HAVE_RUST or TOR_UNIT_TESTS (so they are defined only for
 testing or when Rust is not enabled)

 Other than rearranging for ifdef guards, logic in protover.c was not
 changed

 2. Why src/or/protover_rust.c is needed

 Currently, it is important to keep the C code stable as we test
 feasibility of introducing Rust. In the future, we can change C code to
 better enable adding Rust functionality, but in the short term, changing C
 as little as possible will both allow us to merge Rust code, and worry
 less about introducing bugs in the meantime. Adding wrappers for
 translation in src/or/protover_rust.c is a temporary measure and is not
 meant as a long-term solution.

 3. Naming/similar functionality between src/common/compat_rust and
 src/commonrust_types

 As we are currently experimenting with Rust, I introduced another method
 of handling strings between the Rust/C ABI, which made implementing
 protover in Rust simpler. I propose that we discuss in another ticket how
 to move forward with only one method, and merge this patch with both
 enabled.

 This patch introduces a less heavyweight manner to handle strings passed
 from Rust to C, to better allow Rust to assign string values to pointers
 passed as function arguments.

 4. String handling/copying

 In this patch, strings are passed to C and then immediately copied. The
 string allocated in Rust is immediately freed. In the future, we can
 discuss implementations that avoid this extra copy, but I propose merging
 this patch without that enhancement.

 5. Extending src/rust/smartlist

 In the future, we should talk about how to better handle smartlists that
 are passed between C and Rust, as currently only smartlists of strings is
 enabled.

 6. Documentation and tests in src/rust

 Please let me know if more/less documentation would be helpful, or if
 certain things can be better documented and/or tested.

 7. Logging

 This patch does not implement logging to tor's logger from Rust. Maybe
 this functionality can be added separately, and then logging can be added
 here afterward?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22840 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement protover in Rust

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22840: Implement protover in Rust
--+--
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo  |  Owner:  chelseakomlo
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust protover rust-pilot  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  3
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorZ
--+--
Changes (by chelseakomlo):

 * cc: nickm (added)
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22840 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement protover in Rust

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22840: Implement protover in Rust
--+--
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo  |  Owner:  chelseakomlo
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust protover rust-pilot  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  3
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorZ
--+--
Changes (by chelseakomlo):

 * cc: alexcrichton (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13605 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a client/relay-side ReducedExitPolicy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13605: Create a client/relay-side ReducedExitPolicy
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:
  |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, easy, review-group-18  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  medium
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by neel):

 * Attachment "tor-patch-ReducedExitPolicy-002.patch" added.

 Version 2 of patch to add ReducedExitPolicy option

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13605 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a client/relay-side ReducedExitPolicy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13605: Create a client/relay-side ReducedExitPolicy
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:
  |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, easy, review-group-18  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  medium
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by neel):

 I have created a new patch tor-patch-ReducedExitPolicy-002.patch which
 includes the requested changes. It passes the regression test (at least on
 my machine).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22840 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement protover in Rust

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22840: Implement protover in Rust
--+
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo  |  Owner:  chelseakomlo
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust protover rust-pilot  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  3
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorZ
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21222 [Webpages/Website]: Redesigning torproject.org: cleanup and update, content organization, and creating themed portals

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21222: Redesigning torproject.org: cleanup and update, content organization, 
and
creating themed portals
--+--
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Pari):

 Replying to [comment:16 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [comment:15 Pari]:
 > > Hey! I am an applicant for outreachy who is a user experience
 designer. I would love to take this up! would it be okay?
 >
 > Have a look at #22077 ;)
 Hey, thanks! will look at these

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[tor-bugs] #23679 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor Software Error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23679: Tor Software Error
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.10
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 circuit_package_relay_cell(): Bug: outgoing relay cell sent from
 ../src/or/relay.c:737 has n_chan==NULL. Dropping. (on Tor 0.3.0.10
 c33db290a9d8d0f9)

 The consensus seems to be that this is a duplicate of #8185. If so, then
 it's still there. Nothing unusual logged before, nor after, so I've got
 nothing helpful to add, beyond "someone seems to have wanted to know".

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