[tor-bugs] #24950 [Applications/Tor Browser]: "Restrict third party cookies and other tracking data" enabled = disables exceptions list for popups

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24950: "Restrict third party cookies and other tracking data" enabled = 
disables
exceptions list for popups
--+--
 Reporter:  vanowm|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Options -> Privacy -> Restrict third party cookies and other tracking data
 When enabled, popup blocker ignores exceptions list and blocks popups from
 all websites.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24949 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The problem with TorButton

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24949: The problem with TorButton
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry |Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 However, we do not recommend installing any additional Firefox add-ons
 with Tor Browser. Add-ons can break your anonymity in a number of ways,
 including browser fingerprinting and bypassing proxy settings.

 [https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#TBBOtherExtensions Can I
 install other
 Firefox extensions?]

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24897 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor seems to malfunction on FreeBSD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24897: Tor seems to malfunction on FreeBSD
--+
 Reporter:  yurivict271   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by yurivict271):

 So, once #24899 will be fixed, this problem will still likely persist.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24897 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor seems to malfunction on FreeBSD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24897: Tor seems to malfunction on FreeBSD
--+
 Reporter:  yurivict271   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by yurivict271):

 After increasing the limit to {{{MaxClientCircuitsPending 128}}}, I still
 see the problem. The log ended with
 {{{
 Jan 20 16:33:30.000 [notice] We'd like to launch a circuit to handle a
 connection, but we already have 128 general-purpose client circuits
 pending. Waiting until some finish. [1808313 similar message(s) suppressed
 in last 600 seconds]
 }}}
 ZeroNet has been stopped at about the same time.

 The tor process was at 100% CPU for at least 10 minutes after ZeroNet was
 stopped. Only after ~15 minutes it became usable again.

 The problem seems to be deeper than just the running out of circuits. It
 persists for many minutes after all temporary ZeroNet onions have been
 shut down.

 Once the user-process is shut down, all its onions and circuits should
 shut down promptly. It looks like this doesn't happen.

 Somebody should re-create the setup I have (Tor+ZeroNet with tor=always
 and a lot of sites on FreeBSD 11.1), and see what the problem is.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24943 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorButton is preventing from add-on saving its setting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24943: TorButton is preventing from add-on saving its setting
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24949| Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * reviewer:   => mikeperry


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24949 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The problem with TorButton

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24949: The problem with TorButton
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * reviewer:   => mikeperry


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #2466 [Applications/Torbutton]: Track firefox SOCKS bug and fenec's shouldLoad bug

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#2466: Track firefox SOCKS bug and fenec's shouldLoad bug
+
 Reporter:  mikeperry   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24949  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * parent:   => #24949


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24943 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TorButton is preventing from add-on saving its setting

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24943: TorButton is preventing from add-on saving its setting
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24949| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * parent:   => #24949


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24948 [Applications/Torbutton]: Torbutton breaks other addons

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24948: Torbutton breaks other addons
+
 Reporter:  vanowm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24949  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * parent:   => #24949


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #24949 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The problem with TorButton

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24949: The problem with TorButton
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Stop breaking other add-on!

 This is a collection thread

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18918 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clarify directory and ORPort checking functions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18918: Clarify directory and ORPort checking functions
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, doc, code, refactor|  Actual Points:
  technical-debt tor-relay   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by ffmancera):

 * cc: ffmancera@… (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24947 [Core Tor/Tor]: vanguards bug: connection_ap_expire_beginning(): Bug: circuit->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24947: vanguards bug: connection_ap_expire_beginning(): Bug: circuit->purpose 
==
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL failed.
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tor-guard |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorU
--+
Changes (by ffmancera):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 > Be sure to compare to !#24946, which looks like a duplicate and also has
 a proposed patch.

 I am closing this ticket, it's completly duplicated and the proposed patch
 includes mine too.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24947 [Core Tor/Tor]: vanguards bug: connection_ap_expire_beginning(): Bug: circuit->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24947: vanguards bug: connection_ap_expire_beginning(): Bug: circuit->purpose 
==
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL failed.
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorU
--+

Comment (by arma):

 Be sure to compare to #24946, which looks like a duplicate and also has a
 proposed patch.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #13575 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable randomised Firefox HTTP cache decay user test groups

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13575: Disable randomised Firefox HTTP cache decay user test groups
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-pref, tbb-fingerprinting,|  Actual Points:
  ff52-esr, tbb-easy |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by ffmancera):

 * Attachment "0002-Bug-13575-Disable-randomised-Firefox-HTTP-cache-
 deca.patch" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #13575 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable randomised Firefox HTTP cache decay user test groups

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13575: Disable randomised Firefox HTTP cache decay user test groups
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-pref, tbb-fingerprinting,|  Actual Points:
  ff52-esr, tbb-easy |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by ffmancera):

 * Attachment "0001-Bug-13575-Disable-randomised-Firefox-HTTP-cache-
 deca.patch" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #13575 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable randomised Firefox HTTP cache decay user test groups

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13575: Disable randomised Firefox HTTP cache decay user test groups
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-pref, tbb-fingerprinting,|  Actual Points:
  ff52-esr, tbb-easy |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by ffmancera):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Here is a patch, I did the changes in 000-tor-browser.js instead of
 firefox.js. If it is wrong, please let me know.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #24948 [Applications/Torbutton]: Torbutton breaks other addons

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24948: Torbutton breaks other addons
+
 Reporter:  vanowm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+
 With Torbutton enabled many addon with inline options (options that shown
 on about:addon page) failing with:
 {{{XML Parsing Error: undefined entity Location}}}

 due to .dtd files are blocked(?)

 Example [https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/back-forward-history-
 tweaks/ Back/Forward History Tweaks] - options fail to open
 or
 [https://addons.mozilla.org/firefox/addon/firegestures/ FireGestures] it
 just doesn't work and options also fail to show properly, with the error
 above.

 Disabling Torbutton fixes is.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24947 [Core Tor/Tor]: vanguards bug: connection_ap_expire_beginning(): Bug: circuit->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24947: vanguards bug: connection_ap_expire_beginning(): Bug: circuit->purpose 
==
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL failed.
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorU
--+
Changes (by ffmancera):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 I worked on that, please check my github
 [https://github.com/ffmancera/tor/tree/bug24947 branch bug24947]. Also I
 didn't write a change file because the bug isn't in any release, if it is
 necessary let me know and I will do it.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #5556 [Applications/Tor Browser]: magnet uri support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#5556: magnet uri support
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-firefox-patch |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by V@…):

 As a work around simply go to {{{about:config}}} and create new boolean
 preference
 {{{network.protocol-handler.external.magnet}}}

 set it to {{{true}}}.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16607 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow SVG for extensions, even on "high" security level

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16607: Allow SVG for extensions, even on "high" security level
--+---
 Reporter:  mbauer|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by V@…):

 Oh, yes, there is: svg.in-content.enabled

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24947 [Core Tor/Tor]: vanguards bug: connection_ap_expire_beginning(): Bug: circuit->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24947: vanguards bug: connection_ap_expire_beginning(): Bug: circuit->purpose 
==
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL failed.
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorU
--+
Changes (by ffmancera):

 * cc: ffmancera@… (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16607 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Allow SVG for extensions, even on "high" security level

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16607: Allow SVG for extensions, even on "high" security level
--+---
 Reporter:  mbauer|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by V@…):

 Is there a hidden setting somewhere that would allow SVG? (for those who
 willing risk it)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #24947 [Core Tor/Tor]: vanguards bug: connection_ap_expire_beginning(): Bug: circuit->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24947: vanguards bug: connection_ap_expire_beginning(): Bug: circuit->purpose 
==
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL failed.
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-guard
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  SponsorU  |
--+
 On my hsv3 with vanguards enabled I'm getting the following bug on my
 logs. It was probs caused by #13837 and #23101 which added special circuit
 purposes for fetching/uploading HS descs.

 {{{
 Jan 20 11:52:52.000 [warn] connection_ap_expire_beginning(): Bug:
 circuit->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL failed. The purpose on the
 circuit was Hidden service: Uploading HS descriptor; it was in state open,
 path_state use attempted. (on Tor 0.3.3.0-alpha-dev d69c8f7117a5975a)
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24806 [Core Tor/Tor]: LTS branch leaks memory continuously under stress/attack, requires back-port of 0.3.2.8-rc fixes to remain viable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24806: LTS branch leaks memory continuously under stress/attack, requires back-
port of 0.3.2.8-rc fixes to remain viable
--+--
 Reporter:  starlight |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by starlight):

 Relay came under attack again and total memory utilization went from 1.6GB
 (drifted up from 1.5GB) to 2GB in matter of hours.  This is 0.3.2.8-rc I'm
 talking about with MaxMemInQueues=1024MB.

 Fiddling with it, suspended the daemon for a few minutes to see if that
 would shake off attack circuits and unfortunately this resulted in an
 immediate socket buffer memory consumption surge and kernel OOPS.  So was
 unable to try a gdb-assisted shutdown and obtain pre-exit() statistics.
 The LSAN build has some problem causing it to trap so no progress on
 identifying the exact leak(s).  I am now nearly convinced this a memory
 leak.  Have iptables blocking direct connections from abusive clients, so
 it's clearly distributed circuit-extend attack.  Two crypto threads were
 at 35% CPU each while the main event thread was pegged at 100%.

 Also observed an attack on my exit in recent days and it survived, having
 16GB of RAM--throwing hardware at it is one mitigation.  Don't have time
 right now to deploy the replacement for the "temporary," ancient box
 swapped in due to a hardware failure last summer, so setting
 MaxMemInQueues=512MB and will try again with existing box.  Will try to
 prepare a functional LSAN image.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #4816 [Core Tor/Tor]: Request: add count to "[warn] Your computer is too slow..."

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#4816: Request: add count to "[warn] Your computer is too slow..."
+--
 Reporter:  tmpname0901 |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Minor   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay easy logging  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by aruna1234):

 Can it be done using circuit_add_to_origin_circuit_list() which is called
 at the time of creating circuits. Or can we use circuit_get_cpath_len() to
 get the number of hops in circuit's path, but I don't think it's relevant
 as the issue here is about circuit creation request.
 There must be some function returning the number of circuit creation
 request. I am not sure which one though.
 Can someone help me on that?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22428 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Add webstats module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22428: Add webstats module
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.5.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Section 4.1 (spec) states:


 In addition, log lines are treated differently according to the date they
 contain:

 During an import process the sanitizer takes all log line dates into
 account and determines the reference interval as stretching from the
 oldest date to the youngest date encountered. Depending on the reference
 interval log lines are not yet processed, if their date is on the edges of
 the reference interval, i.e., the date is not at least a day younger than
 the older endpoint or the date is only LIMIT days older than the younger
 endpoint, where LIMIT is initially set to two, but this might change if
 necessary.
 If the younger endpoint of the reference interval coincides with the
 current system date, the day before is used as the new younger reference
 interval endpoint, which ensures that the sanitizer won't publish logs
 prematurely, i.e., before there is a chance that they are complete. Thus,
 processing of log lines carrying such date is postponed.
 All log lines with dates for which the sanitizer already published a
 log file are discarded in order to avoid altering published logs.

 While testing I noticed it might be useful to add a `WebstatsNoLimit'
 property defaulting to false and, if set to true, not applying the limits,
 i.e., writing all logs regardless.  This would make sense for a bulk
 import where it is known that the data are complete and ready to be
 published.
 (Of course, one 'workaround' is to add fake lines to enlarge the interval
 as necessary.)
 Thoughts?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20218 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix and refactor and redocument routerstatus_has_changed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20218: Fix and refactor and redocument routerstatus_has_changed
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed, tor-control, easy, |  Actual Points:
  spec-conformance   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by aruna1234):

 Hey!

 I went through the code of networkstatuc.c.Can the timestamp be changed by
 checking time_t now parameter?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18361 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18361: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance
--+--
 Reporter:  ioerror   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by massar):

 * cc: jeroen@… (removed)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24938 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor error's

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24938: Tor error's
--+---
 Reporter:  John. |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  error's   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * status:  new => closed
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 Hi,

 Modifying Tor Browser's settings like this is not supported.

 Please delete Tor Browser and your Tor Browser data folder.
 Then reinstall Tor Browser.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs