Re: [tor-bugs] #25386 [Core Tor/Tor]: Link Rust Tests to C Dependencies in Tor (allow integration testing from Rust to C) (was: fix rust tests)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25386: Link Rust Tests to C Dependencies in Tor (allow integration testing from
Rust to C)
-+-
 Reporter:  Hello71  |  Owner:  Hello71
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, tor-test, 033-backport,|  Actual Points:
  review-group-34, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-included-20180401  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25639 [Core Tor/Tor]: think about Rust crate boundaries

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25639: think about Rust crate boundaries
--+--
 Reporter:  Hello71   |  Owner:  Hello71
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by chelseakomlo):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25639 [Core Tor/Tor]: think about Rust crate boundaries

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25639: think about Rust crate boundaries
--+--
 Reporter:  Hello71   |  Owner:  Hello71
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by chelseakomlo):

 Closing as this is we have settled on creating a shared crate as described
 by Manish above.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26214 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check stream SENDME against max

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26214: Check stream SENDME against max
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorV-can
--+
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Ok fixed + added tests to cover this case. Same pull request.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23846 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use libtool for building shared library

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23846: Use libtool for building shared library
-+-
 Reporter:  hellais  |  Owner:  sbs
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-mobile, s8-api,  |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328 034-included-20180402 034  |
  -roadmap-subtask   |
Parent ID:  #25510   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by chelseakomlo):

 * cc: chelseakomlo (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24816 [Applications/Tor Browser]: gk and yawning closing "Tor Browser is not your privacy browser, Non-goal: PRIVACY" ticket

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24816: gk and yawning closing "Tor Browser is not your privacy browser, 
Non-goal:
PRIVACY" ticket
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18361| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


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[tor-bugs] #26218 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Enable TLS session tickets on a per-circuit basis

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26218: Enable TLS session tickets on a per-circuit basis
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 TLS session tickets were disabled in #4099 to reduce the risk of tracking.
 Since then, circuit isolation has progressed significantly. I propose re-
 enabling TLS session tickets, but only for individual circuits. This will
 provide the connection handshake speedups while avoiding the risk of
 fingerprinting.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26202 [Core Tor/Tor]: Packaged apparmor settings break tor within LXD containers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26202: Packaged apparmor settings break tor within LXD containers
-+-
 Reporter:  b|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.6
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  lxc lxd apparmor 033-backport,   |  Actual Points:
  032-backport, 031-backport, 029-backport,  |
  034-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by b):

 To be clearer, this appears to be the source:

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/debian/tor.git/tree/debian/tor.apparmor-
 profile.abstraction?h=master

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26214 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check stream SENDME against max

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26214: Check stream SENDME against max
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorV-can
--+
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Eep. Test failure.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25946 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: There seems to be an issue with HTTPS Everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25946: There seems to be an issue with HTTPS Everywhere
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  worksforme =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25946 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: There seems to be an issue with HTTPS Everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25946: There seems to be an issue with HTTPS Everywhere
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 It has been fixed by Hainish.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25386 [Core Tor/Tor]: fix rust tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25386: fix rust tests
-+-
 Reporter:  Hello71  |  Owner:  Hello71
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, tor-test, 033-backport,|  Actual Points:
  review-group-34, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-included-20180401  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorQ
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Hello71, or anybody: can you summarize what the actual problem is at this
 point?  Chelseakomlo, Manish, and I are all confused about where we are.

 It looks like the goal of this ticket is to make it so Tor's C code is
 linked with the Rust tests, so that Rust tests can call functions that
 invoke C functions.  And it looks like we're running into linking issues.
 But, what are they? And what are we trying?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26217 [Core Tor/Tor]: add info that fingerprints in MyFamily are not case-sensitive

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26217: add info that fingerprints in MyFamily are not case-sensitive
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-doc   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26217 [Core Tor/Tor]: add info that fingerprints in MyFamily are not case-sensitive

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26217: add info that fingerprints in MyFamily are not case-sensitive
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-doc   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Sure, we can add this information.

 Perhaps we should look through all the option arguments in the man page,
 and document which ones are case-insensitive, case-preserving, and case-
 sensitive?

 For example, fingerprints are case-insensitive, nicknames are case-
 preserving (or are they case-sensitive?), and nothing is currently
 documented as being case-sensitive.

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[tor-bugs] #26217 [Core Tor/Tor]: add info that fingerprints in MyFamily are not case-sensitive

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26217: add info that fingerprints in MyFamily are not case-sensitive
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-doc
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 The man page does currently not say that MyFamily fingerprint values are
 not case sensitive.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25962 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser crash: [xcb] Unknown sequence number while processing queue

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25962: Tor Browser crash: [xcb] Unknown sequence number while processing queue
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Seems to happen with Lubuntu only, with Xfce it never crashed

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22158 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor browser core dump on Arch Linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22158: Tor browser core dump on Arch Linux
--+---
 Reporter:  jb.1234abcd   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 #20390

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22158 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor browser core dump on Arch Linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22158: Tor browser core dump on Arch Linux
--+---
 Reporter:  jb.1234abcd   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Thanks a lot for that info. I wonder if what you are seeing is related to
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1444532.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22158 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor browser core dump on Arch Linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22158: Tor browser core dump on Arch Linux
--+---
 Reporter:  jb.1234abcd   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by torsocksbug):

 I have been getting similar crashes as long as I can remember. They are
 seemingly random and it can be weeks without an occurrence (although they
 happen as a result of some action, e.g. loading a new page). This time I
 managed to capture and analyze the dump. This was the cause (version
 7.5.4):
 {{{
 #0  0x7f9eb592e91b in raise () at /usr/lib/libpthread.so.0
 #1  0x7f9eb1d6adaa in nsProfileLock::FatalSignalHandler(int, siginfo*,
 void*) (signo=11, info=0x7f9ea30fd470, context=0x7f9ea30fd340) at
 /var/tmp/build/firefox-deaa82b4f8ab/toolkit/profile/nsProfileLock.cpp:181
 #2  0x7f9eb283fef1 in WasmFaultHandler<(Signal)0>(int, siginfo_t*,
 void*) (signum=, info=0x7f9ea30fd470,
 context=0x7f9ea30fd340) at /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 deaa82b4f8ab/js/src/wasm/WasmSignalHandlers.cpp:1239
 #3  0x7f9eb592ea80 in  () at
 /usr/lib/libpthread.so.0
 #4  0x7f9eb5bf7bf6 in PK11_ExitContextMonitor
 (cx=cx@entry=0x7f9e6e6b5160) at pk11cxt.c:50
 #5  0x7f9eb5bf8c46 in PK11_DigestFinal (context=0x7f9e6e6b5160,
 data=0x7f9ea30fd948 , outLen=0x7f9ea30fd93c, length=64) at
 pk11cxt.c:1009
 #6  0x7f9eb1c49254 in nsCryptoHash::Finish(bool, nsACString_internal&)
 (this=0x7f9e6e777940, ascii=, _retval=...) at
 /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 deaa82b4f8ab/security/manager/ssl/nsCryptoHash.cpp:204
 #7  0x7f9eb07fd4af in SHA256 (aResult=..., aPlainText=0x7f9e3cfa2d08
 ) at /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 deaa82b4f8ab/netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpConnectionInfo.cpp:42
 #8  0x7f9eb07fd4af in
 mozilla::net::nsHttpConnectionInfo::BuildHashKey()
 (this=this@entry=0x7f9e8e8829d0) at /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 deaa82b4f8ab/netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpConnectionInfo.cpp:204
 #9  0x7f9eb07fd5f8 in
 mozilla::net::nsHttpConnectionInfo::SetOriginServer(nsACString_internal
 const&, int) (this=this@entry=0x7f9e8e8829d0, host=...,
 port=port@entry=80) at /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 deaa82b4f8ab/netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpConnectionInfo.cpp:236
 #10 0x7f9eb081733f in
 mozilla::net::nsHttpConnectionInfo::Init(nsACString_internal const&, int,
 nsACString_internal const&, nsACString_internal const&,
 mozilla::net::nsProxyInfo*, mozilla::NeckoOriginAttributes const&, bool)
 (this=0x7f9e8e8829d0, host=..., port=80, npnToken=..., username=...,
 proxyInfo=0x7f9e459d74c0, originAttributes=..., e2eSSL=false) at
 /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 deaa82b4f8ab/netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpConnectionInfo.cpp:108
 #11 0x7f9eb081845e in mozilla::net::nsHttpConnectionInfo::Clone()
 const (this=0x7f9e8d9ed690) at /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 deaa82b4f8ab/netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpConnectionInfo.cpp:245
 #12 0x7f9eb08189e1 in
 
mozilla::net::nsHttpConnectionMgr::GetOrCreateConnectionEntry(mozilla::net::nsHttpConnectionInfo*,
 bool) (this=this@entry=0x7f9e9b23bc50, specificCI=,
 prohibitWildCard=, prohibitWildCard@entry=false) at
 /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 deaa82b4f8ab/netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpConnectionMgr.cpp:2951
 #13 0x7f9eb0818b2b in
 mozilla::net::nsHttpConnectionMgr::OnMsgSpeculativeConnect(int,
 mozilla::net::ARefBase*) (this=0x7f9e9b23bc50, param=0x7f9e76f58e80) at
 /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 deaa82b4f8ab/netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpConnectionMgr.cpp:2992
 #14 0x7f9eb081d72f in
 RefPtr::Proxy::operator()(int&, RefPtr&)
 (this=) at /var/tmp/build/firefox-deaa82b4f8ab/obj-x86_64
 -pc-linux-gnu/dist/include/mozilla/RefPtr.h:338
 #15 0x7f9eb081d72f in mozilla::net::ConnEvent::Run() (this=) at /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 deaa82b4f8ab/netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpConnectionMgr.cpp:209
 #16 0x7f9eb05973cd in nsThread::ProcessNextEvent(bool, bool*)
 (this=0x7f9eb46798c0, aMayWait=, aResult=0x7f9ea30fdc6f) at
 /var/tmp/build/firefox-deaa82b4f8ab/xpcom/threads/nsThread.cpp:1216
 #17 0x7f9eb05b201f in NS_ProcessNextEvent(nsIThread*, bool)
 (aThread=, aMayWait=aMayWait@entry=true) at /var/tmp/build
 /firefox-deaa82b4f8ab/xpcom/glue/nsThreadUtils.cpp:361
 #18 0x7f9eb06174c2 in mozilla::net::nsSocketTransportService::Run()
 (this=0x7f9eb46698a0) at /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 deaa82b4f8ab/netwerk/base/nsSocketTransportService2.cpp:939
 #19 0x7f9eb05973cd in nsThread::ProcessNextEvent(bool, bool*)
 (this=0x7f9eb46798c0, aMayWait=, aResult=0x7f9ea30fdddf) at
 

Re: [tor-bugs] #24977 [Core Tor/Tor]: Non-fatal assertion !(tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)node->hsdir_index->fetch, DIGEST256_LEN))

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24977: Non-fatal assertion !(tor_mem_is_zero((const
char*)node->hsdir_index->fetch, DIGEST256_LEN))
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180502  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I think this might actually be a bugfix on 0.3.4, not on 0.3.2: 0.3.4
 changed the way that we call the dirvote calculation code when we did
 #25937. Could that be the cause of this?

 As for the patch itself: Is it possible for us to have this recalculation
 get _scheduled_ in update_current_time, but actually executed inside a
 mainloop_event?  Or does it hurt us to have other stuff called in between
 those points?  The problem there is that update_current_time already does
 too much: I'd rather keep our callgraph simple, and make tiny-fast
 functions like this _never_ have a slow-complex case.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26121 [Core Tor/Tor]: BUILDTIMEOUT_SET totals are still off

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26121: BUILDTIMEOUT_SET totals are still off
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  033-backport 034-backport tor-   |  Actual Points:
  client timeouts performance|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 asn, I can't find this branch in any of your repositories that I have
 links to. Did you push it? Did I forget a repo?

 Can we open another tickets to get some test coverage here?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26110 [Core Tor/Tor]: CIRC_BW fields vague

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26110: CIRC_BW fields vague
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25691 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bridges don't work: Non-fatal assertion !(exit_ei == NULL) failed in onion_pick_cpath_exit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25691: Bridges don't work: Non-fatal assertion !(exit_ei == NULL) failed in
onion_pick_cpath_exit
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  regression, 034-must 033-backport|  Actual Points:
  033-maybe-must |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet, teor|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to 0.3.3.  Let's keep an eye out for reports of trouble in
 0.3.4.1-alpha before we release this in 0.3.3 though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25692 [Core Tor/Tor]: onion_extend_cpath: Non-fatal assertion info || client failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25692: onion_extend_cpath: Non-fatal assertion info || client failed.
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  034-must 033-backport regression |  Actual Points:
  chutney 034-included-20180403 033-maybe-must   |
Parent ID:  #25691   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet, teor|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Backported to 0.3.3

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26196 [Core Tor/Tor]: Abort in test_bridges.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26196: Abort in test_bridges.c
-+-
 Reporter:  gvanem   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crash, tests, 029-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  031-backport 032-backport 033-backport |
  034-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  crash, tests =>
 crash, tests, 029-backport, 031-backport 032-backport 033-backport
 034-backport


Comment:

 I agree, and also we should backport this: we should treat this kind of
 thing as if it were a crash.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25544 [Core Tor/Tor]: Complete vanguard specification

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25544: Complete vanguard specification
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, torspec, guard-   |  Actual Points:
  discovery, 034-roadmap-master, |
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Merged, and renumbered to proposal 292. Please send it to tor-dev@ and
 close this ticket?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26073 [Applications/Tor Browser]: patch tor-browser-build.git for Firefox 60 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26073: patch tor-browser-build.git for Firefox 60 ESR
+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201805, ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:26 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:22 sukhbir]:
 > > EDIT: I guess I should have waited for Tor Browser to build as well.
 Firefox builds but Tor Browser gives an error. I am guessing this is
 related to the language packs so I will debug this later.
 >
 > Actually for some reason `(( count++ ))` in `common.sh` breaks now. I've
 pushed a follow-up commit to `tor-browser-60.0.1esr-8.0-1`
 (b135c59f65dba827b61379a4945251e148c43291) to unbreak us, but we should
 patch all instances of that and find out what the actual underlying issue
 is (looking at the log of changes to `common.sh` did not yield some
 obvious issue).

 I opened #26216 for that.

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[tor-bugs] #26216 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix broken MAR file generation ( `(( count++ ))` breaks now)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26216: Fix broken MAR file generation ( `(( count++ ))` breaks now)
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  ff60-esr,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201805
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 While preparing nightly builds in #26073 we realized that MAR file
 generation is broken now. For some reason `(( count++ ))` in `common.sh`
 does not work anymore and breaks the build. We worked around that for the
 full MAR file generation in commit
 b135c59f65dba827b61379a4945251e148c43291 on `tor-browser-60.0.1esr-8.0-1`
 but should create a proper patch and figure out what's actually going on.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26073 [Applications/Tor Browser]: patch tor-browser-build.git for Firefox 60 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26073: patch tor-browser-build.git for Firefox 60 ESR
+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201805, ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:22 sukhbir]:
 > PS: I cherry-picked Igor's commit as well.
 >
 > EDIT: I guess I should have waited for Tor Browser to build as well.
 Firefox builds but Tor Browser gives an error. I am guessing this is
 related to the language packs so I will debug this later.

 Actually for some reason `(( count++ ))` in `common.sh` breaks now. I've
 pushed a follow-up commit to `tor-browser-60.0.1esr-8.0-1`
 (b135c59f65dba827b61379a4945251e148c43291) to unbreak us, but we should
 patch all instances of that and find out what the actual underlying issue
 is (looking at the log of changes to `common.sh` did not yield some
 obvious issue).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26073 [Applications/Tor Browser]: patch tor-browser-build.git for Firefox 60 ESR

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26073: patch tor-browser-build.git for Firefox 60 ESR
+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201805, ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:24 gk]:
 > You only need to change the `git_hash` part in
 > {{{
 >   nightly:
 > git_hash: 'tor-browser-[% c("var/firefox_version") %]-[%
 c("var/torbrowser_branch") %]-1'
 > tag_gpg_id: 0
 > var:
 >   torbrowser_update_channel: default
 > }}}
 > + `firefox_platform_version`.

 FWIW: in this case just adaping `firefox_platform_version` should be
 enough. Changing the `git_hash` for the nightly build is just sometimes
 needed if we make e.g. a -2 tor-browser branch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17569 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add uBlock Origin to the Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17569: Add uBlock Origin to the Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  kernelcorn   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability tbb-security, tbb- |  Actual Points:
  performance|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by LabraTor):

 @cypherpunks

 Regarding the FF-inbuilt solution with the disconnect lists, I don't see a
 problem if a website blocks ad-/tracking-blocking. TBB users then can
 either avoid the website or use a workaround such as archiving the website
 and then view the archived version. Obviously, a temporary white-listing
 of anti-adblocking websites until a reset would be an option too but
 temporarily reduce anonymity.

 You're right about strictly resetting any uBo modifications, if possible
 at all. This is after all how it is done with Tails. I consider it
 advantageous to merge the TBB and Tails anonymity groups and therefore
 favor the uBo approach.

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[tor-bugs] #26215 [Applications/TorBirdy]: Add an option to Proxy tab: "Do nothing"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26215: Add an option to Proxy tab: "Do nothing"
---+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/TorBirdy  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
---+-
 I need to use custom proxy, and your add-on change proxy settings
 every time I launch Thunderbird.

 Can you add an option "(O) Do nothing" to proxy tab, to force TorBirdy
 not to mess up my proxy settings?

 I really need it, and I'm thinking about removing your add-on.

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