Re: [tor-bugs] #25875 [Obfuscation/meek]: Azure meek bridge bootstrap fails without meek-client-torbrowser proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25875: Azure meek bridge bootstrap fails without meek-client-torbrowser proxy
--+---
 Reporter:  habib |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by yawning):

 For the record meek_lite never got the change that fixes this, so it was
 busted as well.  It should be fixed in master though.

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[tor-bugs] #25879 [HTTPS Everywhere]: HTTPS Everywhere control panel is broken when JavaScript is turned off

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25879: HTTPS Everywhere control panel is broken when JavaScript is turned off
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  javascript
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 I have HTTPS Everywhere in my toolbar. I also have an old addon called JS
 Switch that turns off JavaScript at the about:config level, it's just a
 toggle for that config option.

 Whenever I've used it (or the about:config option directly) to turn off
 JavaScript, HTTPS Everywhere, Privacy Badger, and AdBlock Plus are all
 unable to display their toolbar menus properly or at all. In the case of
 HTTPS Everywhere and Privacy Badger, the menu balloon appears with a few
 words, but most of the words are missing and some of the toggles. The few
 toggles that remain are non functional.

 Is this some new fallout from the move to WebExtensions?

 Can we not turn off all the JavaScript anymore unless we want to cripple
 all our addons?

 God I hope not.

 I'd post a screenshot, but the HTTPS Everywhere menu balloon is literally
 just a blank window with the word "version:" in the  lower left corner.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #3723 [Core Tor/Tor]: Report version of bwscanners in votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3723: Report version of bwscanners in votes
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #13630| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * cc: juga (added)
 * component:  Core Tor/Torflow => Core Tor/Tor
 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 Hi juga, this is the ticket for putting the bandwidth authority version in
 votes.

 We are working on the file format in #25869 and
 https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/4

 I think we should:
 1. add a "timestamp=" to the timestamp
 2. turn the entire bwfile header into a single line
 3. put it all in the vote as a line with a new keyword, "bandwidth-file"

 For bandwidth file format 1.0.0, the line would be:
 bandwidth-file timestamp=1234567890

 For bandwidth file format 1.1.0, the line would be:
 bandwidth-file timestamp=1234567890 version=1.1.0 software=sbws
 software_version=0.1.0

 If we implement the feature in this way, then Tor will automatically add
 new fields to the bandwidth-file line.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25869 [Core Tor/Tor]: Proposal: Bandwidth Measurements Document Format

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25869: Proposal: Bandwidth Measurements Document Format
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bandwidth, bwauth, scanner, torflow  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #3723| Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #3723


Comment:

 We need to finalise this proposal before we add the header to the votes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25869 [Core Tor/Tor]: Proposal: Bandwidth Measurements Document Format

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25869: Proposal: Bandwidth Measurements Document Format
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bandwidth, bwauth, scanner, torflow  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_revision
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


Comment:

 We are working on this spec here:
 https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/4

 It just needs one final revision, then it will be ready for review again.

 Since it's a spec for an existing format, and it's being done by
 volunteers, I'm going to put it in 0.3.4.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25868 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor unexpectedly exited

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25868: Tor unexpectedly exited
--+--
 Reporter:  torman23  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  Applications => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25866 [Core Tor/Stem]: does DescriptorDownloader.get_server_descriptors() get non-consensus descriptors?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25866: does DescriptorDownloader.get_server_descriptors() get non-consensus
descriptors?
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 This is how Tor works in detail:
 Relays try to fetch all descriptors for every consensus they successfully
 download and validate.
 Relays cache all descriptors they have ever successfully downloaded.
 Relays remove a descriptor from their cache when it expires.

 So the number of descriptors returned by a relay depends on its uptime.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24660 [Core Tor/Tor]: Wrap our PRNG interface(s) in Rust with appropriate traits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24660: Wrap our PRNG interface(s) in Rust with appropriate traits
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, tor-crypto, rng, roadmap, 034  |  Actual Points:
  -roadmap-master, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-included-20180328  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24660 [Core Tor/Tor]: Wrap our PRNG interface(s) in Rust with appropriate traits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24660: Wrap our PRNG interface(s) in Rust with appropriate traits
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, tor-crypto, rng, roadmap, 034  |  Actual Points:
  -roadmap-master, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-included-20180328  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-

Comment (by isis):

 Replying to [comment:15 nickm]:
 > I've added some comments and questions to the branch on github. Let's
 discuss more there.  Thanks, Isis!

 Replied to the comments on
 
https://github.com/isislovecruft/tor/commit/5a984badc59927063d9682ffd8cc6f52fc15a44b
 and made a bunch of fixup commits ([https://travis-
 ci.org/isislovecruft/tor/builds/369360848 Travis fails] because we need to
 pull in the appropriate tor-rust-dependencies changes). A squashed version
 is in my `bug24660_r1`
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/tor.git/log/?h=bug24660_r1
 branch].

 The requisite tor-rust-dependencies changes are in my `add/rand_core`
 [https://github.com/isislovecruft/tor-rust-dependencies/tree/add/rand_core
 branch] and `add/rand` [https://github.com/isislovecruft/tor-rust-
 dependencies/tree/add/rand branch].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24658 [Core Tor/Tor]: Split/refactor crypto.h into smaller separate modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24658: Split/refactor crypto.h into smaller separate modules
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:
 |  ffmancera
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-crypto, refactor, review-|  Actual Points:
  group-32, review-group-34, |
  033-triage-20180320, 033-included-20180320 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:41 nickm]:
 > I think I reviewed that as #24660 ?

 Yep! It looks like that was done here:
 
https://github.com/torproject/tor/compare/master...isislovecruft:bug24660#commitcomment-28607519

 After this is merged, all that's left to do is stream and DH refactoring,
 I believe.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25875 [Obfuscation/meek]: Azure meek bridge bootstrap fails without meek-client-torbrowser proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25875: Azure meek bridge bootstrap fails without meek-client-torbrowser proxy
--+---
 Reporter:  habib |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:5 mcs]:
 > Tor Browser 8.0a2 and newer (our alpha releases) include meek 0.29.
 Grabbing that may be easier than building from source.

 Oh, you're right. When I made comment:4 I was in a tor-browser-build
 directory that I didn't realize was out of date.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25875 [Obfuscation/meek]: Azure meek bridge bootstrap fails without meek-client-torbrowser proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25875: Azure meek bridge bootstrap fails without meek-client-torbrowser proxy
--+---
 Reporter:  habib |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by habib):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25875 [Obfuscation/meek]: Azure meek bridge bootstrap fails without meek-client-torbrowser proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25875: Azure meek bridge bootstrap fails without meek-client-torbrowser proxy
--+---
 Reporter:  habib |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by habib):

 Thanks, I can confirm that both amazon and azure works with the latest
 build of meek-client. (I built from source)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25458 [Applications/Tor Browser]: UI customization half-broken in Tor Browser 8.0a3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25458: UI customization half-broken in Tor Browser 8.0a3
-+-
 Reporter:  viktorj  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201804R  |
Parent ID:  #25147   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * keywords:  tbb-regression, TorBrowserTeam201804 => tbb-regression,
 TorBrowserTeam201804R
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25458 [Applications/Tor Browser]: UI customization half-broken in Tor Browser 8.0a3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25458: UI customization half-broken in Tor Browser 8.0a3
-+-
 Reporter:  viktorj  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201804   |
Parent ID:  #25147   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "0001-Bug-25458-UI-customization-half-broken-in-Tor-
 Browse.patch" added.


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[tor-bugs] #25878 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Source release tarballs for Tor Launcher

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25878: Source release tarballs for Tor Launcher
---+---
 Reporter:  attila |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 Related to #25876: it would help porting efforts if there were official
 source tarballs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25875 [Obfuscation/meek]: Azure meek bridge bootstrap fails without meek-client-torbrowser proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25875: Azure meek bridge bootstrap fails without meek-client-torbrowser proxy
--+---
 Reporter:  habib |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: mcs (added)


Comment:

 Tor Browser 8.0a2 and newer (our alpha releases) include meek 0.29.
 Grabbing that may be easier than building from source.

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[tor-bugs] #25877 [Applications/Torbutton]: Source release tarballs for Tor Button

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25877: Source release tarballs for Tor Button
+
 Reporter:  attila  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+
 Related to #25876: it would help porting efforts if there were official
 source tarballs.

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[tor-bugs] #25876 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Source release tarballs for Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25876: Source release tarballs for Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  attila|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Would greatly help with porting efforts if there were official source
 tarballs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25875 [Obfuscation/meek]: Azure meek bridge bootstrap fails without meek-client-torbrowser proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25875: Azure meek bridge bootstrap fails without meek-client-torbrowser proxy
--+---
 Reporter:  habib |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:3 habib]:
 > Thanks for the quick reply, my meek-client.log:
 > {{{
 > meek-client + azure:
 > 2018/04/21 00:23:57 listening on 127.0.0.1:61991
 > 2018/04/21 00:24:00 status code was 411, not 200; trying again after 30
 seconds (9)
 > 2018/04/21 00:25:00 error in handling request: stream error: stream ID
 5; PROTOCOL_ERROR
 > 2018/04/21 00:25:32 error in handling request: stream error: stream ID
 9; PROTOCOL_ERROR
 > }}}

 Aha, this is #22865. Status code 411 is "length required". This problem
 was already fixed in meek 0.28, but it looks like Tor Browser is still
 using meek 0.25.

 Unfortunately you won't be able to use the meek-client you have, until I
 ask to have meek upgraded in Tor Browser. If you cannot wait for another
 Tor Browser release, you can compile meek-client yourself. It is not
 ''very'' difficult, but you will need to download the Go compiler:
 https://golang.org/dl/.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25875 [Obfuscation/meek]: Azure meek bridge bootstrap fails without meek-client-torbrowser proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25875: Azure meek bridge bootstrap fails without meek-client-torbrowser proxy
--+---
 Reporter:  habib |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by habib):

 Thanks for the quick reply, my meek-client.log:
 {{{
 meek-client + azure:
 2018/04/21 00:23:57 listening on 127.0.0.1:61991
 2018/04/21 00:24:00 status code was 411, not 200; trying again after 30
 seconds (9)
 2018/04/21 00:25:00 error in handling request: stream error: stream ID 5;
 PROTOCOL_ERROR
 2018/04/21 00:25:32 error in handling request: stream error: stream ID 9;
 PROTOCOL_ERROR

 meek-client + amazon:
 2018/04/21 00:26:28 listening on 127.0.0.1:62056

 meek-client-torbrowser + azure:
 2018/04/21 00:33:24 using helper on 127.0.0.1:62306
 2018/04/21 00:33:28 listening on 127.0.0.1:62310

 meek-client-torbrowser + amazon
 2018/04/21 00:36:05 using helper on 127.0.0.1:62570
 2018/04/21 00:36:08 listening on 127.0.0.1:62573
 }}}

 my torrc:
 {{{
 ClientTransportPlugin meek exec TorBrowser\Tor\PluggableTransports\meek-
 client -log meek-client.log

 Bridge meek 0.0.2.0:3 97700DFE9F483596DDA6264C4D7DF7641E1E39CE
 url=https://meek.azureedge.net/ front=ajax.aspnetcdn.com
 # Bridge meek 0.0.2.0:2 B9E7141C594AF25699E0079C1F0146F409495296
 url=https://d2cly7j4zqgua7.cloudfront.net/ front=a0.awsstatic.com

 DataDirectory D:\Tor Browser\Browser\TorBrowser\Data\Tor
 GeoIPFile D:\Tor Browser\Browser\TorBrowser\Data\Tor\geoip
 GeoIPv6File D:\Tor Browser\Browser\TorBrowser\Data\Tor\geoip6
 HiddenServiceStatistics 0
 Log notice file D:\Tor Browser\Browser\TorBrowser\Data\Tor\notice.log
 UseBridges 1
 }}}

 Started using `TorBrowser\Tor\tor.exe -f TorBrowser\Data\Tor\torrc`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22782 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Additional domain fronts for Snowflake rendezvous

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22782: Additional domain fronts for Snowflake rendezvous
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * type:  defect => enhancement


Comment:

 I set up a cloudfront.net forwarder to the standalone broker. A patch for
 it is attached.

 I had it completely replace the appspot.com one, which no longer works
 because of #25804.

 I also set up an azureedge.net forwarder; however it doesn't work yet
 because of a technical issue (the CDN doesn't use SNI in its requests to
 the origin). I have a support request in for that. But I propose we merge
 the cloudfront.net one right away, in order to work around #25804 and get
 things working again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22782 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Additional domain fronts for Snowflake rendezvous

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22782: Additional domain fronts for Snowflake rendezvous
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dcf):

 * Attachment "0001-Switch-to-a-CloudFront-Amazon-domain-front.patch"
 added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25875 [Obfuscation/meek]: Azure meek bridge bootstrap fails without meek-client-torbrowser proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25875: Azure meek bridge bootstrap fails without meek-client-torbrowser proxy
--+---
 Reporter:  habib |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by dcf):

 Could you attach your torrc file? It is indeed weird that, according to
 your log,
 || ||= amazon =||= azure =||
 ||= meek-client=||  works  ||  doesn't work  ||
 ||= meek-client-torbrowser=||  ^(not tested)^  ||  works  ||

 You can try adding `-log meek-client.log` to the `ClientTransportPlugin`
 line, to get some lower-level logs.

 Replying to [comment:1 cypherpunks]:
 > The meek client is more and more coupled to the Tor Browser. For a
 standalone app you may try to use `meek_lite` with obfs4proxy.

 Only meek-client-torbrowser is coupled to Tor Browser. meek-client by
 itself is independent. I think the bug reporter is doing it right. meek-
 client by itself is basically the same as meek_lite.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25594 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Broker: investigate non-domain-fronting secure client / proxy registrations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25594: Broker: investigate non-domain-fronting secure client / proxy 
registrations
---+
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by dcf):

 I made #25874 for the DNS idea.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25147 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport of fix shipped in Firefox 58.0.1?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25147: Backport of fix shipped in Firefox 58.0.1?
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201804R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Replying to [comment:13 gk]:
 > So, we are good with this bug then and only #25458 remains? FWIW: I did
 not get any reply about specific ESR52 code that would need to get patched
 which is not in Firefox 58 anymore when asking the Mozilla engineer. I
 think we should not spend more energy on this defense-in-depth, though,
 apart from fixing breakage a la #25458.

 Looked into #25458 and sure enough, it's caused by this patch.  We didn't
 catch it (and there's no related bug for it in FF) because the offending
 calling code no longer exists in FF latest.  Will have a patch up shortly
 once I've verified the fix.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25874 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: DNS-based rendezvous for Snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25874: DNS-based rendezvous for Snowflake
---+
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by sysrqb):

 If it gains in popularity, DNS-over-TLS is another option. There are
 already quite a few providers[1], but I doubt any of them are sufficient
 for domain fronting at this point, although I see Cloudflare is now on the
 list.

 [0] https://dnsprivacy.org/wiki/
 [1] https://dnsprivacy.org/wiki/display/DP/DNS+Privacy+Test+Servers

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25875 [Obfuscation/meek]: Azure meek bridge bootstrap fails without meek-client-torbrowser proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25875: Azure meek bridge bootstrap fails without meek-client-torbrowser proxy
--+---
 Reporter:  habib |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 The meek client is more and more coupled to the Tor Browser. For a
 standalone app you may try to use `meek_lite` with obfs4proxy.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25874 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: DNS-based rendezvous for Snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25874: DNS-based rendezvous for Snowflake
---+
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by dcf):

 For testing purposes, I set up snowflake-broker.bamsoftware.com to be the
 authoritative nameserver for the subdomain test.bamsoftware.com. (I think;
 I'm not too good at this DNS stuff.) There is no responder running there
 yet, but you can use tcpdump on the broker to watch requests arrive:
 {{{
 tcpdump -n -X port 53
 }}}

 Then, from somewhere else, try a normal DNS query. In the tcpdump you
 should see requests arrive from your ISP's recursive nameserver.
 {{{
 dig message${RANDOM}.test.bamsoftware.com
 }}}

 Here is sample Python 2 code for doing requests over the 1.1.1.1 DNS-over-
 HTTPS server.
 {{{
 #!/usr/bin/env python

 NAME = "whatever.test.bamsoftware.com"

 from scapy.all import *
 import base64
 import requests

 # https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/dns-over-https/wireformat
 /#using-post
 print("POST application/dns-udpwireformat")
 udpwireformat = str(DNS(rd=True, qd=DNSQR(qtype="A", qname=NAME)))
 r = requests.post("https://1.1.1.1/dns-query;,
 headers = {
 "Accept": "application/dns-udpwireformat",
 "Content-Type": "application/dns-udpwireformat",
 },
 data = udpwireformat,
 )
 DNS(r.content).show()

 # https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/dns-over-https/wireformat
 /#using-get
 print("POST application/dns-udpwireformat")
 udpwireformat = str(DNS(rd=True, qd=DNSQR(qtype="A", qname=NAME)))
 r = requests.get("https://1.1.1.1/dns-query;,
 params = {
 "dns": base64.urlsafe_b64encode(udpwireformat),
 "ct": "application/dns-udpwireformat",
 },
 )
 DNS(r.content).show()

 # https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/dns-over-https/json-format/
 print("GET application/dns-json")
 r = requests.get("https://1.1.1.1/dns-query;,
 params = {
 "name": NAME,
 "type": "A",
 "ct": "application/dns-json",
 },
 )
 print r.text
 }}}

 If you run this, you will see requests arrive at the broker and responses
 come back with `rcode=server-failure`, which is expected because there's
 nothing running at snowflake-broker.bamsoftware.com:53 yet.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25846 [Webpages/Website]: Add Arthur's key to https://www.torproject.org/docs/signing-keys.html.en

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25846: Add Arthur's key to https://www.torproject.org/docs/signing-keys.html.en
--+
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks! I pushed the change as commit
 `fc8852c5ab7a5a875e7636947b4b27d1d51a1a97`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25846 [Webpages/Website]: Add Arthur's key to https://www.torproject.org/docs/signing-keys.html.en

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25846: Add Arthur's key to https://www.torproject.org/docs/signing-keys.html.en
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Confirmed. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25875 [Obfuscation/meek]: Azure meek bridge bootstrap fails without meek-client-torbrowser proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25875: Azure meek bridge bootstrap fails without meek-client-torbrowser proxy
--+---
 Reporter:  habib |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by habib):

 * Attachment "notice.log" added.


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[tor-bugs] #25875 [Obfuscation/meek]: Azure meek bridge bootstrap fails without meek-client-torbrowser proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25875: Azure meek bridge bootstrap fails without meek-client-torbrowser proxy
--+---
 Reporter:  habib |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 I want to use tor(.exe) + meek bridge as a standalone application, without
 the Tor browser, but after changing the torrc to use the `meek-client`
 instead of `meek-client-torbrowser` the bootstrapping stucks at 85% when
 azure meek bridge selected. The `meek-client-torbrowser` executable fails
 to start without the Tor browser.

 The amazon meek bridge bootstraps and works fine using the `meek-client`
 executable.

 Operating system: Windows10 1703
 Tor: 0.3.2.10
 Tor Browser (and other binaries): 7.5.3 (latest) 32-bit

 Added line to Browser\TorBrowser\Data\Tor\torrc:

 `ClientTransportPlugin meek exec TorBrowser\Tor\PluggableTransports\meek-
 client`

 Attaching the log file

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[tor-bugs] #25874 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: DNS-based rendezvous for Snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25874: DNS-based rendezvous for Snowflake
---+
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 From #25594:
 An idea to use DNS over HTTPS:
 https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/traffic-obf/ZQohlnIEWM4
 > The circumvention idea is to take any existing DNS tunneling scheme and
 send it through DNS over HTTPS. To be a bit more specific: you send
 recursive DNS queries (encoding your upstream traffic) to the DNS-over-
 HTTPS server, which then forwards the queries to another specialized
 server that decodes them and proxies the data they contain.
 >
 > Even if not a general-purpose transport, DNS-over-HTTPS could be an
 ideal rendezvous mechanism for a system like Snowflake or Moat. One where
 you only need to send/receive a small amount of very hard-to-block data in
 order to bootstrap a connection.

 The way I see it, there are two parts of this:
  1. Using DNS as an underlying transport: the client sends a DNS request
 containing its encoded offer; the broker sends back a DNS response
 containing an encoded proxy answer.
  2. Sending via DNS-over-HTTPS in order to avoid blocking of the DNS
 messages themselves.

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[tor-bugs] #25873 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Add teor to the "tortestnet" LDAP group

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25873: Add teor to the "tortestnet" LDAP group
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256

 I believe adding `teor` account to the LDAP group `tortestnet` should give
 him
 access to the testnet infrastructure on `togashii`?

 He basically needs to be able to push to the git on togashii that contains
 the testnet-config.

 Thanks!
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQEzBAEBCAAdFiEEt0QX7d8irJ+ekPSRQuhqKhH0jTYFAlraTgoACgkQQuhqKhH0
 jTbQMgf/SLLEHT3L68MAG6hdEEu/C0b/sspaILK89MPgr0f6o3Pbgfv2QWJ1jlhz
 vBZ91k8m1jr80EVffRkkuqIK4hgVpwCjGcLmjtkepEJ3OriekuH1AyOIOT37refS
 Mi9wKyj6B3I68ZLoirxOUzMx2/8bMQZo3oUmQxYWHREmfeefrHMitrf49dLAi+Mm
 eBoP3JdEDF1e64Oxab7o/kHiLDlH1L8ivdn044mWEKwGO0rL6rHneGxWW2yPZzlK
 YF5XknBrWXxsLs99v+GkFxM9UDbf0JDU3/JBDlyFxB4s8w0Kk6YUEAcq5xr9if3u
 7YoWQ834ggFgVuCZLoxJwIGDPSdmBA==
 =gEi4
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25872 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When Clicking more information when visiting a V3 onion some of the buttons are cut off

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25872: When Clicking more information when visiting a V3 onion some of the 
buttons
are cut off
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 * Attachment "tor bug.png" added.


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[tor-bugs] #25872 [Applications/Tor Browser]: When Clicking more information when visiting a V3 onion some of the buttons are cut off

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25872: When Clicking more information when visiting a V3 onion some of the 
buttons
are cut off
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 When Clicking more information when visiting a V3 onion some of the
 buttons are cut off.
 1. go to
 http://sik5nlgfc5qylnnsr57qrbm64zbdx6t4lreyhpon3ychmxmiem7tioad.onion
 2. click the "!" next to the URL and click ">" then click more
 information.
 3.The "View cookies" and "View saved passwords" buttons are cut off.
 I attached a photo showing the buttons cut off.
 Tor Browser 7.5.3

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24967 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: torsocks fails to check SIP if the path itself is a symlink

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24967: torsocks fails to check SIP if the path itself is a symlink
---+
 Reporter:  Hello71|  Owner:  Hello71
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by Hello71):

 Replying to [comment:4 dgoulet]:
 > This breaks on my Linux with:
 >
 > {{{
 > ERROR: /lib/torsocks/libtorsocks.so does not exist! Try re-installing
 torsocks.
 > }}}
 >
 > It should actually be `/usr/local/lib/torsocks/...` in my case.

 how odd. I know that the full path in autotools should be
 @prefix@/@libdir@, but in this patch I literally expanded the existing
 definition. did the old version work for you?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25870 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix vanguard restrictions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25870: Fix vanguard restrictions
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25546| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Ok. https://oniongit.eu/mikeperry/tor/commits/bug25870 prevents A - B - A
 paths and also allows the last hop to be the same as the first.

 It still leaves node family and /16 restrictions disabled, which is what
 we want until we sort out how we want to alter path creation and vanguard
 selection to make all of that consistent.

 I think this should eventually be backported to 0.3.3, since the vanguard
 script with 0.3.3 could cause warns to be generated at relays if it ever
 tries to build an A - B - A path (or an A - A path).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25871 [Core Tor/Tor]: spelling errors in control-spec.txt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25871: spelling errors in control-spec.txt
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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[tor-bugs] #25871 [Core Tor/Tor]: spelling errors in control-spec.txt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25871: spelling errors in control-spec.txt
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-spec
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 While looking at the spec patch for #25511, I found a few existing
 misspellings in control-spec.txt.  Patch in
 https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/6

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25511 [Core Tor/Tor]: Expose TZ info on control port for better debugging of time errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25511: Expose TZ info on control port for better debugging of time errors
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  roadmap, controller, 034-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  master, 034-triage-20180328,   |
  034-included-20180328, s8-errors, tor-spec |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:52 dgoulet]:
 > Spec patches need the tor version when it was added. This is for 034 so
 "tor-0.3.4.1-alpha" will be the first release with this.
 Sorry about that.  Fix in https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/5

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25511 [Core Tor/Tor]: Expose TZ info on control port for better debugging of time errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25511: Expose TZ info on control port for better debugging of time errors
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  roadmap, controller, 034-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  master, 034-triage-20180328,   |
  034-included-20180328, s8-errors, tor-spec |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Spec patches need the tor version when it was added. This is for 034 so
 "tor-0.3.4.1-alpha" will be the first release with this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25511 [Core Tor/Tor]: Expose TZ info on control port for better debugging of time errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25511: Expose TZ info on control port for better debugging of time errors
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  roadmap, controller, 034-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  master, 034-triage-20180328,   |
  034-included-20180328, s8-errors, tor-spec |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Spec change looks good.

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[tor-bugs] #25870 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix vanguard restrictions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25870: Fix vanguard restrictions
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #25546
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 asn pointed out that Tor relays forbid and will warn if clients create
 paths of the form A - B - A or A - A - A. The vangaurd path restrictions
 currently will do this, though.

 Additionally, they apply exit restrictions while choosing a guard, which I
 think we should disable. Since vanguard paths are all at least 3 hops
 before a chosen exit, this is a simple change.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25511 [Core Tor/Tor]: Expose TZ info on control port for better debugging of time errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25511: Expose TZ info on control port for better debugging of time errors
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  roadmap, controller, 034-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  master, 034-triage-20180328,   |
  034-included-20180328, s8-errors, tor-spec |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25814 [Core Tor/Tor]: Should Travis use "make distcheck"?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25814: Should Travis use "make distcheck"?
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 034-roadmap-subtask  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25550   | Points:
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:5 isis]:
 > I'm sorry, I noticed the Rust breakage with 0.3.1 and 0.3.2 because I
 build .debs for my Qubes sys-tor VM, but I never said anything because I
 don't (want to) understand enough!^Wmore about Debian or its packaging
 system(s) and didn't really want to get into it. In retrospect, I probably
 should have filed a ticket.
 >
 > This patch LGTM!

 Great!  I'll plan to merge it once the team has had a chance to discuss
 the issue below.  Let's either do it at monday meeting, or schedule a time
 then to do it later.

 > Maybe we want to have conversations at some point about what Jenkins'
 function/purpose is (I thought it existed specifically to test packaging
 and more diverse architectures and platforms like arm and win32),

 From my point of view, it's okay if we rely on Jenkins to test packaging
 and diverse architectures, but ''only if we are looking at it and fixing
 the issues''. On the other hand, if we don't treat bugs found by Jenkins
 failures as "must fix", then I think we need to take more patches like
 this that add more configurations to Travis.

 I'm fine with either route: either checking Jenkins more frequently, or
 expanding the scope of what we do with Travis.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25767 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: consensus-health should check for clock skew on dir auths

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25767: consensus-health should check for clock skew on dir auths
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by tom):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/depictor.git/commit/?id=a91384c90639c71dad3486813f85b9bbf79bf2c4

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25858 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: Make consensus health realy info nickname matches case-insensitive

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25858: Make consensus health realy info nickname matches case-insensitive
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by tom):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed.
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/depictor.git/commit/?id=7795022d0ac9cd86c8ee5905c1393c0bdc6b41d5

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25857 [Core Tor/Tor]: ::/128 is not the IPv6 equivalent of 0.0.0.0/0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25857: ::/128 is not the IPv6 equivalent of 0.0.0.0/0
---+
 Reporter:  CTassisF   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  easy doc fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged into 0.3.3 as cb813a352c1ee76c101fe2143b6fff75842b9e42. Thanks,
 everybody!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25804 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Domain fronting to App Engine stopped working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25804: Domain fronting to App Engine stopped working
---+
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  moat   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:21 coldsauce]:
 > Why not use Souq or some other CDN as the domain front like Signal is
 doing?

 It's already pointed out in the ticket's post:

 > Other related tickets:
 >
 > * #22782, use non-Google domain fronts
 > * #25594, use non-fronting-based registration

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25804 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Domain fronting to App Engine stopped working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25804: Domain fronting to App Engine stopped working
---+
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  moat   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by coldsauce):

 Why not use Souq or some other CDN as the domain front like Signal is
 doing?

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[tor-bugs] #25869 [Core Tor/Tor]: Proposal: Bandwidth Measurements Document Format

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25869: Proposal: Bandwidth Measurements Document Format
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:   | Status:  new
  enhancement|
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  bandwidth, bwauth, scanner, torflow
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 See tor-dev. Corrected draft soon.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24360 [Core Tor/Nyx]: When I open nyx and then Immediately click "qq" it will get in a state where nix disappears

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24360: When I open nyx and then Immediately click "qq" it will get in a state
where nix disappears
---+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Nyx   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by atagar):

 * priority:  Very High => Medium
 * status:  new => needs_information
 * severity:  Major => Normal


Comment:

 Hi Dbryrtfbcbhgf, sorry about the long delay. Other things bumped this off
 my radar.

 Unfortunately without a local repro my hands are pretty tied on
 troubleshooting this, but the stacktrace does provide a hint. Evidently a
 status change callback is hanging. Nyx has only four of those so next
 steps for troubleshooting this would be to comment those out one by one to
 determine which listener is at fault. After that we'll be able to
 troubleshoot why it's acting up.

 Since you have a repro but I don't I'll need for you to do this. For each
 of the following lines please add a '#' to the start. Nyx doesn't need any
 of these listeners (they're mostly to detect when tor restarts) so you can
 kill them all and quitting should work...

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/nyx.git/tree/nyx/panel/header.py#n56
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/nyx.git/tree/nyx/panel/graph.py#n443
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/nyx.git/tree/nyx/panel/torrc.py#n52
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/nyx.git/tree/nyx/tracker.py#n384

 Once we have a better idea of which listener is acting up we'll be able to
 narrow down why.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25756 [Core Tor/Tor]: EARLY_CONSENSUS_NOTICE_SKEW of 60 is too strict for some drifting dirauth clocks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25756: EARLY_CONSENSUS_NOTICE_SKEW of 60 is too strict for some drifting 
dirauth
clocks
-+-
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf|  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  clock-skew, s8-errors, 034-roadmap-  |  Actual Points:
  proposed   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => catalyst
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25814 [Core Tor/Tor]: Should Travis use "make distcheck"?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25814: Should Travis use "make distcheck"?
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 034-roadmap-subtask  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25550   | Points:
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * reviewer:   => isis


Comment:

 I'm sorry, I noticed the Rust breakage with 0.3.1 and 0.3.2 because I
 build .debs for my Qubes sys-tor VM, but I never said anything because I
 don't (want to) understand enough!^Wmore about Debian or its packaging
 system(s) and didn't really want to get into it. In retrospect, I probably
 should have filed a ticket.

 This patch LGTM!

 Maybe we want to have conversations at some point about what Jenkins'
 function/purpose is (I thought it existed specifically to test packaging
 and more diverse architectures and platforms like arm and win32), and who
 maintains our Debian stuff (we seem to do a lot of bending over backwards
 specifically for Debian when there's also other good distros whom we
 completely ignore)? If so, maybe we should schedule these conversations
 for the Seattle 2018 network-team meeting?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25511 [Core Tor/Tor]: Expose TZ info on control port for better debugging of time errors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25511: Expose TZ info on control port for better debugging of time errors
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  roadmap, controller, 034-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  master, 034-triage-20180328,   |
  034-included-20180328, s8-errors, tor-spec |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I think I'd prefer that new things be ISOTime2 (the one that is -MM-
 DDTHH:MM:SS) -- I consider the older format (-MM-DD HH:MM:SS) to be
 legacy.  The rationale for the newer format is that, when possible, it's
 often nice to have no spaces inside data items.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25552 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Onion service rev counters are useless and actually harmful for scalability

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25552: prop224: Onion service rev counters are useless and actually harmful for
scalability
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs prop224 034-roadmap-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  4
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * cc: isis (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  project| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor17
---+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:18 tom]:
 > I think one of the pain points we have with Tor Browser is the lack of
 persistent storage. We are so deathly scared of storing anything to disk
 that we can't save user's per-site exceptions to things. Perhaps we should
 reconsider this (opt-in of course.) I'd be curious to brainstorm if we
 could divine a storage mechanism we actually felt some measure of
 confident in. For example: What if we used something like Argon2 combined
 with a TPM-backed value? This is bypassable, but it requires on-machine
 brute forcing. If we developed something akin to 'Firefox Accounts', we
 could enable users the ability to store data on a Hidden Service and
 revoke authorization to it. These ideas are very 'out there'.
 Or just allow to assign different security slider setting to different
 temporary containers (each different container has a new identity, so to
 speak)? If the Project Fission thing gets going then there's a different
 process for different container and that would solve a lot of security
 problems and the UX with containers wouldn't require much work or
 difficulty to setup.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25866 [Core Tor/Stem]: does DescriptorDownloader.get_server_descriptors() get non-consensus descriptors?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25866: does DescriptorDownloader.get_server_descriptors() get non-consensus
descriptors?
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Hi cypherpunks, good point. Pushed a small doc fix...

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=27b2cbd

 Unfortunately the spec is a bit vague about what server descriptors will
 be available but you're right that it's not necessarily what is in the
 consensus. Feel free to reopen with the 'Core Tor / Tor' component if
 you'd like more clarity about what relays will and won't be available in
 the response.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25868 [Applications]: Tor unexpectedly exited

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25868: Tor unexpectedly exited
--+
 Reporter:  torman23  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 * priority:  Immediate => Medium


Comment:

 Reboot your computer and try opening Tor again

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[tor-bugs] #25868 [Applications]: Tor unexpectedly exited

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25868: Tor unexpectedly exited
--+
 Reporter:  torman23  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Hi,

  I received this error Tor unexpectedly exited. It keeps doing this today.
 Worked fine yesterday and I haven't changed any settings or downloaded
 anything to effect this.

  Please advise

 Thanks

 Paul

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24967 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: torsocks fails to check SIP if the path itself is a symlink

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24967: torsocks fails to check SIP if the path itself is a symlink
---+
 Reporter:  Hello71|  Owner:  Hello71
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 This breaks on my Linux with:

 {{{
 ERROR: /lib/torsocks/libtorsocks.so does not exist! Try re-installing
 torsocks.
 }}}

 It should actually be `/usr/local/lib/torsocks/...` in my case.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25785 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: Torsocks error. Symbol res_query, res_search, res_domain, res_querydomian not found.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25785: Torsocks error. Symbol res_query, res_search, res_domain, 
res_querydomian
not found.
---+-
 Reporter:  Maru   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 This is the old 1.x torsocks which has been obsolete for years. Please
 upgrade to latest using deb.torproject.org or source.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25295 [Core Tor/Tor]: Torsocks only accepts IPv4 replies but Tor prefers IPv6Automap by default

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25295: Torsocks only accepts IPv4 replies but Tor prefers IPv6Automap by 
default
+--
 Reporter:  fuzzyTew|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor:
|  0.3.3.2-alpha
 Severity:  Major   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor torsocks ipv6 fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  tor torsocks ipv6 => tor torsocks ipv6 fast-fix
 * component:  Core Tor/Torsocks => Core Tor/Tor
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25627 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: tsocks_gethostbyaddr_r scribbles garbage over data->hostname and then relies on it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25627: tsocks_gethostbyaddr_r scribbles garbage over data->hostname and then
relies on it
---+-
 Reporter:  exarkun|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged in commit 8013dfb1ebf6cb1d.

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25586 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: gethostbyaddr_r doesn't populate h_addrtype field of output hostent struct

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25586: gethostbyaddr_r doesn't populate h_addrtype field of output hostent 
struct
---+-
 Reporter:  exarkun|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks!

 Commit in a44660bd6d32de6c

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24979 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: torsocks could support ptrace sandboxing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24979: torsocks could support ptrace sandboxing
---+-
 Reporter:  Hello71|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Yeah I think #24037 is the way to go but that is Linux specific as pointed
 out.

 `ptrace()` is a mess and I honestly don't think it is a good idea, the
 multi threaded part is not going to be fun.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25691 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bridges don't work: Non-fatal assertion !(exit_ei == NULL) failed in onion_pick_cpath_exit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25691: Bridges don't work: Non-fatal assertion !(exit_ei == NULL) failed in
onion_pick_cpath_exit
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 034-must 033-backport|  Actual Points:
  033-maybe-must |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet, teor|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Nothing much more to say after teor's review here. Lets get it revised and
 I can do the final review if needed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24960 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: Torsocks not builds on old kernels where epoll_pwait isn't implemented

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24960: Torsocks not builds on old kernels where epoll_pwait isn't implemented
---+-
 Reporter:  Mr Dini|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Sorry, 2.6.31 is just too old of a kernel. Not supported anymore.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24081 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: Torsocks logging to a file can cause a crash or corrupt application files.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24081: Torsocks logging to a file can cause a crash or corrupt application 
files.
---+-
 Reporter:  cpwc   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks! Did minor tweak on the patch. Commit e56313a0d59b9a39.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24116 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: Torsocks deadlocks every Rust program

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24116: Torsocks deadlocks every Rust program
-+-
 Reporter:  larsl|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks|Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  torsocks deadlock rust jemalloc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 This patch changes many syscall like `listen()` or `socket` or `close` to
 not use the `tsocks_*`. It is OK since the symbols at that point have been
 hijacked by LD_PRELOAD but is it necessary? I'm asking because I like
 using `tsocks_*` to clearly show that we uses the torsocks wrapper.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23876 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: Torsocks getpeername() is broken for .onion addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23876: Torsocks getpeername() is broken for .onion addresses
---+-
 Reporter:  Torsocks_user  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Hmmm, I'm not having this problem with an onion address... :S

 However, I agree with the fix that we should set the cookie value into the
 `dest_addr` since in `getpeername()` we fallback to IPv4 if the connection
 domain is a FQDN.

 Fixed in `2fa559117c36e2e8`. Thanks for this!!!

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[tor-bugs] #25867 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update this part of the TB design doc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25867: Update this part of the TB design doc
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#other-security

 {{{
 network.jar.block-remote-files is set to true. Mozilla tried to block
 remote JAR files in Firefox 45 but needed to revert that decision due to
 breaking IBM's iNotes. While Mozilla is working on getting this disabled
 again we take the protective stance already now and block remote JAR files
 even on the low security level.
 }}}

 Since https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1329336 has been fixed

 (See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1427726 as well but
 that's for the future 67 ESR.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23715 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: Support `memfd_create(2)`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23715: Support `memfd_create(2)`
---+-
 Reporter:  yawning|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged! Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23667 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: Always send ATYP 0x03 (domain name) with a plain IP address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23667: Always send ATYP 0x03 (domain name) with a plain IP address
---+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Should be fixed in a0070f02d77315b6.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25543 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches for ESR60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25543: Rebase Tor Browser patches for ESR60
--+-
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  arthuredelstein
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25741| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by mcs):

 I removed the individual "fixup" patches that I attached to this ticket a
 couple of days ago and I replaced them with a .zip archive which contains
 proper `git am` formatted patches. The .zip also contains a rebased patch
 for #13252.

 Kathy and I are still working on rebasing these two patches:
 P 4564a5f744df Bug 13379: Sign our MAR files.
 P 4c9f746f2c19 Bug 4234: Use the Firefox Update Process for Tor Browser.

 We will also take care of this one:
 P? 9ae35ba3c07e Bug 19121: reinstate the update.xml hash check
 For this patch we need to resurrect more code that Mozilla has removed
 (see https://bugzil.la/1373267).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25865 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Security Slider USer Manual Page is out of date

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25865: Security Slider USer Manual Page is out of date
--+---
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #24319.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24391 [Community/Tor Browser Manual]: update TB manual with new images of Tor Browser launcher UI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24391: update TB manual with new images of Tor Browser launcher UI
--+--
 Reporter:  alison|  Owner:  Phoul
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Browser Manual  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: tom (added)


Comment:

 #25865 is a duplicate.

 Note there is #24516 as well which looks pretty similar.

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[tor-bugs] #25866 [Core Tor/Stem]: does DescriptorDownloader.get_server_descriptors() get non-consensus descriptors?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25866: does DescriptorDownloader.get_server_descriptors() get non-consensus
descriptors?
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 bad-relays@ runs a stem script that fetches all descriptors from the
 current consensus via
 
https://stem.torproject.org/api/descriptor/remote.html#stem.descriptor.remote.DescriptorDownloader.get_server_descriptors


 "If no fingerprints are provided then this returns all descriptors in the
 present consensus."

 On 2018-04-20 it generated an output about relay
 9925389058263BB54D4AE2319DBCD3087393EB24

 I was unable to find any consensus from 2018-04-20 with this relay in it.

 Only moria1 and dizum seem to vote about it.

 Does .get_server_descriptors() also fetch descriptors not in consensus?

 {{{
 @type server-descriptor 1.0
 router Lesearch2017 223.197.177.49 9090 0 9030
 platform Tor 0.2.6.0-alpha-dev on Linux
 protocols Link 1 2 Circuit 1
 published 2018-04-20 08:26:03
 fingerprint 9925 3890 5826 3BB5 4D4A E231 9DBC D308 7393 EB24
 uptime 13165920
 bandwidth 10485760 20971520 53832
 extra-info-digest 820073CDA736DF930C03D4EA7B82FC8C43645EA7
 onion-key
 -BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-
 MIGJAoGBANuX97BAzqakkQs1pflUljFEZwO+2yLv1TbE40sgfHnATzh5RLFw7Paf
 h6y6wpWb/GYkn2BD2eLzToF/kKmaApIej0ePrIRi0XBwUBajoij+Ga+YdSQrSBOg
 1WiVg+TDJM8Fkfu0UmL8ZcceztddeV+yTMRAEbdV5SAGuzY98uWDAgMBAAE=
 -END RSA PUBLIC KEY-
 signing-key
 -BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-
 MIGJAoGBANxawKDc8HTF9OEqRYQURtgdKP3OIpzufcHb4WUJUdP0IbpTwAfXguuy
 xU7Xe3LmLZo9bqghoigZlbYGX8iLorIshJ0BvDNXErYv0hpqGSxrAnckwoGhgiit
 Ky8oEVugV4KymqeH6gK+itMrUZm/3JvFoACrbe8f3UsxMoEMwRJ3AgMBo7M=
 -END RSA PUBLIC KEY-
 hidden-service-dir
 ntor-onion-key hXVaWAq8PRgiKdIOxhRAgKZ6ECIhYsAsgsHFmxhQCEk=
 reject *:*
 router-signature
 -BEGIN SIGNATURE-
 Mi/lWn+p3xWllJxy3y558WuHyRNUlmtyJ4vnUvZhogQVjETNO1/t70keNDL+1JVW
 Ap5BW6rfZH5ZEI0OJoif+W/8hiWvJpf/Mkn07XbNJMZbr6BsKyfcGZy/SHd6iKK9
 yly/p5GVtQQO2SpgLpEXWB0Tu2cElUsOX7bCQz1LUow=
 -END SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25543 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches for ESR60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25543: Rebase Tor Browser patches for ESR60
--+-
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  arthuredelstein
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25741| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * Attachment "tb-patches-2018-04-20.zip" added.

 #13252 patch plus a few fixups

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25543 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches for ESR60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25543: Rebase Tor Browser patches for ESR60
--+-
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  arthuredelstein
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25741| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * Attachment "libmdns.patch" removed.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  project| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor17
---+---

Comment (by tom):

 Yea. Talking about the slider settings gets confusing because different
 words mean different things to different people, and there are a lot of
 things I think we're trying to roll up into a single slider.

 Privacy: We've previously, and I agree, that we should not encourage or
 support the slider being interpreted as improving privacy. A user's
 privacy should be respected whether it's at Low or High; and by that I
 mean Fingerprinting Protection, FPI, and Circuit Isolation should always
 be in effect.  If for whatever reason we want to loosen privacy
 restrictions to support web functionality - we should probably pursue
 well-working, useful, and informative permission choices. Like Canvas and
 Audio/Video.

 Security from Exit Nodes: I imagine this as 'None', 'Medium', and 'High'.
 'Medium' blocks all Javascript, audio, video, svg, web fonts, and maybe a
 few other things from HTTP. High blocks all HTTP.  I think we admit this
 is a goal of the slider by having the 'Block JS from HTTP' feature. I
 don't think there is any other reason to have this feature except to
 protect from malicious exit nodes.  I would be curious to see how much of
 the web breaks if we broke this out, and defaulted to Medium.

 Security from the Web Site itself: This encompasses most of the rest of
 the slider features. Blocking JS from HTTPS sites. JS Engine optimizations
 are disabled. MathML disabled. SVG disabled, audio/video formats are
 disabled. This is generally what we think of as the goal of the slider, I
 think.

 Given this, I think two settings for the slider can make sense. "Do I
 trust this website or not?" The pain point is that the usability of
 disabling javascript is often so harsh that it makes it untenable... I
 wonder if there's anything that can be done to split that atom

 


 I think one of the pain points we have with Tor Browser is the lack of
 persistent storage. We are so deathly scared of storing anything to disk
 that we can't save user's per-site exceptions to things. Perhaps we should
 reconsider this (opt-in of course.) I'd be curious to brainstorm if we
 could divine a storage mechanism we actually felt some measure of
 confident in. For example: What if we used something like Argon2 combined
 with a TPM-backed value? This is bypassable, but it requires on-machine
 brute forcing. If we developed something akin to 'Firefox Accounts', we
 could enable users the ability to store data on a Hidden Service and
 revoke authorization to it. These ideas are very 'out there'.

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[tor-bugs] #25865 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Security Slider USer Manual Page is out of date

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25865: Security Slider USer Manual Page is out of date
--+--
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 https://tb-manual.torproject.org/en-US/security-slider.html

 The screenshot shows Low, Medium, High - but the slider is now Safe,
 Safer, Safest.

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[tor-bugs] #25864 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Aggregated search doesn't carry filters through to the country and AS views

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25864: Aggregated search doesn't carry filters through to the country and AS 
views
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 In relay search's aggregate search, filters like "flag:exit" are not
 carried through to the country and AS links. Instead, when you click on
 them, it says that no query was submitted.

 The links should go to
 https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#aggregate/cc/flag:exit instead.

 Steps to reproduce:
 1. Go to https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#aggregate/all/flag:exit
 2. Click on the country or AS links in the table

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25861 [Metrics/Relay Search]: make country clickable and provide country-exits only and AS-exits only links

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25861: make country clickable and provide country-exits only  and AS-exits only
links
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 I wonder if we should make all the countries clickable.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22068 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: Make it explicit that Torsocks won't work correctly in certain scenarios in the README

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22068: Make it explicit that Torsocks won't work correctly in certain 
scenarios in
the README
---+-
 Reporter:  Franciscouzo   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  easy, doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed in commit fd7b0d71a0e9f511. Could be better maybe but for now it
 seems a good start.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17618 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: Segfault in tsocks_accept4() if called through syscall()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17618: Segfault in tsocks_accept4() if called through syscall()
---+-
 Reporter:  crystalmaker   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Should be fixed in e4601e0f89b47c5a (pushing in a jiffy).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14132 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: Add SocksPort Unix support to torsocks (was: Add SocksSocket support to torsocks)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14132: Add SocksPort Unix support to torsocks
---+--
 Reporter:  ioerror|  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25862 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clean up wrapper script/CFLAGS and friends mix on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25862: Clean up wrapper script/CFLAGS and friends mix on Windows
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Old description:

> Our mix of wrapper scripts and usage of CFLAGS/LDFLAGS when compiling on
> Windows has grown over the years to a point where it gets confusing. We
> should get back to sanity here.
>
> We needed the wrapper scripts to pass down all required flags to the
> depths of the Firefox build system, but meanwhile those scripts are used
> almost everywhere and `CFLAGS`/`LDFLAGS` additionally sometimes.
>
> One option boklm brought up would be to use the `CFLAGS`/`LDFLAGS`
> defined in rbm.conf and enable those script only during Firefox's build.
>
> Another just get rid of those wrapper script and fix the missing pieces
> in Firefox if those are still there.
>
> At any rate, we should document where we need them in the first place to
> avoid lengthy digging in case someone is wondering in the future or now,
> while looking at our build scripts.

New description:

 Our mix of wrapper scripts and usage of CFLAGS/LDFLAGS when compiling on
 Windows has grown over the years to a point where it gets confusing. We
 should get back to sanity here.

 We needed the wrapper scripts to pass down all required flags to the
 depths of the Firefox build system, but meanwhile those scripts are used
 almost everywhere and `CFLAGS`/`LDFLAGS` additionally sometimes.

 One option boklm brought up would be to use the `CFLAGS`/`LDFLAGS` defined
 in rbm.conf and enable those script only during Firefox's build.

 Another just get rid of those wrapper scripts and fix the missing pieces
 in Firefox if those are still there.

 At any rate, we should document where we need them in the first place to
 avoid lengthy digging in case someone is wondering in the future or now,
 while looking at our build scripts.

--

Comment (by gk):

 FWIW, I came up with this ticket because I hit link failures when building
 the rust std lib for Windows (while working on #25849). It turns out that
 the wrappers compile libbacktrace and jemalloc with stack protections
 support, but the linker when building the std lib is not regarding `-lssp`
 (see linker arg construction in https://github.com/rust-
 lang/rust/blob/1.25.0/src/librustc_back/target/windows_base.rs).

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[tor-bugs] #25863 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Check where the -mwindows flag is needed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25863: Check where the -mwindows flag is needed
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Currently we are setting the `-mwindows` flag by default in `CFLAGS` and
 `LDFLAGS` defined in `rbm.conf`, which are currently used (through
 `var/configure_opt`) in tor, gmp, libevent and go.

 We should check where this flag is really needed, and only set it there.

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[tor-bugs] #25862 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clean up wrapper script/CFLAGS and friends mix on Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25862: Clean up wrapper script/CFLAGS and friends mix on Windows
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Our mix of wrapper scripts and usage of CFLAGS/LDFLAGS when compiling on
 Windows has grown over the years to a point where it gets confusing. We
 should get back to sanity here.

 We needed the wrapper scripts to pass down all required flags to the
 depths of the Firefox build system, but meanwhile those scripts are used
 almost everywhere and `CFLAGS`/`LDFLAGS` additionally sometimes.

 One option boklm brought up would be to use the `CFLAGS`/`LDFLAGS` defined
 in rbm.conf and enable those script only during Firefox's build.

 Another just get rid of those wrapper script and fix the missing pieces in
 Firefox if those are still there.

 At any rate, we should document where we need them in the first place to
 avoid lengthy digging in case someone is wondering in the future or now,
 while looking at our build scripts.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25854 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Improve advertised/observed bandwidth mouseover text

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25854: Improve advertised/observed bandwidth mouseover text
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Hmm? Anything I can help with?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25860 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clean up OpenSSL's configure options for Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25860: Clean up OpenSSL's configure options for Windows
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 Yes, I think using the `CFLAGS` and `LDFLAGS` from `rbm.conf` makes sense.

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[tor-bugs] #25861 [Metrics/Relay Search]: make country clickable and provide country-exits only and AS-exits only links

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25861: make country clickable and provide country-exits only  and AS-exits only
links
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 this use-case comes from the bad-relays@ context.

 When we detect exits in a given country it is useful to easily
 get a list of all exits in that country or in that AS.

 It would be nice if you could add the following URLs/filters on the relay
 page:

 - make country clickable put a second link next to it "(exits only)" with
 flag:exit
 - put a "exits only" link also next to the already AS number link

 thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25860 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clean up OpenSSL's configure options for Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25860: Clean up OpenSSL's configure options for Windows
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * type:  defect => enhancement


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25859 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clean up zlib's build script

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25859: Clean up zlib's build script
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 We can set `flag_mwindows` to `''` I suppose.

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[tor-bugs] #25860 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clean up OpenSSL's configure options for Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25860: Clean up OpenSSL's configure options for Windows
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 There is no need to basically duplicate the `CFLAGS` and `LDFLAGS` in the
 Windows related `configure_opts`. We could just use things defined in
 `rbm.conf` I think (and set `flag_mwindows` to `''`).

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[tor-bugs] #25859 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Clean up zlib's build script

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25859: Clean up zlib's build script
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 We should clean up the compile and link flags zlib build script:

 1) `CFLAGS` and `LDFLAGS` seem to be unused, rather `LOC` is taken to
 define those.
 2) Given 1) we could just assign the relevant flags to `LOC` and omit
 `CFLAGS` and `LDFLAGS` entirely AND we can omit spelling `LOC` out twice
 (once in the `make` command and once in the `make install` command).
 3) While we are at it, just doing a `make install` might be enough.
 4) No need to hard-code `-j4`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  project| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor17
---+---
Changes (by hiro):

 * Attachment "Image-1.jpg" added.

 firefox focus

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