Re: [tor-bugs] #26369 [Core Tor]: Re-fetch onion service descriptor for isolated request

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26369: Re-fetch onion service descriptor for isolated request
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: gk (added)


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[tor-bugs] #26369 [Core Tor]: Re-fetch onion service descriptor for isolated request

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26369: Re-fetch onion service descriptor for isolated request
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 When tor receives a new request for connecting to an onion service and
 this request has different isolation flags/parameters than a previous
 (recent) request, then tor should re-fetch the service descriptor (if we
 already have it). Currently, tor notices it already has the descriptor in
 its cache and it doesn't refetch. This is a nice performance optimization,
 but if a client is requesting an isolated circuit for an onion service,
 then we shouldn't leak that we already have the descriptor in our cache.

 Instead of only using the onion service name as the map-key, we can add a
 unique value of the circuit isolation information (hash?).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26074 [Applications/Tor Browser]: I tried to go to a v2 onion and Tor Browser Bundle crashed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26074: I tried to go to a v2 onion and Tor Browser Bundle crashed
--+
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Okay, let's close this as worksforme for now and open a new ticket in case
 this happens again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26368 [Core Tor]: Consider circuit isolation when closing redundant intro points

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26368: Consider circuit isolation when closing redundant intro points
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: gk (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26365 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport AltSvc/SOCKS patch to ESR60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26365: Backport AltSvc/SOCKS patch to ESR60
-+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  ff60-esr => ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806R
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good. Cherry-picked to `tor-browser-60.0.1esr-8.0-1` as commit
 8a68f975ee5faa39efa26a79062476ab50dd18ab. It will show up in tomorrow's
 nightly at http://f4amtbsowhix7rrf.onion/tor-browser-builds/. Note, there
 are still prefs to be flipped to enable it as we are currently auditing
 both HTTP/2 and Alt-Svc for tracking risks and they are therefore
 disabled. In particular you'll want to flip `network.http.altsvc.enabled`
 and maybe `network.http.altsvc.oe`, too. The HTTP/2 related pref is
 `network.http.spdy.enabled.http2`.

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[tor-bugs] #26368 [Core Tor]: Consider circuit isolation when closing redundant intro points

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26368: Consider circuit isolation when closing redundant intro points
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 When tor receives more than one request for connecting to an onion service
 within a short amount of time, and these requests are circuit-isolated (by
 sockauth, or something else), tor will launch multiple connections to an
 intro point (one for each isolated request). When the first introduction
 succeeds (intro acks), tor closes any circuits it considers redundant
 (`rend_client_close_other_intros`). Tor should only close circuits if the
 socks request isolation bits match.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26367 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider removing tor2web mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26367: Consider removing tor2web mode
--+--
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 
+1000
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0

Re: [tor-bugs] #26074 [Applications/Tor Browser]: I tried to go to a v2 onion and Tor Browser Bundle crashed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26074: I tried to go to a v2 onion and Tor Browser Bundle crashed
--+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by Dbryrtfbcbhgf):

 Replying to [comment:2 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:1 Dbryrtfbcbhgf]:
 > > Can the attachment
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/26074/firefox_2018-05-10
 -152238_Jackis-MacBook-Pro.crash.zip be removed, it has my Macbook's name?
 the other file is the correct one.
 >
 > Done.
 >
 > Can you reproduce this crash?
 > Does it occur for all v2 .onions that you visit?
 >
 > I tried visiting the Facebook .onion and several Tor Project services on
 a macOS 10.13.4 system but could not produce a crash.
 I have not been able to reproduce the crash.

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[tor-bugs] #26367 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider removing tor2web mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26367: Consider removing tor2web mode
--+--
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 It sounds like tor2web mode wont work after the DoS protection code was
 added.

 Would it make sense to get rid of this?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25837 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Integrate fxc2 into our build setup for Windows Tor Browser builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25837: Integrate fxc2 into our build setup for Windows Tor Browser builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff60-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806   |
Parent ID:  #26203   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 IIUC, Firefox autogenerates `ps_4_0_level_9_3` which is old
 [https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb509626(v=vs.85).aspx SM2]. So
 what's wrong with https://github.com/wine-
 mirror/wine/tree/master/dlls/d3dcompiler_47?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26258 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rust tests don't fail on failure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26258: Rust tests don't fail on failure
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  033-backport regression 034-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good to me!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20700 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement standard client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20700: prop224: Implement standard client authorization
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328|
Parent ID:  #25955   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 I've commented on about 1/4 of the whole branch. I hope to continue
 tomorrow!

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[tor-bugs] #26366 [Core Tor/Tor]: Possible duplicated logic in connection_edge_finished_connecting() and connection_exit_connect()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26366: Possible duplicated logic in connection_edge_finished_connecting() and
connection_exit_connect()
--+--
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 There's some possible duplicated logic in
 `connection_edge_finished_connecting()` and `connection_exit_connect()`:

 When `conn->state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_OPEN` is set we have some duplicated
 code on when to begin writing. There is a comment that might be relevant
 around some Windows logic in the switch/case block around the `result`
 variable in `connection_exit_connect()`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26152 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improve errors on crypto/openssl_version badness

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26152: Improve errors on crypto/openssl_version badness
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-testing, 034-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  subtask, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-included-20180328  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 nickm]:
 > I'm not sure about that change -- have a look at my response to the
 comment?

 Oops, you're correct! Carry on.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26365 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport AltSvc/SOCKS patch to ESR60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26365: Backport AltSvc/SOCKS patch to ESR60
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:   => ff60-esr


Comment:

 Backporting is a simple cherry-pick. Here it on top of our current tor-
 browser-60.0.1esr-8.0-1:
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commit/26365

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[tor-bugs] #26365 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport AltSvc/SOCKS patch to ESR60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26365: Backport AltSvc/SOCKS patch to ESR60
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Patrick McManus wrote a patch for using Alternate Service with SOCKS that
 landed in Firefox 62
 (https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1463509). This would be
 useful for us, especially for AltSvc onions. So we'd like to backport to
 ESR60. Turning this on will require completing our audit of HTTP2 and
 AltSvc mechanism in particular to make sure it respects FPI.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26037 [Core Tor/Tor]: DirAuths should check vote signatures before parsing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26037: DirAuths should check vote signatures before parsing
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  Samdney
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-security, tor-crypto  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by Samdney):

 I read me through the necessary part of the code for this ticket and it
 turned out two topics for me:

 1. In networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string() (tor/src/or/routerparse.c):
 It does all the parsing and the signatur verification happens very late.
 => This verification should be moved to an earlier point
 => Should we separate this part from the current
 networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string() function? Or only moving within
 networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string() to an earlier point?

 2. The ticket also mentioned the trusteddirserver_get_by_v3_auth_digest()
 (tor/src/or/routerparse.c):
 From my spontenous thinking, it would be better it could happen before
 networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(), but of course we have some
 dependences here from networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string().

 I need some input for the best strategy/respectively what would you
 prefer.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26152 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improve errors on crypto/openssl_version badness

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26152: Improve errors on crypto/openssl_version badness
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-testing, 034-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  subtask, 034-triage-20180328,  |
  034-included-20180328  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I'm not sure about that change -- have a look at my response to the
 comment?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26258 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rust tests don't fail on failure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26258: Rust tests don't fail on failure
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  033-backport regression 034-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 So, the good news here is that this bug isn't mine: it's already present
 in Tor! The solution is to run Cargo from inside the corresponding
 directory.

 I've updated my `bug26258_033` branch, and pushed it to github too with
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/149

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24977 [Core Tor/Tor]: Non-fatal assertion !(tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)node->hsdir_index->fetch, DIGEST256_LEN))

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24977: Non-fatal assertion !(tor_mem_is_zero((const
char*)node->hsdir_index->fetch, DIGEST256_LEN))
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180502  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Commented on PR.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21378 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Archive bwauth votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21378: Archive bwauth votes
+--
 Reporter:  tom |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth tor-dirauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by juga):

 * keywords:   => tor-bwauth tor-dirauth


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21377 [Core Tor/Tor]: DirAuths should expose bwauth votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21377: DirAuths should expose bwauth votes
+--
 Reporter:  tom |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth metrics tor-bwauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by juga):

 * keywords:  tor-dirauth metrics => tor-dirauth metrics tor-bwauth


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21378 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Archive bwauth votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21378: Archive bwauth votes
---+--
 Reporter:  tom|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by juga):

 As commented in
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21377#comment:4

 > This is now fixed in sbws, though is still not being use by any
 !DirAuth.
 > It is not planned to add this toTorflow.

 We can correlate the votes with the `Torflow` bandwidth measurement files
 by the timestamp, right?, so i wonder if it would still be possible to
 archive the files produced by all the bwauths that are running `Torflow`.

 Another more exotic idea (probably needs other ticket if it makes sense)
 is to collect the data from the testnet, since we have DirAuths running
 sbws there. Would this require lot of extra work?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21377 [Core Tor/Tor]: DirAuths should expose bwauth votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21377: DirAuths should expose bwauth votes
-+--
 Reporter:  tom  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth metrics  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by juga):

 This is now fixed in `sbws`, though is still not being use by any DirAuth.

 It is not planned to add this to `Torflow`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26269 [Core Tor/Tor]: new compiler warning src/or/router.c:2034:36: warning: potential null pointer dereference

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26269: new compiler warning src/or/router.c:2034:36: warning: potential null
pointer dereference
---+
 Reporter:  toralf |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * keywords:  034-must => 034-must fast-fix


Comment:

 I'm fairly sure that there's no underlying bug here, but we should try to
 build without warnings in any case.

 The router.c code here was introduced in 0.2.8.2-alpha, and the
 test_entrynodes.c code in 0.3.0.1-alpha.

 So there's need for one fix in 0.2.9: Branch `bug26269_029` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/147

 And for one fix in 0.3.1: Branch `bug26269_031` with PR at
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/148

 I can't reproduce the compiler errors here, so I'm only _fairly_ sure that
 I fixed all the cases. Testing and review would be welcome!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25693 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 1.2: Make sure Firefox Photon UI works with our style guidelines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25693: Activity 1.2: Make sure Firefox Photon UI works with our style 
guidelines
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201806,   |  Actual Points:
  ff60-esr   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor17
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:14 antonela]:
 > > Could you explain how you arrived at the different colors for the
 nightly/alpha/stable? There is not much purple as we know it and no green
 as we know it anymore. What's e.g. the reasoning for that?
 >
 > >
 >
 > Thanks, GeKo! I'm trying to start a conversation. The method we can use
 to build a new brand could take multiple ways. The process is very similar
 if we think about product icons. For example, Mozilla did their last
 rebrand with community's ideas[1]. But just one designer and an outsourced
 studio made it at Wikipedia[2]. I really believe that we should involve
 our community to work on it. To facilitate this collab, we are working to
 have a design sprint in Mexico to work on it. We are going to have a bunch
 of designers and will be useful and fun to outline the first ideas about
 it together. Our exploration has some time under the hoods; you can sneak
 peek at #25763.
 >
 > That said and since we have to release before it, we could 1) keep the
 same icon we have right now; or 2) try to use the same onion shape
 everywhere, so the brand starts to take consistency.
 >
 > Running for 2), I started to try some containers using the onion icon we
 already have. It works pretty bad on small sizes but at big sizes is quite
 recognizable. Also, this container idea is part of the current Brand
 Assets[3].
 >
 > The violet color is becoming a default to talk about privacy and is our
 brand color [4]. I think we can explore different quality (hue/saturation)
 of purples and the gradients were an experiment for that. You mentioned
 the greens, do you think it worth to explore some options with the green
 color? I'd love to try it.
 >
 > I hope it helps to get a better idea of the principal aim here and gets
 more people involved :)

 It does, thanks, and thanks for the links. I have long known and felt that
 purple is the color for privacy. :) If we could get the new purple close
 to the purple we have right now (or that we plan to have in the future
 assuming it won't go away) that seems to me a good thing. And getting the
 impression that we are "moving" towards it from the nightly over the alpha
 is another thing I like.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12030 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Create a DatabaseManager for interacting with BridgeDB's database backends

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12030: Create a DatabaseManager for interacting with BridgeDB's database 
backends
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-db, bridgedb-dist,  |  Actual Points:
  bridgedb-1.0.x, proposal-226, isis2015Q1Q2,|
  isisExB, isisExC, TorCoreTeam201608|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by MikiMix):

 {{{
 [**''
 == [
 {{{

 


 Magazine rutmix.cc\\
 [[Image()]]
 }}}
 ]''**]
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26045 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create a new MAR signing key for ESR60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26045: Create a new MAR signing key for ESR60
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201806,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks. Merged to `tor-browser-60.0.1esr-8.0-1` as commits
 d77a0ec835e8ee8e4beab614722c02fa7fd96119 and
 1f78032d48850e0197608ac1d9906a095e2a4c06.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12030 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Create a DatabaseManager for interacting with BridgeDB's database backends

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12030: Create a DatabaseManager for interacting with BridgeDB's database 
backends
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-db, bridgedb-dist,  |  Actual Points:
  bridgedb-1.0.x, proposal-226, isis2015Q1Q2,|
  isisExB, isisExC, TorCoreTeam201608|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by MikiMix):

 Replying to [comment:6 isis]:
 > Adding to my august tickets.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26269 [Core Tor/Tor]: new compiler warning src/or/router.c:2034:36: warning: potential null pointer dereference

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26269: new compiler warning src/or/router.c:2034:36: warning: potential null
pointer dereference
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23968 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript icon jumps to the right after update

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23968: NoScript icon jumps to the right after update
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:10 cypherpunks]:
 > Same to 5.1.8.6. No improvement for over half a year, is NoScript dead?
 This isn't an issue with NoScript, it happens even in the FF60-esr based
 Tor Browser nightly build with both NoScript WebExtension and HTTPS
 Everywhere.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23968 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript icon jumps to the right after update

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23968: NoScript icon jumps to the right after update
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:9 cypherpunks]:
 > 5.1.8.3 -> 5.1.8.4 without e10s.
 Same to 5.1.8.6. No improvement for over half a year, is NoScript dead?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22026 [Metrics/Ideas]: Create new service to retrieve raw documents

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22026: Create new service to retrieve raw documents
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Ideas  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by hiro):

 Hi, I have been working on making a little elasticsearch experiment that
 can be used to analyse raw logs.
 It can be accessed here: https://0xacab.org/spaghetti/metrics-search
 At the moment it only downloads tpf logs from onionperf, but it can be
 configured to do a lot more.
 The experiment runs via docker-compose so that it can be tested on your
 own machine.
 I'd be happy to experiment with different data if we like to try this idea
 some more.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26045 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create a new MAR signing key for ESR60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26045: Create a new MAR signing key for ESR60
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201806,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 r=mcs
 Looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26358 [Core Tor/Tor]: relaycell/circbw warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26358: relaycell/circbw warning
--+
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26158 [Core Tor/Tor]: A little bug of circular path of Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26158: A little bug of circular path of Tor
-+-
 Reporter:  TBD.Chen |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  circular-path, security-low, |  Actual Points:
  031-backport, 032-backport, 033-backport,  |
  034-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to 0.3.1 and forward!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25686 [Core Tor/Tor]: Mystery bug causes relays to attempt many many descriptor publishes, with no X-Desc-Gen-Reason header

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25686: Mystery bug causes relays to attempt many many descriptor publishes, 
with
no X-Desc-Gen-Reason header
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-proposed 034-must|  Actual Points:
  regression 033-backport 032-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_information
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 Okay, merging this to 0.3.2 and forward. Putting it in "needs information"
 in case we learn anything from these new messages.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26233 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rebase Tor Browser patches for FF61

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26233: Rebase Tor Browser patches for FF61
---+---
 Reporter:  sysrqb |  Owner:
   |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201806R, tbb-mobile  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25741 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:10 gk]:

 > What's the reason for doing
 > {{{
 > > -rv =
 nsXREDirProvider::GetUserAppDataDirectory(getter_AddRefs(file));
 > > +rv = mDirProvider.GetUserAppDataDirectory(getter_AddRefs(file));
 > }}}
 > essentially reverting bug 1443080 and deviating from the fix pattern
 using the `GetSingleton()`-approach?

 We're reverted that piece of 1443080 because in our patch, the methods are
 no longer static. (That bug was removing instance calls to static
 functions.) We could use either pattern, but because mDirProvider is
 already available and used commonly in that file it seemed OK.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24891 [Core Tor/Tor]: build system --disable-unittests has no effect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24891: build system --disable-unittests has no effect
-+-
 Reporter:  starlight|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328, 029-backport,|
  031-backport, 032-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  isis |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 LGTM, and merging to master, but I'm going to say "no backport" --
 apparently nobody had noticed that this was nonfunctional between 0.2.9
 and now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26203 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adapt tor-browser-build firefox and tor-browser project for ESR 60 Windows build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26203: Adapt tor-browser-build firefox and tor-browser project for ESR 60 
Windows
build
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:4 sukhbir]:
 > For review:
 >
 > https://github.com/azadi/tor-browser-build-1/tree/bug-26203

 Thanks. I will review, and suggest some fixup commits if needed.

 >
 > 2. I think we can do better for #26205 (commit
 `93f89a735792e329bd7853bcbd0db056426e32d6`). Please review and suggest.
 Also, should this patch go in Firefox (as part of `git_url`) or as
 separate patches which we add during the build (current approach)?

 I think the patch should go in `tor-browser.git` (but adding it as a patch
 file is useful for testing before it is merged in `tor-browser.git`).

 > 4. For Rust, I made the change below; let me know if we should remove
 the guards altogether:
 >
 > {{{
 > -[% IF ! c("var/windows") %]
 > +[% IF ! c("var/windows-i686") %]
 > }}}

 I think we can remove the guards altogether, as we will want it at some
 point, and the build fails without rust.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26205 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Don't build the uninstaller for Windows during Firefox compilation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26205: Don't build the uninstaller for Windows during Firefox compilation
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26203   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806 => ff60-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201806R


Comment:

 sukhe posted a `tor-browser.git` patch for review:
 https://raw.githubusercontent.com/azadi/tor-browser-
 build-1/bug-26203/projects/firefox/nsis-uninstall.patch

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26251 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adapt macOS snowflake compilation to new toolchain

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26251: Adapt macOS snowflake compilation to new toolchain
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: sukhbir (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26203 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adapt tor-browser-build firefox and tor-browser project for ESR 60 Windows build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26203: Adapt tor-browser-build firefox and tor-browser project for ESR 60 
Windows
build
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: boklm (added)
 * keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806 => ff60-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201806R


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26341 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Enable setting torbutton.use_nontor_proxy with an environment variable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26341: Enable setting torbutton.use_nontor_proxy with an environment variable
--+---
 Reporter:  eyedeekay |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * status:  new => needs_information
 * component:  Applications/Torbutton => Applications/Tor Browser
 * keywords:   => tbb-torbutton


Comment:

 Why exactly do you need to set that preference to `true`? Because there is
 no domain isolation possible with I2P used instead? FWIW: I don't think
 just switching that pref alone is a food idea. See
 `torbutton_use_nontor_proxy()` in `torbutton.js` for why. If you ship an
 own I2P browser I assume you ship an own profile with it. Why can't you
 just flip the default preferences in it accordingly? What do you plan to
 do with all the Tor-related branding, because it is not Tor Browser you'll
 ship anymore even if it says so.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26203 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adapt tor-browser-build firefox and tor-browser project for ESR 60 Windows build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26203: Adapt tor-browser-build firefox and tor-browser project for ESR 60 
Windows
build
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by sukhbir):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 For review:

 https://github.com/azadi/tor-browser-build-1/tree/bug-26203

 This should address #26205, #26206, #25837, #26326, #26204.

 Some observations:

 1. We have a working build of Windows x86_64 with this branch. I verified
 it on Windows 10.

 2. I think we can do better for #26205 (commit
 `93f89a735792e329bd7853bcbd0db056426e32d6`). Please review and suggest.
 Also, should this patch go in Firefox (as part of `git_url`) or as
 separate patches which we add during the build (current approach)?

 3. For `fxc2`, we are pointing to my fork of the project. We will switch
 to `mozilla/fxc2` when https://github.com/mozilla/fxc2/pull/1 is merged.

 4. For Rust, I made the change below; let me know if we should remove the
 guards altogether:

 {{{
 -[% IF ! c("var/windows") %]
 +[% IF ! c("var/windows-i686") %]
 }}}

 5. For Firefox, I based `gecko-dev/tree/win-ff60` (commit
 `be179ca1a0c7812a332b16a4f1b87eb68c629d01`) on `tor-
 browser-60.0.1esr-8.0-1` and tjr's patches, including the ones from
 
https://treeherder.mozilla.org/#/jobs?repo=try&revision=781b545807dfa9d3de23054bf413ec232a9ce1c1
 (Sandbox).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25693 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 1.2: Make sure Firefox Photon UI works with our style guidelines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25693: Activity 1.2: Make sure Firefox Photon UI works with our style 
guidelines
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201806,   |  Actual Points:
  ff60-esr   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor17
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:13 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:6 antonela]:
 > > Here I just updated the TorBrowser logos. Could we replace them? Which
 format do you need the assets? .svg/.png?
 >
 > I think .png works definitely but I have to check how it looks like with
 .svg. But my assumption would be that that's okay as well.

 If you look at https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 central/source/browser/branding/official you'll see that the default*
 icons are all .png. We want to replace those. I think the easiest would be
 using .png in this case, too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26358 [Core Tor/Tor]: relaycell/circbw warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26358: relaycell/circbw warning
--+
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  assigned => merge_ready


Comment:

 Obvious fix can be found in my branch `bug26358`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26358 [Core Tor/Tor]: relaycell/circbw warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26358: relaycell/circbw warning
--+
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * owner:  (none) => asn
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24977 [Core Tor/Tor]: Non-fatal assertion !(tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)node->hsdir_index->fetch, DIGEST256_LEN))

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24977: Non-fatal assertion !(tor_mem_is_zero((const
char*)node->hsdir_index->fetch, DIGEST256_LEN))
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180502  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 OK people, in branch `bug24977_final` you can see the approach we
 discussed where we use the consensus valid-after to detect outdated state
 and then fix it on-demand:

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/146

 I didn't do the (1) part where we add a timer when we receive a non-live
 consensus that triggers when it becomes live, because I figured out that
 the on-demand approach should cover that too for the HSv3 use case. Let me
 know if you'd like to see that too, in case it helps with the non-HSv3 use
 cases. Perhaps we can have that as a ticket for the future?

 BTW, I choose the nodelist to add the `valid_after` timestamp, since
 that's the data structure that basically carries the HSDir indices. I
 didn't want to add it to each individual `node_t` because that would be a
 bit weird.

 

 Please also see commit `2520ee34c` which fixes another client-side case
 which could produce this bug and stack trace. I left more details in the
 commit message.

 Let me know if you have questions or you'd like to see things done
 differently. I think this is still doable for 034.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26248 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Please delete tag exonerator-2.1.0 in exonerator.git

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26248: Please delete tag exonerator-2.1.0 in exonerator.git
-+
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thank you, hiro! I deleted the tag and pushed the correct one. I'm fine
 with keeping rights as they are now, if this is okay for you. Thanks
 again! Resolving.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26354 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure only Linux users with SSE2 support are trying to use Tor Browser based on ESR60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26354: Make sure only Linux users with SSE2 support are trying to use Tor 
Browser
based on ESR60
-+--
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 wintel 4ever

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26358 [Core Tor/Tor]: relaycell/circbw warning

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26358: relaycell/circbw warning
--+
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * version:  Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha => Tor: 0.3.4.2-alpha
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


Comment:

 Putting this in 0.3.4, because we should fix this test, and make sure it
 can't happen during normal operation.

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[tor-bugs] #26364 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Please remove these unused repositorities to the attic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26364: Please remove these unused repositorities to the attic
-+
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 While doing housekeeping I found a couple Git repositories that are not
 used anymore. Please move them to the attic:

  - compass
  - torperf
  - weather
  - webstats
  - karsten/torperf
  - user/karsten/compass
  - user/karsten/doctor
  - user/karsten/weather

 Thanks in advance!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26354 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure only Linux users with SSE2 support are trying to use Tor Browser based on ESR60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26354: Make sure only Linux users with SSE2 support are trying to use Tor 
Browser
based on ESR60
-+--
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good to me. Merged to `master` (commit
 f606f5d9d55a171e0a6f57ad58e1052c9f7c149d).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18867 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ship auto-updates for Tor Browser nightly channel

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18867: Ship auto-updates for Tor Browser nightly channel
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, boklm201806,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 While working on #26045 we realized that for nightly builds as they are
 produced today it is not sufficient to just replace the
 `nightly_aurora_level3`* certificates Mozilla uses for such cases. The
 reason for that is that our update channel is `default` which lets the
 code use the `dep1.der` and dep2.der` certificates instead.

 I guess it is not unreasonable to move to a `nightly` update channel and
 then only replace the `nightly_aurora_level3`* certs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26045 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create a new MAR signing key for ESR60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26045: Create a new MAR signing key for ESR60
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201806,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  GeorgKoppen201806, TorBrowserTeam201806 => GeorgKoppen201806,
 TorBrowserTeam201806R
 * status:  reopened => needs_review


Comment:

 `bug_26045_v2` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/log/?h=bug_26045_v2) is up for review. It first reverts the
 commit that let us add our old keys and is then starting basically from
 scratch adding the new certificates.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26045 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create a new MAR signing key for ESR60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26045: Create a new MAR signing key for ESR60
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  GeorgKoppen201806,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 It seems mcs and brade found the problem: when building the nightly not
 the nightly certificates are included into the build but `dep1.der` and
 dep2.der`. The code responsible for that is
 {{{
 if CONFIG['MOZ_UPDATE_CHANNEL'] in ('alpha', 'beta', 'release', 'esr'):
 primary_cert.inputs += ['release_primary.der']
 secondary_cert.inputs += ['release_secondary.der']
 elif CONFIG['MOZ_UPDATE_CHANNEL'] in ('nightly', 'aurora', 'nightly-elm',
   'nightly-profiling', 'nightly-oak',
   'nightly-ux'):
 primary_cert.inputs += ['nightly_aurora_level3_primary.der']
 secondary_cert.inputs += ['nightly_aurora_level3_secondary.der']
 else:
 primary_cert.inputs += ['dep1.der']
 secondary_cert.inputs += ['dep2.der']
 }}}
 and we set the update channel to `default` for nightlies (see the `tor-
 browser-build` repo projects/firefox/config). After copying the new certs
 over `dep1.der` and `dep2.der` scenario 3c) and 3d) in comment:6 behave as
 epxected: in the former nothing happens after the successful signature
 verification and in the latter the update works. Thus, we are good with
 the new key.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26363 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Don't use old mar-tools after the watershed for generating 64bit Tor Browser MAR files for Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26363: Don't use old mar-tools after the watershed for generating 64bit Tor
Browser MAR files for Windows
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26050| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 I hope sukhbir can work on the root cause for this bug soon, which is
 #23561 which would solve this bug, too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23561 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix nsis builds for Windows 64

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23561: Fix nsis builds for Windows 64
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201806  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by gk):

 sukhbir: once you are done with the Windows bundles for esr60, this would
 be a worthwhile bug spending your time on as we still need to workaround
 it which is annoying, see: #26363.

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[tor-bugs] #26363 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Don't use old mar-tools after the watershed for generating 64bit Tor Browser MAR files for Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26363: Don't use old mar-tools after the watershed for generating 64bit Tor
Browser MAR files for Windows
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff60-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #26050
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 As a workaround for #24477 we are donwloading and using the `mar-tools`
 from Tor Browser 7.5a7 for generating MAR files during the bundling step
 for 64-bit Windows.

 We need to use newer mar-tools, however, once we are beyond the watershed.

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[tor-bugs] #26362 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use old MAR format when generating the MAR files for the first esr60-based alpha

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26362: Use old MAR format when generating the MAR files for the first 
esr60-based
alpha
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  ff60-esr,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201806
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #26050
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Esr52-based Tor Browsers don't understand the LZMA compressed MAR files.
 We need to create the MAR files for the first esr60-based release using
 the old BZIP2 format. This can be done by setting `MAR_OLD_FORMAT=1`
 before generating both the full and the incremental MAR files.

 We should remove that patch once we generate the MAR files after the first
 esr60-based release.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26234 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add support in update_responses for redirecting old versions to a separate directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26234: Add support in update_responses for redirecting old versions to a 
separate
directory
-+--
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26050   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Path looks good. Merged to `master` (commit
 3cab74acf8a2f2a311c133544ccc8c00a43e00a2).

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