Re: [tor-bugs] #21607 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate WebVR API 1.1 for fingerprinting/linkability risks

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21607: Investigate WebVR API 1.1 for fingerprinting/linkability risks
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by tom):

 Yes, you should definitely do this with high priority =)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26240 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check Maxmind GeoIPLocation Database before distributing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26240: Check Maxmind GeoIPLocation Database before distributing
+--
 Reporter:  jvsg|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  GeoIP, Geoipdb, needs-proposal  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  GeoIP, Geoipdb => GeoIP, Geoipdb, needs-proposal


Comment:

 This idea needs a proposal. Here is our proposals process:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/001-process.txt

 Here is my feedback on your idea:

 I don't believe we can make an unreliable database into a reliable
 database, using other unreliable databases. The definition of "location"
 is ambiguous: it can mean the location of any company in the chain of
 companies owning the data center, or the physical location of the data
 center. Until providers fix the definition, the data will never be
 accurate.

 Also, providers don't care about server locations, because they're not
 used for advertising to consumers.

 Some providers will want you to pay for any use of their data, even if you
 only replace one maxmind location. So you should get a lawyer to read
 their licensing terms before you write your proposal.

 I have an alternative proposal:
 * stop relying on GeoIP for security-sensitive activities:
   * remove support for country codes in torrc options, or document them as
 unreliable
   * stop relying on countries in Sybil scanning
 * document all other uses (for example, in statistics and relay search) as
 informational only

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24249 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create automated mechanism for C/Rust types to stay in sync

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24249: Create automated mechanism for C/Rust types to stay in sync
--+---
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo  |  Owner:  chelseakomlo
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  isis  |Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 Chelsea and I talked about this a bit and we want to take a minute to
 explore how difficult it would be to get bindgen to do this for us
 (without generating the entire world), but in the opposite direction. This
 could probably build off of Nick's work on #26383.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25886 [Core Tor/Tor]: Have frac_nodes_with_descriptors() take and use for_direct_connect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25886: Have frac_nodes_with_descriptors() take and use for_direct_connect
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge-client, tor-guard,|  Actual Points:
  bootstrap  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:13 neel]:
 > Thank you for your response.
 >
 > I don't fully know what a "full descriptor" is.

 A router descriptor, rather than a microdescriptor:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n151

 > Does this mean that for bridges:
 >  * We have `node->ri` only? (based on `node_has_preferred_descriptor()`)

 ri (router info) is used to store router descriptors.

 >  * We have `node->ri`, `node->rs`, and `node->md`? (I am guessing this
 one)

 Bridges don't have rs (router status) or md (microdescriptor), because
 bridges are not in the consensus.

 > Also, I did not see any function in `bridges.h` which directly checks
 for full descriptors (or didn't see them if they were unobvious).
 >
 > The closest thing I saw were functions which get a list of bridges
 (`bridge_list_get()`) so then I get a `SMARTLIST`, and in each iteration
 get a `node_t` from the `bridge_info_t` and check for a full descriptor.
 Should I do this? If not, which function should I use?

 `num_bridges_usable(0) > 0`, which is actually in entrynodes.h :
 
https://github.com/torproject/tor/blob/5edc72a45b7479f5fe791054aa19f6b3b478c725/src/or/entrynodes.c#L3149

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26378 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_rust.sh fails on src/rust/crypto

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26378: test_rust.sh fails on src/rust/crypto
+
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust tor-tests  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  isis|Sponsor:  SponsorV-can
+
Changes (by isis):

 * priority:  Medium => Very High
 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * points:   => 1
 * sponsor:   => SponsorV-can


Comment:

 LGTM!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Circuit display - Let's remove link from the Tor Button

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26321: Circuit display - Let's remove link from the Tor Button
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-circuit-display,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by antonela):

 Arthur and I discussed this idea about to have the link items placed in
 the top menu.

 Raising the plan that eventually removes the Tor Button, Security Settings
 and Tor Network Settings may live in `about:preferences` and New Circuit
 an New Identity will live under File item at the OS top bar menu

 Check the attachments to see how it might look
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/26321/26321.png

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26245 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unused Rust code warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26245: Unused Rust code warnings
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must, rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  isis|Sponsor:
+

Comment (by isis):

 Okay, catalyst's code looks good to me. I've added some patches on top of
 their code in my `bug26245` branch to fix the warnings/errors.

 Could someone else please review my additional changes?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26378 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_rust.sh fails on src/rust/crypto

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26378: test_rust.sh fails on src/rust/crypto
+
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust tor-tests  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  isis|Sponsor:
+
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => isis


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Circuit display - Let's remove link from the Tor Button

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26321: Circuit display - Let's remove link from the Tor Button
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-circuit-display,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "26321.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21378 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Archive bwauth bandwidth files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21378: Archive bwauth bandwidth files
+--
 Reporter:  tom |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth tor-dirauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by teor):

 No, I suggest that we make the current bandwidth file available on every
 directory authority at:
 http:///tor/status-vote/current/bandwidth.z

 Just like the rest of the director documents:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n3294

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26245 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unused Rust code warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26245: Unused Rust code warnings
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must, rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  isis|Sponsor:
+
Changes (by isis):

 * reviewer:   => isis


Comment:

 I'll review and add patches for removing the `smartlist_t` definition and
 `N_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS` (which it appears we don't use in the C code
 either?).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25886 [Core Tor/Tor]: Have frac_nodes_with_descriptors() take and use for_direct_connect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25886: Have frac_nodes_with_descriptors() take and use for_direct_connect
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge-client, tor-guard,|  Actual Points:
  bootstrap  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 Thank you for your response.

 I don't fully know what a "full descriptor" is. Does this mean that for
 bridges:
  * We have `node->ri` only? (based on `node_has_preferred_descriptor()`)
  * We have `node->ri`, `node->rs`, and `node->md`? (I am guessing this
 one)

 Also, I did not see any function in `bridges.h` which directly checks for
 full descriptors (or didn't see them if they were unobvious).

 The closest thing I saw were functions which get a list of bridges
 (`bridge_list_get()`) so then I get a `SMARTLIST`, and in each iteration
 get a `node_t` from the `bridge_info_t` and check for a full descriptor.
 Should I do this? If not, which function should I use?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26245 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unused Rust code warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26245: Unused Rust code warnings
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must, rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26245 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unused Rust code warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26245: Unused Rust code warnings
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must, rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * owner:  isis => catalyst


Comment:

 Patch for `--enable-fatal-warnings` in
 https://github.com/tlyu/tor/tree/bug26245

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25693 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 1.2: Make sure Firefox Photon UI works with our style guidelines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25693: Activity 1.2: Make sure Firefox Photon UI works with our style 
guidelines
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201806,   |  Actual Points:
  ff60-esr   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor17
-+-
Changes (by steph):

 * cc: steph (added)


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[tor-bugs] #26387 [Core Tor/Tor]: sandbox incompatible with glibc 2.27

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26387: sandbox incompatible with glibc 2.27
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.7
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Similar to #24315.  If I enable the sandbox on my system, I get killed
 with:

 {{{
 (Sandbox) Caught a bad syscall attempt (syscall openat)
 tor(+0x1a439a)[0x55d0af97d39a]
 /lib64/libpthread.so.0(open64+0x4b)[0x7f74ed0951cb]
 /lib64/libpthread.so.0(open64+0x4b)[0x7f74ed0951cb]
 tor(tor_open_cloexec+0x40)[0x55d0af963440]
 tor(start_writing_to_file+0x17a)[0x55d0af976e7a]
 tor(+0x19df5b)[0x55d0af976f5b]
 tor(+0x19e0a8)[0x55d0af9770a8]
 tor(or_state_save+0x15b)[0x55d0af8954cb]
 tor(+0x52e3b)[0x55d0af82be3b]
 /usr/lib64/libevent-2.1.so.6(+0x236fa)[0x7f74eddf06fa]
 /usr/lib64/libevent-2.1.so.6(event_base_loop+0x57f)[0x7f74eddf164f]
 tor(do_main_loop+0x254)[0x55d0af82cb54]
 tor(tor_run_main+0x1025)[0x55d0af82ef15]
 tor(tor_main+0x3a)[0x55d0af8276ba]
 tor(main+0x19)[0x55d0af827449]
 /lib64/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xe7)[0x7f74eccdb9f7]
 tor(_start+0x2a)[0x55d0af82749a]
 }}}

 strace:

 {{{
 write(1, "(Sandbox) Caught a bad syscall a"..., 48(Sandbox) Caught a bad
 syscall attempt (syscall ) = 48
 write(1, "openat", 6openat)   = 6
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26267 [Core Tor/Tor]: export rand from the crypto crate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26267: export rand from the crypto crate
+
 Reporter:  isis|  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.6
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  SponsorV-can
+
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25695 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 5.1: Redesign Tor Browser homepage ("about:tor") - create an user onboard

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25695: Activity 5.1: Redesign Tor Browser homepage ("about:tor") - create an 
user
onboard
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201806  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor17
---+---

Comment (by antonela):

 **Tor Browser 8 Onboarding**

 Steph and I we have been working on having the content and the steps of
 the onboarding ready.
 You can grab the copy and the links from here

 
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1c2RZSwI44h5IT0_0HyurByWuzf5jhA1iCLUR6FBjIvY/edit?usp=sharing

 and the prototype is living here
 https://marvelapp.com/5981a4b/screen/44384308

 let me know what else is needed to moving it forward

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26267 [Core Tor/Tor]: export rand from the crypto crate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26267: export rand from the crypto crate
+
 Reporter:  isis|  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.6
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, fast-fix  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  .1
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  SponsorV-can
+

Comment (by isis):

 Done in my `bug26267` branch.

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[tor-bugs] #26386 [Webpages/Website]: Please post job description to website - Project Manager with Product Experience

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26386: Please post job description to website - Project Manager with Product
Experience
--+
 Reporter:  ewyatt|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512


 Hello. Please post the below job description to the website under “Project
 Manager with Product Experience.” Thank you!

 Internet Freedom Nonprofit Seeks Experienced Project Manager with Product
 Experience

 June 2018

 The Tor Project, Inc., a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization advancing human
 rights and freedoms by creating and deploying free and open source
 anonymity and privacy technologies, is seeking a Project Manager with
 product experience to help coordinate our Tor Browser (desktop and
 mobile), UX, and Community teams.

 The ideal candidate has experience leading an open source project. Tor is
 developed and maintained collaboratively through the contributions of a
 diverse, global community. We work hard to choose communications tools
 that encourage participation, where every contributor is heard and
 respected. The person in this job must be a team player with excellent
 communication skills.

 The primary focus of our Product PM is to help the Browser, UX, and
 Community teams succeed by fulfilling their contractual obligations and
 meeting their roadmap goals. This person will be responsible for ensuring
 a productive, healthy work environment so all team members are able to
 contribute effectively and to the best of their abilities. All teams are
 distributed globally across multiple time zones, so the ability to
 organize and communicate via chats, email, etc., is crucial. This person
 will also be the link between the teams, volunteers, and sponsors
 (funders), and thus must have strong organizational skills and the ability
 to communicate in writing to diverse audiences.

 You will be helping teams roadmap, identify projects for grant proposals,
 manage the execution of projects, and write progress reports for sponsors.
 This is where your experience with product comes in -- your product eye
 should help facilitate discussions between all stakeholders participating
 in product decisions at Tor.

 This position will work closely with other team leads and project
 managers. This position reports directly to the Executive Director.

 Responsibilities

 •   Roadmap: provide advice to teams where needed and point them in
 the right direction; help them understand what is expected of them
 •   Coordinate the transfer of information to and between the teams,
 sponsors, and greater Tor community
 •   Organize team meetings, help your teams plan their roadmaps, and
 show the teams how to improve their processes
 •   Work with other project managers to coordinate contingencies
 within other teams’ roadmaps
 •   Work on grant proposals with the Tor Project’s Fundraising
 Director and Grant Writer by providing them with your teams’ ideas for
 projects and the personnel needed for execution
 •   Manage risks and issues that might occur while executing a project
 •   Oversee roadmap execution and monitor each team’s progress on
 their respective projects

 Qualifications:

 •   Solid UX background, with understanding of or hands-on experience
 in software development and web technologies
 •   Super organized
 •   Knowledge of how to build great processes, no matter what tools
 the teams are using
 •   Great facilitator
 •   Excellent written and verbal communication skills; ability to
 communicate with many different audiences
 •   Experience managing a team is a huge plus
 •   Knowledge of and experience with software development life-cycle
 process
 •   Experience with Free and Open Source Software culture
 •   Comfortable with transparency
 •   Excellent attention to detail
 •   General knowledge of internet technologies and security tools
 •   Prior experience working on U.S. government grants and contracts a
 plus!
 •   Willingness to travel internationally at least twice a year

 The Tor Project's workforce is smart and committed. Experience working
 with open source communities and/or a dedication to internet freedom are
 added pluses. The Tor Project currently has a paid and contract staff of
 around 35 developers and operational support staff, plus many thousands of
 volunteers who contribute to our work. The ideal candidate will be
 energetic, unflappable and flexible, and will thrive in a highly-technical
 collaborative environment.

 This is a full-time, hands-on position, which 

[tor-bugs] #26385 [Webpages/Website]: Add job description to website - Project Manager for Network Projects

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26385: Add job description to website - Project Manager for Network Projects
--+
 Reporter:  ewyatt|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512


 Please post the below job description under “Project Manager for Network
 Projects”

 Internet Freedom Nonprofit Seeks Experienced Project
 Manager for Network Projects

 June 2018

 The Tor Project, Inc., a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization advancing human
 rights and freedoms by creating and deploying free and open source
 anonymity and privacy technologies, is seeking a Project Manager to help
 coordinate the projects of our Network, Metrics, and Anti-Censorship
 teams, as well as our network interference observatory team known as OONI.

 The ideal candidate has experience leading an open source project. Tor is
 developed and maintained collaboratively through the contributions of a
 diverse, global community. We work hard to choose communications tools
 that encourage participation, where every contributor is heard and
 respected. The person in this job must be a team player with excellent
 communication skills.

 Our Network Projects PM understands that inter-team collaboration makes
 each team stronger, and will focus on helping teams work together
 effectively. This person will be responsible for ensuring a productive,
 healthy work environment so all team members are able to contribute
 effectively and to the best of their abilities. All teams are distributed
 globally across multiple time zones, so the ability to organize and
 communicate via chats, email, etc., is crucial. This person will also be
 the link between the teams, volunteers, and sponsors (funders), and thus
 must have strong organizational skills and the ability to communicate in
 writing to diverse audiences.

 You will be helping the teams roadmap, identify projects for grant
 proposals, manage project execution, and write progress reports to our
 sponsors. You are an experienced professional who is capable of building
 processes and best practices for the teams, regardless of the tools being
 used.

 This position will work closely with other team leads and project
 managers. This position reports directly to the Executive Director.

 Responsibilities
 •   Provide advice to teams where needed and point them in the right
 direction; help them understand what is expected of them
 •   Coordinate the transfer of information to and between the teams,
 sponsors, and greater Tor community
 •   Organize team meetings, help your teams plan their roadmaps, and
 show the teams how to improve their processes
 •   Work with the Tor Project’s Fundraising Director and Grant Writer
 on grant proposals by providing them with your teams’ ideas for projects
 and the personnel needed for execution
 •   Manage risks and issues that might occur while executing a project
 •   Manage execution of roadmap and monitor the progress of your
 teams’ projects

 Qualifications:
 •   Solid knowledge of internet technologies and security tools
 •   Super organized
 •   Know-how to build great processes no matter what tools teams are
 using
 •   Great facilitator
 •   Excellent written and verbal communication skills
 •   Experience managing people
 •   Knowledge of and experience with software development life-cycle
 process
 •   Experience with Free and Open Source Software culture
 •   Comfortable with transparency
 •   Excellent attention to detail
 •   Prior experience working on U.S. government grants and contracts a
 plus!
 •   Willingness to travel to internationally at least twice a year

 The Tor Project's workforce is smart and committed. Experience working
 with open source communities and/or a dedication to Internet freedom are
 added pluses. The Tor Project currently has a paid and contract staff of
 around 35 developers and operational support staff, plus many thousands of
 volunteers who contribute to our work. The ideal candidate will be
 energetic, unflappable and flexible, and will thrive in a highly-technical
 collaborative environment.

 This is a full-time, hands-on position, which can be done remotely or in
 our office in Seattle, WA. Flexible salary, depending on experience. The
 Tor Project has a competitive benefits package, including a generous PTO
 policy; 14 paid holidays per year (including the week between Christmas
 and New Year's, when the office is closed); health, vision, dental,
 disability, and life insurance paid in full for employee; 

Re: [tor-bugs] #26378 [Core Tor/Tor]: test_rust.sh fails on src/rust/crypto (was: Travis fails on rust tests (test_rust.sh))

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26378: test_rust.sh fails on src/rust/crypto
+
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust tor-tests  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by catalyst):

 The linker error might not get fixed until we fix #25386. That might take
 a while, so maybe we have to not link any of the Rust digest stuff into
 tests until that gets fixed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26378 [Core Tor/Tor]: Travis fails on rust tests (test_rust.sh)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26378: Travis fails on rust tests (test_rust.sh)
+
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust tor-tests  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by catalyst):

 This branch fixes the `default-features = false` inconsistency:
 https://github.com/tlyu/tor/tree/bug26378

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[tor-bugs] #26384 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Private mode does not provide a method for clearing cookies.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26384: Private mode does not provide a method for clearing cookies.
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  |   Keywords:  cookie private
  |  mode
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Unlike normal firefox browsing mode, private mode cookies do not show up
 via the show cookies menu under privacy settings in preferences. Unless a
 new identity is selected or the browser session terminated the cookies
 will persist. If this concern is not unfounded, then some method of cookie
 scrubbing compatible with private mode may be necessary to avoid
 correlation across site visits/exit changes during a single browsing
 session.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26378 [Core Tor/Tor]: Travis fails on rust tests (test_rust.sh)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26378: Travis fails on rust tests (test_rust.sh)
+
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust tor-tests  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by catalyst):

 The linker error seems to be
 {{{
   = note: Undefined symbols for architecture x86_64:
 "_crypto_digest_get_digest", referenced from:
 external::crypto_digest::get_256_bit_digest::ha3da46ac36a82461 in
 libexternal-8bb3f63f9ea96478.rlib(external-
 8bb3f63f9ea96478.3fgl34tvxe66etyo.rcgu.o)
 external::crypto_digest::get_512_bit_digest::h203eb3e5e9737026 in
 libexternal-8bb3f63f9ea96478.rlib(external-
 8bb3f63f9ea96478.3fgl34tvxe66etyo.rcgu.o)
 "_crypto_digest_add_bytes", referenced from:
 external::crypto_digest::CryptoDigest::add_bytes::hb2bf5f14939f0d38 in
 libexternal-8bb3f63f9ea96478.rlib(external-
 8bb3f63f9ea96478.3fgl34tvxe66etyo.rcgu.o)
 "_crypto_digest_new", referenced from:
 external::crypto_digest::CryptoDigest::new::h4cbcd63bf1a2cf1d in
 libexternal-8bb3f63f9ea96478.rlib(external-
 8bb3f63f9ea96478.3fgl34tvxe66etyo.rcgu.o)
 "_crypto_digest256_new", referenced from:
 external::crypto_digest::CryptoDigest::new::h4cbcd63bf1a2cf1d in
 libexternal-8bb3f63f9ea96478.rlib(external-
 8bb3f63f9ea96478.3fgl34tvxe66etyo.rcgu.o)
 "_crypto_digest512_new", referenced from:
 external::crypto_digest::CryptoDigest::new::h4cbcd63bf1a2cf1d in
 libexternal-8bb3f63f9ea96478.rlib(external-
 8bb3f63f9ea96478.3fgl34tvxe66etyo.rcgu.o)
   ld: symbol(s) not found for architecture x86_64
   clang: error: linker command failed with exit code 1 (use -v to
 see invocation)
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26378 [Core Tor/Tor]: Travis fails on rust tests (test_rust.sh)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26378: Travis fails on rust tests (test_rust.sh)
+
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust tor-tests  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by catalyst):

 Apparently rngs/jitter.rs in the `rand` crate won't build without `--cfg
 std`, and we set `default-features = false` for the `rand` crate in
 src/rust/crypto/Cargo.toml. Or it requires `default-features = false` for
 the `rand_core` crate as well for consistency.

 There seems to be a possible linker error now in our digest crate, which
 I'm trying to track down.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26250 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Firefox 60 ESR compilation fails intermittently with Rust 1.25

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26250: Firefox 60 ESR compilation fails intermittently with Rust 1.25
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, tbb-rbm,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This looks good to me. I merged it to master with commit
 `85db911cee972e286b358bdabc50e0796823654d`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26383 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move structures out of or.h

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26383: Move structures out of or.h
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 The branch is "split_or_h", and there's a pull request here:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/151

 This branch does not move all the structures yet, but I'd like to do this
 batch first, and then take care of the remainder.

 If possible, I'd like to take this right away in 0.3.5.

 Notes for the reviewer:
   * If possible, please separate stuff that I must fix before merging from
 stuff that would be ok to fix afterwards: if this branch sits unmerged for
 a long time, it will rot badly.
   * You might find the --color-moved option in the latest versions of git
 to be useful in verifying that certain commits are pure code movement.

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[tor-bugs] #26383 [Core Tor/Tor]: Move structures out of or.h

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26383: Move structures out of or.h
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can  |
--+
 As part of the big 0.3.5 refactoring, we want to split or.h into lots of
 little headers.  And as part of that, we want to get each structure into
 its own header.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26365 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport AltSvc/SOCKS patch to ESR60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26365: Backport AltSvc/SOCKS patch to ESR60
-+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by mahrud):

 I tested this with my experimental setup and it worked, except it didn't
 go quite smoothly. Here is what happened:
 1. enabled those flags.
 2. entered https://perfectoid.space/, which is supposed to return a .onion
 Alt-Svc.
 3. got CAPTCHA and solved it
 4. tab was stuck in loading state indefinitely
 5. entered the .onion address directly in a new tab
 6. both tabs loaded at the same time, perfectoid.space showing `alt-
 gcloud` and the .onion showing 400 Bad Request, both as expected.
 7. Afterwards I did not get any CAPTCHA's even after multiple refreshes
 (with alt-svc disabled, I would still get CAPTCHA's after every few
 refresh)

 My guess is that Tor Browser doesn't realize it needs to make a circuit to
 an onion service if the .onion name is in the Alt-Svc rather than the URL.


 Is there a ticket following HTTP/2 and Alt-Svc audits?

 I'm also curious why `network.http.spdy.enabled.http2draft` is still there
 and since the Alt-Svc logs are different from Firefox ESR60, I suspect the
 HTTP/2 and Alt-Svc code is outdated.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25940 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: Disable autocorrect on the consensus health relay info name/fingerprint entry box

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25940: Disable autocorrect on the consensus health relay info name/fingerprint
entry box
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by tom):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26130 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: Consensus health should say that the valid after time is in UTC

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26130: Consensus health should say that the valid after time is in UTC
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by tom):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26077 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: Do not write out footnotes if nothing is footnoted

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26077: Do not write out footnotes if nothing is footnoted
--+
 Reporter:  tom   |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by tom):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #10848 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor should be an HTTP proxy server

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10848: Tor should be an HTTP proxy server
--+--
 Reporter:  ben   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  http-connect  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)
 * keywords:   => http-connect


Comment:

 Closed (ack), but adding keyword for easier lookup of relevant tickets.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7349 [Core Tor/Tor]: Obfsbridges should be able to "disable" their ORPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7349: Obfsbridges should be able to "disable" their ORPort
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, SponsorZ, tor-pt,|  Actual Points:
  proposal-needed censorship, 035-proposed   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  10
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorM-can
-+-
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26240 [Core Tor/Tor]: Check Maxmind GeoIPLocation Database before distributing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26240: Check Maxmind GeoIPLocation Database before distributing
+--
 Reporter:  jvsg|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  GeoIP, Geoipdb  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Circuit display - Let's remove link from the Tor Button

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26321: Circuit display - Let's remove link from the Tor Button
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-circuit-display,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dmr):

 * cc: dmr (added)


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:2 arthuredelstein]:
 > I agree! We will need to re-implement the keyboard shortcut (if we want
 to keep it)

 Please keep the keyboard shortcut :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26378 [Core Tor/Tor]: Travis fails on rust tests (test_rust.sh)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26378: Travis fails on rust tests (test_rust.sh)
+
 Reporter:  asn |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust tor-tests  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by catalyst):

 A little more info
 {{{
Compiling crypto v0.0.1 (file:///Users/tlyu/src/tor/src/rust/crypto)
 error[E0277]: the trait bound `rngs::jitter::TimerError:
 std::error::Error` is not satisfied
-->
 
/Users/tlyu/src/tor/src/ext/rust/crates/rand-0.5.0-pre.2/src/rngs/jitter.rs:265:9
 |
 265 | Error::with_cause(ErrorKind::Unavailable,
 | ^ the trait `std::error::Error` is not
 implemented for `rngs::jitter::TimerError`
 |
 = note: required because of the requirements on the impl of
 `core::convert::From` for
 `alloc::boxed::Box`
 = note: required because of the requirements on the impl of
 `core::convert::Into>` for
 `rngs::jitter::TimerError`
 = note: required by `rand_core::Error::with_cause`
 }}}
 I'm guessing some dependency of the rand crate needs updating.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14209 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement new option SocksNamedPipe for Windows users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14209: Implement new option SocksNamedPipe for Windows users
-+-
 Reporter:  anon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client needs-libevent-patches|  Actual Points:
  hard win32 windows 035-proposed 036-proposed   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arma):

 * keywords:  tor-client needs-libevent-patches hard win32 windows =>
 tor-client needs-libevent-patches hard win32 windows 035-proposed
 036-proposed


Comment:

 Adding some keywords so this ticket can get triage attention.

 I think the simple version (socketpair?) would be fine in the shorter
 term.

 The goal here is that when the Firefox folks think about sandboxing
 networking on Windows, they don't say "oh, Tor doesn't support that, ok
 we'll skip that idea".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26354 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure only Linux users with SSE2 support are trying to use Tor Browser based on ESR60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26354: Make sure only Linux users with SSE2 support are trying to use Tor 
Browser
based on ESR60
-+--
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:4 cypherpunks]:
 > wintel 4ever
 Not sure what you mean, but Windows 7 doesn't require SSE2 as any other
 well-designed software, and it's a shame for open-source projects to suck
 more than windoze.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #14209 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement new option SocksNamedPipe for Windows users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14209: Implement new option SocksNamedPipe for Windows users
-+-
 Reporter:  anon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client needs-libevent-patches|  Actual Points:
  hard win32 windows |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 The Tor Browser folks, and the Mozilla folks, want Tor to be able to
 handle this feature, so they can move forward with network sandboxing in
 the browser side.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21378 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Archive bwauth bandwidth files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21378: Archive bwauth bandwidth files
+--
 Reporter:  tom |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth tor-dirauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by juga):

 So do you mean to add to `dir-spec.txt` something like?:

 "bandwidth-file-url"

 [At most once]

 The Bandwidth file URL used to obtain the measured bandwidth.
 These files SHOULD be available at:
 http:///tor/bwfiles/

 Since `Torflow` and `sbws` use different names for the bandwidth files, i
 guess it's fine to don't specify the name that file needs to have, but
 just have them available in a known directory/path?.

 Should all files be available or just the one used for the last vote or
 for some period of time?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26381 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:tor page does not load on first start in localized Windows bundle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26381: about:tor page does not load on first start in localized Windows bundle
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, ff60-esr, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Kathy and I can reproduce this on Windows (32-bit de build) but not on
 macOS (de build).

 It almost seems like an e10s problem, but I am not sure why it would be
 Windows-specific.

 We also see both the Firefox "spoof language?" prompt as well as the
 Torbutton one. Is there already a ticket open for that issue?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26355 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure only Windows users on Windows7+ are trying to use Tor Browser based on ESR60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26355: Make sure only Windows users on Windows7+ are trying to use Tor Browser
based on ESR60
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Replying to [comment:4 cypherpunks]:
 > Dropping support can't be an enhancement, it's a shame of Mozilla corp.
 Yeah let's keep supporting the meme of security that is WinXP.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26175 [Applications/GetTor]: Support Experimental Tor Browser for Github Provider

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26175: Support Experimental Tor Browser for Github Provider
-+-
 Reporter:  iry  |  Owner:  ilv
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/GetTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by adrelanos):

 * cc: adrelanos@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21377 [Core Tor/Tor]: DirAuths should expose bwauth bandwidth files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21377: DirAuths should expose bwauth bandwidth files
+--
 Reporter:  tom |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth metrics tor-bwauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by juga):

 My mistake, didn't re-read the title of the ticket.
 No, sbws does not fix this.

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[tor-bugs] #26382 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create support.tpo on the www rotation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26382: Please create support.tpo on the www rotation
-+-
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Can you create support.torproject.org in the www rotation? We already have
 support-staging.torproject.org it needs to be the same.

 Thanks!!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23247 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different padlock states for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23247: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about 
different
padlock states for .onion services
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tor-hs, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 r=mcs
 This looks good to me now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21039 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor and simplify guard code of circuit_send_next_onion_skin()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21039: Refactor and simplify guard code of circuit_send_next_onion_skin()
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-guard, refactor, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180401,|
  034-removed-20180502   |
Parent ID:  #24986   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-

Comment (by jvsg):

 Hi Ordex, the link you shared is no longer valid.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23639 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use "sandboxed-tor-browser" for yawning's sandbox we ship

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23639: Use "sandboxed-tor-browser" for yawning's sandbox we ship
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 We stop shipping sandboxed-tor-browser, so WONTFIX.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23702 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fix the sandbox intermediate filename

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23702: Fix the sandbox intermediate filename
---+-
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201710  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 We stop shipping sandboxed-tor-browser, thus WONTFIX.

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[tor-bugs] #26381 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:tor page does not load on first start in localized Windows bundle

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26381: about:tor page does not load on first start in localized Windows bundle
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,
 Severity:  Normal   |  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 When testing the Windows nightly builds I got greeted with an error page
 on first start
 {{{
  
 ^
 }}}
 This happened with a 32bit de bundle and I can't reproduce this on Linux.
 Moreover if I open `about:tor` in a new tab it works. From the second
 start on the `about:tor` page is shown as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26058 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Revert fix for #18743

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26058: Revert fix for #18743
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, ff60-esr, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-torbutton, ff60-esr => tbb-torbutton, ff60-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201806R


Comment:

 We are getting errors in the console that look like
 {{{
 [06-15 12:22:32] Torbutton WARN: Error updating the Sync UI: TypeError:
 document.getElementById(...) is null
 }}}
 `bug_26058`
 
(https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/torbutton.git/commit/?h=bug_26058=72aacbd7178d50abf2c95c43ce907e65b95ddb1c),
 which is reverting our fix for #18743, should fix that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25540 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Stop building and distributing sandboxed-tor-browser binaries.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25540: Stop building and distributing sandboxed-tor-browser binaries.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff60-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 I created #26380 for removing it from the download page.

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[tor-bugs] #26380 [Webpages/Website]: Remove tor browser sandbox from the download page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26380: Remove tor browser sandbox from the download page
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201806
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 In #25540 we stop building and distributing sandboxed-tor-browser
 binaries.

 We should remove it from the Tor Browser download page.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25540 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Stop building and distributing sandboxed-tor-browser binaries.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25540: Stop building and distributing sandboxed-tor-browser binaries.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff60-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This looks good to me. I pushed it to master as commit
 `dc355882e235178d0a1889a7d96c5721faad2716`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26355 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure only Windows users on Windows7+ are trying to use Tor Browser based on ESR60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26355: Make sure only Windows users on Windows7+ are trying to use Tor Browser
based on ESR60
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * type:  enhancement => task


Comment:

 Dropping support can't be an enhancement, it's a shame of Mozilla corp.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26379 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rend-spec isn't clear about role of first layer of descriptor encryption

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26379: Rend-spec isn't clear about role of first layer of descriptor encryption
--+
 Reporter:  sjmurdoch |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 We should also update sections 2.5.1.1 and 2.5.2.1., which describe how
 the descriptor is encrypted. The encryption uses a subcredential, which is
 derived from a credential, which is derived from the public-identity-key,
 which isn't known to the HSDir.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26377 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fresh Tor Browser 7.5.5 (2018-06-09) for macOS install crashes on start

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26377: Fresh Tor Browser 7.5.5 (2018-06-09) for macOS install crashes on start
--+---
 Reporter:  Z3R0C00l  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  Crash on start => tbb-crash
 * priority:  Low => High
 * status:  new => needs_information
 * severity:  Blocker => Major
 * cc: mcs, brade (added)


Comment:

 Do you get a crash report you could post? When does it crash? Do you see a
 window showing up or is it crashing even earlier?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25540 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Stop building and distributing sandboxed-tor-browser binaries.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25540: Stop building and distributing sandboxed-tor-browser binaries.
-+-
 Reporter:  yawning  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff60-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806 => tbb-rbm, ff60-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201806R


Comment:

 `bug_25540` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_25540=dc355882e235178d0a1889a7d96c5721faad2716)
 in my public `tor-browser-build` repository has a fix for review. We need
 to create an additional ticket for removing sandboxed-tor-browser from the
 download page.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26231 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Addressing trac performance issues

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26231: Addressing trac performance issues
--+-
 Reporter:  hiro  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by hiro):

 I have been implementing a few configuration options as described in:
 https://trac.edgewall.org/wiki/TracPerformance

 More specifically I have set:
 - max_daysback: 30 (It was set to 90 days before and this is known to
 cause issues with trac installation with 'some history' like ours)
 - use_chunked_encoding: true

 If this doesn't solve our issue maybe it is time to upgrade our hardware
 or install a loadbalancing solution like HAproxy.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26203 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Adapt tor-browser-build firefox and tor-browser project for ESR 60 Windows build

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26203: Adapt tor-browser-build firefox and tor-browser project for ESR 60 
Windows
build
-+--
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 We are done here, thanks all!

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[tor-bugs] #26379 [Core Tor/Tor]: Rend-spec isn't clear about role of first layer of descriptor encryption

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26379: Rend-spec isn't clear about role of first layer of descriptor encryption
--+
 Reporter:  sjmurdoch |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 In `[HS-DESC-FIRST-LAYER]` of `rend-spec-v3.txt` it says:
   The first layer of HS descriptor encryption is designed to protect
   descriptor confidentiality against entities who don't know the blinded
   public key of the hidden service.

 However the HSDir does know the blinded public key, as that's part of the
 `descriptor-signing-key-cert` described in `[DESC-OUTER]`. Should the
 above quote instead be "...against entities who don't know the ''public
 identity master key'' of the hidden service"

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8494 [Core Tor/Tor]: Does MaxAdvertisedBandwidth do anything useful and if not, can we deprecate it?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8494: Does MaxAdvertisedBandwidth do anything useful and if not, can we 
deprecate
it?
-+-
 Reporter:  alphawolf|  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, consensus, bandwidth,  |  Actual Points:
  MaxAdvertisedBandwidth tor-relay tor-dirauth   |
  needs-insight tor-bwauth   |
Parent ID:  #25960   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 consensus, bandwidth, MaxAdvertisedBandwidth tor-relay tor-dirauth
 needs-insight tor-bwauth
 =>
 tor-spec, consensus, bandwidth, MaxAdvertisedBandwidth tor-relay tor-
 dirauth needs-insight tor-bwauth


Comment:

 The sbws ticket is fixed, and we won't fix torflow.

 Now we need to update the bandwidth file spec to mention
 MaxAdvertisedBandwidth.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21378 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Archive bwauth bandwidth files (was: Archive bwauth votes)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21378: Archive bwauth bandwidth files
+--
 Reporter:  tom |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth tor-dirauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:2 juga]:
 > As commented in
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21377#comment:4
 >
 > > This is now fixed in sbws, though is still not being use by any
 !DirAuth.
 > > It is not planned to add this toTorflow.
 >
 > We can correlate the votes with the `Torflow` bandwidth measurement
 files by the timestamp, right?, so i wonder if it would still be possible
 to archive the files produced by all the bwauths that are running
 `Torflow`.
 >
 > Another more exotic idea (probably needs other ticket if it makes sense)
 is to collect the data from the testnet, since we have DirAuths running
 sbws there. Would this require lot of extra work?

 This ticket is about archiving the entire v3bw file from each directory
 authority.
 It's not enough to archive the files from the testnet.

 We could implement this ticket by making the bandwidth file part of the
 directory protocol. We have a spec for the bandwidth file format, so all
 we need to do is specify the URL for the file in torspec, and implement it
 in the code.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21377 [Core Tor/Tor]: DirAuths should expose bwauth bandwidth files (was: DirAuths should expose bwauth votes)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21377: DirAuths should expose bwauth bandwidth files
+--
 Reporter:  tom |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth metrics tor-bwauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:4 juga]:
 > This is now fixed in `sbws`, though is still not being use by any
 DirAuth.
 >
 > It is not planned to add this to `Torflow`.

 This ticket is about archiving the entire v3bw file, not just the headers.

 Can you explain how this is fixed in sbws?

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[tor-bugs] #26378 [Core Tor/Tor]: Travis fails on rust tests (test_rust.sh)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26378: Travis fails on rust tests (test_rust.sh)
--+
 Reporter:  asn   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  rust tor-tests
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 The latest travis builds fail on the rust tests after #26258 got merged (i
 guess). Here are some fails:

 {{{
   --> external/crypto_digest.rs:74:1
|
 74 | const N_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS: usize = DIGEST_SHA3_512 as usize + 1;
| 
|
= note: #[warn(dead_code)] on by default

 warning: type alias is never used: `smartlist_t`
--> external/crypto_digest.rs:120:1
 |
 120 | type smartlist_t = Stringlist;
 | ^^

 warning: constant item is never used: `N_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS`
   --> external/crypto_digest.rs:74:1
|
 74 | const N_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS: usize = DIGEST_SHA3_512 as usize + 1;
| 
|
= note: #[warn(dead_code)] on by default

 warning: type alias is never used: `smartlist_t`
--> external/crypto_digest.rs:120:1
 |
 120 | type smartlist_t = Stringlist;
 | ^^

 Finished dev [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 3.39 secs
  Running /home/travis/build/torproject/tor/tor-0.3.4.2-alpha-
 dev/_build/src/rust/target/debug/deps/external-99409f0e61b6d8c2
 }}}

 See https://api.travis-ci.org/v3/job/392350333/log.txt etc.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26377 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fresh Tor Browser 7.5.5 (2018-06-09) for macOS install crashes on start

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26377: Fresh Tor Browser 7.5.5 (2018-06-09) for macOS install crashes on start
--+--
 Reporter:  Z3R0C00l  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Crash on start|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26377 [- Select a component]: Fresh Tor Browser 7.5.5 (2018-06-09) for macOS install crashes on start

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26377: Fresh Tor Browser 7.5.5 (2018-06-09) for macOS install crashes on start
--+
 Reporter:  Z3R0C00l  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Crash on start|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 #26350 maybe

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23231 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error in STL wrappers when building Firefox 64-bit for Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23231: Error in STL wrappers when building Firefox 64-bit for Windows
-+--
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201806R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26203   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor4
-+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This looks good to me. I merged it to master with commit
 `5e72f5077d7c974e30c9f48f2c554ded6e8358d1`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #3723 [Core Tor/Tor]: Report version of bwscanners in votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3723: Report version of bwscanners in votes
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25925| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 I won't have time to review this ticket until next week, I'm still
 catching up.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26222 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a bandwidth-file line to votes in dir-spec.txt

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26222: Add a bandwidth-file line to votes in dir-spec.txt
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, tor-bwauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #3723 | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 The typo was fixed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8494 [Core Tor/Tor]: Does MaxAdvertisedBandwidth do anything useful and if not, can we deprecate it?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8494: Does MaxAdvertisedBandwidth do anything useful and if not, can we 
deprecate
it?
-+-
 Reporter:  alphawolf|  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consensus, bandwidth,|  Actual Points:
  MaxAdvertisedBandwidth tor-relay tor-dirauth   |
  needs-insight tor-bwauth   |
Parent ID:  #25960   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by juga):

 * cc: juga (added)
 * keywords:
 consensus, bandwidth, MaxAdvertisedBandwidth tor-relay tor-dirauth
 needs-insight
 =>
 consensus, bandwidth, MaxAdvertisedBandwidth tor-relay tor-dirauth
 needs-insight tor-bwauth


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[tor-bugs] #26377 [- Select a component]: Fresh Tor Browser 7.5.5 (2018-06-09) for macOS install crashes on start

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26377: Fresh Tor Browser 7.5.5 (2018-06-09) for macOS install crashes on start
--+
 Reporter:  Z3R0C00l  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   |   Keywords:  Crash on start
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Hi Folks,

 Running macOS 10.13.6 **Beta**, just thought "Hey I'll give this whole Tor
 Browser thing a shot" (Never really used it) and see what goes. So, 1
 download and install later, I start Tor Browser but it immediately crashes
 (every time).

 When clicking the copy log to clipboard button, it states that 0 log
 messages where copied, so I even can't show you something...

 Due to macOS beta? Or am I missing something here?

 Cheerios,
 Fabrizio

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24250 [Core Tor/Tor]: In a private network some relays advertise zero bandwidth-observed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24250: In a private network some relays advertise zero bandwidth-observed
-+-
 Reporter:  Sebastian|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport, 031-backport,  |  Actual Points:
  032-backport, 033-backport,|
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #25925   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 I think you just answered your own question in #22453:

 > If i understand it correctly, the self measured bandwidth
 (bandwidthcapacity) is obtained by rep_hist_bandwidth_assess [2].
 > [2] ​https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/or/rephist.c#n1207

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22453 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relays should regularly do a larger bandwidth self-test

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22453: Relays should regularly do a larger bandwidth self-test
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328, tor-bwauth   |
Parent ID:  #25925   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:16 juga]:
 > Diving into the code i found that the function where the relay bandwidth
 is compared with `options->AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee` is in
 `set_routerstatus_from_routerinfo` [0].

 You should make the default value of AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee into a
 #define, and use it when you work out how much data to send during a relay
 self-test.

 > To obtain the relay bandwidth, that function calls
 `dirserv_get_credible_bandwidth_kb` [1] which seems to be using either the
 measured bandwidth (by bwauths) or the self advertised bandwidth, but not
 any self measured bandwidth.

 You should not change the directory authority code, because this ticket is
 about relay self-tests.

 > If i understand it correctly, the self measured bandwidth
 (`bandwidthcapacity`) is obtained by `rep_hist_bandwidth_assess` [2].
 >
 > The function that is making use of the circuits to test the bandwidth is
 `router_perform_bandwidth_test` [3] but i don't see how it is storing the
 results or how is related with the previous.
 >
 > So, should `dirserv_get_credible_bandwidth_kb` make use of the bandwidth
 calculated by self tests?, which are the self tests here to be used?

 When a relay performs a bandwidth self-test, the bandwidth usage from the
 self-test is recorded in the bandwidth history. Then every 24 hours, the
 relay puts the highest bandwidth from its history in its descriptor as the
 observed bandwidth. Then torflow reads the descriptor, and uses the
 observed bandwidth to calculate the consensus weight.

 > Where in the code should go the `times out after 30-60`?

 When you start the test, schedule a timer for 30-60 seconds that cancels
 the test of it is still going.

 > and the `12-24 hours, at random`?

 When the relay completes a bandwidth self-test, you should create a timer
 that changes the bandwidth self-test flag from "completed" to "do a self-
 test" in 12-24 hours. If the self-test times out, you should schedule the
 next test in 1-2 hours.

 > [0] https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/or/dirserv.c#n2058
 > [1] https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/or/dirserv.c#n1780
 > [2] https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/or/rephist.c#n1207
 > [3] https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/or/router.c#n1626

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26304 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update zlib to latest version (currently 1.2.11)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26304: Update zlib to latest version (currently 1.2.11)
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201806R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This looks good to me. I pushed it to master as commit
 `b9a2dfe610121f88be74d8569ee2b9f904132670`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21377 [Core Tor/Tor]: DirAuths should expose bwauth votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21377: DirAuths should expose bwauth votes
+--
 Reporter:  tom |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth metrics tor-bwauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by juga):

 * cc: teor (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24805 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Update fallback whitelist and blacklist in late 2018

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24805: Update fallback whitelist and blacklist in late 2018
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, 034-triage-20180328,   |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #24786   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 An operator wants their relay removed from the whitelist:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2018-June/013207.html

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21378 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Archive bwauth votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21378: Archive bwauth votes
+--
 Reporter:  tom |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth tor-dirauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by juga):

 * cc: teor (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26303 [Core Tor/Tor]: IPv6-Flagging of Relay not accurate

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26303: IPv6-Flagging of Relay not accurate
---+---
 Reporter:  ruebezahl  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.6
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6 035-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24403 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  reopened => needs_information
 * component:  Core Tor/DirAuth => Core Tor/Tor
 * parent:   => #24403


Comment:

 We don't have enough information to diagnose this issue.
 It could be a bug in Core Tor, metrics, or the relay's IPv6 connectivity.

 In most cases that we investigate, the problem is on the relay, or the
 relays network. (It's more likely that one operator has made a mistake,
 than 6 directory authorities.)
 In some cases, Onionoo is outdated.

 If it is a bug in Tor, it could be #24864, where some directory
 authorities take a while to vote on new descriptors. We added #24862 to
 consensus health to diagnose that issue. So if it happens again, please
 tell us the descriptor timestamp from consensus health, and the descriptor
 timestamp from the relay itself:
 http://217.115.10.131/tor/server/authority

 Ultimately, we will resolve this issue (or make it much easier to
 diagnose) by making relays check their own IPv6 addresses in #24403.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26376 [Core Tor/Tor]: add cross compiling docs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26376: add cross compiling docs
--+--
 Reporter:  Hello71   |  Owner:  Hello71
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by rl1987):

 +1.

 There's also: https://github.com/ahf/tor-win32

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25886 [Core Tor/Tor]: Have frac_nodes_with_descriptors() take and use for_direct_connect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25886: Have frac_nodes_with_descriptors() take and use for_direct_connect
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridge-client, tor-guard,|  Actual Points:
  bootstrap  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:11 neel]:
 > I have made the changes in a new GitHub PR:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/145
 >
 > This sets `f_guard` to 1.0 on bridges by checking if `UseBridges` is set
 and if the original `f_guard` is greater than 0 in
 `compute_frac_paths_available()`. I do understand that this may not be a
 perfect solution, and may also be rejected, but it is an alternative (that
 I thought of) to putting a ugly hack in `frac_nodes_with_descriptors()`
 that dgoulet had mentioned.

 We can't check if f_guard is non-zero, because most bridges don't have the
 guard flag.

 > I suggest we make f_guard = 1.0 in compute_frac_paths_available() if we
 are using bridges, and have at least one bridge with ~~the preferred~~ a
 full descriptor.

 Instead, we need to check the number of bridges with full descriptors.
 There is an existing function in bridges.h that does this check.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26304 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update zlib to latest version (currently 1.2.11)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26304: Update zlib to latest version (currently 1.2.11)
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201806R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm => tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201806R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 See `bug_26304` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_26304=b9a2dfe610121f88be74d8569ee2b9f904132670)
 for a version bump for review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26250 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Firefox 60 ESR compilation fails intermittently with Rust 1.25

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26250: Firefox 60 ESR compilation fails intermittently with Rust 1.25
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, tbb-rbm,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 `bug_26250_v5` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_26250_v5=61aac87c00ca7a1da9a1be9f2d181c7841769d4c)
 is what we want (I forgot the Linux bits in the previous branch).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24197 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Building Windows 64 firefox with the sandbox enabled fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24197: Building Windows 64 firefox with the sandbox enabled fails
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen201805,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:15 tom]:
 > Mozilla bug: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1461421

 We cherry-picked the proposed fix (commit
 a64a7c2de648ad87f392e407a92589515a72b0ef on `tor-browser-60.0.1esr-8.0-1)
 and are good for now. We'll backport later on the fix that actually
 landed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26250 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Firefox 60 ESR compilation fails intermittently with Rust 1.25

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26250: Firefox 60 ESR compilation fails intermittently with Rust 1.25
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, tbb-rbm,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201806R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Okay, I've rebased my patch against `master` and updated neersighted's
 patch (the original patch applies cleanly now as it was against 1.26.1
 code). `bug_26250_v4` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_26250_v4=c62728741e6ebc6df4190b7c00d78b34a7789c2d)
 has all the changes for review.

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