Re: [tor-bugs] #24630 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop initialising rust git submodules, travis does this automatically

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24630: Stop initialising rust git submodules, travis does this automatically
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 032-backport, teor-was-  |  Actual Points:
  assigned, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328 very-small|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Let's do it

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21559 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor browser deanonymization/fingerprinting via cached intermediate CAs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21559: Tor browser deanonymization/fingerprinting via cached intermediate CAs
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-linkability  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 #25929 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25929 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Critical breach in first-party isolation allowing users deanonimization and profiling

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25929: Critical breach in first-party isolation allowing users deanonimization 
and
profiling
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #21559.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24630 [Core Tor/Tor]: Stop initialising rust git submodules, travis does this automatically

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24630: Stop initialising rust git submodules, travis does this automatically
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, 032-backport, teor-was-  |  Actual Points:
  assigned, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328 very-small|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM; if teor agrees, I think we should do Hello71's suggestion to cherry-
 pick d219c568abb82e4c564fb8fe95eeb4ac423affc2 onto 0.3.2 and 0.3.3.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25549 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add tor CI config for AppVeyor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25549: Add tor CI config for AppVeyor
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  saper
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-testing, 034-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  subtask, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-included-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #25550   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:  isis, catalyst   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor3
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 There's a bunch of fixes and a bit of a hack to add IRC notifications and
 other such things in my `bug25549` branch. I ended up needed to build
 libevent from git, so I enabled caching of its build directory between
 builds (not sure if this works yet, as caching only happens on successful
 builds). Everything appears to be working, but there's still three tests
 which fail, which I've created new tickets for: `crypto/openssl_version`
 (#25942), `tortls/x509_cert_free` (#25943), and `tortls/context_new`
 (#25944).

 My branch includes @saper's patches, which I've reviewed. Please review my
 additions, thank you!

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[tor-bugs] #25944 [Core Tor/Tor]: Investigate and fix tortls/context_new test failure on win32 CI builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25944: Investigate and fix tortls/context_new test failure on win32 CI builds
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.5-rc
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-ci tor-windows tor-testing
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 From #25549, the `tortls/context_new` is reliably
 
[https://ci.appveyor.com/project/isislovecruft/tor/build/1.0.60/job/a0coox4l2wemeo7w#L3451
 failing]. We should investigate why and fix it.

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[tor-bugs] #25943 [Core Tor/Tor]: Investigate and fix tortls/x509_cert_free test failure on win32 CI builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25943: Investigate and fix tortls/x509_cert_free test failure on win32 CI 
builds
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.5-rc
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-ci tor-windows tor-testing
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 From #25549, the `tortls/x509_cert_free` test is
 
[https://ci.appveyor.com/project/isislovecruft/tor/build/1.0.60/job/a0coox4l2wemeo7w#L3411
 failing] with:

 {{{
 tortls/x509_cert_free: [forking]
   [x509_cert_free FAILED]
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #25942 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix win32 test failure for crypto/openssl_version

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25942: Fix win32 test failure for crypto/openssl_version
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.5-rc
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-ci tor-windows tor-testing
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 From #25549, the `crypto/openssl_version` test
 
[https://ci.appveyor.com/project/isislovecruft/tor/build/1.0.60/job/a0coox4l2wemeo7w#L2693
 fails] on win32 builds with:

 {{{
 crypto/openssl_version: [forking] openssl version = 1.0.2l
 openssl h_version = 1.0.2n
   FAIL ../src/test/test_crypto.c:156: assert(!strcmpstart(version,
 h_version))
   [openssl_version FAILED]
 }}}

 This could possibly be an artifact of how the CI environment is set up. If
 so, there should be a `CI_WINDOWS` environment variable set on the
 machine, so we can probably just ignore this test?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19429 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clean up our OpenSSL 1.1 support.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19429: Clean up our OpenSSL 1.1 support.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.4-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-crypto openssl refactor future-  |  Actual Points:
  proof  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 Confirmed that without `--enable-fatal-warnings`, the building using the
 default build of openssl-1.1.0h seems to only have warnings in that one
 file.  All of these are built on Ubuntu 16.04.04 amd64.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19981 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure we build with OpenSSL 1.1.0 with all deprecated APIs removed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19981: Make sure we build with OpenSSL 1.1.0 with all deprecated APIs removed
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  openssl technical-debt refactor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19429   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  new => needs_revision


Comment:

 Patch in parent ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25353 [Core Tor/Tor]: Configure fails with some OpenSSL 1.1.0 built with no-deprecated.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25353: Configure fails with some OpenSSL 1.1.0 built with no-deprecated.
-+-
 Reporter:  laomaiweng   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  openssl, tor-ssl,|  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-must, compatibility,  |
  build, 034-included-20180405   |
Parent ID:  #19429   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19429 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clean up our OpenSSL 1.1 support.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19429: Clean up our OpenSSL 1.1 support.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.4-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-crypto openssl refactor future-  |  Actual Points:
  proof  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Looks like it works with openssl-1.1.0h built with `no-deprecated`, so
 it's 1.1.0h with deprecated APIs that's the problem.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19429 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clean up our OpenSSL 1.1 support.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19429: Clean up our OpenSSL 1.1 support.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.4-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-crypto openssl refactor future-  |  Actual Points:
  proof  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 I get
 {{{
 src/common/tortls.c:64:0: error: "X509_get_notBefore" redefined [-Werror]
  #define X509_get_notBefore(cert) \
  ^
 In file included from /home/tlyu/ssl/include/openssl/ssl.h:50:0,
  from src/common/tortls.c:41:
 /home/tlyu/ssl/include/openssl/x509.h:635:0: note: this is the location of
 the previous definition
  #  define X509_get_notBefore X509_getm_notBefore
  ^
 src/common/tortls.c:66:0: error: "X509_get_notAfter" redefined [-Werror]
  #define X509_get_notAfter(cert) \
  ^
 In file included from /home/tlyu/ssl/include/openssl/ssl.h:50:0,
  from src/common/tortls.c:41:
 /home/tlyu/ssl/include/openssl/x509.h:636:0: note: this is the location of
 the previous definition
  #  define X509_get_notAfter X509_getm_notAfter
  ^
 }}}
 with a freshly built openssl-1.1.0h and default options (except for
 `--prefix`).  I'll check against a `--no-deprecated` build to see if
 there's any difference.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25804 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Domain fronting to App Engine stopped working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25804: Domain fronting to App Engine stopped working
---+
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  moat   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by twim):

 Hi there,

 It turns out that AppEngine is not the only option for domain fronting
 with Google.
 Google also provides a service called
 [https://developers.google.com/amp/cache/ AMP cache] for
 [https://ampproject.org/ AMP pages]. What it basically does is proxying
 random pages on the Internet and making them load faster (e.g. on Google
 search results). It requires pages to comply with some format though and
 also strips invisible content, resizes images, etc.
 Despite it is being served via different domain names (one per real
 domain) it is still hosted at Google infrastructure which can be fronted.

 I wrote a [https://github.com/nogoegst/amper library] that implements
 wrappers around AMP cache for tunneling traffic through it.
 I've also made a hacky pluggable transport thing as a PoC and managed to
 bootstrap tor using it. Have to say that no one should ever use AMP cache
 as an actual PT because it makes tons of requests (so you will probably be
 banned by Google) and it is incredibly slow.

 I guess that this can be a pretty good fit for both Moat and Snowflake use
 cases.

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[tor-bugs] #25941 [Webpages]: formatting on "Download Tor" www page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25941: formatting on "Download Tor" www page
--+
 Reporter:  gman999   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  formatting css
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 On this page:

 https://www.torproject.org/download/download-easy.html.en

 There looks like there is a css/syntax issue around here and it needs
 another line break:

 {{{

 If provided version is not the current Tor Browser version, it is not
 recommended.
 To install the Tor Browser port from an updated ports tree,
 run:
 cd /usr/ports/meta/tor-browser && make install
   
 
   
 
 }}}

 ty!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25741 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create tor-browser for mobile branch based on mozilla-central

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25741: Create tor-browser for mobile branch based on mozilla-central
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by igt0):

 Can we try to upstream these patches? I think all of them could benefit FF
 as well.

 {{{

 Bug 25741 - TBA: Conditionally require *_LOCATION permissions

 Bug 25741 - TBA: Move GCM Push prefs within preprocessor guard

 Bug 25741 - TBA: Only include GCM permissions if we want them

 Bug 25741 - TBA: Only include Firefox Account permissions if we want them

 Bug 25741 - TBA: Conditionally require *_WIFI_STATE permissions
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25939 [Core Tor/Tor]: A Tor commit seems to have broken creation of V3 onion services with stem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25939: A Tor commit seems to have broken creation of V3 onion services with 
stem
-+
 Reporter:  maqp |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor8
-+
Changes (by asn):

 * cc: asn (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25741 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create tor-browser for mobile branch based on mozilla-central

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25741: Create tor-browser for mobile branch based on mozilla-central
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Okay, nearly done.

 Notes: during the rebase I changed Orfox -> torbrowser, and I renamed
 .mozconfig-orfox -> .mozconfig-android.

 While I updated .mozconfig-android:
  1) I noticed BUILD_OFFICIAL is dead, I deleted this (maybe delete from
 other .mozconfig, too).
  2) Question: why do we set MOZILLA_OFFICIAL in .mozconfig?
  3) --disable-install-strip on mobile? What errors were seen before?

 For (2), to be precise, from what I see `mk_add_options
 MOZILLA_OFFICIAL=1` does not set `MOZILLA_OFFICIAL=1`. The in-tree
 mozconfigs use `export MOZILLA_OFFICIAL=1` and they have a comment "#
 Needed to enable breakpad in application.ini" dated in 2011. I confirmed
 changing `mk_add_options MOZILLA_OFFICIAL=1` to `export
 MOZILLA_OFFICIAL=1` does set `MOZILLA_OFFICIAL=1`.

 I'll research (3). The comment in .mozconfig-orfox says "== Known mobile
 build flag that causes errors", but I'd like having this documented so we
 know if/when this works.

 I'm running a few more builds for testing (and then I'll wait for #25543)

 Based on 61.0.a1
 Repo: ​https://git.torproject.org/user/sysrqb/tor-browser.git
 Branch: bug25741_orfox_patches

 Based on #25543 (60.0b15) + cherry-pick from bug25741_orfox_patches
 Repo: ​https://git.torproject.org/user/sysrqb/tor-browser.git
 Branch: bug25741_orfox_patches_beta_plus_25543+7

 Testing a build from bug25741_orfox_patches_beta_plus_25543+7 confirms
 Necko connections do not bypass the proxy configured by pref. TBA should
 benefit from most of the proxy-bypass work done for desktop, so (as
 expected) we should concentrate on the java-based network connections.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25939 [Core Tor/Tor]: A Tor commit seems to have broken creation of V3 onion services with stem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25939: A Tor commit seems to have broken creation of V3 onion services with 
stem
-+
 Reporter:  maqp |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor8
-+

Comment (by atagar):

 Thanks maqp! Quick note from the peanut gallery regarding
 
[https://gist.githubusercontent.com/maqp/bf2d14ec625556997ae075d2084b4a4c/raw/6a4353336a76350b7511bd65dcc6183efb6bf215/v3_onion_test.py
 your script] - you might want to take a peek at stem.process. There's no
 need to manually write a torrc yourself. :)

 
https://stem.torproject.org/api/process.html#stem.process.launch_tor_with_config

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25938 [Applications/Tor Browser]: backport 1334776

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25938: backport 1334776
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201804R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * cc: gk (added)
 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201804R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Here's my branch for review:
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/torbrowser/commits/25938

 I also pushed to try server. Not sure why Windows and Mac tests didn't
 run. But generally speaking the Linux tests passed:

 
https://treeherder.mozilla.org/#/jobs?repo=try&revision=b76a7f47f5c86169c852424a80573caa158bb2ed

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25733 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: Assertion bin_counts > 0 failed in circuit_build_times_get_xm at ../src/or/circuitstats.c:772.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25733: Bug: Assertion bin_counts > 0 failed in circuit_build_times_get_xm at
../src/or/circuitstats.c:772.
-+-
 Reporter:  cstest   |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash 029-backport 031-backport  |  Actual Points:
  032-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready


Comment:

 https://oniongit.eu/mikeperry/tor/commits/bug25733_029 Rebased on 029,
 with fixed log line. Also in my torproject remote.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25933 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove connection_ap_attach_pending(0) from per-second callback.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25933: Remove connection_ap_attach_pending(0) from per-second callback.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  implemented
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25375   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25939 [Core Tor/Tor]: A Tor commit seems to have broken creation of V3 onion services with stem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25939: A Tor commit seems to have broken creation of V3 onion services with 
stem
-+
 Reporter:  maqp |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor8
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => High
 * cc: dgoulet (added)
 * sponsor:   => Sponsor8
 * keywords:   => 034-must regression
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


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[tor-bugs] #25940 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: Disable autocorrect on the consensus health relay info name/fingerprint entry box

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25940: Disable autocorrect on the consensus health relay info name/fingerprint
entry box
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Otherwise, iOS likes to change relay nicknames.

 Here are the magic attributes:
 https://davidwalsh.name/disable-autocorrect

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[tor-bugs] #25939 [Core Tor/Tor]: A Tor commit seems to have broken creation of V3 onion services with stem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25939: A Tor commit seems to have broken creation of V3 onion services with 
stem
--+
 Reporter:  maqp  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 The commit in question is
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/commit/?id=a4fcdc5decfe60bbd95aee2e5586e90c40b73225
 this].

 [https://gist.github.com/maqp/5ea6cf41a836c290b22ec302213d8a00 Here] is a
 bash script that helps reproduce the bug. By default the script uses the
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/commit/?id=ed89bb32535fbf354b406a36f3176380a4e226bf
 last working commit]. Comment line 22 and uncomment line 23 and run it
 again to see how the
 
[https://gist.githubusercontent.com/maqp/bf2d14ec625556997ae075d2084b4a4c/raw/6a4353336a76350b7511bd65dcc6183efb6bf215/v3_onion_test.py
 python script] launched by the bash script is unable to bring V3 onion
 service online with stem.

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[tor-bugs] #25938 [Applications/Tor Browser]: backport 1334776

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25938: backport 1334776
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 We'd like to backport Mozilla's 1334776

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25936 [Core Tor/Tor]: have travis display test-suite.log from the right place when DISTCHECK=yes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25936: have travis display test-suite.log from the right place when 
DISTCHECK=yes
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25550| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor3-can
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * parent:   => #25550


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25936 [Core Tor/Tor]: have travis display test-suite.log from the right place when DISTCHECK=yes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25936: have travis display test-suite.log from the right place when 
DISTCHECK=yes
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor3-can
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Pull request for 0.2.9: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/61
 My bug25936-03{1,3} branches contain the conflict resolution merge commits
 for those supported releases (though they're fairly straightforward).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25937 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move dirvote_act into a periodic callback

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25937: Move dirvote_act into a periodic callback
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25375   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I've started this as `dirvote_act_refactor`, but I'm going to rebase and
 finish it once #25376 is merged, to avoid conflicts.

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[tor-bugs] #25937 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move dirvote_act into a periodic callback

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25937: Move dirvote_act into a periodic callback
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask,
 Severity:  Normal   |  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #25375
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor8   |
-+-
 Instead of calling dirvote_act once per second, we can just ask it when to
 call it next.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25376 [Core Tor/Tor]: Disable as many timers as possible when DisableNetwork or when idle/hibernating

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25376: Disable as many timers as possible when DisableNetwork or when
idle/hibernating
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25500   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I think this is good; we may have gotten some of the 0 vs NEEDS_NET flags
 wrong, but I can't find any obvious problems there.

 This needs a changes file, though.  (And did we remember to put one on
 #25762 ?  Maybe they can both share a single changes file.)

 Please feel free to put this in merge_ready once a changes_file exists.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24310 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider encrypted bookmarks addon for storing onions on the browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24310: Consider encrypted bookmarks addon for storing onions on the browser
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tbb, network-need, tor-hs,  |  Actual Points:
  arthuredelstein|
Parent ID:   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:  prop224, tbb, network-need, tor-hs => prop224, tbb, network-
 need, tor-hs, arthuredelstein


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25935 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow DA address to be specified as FQDN

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25935: Allow DA address to be specified as FQDN
--+
 Reporter:  somlo |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * keywords:   => tor-dirauth
 * type:  defect => enhancement
 * status:  new => needs_review
 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25376 [Core Tor/Tor]: Disable as many timers as possible when DisableNetwork or when idle/hibernating

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25376: Disable as many timers as possible when DisableNetwork or when
idle/hibernating
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25500   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => nickm


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/60

 See branch: `ticket25376_034_01`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25543 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches for ESR60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25543: Rebase Tor Browser patches for ESR60
--+-
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  arthuredelstein
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25741| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:14 sysrqb]:
 > Replying to [comment:6 arthuredelstein]:
 > > {{{
 > > F 3efb1fb5990a TB4: Tor Browser's Firefox preference overrides.
 > > }}}
 >
 > Friendly reminder to update `general.useragent.override` before merging
 this. (59d6b454184b3 on 25543+7)

 Thanks! I added a fixup commit: 947eba86aeed38727605e9cb875c9a5ddb05b7a4

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25543 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches for ESR60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25543: Rebase Tor Browser patches for ESR60
--+-
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  arthuredelstein
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25741| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:13 mcs]:
 > I attached a zip archive that contains a few more fixup patches.

 Thanks for these -- I have added them to
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commits/25543+7  (HEAD is
 now fe38c8a83d8e90a99f6d04fb19a1dc085a19a766).

 > There are probably more places in the Tor Browser patches where we need
 to remove the JS version from the MIME type when referencing from an XHTML
 file or HTML file (see `0001-fixup-Bug-16940-After-update-load-local-
 change-notes.patch` within the zip archive).

 I did a search to find any examples of "version=" and found them in the
 following files:

 {{{
 docshell/test/test_tor_bug16620.html
 docshell/test/tor_bug16620.html
 docshell/test/tor_bug16620_form.html
 dom/events/test/test_tor_bug15646.html
 tbb-tests/test_tor_bug1517.html
 tbb-tests/test_tor_bug23104.html
 tbb-tests/test_tor_bug2875.html
 }}}

 These are all tests we have added, and it seems that the scripts still
 run, so I'm inclined not to patch them, although it would do no harm to do
 so.

 > Also, Kathy and I finished our initial rebasing of the updater patches
 and are in the process of testing them. I assume you would rather wait and
 receive tested patches, but let us know if you would rather have them
 sooner (we will probably not finish the updater testing until next week).

 Waiting for your tests sounds good to me. Thank you!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25935 [- Select a component]: Allow DA address to be specified as FQDN

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25935: Allow DA address to be specified as FQDN
--+
 Reporter:  somlo |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by somlo):

 can't upload second patch due to TRAC going off on a CAPTCHA death spiral.
 Created github pull request
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/59 instead.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25903 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add OVERHEAD and DELIVERED fields to CIRC_BW events

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25903: Add OVERHEAD and DELIVERED fields to CIRC_BW events
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25546| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Third time's a charm:
 ​​https://oniongit.eu/mikeperry/tor/commits/bug25903_v3 for code changes.
 ​​https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/mikeperry/torspec.git/log/?h=bug25903_v3
 for spec changes.

 This version counts any relay cell the client decides to write as valid
 delivered written data. For received data, it counts relay cells as valid
 delivered data if they do not trigger an error condition in the code that
 handles them.

 I've been testing this with https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/vanguards/ on
 client and service side and have gotten it down to no false positives on
 service side. On client side, if the client closes the connection while
 data is in flight, then that stream id will be unknown, and those packets
 will be dropped data (need #25573 for that).

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[tor-bugs] #25936 [Core Tor/Tor]: have travis display test-suite.log from the right place when DISTCHECK=yes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25936: have travis display test-suite.log from the right place when 
DISTCHECK=yes
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-ci, fast-fix
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor3-can  |
--+
 After #25814, Travis CI sometimes won't find test-suite.log because `make
 distcheck` runs `make check` in a subdirectory.  This causes problems when
 there's a failure that's specific to `make distcheck`, like in [https
 ://travis-ci.org/torproject/tor/jobs/371634830 this example].

 We should create a new make target that shows test-suite.log from the
 correct place.  (It's easier if it's a make target because then we have
 `$(distdir)` available.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25935 [- Select a component]: Allow DA address to be specified as FQDN

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25935: Allow DA address to be specified as FQDN
--+
 Reporter:  somlo |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by somlo):

 * Attachment "0001-Allow-FQDN-in-config-file-DA-address-field.patch"
 added.


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[tor-bugs] #25935 [- Select a component]: Allow DA address to be specified as FQDN

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25935: Allow DA address to be specified as FQDN
--+
 Reporter:  somlo |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 It would be very helpful, particularly in sandbox situations, to specify
 the Directory Authority by FQDN hostname instead of by IP address. This
 would allow us to defer picking an actual IP address until the simulation
 is started, and even to use some "in-game" DNS facility to figure out
 the actual address after the simulation is launched.

 Right now, specifying a FQDN for the "DirAuthority" config file entry
 even *partially* works already: if the FQDN happens to start with a
 digit, it is correctly resolved internally using available DNS resolver
 infrastructure :)

 The first attached patch makes that work in all cases (even when the
 FQDN hostname does *not* begin with a digit).

 The second attached patch allows FQDNs to be inserted into DA certs
 created using tor-gencert, and correspondingly resolved when a client
 parses the downloaded DA certificate.

 I realize there is ongoing work to refactor parsing the DA config entry
 (ticket #17224), so please consider this patch set either independently
 on its own merits or as part of that larger effort. In the first case,
 I'd be happy to redo and resubmit the patches based on review/feedback.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25894 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Get a rust cross-compiler for Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25894: Get a rust cross-compiler for Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff60-esr, boklm201804,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201804R  |
Parent ID:  #25849   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff60-esr, boklm201804, TorBrowserTeam201804 => tbb-
 rbm, ff60-esr, boklm201804, TorBrowserTeam201804R
 * priority:  Medium => High


Comment:

 Okay, a patch for review is up at `bug_25894`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_25894&id=5d6c53155f6fc8d49185dde166ac0471ba2347ae)
 in my public tor-browser-build repo. It needs #25862 and #25832 fixed
 before, though (which we want to have anyway for switching to ESR 60 I
 think).

 The 32bit cross-compilation has been a huge pain in the butt because it is
 essentially broken right now. For details, see: https://github.com/rust-
 lang/rust/issues/12859. Thanks to the help of Alex Crichton and Manish
 Goregaokar I was able to come up with a minimal patch that works around
 that problem.

 I verified that the resulting x86_64 Rust toolchain is able to compile the
 necessary Rust bits shipped in ESR 60.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25933 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove connection_ap_attach_pending(0) from per-second callback.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25933: Remove connection_ap_attach_pending(0) from per-second callback.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25375   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


Comment:

 I believe this is correct.

 We set `untried_pending_connections = 1` just before activating the
 postloop event meaning we will pass over the pending connections soon
 after.

 lgtm;

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17343 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add torrc option OnionService* alias for HiddenService*

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17343: Add torrc option OnionService* alias for HiddenService*
+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs prop224-maybe torrc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25918  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by nickm):

 I'm okay with backporting aliases.

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[tor-bugs] #25934 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable unnecessary bits when compiling the Rust compilers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25934: Disable unnecessary bits when compiling the Rust compilers
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff60-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 We should go over the available configure options and disable all the
 unnecessary bits when compiling the Rust compilers, to save compilation
 time, complexity, and disk space.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25931 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move consdiffmgr_rescan() into its own callback

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25931: Move consdiffmgr_rescan() into its own callback
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  implemented
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25375   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25932 [Core Tor/Tor]: Close closeable objects in a postloop event, not in second_elapsed_callback().

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25932: Close closeable objects in a postloop event, not in
second_elapsed_callback().
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  implemented
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25375   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25843 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make NumEntryGuards consistent with #271 consensus params

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25843: Make NumEntryGuards consistent with #271 consensus params
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Better!  Two fixes here:

  1) Should we we allow NumEntryGuards to be greater than NumPrimaryGuards?
 I think the answer should be no.
  2) There should be a manpage entry for this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25931 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move consdiffmgr_rescan() into its own callback

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25931: Move consdiffmgr_rescan() into its own callback
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25375   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


Comment:

 Oh I see now, we set up the postloop event if the cache is init for which
 only directory server do. Great!

 lgtm;

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25933 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove connection_ap_attach_pending(0) from per-second callback.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25933: Remove connection_ap_attach_pending(0) from per-second callback.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25375   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 See branch `ticket25933`.

 Note that this reverts a change we made for #19969, so we should make sure
 that change is no longer necessary.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25932 [Core Tor/Tor]: Close closeable objects in a postloop event, not in second_elapsed_callback().

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25932: Close closeable objects in a postloop event, not in
second_elapsed_callback().
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25375   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 lgtm;

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25931 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move consdiffmgr_rescan() into its own callback

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25931: Move consdiffmgr_rescan() into its own callback
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25375   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I believe that's safe, yeah.  We can only schedule the rescan if we
 actually need it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25931 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move consdiffmgr_rescan() into its own callback

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25931: Move consdiffmgr_rescan() into its own callback
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25375   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 With this patch we lose this safeguard. On purpose?

 {{{
 -  if (dir_server_mode(options)) {
 -consdiffmgr_rescan();
 -  }
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #25933 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove connection_ap_attach_pending(0) from per-second callback.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25933: Remove connection_ap_attach_pending(0) from per-second callback.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask,
 Severity:  Normal   |  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #25375
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor8   |
-+-
 Thanks to the attach_pending_entry_connections_ev logic, this call doesn't
 need to be in the per-second callback at all.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25932 [Core Tor/Tor]: Close closeable objects in a postloop event, not in second_elapsed_callback().

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25932: Close closeable objects in a postloop event, not in
second_elapsed_callback().
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25375   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 See branch `ticket25932`.  Also pretty easy.

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[tor-bugs] #25932 [Core Tor/Tor]: Close closeable objects in a postloop event, not in second_elapsed_callback().

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25932: Close closeable objects in a postloop event, not in
second_elapsed_callback().
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask,
 Severity:  Normal   |  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #25375
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor8   |
-+-
 We currently close channels, channel listeners, connections, and circuits
 as part of our second_elapsed_callback().  But since all pending-close
 objects are kept in lists, we can just do this in a post-loop event.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25929 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Critical breach in first-party isolation allowing users deanonimization and profiling

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25929: Critical breach in first-party isolation allowing users deanonimization 
and
profiling
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 A PoC would be nice.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25543 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches for ESR60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25543: Rebase Tor Browser patches for ESR60
--+-
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  arthuredelstein
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25741| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:6 arthuredelstein]:
 > {{{
 > F 3efb1fb5990a TB4: Tor Browser's Firefox preference overrides.
 > }}}

 Friendly reminder to update `general.useragent.override` before merging
 this. (59d6b454184b3 on 25543+7)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25931 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move consdiffmgr_rescan() into its own callback

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25931: Move consdiffmgr_rescan() into its own callback
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25375   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 For review as `ticket25931`.  Very small.

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[tor-bugs] #25931 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move consdiffmgr_rescan() into its own callback

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25931: Move consdiffmgr_rescan() into its own callback
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask,
 Severity:  Normal   |  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #25375
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor8   |
-+-
 We run this callback in second_elapsed_callback, but we don't have to: The
 rules for running it are extremely simple.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25927 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove the need for gettimeofday_cached(); use monotonic time in ewma code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25927: Remove the need for gettimeofday_cached(); use monotonic time in ewma 
code
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25375   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 See branch `eliminate_gettimeofday_cached` in my public repository and on
 github.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25927 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove the need for gettimeofday_cached(); use monotonic time in ewma code (was: Refactor approx_time(); remove the need for gettimeofday_cached().)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25927: Remove the need for gettimeofday_cached(); use monotonic time in ewma 
code
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25375   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Description changed by nickm:

Old description:

> approx_time() should be done the way we currently do
> gettimeofday_cached().  gettimeofday_cached() should be removed entirely.
>
> This will improve our performance a little, and improve our code a lot.

New description:

 approx_time() should be done the way we currently do
 gettimeofday_cached().  gettimeofday_cached() should be removed entirely.

 This will improve our performance a little, and improve our code a lot.

 ''edited: this ticket is now only about gettimeofday_cached();
 approx_time() will take a different ticket.''

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25515 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a unit test for geoip_load_file()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25515: Add a unit test for geoip_load_file()
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-test, geoip  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:   => tor-test, geoip
 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 `make check-spaces` is failing on juga0 branch because a wide line in
 `test_geoip.c`.

 I've fixed it in `ticket25515_034_01` with fixup commit:
 `276cd80a3217fa91`. I made the branch `ticket25515_034_01-squashed` with
 the fixup squashed.

 ... and it is merged! Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19757 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make a menu to add onion and auth-cookie to TB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19757: Make a menu to add onion and auth-cookie to TB
+--
 Reporter:  mrphs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-usability, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by teor):

 There isn't any existing part of the URL that can be overloaded for this
 kind of feature, because an onion site can use any URL feature:
 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/URL#Syntax

 Also, overloading the URL is poor UI. And it won't work when sites embed
 resources from the authenticated site.

 The menu item is a much better idea,

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19757 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make a menu to add onion and auth-cookie to TB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19757: Make a menu to add onion and auth-cookie to TB
+--
 Reporter:  mrphs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-usability, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by dmr):

 Replying to [comment:5 teor]:
 > I was wrong, using x.y.onion is not documented or implemented anywhere.
 > (I wonder why I thought that?)

 I wanted to add to this old discussion that `x.y.onion` exists as a way to
 do subdomains for an `.onion`, as of #6344. (That may be where you were
 thinking of this from, teor.)

 So it couldn't reasonably be overloaded for this sort of client-auth
 feature.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19757 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make a menu to add onion and auth-cookie to TB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19757: Make a menu to add onion and auth-cookie to TB
+--
 Reporter:  mrphs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-usability, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dmr):

 * keywords:  UX, tbb-usability => ux-team, tbb-usability, tor-hs
 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25928 [Core Tor/Tor]: Single DA in sandbox vs. PDS_ALLOW_SELF flag (was: Summary: Single DA in sandbox vs. PDS_ALLOW_SELF flag)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25928: Single DA in sandbox vs. PDS_ALLOW_SELF flag
---+--
 Reporter:  somlo  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth, test-network  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25790 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Orfox lists external apps when the user clicks and holds an Android URI in a WebPage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25790: Orfox lists external apps when the user clicks and holds an Android URI 
in
a WebPage
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25703| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by igt0):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Yep, we plan to use FF 61.

 Replying to [comment:5 gk]:
 > Nice! It seems we are good for the first alpha then as this one will
 likely be based on Firefox 61? If so, let's close this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24310 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider encrypted bookmarks addon for storing onions on the browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24310: Consider encrypted bookmarks addon for storing onions on the browser
+--
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tbb, network-need, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  6
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)
 * keywords:  prop224, tbb, network-need => prop224, tbb, network-need, tor-
   hs


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25928 [Core Tor/Tor]: Summary: Single DA in sandbox vs. PDS_ALLOW_SELF flag

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25928: Summary: Single DA in sandbox vs. PDS_ALLOW_SELF flag
---+--
 Reporter:  somlo  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth, test-network  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => tor-dirauth, test-network
 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 I think Tor should automatically set the flag if it is the directory
 authority that is the only relay in:
 * the set of preconfigured authorities, or
 * the set of authorities in the consensus

 This will never happen in the public network, because there are 9
 preconfigured authorities, and a majority for the consensus is 5.

 As a workaround, please use two authorities until this issue is fixed. If
 we don't plan on fixing this soon, perhaps we should document the minimum
 supported number of authorities, and this workaround.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25930 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update gcc to 7.3.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25930: Update gcc to 7.3.0
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * parent:  #24631 =>


Comment:

 That's nothing for ESR 60. We stick to 6.x for Tor Browser 8.

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[tor-bugs] #25930 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update gcc to 7.3.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25930: Update gcc to 7.3.0
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #24631
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 We should build Tor Browser using gcc 7.3.0.
 Firefox meta is https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1320654.
 The only thing to check is https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 central/rev/48ff50f0db50.
 Porting guide is https://gcc.gnu.org/gcc-7/porting_to.html.
 LRA is the default https://gcc.gnu.org/wiki/LRAIsDefault.
 `-mindirect-branch=thunk` is available.

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[tor-bugs] #25929 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Critical breach in first-party isolation allowing users deanonimization and profiling

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25929: Critical breach in first-party isolation allowing users deanonimization 
and
profiling
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 1 An adversary crawls the web creating a database storing the info about
 which website uses which certificates in the chain of trust, including
 resources.
 2 The adversary setups a malicious website evil.com having large amount of
 subdomains each one using different certificates in the chain of trust,
 but NOT SENDING ALL OF THEM, each domain skips sending a single
 intermediate certificate.
 1 A user opens a website stupid.com
 2 The website stupid.com uses different resources from different sites
 using different CAs. All the certs are cached.
 3 User closes stupid.com and visits evil.com. The website includes single
 pixel transparent images (or other resources) from all its crafted
 subdomains.  If an intermediate cert is cached the connection succeeds. If
 it isn't it fails. This way the adversary knows which intermediate certs
 are cached and can reduce its uncertainty about the websites visited by a
 user. the attack doesn't require any JavaScript or CSS, only images.
 4 If an adversary controls some of resources of stupid.com it can craft an
 unique set of intermediate certificates for every its user.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25267 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Create user/brade/tor-browser-build repo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25267: Create user/brade/tor-browser-build repo
-+
 Reporter:  brade|  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by mcs):

 Is any additional info needed here? It has been a while :)
 Similar task: #25620.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23107 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Optimize hs_circ_service_get_intro_circ() digest calculation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23107: prop224: Optimize hs_circ_service_get_intro_circ() digest calculation
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, prop224-extra, tor-hs,  |  Actual Points:
  optimization, 032-unreached|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * owner:  (none) => neel
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25733 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: Assertion bin_counts > 0 failed in circuit_build_times_get_xm at ../src/or/circuitstats.c:772.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25733: Bug: Assertion bin_counts > 0 failed in circuit_build_times_get_xm at
../src/or/circuitstats.c:772.
-+-
 Reporter:  cstest   |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash 029-backport 031-backport  |  Actual Points:
  032-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25733 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: Assertion bin_counts > 0 failed in circuit_build_times_get_xm at ../src/or/circuitstats.c:772.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25733: Bug: Assertion bin_counts > 0 failed in circuit_build_times_get_xm at
../src/or/circuitstats.c:772.
-+-
 Reporter:  cstest   |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.10
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash 029-backport 031-backport  |  Actual Points:
  032-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * owner:  (none) => mikeperry
 * status:  needs_revision => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20700 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20700: prop224: Implement client authorization
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328|
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-

Comment (by haxxpop):

 I just tested it. It works.

 You can just put the public key in `client_authorized_pubkeys` before
 running the HS.
 The HS will not generate a new key and it will use the public key in that
 file.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25928 [Core Tor/Tor]: Summary: Single DA in sandbox vs. PDS_ALLOW_SELF flag

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25928: Summary: Single DA in sandbox vs. PDS_ALLOW_SELF flag
--+
 Reporter:  somlo |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor


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[tor-bugs] #25928 [- Select a component]: Summary: Single DA in sandbox vs. PDS_ALLOW_SELF flag

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25928: Summary: Single DA in sandbox vs. PDS_ALLOW_SELF flag
--+
 Reporter:  somlo |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 I am running a TOR network simulation in a self-contained sandbox, and
 only
 really need a single node to act as Directory Authority. The configuration
 file looks as follows (the DA's fqdn is da.sandbox.local, and its IP is
 12.34.56.78):

 # common to all nodes:
 RunAsDaemon 1
 TestingTorNetwork 1
 UseDefaultFallbackDirs 0
 DataDirectory /var/lib/tor
 PidFile /var/lib/tor/pid
 Log info file /var/lib/tor/info.log
 SafeLogging 0
 DirAuthority orport=5000 v3ident=6542F7312EE19D39E9D389CCCB1DDD342A32E94D
 12.34.56.78:7000 1B494B7382C8C2D2D13FB0B5175B0B3A14E54D69

 # additionally, regular onion routers (incl. the DA):
 ORPort 5000

 # additionally, for the DA only:
 DirPort 7000
 Address da.sandbox.local
 OutboundBindAddress da.sandbox.local
 AuthoritativeDirectory 1
 V3AuthoritativeDirectory 1
 V3AuthVotingInterval 10
 V3AuthVoteDelay 2
 V3AuthDistDelay 2

 When I start the DA, I get lots of log entries (in /var/lib/tor/info.log)
 complaining about the absence of any reachable directory servers:

 [info] router_pick_dirserver_generic(): No dirservers are reachable.
 Trying them all again.
 [info] router_pick_directory_server():  No reachable router entries for
 dirservers. Trying them all again.
 [info] directory_pick_generic_dirserver(): No router found for consensus
 network-status fetch; falling back to dirserver list.

 While the single DA eventually appears to work properly, and publishes a
 consensus file containing itself as a router entry, these warnings keep
 showing up periodically in the log file on an ongoing basis.

 Once the DA publishes its initial one-entry consensus, I can start further
 ORs which are quickly added to the consensus, and any client nodes are
 easily able to build circuits and operate correctly in my sandbox network.

 In an attempt to silence the DA's dirserver reachability complaints I
 looked
 through the TOR sources, and found that a DA's ability to pick itself as
 its
 own directory server (in function router_pick_directory_server() in file
 src/or/routerlist.c) is controlled by the PDS_ALLOW_SELF flag.

 This flag was originally introduced in commit 02e7a83f9, and also appears
 in subsequent commits b87a7760e, 74c2bff78, and b3a690749. The latter two
 commits remove code that used to set the flag (haven't spent the time to
 figure out if this would have helped my single-DA scenario, though).

 Currently, there appears to be no code path that sets this flag, and also
 no way to request it to be set via the command line or configuration file.

 Would it make sense to assume the flag is *always* set (which would always
 allow a DA to pick itself as its own DA), or rather would it be better to
 provide some interface (config file entry) that allows setting the flag
 explicitly (maybe only in testing mode)?

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[tor-bugs] #25927 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor approx_time(); remove the need for gettimeofday_cached().

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25927: Refactor approx_time(); remove the need for gettimeofday_cached().
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask,
 Severity:  Normal   |  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #25375
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
  Sponsor8   |
-+-
 approx_time() should be done the way we currently do
 gettimeofday_cached().  gettimeofday_cached() should be removed entirely.

 This will improve our performance a little, and improve our code a lot.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25926 [Metrics/Website]: "The anonymous Internet" page on metrics has malicious looking links

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25926: "The anonymous Internet" page on metrics has malicious looking links
-+---
 Reporter:  pastly   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Huh, unexpected. Well, I took out the link until OII have resolved this
 issue. I'd like to put it back afterwards, though. We'll see. Leaving this
 ticket open for now. Thanks for the report!

 (Sounds like it's time to think about adding an "External Link" page with
 a big warning...)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25926 [Metrics/Website]: "The anonymous Internet" page on metrics has malicious looking links

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25926: "The anonymous Internet" page on metrics has malicious looking links
-+--
 Reporter:  pastly   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by pastly):

 Here is what the link used to lead to. https://archive.fo/TSnfx

 You can also find it in the wayback machine.
 https://web.archive.org/web/*/http://geography.oii.ox.ac.uk/?page=tor

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[tor-bugs] #25926 [Metrics/Website]: "The anonymous Internet" page on metrics has malicious looking links

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25926: "The anonymous Internet" page on metrics has malicious looking links
-+--
 Reporter:  pastly   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Major|   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 As abrasively reported on [https://redd.it/8f1tml Reddit] ...

 It appears geography.oii.ox.ac.uk no longer is a link worth clicking on.
 In fact, it might be actively malicious now.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #3723, #7177, #7281, #16386, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #3723, #7177, #7281, #16386, #16559, #17036, #19009, 
#22453, #24104, #24250 by juga:
parent to 25925

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[tor-bugs] #25925 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bandwidth scanner parent ticket for SoP planned tasks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25925: Bandwidth scanner parent ticket for SoP planned tasks
--+--
 Reporter:  juga  |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21818 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor's handling of SIGHUP considered harmful

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21818: tor's handling of SIGHUP considered harmful
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25510| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>
 * parent:  #17873 => #25510


Comment:

 This ticket is relevant to mobile embedding, and is more likely to get
 fixed there.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17873 [Core Tor/Tor]: replacing 0.0.0.0 listeners at runtime fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17873: replacing 0.0.0.0 listeners at runtime fails
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client port bind switching  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * points:  medium =>
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #17873 [Core Tor/Tor]: replacing 0.0.0.0 listeners at runtime fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17873: replacing 0.0.0.0 listeners at runtime fails
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client port bind switching  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  medium
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/rl1987/tor/compare/bug17873_take3_squashed

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20700 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20700: prop224: Implement client authorization
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328|
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Someone should also test that it works when the *client* generates the
 private key, and only gives the public key to the onion service.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20700 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20700: prop224: Implement client authorization
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328|
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:17 cypherpunks]:
 > YA I really need HidServAuth for v3 onion!!!

 Please give haxxpop's code (comment:16) a try and let us know how it works
 for you.

 You can test it by adding `HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient basic
 `
 on the service torrc and `HidServAuth  ` on the client torrc You can get the private key from
 `client_authorized_privkeys/.privkey` on the service file
 directory

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20700 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20700: prop224: Implement client authorization
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328|
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 YA I really need HidServAuth for v3 onion!!!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25892 [Core Tor/Tor]: "AccessibleTorPorts" Add a new option and deprecate 2 options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25892: "AccessibleTorPorts" Add a new option and deprecate 2 options
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-config, 035-proposed, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  SponsorZ
+--

Comment (by teor):

 To avoid user confusion, I think we should have this option take a list of
 accept/reject rules, like ExitPolicy, SOCKSPolicy etc.

 We can make accept the default, and we can probably modify it to assume
 all IP addresses if you just specify a port.

 So these options are equivalent:
 {{{
 AccessibleTorPorts 443,9877
 AccessibleTorPorts accept 443, accept 9877
 AccessibleTorPorts accept *:443, accept *:9877
 AccessibleTorPorts accept *:443, accept *:9877, reject *:*
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25892 [Core Tor/Tor]: "AccessibleTorPorts" Add a new option and deprecate 2 options

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25892: "AccessibleTorPorts" Add a new option and deprecate 2 options
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-config, 035-proposed, easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  SponsorZ
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 AccessibleTorPorts 443,9877
 //AccessibleTorPorts reject * <-- don't need this

 When the user set ATP, allow only those and block else.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25923 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Chinese Internet Agency trolls spam the hell out of a trac ticket

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25923: Chinese Internet Agency trolls spam the hell out of a trac ticket
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 I have deleted the spam. I will delete this ticket, because it also
 contains the spam.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25924 [Metrics/Statistics]: Improve execution time of onion service statistics module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25924: Improve execution time of onion service statistics module
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by karsten):

 [[Image(metrics-modules-2016-01-07.png, 600px)]]
 [[Image(metrics-modules-2018-04-26.png, 600px)]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20700 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20700: prop224: Implement client authorization
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328|
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 See haxxpop's PR here: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/36

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25924 [Metrics/Statistics]: Improve execution time of onion service statistics module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25924: Improve execution time of onion service statistics module
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * Attachment "metrics-modules-2018-04-26.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25924 [Metrics/Statistics]: Improve execution time of onion service statistics module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25924: Improve execution time of onion service statistics module
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * Attachment "metrics-modules-2016-01-07.png" added.


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[tor-bugs] #25924 [Metrics/Statistics]: Improve execution time of onion service statistics module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25924: Improve execution time of onion service statistics module
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  |   Keywords:
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+--
 Two years ago, in February 2016, we
 [https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-February/010408.html
 noticed] that some of our back-end modules had really long execution
 times. Back then we made improvements to two of these modules. I'm going
 to post a graph of execution times in the comments.

 Looks like we'll have to do it again, and this time work even harder on
 improving execution times. The onion service statistics module again takes
 roughly 2 hours to complete, with a clear trend. I assume that we'll reach
 execution times of 3 hours by the end of 2018 and 5 to 6 hours by the end
 of 2019.

 I'm going to post another graph with recent execution times. (Note that we
 don't have logs for just the onion service statistics module, but only for
 that module plus the previous module together; but that other module is
 still relatively fast, contributing with just a few minutes execution time
 to the graph.)

 I don't have concrete suggestions for improvements. And it's still early
 enough to try to get this work funded before we dive into it. That's why
 I'm setting priority to low. But it's clear that we'll have to do
 something here in 2019.

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