Re: [tor-bugs] #25241 [Metrics/Onionoo]: effective_family sometimes contains the relay's own fingerprint

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25241: effective_family sometimes contains the relay's own fingerprint
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  iwakeh   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Replying to [comment:9 karsten]:
 > Hmm. Interesting idea. Some thoughts/questions:
 >  - What would the `"effective_family"` field contain if a relay is not
 in an effective family with any other relay?

 A family consists of that relay then, or we decide that it needs more than
 one to be a family, but that seems counter intuitive.

 >  - The suggestion is to include the relay itself to `"effective_family"`
 only, and not to `"alleged_family"` or `"indirect_family"`, right?

 The protocol states clearly that the effective family relays are not
 contained therein.  So, actually, the 'self' needs to be in the effective
 family to make these correct.

 >
 > I'm open to this idea, especially if it makes processing easier for
 Onionoo clients. It's a bit redundant to include the same fingerprint
 twice in a document, but we made similar decisions in the past where some
 redundancy is acceptable if that makes it easier to process results.
 >

 It follows the protocol more closely, I think.

 > I'll look closer at the branch as soon as we have made a decision here.

 Even the other way wouldn't need big changes to the patch, only test
 adaption.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8706 [Applications/Tor Browser]: .recently-used.xbel contains filenames if browser stored them to disk

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8706: .recently-used.xbel contains filenames if browser stored them to disk
-+-
 Reporter:  runa |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  backport-to-mozilla, tbb-disk-leak,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-firefox-patch  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 I'm still excited to see this disk leak get fixed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25407 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Unable to retrieve tor settings - Please ensure Tor is running

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25407: Unable to retrieve tor settings - Please ensure Tor is running
---+---
 Reporter:  Toro   |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  tbb-team => brade
 * cc: mcs (added)
 * component:  Applications/Tor Browser => Applications/Tor Launcher


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25430 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Turkey bridges.torproject.org cant access

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25430: Turkey bridges.torproject.org cant access
--+---
 Reporter:  fromturkey|  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 * status:  new => needs_information


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25435 [Applications/Tor Browser]: keyring/binutils.gpg modified by `make alpha`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25435: keyring/binutils.gpg modified by `make alpha`
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: boklm (added)
 * keywords:   => tbb-rbm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25430 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Turkey bridges.torproject.org cant access

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25430: Turkey bridges.torproject.org cant access
--+--
 Reporter:  fromturkey|  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 A temporary solution is to use, a more permanent solution for users and
 center countries to get on block bridges will be `Moat integration (fetch
 bridges for the user)` that should launch in the next alpha TorBrowser.
 Nightly TorBrowser with that feature is
 [https://nightlies.tbb.torproject.org/tor-browser-builds/2018-03-05/ here]
 `Another way to get bridges is to send an email to brid...@torproject.org`

 Get TorBrowser by sending a DM to https://twitter.com/get_tor

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[tor-bugs] #25436 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Remove from fallback.whitelist, add to fallback.blacklist 328E54981C6DDD7D89B89E418724A4A7881E3192

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25436: Remove from fallback.whitelist, add to fallback.blacklist
328E54981C6DDD7D89B89E418724A4A7881E3192
---+--
 Reporter:  sjcjonker  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512

 Please remove:

 80.127.117.180:80 orport=443 id=328E54981C6DDD7D89B89E418724A4A7881E3192
 ipv6=[2001:985:e77:10::4]:443 # sjc01

 from fallback.whitelist, and add it to the fallback.blacklist. I'll keep
 the relay running for the next year and a half as requested / promissed.
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQQzBAEBCgAdFiEEjP0TTVqsQl6bFzvJtbKWBxlMOw8FAlqeMq4ACgkQtbKWBxlM
 Ow//AyAAkQf+v8pb1jFyxxlr1bhkWEwu7vPe5WK55bOVCbE/fhT5K864sLfeNA0s
 gFGJR57GPS5XHDmtP3x9XIT4TkwsByYoKXikW1Enr3NGspuODjF5JQi8IAtahVdg
 kqHOeyMufVdYPRfKE9YFZqeF0gkYMo9nRi7/3x/EmF7AXZSR836RYonpAvj7FW7C
 n3nDHSOG3t5iewL3dJFYk4pvPsvHMgoytJAXcsyjXL7Srnf6Gtk4SqA9/0QUcDOm
 PGFSPjiysoJ20GF1OxCO5A153ENL92P81K9hq/RJV9KlM0POBah5ioGwEs4OskbA
 hIMuD9ccKiAyPTgtufcfGstocADPkCDGj+AYQe842t3PdC+n7snEv3mcQBtcU1qa
 yxiljyWA2DOAE5SYyieESE73aJ9jK5i85UWk7yxJHxnKmQrtZ0a2LK+eAijQ8QrI
 HcmkKf+tyLycftZv35j0tDeDsSvy2aMAOlmnwSUr9cP8tH3hX3yyN9SyHcoVib/h
 6sozasisxdMjENFD3kjWl/PO3XDGDuvGXOFVHso1GyKeQRbHSqL12hS/chQFwYx7
 FF1qR2F22ZV0CWugNjBve1mStcqUbkAzMPddRI7IWw3dDK3wreedBDwuBq+13Muv
 mWtmfDcPUIBaUOUHZlCHgFuHyUj3CpoGL9oVgM+YuzkT90rVHwUkxEVweirs48X8
 lQ+xb5dSxVxWaXTxJ5h7tkzWcf1i2QQmrY/GLcOWZEvkBIar7RUgIuMOyzzTVZaY
 27EyJuWtPpt5tQ/klE8VAWrOEAHGw8P/dflBgDdMiVrnREy3wpN0DltkDVldIHKT
 YE6MpBqxUFBwMe7Waf3IH7ODDDr2qjhSIlbFGWs8Ax27GRB/TrN/Gl3Eu05GpdU1
 DSIzkcDpYJ0DFA+UrRWjoYDBuJnPhsdbFjIVLPj95xRxTdQCQZhMYZ8oQnIwISIS
 d1R1Tc6nbRzQ1gqmsgn0SWdpjPYthCcqrs7nqD/woe3hHR7n2CMDFgI/73FozH40
 3p6Zj/Nzxg2KH00Q1tckP7uEMQpjnMlM93M1phm8HAycYsclKWXSrgo/z7pwwW0+
 +ZpZwThq2tYxqmWyivuGqA9gfyyAwtv15n2xx+pv3D1yzBaeMDyaXBZG1Ky+gXZR
 Mj7ObME8ber8EYdX3IQ5GMdkQnNURKxlUw5arjcutKl7w5L2pK6+qI7uC81JIhqL
 SvAPONWI9SUgblmHxhOMtUlQesazEdURjhDqHjtGyO3EyYcFM0BrNinQTHBN8uwU
 A/zzqZVHf4MhXOQdWjJc5y4v0mgeJhRFV3+JBZuZAE5CWnCF8AROYujnZZOPXcFO
 8elWAN+Ah9g/CUQMh1AMu+8TzIl7pA==
 =O9d/
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25435 [Applications/Tor Browser]: keyring/binutils.gpg modified by `make alpha`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25435: keyring/binutils.gpg modified by `make alpha`
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by dcf):

 I attached the two files. According to `gpg --list-packets`, the
 difference seems to be the addition of some `:trust packet:` (I don't know
 what that means).

 {{{
 $ diff -u <(gpg --list-packets binutils.gpg~) <(gpg --list-packets
 binutils.gpg)
 --- /dev/fd/63  2018-03-05 22:01:07.388420103 -0800
 +++ /dev/fd/62  2018-03-05 22:01:07.388420103 -0800
 @@ -22,7 +22,9 @@
 subpkt 16 len 8 (issuer key ID C3126D3B4AE55E93)
 data: [160 bits]
 data: [157 bits]
 -# off=558 ctb=89 tag=2 hlen=3 plen=289
 +# off=558 ctb=b0 tag=12 hlen=2 plen=2
 +:trust packet: flag=00 sigcache=03
 +# off=562 ctb=89 tag=2 hlen=3 plen=289
  :signature packet: algo 1, keyid 9710B89BCA57AD7C
 version 4, created 1277536050, md5len 0, sigclass 0x10
 digest algo 2, begin of digest 57 f6
 @@ -30,7 +32,9 @@
 hashed subpkt 3 len 4 (sig expires after 14d0h0m)
 subpkt 16 len 8 (issuer key ID 9710B89BCA57AD7C)
 data: [2039 bits]
 -# off=850 ctb=89 tag=2 hlen=3 plen=290
 +# off=854 ctb=b0 tag=12 hlen=2 plen=2
 +:trust packet: flag=00 sigcache=00
 +# off=858 ctb=89 tag=2 hlen=3 plen=290
  :signature packet: algo 1, keyid 9710B89BCA57AD7C
 version 4, created 1225721682, md5len 0, sigclass 0x10
 digest algo 2, begin of digest be 39
 ...
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25435 [Applications/Tor Browser]: keyring/binutils.gpg modified by `make alpha`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25435: keyring/binutils.gpg modified by `make alpha`
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "binutils.gpg" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25435 [Applications/Tor Browser]: keyring/binutils.gpg modified by `make alpha`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25435: keyring/binutils.gpg modified by `make alpha`
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "binutils.gpg~" added.


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[tor-bugs] #25435 [Applications/Tor Browser]: keyring/binutils.gpg modified by `make alpha`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25435: keyring/binutils.gpg modified by `make alpha`
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 From commit [https://gitweb.torproject.org/builders/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?id=4bed9a85478b6fb16e0d654589d8cb8ed3865027
 4bed9a85478b6fb16e0d654589d8cb8ed3865027], I ran `make alpha`. When it was
 finished, `git status` showed that the file keyring/binutils.gpg had
 changed, and left a backup file keyring/binutils.gpg~.

 {{{
 Changes not staged for commit:
   (use "git add ..." to update what will be committed)
   (use "git checkout -- ..." to discard changes in working
 directory)

 modified:   keyring/binutils.gpg

 Untracked files:
   (use "git add ..." to include in what will be committed)

 keyring/binutils.gpg~
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #25434 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Use `ListenAndServeTLS`, not separate `listenTLS` and `Serve` in snowflake-server

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25434: Use `ListenAndServeTLS`, not separate `listenTLS` and `Serve` in 
snowflake-
server
---+--
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 Port these two patches from meek-server to snowflake-server:
  * [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/meek.git/commit/?id=cea86c937dc278ba6b2100c238b1d5206bbae2f0
 Use ListenAndServe{TLS} rather than separate Listen and Serve.]
  * [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/meek.git/commit/?id=e3f3054f8b74caa639a6d9be09702693af9a70e7
 Wait briefly after calling ListenAndServe{TLS} to see if it errors.]
 This way, we automatically get support for HTTP/2 and whatever TLS
 settings Go configures by default, rather than copy-pasted settings from
 some previous version. The only thing we lose is the ability to run a
 server on port 0; i.e. a random ephemeral port.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25346 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Adapt snowflake-server to use ACME HTTP-01 challenge for automatic certificates

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25346: Adapt snowflake-server to use ACME HTTP-01 challenge for automatic
certificates
---+
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks, merged as [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/commit/?id=d0686b1c8df037413f32bef891ef90638b75a080
 d0686b1c8d].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25427 [Webpages/Website]: Please add job description to website: User Research Coordinator

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25427: Please add job description to website: User Research Coordinator
--+
 Reporter:  ewyatt|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 Replying to [ticket:25427 ewyatt]:
 > A note about our research ethics: we strive to conduct user research in
 a safe and privacy-preserving way: we only collect data from our own
 studies, with explicit user consent, and we prefer to do studies in
 person.

 Ten points for having a research ethics shoutout! But, the words "our" and
 "we" are confusing here. It is not the case that Tor only collects data
 from our own studies. There are all sorts of things in the metrics data
 sets that are automated or that come in from other researchers.

 I'm guessing that whoever wrote this text meant themselves, or the UX
 group, or some other subset of Tor when they said we and our. Maybe being
 specific about which group it is could be smart?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25263 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix the hidden service statistics noise

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25263: Fix the hidden service statistics noise
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22898| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorQ
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #22898


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25331 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Test from #18912 failing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25331: Test from #18912 failing
--+---
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * Attachment "bug25331-patch.txt" added.

 patch for test

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25331 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Test from #18912 failing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25331: Test from #18912 failing
--+---
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by mcs):

 After some time in the debugger comparing execution path of Tor Browser
 vs. a mozilla-central build, I found the problem: to get the correct error
 code we need to enable strict enforcement for pinning. I will attach a
 patch for the test which works for me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25346 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Adapt snowflake-server to use ACME HTTP-01 challenge for automatic certificates

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25346: Adapt snowflake-server to use ACME HTTP-01 challenge for automatic
certificates
---+-
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by arlolra):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Look good.  Hopefully nobody running this wants to enable TLS on port 80.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25432 [Core Tor/Tor]: remove router.c internal functions from router.h

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25432: remove router.c internal functions from router.h
---+
 Reporter:  valentecaio|  Owner:  valentecaio
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy refactor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by teor):

 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>
 * component:  Core Tor => Core Tor/Tor
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


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[tor-bugs] #25433 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Update our rbm.local.conf file to support make clean-old

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25433: Update our rbm.local.conf file to support make clean-old
+
 Reporter:  sukhbir |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+
 We should have a rbm.local.conf file so that we can use make clean-old to
 remove the old runc containers that occupy disk space in the $rootdir/tmp
 folder. This ticket is both for Tor Messenger and Tor Mail.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25432 [Core Tor]: remove router.c internal functions from router.h

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25432: remove router.c internal functions from router.h
---+--
 Reporter:  valentecaio|  Owner:  valentecaio
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor   |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy refactor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by valentecaio):

 * cc: caio-valente@… (added)
 * type:  defect => enhancement


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25429 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Need something better than client's `checkForStaleness`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25429: Need something better than client's `checkForStaleness`
---+
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by arlolra):

 > I wonder if the repeated disconnections after 30 seconds is also the
 cause of ...

 I doubt it.  Commenting out `// go c.checkForStaleness()` doesn't have any
 effect on that log line.  However, changing the value of `-max` from `1`
 to `3` reduces it to single instance.  And, I've only ever seen it at
 startup.  Which leads me to believe it has something to do with buffering
 when the initial connections are made.

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[tor-bugs] #25432 [Core Tor]: remove router.c internal functions from router.h

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25432: remove router.c internal functions from router.h
-+--
 Reporter:  valentecaio  |  Owner:  valentecaio
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Minor|   Keywords:  easy refactor
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 These functions (group A):
 {{{
 A
 const char *router_get_description(char *buf, const routerinfo_t *ri);
 const char *node_get_description(char *buf, const node_t *node);
 const char *routerstatus_get_description(char *buf, const routerstatus_t
 *rs);
 const char *extend_info_get_description(char *buf, const extend_info_t
 *ei);
 }}}

 Do the same as these (group B):
 {{{
 B
 const char *router_describe(const routerinfo_t *ri);
 const char *node_describe(const node_t *node);
 const char *routerstatus_describe(const routerstatus_t *ri);
 const char *extend_info_describe(const extend_info_t *ei);
 }}}

 With the difference that those last allocate a buffer, instead of forcing
 the caller to create and pass the buffer as a parameter.

 The functions from group B are an abstraction to the ones from group A:
 they are better because they always generate buffers of enough size (the
 size is NODE_DESC_BUF_LEN). So, we should avoid using group A.

 By now, both groups are declared in the header, and there is only one use
 of a function of group A (router_get_description is used on dirserv.c).

 Also, all those functions are abstractions to format_node_description,
 that should also not be used externally, so we could also remove this one
 from the header.

 The constant NODE_DESC_BUF_LEN is not necessary externally either.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23780 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Tor repeatedly tells me that "Your Guard is failing an extremely large amount of circuits" when using snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23780: Tor repeatedly tells me that "Your Guard is failing an extremely large
amount of circuits" when using snowflake
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by arlolra):

 > Tor repeatedly tells me that "Your Guard is failing an extremely large
 amount of circuits" when using snowflake

 This is only while bootstrapping, right?

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[tor-bugs] #25431 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Tor Browser Interface Idea - Unable To Access Blocked Ports Option

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25431: Tor Browser Interface Idea - Unable To Access Blocked Ports Option
-+-
 Reporter:  oneandonly   |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
  Launcher   |   Keywords:  tor browser ports
 Severity:  Normal   |  firewall
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 I have some suggestions for Tor Browser Interface.

 The configuration option which configures what ports tor browser connects
 through has been moved to a place where it does not appear when the
 configure button is clicked, and it only accessible after a successful
 connection. This could make it very difficult for people who are
 connecting through a firewall that only allows certain ports to configure
 this option, and I would suggest it is moved back.

 The option to configure tor browser to use bridge relays has been renamed
 to "Tor is censored in my country". Even if in America, it could be a
 company, school, college, etc. firewall that is blocking the tor network
 (thus bridges would be useful). I would suggest ISP, firewall, etc, after
 the word Country.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25346 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Adapt snowflake-server to use ACME HTTP-01 challenge for automatic certificates

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25346: Adapt snowflake-server to use ACME HTTP-01 challenge for automatic
certificates
---+--
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Here is a simple patch. I started this running on
 https://snowflake.bamsoftware.com/ and it just issued a fresh certificate.

 Because the SNI-based ACME challenge needed HTTPS on port 443, and we were
 going to be listening with HTTPS on other ports anyway, the way it was
 formerly handled is that if there was no listener for port 443, we just
 opened an additional one (as if the parent process had given us an
 additional bindaddr).

 Now we do something similar, except the additional listener we open on
 port 80 only handles HTTP-01 messages; it doesn't implement WebSocket and
 can't be used to reach tor.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25346 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Adapt snowflake-server to use ACME HTTP-01 challenge for automatic certificates

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25346: Adapt snowflake-server to use ACME HTTP-01 challenge for automatic
certificates
---+
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "0001-Use-Manager.HTTPHandler-for-automatic-TLS-support-
 in.patch" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25353 [Core Tor/Tor]: Configure fails with some OpenSSL 1.1.0 built with no-deprecated.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25353: Configure fails with some OpenSSL 1.1.0 built with no-deprecated.
-+-
 Reporter:  laomaiweng   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  openssl, tor-ssl, 033-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  032-backport,  033-must|
Parent ID:  #19429   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by laomaiweng):

 Thanks for this work!

 I'm well aware of the fact that Tor still won't build against OpenSSL
 1.1.0 with `no-deprecated` even after this ticket is resolved. But I was
 under the impression that this was not a priority for Tor (see #19429 and
 particularly comment:4:ticket:19429), though I'd be glad if this position
 were revised! :)

 I reported this ticket as a first step towards `no-deprecated`
 compatibility and because `TLSv1_1_method()` felt wrong to check for in
 ''configure'', as it wasn't even used anywhere.

 If Tor wants to move towards full `no-deprecated` compatibility, be aware
 a Gentoo user already offered a patch here:
 https://bugs.gentoo.org/630380. Though the patch was against Tor 0.3.0, I
 think it still applies fine to Tor 0.3.3.
 Other than that, I don't have strong feelings as to what to do next about
 this ticket, or OpenSSL 1.1.0 `no-deprecated` compatibility in general.
 I'll just be happy if it all gets merged/supported eventually.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21003 [Core Tor/Tor]: extend_info_describe should list IPv6 address (if present)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21003: extend_info_describe should list IPv6 address (if present)
-+--
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy intro ipv6 logging  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by teor):

 Yes, this ticket is about log messages that look like:
 {{{
 [info] add_an_entry_guard(): Chose %s as new entry guard
 }}}
 where %s is the output of extend_info_describe().

 But it is good to see that messages like:
 {{{
 [debug] onion_extend_cpath(): Chose router %s for hop #%d (%s)
 }}}
 work correctly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25346 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Adapt snowflake-server to use ACME HTTP-01 challenge for automatic certificates

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25346: Adapt snowflake-server to use ACME HTTP-01 challenge for automatic
certificates
---+
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "0001-Use-Manager.HTTPHandler-for-automatic-TLS-support-
 in.patch" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21003 [Core Tor/Tor]: extend_info_describe should list IPv6 address (if present)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21003: extend_info_describe should list IPv6 address (if present)
-+--
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy intro ipv6 logging  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by valentecaio):

 Is this ticket still valid?

 According to teor comments, only entry nodes should be concerned by it.
 I've run an IPv6 client (ClientUseIPv4 0 UseMicrodescriptors 0) and I
 can't find any log of entry points using an IPv4 address.
 However, other nodes are referred to by their IPv4 addresses.

 An example:
 {{{
 [debug] onion_extend_cpath(): Chose router
 $A6EDA578BA3CA94AB207841DBD468B0FF991643B~FalkensteinTor01 at
 2a01:4f8:1c17:4216::1 for hop #1 (exit is inwaiting)
 [debug] onion_extend_cpath(): Chose router
 $AC153580D1DE33051AFC975C7108BCD31CBBC9A1~spaghetti2 at 176.31.181.71 for
 hop #2 (exit is inwaiting)
 [debug] onion_extend_cpath(): Chose router
 $18BFF1DEAA073003108CFDA2C0DE970D8F604478~inwaiting at 178.175.138.98 for
 hop #3 (exit is inwaiting)
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #25430 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Turkey bridges.torproject.org cant access

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25430: Turkey bridges.torproject.org cant access
--+--
 Reporter:  fromturkey|  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Greetings,

 In Turkey as you know there are lots of internet censorship and im fearing
 that this censorship could go way much worse just like russia and china.

 About 2-3 years ago Turkey government blocked tor, by that i mean tor
 relays and torproject.org website.

 So im trying to get along with it by using bridges.

 The problem is, both torproject.org and its subdomain
 bridges.torproject.org is censored as well-in all Turkey's ISP's.
 Currently i can only access via vpn-but also in tails its really hard to
 access bridges as well.(one time i had to manually input bridges plus
 certs doh!)

 My search on mirrors of bridges.torproject.org gave no results, and i cant
 find any problem solving answers here as well unfortunately.

 And yes there are other ways to get bridges by mail, but those mail
 adresses-gmail,yahoo and riseup could be censored as well. So we need a
 solution about that too.

 So my problem/ suggestion is to put a mirror site-other than
 torproject.org on your web page,and maybe put some sync'ing bridges in
 tails ( i mean with a script, bridges info could be pulled -from clearnet
 :( i know right-and put in torrc file)

 Sorry i dont have enough tech info about this,im just throwing the ideas i
 have.

 This censorship of ours could be gotten worse-in anytime so please help
 us!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23780 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Tor repeatedly tells me that "Your Guard is failing an extremely large amount of circuits" when using snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23780: Tor repeatedly tells me that "Your Guard is failing an extremely large
amount of circuits" when using snowflake
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by arlolra):

 * cc: arlolra (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25429 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Need something better than client's `checkForStaleness`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25429: Need something better than client's `checkForStaleness`
---+
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by dcf):

 I wonder if the repeated disconnections after 30 seconds is also the cause
 of "Your Guard is failing an extremely large amount of circuits" in
 #23780.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25426 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Failure to download Tor Browser (curl --tlsv1.2 fail)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25426: Failure to download Tor Browser (curl --tlsv1.2 fail)
-+-
 Reporter:  0brand   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * keywords:  Tor Browser Download SSL failure curl --tlsv1.2 =>
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 This is a duplicate of #25418, which is being resolved with the provider.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21312 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21312: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu
---+--
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by arlolra):

 Opened #25429 for another problem surfaced here.

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[tor-bugs] #25429 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Need something better than client's `checkForStaleness`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25429: Need something better than client's `checkForStaleness`
---+
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 If no message has been received on the datachannel on the client for
 `SnowflakeTimeout` (30 seconds), `checkForStaleness` closes the
 connection.  The comment says this is to,

 > // Prevent long-lived broken remotes.

 but there's no heartbeat at this level of abstraction so the connection is
 constantly being reset anytime the user pauses their activity (for
 example, to read a webpage).

 This greatly exacerbated #21312

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21312 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21312: snowflake-client is pegged at 100% cpu
---+--
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  arlolra
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by arlolra):

 Pushed a patch which makes use of the above fixed in the client,
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/commit/?id=f6301197cc154781cfa96a5255c47c9977887f02

 A similar patch for the go proxy (which I have) and webrtc server (which I
 don't) are needed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25345 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Adapt broker to use ACME HTTP-01 challenge for automatic certificates

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25345: Adapt broker to use ACME HTTP-01 challenge for automatic certificates
---+
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks for the review, merged in [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/snowflake.git/commit/?id=fcc274ac68dcb9063ca631fac9e8905e90088660
 fcc274ac68].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25423 [Core Tor/Stem]: Treat 'ExitRelay 0' as a reject-all policy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25423: Treat 'ExitRelay 0' as a reject-all policy
---+
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by arma):

 Is nyx looking at a 'getconf exitpolicy'?

 It seems like it should instead be doing a 'getinfo exitpolicy', which
 should tell it what Tor is actually using as its exit policy.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25426 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Failure to download Tor Browser (curl --tlsv1.2 fail)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25426: Failure to download Tor Browser (curl --tlsv1.2 fail)
-+-
 Reporter:  0brand   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  Tor Browser Download SSL failure |  Actual Points:
  curl --tlsv1.2 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by 0brand):

 Replying to [ticket:25426 0brand]:
 > Attempting to download Tor Browser from
 [https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/RecommendedTBBVersion]
 fails using **curl --tlsv1.2** with error.\\
 > \\
 > curl: (35) error:14077102:SSL
 routines:SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO:unsupported protocol
 >
 > However, lower TLS version **curl --tlsv1.0** is working when
 downloading from
 [https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/RecommendedTBBVersions]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25426 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Failure to download Tor Browser (curl --tlsv1.2 fail)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25426: Failure to download Tor Browser (curl --tlsv1.2 fail)
-+-
 Reporter:  0brand   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  Tor Browser Download SSL failure |  Actual Points:
  curl --tlsv1.2 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by adrelanos):

 Failing:

 {{{
 curl --tlsv1.2
 https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/RecommendedTBBVersions
 }}}

 > `curl: (35) error:14077102:SSL
 routines:SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO:unsupported protocol`

 

 Working, but low TLS version:

 {{{
 curl --tlsv1.0
 https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/RecommendedTBBVersion
 }}}

 {{{--tlsv1.2}}} was working previously. The TLS downgrade was done around
 26 Feb 2018. So this is a regression.

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[tor-bugs] #25428 [Webpages/Website]: Please add job description to website: Community Liaison

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25428: Please add job description to website: Community Liaison
--+
 Reporter:  ewyatt|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512

 Hello. Please add the below job description to the website. Thank you!

 March 5, 2018

 Community Liaison

 Are you passionate about helping people all over the world access the
 Internet freely and safely? Are you an advocate who wants to help build a
 network of communities that can use and improve privacy software?

 The Tor Project is looking for an outgoing and engaging Community Liaison
 to help advance our Global South outreach and training efforts. This will
 be a part-time position, approximately 20 hours/wk.

 We are developing tools to safely conduct user research, improve our
 software, and better serve people in under-resourced parts of the world.
 An important part of conducting this research is educating people and
 building relationships in small communities throughout the world. The
 Community Liaison will be the person who builds the bridges between us and
 these communities.

 Your job will be to cultivate and nurture relationships with local people
 and community organizations in our target countries. You will contact,
 recruit, engage, and support Training Partners who represent local at-risk
 populations, and collaborate on identifying specific research objectives
 for users in target regions (i.e., Internet censorship circumvention tools
 for mobile, anonymization for file sharing, etc.).

 The ideal candidate will have the following:

 •   Experience using and teaching Free Software (FOSS), particularly
 privacy tools like Tor, Signal, GNU/Linux, etc.
 •   Community outreach and teaching experience, including organizing
 privacy technology workshops
 •   Good understanding of threat models for users in high-risk parts
 of the world
 •   Ability to engage diverse groups of people for workshops,
 including activists, human rights organizations, LGBTQ organizations,
 women's rights organizations, journalists, etc.
 •   Fluently speak a non-English language used in the Global South,
 such as Spanish or Portugese
 •   Willing and able to travel internationally
 •   Largely self-directed, motivated, and organized

 This position will be working closely with the UX and Community teams to
 define the best methods to test our hypotheses with our users. This
 position will report to the Community Team Lead and may be performed from
 anywhere in the world.

 The Tor Project, Inc., is a 501(c)(3) organization headquartered in
 Seattle that provides the technical infrastructure for privacy protection
 over the Internet, helping millions of activists, journalists and others
 around the world communicate securely. With paid staff and contractors of
 around 35 engineers and operational support people, plus many volunteers
 all over the world who contribute to our work, the Tor Project is funded
 in part by government grants and contracts, as well as by individual,
 foundation, and corporate donations. Our mission is “To advance human
 rights and freedoms by creating and deploying free and open anonymity and
 privacy technologies, supporting their unrestricted availability and use,
 and furthering their scientific and popular understanding.”

 Salary is commensurate with experience and other qualifications. The Tor
 Project has a competitive benefits package, including a generous PTO
 policy; 14 paid holidays per year (including the week between Christmas
 and New Year's, when the office is closed); health, vision, dental,
 disability, and life insurance paid in full for employee; flexible work
 schedule; and occasional travel opportunities. The Tor Project, Inc., is
 an equal opportunity, affirmative action employer.

 This is a part-time position working remotely. To apply, send a cover
 letter explaining why you believe you should be our Community Liaison,
 along with your resume, to h...@torproject.org with “Community Liaison” in
 the subject line. No phone calls please!


 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
 Comment: GPGTools - https://gpgtools.org

 iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEENecqn2ZVRfkstmYkugyUAPgPkc4FAlqdyz0ACgkQugyUAPgP
 kc74cA//RUs5fDVC+zmYvNdDEHz2L1LZVkGt/n9d8b1NOIdf4bX02HQrGLVj1eS9
 YE1UVKshK/ZMPeK122vdVUP589nRynIxJph9v2WaqDobB0Ms7nGkkGJHPNDaiUce
 1fnUKLYcMZMYVqAMAGv6v0VBqoN1PTkD1nYG/mppHdIfnsZ6ogQz2CMMBk5MTxne
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 +TsYyDwk/KVY0eVFyAwgnfLcJ

Re: [tor-bugs] #25426 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Failure to download Tor Browser (curl --tlsv1.2 fail)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25426: Failure to download Tor Browser (curl --tlsv1.2 fail)
-+-
 Reporter:  0brand   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  Tor Browser Download SSL failure |  Actual Points:
  curl --tlsv1.2 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by adrelanos):

 * cc: adrelanos@… (added)
 * owner:  (none) => tpa
 * component:  - Select a component => Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team


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[tor-bugs] #25427 [Webpages/Website]: Please add job description to website: User Research Coordinator

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25427: Please add job description to website: User Research Coordinator
--+
 Reporter:  ewyatt|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 {{{

 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512

 Hello. Please add the below job description to the website. Thank you!

 March 5, 2018

 User Research Coordinator

 The Tor Project is looking for a well-organized User Research Coordinator!
 Are you passionate about making software usable and fun for all types of
 people? Do you want to help conduct user research for software that helps
 people protect their privacy and freedom online? If so, this may be the
 job for you.

 The Tor Project supports multiple software projects related to online
 censorship and surveillance. Our goal is to expand the reach of our
 software products, specifically into non-US and non-European countries,
 where oppressive censorship and surveillance can be a matter of life or
 death. In order for us to reach people in these countries and make our
 software usable for them, we need to conduct user research with people who
 live there.

 Our ability to do research depends on social networking help from fellow
 Internet Freedom members and volunteers all around the world. Your job
 would be to manage and support this network. Specifically, you would work
 with the technical teams to monitor the software projects they’re
 building, create test guides for those projects, coordinate the user
 research tests, and then collect and present a summary of the results to
 the respective teams.

 A note about our research ethics: we strive to conduct user research in a
 safe and privacy-preserving way: we only collect data from our own
 studies, with explicit user consent, and we prefer to do studies in
 person.

 The ideal candidate for this job will have the following experience:
 •   Organizing and managing multiple projects with stakeholders
 located in different parts of the world
 •   Performing usability studies, A/B testing, defining personas,
 identifying corner cases
 •   Working with a multidisciplinary team with people from different
 cultures and backgrounds
 •   Designing and executing user research surveys
 •   Awareness of privacy-by-design practices and respect for our
 users' privacy and anonymity
 •   Ethnographic research a huge plus!
 •   Using and teaching Free Software (FOSS), particularly privacy
 tools like Tor, Signal, GNU/Linux, etc.
 •   Willingness and ability to travel internationally at least twice a
 year

 This position will work closely with the Tor Project's UX and Community
 teams to define the best methods to test our hypotheses with our users.
 This position will report to the Project Manager.

 The Tor Project, Inc., is a 501(c)(3) organization headquartered in
 Seattle that provides the technical infrastructure for privacy protection
 over the Internet, helping millions of activists, journalists and others
 around the world communicate securely. With paid staff and contractors of
 around 35 engineers and operational support people, plus many volunteers
 all over the world who contribute to our work, the Tor Project is funded
 in part by government grants and contracts, as well as by individual,
 fou7899ndation, and corporate donations. Our mission is “To advance human
 rights and freedoms by creating and deploying free and open anonymity and
 privacy technologies, supporting their unrestricted availability and use,
 and furthering their scientific and popular understanding.”

 Salary is commensurate with experience and other qualifications. The Tor
 Project has a competitive benefits package, including a generous PTO
 policy; 14 paid holidays per year (including the week between Christmas
 and New Year's, when the office is closed); health, vision, dental,
 disability, and life insurance paid in full for employee; flexible work
 schedule; and occasional travel opportunities. The Tor Project, Inc., is
 an equal opportunity, affirmative action employer.

 This is a full-time position working either out of our office in Seattle
 or remotely. To apply, send a cover letter explaining why you believe you
 should be our User Research Coordinator, along with your resume, to hr at
 torproject dot org with “User Research Coordinator” in the subject line.
 No phone calls please!

 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
 Comment: GPGTools - https://gpgtools.org

 iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEENecqn2ZVRfkstmYkugyUAPgPkc4FAlqdyqIACgkQugyUAPgP
 kc460g/9GanZMvHP8EyPay+sU/41NAqwQhb8iYuxOxvFuLPHQs0+3BApQ4ougUbJ
 GsP1+bD+FsPW5RRpcVxzbiQYlUVUWVjY

[tor-bugs] #25426 [- Select a component]: Failure to download Tor Browser (curl --tlsv1.2 fail)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25426: Failure to download Tor Browser (curl --tlsv1.2 fail)
-+-
 Reporter:  0brand   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a   |Version:
  component  |   Keywords:  Tor Browser Download
 Severity:  Major|  SSL failure curl --tlsv1.2
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Whonix- Attempting to download Tor Browser from
 [https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/RecommendedTBBVersion]
 fails using **curl --tlsv1.2** with error.\\
 \\
 curl: (35) error:14077102:SSL routines:SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO:unsupported
 protocol

 However, lower TLS version **curl --tlsv1.0** is working when downloading
 from
 [https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/RecommendedTBBVersions]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25423 [Core Tor/Stem]: Treat 'ExitRelay 0' as a reject-all policy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25423: Treat 'ExitRelay 0' as a reject-all policy
---+
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 atagar, do you think Tor should prepend "reject *:*" to the ExitPolicy
 when ExitRelay is 0?
 I thought we did that, but if we don't, that's probably a bug in Tor.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25425 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add unittests for bridges.c module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25425: Add unittests for bridges.c module
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-unittests, tor-bridge, review-   |  Actual Points:
  group-35   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * keywords:  tor-unittests, tor-bridge => tor-unittests, tor-bridge,
 review-group-35


Comment:

 Putting in review-group-35, since it's not priority and we can do this
 after Rome.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24658 [Core Tor/Tor]: Split/refactor crypto.h into smaller separate modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24658: Split/refactor crypto.h into smaller separate modules
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:
 |  ffmancera
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-crypto, refactor, review-|  Actual Points:
  group-32, review-group-34  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_review


Comment:

 Changing back to needs_review. Please review my patches in comment:30;
 I've already reviewed ffmancera's latest code. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25425 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add unittests for bridges.c module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25425: Add unittests for bridges.c module
---+---
 Reporter:  isis   |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-unittests, tor-bridge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
---+---
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * version:  Tor: 0.3.3.3-alpha =>
 * type:  defect => enhancement
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


Comment:

 Patch in my `bug25425`
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/tor.git/log/?h=bug25425 branch].
 It roughly doubles the test coverage of that module.

 || make directive || line coverage || function coverage ||
 || coverage-html || 43.0% || 59.4% ||
 || coverage-html-full || ??? || ??? ||

 (The stem tests freeze upon
 `test.integ.descriptor.remote.TestDescriptorDownloader` and turn into
 three zombie processes on my development machine for some reason that I
 didn't bother looking into, so I don't know what `coverage-html-full` will
 say.)

 I built with `--enable-fatal-warnings --enable-expensive-hardening` and
 also ran it under valgrind to check for accidental leaks. Also [https
 ://travis-ci.org/isislovecruft/tor/builds/349504986 TravisCI passes].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25112 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 7.5 is not working on Windows Vista 64bit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25112: Tor Browser 7.5 is not working on Windows Vista 64bit
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr-will-have,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201803R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 I don't have a way to test this patch, but it looks okay. I have a couple
 of comments:
 - To match Mozilla's style inside `GeckoChildProcessHost.cpp` you should
 add a space after the `if` keywords.
 - It is okay to check for the existence of `IsWow64Process()` but I think
 it will be present in all versions of Windows we care about since I am
 pretty sure we required WinXP sp2 or later. That said, I am not sure what
 happens if you try try to run on something older so maybe we should keep
 the `GetProcAddress` fun.
 - I don't think having `TweakSandboxLevel()` adds much; I would just put
 code like this inside `GeckoChildProcessHost::PrepareLaunch()`:
 {{{
   if (ShouldLowerSandboxLevel(mSandboxLevel)) {
 mSandboxLevel = 0;
   }
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25353 [Core Tor/Tor]: Configure fails with some OpenSSL 1.1.0 built with no-deprecated.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25353: Configure fails with some OpenSSL 1.1.0 built with no-deprecated.
-+-
 Reporter:  laomaiweng   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  openssl, tor-ssl, 033-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  032-backport,  033-must|
Parent ID:  #19429   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I've had a partial success here.

 My branch `bug25353_032` replaces the `TLSv1_1_method()` check with a
 `SSL_CIPHER_get_id()` test.  (You can see my public repository at
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/nickm/tor.git .)

 The problem here, though, is that this change is not enough to make Tor
 compile when OpenSSL is built with no-deprecated.  Tor uses the following
 deprecated functions:
 {{{
 CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data
 ENGINE_cleanup
 ERR_free_strings
 ERR_load_crypto_strings
 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup
 EVP_cleanup
 OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms
 SSL_library_init
 SSL_load_error_strings
 X509_get_notAfter
 X509_get_notBefore
 }}}

 The number of functions here makes me think that we should postpone
 compatibility with `no-deprecated` OpenSSL until 0.3.4.  What do you
 think?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24494 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Specification says nickname is optional in documents but it's always there

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24494: Specification says nickname is optional in documents but it's always 
there
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  iwakeh   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Onionoo changes look fine and pass all tests and checks.  The protocol
 description makes sense.
 Always good to simplify things when possible.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25425 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add unittests for bridges.c module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25425: Add unittests for bridges.c module
---+---
 Reporter:  isis   |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-unittests, tor-bridge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
---+---
Changes (by isis):

 * owner:  (none) => isis
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25425 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add unittests for bridges.c module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25425: Add unittests for bridges.c module
---+---
 Reporter:  isis   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-unittests, tor-bridge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  2
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
---+---
Changes (by isis):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


Comment:

 Are we allowed to put in merge requests for unittests for the currently
 closed (but still stabilising) release (0.3.3)? I'm not sure. Feel free to
 bump into 0.3.4 if not. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25241 [Metrics/Onionoo]: effective_family sometimes contains the relay's own fingerprint

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25241: effective_family sometimes contains the relay's own fingerprint
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  iwakeh   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Hmm. Interesting idea. Some thoughts/questions:
  - What would the `"effective_family"` field contain if a relay is not in
 an effective family with any other relay?
  - The suggestion is to include the relay itself to `"effective_family"`
 only, and not to `"alleged_family"` or `"indirect_family"`, right?

 I'm open to this idea, especially if it makes processing easier for
 Onionoo clients. It's a bit redundant to include the same fingerprint
 twice in a document, but we made similar decisions in the past where some
 redundancy is acceptable if that makes it easier to process results.

 I'll look closer at the branch as soon as we have made a decision here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25353 [Core Tor/Tor]: Configure fails with some OpenSSL 1.1.0 built with no-deprecated.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25353: Configure fails with some OpenSSL 1.1.0 built with no-deprecated.
-+-
 Reporter:  laomaiweng   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  openssl, tor-ssl, 033-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  032-backport,  033-must|
Parent ID:  #19429   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I think we could use "SSL_CIPHER_get_id" here -- it is new in 1.0.1,
 present in libressl, not deprecated, and actually used by Tor.

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[tor-bugs] #25425 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add unittests for bridges.c module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25425: Add unittests for bridges.c module
--+---
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-unittests, tor-bridge
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  2 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can  |
--+---
 It didn't have any tests explicitly for it, and it currently has:

 || make directive || line coverage || function coverage ||
 || coverage-html || 19.9% || 34.4% ||
 || coverage-html-full || 58.1% || 78.1 % ||

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24256 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Add a new "outdated" field to distinguish between outdated and too new tor versions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24256: Add a new "outdated" field to distinguish between outdated and too new 
tor
versions
-+--
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25199   | Points:
 Reviewer:  iwakeh   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * reviewer:   => iwakeh


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25241 [Metrics/Onionoo]: effective_family sometimes contains the relay's own fingerprint

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25241: effective_family sometimes contains the relay's own fingerprint
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  iwakeh   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 Please find
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/onionoo.git/log/?h=task-25241
 two commits] on top of the above branch.

 (Pending question still in comment:6)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25353 [Core Tor/Tor]: Configure fails with some OpenSSL 1.1.0 built with no-deprecated.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25353: Configure fails with some OpenSSL 1.1.0 built with no-deprecated.
-+-
 Reporter:  laomaiweng   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  openssl, tor-ssl, 033-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  032-backport,  033-must|
Parent ID:  #19429   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 One challenge here is that we need to make sure that we do not needlessly
 break libressl.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25353 [Core Tor/Tor]: Configure fails with some OpenSSL 1.1.0 built with no-deprecated. (was: Configure fails with some OpenSSL 1.1.0)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25353: Configure fails with some OpenSSL 1.1.0 built with no-deprecated.
-+-
 Reporter:  laomaiweng   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  openssl, tor-ssl, 033-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  032-backport,  033-must|
Parent ID:  #19429   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:
 openssl, tor-ssl, 033-backport, 032-backport, 031-backport,
 029-backport 033-must
 => openssl, tor-ssl, 033-backport, 032-backport,  033-must


Comment:

 This bug appears to be an issue when openssl is built with no-deprecated,
 and only with Tor 0.3.2 or later.

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[tor-bugs] #25424 [Webpages/Blog]: view-by-tag has broken output

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25424: view-by-tag has broken output
---+--
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 https://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/form-990

 should list all of our financials blog posts. And it does, but the 2014
 and 2015 ones are small font and not clickable. :(

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #21704, #23745, #18022, #21850, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #21704, #23745, #18022, #21850, #23439, #25013, #25126 by 
gk:


Comment:
Moving our reviews to March 2018

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24031 [Core Tor/Tor]: Protover.rs could use a better algorithm

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24031: Protover.rs could use a better algorithm
+
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust 033-must protover  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by nickm):

 (FWIW, I think it would be okay to defer this to 0.3.4 if it isn't fast.
 We can just say "don't use Rust on dirauths yet", right?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25415 [Core Tor/Tor]: moria1 seg faults on testing relay reachability

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25415: moria1 seg faults on testing relay reachability
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.2-alpha
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth, crash, 033-must,|  Actual Points:
  review-group-34|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Okay. I'm merging this to 0.3.3.  But let's reopen if this doesn't go
 away, or if it shows up in 0.3.2, or anything like that.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #24031, #25208

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #24031, #25208 by isis:


Action: accept

Comment:
Assigning some 033-must tickets to myself.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25420 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update gcc to 6.4.0 (Windows)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25420: Update gcc to 6.4.0 (Windows)
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201803,   |  Actual Points:
  boklm201803|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Taking the 2 patches from bugs 1389965 and 1407601 is fixing the firefox
 build issues. I am now hitting #20302.

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[tor-bugs] #25423 [Core Tor/Stem]: Treat 'ExitRelay 0' as a reject-all policy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25423: Treat 'ExitRelay 0' as a reject-all policy
---+
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 Oops! Most folks use 'ExitPolicy reject *:*' to flag their relay as being
 a non-exit, but turns out that tor has another option that does the same
 thing...

 https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en#ExitRelay

 We should change the Controller's get_exit_policy() method to provide a
 reject-all policy when this is set. Caught thanks to Gary on tor-relays...

 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2018-March/014741.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25241 [Metrics/Onionoo]: effective_family sometimes contains the relay's own fingerprint

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25241: effective_family sometimes contains the relay's own fingerprint
-+---
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  iwakeh   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Iirc I'm the reason that effective_family has been added to onionoo and
 I'm post-processing onionoo data to always add self to all
 effective_family sets to have uniform effective_family sets for relays
 that are in the same effective_family.  (That said I'm happy with either,
 remove it always or add it always)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25241 [Metrics/Onionoo]: effective_family sometimes contains the relay's own fingerprint

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25241: effective_family sometimes contains the relay's own fingerprint
-+---
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  iwakeh   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 Wondering, if his shouldn't go in a different direction.  I would expect
 the family to contain the listing relay (the 'self').  Isn't it a use case
 to compare families of relays?  Then I would need to somewhat artificially
 add the 'self's.  And, the field's name also yields that the entire family
 is listed incl. 'self'.  So, Onionoo should rather add 'self' always (,
 which is also a slightly simpler patch).
 I couldn't find any reasons for removing the 'self' in the other tickets
 referenced here.
 Thoughts?

 (On first glance I couldn't find any related tests.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25353 [Core Tor/Tor]: Configure fails with some OpenSSL 1.1.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25353: Configure fails with some OpenSSL 1.1.0
-+-
 Reporter:  laomaiweng   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  openssl, tor-ssl, 033-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  032-backport, 031-backport, 029-backport   |
  033-must   |
Parent ID:  #19429   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25380 [Core Tor/Tor]: Transparent proxy not working with linux kernel 4.15.6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25380: Transparent proxy not working with linux kernel 4.15.6
-+-
 Reporter:  vafan|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  033-must, hang, 032-backport, 031|  Actual Points:
  -backport-maybe, 029-backport-maybe, 025   |
  -backport-maybe|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Marking as "needs_information".  The information we need here is: Is this
 a kernel bug, or are we doing something wrong?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13086 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Causing wrong rendering of openstreetmap in Pale Moon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13086: Causing wrong rendering of openstreetmap in Pale Moon
-+-
 Reporter:  pzaccaria|  Owner:  zyan
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Palemoon is not a supported browser. See https://github.com/EFForg/https-
 everywhere/issues/1315. Since this is not an issue on supported browsers,
 I'm closing this issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25420 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update gcc to 6.4.0 (Windows)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25420: Update gcc to 6.4.0 (Windows)
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201803,   |  Actual Points:
  boklm201803|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 I guess https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/9f9a79521c24 is the
 right fix, though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25420 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update gcc to 6.4.0 (Windows)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25420: Update gcc to 6.4.0 (Windows)
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201803,   |  Actual Points:
  boklm201803|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Probably https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1389965.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24290 [Metrics]: Configure timeout for metrics-lib clients, e.g., those using DescriptorIndexCollector

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24290: Configure timeout for metrics-lib clients, e.g., those using
DescriptorIndexCollector
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by karsten):

 Replying to [comment:8 iwakeh]:
 > As operator I might be able to know if some other host sits on the same
 rack in the same server room or is on a slow connection far away.

 Well, I guess we can safely assume that none of our tools runs in such an
 environment.

 > The above properties shouldn't be overridden in code.  To provide a
 better default behavior and avoid overriding a sort of system property I'd
 suggest setting a timeout only if
 `sun.net.client.defaultTimeout` is not set.

 Right, I didn't mean to override those properties. I was rather thinking
 of switching to methods that allow us to specify connect/read timeouts.

 But I also don't think we need to respect system properties starting with
 `sun.net.*`. We can just ignore them and set the timeout we think is
 right.

 > Maybe, one minute for connect and two for read?

 Anything between 1 and 5 minutes should be okay to start with.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24290 [Metrics]: Configure timeout for metrics-lib clients, e.g., those using DescriptorIndexCollector

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24290: Configure timeout for metrics-lib clients, e.g., those using
DescriptorIndexCollector
-+---
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 karsten]:
 > Great that you were able to track this down!
 >
 > Regarding the suggested solution, leaving this as JVM property feels a
 bit ugly to me. First, with every config option we're making it harder to
 remember how to run our tools. And in this case, if somebody forgets to
 set the option, they'll end up with a bad default value. Second, this
 timeout is something that we should decide as developers and not leave up
 to operators. If we don't know what a good value is, how do the operators?
 And it's not that environments vary by that much.

 As operator I might be able to know if some other host sits on the same
 rack in the same server room or is on a slow connection far away.  The
 above properties shouldn't be overridden in code.  To provide a better
 default behavior and avoid overriding a sort of system property I'd
 suggest setting a timeout only if
 `sun.net.client.defaultTimeout` is not set.  Maybe, one
 minute for connect and two for read?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25420 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update gcc to 6.4.0 (Windows)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25420: Update gcc to 6.4.0 (Windows)
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201803,   |  Actual Points:
  boklm201803|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Thanks, this patch is indeed fixing the issue.

 The next build issue is:
 {{{
 /var/tmp/dist/mingw-w64/helpers/i686-w64-mingw32-g++ -std=gnu++11
 -mwindows -o NameTable.o -c -I/var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/obj-
 mingw/dist/stl_wrappers  -DNDEBUG
 =1 -DTRIMMED=1 -DGRAPHITE2_STATIC '-DPACKAGE_VERSION="moz"'
 '-DPACKAGE_BUGREPORT="http://bugzilla.mozilla.org/";' -DGRAPHITE2_NFILEFACE
 -DGRAPHITE2_NTRACING -DGRAPHITE2_N
 SEGCACHE '-DGRAPHITE2_CUSTOM_HEADER="MozGrMalloc.h"' -I/var/tmp/build
 /firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/gfx/graphite2/src -I/var/tmp/build/firefox-
 8ee6fdadea2a/obj-mingw/gfx/graphite
 2/src  -I/var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/obj-mingw/dist/include
 -I/var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/obj-mingw/dist/include/nspr
 -I/var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdade
 a2a/obj-mingw/dist/include/nss -DMOZILLA_CLIENT -include
 /var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/obj-mingw/mozilla-config.h -MD -MP -MF
 .deps/NameTable.o.pp  -Wall -
 Wc++11-compat -Wempty-body -Wignored-qualifiers -Woverloaded-virtual
 -Wpointer-arith -Wsign-compare -Wtype-limits -Wunreachable-code -Wwrite-
 strings -Wno-invalid-offseto
 f -Wc++14-compat -Wno-error=maybe-uninitialized -Wno-error=deprecated-
 declarations -Wno-error=array-bounds -Wno-format -fno-lifetime-dse -fno-
 exceptions -fno-strict-alia
 sing -mms-bitfields -mstackrealign -fno-keep-inline-dllexport -fno-rtti
 -fno-exceptions -fno-math-errno -pipe  -g -O -fno-omit-frame-pointer
 /var/tmp/build/firefox-8e
 e6fdadea2a/gfx/graphite2/src/NameTable.cpp
 libdom_messagechannel.a.desc
 rm -f libdom_messagechannel.a
 /var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/obj-mingw/_virtualenv/bin/python
 /var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/config/expandlibs_gen.py -o
 libdom_messagechannel.a.desc Unified
 _cpp_dom_messagechannel0.o
 In file included from /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 8ee6fdadea2a/gfx/graphite2/src/inc/Main.h:33:0,
  from /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 8ee6fdadea2a/gfx/graphite2/src/NameTable.cpp:27:
 /var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/gfx/graphite2/src/MozGrMalloc.h:16:16:
 error: 'std::moz_xcalloc' has not been declared
  #define calloc moz_xcalloc
 ^
 /var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/gfx/graphite2/src/MozGrMalloc.h:15:16:
 error: 'std::moz_xmalloc' has not been declared
  #define malloc moz_xmalloc
 ^
 /var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/gfx/graphite2/src/MozGrMalloc.h:17:17:
 error: 'std::moz_xrealloc' has not been declared
  #define realloc moz_xrealloc
  ^
 /var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/config/rules.mk:951: recipe for target
 'NameTable.o' failed
 make[5]: *** [NameTable.o] Error 1
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25196 [Metrics/Statistics]: Cut off recent dates from hidserv.csv

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25196: Cut off recent dates from hidserv.csv
+
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  iwakeh  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by karsten):

 * priority:  Very High => Medium
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I'd like to generalize this patch and also include the other statistics
 files. I'm currently waiting on some more data points from a local
 metrics-web instance. As soon as I have something, I'll revise the patch
 and set this ticket to needs_review again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23169 [Metrics/Website]: Explain why metrics are important and what we do to make sure they're safe

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23169: Explain why metrics are important and what we do to make sure they're 
safe
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  metrics-2018 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  iwakeh, karsten  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Replying to [comment:26 irl]:
 > ...
 > Having reviewed the man page for dot, I noticed the standard file
 extension is actually .gv so I've changed that and moved the source to
 `src/main/resources/graphviz`. The idea would be that this serves as a
 common directory for any graphviz source files and then they are installed
 into `src/main/resources/web/images` with the "generate-graphviz-pngs" Ant
 task (added in a separate commit).

 Yes, these are good naming choices and the Ant task looks fine.

 ...
 > I've removed the floating metrics-lib and instead added 3 smaller boxes
 on the paths between CollecTor and the consuming services. I've also added
 an additional paragraph above the image that should help to explain it
 further. If people want to learn additional information, they should read
 the relevant pages that are linked in the text, this is only meant to be a
 quick primer.

 Nice synthesis from the two other graphs and the (short) description is a
 good start.
 Thanks for this really nice Metrics about page!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25387 [Metrics/Website]: Add comment section to CSV file headers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25387: Add comment section to CSV file headers
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 I started an implementation in [https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten
 /metrics-web.git/log/?h=task-25387 my task-25387 branch]. It's also
 temporarily deployed right now, but not merged to master yet.

 In contrast to the suggestions above, I added the header in Java, not in
 R. I think that's going to be more flexible if we make the header more
 complex.

 I did not yet include parameters or a legend. That will require more
 effort and might not be done this week. If the current changes look okay,
 I'll merge and deploy permanently. We could still keep this ticket open to
 do more.

 Please take a quick look!

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #24658, #25306, #24767, #3940, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #24658, #25306, #24767, #3940, #23881, #25036, #25415, 
#24456, #25055, #25226, #25388 by nickm:


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #16849, #24740, #25372, #25386, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #16849, #24740, #25372, #25386, #2536, #3794, #4676, 
#5683, #7553, #7875, #12169, #12377, #13081, #17799, #22907, #24659, #24854, 
#24989, #25341, #25355, #25368, #25400, #13621, #25024, #25398, #25399, #25188 
by nickm:


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #25268, #3940, #24456, #24854

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #25268, #3940, #24456, #24854 by nickm:


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #24658, #24767, #16849, #24456, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #24658, #24767, #16849, #24456, #24854, #25188 by nickm:


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25422 [Applications/rbm]: Give more details in "Cannot checkout" errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25422: Give more details in "Cannot checkout" errors
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/rbm |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, boklm201803,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201803R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, boklm201803 => tbb-rbm, boklm201803,
 TorBrowserTeam201803R


Comment:

 There is a patch for review in branch `bug_25422`:
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/rbm.git/commit/?h=bug_25422&id=b4c8c38e12d11eb232305949c5d42d5df5e8f5c8

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[tor-bugs] #25422 [Applications/rbm]: Give more details in "Cannot checkout" errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25422: Give more details in "Cannot checkout" errors
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/rbm  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm, boklm201803
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Our nightly build sometimes fail with an error such as:
 {{{
 Error: Cannot checkout tor-browser-52.6.0esr-8.0-2-build2
 }}}

 We should print the stderr output from the git/hg command to give more
 details about the error.

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[tor-bugs] #25421 [Applications/rbm]: Add an option to clean repository if checkout fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25421: Add an option to clean repository if checkout fails
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/rbm  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  boklm201803, tbb-rbm
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Our nightly build sometimes fail with an error such as:
 {{{
 Error: Cannot checkout tor-browser-52.6.0esr-8.0-2-build2
 }}}

 The reason is that the working tree from the git repository is not clean,
 which prevents checking out an other commit.

 We should add an option to rbm to do a `git reset --hard` and `git clean`
 if the checkout fails.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25420 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update gcc to 6.4.0 (Windows)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25420: Update gcc to 6.4.0 (Windows)
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201803,   |  Actual Points:
  boklm201803|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Yeah, that's fixed by Jacek's patch for bug 1372870.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25411 [Metrics/Website]: Remove quote from header

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25411: Remove quote from header
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25404   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Removed, with my very limited web designer skills, and deployed. Might be
 necessary to clear the cache to get the updated CSS file that saves a few
 pixels more. Closing.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #20301, #16472, #18867, #21404, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #20301, #16472, #18867, #21404, #23386, #25318 by boklm:


Comment:
boklm201802 -> boklm201803

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25420 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update gcc to 6.4.0 (Windows)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25420: Update gcc to 6.4.0 (Windows)
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201803,   |  Actual Points:
  boklm201803|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 I started a patch for this in branch `bug_25420`:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_25420&id=318ab85316b5d2d29084f5c1f9235c8909f8c1b6

 Building firefox using mingw and gcc 6.4.0 fails with the following error:
 {{{
 /var/tmp/dist/mingw-w64/helpers/i686-w64-mingw32-g++ -std=gnu++11
 -mwindows -o Unified_cpp_media_platforms_wmf0.o -c -I/var/tmp/build
 /firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/obj-mingw/dist
 /stl_wrappers  -DNDEBUG=1 -DTRIMMED=1 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -D_WIN32
 -DWIN32 -D_CRT_RAND_S -DCERT_CHAIN_PARA_HAS_EXTRA_FIELDS -DOS_WIN=1
 -D_UNICODE -DCHROMIUM_BUILD -DU_
 STATIC_IMPLEMENTATION -DUNICODE -D_WINDOWS -D_SECURE_ATL
 -DSTATIC_EXPORTABLE_JS_API -DMOZ_HAS_MOZGLUE -DMOZILLA_INTERNAL_API
 -DIMPL_LIBXUL -I/var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6f
 dadea2a/dom/media/platforms/wmf -I/var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/obj-
 mingw/dom/media/platforms/wmf -I/var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/obj-
 mingw/ipc/ipdl/_ipdlhea
 ders -I/var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/ipc/chromium/src
 -I/var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/ipc/glue -I/var/tmp/build/firefox-
 8ee6fdadea2a/obj-mingw/dist/include
 -I/var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/obj-mingw/dist/include/nspr
 -I/var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/obj-mingw/dist/include/nss
 -DMOZILLA_CLIENT -include /var
 /tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/obj-mingw/mozilla-config.h -MD -MP -MF
 .deps/Unified_cpp_media_platforms_wmf0.o.pp  -Wall -Wc++11-compat -Wempty-
 body -Wignored-qualifier
 s -Woverloaded-virtual -Wpointer-arith -Wsign-compare -Wtype-limits
 -Wunreachable-code -Wwrite-strings -Wno-invalid-offsetof -Wc++14-compat
 -Wno-error=maybe-uninitialize
 d -Wno-error=deprecated-declarations -Wno-error=array-bounds -Wno-format
 -fno-lifetime-dse -fno-exceptions -fno-strict-aliasing -mms-bitfields
 -mstackrealign -fno-keep-i
 nline-dllexport -fno-rtti -fno-exceptions -fno-math-errno -pipe  -g -O
 -fno-omit-frame-pointer   -I/var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/obj-
 mingw/dist/include/cairo  /var
 /tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/obj-
 mingw/dom/media/platforms/wmf/Unified_cpp_media_platforms_wmf0.cpp
 In file included from /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 8ee6fdadea2a/dom/media/platforms/wmf/WMFUtils.cpp:11:0:
 /var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/obj-
 mingw/dist/include/mozilla/WindowsVersion.h:218:0: warning: ignoring
 #pragma warning  [-Wunknown-pragmas]
  #pragma warning(push)

 /var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/obj-
 mingw/dist/include/mozilla/WindowsVersion.h:219:0: warning: ignoring
 #pragma warning  [-Wunknown-pragmas]
  #pragma warning(disable:4996)

 /var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/obj-
 mingw/dist/include/mozilla/WindowsVersion.h:221:0: warning: ignoring
 #pragma warning  [-Wunknown-pragmas]
  #pragma warning(pop)
 In file included from /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 8ee6fdadea2a/dom/media/platforms/wmf/WMFDecoderModule.cpp:28:0,
  from /var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/obj-
 mingw/dom/media/platforms/wmf/Unified_cpp_media_platforms_wmf0.cpp:29:
 /var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/obj-
 mingw/dist/include/mozilla/WindowsVersion.h:218:0: warning: ignoring
 #pragma warning  [-Wunknown-pragmas]
  #pragma warning(push)

 /var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/obj-
 mingw/dist/include/mozilla/WindowsVersion.h:219:0: warning: ignoring
 #pragma warning  [-Wunknown-pragmas]
  #pragma warning(disable:4996)

 /var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/obj-
 mingw/dist/include/mozilla/WindowsVersion.h:221:0: warning: ignoring
 #pragma warning  [-Wunknown-pragmas]
  #pragma warning(pop)

 In file included from /var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/obj-
 mingw/dist/include/mozilla/layers/Compositor.h:15:0,
  from /var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/obj-
 mingw/dist/include/mozilla/layers/TextureD3D11.h:10,
  from /var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/obj-
 mingw/dist/include/mozilla/layers/D3D11ShareHandleImage.h:13,
  from /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 8ee6fdadea2a/dom/media/platforms/wmf/DXVA2Manager.cpp:14,
  from /var/tmp/build/firefox-8ee6fdadea2a/obj-
 mingw/dom/media/platforms/wmf/Unified_cpp_media_platforms_wmf0.cpp:2:
 /var/tmp/build/fi

Re: [tor-bugs] #25413 [Community/Tor Support]: Concept: Secure Mail Server / Mail Network

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25413: Concept: Secure Mail Server / Mail Network
---+---
 Reporter:  bkapur |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  email, secure mail system  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Have you seen OnionMX? As I understand it, it is currently in use.

 https://github.com/ehloonion/onionmx

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7961 [Core Tor/Tor]: Publish transports that bind on IPv6 addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7961: Publish transports that bind on IPv6 addresses
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, pt, ipv6 anticensorship  |  Actual Points:
  needs-spec refactor|
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by fristonio):

 I think that I need to be more familiar with the codebase first in order
 to move to difficult issues. Thank you for your response teor, I really
 appreciate it :) I will take on some easy issues related to Pluggable
 Transports to get familiar, and will try to resolve difficult ones after
 that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25304 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update gcc to 6.4.0 (Linux) (was: Update gcc to 6.4.0)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25304: Update gcc to 6.4.0 (Linux)
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201803,   |  Actual Points:
  boklm201803|
Parent ID:  #24631   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201802, boklm201802 => tbb-rbm,
 TorBrowserTeam201803, boklm201803


Comment:

 I created a separate ticket for the Windows gcc update (#25420), to do the
 Linux and Windows gcc updates separately, as we might not need the Windows
 one if we switch to clang-cl with #21777.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20302 [Obfuscation/FTE]: FTE compilation in our gitian setup is broken for Windows with GCC 6.2.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20302: FTE compilation in our gitian setup is broken for Windows with GCC 6.2.0
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  kpdyer
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/FTE  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201803, tbb-rbm,   |  Actual Points:
  boklm201803|
Parent ID:  #25420   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201802, tbb-rbm, boklm201802 =>
 TorBrowserTeam201803, tbb-rbm, boklm201803
 * parent:  #25304 => #25420


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[tor-bugs] #25420 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update gcc to 6.4.0 (Windows)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25420: Update gcc to 6.4.0 (Windows)
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201803, boklm201803
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We should build Tor Browser for Windows using gcc 6.4.0.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24740 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor launches two requests for authority certificates on first bootstrap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24740: Tor launches two requests for authority certificates on first bootstrap
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bootstrap, tor-bandwidth, easy,  |  Actual Points:
  intro  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-

Comment (by fristonio):

 Ah Thanks, I created the symlink for `tor-stable` and all the mixed
 network tests passed :)

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[tor-bugs] #25419 [Community/Relays]: Advise using GNSS for getting time if it is possible

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25419: Advise using GNSS for getting time if it is possible
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  Nusenu
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
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 Because NTP spoofing can be used to attack the node. GNSS spoofing is much
 harder: it would either require being in physical proximity of the target
 or being a clique of GNSS operators ready to make lot of collateral damage
 in order to attack the network. Of course we can use both GNSS and NTP and
 detect such attacks.

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