Re: [tor-bugs] #24642 [Obfuscation/meek]: cannot use TOR_PT_EXIT_ON_STDIN_CLOSE with meek-client-torbrowser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24642: cannot use TOR_PT_EXIT_ON_STDIN_CLOSE with meek-client-torbrowser
--+-
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24689| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by dcf):

 You're right. This is a bug in meek-client-torbrowser.

 Better than unsetting `TOR_PT_EXIT_ON_STDIN_CLOSE`, I think, is to
 actually give the meek-client subprocess a stdin, something like this:
 {{{
 #!diff
 @@ -268,6 +268,7 @@ func runMeekClient(helperAddr string,
 meekClientCommandLine []string) (cmd *exec
 args := meekClientCommandLine[1:]
 args = append(args, []string{"--helper", helperAddr}...)
 cmd = exec.Command(meekClientPath, args...)
 +   cmd.Stdin = os.Stdin
 cmd.Stdout = os.Stdout
 cmd.Stderr = os.Stderr
 log.Printf("running meek-client command %q", cmd.Args)
 }}}
 Another (possibly better) option is to call `cmd.StdinPipe()` and just
 never close the pipe (that way the child process's stdin is separate from
 the parent's, so you don't have a race between them trying to terminate
 when the stdin is closed).

 I was pretty surprised by this, because I was under the impression that
 tor always sets `TOR_PT_EXIT_ON_STDIN_CLOSE=1` nowadays, and therefore
 this code should never have worked in any released bundle. But it turns
 out it only sets the variable for server transports, not client
 transports, which is why this bug wasn't detected earlier:
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/or/transports.c?id=9e8b762fcecfece64aae70ae640aaa59fd227ca5#n1387

 What do you need from me, a new tag with this bug fixed?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24850 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor2web option without the corresponding tag in torrc causes tor to fail with confusing console output

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24850: tor2web option without the corresponding tag in torrc causes tor to fail
with confusing console output
--+--
 Reporter:  yurivict271   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24826 [Core Tor/Tor]: LZMA- and Zstandard compressed consensus diffs stall Tor Browser launch for at least 20s or break it entirely

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24826: LZMA- and Zstandard compressed consensus diffs stall Tor Browser launch 
for
at least 20s or break it entirely
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22341| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * parent:   => #22341


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24826 [Core Tor/Tor]: LZMA- and Zstandard compressed consensus diffs stall Tor Browser launch for at least 20s or break it entirely (was: LZMA-compressed consensus diffs stall Tor Brow

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24826: LZMA- and Zstandard compressed consensus diffs stall Tor Browser launch 
for
at least 20s or break it entirely
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Old description:

> In #22341 we are thinking about picking up LZMA- and zstd-support for
> consensus diffs.
>
> For LZMA-compressed diffs I often encounter boostrap delays of at least
> 20s like this:
> {{{
> Dec 26 21:01:18.000 [debug] HTTP body from server 'XX.XX.XX.XX:9001' was
> labeled as LZMA compressed, and it seems to be LZMA compressed.
> Dec 26 21:01:38.000 [info] handle_response_fetch_consensus(): Applied
> consensus diff (size 482897) from server 'XX.XX.XX.XX:9001', resulting in
> a new consensus document (size 1903167).
> }}}
>
> But, worse, it might even break Tor Browser bootstrap entirely when
> blocking a Tor Launcher `GETCONF` call (throwing an exception as Tor
> Launcher thinks tor is not working) like so:
> {{{
> Dec 30 23:54:54.000 [debug] HTTP body from server 'XX.XX.XX.XX:9001' was
> labeled as LZMA compressed, and it seems to be LZMA compressed.
> Illegal AddressMatcher: [xpconnect wrapped nsIPrefBranch] -- TypeError:
> s.split is not a function
> Illegal AddressMatcher: [xpconnect wrapped nsIPrefBranch] -- TypeError:
> s.split is not a function
> [12-30 22:54:55] TorLauncher DBUG: readTorSettings
> --
> [12-30 22:54:55] TorLauncher DBUG: Sending Tor command: GETCONF
> UseBridges
> [12-30 22:55:10] TorLauncher NOTE: Exception on control port
> [Exception... "Component returned failure code: 0x804b000e
> (NS_ERROR_NET_TIMEOUT) [nsIBinaryInputStream.readBytes]"  nsresult:
> "0x804b000e (NS_ERROR_NET_TIMEOUT)"  location: "JS frame ::
> jar:file:///home/thomas/Arbeit/TBB/tor-browser_en-
> US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Browser/profile.default/extensions/tor-
> launc...@torproject.org.xpi!/components/tl-protocol.js ::
> TorProtocolService.prototype._torReadLine :: line 920"  data: no]
> }}}

New description:

 In #22341 we are thinking about picking up LZMA- and Zstandard-support for
 consensus diffs.

 For LZMA-compressed diffs I often encounter boostrap delays of at least
 20s like this:
 {{{
 Dec 26 21:01:18.000 [debug] HTTP body from server 'XX.XX.XX.XX:9001' was
 labeled as LZMA compressed, and it seems to be LZMA compressed.
 Dec 26 21:01:38.000 [info] handle_response_fetch_consensus(): Applied
 consensus diff (size 482897) from server 'XX.XX.XX.XX:9001', resulting in
 a new consensus document (size 1903167).
 }}}

 But, worse, it might even break Tor Browser bootstrap entirely when
 blocking a Tor Launcher `GETCONF` call (throwing an exception as Tor
 Launcher thinks tor is not working) like so:
 {{{
 Dec 30 23:54:54.000 [debug] HTTP body from server 'XX.XX.XX.XX:9001' was
 labeled as LZMA compressed, and it seems to be LZMA compressed.
 Illegal AddressMatcher: [xpconnect wrapped nsIPrefBranch] -- TypeError:
 s.split is not a function
 Illegal AddressMatcher: [xpconnect wrapped nsIPrefBranch] -- TypeError:
 s.split is not a function
 [12-30 22:54:55] TorLauncher DBUG: readTorSettings
 --
 [12-30 22:54:55] TorLauncher DBUG: Sending Tor command: GETCONF UseBridges
 [12-30 22:55:10] TorLauncher NOTE: Exception on control port [Exception...
 "Component returned failure code: 0x804b000e (NS_ERROR_NET_TIMEOUT)
 [nsIBinaryInputStream.readBytes]"  nsresult: "0x804b000e
 (NS_ERROR_NET_TIMEOUT)"  location: "JS frame ::
 jar:file:///home/thomas/Arbeit/TBB/tor-browser_en-
 US/Browser/TorBrowser/Data/Browser/profile.default/extensions/tor-
 launc...@torproject.org.xpi!/components/tl-protocol.js ::
 TorProtocolService.prototype._torReadLine :: line 920"  data: no]
 }}}

--

Comment (by gk):

 Turns out this is affecting Zstandard-compressed diffs as well:
 {{{
 Jan 10 07:55:33.000 [debug] HTTP body from server 'XX.XX.XX.XX:9001' was
 labeled as Zstandard compressed, and it seems to be Zstandard compressed.
 Jan 10 07:55:53.000 [info] handle_response_fetch_consensus(): Applied
 consensus diff (size 522839) from server 'XX.XX.XX.XX:9001', resulting in
 a new consensus document (size 1866898).
 }}}
 This time it hit the 2 second Torbutton timeout breaking the local SOCKS
 port check.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24723 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When I go to https://www.sss.gov/ I get a error "secure Connection Failed" every time

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24723: When I go to https://www.sss.gov/ I get a error "secure Connection 
Failed"
every time
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by dcf):

 SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG, in my experience, often happens when you try
 to talk TLS to a non-TLS port. You'll see it, for example, when you go to
 https://www.example.com:80/ (TLS to port 80 instead of port 443).

 Maybe this site has a bug in its load balancer, or something like that,
 such that TLS gets directed to a plaintext port somewhere on the backend.
 It's weird that it only happens when you access from Tor, but maybe they
 had a special rule for Tor and they didn't update it when they updated
 something else.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24260 [Metrics/Website]: Add metrics timeline events underneath graphs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24260: Add metrics timeline events underneath graphs
--+--
 Reporter:  karsten   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team metrics-timeline  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:18 karsten]:
 > Please review [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-
 web.git/commit/?h=task-24260-2&id=4510449926e96ca8ccf19ab29919e1bf1928e6a3
 commit 4510449 in my branch task-24260-2] which adapts the new format to
 the News page:

 Your commit 4510449 looks fine to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24816 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser is not your privacy browser, Non-goal: PRIVACY

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24816: Tor Browser is not your privacy browser, Non-goal: PRIVACY
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24351| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 >Cloudflare is a MITM point
 So is the Tor network.
 That's the point.

 >[users] clearly didn't read all data
 They cannot be expected to.
 The interface should be self-instructing.
 The interface should educate users on the functionality the Tor network.
 It does neither of these things.
 This is by design.

 Tor is a honeypot for peedos and snitches.
 Tor is used to drone niggers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24850 [- Select a component]: tor2web option without the corresponding tag in torrc causes tor to fail with confusing console output (was: tor2web option without the corresponding tag

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24850: tor2web option without the corresponding tag in torrc causes tor to fail
with confusing console output
--+--
 Reporter:  yurivict271   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

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[tor-bugs] #24850 [- Select a component]: tor2web option without the corresponding tag in torrc makes torfail with confusing console output

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24850: tor2web option without the corresponding tag in torrc makes torfail with
confusing console output
--+--
 Reporter:  yurivict271   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 The log file explains it:
 {{{
 Jan 09 17:12:29.000 [warn] This copy of Tor was compiled or configured to
 run in a non-anonymous mode. It will provide NO ANONYMITY.
 Jan 09 17:12:29.000 [err] This copy of Tor was compiled to run in 'tor2web
 mode'. It can only be run with the Tor2webMode torrc option enabled.
 Jan 09 17:12:29.000 [err] set_options: Bug: Acting on config options left
 us in a broken state. Dying. (on Tor 0.3.2.9 9e8b762fcecfece6)
 }}}

 But the console output looks like it fails for no reason:
 {{{
 Starting tor.
 Jan 09 17:12:29.178 [notice] Tor 0.3.2.9 (git-9e8b762fcecfece6) running on
 FreeBSD with Libevent 2.1.8-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.2n, Zlib 1.2.11, Liblzma
 5.2.3, and Libzstd 1.3.3.
 Jan 09 17:12:29.178 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn
 how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning
 Jan 09 17:12:29.178 [notice] Read configuration file
 "/usr/local/etc/tor/torrc".
 Jan 09 17:12:29.187 [notice] Scheduler type KISTLite has been enabled.
 Jan 09 17:12:29.187 [notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9050
 /usr/local/etc/rc.d/tor: WARNING: failed to start tor
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21109 [Core Tor/Tor]: apparent inconsistency in prop264

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21109: apparent inconsistency in prop264
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, easy, doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  reopened => merge_ready
 * keywords:  tor-spec => tor-spec, easy, doc
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


Comment:

 I assume this commit exists somewhere, it just hasn't been merged.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24805 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Update fallback whitelist and blacklist

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24805: Update fallback whitelist and blacklist
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24786 | Points:  2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by teor):

 An operator sent an email to me directly, opting-in this relay:

 F2DFE5FA1E4CF54F8E761A6D304B9B4EC69BDAE8

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24729 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Find reason for 'null' values in Onionoo document

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24729: Find reason for 'null' values in Onionoo document
-+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by teor):

 This is related to the metrics ticket #24155 about the tor reporting
 change in #23856. There's also #24829 about the graphs we show.

 Maybe #24155 should be the parent here? (How does metrics do parent
 tickets?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #9186 [Webpages/Website]: Document how to report security vulnerabilities

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9186: Document how to report security vulnerabilities
--+--
 Reporter:  lunar |  Owner:  kat5
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * cc: arma (added)


Comment:

 This looks fine to me, let's get the ok from someone on the list before we
 merge it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8742 [Core Tor/Tor]: Byte history leaks information about local usage/hidden services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8742: Byte history leaks information about local usage/hidden services
-+-
 Reporter:  alphawolf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  byte-history, stats, tor-hs, |  Actual Points:
  privacy, tor-relay, 026-triaged-1, |
  027-triaged-1-in, PostFreeze027|
Parent ID:   | Points:  medium
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR
-+-
Changes (by 43901348):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 I guess I am allowed to re-open it. Please adjust as necessary, including
 closed as WONTFIX if that's really the consensus.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24497 [Webpages/Website]: Improve documentation for tor relay operators

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24497: Improve documentation for tor relay operators
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I'm planing to remove the WIP header, name it tor relay guide and ask tor
 relay operators for comments and testing latest by 2018-01-12
 please let me know if you do not want that.

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[tor-bugs] #24849 [Core Tor/Tor]: Added -1 signatures to consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24849: Added -1 signatures to consensus
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-sr, tor-ddos
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #24815
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 This line is also in the logs from #24815.
 {{{
 Jan 09 08:57:32.637 [info] dirvote_add_signatures_to_pending_consensus:
 Added -1 signatures to consensus.
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21109 [Core Tor/Tor]: apparent inconsistency in prop264

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21109: apparent inconsistency in prop264
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 > I've amended tor-spec.txt with 8692de910d3b56da27f17f890472ec91cf2014e7
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/commit/?id=8692de910d3b56da27f17f890472ec91cf2014e7
 Bad commit reference: 8692de910d3b56da27f17f890472ec91cf2014e7

 There's no such commit and it still says HSDir=2 is recommended required.
  https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/log/tor-spec.txt
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/or/dirserv.c?id=5ee0cccd49e57fad8c810e817d912d4a61dbc96c#n3054

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24815 [Core Tor/Tor]: Validate shared random state dates before each voting period

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24815: Validate shared random state dates before each voting period
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-sr, tor-ddos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 I can't do that, because the network addresses are supposed to be secret.
 I'll email them instead.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18856 [Core Tor/Stem]: Talk with tor's ORPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18856: Talk with tor's ORPort
---+
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  descriptor |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 There's no urgency on #19129, I have to do a lot of other things first
 (like #24818, #24838, and #24839). Otherwise, my time gets taken up
 contacting relay operators every 6 months.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24687 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor eats all mbufs on FreeBSD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24687: Tor eats all mbufs on FreeBSD
--+
 Reporter:  AMDmi3|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.9
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 It looks like the existing tor options are enough to resolve this issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24834 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Map consensus weight vs bandwidth for each bandwidth authority's votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24834: Map consensus weight vs bandwidth for each bandwidth authority's votes
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth-needs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24674| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by atagar):

 > consensus-health uses stem: a small stem program could write out the
 per-bandwidth-authority votes

 Hi Tim. For what it's worth we already have that in our examples...

 
https://stem.torproject.org/tutorials/examples/votes_by_bandwidth_authorities.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24674 [Core Tor/Torflow]: Bandwidth authorities should use geographically distributed bandwidth servers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24674: Bandwidth authorities should use geographically distributed bandwidth
servers
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torflow  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24499| Points:  3
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by teor):

 From irl's quick analysis in #24834 at
 https://people.torproject.org/~irl/volatile/rsvotes/ it looks like
 gabelmoo is the most significant source of bias towards DE and FR.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24834 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Map consensus weight vs bandwidth for each bandwidth authority's votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24834: Map consensus weight vs bandwidth for each bandwidth authority's votes
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth-needs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24674| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 (Also, the map is missing Faravahar. Was it missing from that particular
 vote?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24834 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Map consensus weight vs bandwidth for each bandwidth authority's votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24834: Map consensus weight vs bandwidth for each bandwidth authority's votes
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth-needs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24674| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 What format did you need?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24834 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Map consensus weight vs bandwidth for each bandwidth authority's votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24834: Map consensus weight vs bandwidth for each bandwidth authority's votes
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth-needs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24674| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 consensus-health uses stem: a small stem program could write out the per-
 bandwidth-authority votes. And the output would be much smaller than
 consensus-health's flags table.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24833 [Core Tor/Tor]: DNS not reliably returning AAAA records

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24833: DNS not reliably returning  records
--+
 Reporter:  Zakhar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor:
  |  0.2.9.14
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6 tor-client tor-exit tor-dns  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21311| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  DNS  => ipv6 tor-client tor-exit tor-dns
 * parent:   => #21311


Comment:

 This could be a duplicate of #21311: we need to find out if the exits that
 don't return IPv6 addresses:
 * have a DNS server that fails to return  records,
 * fail to ask for  records, or
 * fail to return  records to clients.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24497 [Webpages/Website]: Improve documentation for tor relay operators

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24497: Improve documentation for tor relay operators
--+
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > > > - I'd would like to make the page readonly for the first 3 days
 after you announce it on twitter and/or blog
 > >
 > > Good idea.
 >
 > I don't think "The Tor Relay Guide" is descriptive enough. It's not all
 about relays, it's about running a relay. We added "Ultimate" because
 there are so many other resources that had to be pulled from in order to
 create this, so ultimate signals this is the place to come to see them
 all.


 Since it will be located at .torproject.org it is the authoritative source
 of tor related information anyway, no? (even without 'ultimate')

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22488 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Include relay version listed in consensus in addition to platform line from server descriptor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22488: Include relay version listed in consensus in addition to platform line 
from
server descriptor
-+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Onionoo-1.8.0
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2017 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 This causing confusion for tor relay operators
 example:
 http://lists.nycbug.org/pipermail/tor-bsd/2018-January/000620.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22488 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Include relay version listed in consensus in addition to platform line from server descriptor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22488: Include relay version listed in consensus in addition to platform line 
from
server descriptor
-+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Onionoo-1.8.0
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2017 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 Is this fix already deployed?
 A few relays that have recommended_version set to False even though they
 are running a recommended version:

 {{{
 
++-+--+-+-+
 | nickname   | tor_version | fingerprint
 | last_restarted  | running |
 
++-+--+-+-+
 | TOris  | 0.3.1.9 | A2888CB01CEAD3BBD84F63707F45318A7A71D141
 | 2018-01-08 07:39:07 |   0 |
 | NoSpyOrg   | 0.2.9.14| 1AFD68DF6403140E32E73F1DB72415CE4229832F
 | 2018-01-09 10:17:15 |   0 |
 | DeltaIV| 0.3.1.9 | 75CCC14FB38F2E473AC2C31F255355110FCE8D38
 | 2018-01-06 21:01:47 |   0 |
 | cosmicsurfin   | 0.3.1.9 | 4A0242BED06138AD6BB1FE103A1D5D3AA9E97C05
 | 2018-01-08 21:32:15 |   0 |
 | wintermute | 0.3.1.9 | 276EAD6119C327930C0B8D3E370BF163EFB0244B
 | 2018-01-09 15:40:38 |   1 |
 | heteigenwijsje | 0.3.1.9 | 1283EBDEEC2B9D745F1E7FBE83407655B984FD66
 | 2018-01-09 16:38:02 |   1 |
 | monoculus  | 0.3.1.9 | A1A01D1B3353F3CFB065E9CBA113AEEB948DF8E1
 | 2018-01-09 20:47:16 |   1 |
 | Unnamed| 0.2.9.14| 7C8F045FC6710FBA57B2C84D008F91BCEABD6A36
 | 2018-01-03 15:32:15 |   0 |
 | propub01   | 0.3.2.8-rc  | 4290EEF4276FEACAD3A4694770B3B905FED51302
 | 2018-01-03 22:27:11 |   0 |
 
++-+--+-+-+
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24729 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Find reason for 'null' values in Onionoo document

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24729: Find reason for 'null' values in Onionoo document
-+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by sjcjonker):

 * cc: sjcjonker@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24823 [Metrics/Website]: Avoid sending an error after a (partial) response (was: Avoid logging an exception when the client aborts a CSV file download)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24823: Avoid sending an error after a (partial) response
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 iwakeh]:
 > Replying to [comment:2 karsten]:
 > > Hmm, or maybe we should not attempt to send an error code after
 sending a (partial) response to the client. Please review
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-
 web.git/commit/?h=task-24823&id=f310c0dab2a30aa6f7b7a844e4304e6f347168bb
 commit f310c0d in my task-24823 branch]. (Untested!)
 >
 > This is a good idea. Maybe, the ticket title should be changed to 'Avoid
 sending an error after a (partial) response.'?

 Sure!

 > I would want to keep the try-with-resources in method 'writeStatsFile'
 in order to close everything properly;  the exceptions don't need to be
 caught in there.  Setting to needs-revision.

 Ah, good idea. Please find [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-
 web.git/commit/?h=task-24823&id=535dc67071e702fa60e858a613af3e620daa6039
 commit 535dc67] which puts the try-with-resources back. (Still untested!)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24823 [Metrics/Website]: Avoid logging an exception when the client aborts a CSV file download

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24823: Avoid logging an exception when the client aborts a CSV file download
-+
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 karsten]:
 > Hmm, or maybe we should not attempt to send an error code after sending
 a (partial) response to the client. Please review
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-
 web.git/commit/?h=task-24823&id=f310c0dab2a30aa6f7b7a844e4304e6f347168bb
 commit f310c0d in my task-24823 branch]. (Untested!)

 This is a good idea. Maybe, the ticket title should be changed to 'Avoid
 sending an error after a (partial) response.'?

 I would want to keep the try-with-resources in method 'writeStatsFile' in
 order to close everything properly;  the exceptions don't need to be
 caught in there.  Setting to needs-revision.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24723 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When I go to https://www.sss.gov/ I get a error "secure Connection Failed" every time

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24723: When I go to https://www.sss.gov/ I get a error "secure Connection 
Failed"
every time
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Huh, interesting. What are they doing at the TLS level, though, and why? I
 mean there should be easier ways to ban Tor users...

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[tor-bugs] #24848 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: update sponsor list on trac

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24848: update sponsor list on trac
--+--
 Reporter:  isabela   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Hi there!
 is time to update our sponsor list.

 Add:
 sponsor13
 sponsor9
 sponsor17

 No need to create -can and -must for these sponsors.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22983 [Metrics/Library]: Add a Descriptor subinterface and implementation for Tor web server logs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22983: Add a Descriptor subinterface and implementation for Tor web server logs
-+---
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  metrics-lib 2.2.0
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * priority:  Medium => High
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review the top commits on
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/metrics-
 lib.git/log/?h=task-22983-4 this branch].

 The additional commits should address all topics from the comments above
 starting at comment:47.  Sanitization and validation are now separated (of
 course only valid lines can be cleaned at all and invalid ones have to be
 discarded).  (The range of what log lines are considered valid
 (independent of them being discarded during sanitization) is kind of
 arbitrary.  Thus, for having a stricter or laxer validation it is best to
 provide test log line examples and how they should be treated.)

 Setting to high, as this is the basis for CollecTor's webstat module in
 #22428.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24723 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When I go to https://www.sss.gov/ I get a error "secure Connection Failed" every time

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24723: When I go to https://www.sss.gov/ I get a error "secure Connection 
Failed"
every time
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


Comment:

 Perhaps this is a case of the website treating incoming Tor connections
 badly? I can connect without errors in Tor Browser 7.5a10 if I bypass the
 tor proxy, and I can reproduce the `SSL_ERROR_RX_RECORD_TOO_LONG` error
 using Firefox 57.0.4 when it is configured to use a tor proxy.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24103 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove the NoEdConsensus flag

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24103: Remove the NoEdConsensus flag
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  prop224 tor-dirauth tor-hs ed25519   |  Actual Points:
  needs-proposal TorCoreTeam201711.1 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 We intend one day to have _only_ ed keys in the consensus, but that's a
 long way off, and we can revisit it when we do that design.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24756 [Applications/Tor Browser]: New default bridge: bridge-01.noisetor.net

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24756: New default bridge: bridge-01.noisetor.net
--+---
 Reporter:  patrickod |  Owner:  patrickod
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-bridges   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  gk|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-bridges, TorBrowserTeam201801R => tbb-bridges


Comment:

 patrickod, thanks! You want to write a patch against the code in `tor-
 browser-build`, see e.g. https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-
 browser-build.git/commit/?id=5eb4c84fd87c80496dc522f44f26928f1330b814

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24833 [- Select a component]: DNS not reliably returning AAAA records

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24833: DNS not reliably returning  records
--+
 Reporter:  Zakhar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.14
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  DNS   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24833 [Core Tor/Tor]: DNS not reliably returning AAAA records

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24833: DNS not reliably returning  records
--+
 Reporter:  Zakhar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.14
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  DNS   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24756 [Applications/Tor Browser]: New default bridge: bridge-01.noisetor.net

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24756: New default bridge: bridge-01.noisetor.net
+--
 Reporter:  patrickod   |  Owner:
|  patrickod
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-bridges, TorBrowserTeam201801R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  gk  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * owner:  tbb-team => patrickod
 * reviewer:   => gk
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24756 [Applications/Tor Browser]: New default bridge: bridge-01.noisetor.net

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24756: New default bridge: bridge-01.noisetor.net
+--
 Reporter:  patrickod   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-bridges, TorBrowserTeam201801R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:6 patrickod]:
 > @gk I'm happy to do it, however I've not contributed to Tor Browser at
 all before. Would you have an example patch introducing a new bridge that
 I could use as a reference?

 Examples:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/21917/0001-Add-
 new-default-bridges-cymrubridge31-80-and-cymrubr.patch and
 https://github.com/isislovecruft/tor-browser-bundle/tree/bug23166

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24783 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Support browser.storage.sync.*

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24783: Support browser.storage.sync.*
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 According to the following document, `browser.storage.sync` is not
 available in Firefox 52 ESR (which is the version of Firefox that Tor
 Browser is based on):
 https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/Add-ons/WebExtensions/API/storage/sync

 For now this is not a bug, and this functionality may "just work" when Tor
 Browser switches to Firefox 59 ESR.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24826 [Core Tor/Tor]: LZMA-compressed consensus diffs stall Tor Browser launch for at least 20s or break it entirely

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24826: LZMA-compressed consensus diffs stall Tor Browser launch for at least 
20s
or break it entirely
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by mcs):

 For reference:
 * The control port read timeout that is used by Tor Launcher is 15 seconds
 (used when reading Tor configuration via the control port, to issue
 commands during startup such as `TAKEOWNERSHIP`, and so on).
 * The control port read timeout that is used by Torbutton is 2 seconds
 (used when sending control port commands for the local SOCKS port check
 during browser startup and for new identity).

 Should these timeouts be increased? What value should we use?

 As someone pointed out, in an ideal world tor would be responsive to
 control port commands at all times.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #9186 [Webpages/Website]: Document how to report security vulnerabilities

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9186: Document how to report security vulnerabilities
--+--
 Reporter:  lunar |  Owner:  kat5
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by kat5):

 Added to the mailing list wiki page.

 Ready for review/merge:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/kat/webwml.git/commit/?h=add-tor-
 security-list-info-to-contact

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Re: [tor-bugs] #9186 [Webpages/Website]: Document how to report security vulnerabilities

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9186: Document how to report security vulnerabilities
--+--
 Reporter:  lunar |  Owner:  kat5
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by kat5):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24756 [Applications/Tor Browser]: New default bridge: bridge-01.noisetor.net

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24756: New default bridge: bridge-01.noisetor.net
+--
 Reporter:  patrickod   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-bridges, TorBrowserTeam201801R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by patrickod):

 @gk I'm happy to do it, however I've not contributed to Tor Browser at all
 before. Would you have an example patch introducing a new bridge that I
 could use as a reference?

 @dcf Thanks for the suggestion. Will update the configuration later
 tonight.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #19566, #19926, #23300

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #19566, #19926, #23300 by dgoulet:
priority to Medium

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #22893, #22781, #24554

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #22893, #22781, #24554 by dgoulet:
priority to Very High

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20699 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Add control port events and commands

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20699: prop224: Add control port events and commands
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs, needs-proposal,  |  Actual Points:
  prop224-extra, tor-control, prop284, review-   |
  group-26, review-group-27  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Closing in favor of #24847 that I just opened.

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[tor-bugs] #24847 [Core Tor/Tor]: Merge HS v3 prop284 into control-spec.txt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24847: Merge HS v3 prop284 into control-spec.txt
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-spec, tor-hs, easy
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Proposal 284 has now been merged, it needs to be put in the control-
 spec.txt.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #24815, #19566

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #24815, #19566 by dgoulet:


Action: reassign

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #23301, #23306, #23307, #23576, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #23301, #23306, #23307, #23576, #23759, #23988, #24182, 
#24449, #24694 by dgoulet:


Action: reassign

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23993 [Core Tor/Tor]: sched: Refactor and fix interactions between channel and scheduler

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23993: sched: Refactor and fix interactions between channel and scheduler
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-sched |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


Comment:

 We won't be able to fix everything in 033.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23744 [Core Tor/Tor]: sched: Notification events have different meaning for each scheduler

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23744: sched: Notification events have different meaning for each scheduler
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-sched |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23993| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorV
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


Comment:

 This is simply too huge for now to be in 033.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23543 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Disconnects on long-lasting HS connections (possibly because of mds)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23543: prop224: Disconnects on long-lasting HS connections (possibly because of
mds)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  tor-hs prop224 prop224-bugs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 After almost a month of ping/pong with a simpler client and service setup,
 we got very very few of these so I'm calling it "IRC protocol + IRC
 daemon" crazyness.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24846 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: create logo for Tor Project | Survey

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24846: create logo for Tor Project | Survey
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23669   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isabela):

 * parent:  #24845 => #23669


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23662 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Service edge-case where it re-uploads descriptor with same rev counter

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23662: prop224: Service edge-case where it re-uploads descriptor with same rev
counter
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24103 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove the NoEdConsensus flag

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24103: Remove the NoEdConsensus flag
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224 tor-dirauth tor-hs ed25519   |  Actual Points:
  needs-proposal TorCoreTeam201711.1 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by irl):

 Do we still intend to one day have ed keys in the consensus? If not, then
 maybe this should be wontfix too?

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[tor-bugs] #24846 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: create logo for Tor Project | Survey

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24846: create logo for Tor Project | Survey
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin   |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  ux-team
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #24845
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We should have a logo following the styleguide.torproject

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24346 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Service stops uploading one of its two descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24346: prop224: Service stops uploading one of its two descriptors
-+
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.4-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => accepted


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[tor-bugs] #24845 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: update Limesurvey theme and logo to follow styleguide.torproject.org

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24845: update Limesurvey theme and logo to follow styleguide.torproject.org
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin   |Version:
  Team   |
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  ux-team
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #23669
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Our survey platform should follow our design style guidelines:
 styleguide.torproject.org

 Should be easy since both are done with bootstrap (Limesurvey and
 styleguide.tpo).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24342 [Core Tor]: Various spec fixes to dir-spec, rend-spec-v3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24342: Various spec fixes to dir-spec, rend-spec-v3
-+-
 Reporter:  filippo  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, review-group-26, review-   |  Actual Points:
  group-27   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * owner:  (none) => asn
 * status:  needs_revision => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19566 [Core Tor/Tor]: SR: Use BUG() instead of tor_assert() when we can

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19566: SR: Use BUG() instead of tor_assert() when we can
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-sr, dirauth, easy, disaster- |  Actual Points:
  waiting-to-happen  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24103 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove the NoEdConsensus flag

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24103: Remove the NoEdConsensus flag
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224 tor-dirauth tor-hs ed25519   |  Actual Points:
  needs-proposal TorCoreTeam201711.1 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * parent:  #23170 =>
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 Closing #23170 since the HS reachability issue has been "solved" by
 bumping the HSDir store parameter so I'm unparenting this and sending it
 to the Unspecified world.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23170 [Core Tor/Tor]: Include ed25519 relay id keys in the consensus

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23170: Include ed25519 relay id keys in the consensus
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tor-spec prop224 tor-dirauth tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
  ed25519 needs-proposal TorCoreTeam201711.1 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:22 nickm]:
 > I'm currently inclined to call this ticket "wontfix" based on the
 performance regression.

 ACK.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22810 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Make the client/service extend properly to the IP/RP

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22810: prop224: Make the client/service extend properly to the IP/RP
---+
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224-extra  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 I'm closing this. Part of it is wrong and most of it gets superseded with
 the work in #22781 and the IPv6 effort.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20699 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Add control port events and commands

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20699: prop224: Add control port events and commands
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, needs-proposal,  |  Actual Points:
  prop224-extra, tor-control, prop284, review-   |
  group-26, review-group-27  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_revision => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24831 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Consider providing more/less fine grained data for Realy Search graphs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24831: Consider providing more/less fine grained data for Realy Search graphs
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24155| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by irl):

 * owner:  metrics-team => irl
 * status:  new => accepted
 * component:  Metrics/Onionoo => Metrics/Relay Search


Comment:

 Ok, I'll try to fix this in Relay Search first. This is probably the
 "right way" to do it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24815 [Core Tor/Tor]: Validate shared random state dates before each voting period

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24815: Validate shared random state dates before each voting period
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-sr, tor-ddos  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [comment:2 teor]:
 > There are times when it never syncs up.
 > Sometimes it will be out of sync for hours, and other times it won't get
 back in sync until I restart the Tor process.

 If you can attach the info logs when it is out of sync, I can look at it,
 in theory if the consensus you download is the latest from the network,
 this shouldn't happened :S.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21693 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: HS descriptors do wasteful double-base64 encoding

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21693: prop224: HS descriptors do wasteful double-base64 encoding
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, 031-stretch  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  4
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24837 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Allow Relay Searches for Additional Flags

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24837: Allow Relay Searches for Additional Flags
-+--
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by irl):

 The following flags are synthesised by Relay Search:

 ||=Flag=||=Description=||
 || NotRecommended || This relay is running a version of tor that is not
 recommended by the directory authorities ||
 || Unmeasured || This relay has not been measured by at least 3 bwauths ||
 || Hibernating || This relay indicated that it is hibernating in its last
 known descriptor ||
 || FallbackDir || This relay is listed as a fallback directory in the tor
 source code ||
 || ReachableIPv6 || This relay has been confirmed as reachable via IPv6 in
 the consensus ||
 || UnreachableIPv4 || This relay was not reachable on at least one IPv4
 address published in the server descriptor ||
 || UnreachableIPv6 || This relay was not reachable on at least one IPv6
 address published in the server descriptor ||
 || IPv6 Exit || This relay allows exit connections to IPv6 hosts ||

 The relevant code in Relay Search is:

 {{{
 /* Synthetic Additional Flags */
 var additional_flags = []
 if (!((typeof relay.recommended_version !== 'undefined') ?
 relay.recommended_version : true)) additional_flags.push("Not
 Recommended");
 if (!((typeof relay.measured !== 'undefined') ? relay.measured : true))
 additional_flags.push("Unmeasured");
 if (((typeof relay.hibernating !== 'undefined') ? relay.hibernating :
 false)) additional_flags.push("Hibernating");
 if (IsFallbackDir(relay.fingerprint))
 additional_flags.push("FallbackDir");
 if (relay.or_v6_addresses.length > 0)
 additional_flags.push("ReachableIPv6");
 if (relay.unreachable_or_v4_addresses.length > 0)
 additional_flags.push("UnreachableIPv4");
 if (relay.unreachable_or_v6_addresses.length > 0)
 additional_flags.push("UnreachableIPv6");
 if (relay.exit_policy_v6_summary !== null) additional_flags.push("IPv6
 Exit");
 }}}

 For the Onionoo protocol, I would prefer it if these flags are kept
 separate from the dir-spec flags in a new "additional_flags" field, but
 for searching it would be good to still have "flag:X" work. I don't know
 if this introduces a lot more complexity in Onionoo though.

 Things that would need to be done as I understand it:

 * Add a new "additional_flags" field to Onionoo's relay details documents
 * Extend the "flag" parameter to also search in this new field, as well as
 the existing "flags" field
 * Synthesise each of the flags:
  * NotRecommended, Hibernating and Unmeasured are all based on boolean
 values already in the document
  * ReachableIPv6, UnreachableIPv4 and UnreachableIPv6 will require
 checking the "or_addresses" and "unreachable_or_addresses" fields
  * IPv6 Exit will require checking the exit policies
  * FallbackDir will depend on #24436

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18856 [Core Tor/Stem]: Talk with tor's ORPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18856: Talk with tor's ORPort
---+
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  descriptor |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by atagar):

 Hi Tim, just spotted your updates on #19129. Sorry about the long radio
 silence - this is in progress. I've been digging into endosome for the
 last couple weeks, integrating and adding test coverage into Stem.

 I'm jugging it with other stuff (like new fallback fields), but I hope to
 shoot ya a pull request once Stem at least has cell packing/unpacking
 support.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24837 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Allow Relay Searches for Additional Flags

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24837: Allow Relay Searches for Additional Flags
-+--
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by irl):

 I'll add a list and make individual tickets for these.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24798 [Core Tor/Tor]: Enforce ipv4 + ipv6 capable exit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24798: Enforce ipv4 + ipv6 capable exit
--+
 Reporter:  Zakhar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.11
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tor-client, ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Zakhar):

 Please, close this ticket that is incorrectly explained.

 It is now superseded by: #24833

 ''(focus on DNS, all the rest works like a charm!)''

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24593 [Webpages/Website]: Upload press clips to website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24593: Upload press clips to website
--+--
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by kat5):

 * owner:  kat5 => hiro
 * status:  needs_review => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24593 [Webpages/Website]: Upload press clips to website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24593: Upload press clips to website
--+--
 Reporter:  steph |  Owner:  kat5
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by kat5):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Ready for review/merge:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/kat/webwml.git/commit/?h=press-
 updates-01092018

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18122 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Show prefetched new Tor circuit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18122: Show prefetched new Tor circuit
-+-
 Reporter:  bugzilla |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-circuit-display, tbb-usability,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-performance|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:10 cypherpunks]:
 > I think this is a second time I see all other developers said there's
 nothing to fix, except Arthur who finally fixed the issue. (comment:4 has
 nothing about isolated circuits)

 I think you are wrong here. If you think I or someone else misunderstood
 you please reopen the ticket and explain what you mean (explaining as well
 my understanding of your issue was wrong). And, no, new tabs don't have
 pre-built circuits either. `Ctrl+t` does not interact with `tor` in any
 way. Thus, there is nothing the circuit display could reasonably show in
 this case.

 And please don't put multiple issues in a single bug (or hijack a bug).
 I've told that to you (yes, you, even though you are behind the
 cypherpunks account) numerous times. It makes dealing with bugs harder,
 error-prone and there is the risk that things are falling through the
 cracks. Thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24823 [Metrics/Website]: Avoid logging an exception when the client aborts a CSV file download

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24823: Avoid logging an exception when the client aborts a CSV file download
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Hmm, or maybe we should not attempt to send an error code after sending a
 (partial) response to the client. Please review
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-
 web.git/commit/?h=task-24823&id=f310c0dab2a30aa6f7b7a844e4304e6f347168bb
 commit f310c0d in my task-24823 branch]. (Untested!)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24837 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Allow Relay Searches for Additional Flags

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24837: Allow Relay Searches for Additional Flags
-+--
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Fallback directories are a special case, because Onionoo doesn't even have
 this data. We'd have to add the data first before adding this additional
 flag to search parameters.

 The other additional flags would be easier. Would you mind adding a list
 and precise specification for each of them here?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24831 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Consider providing more/less fine grained data for Realy Search graphs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24831: Consider providing more/less fine grained data for Realy Search graphs
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24155   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 There are two reasons why Onionoo would not provide data for a given graph
 (let's take 3 months as example):
  1. Data is not available on the granularity that is typically plotted for
 the desired time frame, but only on a higher granularity. This is
 currently biting us with relays switching from 4 to 24 hours granularity
 for bandwidth data. Onionoo does not include this data, because it would
 be exactly the same as the graph data for longer time periods. Clients can
 check whether there is graph data available for the next longer periods.
 In the example, check whether there's a 1 year or 5 years data object and
 just plot the last 3 months.
  2. Data is available on the right granularity, but only for part of the
 graph interval that is already contained in a graph with shorter time
 period. In the example, if a relay or bridge is around for less than 1
 month, it wouldn't have a 3 months data set, but clients could fall back
 to using the 1 month or 1 week or 3 days data set. Note that Onionoo makes
 sure that at least one graph is available in such a case.

 Would it be difficult to put an ordered list of graph intervals into the
 client code, and whenever the requested graph cannot be found, first
 search towards longer graph periods and then towards shorter graph
 periods? Adding all this redundant data feels like a kludge. We could even
 document the approach taken by Relay Search in the Onionoo protocol
 specification as recommendation for other clients, if that would help.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18122 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Show prefetched new Tor circuit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18122: Show prefetched new Tor circuit
-+-
 Reporter:  bugzilla |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-circuit-display, tbb-usability,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-performance|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I think this is a second time I see all other developers said there's
 nothing to fix, except Arthur who finally fixed the issue. (comment:4 has
 nothing about isolated circuits)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24816 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser is not your privacy browser, Non-goal: PRIVACY

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24816: Tor Browser is not your privacy browser, Non-goal: PRIVACY
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24351| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:14 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [comment:12 cypherpunks]:
 > > Replying to [comment:9 cypherpunks]:
 > > > Replying to [comment:7 cypherpunks]:
 > > > > LOL if I go to https://kproxy.com to visit https://github.com,
 should the browser
 > > > CLoudflare *is* exit node. Not unfair because Tor node and coudflare
 can read your data
 > > This is just wrong, the Tor node won't look at your traffic which is
 great since in the past it would've been able to just do that, thank you
 Cloudflare and eastdakota for protecting Tor users!
 >
 > This is just wrong, Cloudflare look at your traffic, just like bad Tor
 exits which running sslstrip or proxy.
 So you have statement T_1: "With Cloudflare basic SSL a Tor exit wont look
 at your plaintext traffic" and statement T_2: "Cloudflare may look at your
 traffic with basic SSL", do you realize that T_2 has no epistemological
 bearing on statement T_1?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24729 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Find reason for 'null' values in Onionoo document

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24729: Find reason for 'null' values in Onionoo document
-+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Here's a possibly smarter idea. We add a 6 month history object with a
 data resolution of 1 day. And we skip graphs if the reported data interval
 of even a single data point is higher than the graph interval.

 Let me illustrate this idea by giving a table of all documents containing
 histories together with their graph intervals (columns), data resolution
 (cells), and maximum number of data points (in parentheses):

 ||=''document'' =||=''3 days'' =||=''1 week''=||=''1 month''
 =||=''3 months''   =||=''6 months''=||=''1 year'' =||=''5 years''
 =||
 ||clients|| ||'''~~1 day (7)~~''' ||'''~~1 day
 (31)~~''' ||'''~~1 day (92)~~''' ||'''1 day (183)''' ||2 days (183) ||10
 days (183) ||
 ||bandwidth  ||15 minutes (288) ||1 hour (168)||4 hours (186)
 ||12 hours (184)   ||'''1 day (183)''' ||2 days (183) ||10 days (183)
 ||
 ||uptime || ||1 hour (168)||4 hours (186)
 ||12 hours (184)   ||'''1 day (183)''' ||2 days (183) ||10 days (183)
 ||
 ||weights|| ||1 hour (168)||4 hours (186)
 ||12 hours (184)   ||'''1 day (183)''' ||2 days (183) ||10 days (183)
 ||

 Example: The 3 days bandwidth graph has a data resolution of 15 minutes
 which means that it can hold up to 288 data points (3 * 24 * 60 / 15 =
 288).

 Suggested changes in bold are to add a 6 months graph with a resolution of
 1 day and also to drop the shorter graphs from clients documents with a
 data resolution of 1 day. (The latter is unrelated to this change, but why
 not clean up here now that we discovered this redundancy.)

 How does this sound?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24696 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Moat: network activity SVG needed for Tor Launcher

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24696: Moat: network activity SVG needed for Tor Launcher
---+--
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ux-team|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24689 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by antonela):

 Awesome (~‾▿‾)~ㅤ

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24729 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Find reason for 'null' values in Onionoo document

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24729: Find reason for 'null' values in Onionoo document
-+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Here's what happened:
  - The relay upgraded from a tor software version reporting bandwidth for
 4 hour intervals to 0.3.2.6-alpha on December 2 and later downgraded to a
 pre-0.3.2.6-alpha version on December 21. During that time it reported
 bandwidth values for 24 hour intervals.
  - Onionoo's 1 month graph has a fixed data point interval of 4 hours. It
 cannot report data with a resolution of only 1 data point per 24 hours.
 That's why Onionoo includes all those `null` values, simply meaning that
 it doesn't know how much bandwidth the relay read or wrote during that
 time.
  - Relay search displays those `null` values as `0` values, which it
 shouldn't do. Knowing that a relay pushed 0 bytes is a different thing
 than not knowing how many bytes it pushed.
  - Only the 1 month and 3 months graphs are affected, because they have a
 data resolution of 4 hours and 12 hours, respectively. Look at the 1 year
 graph with a data resolution of 48 hours and which doesn't have a gap in
 December 2017.
  - Note that this is the same issue that leads to blank 1 month and 3
 month graphs and non-blank 1 year graphs for new relays.

 Is this a bug in Onionoo? Probably.

 What can we do? We could go through all reported data points for a given
 graph and pick the largest interval as data point interval. That is, if
 all data points have an interval of 4 hours, we produce graph data with 1
 data point per 4 hours. But if there's at least 1 reported data point with
 an interval of 24 hours, we aggregate all data for that graph to 1 data
 point per 24 hours.

 A possible downside is that the graphs for 3 months, 1 month, 1 week, and
 3 days will basically contain the exact same data. Maybe we can do
 something smart to avoid providing data that is too redundant, but not too
 smart in order to not move too much logic into clients.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24309: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
---+--
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201801  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela   |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ux-team => ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201801


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[tor-bugs] #24844 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add HS v3 status to the SIGUSR1 dumpstats()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24844: Add HS v3 status to the SIGUSR1 dumpstats()
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Only v2 is supported with `rend_service_dump_stats()`. Would be nice to
 have one for v3 as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18691 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Switch rbm VMs for Windows to those used for our macOS cross-builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18691: Switch rbm VMs for Windows to those used for our macOS cross-builds
---+--
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201801  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: boklm (added)
 * keywords:  tbb-rbm => tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201801


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #6119, #18101, #22586, #22587, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #6119, #18101, #22586, #22587, #23136, #23231, #23738, 
#14205, #15599, #16341, #17965, #21777, #22451, #23930, #24159, #24421, #24622, 
#10394, #17252, #18925, #19675, #20254, #21256, #21542, #21657, #21689, #21727, 
#21850, #21851, #21863, #22070, #22125, #22170, #22525, #22564, #22581, #22612, 
#22659, #22794, #22854, #23386, #23439, #23561, #23916, #24331, #24476, #24585 
by gk:


Comment:
Moving tickets to 2018.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23231 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error in STL wrappers when building Firefox 64-bit for Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23231: Error in STL wrappers when building Firefox 64-bit for Windows
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201712  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => new


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #21777, #22451, #24622, #18925, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #21777, #22451, #24622, #18925, #20254, #21256, #22581, 
#22659, #23439, #23916 by gk:


Comment:
Moving my tickets to 2018

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24723 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When I go to https://www.sss.gov/ I get a error "secure Connection Failed" every time

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24723: When I go to https://www.sss.gov/ I get a error "secure Connection 
Failed"
every time
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:   => tbb-usability-website


Comment:

 Weird.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24687 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor eats all mbufs on FreeBSD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24687: Tor eats all mbufs on FreeBSD
--+
 Reporter:  AMDmi3|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.1.9
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by AMDmi3):

 I've gathered some socket statistics, and it doesn't show any apparent
 anomalies (e.g. specific sockets with unusually large buffers). There's
 just a lot of sockets with moderately big receive buffers (up to 512KB),
 and these sum up to take a lot of buffer space. The only anomaly is that
 number of such sockets raise quite quickly at some moment.

 ConstrainedSockets seem to be just what I need, thanks. Don't want to
 limit number of sockets for now, since there's no peaks in socket usage,
 it stable around ~6k.

 I'm running tor 0.3.1.9.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18122 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Show prefetched new Tor circuit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18122: Show prefetched new Tor circuit
-+-
 Reporter:  bugzilla |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-circuit-display, tbb-usability,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-performance|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 I think I agree with comment:4.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24816 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser is not your privacy browser, Non-goal: PRIVACY

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24816: Tor Browser is not your privacy browser, Non-goal: PRIVACY
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24351| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:12 cypherpunks]:
 > Replying to [comment:9 cypherpunks]:
 > > Replying to [comment:7 cypherpunks]:
 > > > LOL if I go to https://kproxy.com to visit https://github.com,
 should the browser
 > > CLoudflare *is* exit node. Not unfair because Tor node and coudflare
 can read your data
 > This is just wrong, the Tor node won't look at your traffic which is
 great since in the past it would've been able to just do that, thank you
 Cloudflare and eastdakota for protecting Tor users!

 This is just wrong, Cloudflare look at your traffic, just like bad Tor
 exits which running sslstrip or proxy.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24843 [Webpages/Website]: Illustrations for tpo.org redesign

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24843: Illustrations for tpo.org redesign
--+--
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * component:  - Select a component => Webpages/Website


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24816 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser is not your privacy browser, Non-goal: PRIVACY

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24816: Tor Browser is not your privacy browser, Non-goal: PRIVACY
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24351| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > thank you Cloudflare and eastdakota for protecting Tor users!

 Are you joking? They hate Tor users.
 https://blog.cloudflare.com/the-trouble-with-tor/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24843 [- Select a component]: Illustrations for tpo.org redesign

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24843: Illustrations for tpo.org redesign
--+--
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "Option A.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15897 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Circuit Information is not displayed on Firefox error pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15897: Circuit Information is not displayed on Firefox error pages
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-circuit-display,  |  worksforme
  tbb-usability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:22 cypherpunks]:
 > Bleh.
 > Not expected, but as you insist, restoring the tickets...
 > Also it doesn't work for URL in comment:16, still has comment:17 and
 comment:18.

 What is expected instead if you are opening a new tab and look at the
 circuit display? You don't have any domain in your URL bar let alone
 started to load that one.

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