Re: [tor-bugs] #24119 [Core Tor/Tor]: channel_rsa_id_group_set_badness spends a lot of time in malloc/free

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24119: channel_rsa_id_group_set_badness spends a lot of time in malloc/free
-+-
 Reporter:  Hello71  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-channel, tor-sched 032-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23777   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Hello71):

 I think this one is even better, but given that the first one took me
 about six tries, this one is probably wrong too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24119 [Core Tor/Tor]: channel_rsa_id_group_set_badness spends a lot of time in malloc/free

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24119: channel_rsa_id_group_set_badness spends a lot of time in malloc/free
-+-
 Reporter:  Hello71  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-channel, tor-sched 032-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23777   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by Hello71):

 * Attachment "0001-Simplify-channel_rsa_id_group_set_badness-24119.patch"
 added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24145 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor Browser crash on Windows 7

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24145: Tor Browser crash on Windows 7
--+--
 Reporter:  P0k0l3s   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Tor, Crash, APPCRASH  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 https://sourceforge.net/p/mingw-w64/bugs/537/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24145 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor Browser crash on Windows 7

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24145: Tor Browser crash on Windows 7
--+--
 Reporter:  P0k0l3s   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Tor, Crash, APPCRASH  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 mingw-w64-crt/crt/pseudo-reloc.c#288
 memcpy (addr, src, len)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24146 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Linux 7.0.9 version: The proxy server is refusing connections

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24146: Linux 7.0.9 version: The proxy server is refusing connections
--+---
 Reporter:  TorontoBoy|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  linux,ubuntu  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by TorontoBoy):

 This is my terminal output, then Tor starts. Same message in Tor: The
 proxy server is refusing connections. I see no log created in the
 directory.

 
 don-pc:~/.tor-browser-en/INSTALL$ ls
 Browser  start-tor-browser.desktop
 don-pc:~/.tor-browser-en/INSTALL$ ./start-tor-browser.desktop --debug
 Launching './Browser/start-tor-browser --detach --debug'...
 Unable to update the static FcBlanks: 0x0600
 Unable to update the static FcBlanks: 0x0601
 Unable to update the static FcBlanks: 0x0602
 Unable to update the static FcBlanks: 0x0603
 Unable to update the static FcBlanks: 0x06dd
 Unable to update the static FcBlanks: 0x070f
 Unable to update the static FcBlanks: 0x2028
 Unable to update the static FcBlanks: 0x2029
 Unable to update the static FcBlanks: 0xfff9
 Unable to update the static FcBlanks: 0xfffa
 Unable to update the static FcBlanks: 0xfffb
 1509831704200   addons.webextension.{73a6fe31-595d-460b-a920-fcc0f8843232}
 WARNLoading extension '{73a6fe31-595d-460b-a920-fcc0f8843232}':
 Reading manifest: Error processing permissions.1: Unknown permission
 "privacy"
 1509831704200   addons.webextension.{73a6fe31-595d-460b-a920-fcc0f8843232}
 WARNLoading extension '{73a6fe31-595d-460b-a920-fcc0f8843232}':
 Reading manifest: Error processing permissions.4: Unknown permission
 "unlimitedStorage"
 1509831704300   addons.webextension.https-everywhere-...@eff.org
 WARNLoading extension 'https-everywhere-...@eff.org': Reading
 manifest: Error processing devtools_page: An unexpected property was found
 in the WebExtension manifest.
 1509831704600   addons.webextension.https-everywhere-...@eff.org
 WARNPlease specify whether you want browser_style or not in your
 browser_action options.
 Unable to update the static FcBlanks: 0x0600
 Unable to update the static FcBlanks: 0x0601
 Unable to update the static FcBlanks: 0x0602
 Unable to update the static FcBlanks: 0x0603
 Unable to update the static FcBlanks: 0x06dd
 Unable to update the static FcBlanks: 0x070f
 Unable to update the static FcBlanks: 0x2028
 Unable to update the static FcBlanks: 0x2029
 Unable to update the static FcBlanks: 0xfff9
 Unable to update the static FcBlanks: 0xfffa
 Unable to update the static FcBlanks: 0xfffb
 

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24145 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor Browser crash on Windows 7

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24145: Tor Browser crash on Windows 7
--+--
 Reporter:  P0k0l3s   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Tor, Crash, APPCRASH  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 There's not enough information here for me to figure out what's going on.
 Any ideas for debugging it, folks?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24147 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix manual mistakes

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24147: Fix manual mistakes
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24147 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix manual mistakes

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24147: Fix manual mistakes
--+--
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24147 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix manual mistakes

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24147: Fix manual mistakes
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by atagar):

 Ahh, just spotted something else: tor's ExitPolicy entry has a couple
 extra plus signs in it, causing them to be in the output...

 {{{
   reject *:6699
   reject *:6881-6999
   accept *:* +
 +
If you want to use a reduced exit policy rather than the default
 exit
policy, set "ReducedExitPolicy 1". If you want to _replace_ the
 default
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24144 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Cannot login or submit forms Trac onion site ('must use HTTPS to submit forms')

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24144: Cannot login or submit forms Trac onion site ('must use HTTPS to submit
forms')
--+-
 Reporter:  nido  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by arma):

 Yes, this is expected, and not straightforward to fix.

 Trac isn't written to be able to think of itself as multiple server names.

 Also, it defends itself from having you use it over plain http, and it
 doesn't know about onion services so it doesn't know to maybe treat them
 differently.

 The ultimate answer is probably to get an https cert for trac's onion
 service (which will be more straightforward once onion services are
 permitted to get DV https certs), and also to rewrite trac as needed so it
 can handle being multiple server names.

 In the mean time, it's probably simplest to close this ticket as a
 "wontfix", in that we would welcome a trac rewrite but I can't imagine
 anybody is actually going to do it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24145 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor Browser crash on Windows 7

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24145: Tor Browser crash on Windows 7
--+--
 Reporter:  P0k0l3s   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Tor, Crash, APPCRASH  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 Is this a case of an antivirus program trying to meddle with everything
 and accidentally wrecking things?

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[tor-bugs] #24147 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix manual mistakes

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24147: Fix manual mistakes
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Just a couple small manual mistakes I spotted while parsing the manual
 with stem. Corrections are available in the 'manual' branch of my repo...

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/atagar/tor.git/commit/?h=manual

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24128 [Core Tor/Tor]: GETCONF doesn't resolve "auto" settings

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24128: GETCONF doesn't resolve "auto" settings
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 Agreed, getconf should tell you the actual setting string for the config
 option -- if it's auto, then it's auto.

 There are indeed a pile of config options which have different behaviors
 depending on other things. For simple examples, I'm thinking of the ones
 that disable stuff if something else isn't enabled, e.g.
 {{{
 if (options->UseEntryGuards) {
   log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Authoritative directory servers can't set "
"UseEntryGuards. Disabling.");
   options->UseEntryGuards = 0;
 }
 }}}

 I am fine in theory with a getinfo for looking up Tor's "actual" plans for
 various situations. But we might be wise to make some good plan for
 bringing order to the config.c chaos first. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21394 [Core Tor/Tor]: connection timeouts are affecting Tor Browser usability

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#21394: connection timeouts are affecting Tor Browser usability
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance, tbb-usability,  |  Actual Points:
  performance, tbb-needs |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Dhalgren):

 Just noticed the handy Unbound statistic "requestlist max X avg Y".

 Going back I see typically the maximum pending DNS query list runs around
 600 with an average length of around 300.  Max has been steady but average
 tripled over 12 months to the present value.  Occasional extreme case is
 3000 for a day, sometimes two.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24146 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Linux 7.0.9 version: The proxy server is refusing connections

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24146: Linux 7.0.9 version: The proxy server is refusing connections
--+---
 Reporter:  TorontoBoy|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  linux,ubuntu  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 What do you get as log if you start Tor Browser from the command line like
 so: `./start-tor-browser.desktop --debug` in your Tor Browser directory?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24145 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor Browser crash on Windows 7

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24145: Tor Browser crash on Windows 7
--+--
 Reporter:  P0k0l3s   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Tor, Crash, APPCRASH  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24142 [Applications/Tor Browser]: After upgrade, Tor browser restarts, and the new Tor windows show up as Firefox windows.

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24142: After upgrade, Tor browser restarts, and the new Tor windows show up as
Firefox windows.
--+---
 Reporter:  eezacque  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Closed as mentioned in comment:13:ticket:18199. (Duplicate of #18199).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21031 [Core Tor/Tor]: Please don't remove ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#21031: Please don't remove ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses
-+
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:  Sebastian
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-23  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by Sebastian):

 Yeah, it's the same thing that happened when UseEntryguards 1 was added I
 think. I didn't really consider this a proper fix because it's more like
 just hiding the problem imo. If you would take it for now though and we
 can reconsider the testing stuff, check out branch ticket21031_v2 which is
 a rebased branch on top of maint-0.3.2 which includes your fix in the
 commit.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18105 [Core Tor/Tor]: Replace getsockname with tor_getsockname

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#18105: Replace getsockname with tor_getsockname
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  eewayhsu
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, intro, api, code-  |  Actual Points:
  simplification |
Parent ID:   | Points:  small
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by callumw):

 Replying to [comment:14 nickm]:
 > The idea would be to have a new, different function that only outputs
 the tor_addr_t -- not the sockaddr or the address_len.

 So would we want to pass the sockaddr and address_len by value instead of
 by reference? Otherwise I do not know another way to derive the
 tor_addr_t.

 Cheers

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24146 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Linux 7.0.9 version: The proxy server is refusing connections

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24146: Linux 7.0.9 version: The proxy server is refusing connections
--+--
 Reporter:  TorontoBoy|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  linux,ubuntu  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


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[tor-bugs] #24146 [- Select a component]: Linux 7.0.9 version: The proxy server is refusing connections

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24146: Linux 7.0.9 version: The proxy server is refusing connections
--+--
 Reporter:  TorontoBoy|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  linux,ubuntu
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 My tor browser auto-upgraded yesterday 2017 Friday Nov 03 to 7.0.9 but the
 restart gave me the error "The proxy server is refusing connections" for
 any URL. I cannot use the browser.

 I'm on Ubuntu 16.04. How do I fix this issue. I normally do not change any
 of Tor's settings.

 About Tor Borowser: 7.0.9 (based on Mozilla Firefox 52.4.1) (64-bit)

 Any help to get Tor browser working again would be appreciated. Thank you.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18199 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Firefox icon for browser after update

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#18199: Firefox icon for browser after update
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-branding  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 This seems to happen after an update with Gnome Shell.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21031 [Core Tor/Tor]: Please don't remove ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#21031: Please don't remove ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses
-+
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:  Sebastian
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-23  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 I've figured out how to fix the tests, but I'm not convinced this should
 be necessary:
 {{{
 diff --git a/src/test/test_options.c b/src/test/test_options.c
 index c55be358451192..6bc692d009cffb 100644
 --- a/src/test/test_options.c
 +++ b/src/test/test_options.c
 @@ -402,7 +402,8 @@ fixed_get_uname(void)
"VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4 127.192.0.0/10\n" \
"VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6 [FE80::]/10\n"\
"UseEntryGuards 1\n"  \
 -  "Schedulers Vanilla\n"
 +  "Schedulers Vanilla\n"\
 +  "ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 1\n"

  typedef struct {
or_options_t *old_opt;
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21031 [Core Tor/Tor]: Please don't remove ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#21031: Please don't remove ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses
-+
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:  Sebastian
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-23  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 quick note -- if you want this in 0.3.2, it should be based on the
 `maint-0.3.2` branch.  For small patches, it's not hard to rebase or
 cherry-pick: just please remember in the future.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21031 [Core Tor/Tor]: Please don't remove ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#21031: Please don't remove ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses
-+
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:  Sebastian
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-23  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by Sebastian):

 Hrm. I am having trouble figuring out what's the right fix here. If
 someone could take a look I'd be grateful

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24137 [Core Tor/Tor]: Exit flag should not depend on bandwidth

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24137: Exit flag should not depend on bandwidth
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by Sebastian):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24137 [Core Tor/Tor]: Exit flag should not depend on bandwidth

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24137: Exit flag should not depend on bandwidth
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Sebastian):

 This can go to 0.3.3.x

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24023 [Core Tor/Tor]: Is proto required for alternate relay implementations?

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24023: Is proto required for alternate relay implementations?
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy doc tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by nickm):

 Ah, that appears to be what Mike said.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24023 [Core Tor/Tor]: Is proto required for alternate relay implementations?

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24023: Is proto required for alternate relay implementations?
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy doc tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  easy doc => easy doc tor-spec


Comment:

 So, it's not actually mandatory: Tor versions before 0.2.9 didn't have it,
 and they are still listed in the consensus.  Possibly, it is mandatory
 when the platform line is empty?  We should investigate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24128 [Core Tor/Tor]: GETCONF doesn't resolve "auto" settings

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24128: GETCONF doesn't resolve "auto" settings
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Right.  It's not clear to me that the GETCONF behavior is even _wrong_
 here: the setting is in fact "auto", not something else.  Some kind of
 standard GETINFO mapping for the as-used value of these options might be
 better?

 e.g., I'm thinking of something like:

 {{{
 GETCONF UseMicrodescriptors
 250 UseMicrodescriptors=auto
 GETINFO config/as-used/UseMicrodescriptors
 250-config/as-used/UseMicrodescriptors=1
 250 OK
 }}}

 (but I'm not at all attached to the "as-used" name)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21284 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add torrc option for non-anonymous SocksPort

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#21284: Add torrc option for non-anonymous SocksPort
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, single-onion, eotk-wants,|  Actual Points:
  wontfix?   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, single-onion, eotk-needs => tor-hs, single-onion,
 eotk-wants, wontfix?


Comment:

 I am not sure. I'll leave it in 0.3.3 for now, but I'm adjusting the
 keywords again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18105 [Core Tor/Tor]: Replace getsockname with tor_getsockname

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#18105: Replace getsockname with tor_getsockname
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  eewayhsu
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, intro, api, code-  |  Actual Points:
  simplification |
Parent ID:   | Points:  small
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 The idea would be to have a new, different function that only outputs the
 tor_addr_t -- not the sockaddr or the address_len.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24050 [Core Tor/Tor]: We still do client-side caching. We just don't use the cache.

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24050: We still do client-side caching. We just don't use the cache.
+--
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  032-backport, ???-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by nickm):

 One big problem with client-side DNS caching in Tor is that if the exit on
 the first circuit lies about the IP address, the exit on the second
 circuit will be told about the false IP address too.  In this way, one bad
 exit can set up a "sticky" MITM that will persist even on a new circuit if
 the user is using the same DNS cache.  Similarly, IPv6 addresses can
 trivially be used to set up unique client identifiers that will last for
 as long as the DNS cache lasts.

 How bad is this attack?  Consider:

 1. The more we reuse DNS caches across multiple circuits, the worse this
 attack gets... but on the other hand, the DNS cache is only beneficial to
 the extent that we can reuse it.

 2. These attacks seem especially bad when performed against uncommon
 sites... but common sites are likely to be in the exit-side DNS cache,
 making client-side caching unnecessary.

 So it seems to me that client-side DNS caching is risky to the extent that
 it is useful, and vice versa. :)

 One more consideration: client-side DNS caching can also lower performance
 for big sites that use CDNs to match exits with nearby servers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18105 [Core Tor/Tor]: Replace getsockname with tor_getsockname

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#18105: Replace getsockname with tor_getsockname
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 |  eewayhsu
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, intro, api, code-  |  Actual Points:
  simplification |
Parent ID:   | Points:  small
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by callumw):

 Would this suffice for a new tor_getsockname function?

 MOCK_IMPL(int,
 tor_getsockname,(tor_socket_t sock, struct sockaddr *sock_address,
  tor_addr_t *tor_address, socklen_t *address_len))
 {
if (getsockname(sock, address, address_len) < 0) { return -1 }

return tor_addr_from_sockaddr(_address, (struct
 sockaddr*)_address, NULL);
 }

 I have done it this way so that each call to tor_getsockname can be dealt
 with individually as they are now with getsockname.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24137 [Core Tor/Tor]: Exit flag should not depend on bandwidth

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24137: Exit flag should not depend on bandwidth
--+
 Reporter:  Sebastian |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Can this safely be taken in 0.3.3, or is it important to have it in 0.3.2
 or earlier?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24141 [Core Tor/Tor]: consdiffmgr.c:329: cdm_diff_ht_purge: Non-fatal assertion

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24141: consdiffmgr.c:329: cdm_diff_ht_purge: Non-fatal assertion
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  031-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => 031-backport
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21394 [Core Tor/Tor]: connection timeouts are affecting Tor Browser usability

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#21394: connection timeouts are affecting Tor Browser usability
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-performance, tbb-usability,  |  Actual Points:
  performance, tbb-needs |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Dhalgren):

 Replying to [comment:55 arma]:
 > Replying to [comment:54 arma]:
 > > the client starts its 10 second timer when it sends the begin cell
 >
 > I should also point out that the client's *first* stream attempt is 10
 seconds, but subsequent attempts (once it's given up on the first one and
 tried a new circuit) are 15 seconds each.

 Interesting, thank you for the detail.  The number of successful resolves
 arriving between 5 and 15 seconds is on the order of 0.45% and the
 difference between discarding them and forwarding them not severe enough
 to cause me regret over configuring this for 18 months.  Here is a recent
 set of Unbound statistics to illustrate.  The data seems unlikely to be of
 actionable use to adversaries and hopefully it's not improper to share
 publicly:

 {{{
 unbound: [:0] info: server stats for thread 0: 1748646 queries, 368913
 answers from cach
 unbound: [:0] info: server stats for thread 0: requestlist max 331 avg
 134.014 exceeded
 unbound: [:0] info: average recursion processing time 6.735093 sec
 unbound: [:0] info: histogram of recursion processing times
 unbound: [:0] info: [25%]=0.0130326 median[50%]=0.0450708 [75%]=0.127054
 unbound: [:0] info: lower(secs) upper(secs) recursions
 unbound: [:0] info:0.000.01 39515
 unbound: [:0] info:0.320.64 1
 unbound: [:0] info:0.0001280.000256 1
 unbound: [:0] info:0.0002560.000512 23408
 unbound: [:0] info:0.0005120.001024 64670
 unbound: [:0] info:0.0010240.002048 33392
 unbound: [:0] info:0.0020480.004096 19250
 unbound: [:0] info:0.0040960.008192 47427
 unbound: [:0] info:0.0081920.016384 198450
 unbound: [:0] info:0.0163840.032768 159053
 unbound: [:0] info:0.0327680.065536 278833
 unbound: [:0] info:0.0655360.131072 181936
 unbound: [:0] info:0.1310720.262144 207508
 unbound: [:0] info:0.2621440.524288 45953
 unbound: [:0] info:0.5242881.00 14731
 unbound: [:0] info:1.002.00 7530
 unbound: [:0] info:2.004.00 8677
 unbound: [:0] info:4.008.00 2740
 unbound: [:0] info:8.00   16.00 3461
 unbound: [:0] info:   16.00   32.00 11938
 unbound: [:0] info:   32.00   64.00 13751
 unbound: [:0] info:   64.00  128.00 4671
 unbound: [:0] info:  128.00  256.00 3268
 unbound: [:0] info:  256.00  512.00 6127
 unbound: [:0] info:  512.00 1024.00 2086
 unbound: [:0] info: 1024.00 2048.00 626
 unbound: [:0] info: 2048.00 4096.00 480
 unbound: [:0] info: 4096.00 8192.00 200
 unbound: [:0] info: 8192.00 16384.00 20
 unbound: [:0] info: 16384.00 32768.00 6
 unbound: [:0] info: 32768.00 65536.00 1
 }}}

 Unbound displays impressive patience w/r/t completing queries.  Arrived at
 0.46 by taking the percent of successful resolves under 16 seconds.  Is
 0.36% relative to queries resolved in under 16 seconds plus resolves from
 cache.  2.47% of queries resolve in over 16 seconds, are lost.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21031 [Core Tor/Tor]: Please don't remove ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#21031: Please don't remove ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses
-+
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:  Sebastian
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-23  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by Sebastian):

 wait, there's a test failure.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21031 [Core Tor/Tor]: Please don't remove ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#21031: Please don't remove ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses
-+
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:  Sebastian
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-23  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by Sebastian):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Cool, ticket21031 in my repo :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21031 [Core Tor/Tor]: Please don't remove ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#21031: Please don't remove ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses
-+
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:  Sebastian
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-23  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  reopened => assigned
 * owner:  nickm => Sebastian


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21031 [Core Tor/Tor]: Please don't remove ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#21031: Please don't remove ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses
-+
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  review-group-23  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:   | Points:  .5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 Sure; that would be okay.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #24067, #24068, #24078

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
Batch modification to #24067, #24068, #24078 by irl:


Action: accept

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24075 [Metrics/Bot]: Add new StatusTypes for internal logging

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24075: Add new StatusTypes for internal logging
-+
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Bot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 These are now added to the ENUM and the methods moved to the microblog
 package under MicroblogManager. Investigating making this work as an slf4j
 logger.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24145 [- Select a component]: Tor Browser crash on Windows 7

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24145: Tor Browser crash on Windows 7
--+--
 Reporter:  P0k0l3s   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Tor, Crash, APPCRASH  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by P0k0l3s):

 * Attachment "2017-11-04.png" added.

 Screen after Tor crash

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[tor-bugs] #24145 [- Select a component]: Tor Browser crash on Windows 7

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24145: Tor Browser crash on Windows 7
--+--
 Reporter:  P0k0l3s   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Critical  |   Keywords:  Tor, Crash, APPCRASH
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 I don't really know what happened. Could you solve this please? Another
 window shows up after Tor crash - just check my screen attachment.
 Tor Browser version: 7.0.8
 Installer: torbrowser-install-7.0.8_en-US.exe

 Problem signature:
 Problem Event Name: APPCRASH
 Application Name: tor.exe
 Application Version: 0.0.0.0
 Application Timestamp: 386d4380
 Fault Module Name: tor.exe
 Fault Module Version: 0.0.0.0
 Fault Module Timestamp: 386d4380
 Exception Code: c005
 Exception Offset: 0026e802
 OS Version: 6.1.7601.2.1.0.256.1
 Locale ID: 1029
 Additional Information 1: 0a9e
 Additional Information 2: 0a9e372d3b4ad19135b953a78882e789
 Additional Information 3: 0a9e
 Additional Information 4: 0a9e372d3b4ad19135b953a78882e789

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24143 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Have medium security level allow JavaScript on non-HTTPS onion sites?

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24143: Have medium security level allow JavaScript on non-HTTPS onion sites?
-+-
 Reporter:  nido |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  securitylevel javascript |  duplicate
  onionservices  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nido):

 Sorry, didn't see that (although I did some searching).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24144 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Cannot login or submit forms Trac onion site ('must use HTTPS to submit forms') (was: Cannot login on Trac onion site ('must use HTTPS to subm

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24144: Cannot login or submit forms Trac onion site ('must use HTTPS to submit
forms')
--+-
 Reporter:  nido  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by nido):

 Not only login, but any form submitted, e.g. any custom query.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21004 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "JavaScript is disabled by default on all non-HTTPS sites" option shouldn't block JS on hidden services

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#21004: "JavaScript is disabled by default on all non-HTTPS sites" option 
shouldn't
block JS on hidden services
--+--
 Reporter:  righnaw   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security-slider   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * cc: nido (added)


Comment:

 #24143 is a duplicate.

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[tor-bugs] #24144 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Cannot login on Trac onion site ('must use HTTPS to submit forms')

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24144: Cannot login on Trac onion site ('must use HTTPS to submit forms')
--+-
 Reporter:  nido  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Attempting to login on the onion service for trac
 (http://ea5faa5po25cf7fb.onion) results in 'Error: Bad request. Missing or
 invalid form token. Secure cookies are enabled, you must use https to
 submit forms.'

 The onion service doesn't work with HTTPS.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24143 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Have medium security level allow JavaScript on non-HTTPS onion sites?

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24143: Have medium security level allow JavaScript on non-HTTPS onion sites?
-+-
 Reporter:  nido |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  securitylevel javascript |  duplicate
  onionservices  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 This is a duplicate of #21004.

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[tor-bugs] #24143 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Have medium security level allow JavaScript on non-HTTPS onion sites?

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24143: Have medium security level allow JavaScript on non-HTTPS onion sites?
-+-
 Reporter:  nido |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  securitylevel
 Severity:  Normal   |  javascript onionservices
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Medium security level allows JavaScript only on HTTPS sites, with no
 exception for onion sites. But is it any less secure to run JavaScript on
 an onion site (with or without HTTPS) than on a HTTPS clearnet site? (If
 so, how?) If not, wouldn't it be a good idea to allow JavaScript on all
 onion sites?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18199 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Firefox icon for browser after update

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#18199: Firefox icon for browser after update
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-branding  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: eezacque (added)


Comment:

 I resolved #24142 as a duplicate. An additional comment from that ticket:
 "This is confusing and possibly dangerous, because the user cannot
 distinguish between secure Tor and insecure Firefox!"

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[tor-bugs] #24142 [Applications/Tor Browser]: After upgrade, Tor browser restarts, and the new Tor windows show up as Firefox windows.

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24142: After upgrade, Tor browser restarts, and the new Tor windows show up as
Firefox windows.
--+--
 Reporter:  eezacque  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Major |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 After upgrade, Tor browser restarts, and the new Tor windows show up as
 Firefox windows. This is confusing and possibly dangerous, because the
 user cannot distinguish between secure Tor and insecure Firefox! This is
 fixed by restarting Tor. Running 7.0.9 (based on Mozilla Firefox 52.4.1)
 (64-bit)

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[tor-bugs] #24141 [Core Tor/Tor]: consdiffmgr.c:329: cdm_diff_ht_purge: Non-fatal assertion

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24141: consdiffmgr.c:329: cdm_diff_ht_purge: Non-fatal assertion
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 {{{
  Error from LZMA encoder: Unable to allocate memory (5).
  NULL stream while compressing
  Error from LZMA encoder: Unable to allocate memory (5).
  NULL stream while compressing
  tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/consdiffmgr.c:329: cdm_diff_ht_purge:
 Non-fatal assertion !((*diff)->entry == NULL) failed. (on Tor
 0.3.2.3-alpha )
  Bug: Non-fatal assertion !((*diff)->entry == NULL) failed in
 cdm_diff_ht_purge at ../src/or/consdiffmgr.c:329. Stack trace: (on Tor
 0.3.2.3-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace+0x44) [0x562a0ed18014] (on Tor
 0.3.2.3-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xb9) [0x562a0ed33159] (on Tor
 0.3.2.3-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(consdiffmgr_rescan+0xd14) [0x562a0ecb1694] (on Tor
 0.3.2.3-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x5116f) [0x562a0ebe616f] (on Tor 0.3.2.3-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0x6a0) [0x7fe4219cc5a0] (on Tor
 0.3.2.3-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x29d) [0x562a0ebe6eed] (on Tor
 0.3.2.3-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x1c25) [0x562a0ebea9f5] (on Tor
 0.3.2.3-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19) [0x562a0ebe26a9] (on Tor 0.3.2.3-alpha )
  Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf1)
 [0x7fe42042e2b1] (on Tor 0.3.2.3-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x2a) [0x562a0ebe26fa] (on Tor 0.3.2.3-alpha
 )
  tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: ../src/or/consdiffmgr.c:329: cdm_diff_ht_purge:
 Non-fatal assertion !((*diff)->entry == NULL) failed. (on Tor
 0.3.2.3-alpha )
  Bug: Non-fatal assertion !((*diff)->entry == NULL) failed in
 cdm_diff_ht_purge at ../src/or/consdiffmgr.c:329. Stack trace: (on Tor
 0.3.2.3-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace+0x44) [0x562a0ed18014] (on Tor
 0.3.2.3-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xb9) [0x562a0ed33159] (on Tor
 0.3.2.3-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(consdiffmgr_rescan+0xd14) [0x562a0ecb1694] (on Tor
 0.3.2.3-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x5116f) [0x562a0ebe616f] (on Tor 0.3.2.3-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0x6a0) [0x7fe4219cc5a0] (on Tor
 0.3.2.3-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x29d) [0x562a0ebe6eed] (on Tor
 0.3.2.3-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x1c25) [0x562a0ebea9f5] (on Tor
 0.3.2.3-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x19) [0x562a0ebe26a9] (on Tor 0.3.2.3-alpha )
  Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf1)
 [0x7fe42042e2b1] (on Tor 0.3.2.3-alpha )
  Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x2a) [0x562a0ebe26fa] (on Tor 0.3.2.3-alpha
 )
  Channel padding timeout scheduled 313494ms in the past.
 }}}

 possible duplicate of #24086

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24050 [Core Tor/Tor]: We still do client-side caching. We just don't use the cache.

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#24050: We still do client-side caching. We just don't use the cache.
+--
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  032-backport, ???-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Let's say we're using Tor Browser to visit a website with embedded content
 (images, scripts, etc.) from various third parties. Each domain needs a
 DNS resolve of course. Now, if at some point a stream times out for any
 reason, the circuit is closed and we start using a new circuit. Doesn't
 that mean we need to resolve all of our domains over again?

 So from Tor Browser's point of view, it seems we would have a performance
 benefit (not sure how significant) from a client-side DNS cache keyed by
 first-party domain. Just as the content cache and other stqte in the
 browser is first-party isolated. In the tor proxy, the Tor Browser
 indicates the first party domain via SOCKS credentials. Then, for a given
 website, even when we switch circuits, we still have the domain->IP
 mappings.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23322 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTTPS Everywhere Import Settings is Missing From Preferences on higher security levels

2017-11-04 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
#23322: HTTPS Everywhere Import Settings is Missing From Preferences on higher
security levels
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 {{{
 [NoScript P] Window created, origin: moz-extension://823583b8-f3a0-4821
 -b05e-2333817a14cf, site: moz-extension://823583b8-f3a0-4821-b05e-
 2333817a14cf, URL: moz-extension://823583b8-f3a0-4821-b05e-
 2333817a14cf/options.html, location: moz-extension://823583b8-f3a0-4821
 -b05e-2333817a14cf/options.html
 [NoScript P] Forbidding moz-extension://823583b8-f3a0-4821-b05e-
 2333817a14cf
 }}}

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