[tor-bugs] #25971 [Webpages/Support]: Po generator makes long strings that are harder to localiza

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25971: Po generator makes long strings that are harder to localiza
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  l10n
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Hello:

 while reviewing the translations for the new tor support page in
 Transifex, I noticed that the new strings to translate coming from .json
 files  [1] get converted in very long strings to translate.

 They are not separated by periods, they are only a long string.

 It would be better for translating, reusing translations and reviewing if
 the strings where separated on several strings for each answer.





 [1] for example
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/tree/es.json?h=support-
 miscellaneous

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25971 [Webpages/Support]: Po generator makes long strings that are harder to localize (was: Po generator makes long strings that are harder to localiza)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25971: Po generator makes long strings that are harder to localize
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  l10n  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22079 [Community]: Community governance documents

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22079: Community governance documents
---+
 Reporter:  alison |  Owner:  alison
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by karsten):

 Here's another suggestion for the voting policy. I suggest we replace:

 {{{
 * The secretary cannot cast a vote. However, in the case of a tie
   they act as the tie breaker.
 }}}

 with:

 {{{
 * The secretary can cast a vote, if they wish to, by sending it to
   the proposer before starting the vote for everyone.
 }}}

 The main reason for this change is that whenever there's a tie and the
 secretary acts as tie breaker, the secretary's vote will not be secret as
 opposed to all other votes. Because, if the secretary voted and there's a
 vote result that was decided by a single vote, that's the secretary's
 vote.

 If we make this change, we won't be able to resolve ties anymore. If two
 or more proposal receive the exact same number of votes, none of them
 wins.

 The requirement to send the vote to the proposer before starting the vote
 ensures that the secretary cannot change their opinion in the middle of
 the vote. Of course, the proposer would have to keep the secretary's vote
 secret as much as the secretary has to keep all other votes secret.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22079 [Community]: Community governance documents

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22079: Community governance documents
---+
 Reporter:  alison |  Owner:  alison
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by karsten):

 * cc: karsten (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25536 [Internal Services/Schleuder]: Build (and document) a set of habits around our schleuder replies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25536: Build (and document) a set of habits around our schleuder replies
-+--
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Schleuder  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 When using X-RESEND you need to add also the line X-LIST-NAME line to your
 email, and send it signed:

 X-LIST-NAME: listn...@withtheemail.org
 X-RESEND: per...@nogpgkey.org

 You could also add their key to your schleuder mailing list, with

 X-LIST-NAME: listn...@withtheemail.org
 X-ADD-KEY:
 [--- PGP armored block--]


 And then do:

 X-LIST-NAME: listn...@withtheemail.org
 X-RESEND-ENCRYPTED-ONLY: per...@nogpgkey.org

 You can also do:

 X-LIST-NAME: listn...@withtheemail.org
 X-LIST-KEYS

 To see the keys currently on the keyring

 and my personal favorite:

 X-LIST-NAME: listn...@withtheemail.org
 X-GET-KEY: some...@important.org

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #25972 [Webpages/Support]: Po files allow translation of untranslatable strings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25972: Po files allow translation of untranslatable strings
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  l10n, i18n
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 The po parser plugin is currently generating translation strings for all
 strings in the json files, including the 'id' and 'control' strings[1].

 This breaks the pages.

 The po parser should not give the possibility of translating those.

 [1] https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/tree/support-
 miscellaneous.json?h=support-miscellaneous

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20849 [Core Tor/Tor]: periodic pattern in network connections ofa newly setup relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20849: periodic pattern in network connections ofa  newly setup relay
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.5-alpha
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay needs-analysis  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by toralf):

 * Attachment "graph.svg.gz" added.

 gzipped svg graphic

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #20849 [Core Tor/Tor]: periodic pattern in network connections ofa newly setup relay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20849: periodic pattern in network connections ofa  newly setup relay
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.5-alpha
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay needs-analysis  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by toralf):

 Attached the sysstat graphic output of 5th of April

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25958 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Signed Windows executables

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25958: Signed Windows executables
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 I guess it is possible, but not that easy. We have currently trouble with
 content signing on macOS which makes our final binaries (content-signed)
 not easily verifiable (see: comment:4:ticket:20254 for details on what a
 reasonable start for fixing this for macOS could look like). That said,
 this is a duplicate of #18288.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18288 [Applications/Tor bundles/installation]: Sign Tor Browser binaries on Windows (not just the setup executable)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18288: Sign Tor Browser binaries on Windows (not just the setup executable)
---+---
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  erinn
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor bundles/installation  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-usability|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by gk):

 #25958 is a duplicate.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #3029 [Core Tor/Tor]: We should save received documents before parsing them

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3029: We should save received documents before parsing them
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  lorax, tor-dirauth, debugging,   |  Actual Points:
  diagnostic, tor-dos|
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  accepted => new


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25946 [Applications/Tor Browser]: There seems to be an issue with HTTPS Everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25946: There seems to be an issue with HTTPS Everywhere
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 So, this happens with a clean, new Tor Browser alpha? Or do I have to use
 something else to be able to reproduce this problem? On which OS does this
 happen?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25882 [Core Tor/Tor]: clients not detecting stale onion service introduction points

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25882: clients not detecting stale onion service introduction points
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22455| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * Attachment "tmp_4396-tor-258823254419993784754180.pdf" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17949 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make loopback address search more accurate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17949: Make loopback address search more accurate
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy tor-client tor-relay loopback   |  Actual Points:
  weird-configuration|
Parent ID:  #17991   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf, teor|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Responded to your feedback on Github.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25962 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser crash: [xcb] Unknown sequence number while processing queue

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25962: Tor Browser crash: [xcb] Unknown sequence number while processing queue
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 I wonder if that's https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1336745.
 Does this happen with a vanilla Firefox ESR 52 as well? (see:
 https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/organizations/all/)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25970 [Core Tor/Nyx]: Can not start nyx in a Raspberry pi 3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25970: Can not start nyx in a Raspberry pi 3
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Nyx  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  nyx,  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Dear Tor Friend Atagar

  Thanks for your help, now it is working, the problem started when
 sqlite.database was with more than 999 connections or something like this
 I can not remember! I am new at tor just start 3 days ago, it is possible
 in some way to measure the size of my sqlite.database so I could erase it
 time to time? Or this is really a bug, not a big one but a minor! Anyway I
 respectfully thankfully again, have a nice day! :)
 Enclosed the correction file showing nyx working again, for how long a do
 not know yet.

 https://ibb.co/hdqLrx";>https://preview.ibb.co/c8nddc/Captura_de_tela_2018_04_30_09_02_28_atagar_correction_del_cache_sqlite_database.png";
 
alt="Captura_de_tela_2018_04_30_09_02_28_atagar_correction_del_cache_sqlite_database"
 border="0">

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #15015 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor --verify-config should not bind to ports

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15015: tor --verify-config should not bind to ports
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, intro, startup,   |  Actual Points:
  configuration, torrc, bootstrap, refactor, |
  technical-debt |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Pushed c1c5970ac83ad804739bd2515b297195df927956 that improves the manpage.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25969 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SOCKS5 proxy hostname parsing problem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25969: SOCKS5 proxy hostname parsing problem
--+---
 Reporter:  Elfeater  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  broken, proxy, parser |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Could you give us a detailed explanation about how you set up things on
 your side so we have steps to reproduce your problem?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25968 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No audio during video playback

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25968: No audio during video playback
--+---
 Reporter:  heyjoe|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Hm, hard to tell what is going wrong. I have no issues with sound on my
 Debian box but it seems there are quite a bunch of Firefox users that do,
 see e.g.:

 https://forums.linuxmint.com/viewtopic.php?t=262962
 
https://www.reddit.com/r/firefox/comments/7w171n/to_play_audio_you_may_need_to_install_the/

 Does any of the workarounds mentioned there help at least?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25810 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport fixes for Orfox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25810: Backport fixes for Orfox
---+
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  igt0
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201804R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks, looks good. I applied both fixes to `tor-browser-52.7.3esr-8.0-1`
 (commits e53935623c1da11a7b327542667dba32ddd95017 and
 5bdd0416f089ddaab4d14e63b7cd35bf51a2035b).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #15015 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor --verify-config should not bind to ports

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15015: tor --verify-config should not bind to ports
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, intro, startup,   |  Actual Points:
  configuration, torrc, bootstrap, refactor, |
  technical-debt |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Thanks. Looks good to me.

 I'd like someone else to review this next, and check it against CI.
 They can decide if we need unit test scripts for --parse-config and
 --verify-config.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25946 [Applications/Tor Browser]: There seems to be an issue with HTTPS Everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25946: There seems to be an issue with HTTPS Everywhere
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  needs_information => new


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:6 gk]:
 > So, this happens with a clean, new Tor Browser alpha?
 No, but I experienced it with the latest TB alpha that I use everyday (I
 didn't change the browser's config in any way, no additional addons
 installed, ..etc).

 > Or do I have to use something else to be able to reproduce this problem?
 On which OS does this happen?
 I use Ubuntu. I have been fortunate to record the error message in the
 browser console when this happens (comment:4) since I can no longer
 reproduce it with that same TB install.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25962 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser crash: [xcb] Unknown sequence number while processing queue

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25962: Tor Browser crash: [xcb] Unknown sequence number while processing queue
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 gk]:
 > I wonder if that's https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1336745.
 Does this happen with a vanilla Firefox ESR 52 as well? (see:
 https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/organizations/all/)
 Yes, so this is Mozilla's business.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16472 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Upgrade Binutils to 2.25+ for Tor Browser builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16472: Upgrade Binutils to 2.25+ for Tor Browser builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, boklm201804,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201804   |
Parent ID:  #12968   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 When building using binutils 2.27, the files that are different are:
 {{{
 Browser/firefox.exe
 Browser/lgpllibs.dll
 Browser/libEGL.dll
 Browser/libGLESv2.dll
 Browser/mozglue.dll
 Browser/plugin-container.exe
 Browser/plugin-hang-ui.exe
 Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/PluggableTransports/fte.cDFA.pyd
 Browser/updater.exe
 Browser/xul.dll
 }}}

 So it seems this issue doesn't affect tor, meek, obfs4proxy. It also does
 not affect all firefox dlls.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25966 [- Select a component]: Report on Tor in the UAE (and question about Snowflake)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25966: Report on Tor in the UAE (and question about Snowflake)
--+
 Reporter:  mwolfe|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 [https://citizenlab.ca/2018/04/planet-netsweeper/ The Citizen Lab
 Research]
 > We found that Netsweeper technology is being used to block access in
 these ten countries to a wide range of digital content protected by
 international legal frameworks, including religious content in Bahrain,
 political campaigns in the United Arab Emirates, and media websites in
 Yemen
 [https://citizenlab.ca/2018/04/planet-netsweeper-section-2-country-case-
 studies/ Section 2- Country Case Studies]
 > We found three IP addresses in the UAE that were part of Netsweeper
 installations
 > ISP du
 > AS Name Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Company PJSC (EITC-DU)
 > Blocking was implemented through an HTTP 302 redirect.
 > The blockpage contains du branding, contains a link to the UAE
 Telecommunications Regulatory Authority’s “Internet Access Management
 Regulatory Policy,” and links to a form that allows a user to flag a
 website believed to be blocked in error.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25966 [- Select a component]: Report on Tor in the UAE (and question about Snowflake)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25966: Report on Tor in the UAE (and question about Snowflake)
--+
 Reporter:  mwolfe|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by mwolfe):

 If I click 'request a bridge', nothing happens. Bridges used to be obvious
 on the Tor website, but I couldn't find a link when I looked, so I just
 click 'Select a built-in bridge', and this works fine here. After obsf4
 stopped working, I'd click 'Select a built-in bridge' and choose meek,
 then when meek got slow, I tried obfs4, and it worked and was faster than
 meek.

 Thanks for the link to the new snowflake. I'll try it and report later.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25966 [- Select a component]: Report on Tor in the UAE (and question about Snowflake)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25966: Report on Tor in the UAE (and question about Snowflake)
--+
 Reporter:  mwolfe|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by mwolfe):

 The UAE has at least two ISPs. I see ads for Virgin, but I'm not sure if
 it's another ISP, or just a tool for one or both of the two I know. The
 two are du, which was used for your tests, and the other is Etisalat,
 eim.ae or etisalat.ae (that's the one I use).

 All the info about blocks was related to du, but the blocks would be the
 same for both (both du and Etisalat must run everything through the
 Telecommunications Regulatory Agency, or TRA). When du started, about 15
 years ago, it was only in Free Zones, and so didn't have any blocks, but
 then pressure to have two nationwide ISPs got du to offer Internet and
 phone services all over, and it got the same blocks Etisalat has always
 had.

 I'm glad someone was able to run the tests safely from a .ca account.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25966 [- Select a component]: Report on Tor in the UAE (and question about Snowflake)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25966: Report on Tor in the UAE (and question about Snowflake)
--+
 Reporter:  mwolfe|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:4 mwolfe]:
 > If I click 'request a bridge', nothing happens.
 That's because moat is broken too due to Google deprecating domain
 fronting. It will be fixed though in a next release(s).

 > Bridges used to be obvious on the Tor website, but I couldn't find a
 link when I looked, so I just click 'Select a built-in bridge', and this
 works fine here. After obsf4 stopped working, I'd click 'Select a built-in
 bridge' and choose meek, then when meek got slow, I tried obfs4, and it
 worked and was faster than meek.
 I'd recommend not using default built-in obfs4 bridges since they're
 public, you can however try out non-public obfs4 bridges by using meek
 first then going to https://bridges.torproject.org/bridges?transport=obfs4
 and doing the process to get obfs4 ones.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25962 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser crash: [xcb] Unknown sequence number while processing queue

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25962: Tor Browser crash: [xcb] Unknown sequence number while processing queue
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  wontfix =>


Comment:

 Thanks for reporting back. Does anyone know how to reproduce this problem
 reliably? Like, what environment does one need to have to hit this issue?
 We could then bisect the offending commit and help Mozilla with a fix
 (which we would backport for Tor Browser until we pick it up).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25962 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser crash: [xcb] Unknown sequence number while processing queue

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25962: Tor Browser crash: [xcb] Unknown sequence number while processing queue
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => needs_information


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25536 [Internal Services/Schleuder]: Build (and document) a set of habits around our schleuder replies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25536: Build (and document) a set of habits around our schleuder replies
-+--
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Schleuder  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by hiro):

 This has been now added to the Schleuder service document:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/operations/services/schleuder

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17810 [Core Tor/Torflow]: TorFlow should ignore self-reported bandwidths when measuring relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17810: TorFlow should ignore self-reported bandwidths when measuring relays
--+
 Reporter:  robgjansen|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torflow  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by robgjansen):

 > While Torflow votes are unitless, they resemble actual bandwidths owing
 that they are interpretations of bandwidth measurements taken at each
 node.

 Careful here. I think TorFlow measures something closer to residual
 bandwidth capacity at the time of the measurement, not the full capacity
 of the link. And it doesn't even measure residual capacity exactly,
 because of scheduling and fairness. For example, if my relay is operating
 at 100% link utilization and TorFlow tries to measure it, TorFlow isn't
 going to get 0 bandwidth and it isn't going to get 100% bandwidth; TorFlow
 is probably only going to get roughly 1/N of my bandwidth where N is the
 number of other active flows.

 Or am I misunderstanding and the authorities interpret the measurements
 differently?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25962 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser crash: [xcb] Unknown sequence number while processing queue

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25962: Tor Browser crash: [xcb] Unknown sequence number while processing queue
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  needs_information => new


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 gk]:
 > We could then bisect the offending commit and help Mozilla with a fix
 (which we would backport for Tor Browser until we pick it up).
 lol you're too kind :P I expected that you wouldn't care much in view of
 the ton of work that you have.

 > Does anyone know how to reproduce this problem reliably? Like, what
 environment does one need to have to hit this issue?
 I hit that after a transition from Ubuntu 17.10 -> Ubuntu 18.04 -> Lubuntu
 18.04 where I messed up and ended up breaking and deleting many packages,
 I didn't even have `zlibc` installed (after installing it the problem
 didn't happen - so far), so I guess remove `zlibc` and something else if
 needed and do the procedure I described in comment:1.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17810 [Core Tor/Torflow]: TorFlow should ignore self-reported bandwidths when measuring relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17810: TorFlow should ignore self-reported bandwidths when measuring relays
--+
 Reporter:  robgjansen|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torflow  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 I will enjoy having a bandwidth measurement specification, because then I
 won't have to ask questions like:
 * when you say "authorities", which part of the bandwidth measurement
 system are you referring to?

 I think all the interpretation is within the bandwidth measurement system,
 or within tor clients.

 Here's a summary of the process:
 1. Torflow measures the available bandwidth at the relay, which is
 approximately max(current residual bandwidth, available bandwidth / number
 of current flows)
 2. Torflow converts this figure into kilobytes per second and stores it
 3. Torflow aggregates measurements and self-reported bandwidths to produce
 a figure that is technically unitless, but is practically kilobytes per
 second
 4. The authorities read the bandwidths file and put the numbers from the
 file in their votes
 5. The consensus contains the low-median bandwidth for each relay as the
 consensus weight
 6. Clients use consensus weights and position weights to choose randomly
 weighted paths through the network

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25852 [Core Tor/Tor]: GETINFO exit-policy for tor client should return 551

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25852: GETINFO exit-policy for tor client should return 551
--+
 Reporter:  dmr   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, tor-client  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25869 [Core Tor/Tor]: Proposal: Bandwidth Measurements Document Format

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25869: Proposal: Bandwidth Measurements Document Format
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bandwidth, bwauth, scanner, torflow  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #3723| Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 First revision being send to tor-dev@.
 Work moved to https://github.com/juga0/torspec/commits/bandwidth-file-
 spec, as the previous branch was missing the first draft sent to tor-dev@

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25353 [Core Tor/Tor]: Configure fails with some OpenSSL 1.1.0 built with no-deprecated.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25353: Configure fails with some OpenSSL 1.1.0 built with no-deprecated.
-+-
 Reporter:  laomaiweng   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  openssl, tor-ssl,|  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-must, compatibility,  |
  build, 034-included-20180405   |
Parent ID:  #19429   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 merging parent.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25353 [Core Tor/Tor]: Configure fails with some OpenSSL 1.1.0 built with no-deprecated.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25353: Configure fails with some OpenSSL 1.1.0 built with no-deprecated.
-+-
 Reporter:  laomaiweng   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.7.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  openssl, tor-ssl,|  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-must, compatibility,  |
  build, 034-included-20180405   |
Parent ID:  #19429   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19981 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure we build with OpenSSL 1.1.0 with all deprecated APIs removed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19981: Make sure we build with OpenSSL 1.1.0 with all deprecated APIs removed
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  openssl technical-debt refactor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19429   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 merging parent; closing this.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19429 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clean up our OpenSSL 1.1 support.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19429: Clean up our OpenSSL 1.1 support.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.4-rc
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-crypto openssl refactor future-  |  implemented
  proof  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Merging!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25967 [Core Tor/Tor]: v3 onion keep working without the HiddenServiceVersion 3 line

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25967: v3 onion keep working without the HiddenServiceVersion 3 line
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, 033-must-maybe, |  duplicate
  032-backport, 033-backport |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate #25761.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25939 [Core Tor/Stem]: A Tor commit seems to have broken creation of V3 onion services with stem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25939: A Tor commit seems to have broken creation of V3 onion services with 
stem
+--
 Reporter:  maqp|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Stem   |Version:
 Severity:  Major   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must regression tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor8
+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * component:  Core Tor/Tor => Core Tor/Stem


Comment:

 Hmm, I'll send this in Stem's court for now and see what atagar says if it
 is a Tor issue afterall.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #25973 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport off-by-one fix in 1352073

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25973: Backport off-by-one fix in 1352073
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201804,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201804
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 As a defense in depth we should backport the off-by-one error fix in
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1352073.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23354 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove deterministic download schedule code and configs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23354: Remove deterministic download schedule code and configs
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  refactor, s8-perf, technical-debt,   |  implemented
  tor-bootstrap, 034-triage-20180328, fast-fix   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 You suggested, wrt `getinfo_helper_config()`:
 > we might want to change this to something that does NOT say "comma list"

 So, these values still accept the same format as before (ignoring
 everything except the first entry), and they still emit a subset of the
 format that they emitted before.

 On the other hand, they are closer to TimeInterval now than they were
 before.  So I'l change them to that.  Done in commit
 b205061eb13abd68a5335f8008c5121ef230c34e.

 Also, merged.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25948 [Core Tor/Tor]: Run or_state_save as a mainloop event

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25948: Run or_state_save as a mainloop event
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25375   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I don't think that can happen: the next_write value is set by the
 or_state_save() function, which bases it on the value of "now" it takes as
 an argument.

 I've added a fixup to use PERIODIC_EVENT_NO_UPDATE, and explain the
 rationale for using BUG()

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25937 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move dirvote_act into a periodic callback

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25937: Move dirvote_act into a periodic callback
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25375   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 (In any case, we should not merge this as-is -- it will need to be rebased
 because of the dirvote code movement in #25610)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25417 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSFETCH support for v3 Hidden Services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25417: HSFETCH support for v3 Hidden Services
-+--
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * parent:  #25955 =>


Comment:

 Unparenting, this has nothing to do with v2 deprecation roadmap. We might
 need it or not in the future. But if we do, lets provide a rationale
 instead of flat parenting. (And if it is about OnionBalance v3 support,
 please make sure with the maintainer that it is in fact needed.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18098 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement tor-genkey tool for offline HS key creation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18098: prop224: Implement tor-genkey tool for offline HS key creation
---+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224-extra  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  6
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorR-can
---+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * priority:  Very High => Medium
 * parent:  #25955 =>


Comment:

 Unparenting. Nothing to do with v2 deprecation.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22893 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Make intro point per-service and not per-descriptor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22893: prop224: Make intro point per-service and not per-descriptor
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  accepted
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224-extra,   |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-must
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * parent:  #25955 =>


Comment:

 Unparenting. Nothing to do with v2 deprecation.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24310 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider encrypted bookmarks addon for storing onions on the browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24310: Consider encrypted bookmarks addon for storing onions on the browser
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tbb, network-need, tor-hs,  |  Actual Points:
  arthuredelstein|
Parent ID:   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * parent:  #25955 =>


Comment:

 This is Tor Browser specific. In rare cases we should link them to Core
 Tor/Tor component but the TBB team should decided that.

 Unparenting. Nothing to do with v2 deprecation.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23662 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Service edge-case where it re-uploads descriptor with same rev counter

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23662: prop224: Service edge-case where it re-uploads descriptor with same rev
counter
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  assigned => new
 * reviewer:  dgoulet =>
 * parent:  #25955 =>


Comment:

 Unparenting. Nothing to do with v2 deprecation.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25955 [Core Tor/Tor]: onion v2 deprecation plan

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25955: onion v2 deprecation plan
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [comment:3 teor]:
 > A cypherpunks just added a bunch of tickets as child tickets.
 > Isis and I have removed the least relevant ones.
 >
 > Can someone check if you want #18098 and #25417?

 I've unparent most of them. Even if in the end some turn out to be
 relevant to parent to this ticket, we should use a keyword instead of a
 ticket dependency which is mostly used for development workflow.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25973 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport off-by-one fix in 1352073

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25973: Backport off-by-one fix in 1352073
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201804,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201804R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  GeorgKoppen201804, TorBrowserTeam201804 => GeorgKoppen201804,
 TorBrowserTeam201804R


Comment:

 See `bug_25973` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_25973&id=67a38d1ab3375e9d094160f966559296c6e25f7d)
 in my public repo for the backport.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25937 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move dirvote_act into a periodic callback

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25937: Move dirvote_act into a periodic callback
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25375   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Okay, I tried to answer your review; please let me know if you believe my
 answers :)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25807 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Can not request bridges from torproject.org (App Engine is broken for moat)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25807: Can not request bridges from torproject.org (App Engine is broken for 
moat)
-+-
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201804,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201804R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => needs_review
 * keywords:   => GeorgKoppen201804, TorBrowserTeam201804R
 * component:  Applications/Tor Browser => Applications/Tor Launcher


Comment:

 Let's work around that for now. See `bug_25807`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 launcher.git/commit/?h=bug_25807&id=add227697f9af12056ca26f6e510572cd9c5faef)
 in my public tor-launcher repo for a patch that works for me.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #25974 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure Android Oreo(API level 26) autofill feature is disabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25974: Make sure Android Oreo(API level 26) autofill feature is disabled
--+
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 The autofill feature allows external apps to store in disk login
 credentials and form values such as addresses, credit card and so on. It
 violates the disk avoidance requirement.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25964 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove hs_index_t fetch, and use one of the stores instead

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25964: Remove hs_index_t fetch, and use one of the stores instead
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, refactor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Datapoint:

 The function that does all the hsdir index magic assignment is:
 `node_set_hsdir_index()`.

 > analyse the state machine of fetch, store_first, and store_second to
 make sure that fetch is always equal to store_first or store_second

 We have to be very careful here. This hsdir index logic has been a source
 of complexity that created many headache during the prop224 development.
 We have a very very very important unit tests that makes sure client and
 service will always be in sync with the hashring and thus the index they
 compute. See in `test_hs_common.c`: `reachability_scenarios` so at least
 if that passes, we should be maybe be OK.

 > write a function that produces fetch from a hsdir_index_t, and use it
 instead of fetch

 To clarify this a bit. We do *not* compute HSDir index on the fly but
 rather when the node_t is added to the nodelist. And we should keep it
 that way because else, everytime you want to upload or download a
 descriptor, you would need to compute all the indexes for all the nodes to
 get the full hashring.

 v2 used the relay identity but in v3, we do a computation that changes
 every time there is a new SRV and entering a new time period.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25900 [Core Tor/Tor]: Run clean_consdiffmgr() callback on all directories

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25900: Run clean_consdiffmgr() callback on all directories
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25500| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Okay, merging!  I had to fix a conflict
 (3800d5916f90b11df433c885fae94f1dc7edca5c) and update the unit tests
 (d1a0534649be02e37668073279664f513f4dc7d7), so please have a look at those
 and make sure your like them.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25974 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure Android Oreo(API level 26) autofill feature is disabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25974: Make sure Android Oreo(API level 26) autofill feature is disabled
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by igt0):

 There is a confusion about Firefox mobile supporting or not autofill
 (focus/klaus supports it out of the box).

 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1352011

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25974 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure Android Oreo(API level 26) autofill feature is disabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25974: Make sure Android Oreo(API level 26) autofill feature is disabled
--+--
 Reporter:  igt0  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by igt0):

 * cc: sysrqb, gk (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25779 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ship tor in Tor Browser nightly builds for macOS with Rust enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25779: Ship tor in Tor Browser nightly builds for macOS with Rust enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff60-esr, boklm201804,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201804, GeorgKoppen201804|
Parent ID:  #25220   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Similar to Windows we need to split up this task and do the rust compiler
 + the tor work in child tickets. It seems we need explicit rust cross-
 compile support for macOS, too.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #25975 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Get a rust cross-compiler for macOS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25975: Get a rust cross-compiler for macOS
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff60-esr,
 Severity:  Normal   |  boklm201804, TorBrowserTeam201804,
 |  GeorgKoppen201804
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #25779
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We want to build our own rust compiler for building the Firefox and tor
 rust parts.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #25976 [Core Tor/Tor]: connection_dir_finished_flushing(): Bug: called in unexpected state 3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25976: connection_dir_finished_flushing(): Bug: called in unexpected state 3
--+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  regression, 034-must
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 This from tor version git-302908657f492f06 on one of my test relay. It was
 immediately followed by another BUG() below. Note that relay is still
 running and seems well.

 Torrc has nothing special except:

 {{{
 BandwidthRate 400 KBytes
 }}}

 Stacktrace:

 {{{
 Apr 29 13:30:59.691 [warn] connection_dir_finished_flushing(): Bug: called
 in unexpected state 3. (on Tor 0.3.4.0-alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.691 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug:
 src/or/directory.c:5248: connection_dir_finished_flushing: This line
 should not have been reached. (Future instances of this warning will be
 silenced.) (on Tor 0.3.4.0-alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] Bug: Line unexpectedly reached at
 connection_dir_finished_flushing at src/or/directory.c:5248. Stack trace:
 (on Tor 0.3.4.0-alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] Bug:
 /home/relay/tor/src/or/tor(log_backtrace+0x42) [0x55811a451722] (on Tor
 0.3.4.0-alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] Bug:
 /home/relay/tor/src/or/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xb9) [0x55811a46c559] (on
 Tor 0.3.4.0-alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] Bug:
 /home/relay/tor/src/or/tor(connection_dir_finished_flushing+0x12e)
 [0x55811a3fc6ee] (on Tor 0.3.4.0-alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] Bug: /home/relay/tor/src/or/tor(+0x108fcd)
 [0x55811a3d5fcd] (on Tor 0.3.4.0-alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] Bug:
 /home/relay/tor/src/or/tor(connection_handle_write+0x2e) [0x55811a3d67ae]
 (on Tor 0.3.4.0-alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] Bug: /home/relay/tor/src/or/tor(+0x534be)
 [0x55811a3204be] (on Tor 0.3.4.0-alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0x819) [0x7f0f91d364c9] (on Tor
 0.3.4.0-alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] Bug:
 /home/relay/tor/src/or/tor(do_main_loop+0x1a5) [0x55811a3217d5] (on Tor
 0.3.4.0-alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] Bug:
 /home/relay/tor/src/or/tor(tor_run_main+0x275) [0x55811a322ed5] (on Tor
 0.3.4.0-alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] Bug:
 /home/relay/tor/src/or/tor(tor_main+0x3a) [0x55811a31c40a] (on Tor 0.3.4.0
 -alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] Bug: /home/relay/tor/src/or/tor(main+0x19)
 [0x55811a31c179] (on Tor 0.3.4.0-alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] Bug: /lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf0) [0x7f0f90a48830] (on Tor 0.3.4.0
 -alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] Bug:
 /home/relay/tor/src/or/tor(_start+0x29) [0x55811a31c1c9] (on Tor 0.3.4.0
 -alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] conn_write_callback(): Bug: unhandled error on
 write for Directory connection (fd 1588); removing (on Tor 0.3.4.0-alpha-
 dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug: src/or/main.c:935:
 conn_write_callback: This line should not have been reached. (Future
 instances of this warning will be silenced.) (on Tor 0.3.4.0-alpha-dev
 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] Bug: Line unexpectedly reached at
 conn_write_callback at src/or/main.c:935. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.3.4.0
 -alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] Bug:
 /home/relay/tor/src/or/tor(log_backtrace+0x42) [0x55811a451722] (on Tor
 0.3.4.0-alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] Bug:
 /home/relay/tor/src/or/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xb9) [0x55811a46c559] (on
 Tor 0.3.4.0-alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] Bug: /home/relay/tor/src/or/tor(+0x53692)
 [0x55811a320692] (on Tor 0.3.4.0-alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] Bug: /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0x819) [0x7f0f91d364c9] (on Tor
 0.3.4.0-alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] Bug:
 /home/relay/tor/src/or/tor(do_main_loop+0x1a5) [0x55811a3217d5] (on Tor
 0.3.4.0-alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] Bug:
 /home/relay/tor/src/or/tor(tor_run_main+0x275) [0x55811a322ed5] (on Tor
 0.3.4.0-alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] Bug:
 /home/relay/tor/src/or/tor(tor_main+0x3a) [0x55811a31c40a] (on Tor 0.3.4.0
 -alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 Apr 29 13:30:59.731 [warn] Bug: /home/relay/tor/src

Re: [tor-bugs] #19665 [Core Tor/Tor]: Should *Port_set count sockets?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19665: Should *Port_set count sockets?
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control technical-debt config|  Actual Points:
  torrc startup  |
Parent ID:  #25500   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Needs a changes file.

 Also, I don't understand what exactly the fix in this patch has to do with
 the original issue report above.  It seems like this patch is fixing
 "ControlPort doesn't mean you're a client!" but the ticket is asking for
 something else.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #25977 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cross-compiling tor rust for macOS is broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25977: Cross-compiling tor rust for macOS is broken
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  rust
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #25779
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Using our cross-compile setup for compiling tor with Rust support for
 macOS results in a build failure. It seems the macOS cross-compile Rust
 support is missing:
 {{{
   CCLD src/tools/tor-resolve
 /var/tmp/dist/macosx-toolchain/cctools/bin/x86_64-apple-darwin10-ranlib:
 file: src/or/libtor.a(protover.o) has no symbols
 ld: warning: ignoring file ./src/rust/target/release/libtor_rust.a, file
 was built for archive which is not the architecture being linked (x86_64)
 ld: warning: ignoring file ./src/rust/target/release/libtor_rust.a, file
 was built for archive which is not the architecture being linked (x86_64)
 /var/tmp/dist/macosx-toolchain/cctools/bin/x86_64-apple-darwin10-ranlib:
 file: src/or/libtor-testing.a(src_or_libtor_testing_a-protover.o) has no
 symbols
 x86_64-apple-darwin10-ranlib: file: src/or/libtor.a(protover.o) has no
 symbols
   CCLD src/test/test-child
   CCLD src/test/test-switch-id
 x86_64-apple-darwin10-ranlib: file: src/or/libtor-testing.a
 (src_or_libtor_testing_a-protover.o) has no symbols
   CCLD src/test/test-timers
   CCLD src/test/test-ntor-cl
 ld: warning: ignoring file ./src/rust/target/release/libtor_rust.a, file
 was built for archive which is not the architecture being linked (x86_64)
 ld: warning: ignoring file ./src/rust/target/release/libtor_rust.a, file
 was built for archive which is not the architecture being linked (x86_64)
   CCLD src/test/test-hs-ntor-cl
 ld: warning: ignoring file ./src/rust/target/release/libtor_rust.a, file
 was built for archive which is not the architecture being linked (x86_64)
   CCLD src/test/test-bt-cl
   CCLD src/test/fuzz/fuzz-consensus
 ld: warning: ignoring file ./src/rust/target/release/libtor_rust.a, file
 was built for archive which is not the architecture being linked (x86_64)
 ld: warning: ignoring file ./src/rust/target/release/libtor_rust.a, file
 was built for archive which is not the architecture being linked (x86_64)
   CCLD src/test/fuzz/fuzz-descriptor
   CCLD src/test/fuzz/fuzz-diff
 ld: warning: ignoring file ./src/rust/target/release/libtor_rust.a, file
 was built for archive which is not the architecture being linked (x86_64)
 ld: warning: ignoring file ./src/rust/target/release/libtor_rust.a, file
 was built for archive which is not the architecture being linked (x86_64)
   CCLD src/test/fuzz/fuzz-diff-apply
 ld: warning: ignoring file ./src/rust/target/release/libtor_rust.a, file
 was built for archive which is not the architecture being linked (x86_64)
   CCLD src/test/fuzz/fuzz-extrainfo
   CCLD src/test/fuzz/fuzz-hsdescv2
 ld: warning: ignoring file ./src/rust/target/release/libtor_rust.a, file
 was built for archive which is not the architecture being linked (x86_64)
 ld: warning: ignoring file ./src/rust/target/release/libtor_rust.a, file
 was built for archive which is not the architecture being linked (x86_64)
   CCLD src/test/fuzz/fuzz-hsdescv3
   CCLD src/test/fuzz/fuzz-http
 ld: warning: ignoring file ./src/rust/target/release/libtor_rust.a, file
 was built for archive which is not the architecture being linked (x86_64)
 ld: warning: ignoring file ./src/rust/target/release/libtor_rust.a, file
 was built for archive which is not the architecture being linked (x86_64)
   CCLD src/test/fuzz/fuzz-http-connect
   CCLD src/test/fuzz/fuzz-iptsv2
 ld: warning: ignoring file ./src/rust/target/release/libtor_rust.a, file
 was built for archive which is not the architecture being linked (x86_64)
 ld: warning: ignoring file ./src/rust/target/release/libtor_rust.a, file
 was built for archive which is not the architecture being linked (x86_64)
 Undefined symbols for architecture x86_64:
   "_protocol_list_supports_protocol_or_later", referenced from:
   _summarize_protover_flags in libtor-testing.a
 (src_or_libtor_testing_a-routerparse.o)
   "_protocol_list_supports_protocol", referenced from:
   _summarize_protover_flags in libtor-testing.a
 (src_or_libtor_testing_a-routerparse.o)
 ld: symbol(s) not found for architecture x86_64
 clang-3.8: error: linker command failed with exit code 1 (use -v to see
 invocation)
 Makefile:4715: recipe for target 'src/test/fuzz/fuzz-descriptor' failed
 make[1]: *** [src/test/fuzz/fuzz-descriptor] Error 1
 make[1]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs
 Undefined symbols for architecture x86_64:
   "_protocol_list_supports_protocol_or_later", referenced from:
   _summarize_protover_flags in l

Re: [tor-bugs] #25976 [Core Tor/Tor]: connection_dir_finished_flushing(): Bug: called in unexpected state 3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25976: connection_dir_finished_flushing(): Bug: called in unexpected state 3
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 034-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Huh. So the complaint is:
 {{{
 Apr 29 13:30:59.691 [warn] connection_dir_finished_flushing(): Bug: called
 in unexpected state 3. (on Tor 0.3.4.0-alpha-dev 302908657f492f06)
 }}}

 And state 3 is:
 {{{
 /** State for connection to directory server: reading HTTP response. */
 #define DIR_CONN_STATE_CLIENT_READING 3
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #19665 [Core Tor/Tor]: Should *Port_set count sockets?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19665: Should *Port_set count sockets?
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control technical-debt config|  Actual Points:
  torrc startup  |
Parent ID:  #25500   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 We should split off 59a32e5b4ff210b95bbed294cdc787cb75539da5 into a
 separate ticket and backport it to 0.2.9 and later. Otherwise, relays with
 the control port open will warn based on the client required protocols
 list.

 And I agree with nickm, we should make ControlPort_set count sockets.
 Maybe we should make all the *Port_set options count sockets, for
 consistency. Otherwise, weird things will happen in test networks that use
 sockets.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #25978 [Core Tor/Tor]: I found a Critial error.......When set in TORRC UseEntryNodes only picks a guard node and fails otherwise

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25978: I found a Critial error...When set in TORRC UseEntryNodes only 
picks a
guard node and fails otherwise
--+-
 Reporter:  tortrac   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Critical  |   Keywords:  EntryNodes, EntryGuards
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 UseEntryNodes {se} should allow UseEntryGuards 0

 But UseEntryGuards 0 breaks UseEntryNodes unless it can find a GuardNode
 which is against the purpose of UseEntryNodes in TORRC.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #15563 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ServiceWorkers violate first party isolation, probably

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15563: ServiceWorkers violate first party isolation, probably
---+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, ff67-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-linkability, ff60-esr => tbb-linkability, ff67-esr


Comment:

 Will still be disabled in ESR 60:
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1457915. However, we might
 need to do something about it much earlier for the mobile context...

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25978 [Core Tor/Tor]: Document that UseEntryGuards 0 disables EntryNodes (was: I found a Critial error.......When set in TORRC UseEntryNodes only picks a guard node and fails otherwise

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25978: Document that UseEntryGuards 0 disables EntryNodes
--+--
 Reporter:  tortrac   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, doc |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * severity:  Critical => Normal
 * priority:  Immediate => Medium
 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final => Tor: unspecified
 * keywords:  EntryNodes, EntryGuards => easy, doc


Comment:

 Tor is working as designed.

 UseEntryGuards 0 disables all entry guards, including EntryNodes
 restrictions.

 We already explain in the man page that UseBridges 1 disables EntryNodes
 restrictions.
 We should explain that UseEntryGuards 0 does a similar thing.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25807 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: Can not request bridges from torproject.org (App Engine is broken for moat)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25807: Can not request bridges from torproject.org (App Engine is broken for 
moat)
-+-
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201804,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201804R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:5 gk]:
 > Let's work around that for now. See `bug_25807`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 launcher.git/commit/?h=bug_25807&id=add227697f9af12056ca26f6e510572cd9c5faef)
 in my public tor-launcher repo for a patch that works for me.

 r=mcs
 Your patch looks fine, but won't it be easy to block Moat now?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25946 [Applications/Tor Browser]: There seems to be an issue with HTTPS Everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25946: There seems to be an issue with HTTPS Everywhere
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Happened again :(

 One thing that I noticed: When it works fine, the "Latest EFF ruleset
 update ..." or whatever appears in the addon's popup. When this problem
 happens it no longer appears.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25946 [Applications/Tor Browser]: There seems to be an issue with HTTPS Everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25946: There seems to be an issue with HTTPS Everywhere
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:8 cypherpunks]:
 > Happened again :(
 >
 > One thing that I noticed: When it works fine, the "Latest EFF ruleset
 update ..." or whatever appears in the addon's popup. When this problem
 happens it no longer appears.
 Not OP. Seen this on Windows 10 only, and nothing - on other machines.
 BTW, where to check what the latest ruleset update is?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25903 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add OVERHEAD and DELIVERED fields to CIRC_BW events

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25903: Add OVERHEAD and DELIVERED fields to CIRC_BW events
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25546| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


Comment:

 Without a Milestone, that ticket is good as lost ;).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25927 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove the need for gettimeofday_cached(); use monotonic time in ewma code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25927: Remove the need for gettimeofday_cached(); use monotonic time in ewma 
code
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25375   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25948 [Core Tor/Tor]: Run or_state_save as a mainloop event

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25948: Run or_state_save as a mainloop event
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25375   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25937 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move dirvote_act into a periodic callback

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25937: Move dirvote_act into a periodic callback
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25375   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25953 [Core Tor/Tor]: Module: Add Travis target for modularized directory authority subsystem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25953: Module: Add Travis target for modularized directory authority subsystem
+
 Reporter:  ahf |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  modularization  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25610  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor8
+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => assigned


Comment:

 Putting it back in Assigned since we can't review this until we have
 #25610 merged.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23107 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Optimize hs_circ_service_get_intro_circ() digest calculation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23107: prop224: Optimize hs_circ_service_get_intro_circ() digest calculation
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, prop224-extra, tor-hs,  |  Actual Points:
  optimization, 032-unreached|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:  dgoulet => asn


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17873 [Core Tor/Tor]: replacing 0.0.0.0 listeners at runtime fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17873: replacing 0.0.0.0 listeners at runtime fails
+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client port bind switching  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => ahf


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25852 [Core Tor/Tor]: GETINFO exit-policy for tor client should return 551

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25852: GETINFO exit-policy for tor client should return 551
+--
 Reporter:  dmr |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, tor-client, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:  tor-spec, tor-client => tor-spec, tor-client, fast-fix
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #25914, #25936

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #25914, #25936 by dgoulet:
reviewer to isis

--
Tickets URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #15015 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor --verify-config should not bind to ports

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15015: tor --verify-config should not bind to ports
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, intro, startup,   |  Actual Points:
  configuration, torrc, bootstrap, refactor, |
  technical-debt |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => catalyst


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25869 [Core Tor/Tor]: Proposal: Bandwidth Measurements Document Format

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25869: Proposal: Bandwidth Measurements Document Format
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bandwidth, bwauth, scanner, torflow  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #3723| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => nickm


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25914 [Core Tor/Tor]: dirserv: Remove dead code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25914: dirserv: Remove dead code
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth, deadcode, easy, 034 |  Actual Points:
  -roadmap-subtask   |
Parent ID:  #25610   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:  isis => mikeperry


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25903 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add OVERHEAD and DELIVERED fields to CIRC_BW events

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25903: Add OVERHEAD and DELIVERED fields to CIRC_BW events
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25546| Points:
 Reviewer:  isis  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * reviewer:   => isis


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #25979 [Core Tor/Stem]: Stem, Tor LTS, broken exit policies, and maybe microdescriptor issues too

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25979: Stem, Tor LTS, broken exit policies, and maybe microdescriptor issues 
too
---+
 Reporter:  pastly |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 [https://github.com/pastly/simple-bw-
 scanner/blob/656619f51ecfb88ff8909b79c5bd7c6830ec7872/sbws/lib/relaylist.py#L71
 Here in sbws ] I'm wanting to see what exits in the Tor network allow
 exiting to an ip:port.

 However, there seems to be an issue revolving around microdescriptors and
 the "exit policy summaries" contained in them. Perhaps related to #24110,
 I can't tell because I don't understand these details enough.



 stem version: 1.6.0

 Tor version: 0.2.9.14

 torrc:
 {{{
 ORPort 3537
 SocksPort 3538
 ControlPort 3536
 CookieAuthentication 1
 DataDirectory /home/pastly/run/livenet1
 PidFile /home/pastly/run/livenet1/tor.pid
 Log notice file /home/pastly/run/livenet1/notice.log
 ControlSocket /home/pastly/run/livenet1/control_socket
 ContactInfo 
 RunAsDaemon 1
 Nickname X
 SafeLogging 0
 DisableDebuggerAttachment 0
 MaxAdvertisedBandwidth 8 Mbits
 ExitRelay 1
 ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0
 # The public IP address of this machine, and a port on it
 ExitPolicy accept xx.xx.xx.xx:
 ExitPolicy reject *:*
 }}}

 Traceback:

 Mostly unhelpful, since it's mostly code in my "http"  branch of sbws. But
 you can see the exception.

 `e` is a RouterStatusEntryV3 for a relay with the Exit flag

 {{{
 Traceback (most recent call last):
   File "/home/pastly/src/simple-bw-scanner/sbws/core/scanner.py", line
 247, in dispatch_worker_thread
 return measure_relay(*a, **kw)
   File "/home/pastly/src/simple-bw-scanner/sbws/core/scanner.py", line
 193, in measure_relay
 exits = rl.exits_can_exit_to(dest.hostname, dest.port)
   File "/home/pastly/src/simple-bw-scanner/sbws/lib/relaylist.py", line
 100, in exits_can_exit_to
 if e.exit_policy.can_exit_to(host, port):
 KeyError: (,
 '144.217.254.208', 80)
 }}}

 If I try only giving a port, same basic traceback (only last few lines
 included) ...

 {{{
   File "/home/pastly/src/simple-bw-scanner/sbws/lib/relaylist.py", line
 101, in exits_can_exit_to
 if e.exit_policy.can_exit_to(port=port):
 KeyError: (,
 , ('port', 80))
 }}}



 Additional information:

 - If I use an 02914 client without setting `UseMicrodescriptors 0`, the
 exit_policy members are None. (hence some disconnect between line numbers
 in the tracebook in order to find and log Nones)

 - If I use an 02914 client with `UseMicrodescriptors 0`, I get the above
 tracebacks

 - If I use an 02914 relay as the client, I get the above traceback

 - This wasn't an issue when I was using an 03210 authority as the client


 My theories:

 - In 02914, one must tell Tor to NOT use microdescs in order to get
 SOMETHING stored as a RouterStatusEntryV3's exit policy
 - Even when you get SOMETHING stored in a RouterStatusEntryV3's exit
 policy when using 02914, it is buggy/missing information/something bad.
 - Something changed between 02914 and 03210 regarding the way Tor tells
 its controllers about (micro)descriptors and the exit policies within.
 This is most likely a stem bug, possibly exacerbated by a Tor bug.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25817 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add ansible scripts for setup of nigthly build server

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25817: Add ansible scripts for setup of nigthly build server
+--
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:
|  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  boklm201804, TorBrowserTeam201804R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  boklm201804, TorBrowserTeam201804 => boklm201804,
 TorBrowserTeam201804R


Comment:

 The branch `bug_25817_v7` is adding ansible roles used to setup a nightly
 build machine:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_25817_v7&id=9053f0f20f094b8cec2879c7c763d7bd45100039

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25318 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Add Tor Browser nightly builds email notification

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25318: Add Tor Browser nightly builds email notification
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  boklm201804, TorBrowserTeam201804R   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * keywords:  boklm201804, TorBrowserTeam201804 => boklm201804,
 TorBrowserTeam201804R


Comment:

 The branch `bug_25318` contains the ansible changes to setup email
 configuration on the nightly build machine:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_25318&id=8bc491bc36e79797b38760b264780b266b3445db

 It is based on branch `bug_25817_v7`, so it needs to be merged after
 #25817.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #25980 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Orfox bustage on Alpha branch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25980: Orfox bustage on Alpha branch
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 {{{
  3:24.92 In file included from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-
 browser/intl/hyphenation/glue/hnjstdio.cpp:11:0:
  3:24.93 /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-
 browser/intl/hyphenation/glue/hnjalloc.h:34:0: warning: "feof" redefined
  3:24.93  #define feof(file)hnjFeof(file)
  3:24.93  ^
  3:24.93 In file included from /home/sysrqb/.mozbuild/android-ndk-
 r11b/sources/android/support/include/stdio.h:41:0,
  3:24.93  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/system_wrappers/stdio.h:3,
  3:24.93  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/include/mozilla/throw_gcc.h:13,
  3:24.93  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/stl_wrappers/type_traits:66,
  3:24.93  from /home/sysrqb/.mozbuild/android-ndk-
 r11b/sources/cxx-stl/llvm-libc++/libcxx/include/exception:81,
  3:24.93  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/system_wrappers/exception:3,
  3:24.93  from /home/sysrqb/.mozbuild/android-ndk-
 r11b/sources/cxx-stl/llvm-libc++/libcxx/include/new:68,
  3:24.93  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/system_wrappers/new:3,
  3:24.93  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/stl_wrappers/new:44,
  3:24.93  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/include/mozilla/mozalloc.h:16,
  3:24.93  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-
 browser/intl/hyphenation/glue/hnjalloc.h:13,
  3:24.93  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-
 browser/intl/hyphenation/glue/hnjstdio.cpp:11:
  3:24.93 /home/sysrqb/.mozbuild/android-ndk-r11b/platforms/android-9/arch-
 arm/usr/include/stdio.h:367:0: note: this is the location of the previous
 definition
  3:24.93  #define feof(p)  __sfeof(p)
  3:24.93  ^
  3:24.93 In file included from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/system_wrappers/cstdio:3:0,
  3:24.93  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/stl_wrappers/cstdio:44,
  3:24.93  from /home/sysrqb/.mozbuild/android-ndk-
 r11b/sources/cxx-stl/llvm-libc++/libcxx/include/string:437,
  3:24.93  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/system_wrappers/string:3,
  3:24.93  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/stl_wrappers/string:44,
  3:24.94  from /home/sysrqb/.mozbuild/android-ndk-
 r11b/sources/cxx-stl/llvm-libc++/libcxx/include/__locale:15,
  3:24.94  from /home/sysrqb/.mozbuild/android-ndk-
 r11b/sources/cxx-stl/llvm-libc++/libcxx/include/ios:216,
  3:24.94  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/system_wrappers/ios:3,
  3:24.94  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/stl_wrappers/ios:44,
  3:24.94  from /home/sysrqb/.mozbuild/android-ndk-
 r11b/sources/cxx-stl/llvm-libc++/libcxx/include/ostream:131,
  3:24.94  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/system_wrappers/ostream:3,
  3:24.94  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/stl_wrappers/ostream:44,
  3:24.94  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/include/mozilla/gfx/BasePoint.h:10,
  3:24.94  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/include/mozilla/gfx/Point.h:13,
  3:24.94  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/include/mozilla/gfx/Triangle.h:12,
  3:24.94  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/include/mozilla/gfx/Matrix.h:10,
  3:24.94  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/include/Units.h:11,
 

Re: [tor-bugs] #25980 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Orfox bustage on Alpha branch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25980: Orfox bustage on Alpha branch
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 This is because:

 {{{
  0:28.10 In file included from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-
 browser/intl/hyphenation/glue/hnjstdio.cpp:11:0:
  0:28.10 /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-
 browser/intl/hyphenation/glue/hnjalloc.h:34:0: warning: "feof" redefined
  0:28.10  #define feof(file)hnjFeof(file)
  0:28.10  ^
  0:28.10 In file included from /home/sysrqb/.mozbuild/android-ndk-
 r11b//sources/android/support/include/stdio.h:41:0,
  0:28.10  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/system_wrappers/stdio.h:3,
  0:28.10  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/include/mozilla/throw_gcc.h:13,
  0:28.10  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/stl_wrappers/type_traits:66,
  0:28.10  from /home/sysrqb/.mozbuild/android-ndk-
 r11b//sources/cxx-stl/llvm-libc++/libcxx/include/exception:81,
  0:28.10  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/system_wrappers/exception:3,
  0:28.10  from /home/sysrqb/.mozbuild/android-ndk-
 r11b//sources/cxx-stl/llvm-libc++/libcxx/include/new:68,
  0:28.10  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/system_wrappers/new:3,
  0:28.10  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/stl_wrappers/new:44,
  0:28.10  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-browser
 /obj-tbb-arm-linux-androideabi/dist/include/mozilla/mozalloc.h:16,
  0:28.10  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-
 browser/intl/hyphenation/glue/hnjalloc.h:13,
  0:28.10  from /home/sysrqb/Orfox/external/tor-
 browser/intl/hyphenation/glue/hnjstdio.cpp:11:
  0:28.10 /home/sysrqb/.mozbuild/android-ndk-r11b/platforms/android-9/arch-
 arm/usr/include/stdio.h:367:0: note: this is the location of the previous
 definition
  0:28.10  #define feof(p)  __sfeof(p)
 }}}

 and

 {{{
 #ifdef feof
 inline _LIBCPP_INLINE_VISIBILITY int __libcpp_feof(FILE* __stream) {return
 feof(__stream);}
 #undef feof
 inline _LIBCPP_INLINE_VISIBILITY int feof(FILE* __stream) {return
 __libcpp_feof(__stream);}
 #endif  // feof
 }}}
 in `/home/sysrqb/.mozbuild/android-ndk-r11b//sources/cxx-stl/llvm-
 libc++/libcxx/include/cstdio`

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25980 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Orfox bustage on tor-browser-52.7.3esr-8.0-1 (was: Orfox bustage on Alpha branch)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25980: Orfox bustage on tor-browser-52.7.3esr-8.0-1
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25980 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Orfox bustage on tor-browser-52.7.3esr-8.0-1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25980: Orfox bustage on tor-browser-52.7.3esr-8.0-1
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Looks like this came in from upstream
 {{{
 commit 0e1e49d4971bb891152c93b8b62665f24bd8a0c2
 Author: Jonathan Kew 
 Date:   Wed Mar 28 10:17:51 2018 +0100

 Bug 1448771 - Update hnjstdio to handle additional functions from
 stdio.h that libhyphen wants to use. r=glandium, a=RyanVM

 --HG--
 extra : source : 846bcaa210aa2264bec412c0595113964fafc972
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25977 [Core Tor/Tor]: Cross-compiling tor rust for macOS is broken

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25977: Cross-compiling tor rust for macOS is broken
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust build|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25779| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  rust => rust build
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  project| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor17
---+---
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "25658 - 5.png" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features (was: Actity 2.1: Improve user understanding a

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  project| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor17
---+---
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "25658 - 5.png" removed.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  project| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor17
---+---
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "25658 - 5.png" added.


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25417 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSFETCH support for v3 Hidden Services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25417: HSFETCH support for v3 Hidden Services
+--
 Reporter:  atagar  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control, tor-hs, prop224-extra  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)
 * keywords:  tor-control, tor-hs => tor-control, tor-hs, prop224-extra


Comment:

 Tagging with `prop224-extra` in the interim until we know for sure whether
 its needed. See tor-dev email thread, notably
 [[https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 dev/2018-April/013137.html|this]].

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25955 [Core Tor/Tor]: onion v2 deprecation plan

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25955: onion v2 deprecation plan
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224-extra  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dmr):

 * keywords:   => tor-hs, prop224-extra
 * cc: dmr (added)


Comment:

 Tagging with the keywords that I hope are most appropriate. Please correct
 me if we should be using `prop224-maybe` instead of `-extra`!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25980 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Orfox bustage on tor-browser-52.7.3esr-8.0-1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25980: Orfox bustage on tor-browser-52.7.3esr-8.0-1
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Right, so this patch redefines `feof()` and changes the function signature
 (`feof(FILE*)` -> `feof(hnjFile*)`), and it seems there isn't a conversion
 between FILE and hnjFile. Fun.

 {{{
 diff --git a/intl/hyphenation/glue/hnjalloc.h
 b/intl/hyphenation/glue/hnjalloc.h
 index fec3a4b..5cee1be1 100644
 --- a/intl/hyphenation/glue/hnjalloc.h
 +++ b/intl/hyphenation/glue/hnjalloc.h
 @@ -31,6 +31,8 @@
  #define fopen(path,mode)  hnjFopen(path,mode)
  #define fclose(file)  hnjFclose(file)
  #define fgets(buf,count,file) hnjFgets(buf,count,file)
 +#define feof(file)hnjFeof(file)
 +#define fgetc(file)   hnjFgetc(file)

  typedef struct hnjFile_ hnjFile;

 @@ -44,6 +46,10 @@ int hnjFclose(hnjFile* f);

  char* hnjFgets(char* s, int n, hnjFile* f);

 +int hnjFeof(hnjFile* f);
 +
 +int hnjFgetc(hnjFile* f);
 +
  #ifdef __cplusplus
  }
  #endif
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs