Re: [tor-bugs] #23836 [Core Tor/Tor]: spurious warning about used nickname

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23836: spurious warning  about used nickname
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by toralf):

 Well, circumvent it by the issue by :
 
https://github.com/toralf/torutils/commit/e98f6a5c82fe1317cfd017195f6926a69e23ee9f
 But still do wonder why this message appears nowadays.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23724 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript restartless update breaks Security Slider and its icon disappears

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23724: NoScript restartless update breaks Security Slider and its icon 
disappears
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Found https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 
esr52/rev/efa03deffad75f19fc598a757239e99b22a8bceb/toolkit/mozapps/extensions/internal/XPIProvider.jsm#5764,
 which may affect the update process as TBB has that cache disabled.

 `No chrome package registered for chrome://noscript/skin/icon32.png` is a
 leftover after `shutdown` bootstrap method and removal of manifest.
 Also it's possible to trigger
 {{{
 No chrome package registered for chrome://noscript/content/UISync.jsm
 NS_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND: File error: Not found  UISync.jsm:32
 08:40:31.268 TypeError: Ci is undefined 1 Main.js:1507:11
 }}}

 Minor:
 {{{
 TypeError: ns is undefined MimeServiceParent.js:13:9
 [NoScript XSS] xss.reason.URIError: malformed URI sequence ---
 
InjectionChecker.checkHTML@chrome://noscript/content/InjectionChecker.js?1bsc7269keutfaq7v55o:831:73
 
InjectionChecker._checkRecursive@chrome://noscript/content/InjectionChecker.js?1bsc7269keutfaq7v55o:995:9
 
InjectionChecker._checkRecursive@chrome://noscript/content/InjectionChecker.js?1bsc7269keutfaq7v55o:1044:11
 
InjectionChecker.checkRecursive@chrome://noscript/content/InjectionChecker.js?1bsc7269keutfaq7v55o:990:12
 
InjectionChecker.checkURL@chrome://noscript/content/InjectionChecker.js?1bsc7269keutfaq7v55o:939:12
 
RequestWatchdog.prototype.filterXSS@chrome://noscript/content/RequestWatchdog.js?1bsc7269keutfaq7v55o:803:43
 
RequestWatchdog.prototype.onHttpStart/<@chrome://noscript/content/RequestWatchdog.js?1bsc7269keutfaq7v55o:158:18
 
DOSChecker.prototype.run@chrome://noscript/content/RequestWatchdog.js?1bsc7269keutfaq7v55o:1114:22
 
RequestWatchdog.prototype.onHttpStart@chrome://noscript/content/RequestWatchdog.js?1bsc7269keutfaq7v55o:156:9
 MainParent["http-on-modify-
 
request"].observe@chrome://noscript/content/MainParent.js?1bsc7269keutfaq7v55o:83:24
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23852 [Webpages]: Document the value of embedding Tor in third-party products

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23852: Document the value of embedding Tor in third-party products
-+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 An interesting idea about using Tor for error reporting:
 https://micahflee.com/2013/12/two-really-simple-things-microsoft-can-do-
 to-make-windows-more-secure-against-nsa/

 > Windows, and every other operating system, should come with Tor
 installed. When software wants to send “anonymous error reports,” or
 “anonymous usage data to improve our service,” or anything else like that,
 they should actually make it anonymous by proxying those requests through
 the Tor network.

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[tor-bugs] #23854 [Metrics/Website]: Add an RSS feed for https://metrics.torproject.org/news.html

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23854: Add an RSS feed for https://metrics.torproject.org/news.html
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 This is an item on the roadmap and has also been requested on twitter:
 https://twitter.com/33b5e5/status/918598903066386432

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[tor-bugs] #23855 [Applications/Tor Browser]: add system URL scheme to open in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23855: add system URL scheme to open in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 There is at least one scenario where it would be useful for other
 applications to be able to open an URL in Tor Browser. Facebook has
 special handling for .onion URLs and already prompts users who click on
 such a link that it is a Tor link and and may not work (if they are not
 connected to Facebook via the Facebook .onion and they are not coming from
 a known Tor exit node). If we changed Tor Browser to register a custom URL
 scheme such as torbrowser:, then Facebook and others could offer to open
 the .onion URL in Tor Browser.

 If we do this, it would involve registering an URL scheme with the OS
 (which would allow other applications to detect that Tor Browser is
 installed).

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[tor-bugs] #23856 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reduce relay bandwidth stats interval to 24 hours

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23856: Reduce relay bandwidth stats interval to 24 hours
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  guard-discovery
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We want to do this to reduce the efficiency of guard discovery attacks.

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[tor-bugs] #23857 [Webpages/Blog]: Search box isn't properly aligned with the search button

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23857: Search box isn't properly aligned with the search button
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 Here's what I'm thinking about:

 [[Image(screenshot.png)]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23857 [Webpages/Blog]: Search box isn't properly aligned with the search button

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23857: Search box isn't properly aligned with the search button
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * Attachment "screenshot.png" added.


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[tor-bugs] #23858 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a local tool that provides detailed statistics for relay operators

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23858: Create a local tool that provides detailed statistics for relay 
operators
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-relay
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  5 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We want to reduce relay stats to 24 hours, and maybe eventually a month.

 Maybe we could use nyx or local Atlas-like graphs for this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] tor-bugs Digest, Vol 88, Issue 105

[Conner Bracket]

Stop

On Sat, Oct 14, 2017 at 7:00 AM 
wrote:

> Send tor-bugs mailing list submissions to
> tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
>
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
> tor-bugs-requ...@lists.torproject.org
>
> You can reach the person managing the list at
> tor-bugs-ow...@lists.torproject.org
>
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of tor-bugs digest..."
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
>1. #23854 [Metrics/Website]: Add an RSS feed for
>   https://metrics.torproject.org/news.html (Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki)
>
>
> --
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Sat, 14 Oct 2017 10:08:05 -
> From: "Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" 
> To: undisclosed-recipients: ;
> Subject: [tor-bugs] #23854 [Metrics/Website]: Add an RSS feed for
> https://metrics.torproject.org/news.html
> Message-ID: <051.8b2f9880257b4a4afa46c4240d50c...@torproject.org>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> #23854: Add an RSS feed for https://metrics.torproject.org/news.html
> -+--
>  Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  metrics-team
>  Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
>  Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
> Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
>  Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
> Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
>Points:   |   Reviewer:
>   Sponsor:   |
> -+--
>  This is an item on the roadmap and has also been requested on twitter:
>  https://twitter.com/33b5e5/status/918598903066386432
>
> --
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>
> --
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> Subject: Digest Footer
>
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> End of tor-bugs Digest, Vol 88, Issue 105
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Re: [tor-bugs] tor-bugs Digest, Vol 88, Issue 105

[Conner Bracket]

Help

On Sat, Oct 14, 2017 at 10:49 AM Conner Bracket 
wrote:

> Stop
>
> On Sat, Oct 14, 2017 at 7:00 AM 
> wrote:
>
>> Send tor-bugs mailing list submissions to
>> tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
>>
>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs
>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>> tor-bugs-requ...@lists.torproject.org
>>
>> You can reach the person managing the list at
>> tor-bugs-ow...@lists.torproject.org
>>
>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
>> than "Re: Contents of tor-bugs digest..."
>>
>>
>> Today's Topics:
>>
>>1. #23854 [Metrics/Website]: Add an RSS feed for
>>   https://metrics.torproject.org/news.html (Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki)
>>
>>
>> --
>>
>> Message: 1
>> Date: Sat, 14 Oct 2017 10:08:05 -
>> From: "Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" 
>> To: undisclosed-recipients: ;
>> Subject: [tor-bugs] #23854 [Metrics/Website]: Add an RSS feed for
>> https://metrics.torproject.org/news.html
>> Message-ID: <051.8b2f9880257b4a4afa46c4240d50c...@torproject.org>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>>
>> #23854: Add an RSS feed for https://metrics.torproject.org/news.html
>> -+--
>>  Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  metrics-team
>>  Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
>>  Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
>> Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
>>  Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
>> Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
>>Points:   |   Reviewer:
>>   Sponsor:   |
>> -+--
>>  This is an item on the roadmap and has also been requested on twitter:
>>  https://twitter.com/33b5e5/status/918598903066386432
>>
>> --
>> Ticket URL: 
>> Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
>> The Tor Project: anonymity online
>>
>> --
>>
>> Subject: Digest Footer
>>
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Re: [tor-bugs] #21816 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add support for Pluggable Transports 2.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21816: Add support for Pluggable Transports 2.0
-+-
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo |  Owner:
 |  dasyatid1
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-pt, tor-bridge,  |  Actual Points:
  design, pt2, review-group-23   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: mcs (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23542 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Add Snowflake PT to Tor Messenger

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23542: Add Snowflake PT to Tor Messenger
+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  snowflake   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 This is done in https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-messenger-
 build.git/commit/?id=de4f50f02929b36f7ecdcb654e3dfe2b7e8ca5d2

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19926 [Core Tor/Tor]: BUG warning in connection_ap_attach_pending: waiting for rendezvous desc :*

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19926: BUG warning in connection_ap_attach_pending: waiting for rendezvous 
desc :*
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bug, regression, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 P.S. As I see, it happens when tor is waiting long for a HS descriptor and
 cannot get it yet. If in this moment both kill -1 signal is issued to tor
 and NEWNYM is sent, then, in some cases (not always!), this error appears
 in log files (just 1 second later after NEWNYM and kill -1).

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[tor-bugs] #23859 [Core Tor/Stem]: stem parse_file doesn't handle stdin

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23859: stem parse_file doesn't handle stdin
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 The code looks like:

 {{{
 from sys import stdin

 from stem.descriptor import parse_file

 new_micro_digests = set()

 for desc in parse_file(stdin, validate = True):
 new_micro_digests.add(desc.digest)
 }}}

 The stack trace looks like:

 {{{
 $ cat 2017-10-14-17-05-00-micro | ./get_micro_fp.py
 Traceback (most recent call last):
   File "./get_micro_fp.py", line 9, in 
 for desc in parse_file(stdin, validate = True):
   File "/Users/dev/stem/stem/descriptor/__init__.py", line 196, in
 parse_file
 initial_position = descriptor_file.tell()
 IOError: [Errno 29] Illegal seek
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #1258 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor allows non-ASCII chars in contact line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1258: Tor allows non-ASCII chars in contact line
--+
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  0.2.1.22
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  duplicate =>
 * severity:   => Blocker


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Re: [tor-bugs] #1258 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor allows non-ASCII chars in contact line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1258: Tor allows non-ASCII chars in contact line
--+
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  0.2.1.22
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 set to wontfix as suggested by teor:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2017-October/012487.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18628 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Devise some way for the browser proxy to forward metadata to the bridge before the OR data

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18628: Devise some way for the browser proxy to forward metadata to the bridge
before the OR data
---+--
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  cmm323
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:15 dcf]:
 > Now all that remains is to make `remoteIPFromSDP` pass its tests. I have
 an idea for doing that. Let me know if you want me to do it or if you want
 to do it yourself.

 Here's the change (uses regexp like the JS code does):
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/dcf/snowflake.git/commit/?h=bug18628&id=319119a6117e43a11297ce24cae498c29087f6d4

 Rebased and merged to master:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 
transports/snowflake.git/diff/?id=9e5eb7f5ee1c15122425ab4fe47fa6ad6ec75f92&id2=82d7f16babcdacdd120465fdd80b3468ea03246c

 The new code is running live now, the server and six proxy instances at
 snowflake.bamsoftware.com. So we should start seeing the first uploaded
 descriptors with country-level information within a day or so.

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[tor-bugs] #23860 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Make dcf and arlolra owners of the "Obfuscation/Snowflake" component.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23860: Make dcf and arlolra owners of the "Obfuscation/Snowflake" component.
--+-
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 I don't know if it's possible for a component to have more than one owner.
 If not, we can perhaps set up some sort of alias. Mainly we just both want
 to be Cced on Snowflake tickets.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23860 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Make dcf and arlolra owners of the "Obfuscation/Snowflake" component.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23860: Make dcf and arlolra owners of the "Obfuscation/Snowflake" component.
--+-
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * keywords:   => snowflake


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[tor-bugs] #23861 [Core Tor/Tor]: Excessive I learned some more directory information. [...] log message at startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23861: Excessive I learned some more directory information. [...] log message 
at
startup
--+
 Reporter:  s7r   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 On `0.3.2.2-alpha-dev (git-51e47481fc6f131d)`, if started with an old
 consensus, until it bootstraps to 80% and starts with guard context
 'default' it will print this log message excessively, multiple times per
 second even:
 {{{
 Oct 14 23:38:08.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%: Starting
 Oct 14 23:38:27.000 [notice] This version of Tor (0.3.2.2-alpha-dev) is
 newer than any recommended version, according to the directory
 authorities. Recommended versions are:
 
0.2.5.14,0.2.8.14,0.2.8.15,0.2.9.11,0.2.9.12,0.3.0.9,0.3.0.10,0.3.0.11,0.3.1.5-alpha,0.3.1.6-rc,0.3.1.7,0.3.2.1-alpha,0.3.2.2-alpha
 Oct 14 23:38:27.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:40.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 50%: Loading relay descriptors
 Oct 14 23:38:40.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:41.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:41.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:41.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:41.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:42.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:42.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:42.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:43.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:43.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:43.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:43.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:43.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:43.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:44.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:44.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:44.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:44.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:44.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:44.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:44.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:44.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:44.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:44.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no recent usable consensus.
 Oct 14 23:38:45.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough

Re: [tor-bugs] #23817 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor re-tries directory mirrors that it knows are missing microdescriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23817: Tor re-tries directory mirrors that it knows are missing 
microdescriptors
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21969  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by teor):

 This issue occurs because a directory guard that is missing
 microdescriptors we need is still considered live. We only mark a guard
 dead when we fail to connect to it. (When all guards are marked dead, we
 use a fallback or authority to fetch microdescriptors).

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[tor-bugs] #23862 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor only updates guard state after a consensus if it has enough directory info

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23862: Tor only updates guard state after a consensus if it has enough 
directory
info
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.6
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client,
 Severity:  Normal   |  030-backport, 031-backport
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #21969
   Points:  1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Steps to reproduce:
 1. Launch tor in a fresh data directory
 {{{
 export DATADIR=`mktemp -d`
 src/or/tor DataDirectory "$DATADIR" StrictNodes 1 EntryNodes
 1390DFDB5603AB5A16564505D7AE8647B1818A3C
 }}}
 2. Delete its microdescriptors
 {{{
 rm -v "$DATADIR"/cached-microdescs*
 }}}
 3. Repeat step 1

 Expected behaviour:

 Tor uses the selected EntryNode

 Actual Behaviour:

 Tor uses a fallback directory mirror

 This happens because tor should update guard state after every consensus,
 but it only updates guard state when it has enough directory info.

 It is pathological when combined with #23817, when tor gets in a state
 when it doesn't have enough directory info because its guards are broken,
 and never updates its guard state, so it can't get enough directory info.

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[tor-bugs] #23863 [Core Tor/Tor]: When our directory guards don't have each others' microdescs, we should mark some dead

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23863: When our directory guards don't have each others' microdescs, we should
mark some dead
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.6
  Tor/Tor  |
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #21969
   Points:  1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 If our directory guards don't have each others' microdescriptors, we
 should mark some of them dead.

 But should we mark the one that won't give us the microdescriptor dead?
 Or should we mark the one that we can't get a microdescriptor for dead?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23862 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor only updates guard state after a consensus if it has enough directory info

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23862: Tor only updates guard state after a consensus if it has enough 
directory
info
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client,   |  Actual Points:
  030-backport, 031-backport |
Parent ID:  #21969   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * version:  Tor: 0.3.0.6 => Tor: 0.3.0.1-alpha


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23862 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor only updates guard state after a consensus if it has enough directory info

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23862: Tor only updates guard state after a consensus if it has enough 
directory
info
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client,   |  Actual Points:
  030-backport, 031-backport |
Parent ID:  #21969   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Please see my draft branch bug23862.
 Someone else will need to write the changes file, and any unit tests, and
 maybe edit the commit message. (I don't have time.)

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[tor-bugs] #23864 [Applications]: Onion browser can be signed with a Enterprise Distribution certificate, to get around China's censorship

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23864: Onion browser can be signed with a Enterprise Distribution certificate, 
to
get around China's censorship
---+
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications   |Version:
 Severity:  Major  |   Keywords:  IOS
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 Onion browser can be signed with a Enterprise Distribution certificate, so
 that the app can be Distributed outside the App Store and allow users in
 China to Obtain the app evening though may be removed from the App Store
 in China.

 Here is information on the Distributing Apple Developer Enterprise Program
 Apps.
 
https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/IDEs/Conceptual/AppDistributionGuide/DistributingEnterpriseProgramApps/DistributingEnterpriseProgramApps.html


 There is the possibility that distributing the app like this may not be
 acceptable for their terms of service.

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[tor-bugs] #23865 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When I visit https://twitter.com/torproject it will always redirects me to the mobile site

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23865: When I visit https://twitter.com/torproject it will always redirects me 
to
the mobile site
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 When I visit https://twitter.com/torproject it will always redirects me to
 the mobile site https://mobile.twitter.com/torproject
 Tested on TorBrowser 7.0.6 noscript 5.1.2

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23865 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When I visit https://twitter.com/torproject it will always redirects me to the mobile site

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23865: When I visit https://twitter.com/torproject it will always redirects me 
to
the mobile site
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 I'm using the High security setting.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12424 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement improved hidden service protocol (prop224)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12424: Implement improved hidden service protocol (prop224)
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, term-project-ideas  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-must
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 The Ritual has been completed. This ticket can now be closed. Fly away!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12424 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement improved hidden service protocol (prop224)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12424: Implement improved hidden service protocol (prop224)
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, term-project-ideas  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  parent
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-must
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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[tor-bugs] #23866 [Applications/Tor Check]: 178.63.97.34

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23866: 178.63.97.34
+-
 Reporter:  Fox |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Check  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:  Not76
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:  #20114
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+-
 178.63.97.34

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23866 [Applications/Tor Check]: 178.63.97.34

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23866: 178.63.97.34
+-
 Reporter:  Fox |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Check  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Not76   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20114  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Can you explain the problem, all you posted was a IP.

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