Re: [tor-bugs] #23883 [Core Tor/Tor]: document how to get Travis or GitLab CI running on your fork of tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23883: document how to get Travis or GitLab CI running on your fork of tor
---+---
 Reporter:  catalyst   |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  new-developers tor-ci tor-doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by catalyst):

 * keywords:   => new-developers tor-ci tor-doc


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[tor-bugs] #23883 [Core Tor/Tor]: document how to get Travis or GitLab CI running on your fork of tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23883: document how to get Travis or GitLab CI running on your fork of tor
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22769 [Core Tor/Tor]: Investigate the reproducibility of Rust binaries

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22769: Investigate the reproducibility of Rust binaries
+
 Reporter:  isis|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, SponsorZ  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  SponsorZ
+

Comment (by manish.earth):

 There's a lot of work done by a contributor in investigating exactly what
 things cause irreproducibility in Rust.

 You can find this at https://users.rust-lang.org/t/testing-out-
 reproducible-builds/9758 , along with instructions for making it work
 reproducibly in qemu.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23878 [Core Tor/Tor]: Attempt rewriting buffers.c in Rust

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23878: Attempt rewriting buffers.c in Rust
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust-pilot, rust, datatypes  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+-

Comment (by manish.earth):

 Probably a thin wrapper around VecDeque would work better; Bytes seems
 to itself be a growable buffer (which also does stuff like reference
 counting).

 Looking at the C API in buffers.h there doesn't seem to be any reason why
 we can't expose the same API.

 (I don't mind taking a crack at this if I get the time, but I also don't
 want to take the place of someone who wants to learn Rust/Rust FFI through
 this exercise)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23882 [Core Tor/Tor]: Investigate implementing a Rust allocator wrapping tor_malloc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23882: Investigate implementing a Rust allocator wrapping tor_malloc
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, rust-pilot  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  3
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
--+

Comment (by manish.earth):

 The tracking issue for stabilization is at https://github.com/rust-
 lang/rust/issues/27389 . FF isn't using it, but I would like it to.

 I'll be trying to get stabilization to happen soon.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23878 [Core Tor/Tor]: Attempt rewriting buffers.c in Rust

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23878: Attempt rewriting buffers.c in Rust
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust-pilot, rust, datatypes  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by manish.earth):

 * cc: manishearth@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22907 [Core Tor/Tor]: Investigate using cargo-vendor for offline dependencies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22907: Investigate using cargo-vendor for offline dependencies
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, rust-pilot, tor-build, |  Actual Points:
  032-unreached  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorZ
-+-
Changes (by manish.earth):

 * cc: manishearth@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23351 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a rustfmt.toml defining our whitespace/formatting standards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23351: Create a rustfmt.toml defining our whitespace/formatting standards
---+--
 Reporter:  isis   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust rust-pilot style  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22156 | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by manish.earth):

 * cc: manishearth@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22840 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement protover in Rust

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22840: Implement protover in Rust
--+
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo  |  Owner:  chelseakomlo
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust protover rust-pilot  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  3
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorZ
--+
Changes (by manish.earth):

 * cc: manishearth@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23881 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement a way to utilise tor's logging system from Rust code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23881: Implement a way to utilise tor's logging system from Rust code
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, rust-pilot  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  3
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by manish.earth):

 * cc: manishearth@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23880 [Applications/Orbot]: Build tor with --enable-rust in Orbot and OnionBrowser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23880: Build tor with --enable-rust in Orbot and OnionBrowser
+
 Reporter:  isis|  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, rust-pilot|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by manish.earth):

 * cc: manishearth@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23880 [Applications/Orbot]: Build tor with --enable-rust in Orbot and OnionBrowser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23880: Build tor with --enable-rust in Orbot and OnionBrowser
+
 Reporter:  isis|  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, rust-pilot|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by manish.earth):

 * cc: manishsmail@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23813 [Core Tor/Tor]: router_reset_descriptor_download_failures() doesn't actually reset descriptor downloads

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23813: router_reset_descriptor_download_failures() doesn't actually reset
descriptor downloads
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Congratulations; this is the first patch merged in 0.3.3 :)

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[tor-bugs] #23882 [Core Tor/Tor]: Investigate implementing a Rust allocator wrapping tor_malloc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23882: Investigate implementing a Rust allocator wrapping tor_malloc
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  rust, rust-pilot
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  3 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can  |
--+
 We should look into implementing the Rust `alloc::allocator::Alloc`
 [https://doc.rust-lang.org/stable/alloc/allocator/trait.Alloc.html trait]
 as a wrapper around `tor_malloc` as a way to have a cleaner allocator
 interface in Rust moving forward (which still works with our current
 legacy C code).

 This is what the Rust code in Firefox has done, and the `alloc` crate is
 supposed to stabilised "soon" (as in, within the next six months) because
 FF is using it.

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[tor-bugs] #23881 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement a way to utilise tor's logging system from Rust code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23881: Implement a way to utilise tor's logging system from Rust code
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  rust, rust-pilot
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  3 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We really need a way to use tor's logging subsystem from Rust code. I
 haven't ever really looked at our logging code because it always Just
 Works™, but it seems possible that we could construct/format `String`s to
 log in Rust code, choose a logging level, and throw the `String` across
 the FFI boundary, have the C code log it, then have the Rust code free it?

 I'm not sure what we'll do about logging in general moving forward, once
 (and if) more and more of tor is rewritten in Rust.

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[tor-bugs] #23880 [Applications/Orbot]: Build tor with --enable-rust in Orbot and OnionBrowser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23880: Build tor with --enable-rust in Orbot and OnionBrowser
+
 Reporter:  isis|  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:  rust, rust-pilot
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  3   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+
 Hello! During our Rust discussions at the Montréal meeting, we discussed
 that it would be extremely useful to know — before we enable Rust by
 default — if doing so will cause issues for our packagers and downstreams,
 particularly on mobile. Would it be possible, please, for someone to
 create an experimental build of Orbot (and OnionBrowser!) building with
 `./configure --enable-rust [--enable-cargo-online-mode]`, and let us know
 any issues you encounter here?

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[tor-bugs] #23879 [Applications/Torbutton]: Implement more user.js fixes in TorButton/TBB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23879: Implement more user.js fixes in TorButton/TBB
+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+
 There are quite a few new anti-Features in the latest Firefox that harm
 privacy.

 We should review these lists and implementing them into TorButton and the
 browser bundle respectively.

 https://github.com/The-OP/Fox

 https://github.com/pyllyukko/user.js/

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[tor-bugs] #23878 [Core Tor/Tor]: Attempt rewriting buffers.c in Rust

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23878: Attempt rewriting buffers.c in Rust
--+-
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  rust-pilot, rust, datatypes
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  3 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can  |
--+-
 In buffers.c, we define `buf_t`, which is essentially a doubly-linked list
 comprised of chunks of contiguously-allocated memory. During the Montréal
 meeting, we identified `buf_t` as a potentially good candidate datatype
 for reimplementation in Rust.

 My understanding of possibly the ideal way to do this (after talking with
 Alex Crichton, without boats, nickm, and Nika Layzell) would be to
 entirely rethink the implementation in terms of a `VecDeque` using
 [https://doc.rust-lang.org/nightly/std/collections/struct.VecDeque.html
 VecDeque from the stdlib] and [https://carllerche.github.io/bytes/bytes/
 Bytes or another buffer type from the bytes crate]. If this is something
 which works out, we could then (hopefully!) expose a similar API as to the
 C interface. (If that doesn't work out, there's only a couple points in
 the code which appear to rely on the current implementation of `buf_t`.)

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[tor-bugs] #23877 [Internal Services/Wiki]: Live CD / USB wiki section needs updating

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23877: Live CD / USB wiki section needs updating
+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Wiki  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+
 From the main trac wiki page:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/WikiStart#LiveCDUSB

 For removal:
 * ​Liberté Linux - Not updated since 2012
 * ​Privatix LiveCD/USB - Not updated since 2011


 You might consider replacing them with:

 * Whonix - https://www.whonix.org/
 * Heads - https://heads.dyne.org/

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[tor-bugs] #23876 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: Torsocks getpeername() is broken for .onion addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23876: Torsocks getpeername() is broken for .onion addresses
---+-
 Reporter:  Torsocks_user  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 When I connect to a .onion host with ssh using torsocks, ssh connects to
 the host and completes authentication but then it aborts with this error:
{{{get_sock_port: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICSERV failed: ai_family not
 supported}}}

 I built torsocks with additional debug messages and found that the failure
 is due to a bug in torsocks. Ssh calls getpeername() to map the onion IP
 cookie address it was given by torsocks back to a hostname, and
 tsocks_getpeername() at getpeername.c:60 returns the sockaddr struct from
 the connection table expecting it to contain the onion IP cookie. But that
 struct is actually all 0's because when the connection entry for a .onion
 address is created in tsocks_connect() at connect.c:162, the address
 passed to connection_create is null instead of the onion IP cookie
 address.

 Here's a patch to pass the onion IP cookie address to connection_create()
 instead of null. With this patch, the ssh connection to a .onion host
 works.
 {{{
 --- src/lib/connect.c.orig
 +++ src/lib/connect.c
 @@ -156,10 +156,11 @@
 onion_pool_unlock(&tsocks_onion_pool);
 if (on_entry) {
 /*
 -* Create a connection without a destination address since
 we will set
 +* Create a connection with the onion IP cookie since
 getpeername()
 +* might need it, and set connection domain and hostname
 to use
  * the onion address name found before.
  */
 -   new_conn = connection_create(sockfd, NULL);
 +   new_conn = connection_create(sockfd, addr);
 if (!new_conn) {
 errno = ENOMEM;
 goto error;
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #23875 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Facebook's onion site is a single hop onion, but clicking on the Tor onion icon shows that it is a 6 hop circuit.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23875: Facebook's onion site is a single hop onion, but clicking on the Tor 
onion
icon shows that it is a 6 hop circuit.
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Facebook's onion site is a single hop onion, but clicking on the Tor onion
 icon shows that it is a 6 hop circuit.
 Roger Dingledine said at Def Con that facebook uses a single hop, here
 https://youtu.be/Di7qAVidy1Y?t=2135
 1. Go to facebookcorewwwi.onion
 2. click on the onion icon in the upper left and it should show that it is
 a 6 hop circuit, even though it should show that it is a 4 hop circuit.
 Tested on 7.0.6 and 7.5a5.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23874 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clear the address when node_get_prim_orport() returns early

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23874: Clear the address when node_get_prim_orport() returns early
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, memory-safety,   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  032-backport, 031-backport, 030-backport,  |
  029-backport   |
Parent ID:  #23873   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * version:   => Tor: 0.2.8.2-alpha


Comment:

 Please see my branch bug23874-029, because we should probably backport
 this to 0.2.9 and later.

 There may be a merge conflict with a comment that was added later.
 bug23874 will merge to master.

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[tor-bugs] #23874 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clear the address when node_get_prim_orport() returns early

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23874: Clear the address when node_get_prim_orport() returns early
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  technical-debt, memory-safety,
 Severity:  Normal   |  032-backport, 031-backport, 030-backport,
 |  029-backport
Actual Points:  0.1  |  Parent ID:  #23873
   Points:  0.1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 This is a memory safety thing.

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[tor-bugs] #23873 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor often forgets to check the return value of node_get_prim_orport()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23873: Tor often forgets to check the return value of node_get_prim_orport()
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  technical-debt
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Also, we don't clear the address and port when we fail.

 This probably doesn't matter right now, but it matters as soon as we try
 to change node_get_prim_orport().

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20916 [Core Tor/Tor]: Proposal: Put Relay IPv6 Addresses in the microdesc consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20916: Proposal: Put Relay IPv6 Addresses in the microdesc consensus
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal, ipv6, regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 This now needs:
 * a proposal
 * a dir-spec patch
 * a changes file

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23724 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript restartless update breaks Security Slider and its icon disappears

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23724: NoScript restartless update breaks Security Slider and its icon 
disappears
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Although it's off-topic for Tor Browser, as it doesn't use additional
 NoScript buttons by default, but also worth mentioning: `noscript-tbb` is
 used in two more places (MainParent.js, Restartless.jsm) in the codebase
 than the other two buttons, which disappear.

 Pearl Crescent, are you doing code review of changes between NoScript
 versions?

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[tor-bugs] #23872 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: torsocks hangs recent firefox versions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23872: torsocks hangs recent firefox versions
---+---
 Reporter: |  Owner:  dgoulet
  cypherpunks  |
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.12
  Tor/Torsocks |
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE hangs torsocks
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 Firefox 52.4.0 (and the ESR variant) hang if launched as:

   "torsocks firefox"

 It's similar to this old bug:

   https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12119

 End of the strace looks like this:

 getrlimit(RLIMIT_STACK, {rlim_cur=8192*1024, rlim_max=RLIM64_INFINITY}) =
 0
 readlink("/etc/malloc.conf", 0x7ffdbbb59657, 4096) = -1 ENOENT (No such
 file or directory)
 getuid()= 1000
 geteuid()   = 1000
 futex(0x7f76ce5460a8, FUTEX_WAKE_PRIVATE, 2147483647) = 0
 futex(0x55b36758c320, FUTEX_WAIT_PRIVATE, 2, NULL

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[tor-bugs] #23871 [Metrics/Atlas]: Atlas top-10 drop down broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23871: Atlas top-10 drop down broken
---+--
 Reporter:  phoul  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 When navigating to https://atlas.torproject.org/#top10 there is a drop
 down menu which allows you to select to show more results. Selecting any
 of the options do not seem to cause any effect.

 This drop down should likely be fixed or removed from the top-10 page.

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[tor-bugs] #23870 [Core Tor/Tor]: Authorities: When relays have misconfigured IPv6, mark them as running and IPv4 only

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23870: Authorities: When relays have misconfigured IPv6, mark them as running 
and
IPv4 only
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core|Version:
  Tor/Tor   |
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:  needs-proposal, ipv6, regression
Actual Points:  0.1 |  Parent ID:  #20916
   Points:  0.2 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+--
 Otherwise, we lose useful relays when authorities set
 AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13043 [Core Tor/Tor]: torspec lies about accepting both IPv4 and IPv6 for ORAddress lines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13043: torspec lies about accepting both IPv4 and IPv6 for ORAddress lines
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  massar
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, spec, 032-unreached, ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20916   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  tor-spec, spec, 032-unreached => tor-spec, spec,
 032-unreached, ipv6
 * parent:   => #20916
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21637 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Include both declared and reachable IPv6 OR addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21637: Include both declared and reachable IPv6 OR addresses
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2017, ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  metrics-2017 => metrics-2017, ipv6


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23827 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clients/Relays: Use IPv6 Addresses from microdesc consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23827: Clients/Relays: Use IPv6 Addresses from microdesc consensus
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20916| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * points:   => 0.5


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23828 [Core Tor/Tor]: Authorities: Remove IPv6 addresses from microdescriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23828: Authorities: Remove IPv6 addresses from microdescriptors
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #20916| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorV-can
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * sponsor:   => SponsorV-can
 * actualpoints:   => 0.2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23826 [Core Tor/Tor]: Authorities: Put Relay IPv6 addresses in the microdesc consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23826: Authorities: Put Relay IPv6 addresses in the microdesc consensus
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6  |  Actual Points:  0.2
Parent ID:  #20916| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorV-can
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * points:   => 0.5
 * sponsor:   => SponsorV-can
 * actualpoints:   => 0.2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23828 [Core Tor/Tor]: Authorities: Remove IPv6 addresses from microdescriptors (was: Remove IPv6 addresses from microdescriptors)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23828: Authorities: Remove IPv6 addresses from microdescriptors
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20916| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
 * points:   => 0.5


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23836 [Core Tor/Tor]: spurious warning about used nickname

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23836: spurious warning  about used nickname
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 I think that the relevant patch was #5847 ; I think the warning is rate-
 limited, to avoid spamming your logs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20916 [Core Tor/Tor]: Proposal: Put Relay IPv6 Addresses in the microdesc consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20916: Proposal: Put Relay IPv6 Addresses in the microdesc consensus
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-proposal, ipv6, regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_revision


Comment:

 Please see my branch bug20916-v2, which moves the IPv6 address from the
 microdescriptor to the microdesc consensus.

 This needs:
 * a proposal
 * a dir-spec patch
 * a changes file
 * authority changes
 * relay changes

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23836 [Core Tor/Tor]: spurious warning about used nickname

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23836: spurious warning  about used nickname
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by toralf):

 yeah, the warning is fully ok
 I was just wondering, what git commit between 0.3.1.7 and 0.3.2.2-alpha
 caused that and why that warning doesn't appear always when I run that
 Python script, but just sometimes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23869 [Core Tor/Tor]: Pull in control port parser test cases from Zcash

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23869: Pull in control port parser test cases from Zcash
--+
 Reporter:  str4d |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


Comment:

 The test code itself is in C++, but we should be able to take the test
 _cases_.

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[tor-bugs] #23869 [Core Tor/Tor]: Pull in control port parser test cases from Zcash

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23869: Pull in control port parser test cases from Zcash
--+--
 Reporter:  str4d |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 While pulling in Bitcoin's ephemeral onion services support, we tightened
 up its Tor control port parser, and added a bunch of test cases. It would
 be great for Tor's internal parser to be tested against these test cases.

 Links:

  - [https://github.com/zcash/zcash/pull/2177 Ephemeral onion services PR]
  - [https://github.com/zcash/zcash/pull/2251 PR handling escapes in Tor
 QuotedStrings]
  -
 [https://github.com/zcash/zcash/blob/master/src/torcontrol.cpp#L248-L359
 The control port parser in Zcash]
  -
 [https://github.com/zcash/zcash/blob/master/src/test/torcontrol_tests.cpp
 The control port test cases]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21816 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add support for Pluggable Transports 2.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21816: Add support for Pluggable Transports 2.0
-+-
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo |  Owner:
 |  dasyatid1
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client, tor-pt, tor-bridge,  |  Actual Points:
  design, pt2, review-group-23   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dcf):

 Here's a link to view the diff resulting from dasyatid's patch:
   https://bitbucket.org/DasyatidPrime/tor-
 rtt2017-21816/branches/compare/rtt2017%0Dmaster#diff

 One of the changes in the
 [https://operatorfoundation.org/PluggableTransportSpecification-v2-Draft3.pdf
 PT 2.0 spec draft 3] is that error responses such as ENV-ERROR, VERSION-
 ERROR, etc. are now written to stderr, not stdout. But I don't see
 anything the patch series that accounts for that?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23867 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Can not build Tor Browser Bundle json: cannot unmarshal object into Go value of type []string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23867: Can not build Tor Browser Bundle json: cannot unmarshal object into Go
value of type []string
--+--
 Reporter:  kv1835946 |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 This looks like a duplicate of #23812.

 Could you check if the proposed patch in #23812 is fixing the issue?

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_23812_v2&id=0b698f41ac88ef08b33d070a576c9f5649238af6

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19610 [Core Tor/Tor]: IPv6-only clients fetch microdescriptors from a small number of IPv6 fallbacks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19610: IPv6-only clients fetch microdescriptors from a small number of IPv6
fallbacks
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.4-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, microdesc, fallbacks, tor- |  Actual Points:
  client network-health user-enumeration |
Parent ID:  #17217   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Comment:

 This can be closed (and the IPv6-only bootstrasp workaround code removed)
 once the consensus method that adds IPv6 addresses to the microdesc
 consensus (#23826) is supported by all directory authorities.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22089 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Decentraleyes to slighten off a bit exit traffic and work around some CDNs blocking of Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22089: Add Decentraleyes to slighten off a bit exit traffic and work around 
some
CDNs blocking of Tor
+--
 Reporter:  imageverif  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-performance  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Might be relevant here in regards to comment:1 :
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/meetings/2017Montreal/Notes/CDNsAndTorExitBlocking

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22026 [Metrics/Ideas]: Create new service to retrieve raw documents

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22026: Create new service to retrieve raw documents
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Ideas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by irl):

 I've thought some more about this. In fact, the use case is almost
 satisfied by the directory protocol. To fetch the latest server descriptor
 or extrainfo descriptor, `/tor/{server,extrainfo}/fp/` provides this.

 There are some problems I can see with this approach that I still think
 needs another layer in between though:

 1. We should probably run a relay dedicated for the purpose of serving
 these descriptors, probably reverse proxy it behind nginx/Apache and give
 it a DNS name and an SSL certificate.
 2. As part of the reverse proxying, we should (maybe? not sure if actually
 required) rewrite the content type to `text/plain`.
 3. As another part of the reverse proxying, we should add an `Access-
 Control-Allow-Origin: *` header.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23856 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reduce relay bandwidth stats interval to 24 hours

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23856: Reduce relay bandwidth stats interval to 24 hours
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard-discovery  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * cc: karsten (added)
 * priority:  Medium => High


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23862 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor only updates guard state after a consensus if it has enough directory info

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23862: Tor only updates guard state after a consensus if it has enough 
directory
info
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, tor-bridge, tor-client,   |  Actual Points:
  030-backport, 031-backport |
Parent ID:  #21969   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => High


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23684 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make it easier for mobile app developers to embed tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23684: Make it easier for mobile app developers to embed tor
--+
 Reporter:  hellais   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23847 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add shutdown command to Tor control port

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23847: Add shutdown command to Tor control port
--+
 Reporter:  hellais   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23684| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 This doesn't necessarily need to be a new command; it could also be new
 behavior for (say) "SIGNAL SHUTDOWN" or "SIGNAL HALT".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23836 [Core Tor/Tor]: spurious warning about used nickname

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23836: spurious warning  about used nickname
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 I don't think this message is wrong.  It's totally possible for there to
 be two relays in the consensus named "zwiebeltoralf2" -- anybody can sign
 up a relay with any nickname they want, and nothing prevents that.  If you
 want to identify a relay uniquely, you need to use its fingerprint.

 I'm closing this as "not a bug", but please reopen if there is something I
 am missing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23780 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Tor repeatedly tells me that "Your Guard is failing an extremely large amount of circuits" when using snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23780: Tor repeatedly tells me that "Your Guard is failing an extremely large
amount of circuits" when using snowflake
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * version:   => Tor: 0.3.2.1-alpha


Comment:

 Precising the version of little-t-tor in which this happened

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23865 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When I visit https://twitter.com/torproject it will always redirects me to the mobile site

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23865: When I visit https://twitter.com/torproject it will always redirects me 
to
the mobile site
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 This is by design from Twitter's part and there's nothing that TB folks
 can do here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23866 [Applications/Tor Check]: 178.63.97.34

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23866: 178.63.97.34
+-
 Reporter:  Fox |  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Check  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Not76   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20114  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:1 Dbryrtfbcbhgf]:
 > Can you elaborate?
 He's trying to say that he had a false negative with check.tp.o with exit
 178.63.97.34

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[tor-bugs] #23868 [Metrics/Atlas]: Long contactInfo is not properly displayed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23868: Long contactInfo is not properly displayed
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Atlas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 long contactinfo (single word) is not broken into multiple lines and
 goes into the second column

 example:
 https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/A5B70A588FC01FAC572536B0BC35C7DD4252842A

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[tor-bugs] #23867 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Can not build Tor Browser Bundle json: cannot unmarshal object into Go value of type []string

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23867: Can not build Tor Browser Bundle json: cannot unmarshal object into Go
value of type []string
--+--
 Reporter:  kv1835946 |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Hello.

 Can not build Tor Browser Bundle. Trying different OS. Strictly following
 guide. Is using clean OS.
 Latest tried Ubuntu 17.04 64-bit.

 Here's last lines:

 {{{#!bash
 --2017-10-10 07:22:49--  http://cdimage.ubuntu.com/ubuntu-
 base/releases/17.04/release/ubuntu-base-17.04-base-amd64.tar.gz
 Resolving cdimage.ubuntu.com (cdimage.ubuntu.com)... 91.189.88.165
 Connecting to cdimage.ubuntu.com (cdimage.ubuntu.com)|91.189.88.165|:80...
 connected.
 HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
 Length: 36461782 (35M) [application/x-gzip]
 Saving to: '/compile/tor-browser-build/out/debootstrap-image/container-
 image_ubuntu-base-17.04-base-amd64.tar.gz'

 /compile/tor-browser-build/out/debootstrap-image/container-
 
100%[>]
 34.77M  11.6MB/sin 3.0s

 2017-10-10 07:22:52 (11.6 MB/s) - '/compile/tor-browser-build/out
 /debootstrap-image/container-image_ubuntu-base-17.04-base-amd64.tar.gz'
 saved [36461782/36461782]

 Using file /compile/tor-browser-build/out/debootstrap-image/container-
 image_ubuntu-base-17.04-base-amd64.tar.gz
 Error: Error starting remote:

 json: cannot unmarshal object into Go value of type []string

 Makefile:75: recipe for target 'testbuild-windows-i686' failed
 make: *** [testbuild-windows-i686] Error 1
 }}}


 Any idea please?

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