Re: [tor-bugs] #25435 [Applications/rbm]: keyring/binutils.gpg modified by `make alpha`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25435: keyring/binutils.gpg modified by `make alpha`
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/rbm |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, boklm201803,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201803R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good to me. Applied to `rbm` (commit
 db41d8e754ed8cd6cee7bca18d76d59f8f7f369b, as I fixed a typo in the commit
 description) and available in `tor-browser-build` (with commit
 058b6520125e57161753d3357fcab6ecd67496bf).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24928 [Obfuscation/meek]: Use `Manager.HTTPHandler` (ACME "HTTP-01" challenge) for automatic certificates

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24928: Use `Manager.HTTPHandler` (ACME "HTTP-01" challenge) for automatic
certificates
--+
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  project   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Done in [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/meek.git/commit/?id=cb8314e0b3a94b9d3c8ce2368ec5b461fb61d117
 cb8314e0b3a94b9d3c8ce2368ec5b461fb61d117].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21926 [Core Tor/Tor]: Still had 1 address policies cached at shutdown

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21926: Still had 1 address policies cached at shutdown
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.10
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: 0.3.2.x-final


Comment:

 I haven't seen it on 0.3.2.9, so let's call it fixed in 0.3.2 or 0.3.1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25241 [Metrics/Onionoo]: effective_family sometimes contains the relay's own fingerprint

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25241: effective_family sometimes contains the relay's own fingerprint
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  iwakeh   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by irl):

 If we do include a relay in its own effective family, Relay Search will
 need to be updated to not perform that step as it currently does.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25380 [Core Tor/Tor]: Transparent proxy not working with linux kernel 4.15.6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25380: Transparent proxy not working with linux kernel 4.15.6
-+-
 Reporter:  vafan|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  033-must, hang, 032-backport, 031|  Actual Points:
  -backport-maybe, 029-backport-maybe, 025   |
  -backport-maybe|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by FlinchX):

 Feel free to add tor-0.3.2.10 to the list of affected versions. I have
 just tried to reproduce the problem on Slackware64-14.2 with kernel
 4.4.118 and tor locks the same way as soon as a program tries to run
 transparently over it, but works fine when it is used just as socks proxy.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23169 [Metrics/Website]: Explain why metrics are important and what we do to make sure they're safe

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23169: Explain why metrics are important and what we do to make sure they're 
safe
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  metrics-2018 |  Actual Points:  2.5
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  iwakeh, karsten  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * actualpoints:   => 2.5


Comment:

 I believe this is done.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25112 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 7.5 is not working on Windows Vista 64bit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25112: Tor Browser 7.5 is not working on Windows Vista 64bit
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr-will-have,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201803R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * keywords:  ff60-esr-will-have, TorBrowserTeam201803 => ff60-esr-will-
 have, TorBrowserTeam201803R
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25112 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 7.5 is not working on Windows Vista 64bit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25112: Tor Browser 7.5 is not working on Windows Vista 64bit
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr-will-have,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201803   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Ignore that 25147 patch, I'm bad with computers

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25112 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 7.5 is not working on Windows Vista 64bit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25112: Tor Browser 7.5 is not working on Windows Vista 64bit
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr-will-have,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201803   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "0001-Bug-25112-Tor-Browser-7.5-is-not-working-on-
 Windows-.patch" added.

 disables sandbox on Vista and below when in wow64 scenario

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25112 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 7.5 is not working on Windows Vista 64bit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25112: Tor Browser 7.5 is not working on Windows Vista 64bit
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr-will-have,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201803   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "0001-Bug-25147-Backport-of-fix-shipped-in-
 Firefox-58.0.1.patch" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25381 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add crypto_rand_double_sign() in C and Rust

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25381: Add crypto_rand_double_sign() in C and Rust
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, privcount, review-|  Actual Points:  1
  group-34   |
Parent ID:  #23061   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * keywords:  tor-relay, privcount => tor-relay, privcount, review-group-34
 * reviewer:   => isis


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25438 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use Locked Prefs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25438: Use Locked Prefs
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:3 cypherpunks]:
 > Please don't lock the proxy settings!  There are legitimate reasons to
 change them, for example:
 > running Tor Browser with a system-wide Tor service, or connecting to a
 Unix socket rather than a TCP port.
 In such cases one should lock prefs that are baked by consensus: everyone
 agrees that fingerprinting protection and first-party isolation should
 always be enforced.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16472 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Upgrade Binutils to 2.25+ for Tor Browser builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16472: Upgrade Binutils to 2.25+ for Tor Browser builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201803,   |  Actual Points:
  boklm201803|
Parent ID:  #12968   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 A Windows-i686 build (I did not try x86_64 yet) using binutils 2.29 is
 also working fine. So it seems the crash is caused by some change between
 binutils 2.29 and 2.30.

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[tor-bugs] #25441 [Core Tor/Tor]: Occasional timing? failures in hs_descriptor/validate_cert unit test

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25441: Occasional timing? failures in hs_descriptor/validate_cert unit test
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs, rust?
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 I see failures like this occasionally on a macOS VM when using Rust. Is
 there some weird timing issue, or is the Rust code interfering with the
 validation?

 {{{
 hs_descriptor/validate_cert: [forking]
   FAIL ../src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c:710: assert(ret OP_EQ 1): 0 vs 1
   [validate_cert FAILED]
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25381 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add crypto_rand_double_sign() in C and Rust

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25381: Add crypto_rand_double_sign() in C and Rust
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, privcount  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:  #23061| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorQ
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 1


Comment:

 Please see my draft branch rust-rand-f64-v4 on
 https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git

 It's not ready to be merged yet, but it has basic structure, tests, and
 some functionality.

 Here are the remaining tasks:
 * write some floating-point error documentation
 * clean up the module imports: the imports I'm doing seem rather clunky
 * tidy up some of the comments and missing references

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24732 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove unused IPv6 DirPort code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24732: Remove unused IPv6 DirPort code
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24403   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorV-can
-+

Comment (by meryemz):

 I have my first change here concerning removing the unused function:
 fascist_firewall_choose_address_dir_server()
 {{{
 https://github.com/mary-em/torprojet-tor/compare/t-24732
 }}}

 And i made the necessary tests.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25435 [Applications/rbm]: keyring/binutils.gpg modified by `make alpha`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25435: keyring/binutils.gpg modified by `make alpha`
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/rbm |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, boklm201803,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201803R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm => tbb-rbm, boklm201803, TorBrowserTeam201803R
 * status:  new => needs_review
 * cc: tbb-team (added)
 * component:  Applications/Tor Browser => Applications/rbm
 * owner:  tbb-team => boklm


Comment:

 There is a patch for review in branch `bug_25435`:
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/rbm.git/commit/?h=bug_25435&id=ddccb0de3cceee4fc83f4508ad7cf14f3b4461c1

 In this patch we add the `--no-auto-check-trustdb` option. At the same
 time, we add `--trust-model always` as we are not using the Web of Trust
 when using a keyring file.

 The `trust-model always` options means:
 > Skip key validation and assume that used keys are always fully valid.
 You generally won’t use this unless you are using some external validation
 scheme. This option also suppresses the "[uncertain]" tag printed with
 signature checks when there is no evidence that the user ID is bound to
 the key. Note that this trust model still does not allow the use of
 expired, revoked, or disabled keys.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25432 [Core Tor/Tor]: remove router.c internal functions from router.h

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25432: remove router.c internal functions from router.h
---+
 Reporter:  valentecaio|  Owner:  valentecaio
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy refactor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by valentecaio):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25432 [Core Tor/Tor]: remove router.c internal functions from router.h

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25432: remove router.c internal functions from router.h
---+
 Reporter:  valentecaio|  Owner:  valentecaio
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy refactor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by valentecaio):

 Ok!

 It's done. Please check it on this branch:
 https://github.com/valentecaio/torproject-tor/tree/t-25432

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25430 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Turkey bridges.torproject.org cant access

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25430: Turkey bridges.torproject.org cant access
--+---
 Reporter:  fromturkey|  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  censorship block tr   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by dcf):

 * keywords:   => censorship block tr


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25435 [Applications/Tor Browser]: keyring/binutils.gpg modified by `make alpha`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25435: keyring/binutils.gpg modified by `make alpha`
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:3 boklm]:

 The cause seems to be the automatic `--check-trustdb` that gpg
 occasionally runs before executing a command. I think I got "lucky" and
 gpg decided to update the trustdb during the rbm build.

 > The only command we use with `binutils.gpg` should be something like
 this:
 > {{{
 > $ gpg --with-fingerprint --keyring ./keyring/binutils.gpg --no-default-
 keyring --verify ./out/binutils/binutils-2.24.tar.bz2.sig
 ./out/binutils/binutils-2.24.tar.bz2
 > }}}
 >
 > Could you check if just running this command is enough to modify
 `binutils.gpg` ?

 I did another `make alpha`, and this time there was no change to
 binutils.gpg. Likewise, with your suggested `--verify` command, there is
 no change. But if I run `--check-trustdb`, I get the same modified
 binutils.gpg and backup file.
 {{{
 $ gpg --with-fingerprint --keyring ./keyring/binutils.gpg --no-default-
 keyring --check-trustdb
 }}}

 The [https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/Operational-GPG-
 Commands.html gpg manual says this]:
 >  `--update-trustdb`:: Do trust database maintenance. This command
 iterates over all keys and builds the Web of Trust. This is an interactive
 command because it may have to ask for the "ownertrust" values for keys.
 >  `--check-trustdb`:: Do trust database maintenance without user
 interaction. From time to time the trust database must be updated so that
 expired keys or signatures and the resulting changes in the Web of Trust
 can be tracked. Normally, GnuPG will calculate when this is required and
 do it automatically unless `--no-auto-check-trustdb` is set. This command
 can be used to force a trust database check at any time. The processing is
 identical to that of --update-trustdb but it skips keys with a not yet
 defined "ownertrust".

 So, it appears that you can use the `--no-auto-check-trustdb` option to
 avoid modifying keyring files.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24148 [Community/Outreach]: Start a program where developers can call out volunteers for swag and glory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24148: Start a program where developers can call out volunteers for swag and 
glory
+
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  alison
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Outreach  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by kat5):

 I scheduled a slot to talk about this on the first unstructured day of the
 Rome meeting.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25438 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use Locked Prefs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25438: Use Locked Prefs
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Please don't lock the proxy settings!  There are legitimate reasons to
 change them, for example:
 running Tor Browser with a system-wide Tor service, or connecting to a
 Unix socket rather than a TCP port.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25440 [Core Tor/Tor]: Broken openat syscall in Sandbox mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25440: Broken openat syscall in Sandbox mode
--+
 Reporter:  ageisp0lis|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  sandbox   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * component:  Core Tor => Core Tor/Tor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25440 [Core Tor]: Broken openat syscall in Sandbox mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25440: Broken openat syscall in Sandbox mode
+
 Reporter:  ageisp0lis  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sandbox |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by arma):

 #24454 and #24400 look very related.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25440 [Core Tor]: Broken openat syscall in Sandbox mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25440: Broken openat syscall in Sandbox mode
+
 Reporter:  ageisp0lis  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sandbox |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by arma):

 * cc: nickw (removed)
 * cc: nickm (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25112 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 7.5 is not working on Windows Vista 64bit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25112: Tor Browser 7.5 is not working on Windows Vista 64bit
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr-will-have,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201803   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff60-esr-will-have, TorBrowserTeam201803R => ff60-esr-will-
 have, TorBrowserTeam201803
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I tested on a Windows 7 and Windows 8 box both 64bit and 32bit Tor Browser
 builds and they behaved as they should. Marking this as `needs_revision`
 for the things mcs and brade found.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25147 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport of fix shipped in Firefox 58.0.1?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25147: Backport of fix shipped in Firefox 58.0.1?
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201803R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: mcs, brade (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25440 [Core Tor]: Broken openat syscall in Sandbox mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25440: Broken openat syscall in Sandbox mode
+
 Reporter:  ageisp0lis  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sandbox |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Hey ageis (<3 your hardening guide), in the cc it's `nickm` not `nickw` ;)

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[tor-bugs] #25440 [Core Tor]: Broken openat syscall in Sandbox mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25440: Broken openat syscall in Sandbox mode
+
 Reporter:  ageisp0lis  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:  sandbox
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+
 My version is 0.3.3.2-alpha (git-7b1d356bdb76607d).

 If relevant, I am running under Debian buster/sid amd64 KVM VPS with a
 4.14.24 kernel patched with grsecurity, and AppArmor enabled.


 {{{
 Mar 06 10:14:36.024 [notice] Tor 0.3.3.2-alpha (git-7b1d356bdb76607d)
 running on Linux with Libevent 2.1.8-stable, OpenSSL 1.1.0g, Zlib 1.2.8,
 Liblzma 5.2.2, and Libzstd 1.3.3.
 Mar 06 10:14:36.025 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn
 how to be safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning
 Mar 06 10:14:36.025 [notice] This version is not a stable Tor release.
 Expect more bugs than usual.
 Mar 06 10:14:36.025 [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc".
 Mar 06 10:14:36.029 [notice] Scheduler type KIST has been enabled.
 Mar 06 10:14:36.029 [notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9050
 Mar 06 10:14:36.029 [notice] Opening DNS listener on 127.0.0.1:5353
 Mar 06 10:14:36.029 [notice] Opening Transparent pf/netfilter listener on
 127.0.0.1:9040
 Mar 06 10:14:36.029 [notice] Opening Control listener on 127.0.0.1:9051

  T= 1520360077
 (Sandbox) Caught a bad syscall attempt (syscall openat)
 tor(+0x1a57ea)[0x20b99917ea]
 /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0(open64+0x4b)[0x38f248203ab]
 /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0(open64+0x4b)[0x38f248203ab]
 tor(tor_open_cloexec+0x40)[0x20b9977a00]
 tor(start_writing_to_file+0x17a)[0x20b998b2ea]
 tor(+0x19f3cb)[0x20b998b3cb]
 tor(+0x19f518)[0x20b998b518]
 tor(or_state_save+0x15b)[0x20b98aa27b]
 tor(+0x5488b)[0x20b984088b]
 /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libevent-2.1.so.6(+0x229ba)[0x38f25cbe9ba]
 /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.1.so.6(event_base_loop+0x5a7)[0x38f25cbf537]
 tor(do_main_loop+0x2b4)[0x20b9841604]
 tor(tor_run_main+0x1025)[0x20b9843ad5]
 tor(tor_main+0x3a)[0x20b983c09a]
 tor(main+0x19)[0x20b983be29]
 /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xe7)[0x38f24272a87]
 tor(_start+0x2a)[0x20b983be7a]

 }}}

 It is possible this error is either due to Tor, or it could be security
 hardening applied to my server. Let me know in any case... Could commit
 ea8e9f17f52877cc795f1792acb81d7fdaff6baf be relevant?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21003 [Core Tor/Tor]: extend_info_describe should list IPv6 address (if present)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21003: extend_info_describe should list IPv6 address (if present)
-+--
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy intro ipv6 logging  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by valentecaio):

 I would add that we have four functions for describing routers and nodes:
 {{{
 const char *router_describe(const routerinfo_t *ri);
 const char *node_describe(const node_t *node);
 const char *routerstatus_describe(const routerstatus_t *ri);
 const char *extend_info_describe(const extend_info_t *ei);
 }}}
 But three of them use IPv4 addresses when describing the node.
 The only one that can use IPv6 is extend_info_describe().

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[tor-bugs] #25439 [Applications/Tor Browser]: https://fpcentral.tbb.torproject.org/tor security slider values and screenshots need to be updated

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25439: https://fpcentral.tbb.torproject.org/tor security slider values and
screenshots need to be updated
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 "Low" to "Standard",

 "Medium" to "Safer",

 etc

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16472 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Upgrade Binutils to 2.25+ for Tor Browser builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16472: Upgrade Binutils to 2.25+ for Tor Browser builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201803,   |  Actual Points:
  boklm201803|
Parent ID:  #12968   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Oops, I should have tried to run it before setting the ticket in
 needs_review.

 It is also crashing for me on Windows. However, doing a rebuild using
 binutils 2.28.1 instead of 2.30, the browser is starting fine.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25391 [Applications/Tor Browser]: [Feature Request] Environment Variable to set security slider level

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25391: [Feature Request] Environment Variable to set security slider level
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 How are you shipping Tor Browser to your users right now? Do you include a
 user profile?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25391 [Applications/Tor Browser]: [Feature Request] Environment Variable to set security slider level

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25391: [Feature Request] Environment Variable to set security slider level
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by adrelanos):

 The very root issue still is the absence of a Debian package for Tor
 Browser. (#3994 and/or #5236)

 If there was a stable drop-in ({{{.d}}}) folder as there is {{{/etc
 /firefox-esr/}}} for Firefox in Debian that only changes between major
 release upgrades ({{{jessie}}} -> {{{stretch}}}), that would be a perfect
 solution.

 Experience tells, that the folder structure of TBB changes over time.
 Therefore a file based solution easily breaks after an upgrade or
 installation of a newer version of TBB.

 Therefore, everything that can be configured by environment variable works
 very easy, stable and long term for Whonix.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25432 [Core Tor/Tor]: remove router.c internal functions from router.h

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25432: remove router.c internal functions from router.h
---+
 Reporter:  valentecaio|  Owner:  valentecaio
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy refactor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by nickm):

 That plan seems reasonable to me, if the situation is the way you describe
 it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25353 [Core Tor/Tor]: Configure fails with some OpenSSL 1.1.0 built with no-deprecated.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25353: Configure fails with some OpenSSL 1.1.0 built with no-deprecated.
--+
 Reporter:  laomaiweng|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  openssl, tor-ssl  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19429| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  openssl, tor-ssl, 033-backport, 032-backport,  033-must =>
 openssl, tor-ssl


Comment:

 I think maybe we should revisit that choice in 0.3.4, time permitting.
 This can't be an 033 item, though, since it's pretty solidly a new
 feature.

 Our earlier plan to wait until 1.0.2 is obsolete looks like it won't fly:
 that's a LTS release, and it won't go away till the end of next year.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25432 [Core Tor/Tor]: remove router.c internal functions from router.h

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25432: remove router.c internal functions from router.h
---+
 Reporter:  valentecaio|  Owner:  valentecaio
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy refactor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by valentecaio):

 Since each group A function would only be used once, by the respective
 group B function, I suggest that we suppress the group A.

 So, I would do the following:

 1- remove group A functions from header file.
 2- merge group A functions into group B functions (remove declarations of
 group A functions).
 3- remove format_node_description() declaration from header file.
 4- move NODE_DESC_BUF_LEN constant from header to source file.
 5- replace the external call (there is only one) to
 router_get_description() by a call to router_describe().

 What do you think about this?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21003 [Core Tor/Tor]: extend_info_describe should list IPv6 address (if present)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21003: extend_info_describe should list IPv6 address (if present)
-+--
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy intro ipv6 logging  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by meryemz):

 I can't reproduce this output:
 {{{
 [info] add_an_entry_guard(): Chose %s as new entry guard
 }}}
 I think the function: add_an_entry_guard() has been deleted somewhere
 between the versions 0.2.3 and 0.2.4 .
 Is there any other function with the same bug?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25391 [Applications/Tor Browser]: [Feature Request] Environment Variable to set security slider level

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25391: [Feature Request] Environment Variable to set security slider level
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Why is it not enough to just set the desired slider level in a prefs file
 that you ship in the browser profile (anyway)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25391 [Applications/Tor Browser]: [Feature Request] Environment Variable to set security slider level

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25391: [Feature Request] Environment Variable to set security slider level
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by adrelanos):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  Applications => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25408 [Applications/Tor Browser]: latin-1 supplement characters in filename results in zero-sized downloaded files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25408: latin-1 supplement characters in filename results in zero-sized 
downloaded
files
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 LANG=en_US.utf8
 LC_MEASUREMENT=en_US.utf8
 LC_MONETARY=en_US.utf8
 LC_PAPER=en_US.utf8
 LC_NUMERIC=en_US.utf8
 LC_TIME=en_US.utf8
 LC_ALL=C

 still happens with a fresh and clean en-us bundle, everything default
 (except extensions.torlauncher.start_tor and
 extensions.torlauncher.prompt_at_startup to hook into the system tor)

 % ./start-tor-browser.desktop
 Launching './Browser/start-tor-browser --detach'...
 %

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25437 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor browser coonecting stops while it's connecting please help!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25437: Tor browser coonecting stops while it's connecting please help!
--+---
 Reporter:  amirmax   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: tbb-team (added)
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25410 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The Tor browser button icon and no script icon are low resolution

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25410: The Tor browser button icon and no script icon are low resolution
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 We address the non-NoScript part during our UI redesign I think. We don't
 have control about the NoScript icon.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25410 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The Tor browser button icon and no script icon are low resolution

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25410: The Tor browser button icon and no script icon are low resolution
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: arma, mcs (added)


Comment:

 #13485 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13485 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbutton icon is squashed and ugly in TBB 4.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13485: Torbutton icon is squashed and ugly in TBB 4.0
--+---
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Making this a duplicate of #25410 which should get resolved when we are
 doing our UI redesign.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25438 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use Locked Prefs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25438: Use Locked Prefs
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Locking what you have mentioned would be great considering the amount of
 times well intentioned but uninformed people install "VPN" addons on the
 Tor Browser and end up screwing up their anonymity and proxy settings as
 I've seen on irc.

 > We could consider locking FPI and Fingerprinting settings, but I'm not
 sure those would be appropriate to lock.

 Related ticket: #24072 (#1047 for Torbutton-only times :) )

 The only disadvantage is that it may make it more difficult to setup a
 clearnet Tor Browser.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25408 [Applications/Tor Browser]: latin-1 supplement characters in filename results in zero-sized downloaded files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25408: latin-1 supplement characters in filename results in zero-sized 
downloaded
files
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * severity:  Critical => Normal


Comment:

 What locale are you using? Does that work for you with a clean default en-
 US bundle? On my Debian box it worked for me with an en-US bundle.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25419 [Community/Relays]: Advise using GNSS for getting time if it is possible

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25419: Advise using GNSS for getting time if it is possible
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  Nusenu
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * priority:  Medium => Low
 * type:  defect => enhancement
 * severity:  Normal => Minor


Comment:

 it is not realistic that many people will have GNSS hardware, right?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25348 [Community/Relays]: Add instructions for OpenBSD, amend FreeBSD to also mention obfs4

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25348: Add instructions for OpenBSD, amend FreeBSD to also mention obfs4
--+
 Reporter:  attila|  Owner:  Nusenu
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * type:  defect => enhancement


Comment:

 Sorry for the long delay - I'll be faster next time.

 bridges instructions are outside the scope of the RelayGuide, please add
 your obfs4 instructions to the obfs4 section of the wiki that the relay
 guide is linking to:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/PluggableTransports/obfs4proxy



 Regarding OpenBSD:
 Pascal is fast in updating -current but OpenBSD 6.2 is still on tor
 0.3.0.x
 https://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-
 bin/cvsweb/ports/net/tor/?only_with_tag=OPENBSD_6_2
 ref regarding performance hit on OpenBSD #20688

 In general: please submit distinct topics using separate trac tickets

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25408 [Applications/Tor Browser]: latin-1 supplement characters in filename results in zero-sized downloaded files (was: torbrowser doesn't download files properly)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25408: latin-1 supplement characters in filename results in zero-sized 
downloaded
files
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 simplifying title and adding screenshot

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25408 [Applications/Tor Browser]: torbrowser doesn't download files properly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25408: torbrowser doesn't download files properly
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * Attachment "out.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25438 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use Locked Prefs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25438: Use Locked Prefs
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  esr60 => ff60-esr


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #18101, #20301, #23231, #14205, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #18101, #20301, #23231, #14205, #16341, #17965, #19417, 
#21777, #22343, #22451, #23930, #24622, #10394, #17252, #18287, #18867, #18925, 
#20254, #21404, #21542, #21657, #21689, #21727, #21851, #21863, #22070, #22125, 
#22170, #22525, #22564, #22581, #22854, #23386, #23561, #24196, #24197, #24309, 
#24331, #24465, #24476, #24855, #24856, #25030, #25143, #25247, #25318 by gk:


Comment:
Adding to our March plate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24918 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Help users finding the new circuit display

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24918: Help users finding the new circuit display
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24309| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: arthuredelstein (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25422 [Applications/rbm]: Give more details in "Cannot checkout" errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25422: Give more details in "Cannot checkout" errors
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/rbm |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, boklm201803,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201803R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good. Applied to `rbm` (commit
 b4c8c38e12d11eb232305949c5d42d5df5e8f5c8) and included in `tor-browser-
 build` with commit 5ab5b08179208d0fc4f38dd76686bf1df65a7389.

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[tor-bugs] #25438 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use Locked Prefs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25438: Use Locked Prefs
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  esr60
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=440908 adds support for
 locked prefs, which are set during build and cannot be changed.

 If that doesn't wind up in 60, I think it should be backported, and taken
 advantage of.

 We can lock at least the proxy settings. We could consider locking FPI and
 Fingerprinting settings, but I'm not sure those would be appropriate to
 lock.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #21777, #22451, #24622, #18925, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #21777, #22451, #24622, #18925, #20254, #22581, #23439, 
#24197, #25030 by gk:


Comment:
Moving my tickets to March.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25342 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please sync recent Apache web server logs from torproject.org hosts to colchicifolium

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25342: Please sync recent Apache web server logs from torproject.org hosts to
colchicifolium
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by weasel):

 You might want to update /srv/collector.torproject.org/collector/bin/ssh-
 wrap to support receiving the weblogs.

 this is the current script on wendelboi:
 {{{
 /srv/webstats.torproject.org$ cat /srv/webstats.torproject.org/bin/weblog-
 ssh-wrap
 #!/bin/sh

 set -e
 set -u

 if [ "$#" != "1" ] || [ -z "${SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND:-}" ]; then
   echo >&2 "Usage: $0[via remote ssh]"
   exit 1
 fi

 target="/srv/webstats.torproject.org/incoming/$1"
 mkdir -p "$target"

 rsync  --server -logDtpre.iLsfx --delete . "$target/."
 }}}

 Once that is in place I can check how to get that working without breaking
 the bridgedb sync at the same time.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25437 [- Select a component]: Tor browser coonecting stops while it's connecting please help!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25437: Tor browser coonecting stops while it's connecting please help!
--+---
 Reporter:  amirmax   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Click on that "Copy Tor Log to Clipboard" and copy-paste it to
 https://privatebin.net and provide a link to it here to know what's going
 on

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25437 [- Select a component]: Tor browser coonecting stops while it's connecting please help!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25437: Tor browser coonecting stops while it's connecting please help!
--+
 Reporter:  amirmax   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by amirmax):

 * Attachment "tor001.png" added.


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[tor-bugs] #25437 [- Select a component]: Tor browser coonecting stops while it's connecting please help!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25437: Tor browser coonecting stops while it's connecting please help!
--+
 Reporter:  amirmax   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Hi There,

 I installed torbrowser and when I'm gonna run it the connection can't be
 ended and stops Please see the screenshot.

 [[Image(https://cloudup.com/czQuwVZOclX)]]

 acreenshot url:https://cloudup.com/czQuwVZOclX

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23780 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Tor repeatedly tells me that "Your Guard is failing an extremely large amount of circuits" when using snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23780: Tor repeatedly tells me that "Your Guard is failing an extremely large
amount of circuits" when using snowflake
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.9
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:7 arlolra]:
 > This is only while bootstrapping, right?
 Yeah.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25430 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Turkey bridges.torproject.org cant access

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25430: Turkey bridges.torproject.org cant access
--+---
 Reporter:  fromturkey|  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 > This censorship of ours could be gotten worse-in anytime so please help
 us!

 [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right_of_revolution Right of revolution]
 > the right of revolution is the right or **duty** of the people of a
 nation to overthrow a government that acts against their common interests
 and/or threatens the safety of the people without probable cause.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25430 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Turkey bridges.torproject.org cant access

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25430: Turkey bridges.torproject.org cant access
--+---
 Reporter:  fromturkey|  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:1 Dbryrtfbcbhgf]:
 > permanent solution for users in a Censored country is to use `Moat
 integration (fetch bridges for the user)` that should launch in the next
 alpha TorBrowser. Nightly {{{dev-alpha}}} TorBrowser with that feature is
 [https://nightlies.tbb.torproject.org/tor-browser-builds/2018-03-04/ here]

 Replying to [comment:3 cypherpunks]:
 > Oh BTW there's already a fix for that in the coming Tor Browser alpha
 builds ;) (It doesn't connect directly to bridges.torproject.org but to a
 front domain)

 > **
 > **
 > **gmail**,yahoo and riseup could be censored as well. So we need a
 solution about that too.
 > **
 > **

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25435 [Applications/Tor Browser]: keyring/binutils.gpg modified by `make alpha`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25435: keyring/binutils.gpg modified by `make alpha`
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 The only command we use with `binutils.gpg` should be something like this:
 {{{
 $ gpg --with-fingerprint --keyring ./keyring/binutils.gpg --no-default-
 keyring --verify ./out/binutils/binutils-2.24.tar.bz2.sig
 ./out/binutils/binutils-2.24.tar.bz2
 }}}

 Could you check if just running this command is enough to modify
 `binutils.gpg` ?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25430 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Turkey bridges.torproject.org cant access

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25430: Turkey bridges.torproject.org cant access
--+---
 Reporter:  fromturkey|  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Greetings sir!

 Do you have enough technical expertise to try this trick :) ?
 https://helloweishi.github.io/network/firewall/2015/04/03/access-youtube-
 without-vpn/ (you'd need the DNS of bridges.torproject.org which you can
 find using https://dnslookup.org/ )

 If not, try this other solution:

 > This censorship of ours could be gotten worse-in anytime so please help
 us!

 Which OS are you using? If it's Linux/Mac OS you can try out the snowflake
 pluggable transport in the alpha Tor Browser which may work great for you
 and is certainly not blocked in Turkey (yet).


 

 Oh BTW there's already a fix for that in the coming Tor Browser alpha
 builds ;) (It doesn't connect directly to bridges.torproject.org but to a
 front domain)

 [[Image(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/raw-
 attachment/ticket/23136/moat-Dec8-B-canceled.png)]]

 [[Image(https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/raw-
 attachment/ticket/23136/moat-Dec8-C-incorrect.png)]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21926 [Core Tor/Tor]: Still had 1 address policies cached at shutdown

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21926: Still had 1 address policies cached at shutdown
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.10
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 I don't think I've been seeing this one lately. Did we fix it in some
 other bugfix, and this is now a duplicate of whatever-ticket-that-was?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16472 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Upgrade Binutils to 2.25+ for Tor Browser builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16472: Upgrade Binutils to 2.25+ for Tor Browser builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201803,   |  Actual Points:
  boklm201803|
Parent ID:  #12968   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201803R, boklm201803 => tbb-rbm,
 TorBrowserTeam201803, boklm201803


Comment:

 I made test builds with your patch but both the 32bit and the 64bit
 bundles are crashing for me right on start. In the debugger I see tons of
 messages like
 {{{
 warning: 0f64:0944 @ 01846240 - LdrpSnapThunk - WARNING: Hint index 0x119
 for pr
 ocedure "NtEnumerateKey" in DLL "ntdll.dll" is invalid

 warning: 0f64:0944 @ 01846256 - LdrpSnapThunk - WARNING: Hint index 0x3bb
 for pr
 ocedure "RtlIntegerToUnicodeString" in DLL "ntdll.dll" is invalid

 warning: 0f64:0944 @ 01846287 - LdrpSnapThunk - WARNING: Hint index 0x26e
 for pr
 ocedure "RtlAppendUnicodeStringToString" in DLL "ntdll.dll" is invalid

 warning: 0f64:0944 @ 01846303 - LdrpSnapThunk - WARNING: Hint index 0x4a7
 for pr
 ocedure "RtlStringFromGUID" in DLL "ntdll.dll" is invalid
 }}}.

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