Re: [tor-bugs] #26367 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider removing tor2web mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26367: Consider removing tor2web mode
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor2web, 035-roadmap-master, tor-|  Actual Points:
  hs, 035-triaged-in-20180711|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready
 * reviewer:   => teor


Comment:

 Ok, looks good to me, let's get it merged,
 I opened #26788 for the unrelated make distcheck error.

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[tor-bugs] #26788 [Core Tor/Tor]: make distcheck sometimes leaves the core directory behind

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26788: make distcheck sometimes leaves the core directory behind
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  035-must, regression, tor-build
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 For example, see:
 https://travis-ci.org/torproject/tor/jobs/403115782

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26540 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Enabling pdfjs disableRange option prevents pdfs from loading

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26540: Enabling pdfjs disableRange option prevents pdfs from loading
+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr   |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201807  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "0001-Bug-26450-Enabling-pdfjs-disableRange-option-prevent
 (tor-browser).patch" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26540 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Enabling pdfjs disableRange option prevents pdfs from loading

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26540: Enabling pdfjs disableRange option prevents pdfs from loading
+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr   |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201807  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * Attachment "0001-Bug-26450-Enabling-pdfjs-disableRange-option-
 prevent(torbutton).patch" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26540 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Enabling pdfjs disableRange option prevents pdfs from loading

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26540: Enabling pdfjs disableRange option prevents pdfs from loading
-+-
 Reporter:  pospeselr|  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201807R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201807 => ff60-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201807R
 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 Two patches, one for tor-browser and one for torbutton.

 The patches take an approach of 'smuggling' the first party domain on the
 existing nsIPrivateBrowsingChannel used by XMLHttpRequest.  Basically, the
 first-party domain is known when the range-based request is created, but
 since it's created from within chrome js code, it gets the System
 Principal which throws out all that info.  So, in pdfjs we set the
 firstPartyDomain on the channel object which is then read by torbutton.
 If torbutton fails to find a firstPartyDomain in the usual way from the
 OriginAttributes, it will try to read it off of the channel directly.

 With this smuggling hack in place, we should be able to fix any other
 'XMLHttpRequest-created-in-System-Principal' first-party isolation issues
 we come across.

 Currently doing an RBM build with the patches applied just to make sure it
 all works as expected without hacks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22220 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Move cell encoding/decoding out of hs_intropoint.c to hs_cell.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#0: hs: Move cell encoding/decoding out of hs_intropoint.c to hs_cell.c
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, prop224-extra   |  Actual Points:
  refactor code-movement |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22220 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Move cell encoding/decoding out of hs_intropoint.c to hs_cell.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#0: hs: Move cell encoding/decoding out of hs_intropoint.c to hs_cell.c
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, prop224-extra   |  Actual Points:
  refactor code-movement |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-can
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * cc: neel@… (removed)
 * owner:  neel => (none)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #20805 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Circuit display does not honor or use the UI font.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20805: Circuit display does not honor or use the UI font.
--+---
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-circuit-display  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Fixed by #24309.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26321 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Circuit display - Let's remove link from the Tor Button

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26321: Circuit display - Let's remove link from the Tor Button
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-circuit-display,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201807R, ff60-esr|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-circuit-display, TorBrowserTeam201807R =>
 tbb-torbutton, tbb-circuit-display, TorBrowserTeam201807R, ff60-esr


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26519 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Avoid Firefox icons in ESR60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26519: Avoid Firefox icons in ESR60
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201807R, ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201807R => TorBrowserTeam201807R, ff60-esr


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26237 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Back and Forward button should be on the left side of the toolbar

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26237: Back and Forward button should be on the left side of the toolbar
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201807R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201807 => ff60-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201807R
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Here's a revised version without the home button (I'd suggest we consider
 adding back a home button in the next iteration).

 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commit/26237+1

 [[Image(toolbar_26237+1.png)]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26237 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Back and Forward button should be on the left side of the toolbar

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26237: Back and Forward button should be on the left side of the toolbar
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201807  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * Attachment "toolbar_26237+1.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18598 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure speech recognition is disabled by default (WebSpeech API)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18598: Make sure speech recognition is disabled by default (WebSpeech API)
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:  ff60-esr => tbb-fingerprinting
 * priority:  High => Medium


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18598 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure speech recognition is disabled by default (WebSpeech API)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18598: Make sure speech recognition is disabled by default (WebSpeech API)
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 In https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js?h=tor-
 browser-60.1.0esr-8.0-1, we set `media.webspeech.synth.enabled` to false
 (from #10283). So I think we should leave this as is, and how to enable
 speech synthesis without allowing fingerprinting will require more
 detailed study.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18598 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure speech recognition is disabled by default (WebSpeech API)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18598: Make sure speech recognition is disabled by default (WebSpeech API)
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 In Firefox 60ESR,

 * `media.webspeech.synth.enabled` is `true`
 * `media.webspeech.recognition.enable` is `false`.

 We'll need to investigate whether the synth should be false as well.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #15563, #16339, #16693, #22166, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #15563, #16339, #16693, #22166, #23362, #26345 by 
arthuredelstein:


Comment:
Version 68 of Firefox will be the next ESR.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16339 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure the ImageCapture API is not leaking information (camera availability)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16339: Make sure the ImageCapture API is not leaking information (camera
availability)
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, ff67-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  None
--+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, ff60-esr => tbb-fingerprinting, ff67-esr


Comment:

 `dom.imagecapture.enabled` is still disabled in ESR60
 https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 esr60/source/modules/libpref/init/all.js#5276

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26765 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Tor Browser indicator where Firefox PB indicator is

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26765: Add Tor Browser indicator where Firefox PB indicator is
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, ff60-esr,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201807   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * cc: antonela (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26736 [Core Tor/sbws]: Stop requiring me to change the sbws version in more than one place

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26736: Stop requiring me to change the sbws version in more than one place
---+-
 Reporter:  pastly |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws 1.0 (MVP nice)
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/pastly/simple-bw-scanner/pull/234

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26709 [Core Tor/Tor]: Onion V3 addresses not always working

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26709: Onion V3 addresses not always working
---+---
 Reporter:  time_attacker  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  onion, tor-hs  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by time_attacker):

 Now I have logs (just needed to set 'AvoidDiskWrites 0') and will provide
 them here if the patch will not help.

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[tor-bugs] #26787 [Core Tor/Tor]: Core file left on travis hardened rust builld

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26787: Core file left on travis hardened rust builld
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  travis
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 https://travis-ci.org/torproject/tor/jobs/403730172

 It looks like all the tests pass, the only problem I can see is the
 mysterious core left over at the end. I'm unable to get this to happen on
 my system.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26492 [Core Tor/Tor]: code style improvements for src/rust/protover/ffi.rs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26492: code style improvements for src/rust/protover/ffi.rs
-+
 Reporter:  frewsxcv |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  035-triaged-in-20180711  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 lgtm; merged this to master.  Thanks frewscxv, and thanks catalyst!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26786 [Metrics/CollecTor]: CollecTor does not know about Serge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26786: CollecTor does not know about Serge
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by irl):

 * cc: metrics-team (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26786 [Metrics/CollecTor]: CollecTor does not know about Serge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26786: CollecTor does not know about Serge
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


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[tor-bugs] #26786 [Metrics/CollecTor]: CollecTor does not know about Serge

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26786: CollecTor does not know about Serge
---+--
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 Descriptor tarballs are now synced to colchicifolium.

 {{{
 2018-07-13 22:09:00,408 WARN o.t.c.b.BridgeSnapshotReader:125 Did not
 recognize the bridge authority that generated from-
 serge-2018-07-13T093706Z.tar.gz.  Skipping.
 }}}

 The following is required to make it go:

 {{{
 diff --git
 
a/src/main/java/org/torproject/metrics/collector/bridgedescs/BridgeSnapshotReader.java
 
b/src/main/java/org/torproject/metrics/collector/bridgedescs/BridgeSnapshotReader.java
 index 1a58d84..85c593d 100644
 ---
 
a/src/main/java/org/torproject/metrics/collector/bridgedescs/BridgeSnapshotReader.java
 +++
 
b/src/main/java/org/torproject/metrics/collector/bridgedescs/BridgeSnapshotReader.java
 @@ -121,6 +121,10 @@ public class BridgeSnapshotReader {
authorityFingerprint =
"1D8F3A91C37C5D1C4C19B1AD1D0CFBE8BF72D8E1";
break;
 +case "from-serge-":
 +  authorityFingerprint =
 +  "BA44A889E64B93FAA2B114E02C2A279A8555C533";
 +  break;
  default:
logger.warn("Did not recognize the bridge authority
 that "
+ "generated " + fn + ".  Skipping.");
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26784 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate if Orfox is shipping with active tracker

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26784: Investigate if Orfox is shipping with active tracker
--+---
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/reports/11967/ has an interesting
 note:
 {{{
 Here is the list of trackers signatures found by static analysis in this
 APK.
 This is not a proof of activity of these trackers. The application could
 contain
 tracker(s) we do not know yet.
 }}}

 So I do wonder if we have some dead/unreachable code which contains
 whatever signature they're searching. Maybe we can contact them and
 they'll tell us what we missed, too.

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[tor-bugs] #26785 [Core Tor/Tor]: older gccs don't accept -Wunused-const-variable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26785: older gccs don't accept -Wunused-const-variable
-+-
 Reporter:   |  Owner:  (none)
  catalyst   |
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.2.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.11
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  compression, portability,
 Severity:  Normal   |  regression?, zstd
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 In src/common/compress_zstd.c, we use the `DISABLE_GCC_WARNING()` macro to
 disable the `-Wunused-const-variable` warning.  Some versions of gcc don't
 recognize that warning option, so they will warn about incorrect pragma
 usage.

 {{{
 src/common/compress_zstd.c:29:1: warning: unknown option after ‘#pragma
 GCC diagnostic’ kind [-Wpragmas]
  DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(unused-const-variable)
  ^
 }}}

 We should probably define a macro if `-Wunused-const-variable` is
 supported by gcc and update the preprocessor conditional in
 compress_zstd.c
 {{{
 #ifdef HAVE_ZSTD
 DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(unused-const-variable)
 }}}
 to use it.

 Reported on IRC.

 Confirmed on Xenial with gcc 5.4.0-6ubuntu1~16.04.10 and libzstd1-dev
 1.3.1+dfsg-1~ubuntu0.16.04.1.  Travis is still on Trusty so doesn't have a
 libzstd-dev.

 This might be a regression on platforms with libzstd but an older gcc.

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[tor-bugs] #26784 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate if Orfox is shipping with active tracker

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26784: Investigate if Orfox is shipping with active tracker
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 {{{
 I just came across an interesting observation: According to the tool
 Exodus, Orfox (Tor browser for Android) contains 4 trackers:

 - Adjust
 - Google Ads
 - Google DoubleClick
 - Google Firebase Analytics

 https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/reports/11967/
 }}}
 https://mastodon.at/@infosechandbook/100367643736030856

 Confirm where these are and why they aren't excluded at compile-time. Is
 it worth adding additional built-time logic for excluding this code? Is
 there more we should do? etc.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26736 [Core Tor/sbws]: Stop requiring me to change the sbws version in more than one place

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26736: Stop requiring me to change the sbws version in more than one place
---+-
 Reporter:  pastly |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws 1.0 (MVP nice)
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => juga


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[tor-bugs] #26783 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Snowflake statistics appear to be broken from something plus mid-June

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26783: Snowflake statistics appear to be broken from something plus mid-June
-+
 Reporter:  TracTorProjectSucksRightNow  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-bridge-
 transport.html?start=2018-04-14=2018-07-13=snowflake

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20700 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement standard client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20700: prop224: Implement standard client authorization
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, 035-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  master, 035-triaged-in-20180711|
Parent ID:  #25955   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Notes:
   * Apparently we have two things called Appendix E in `rend-spec-v3.txt`
 now.  I don't think this is new with this patch, but let's fix that.
   * When you list "./authorized_clients/alice", etc in appendix F, do you
 intend to specify that this list has to be inside the service directory?
 I ask because if you're doing this, I don't think it makes sense to list
 them all separately in the torrc, and list the directory separately as
 well.
   * Do we want to allow multiple keys per file?
   * I'd suggest renaming all the client options so that they don't start
 with "HiddenService": It makes things much easier if only our service-side
 options start with "HiddenService".  How about ClientOnionAuth or
 something?
   * We should say what happens if Tor encounters an unrecognized auth-
 type, user name, or onion service name in one of these files.  I say it
 should ignore that key.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26398 [Core Tor/Tor]: feature gate testing C code from Rust for now

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26398: feature gate testing C code from Rust for now
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect| Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor:
  |  0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, tor-test, fast-fix, tor-ci  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
  |  Sponsor8-can
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:6 isis]:
 > Looking at the current status of #25386 it seems there's still going to
 be linker issues, particularly from doctests, for the time being until
 everything has rustc 1.27 stable (when the `-C` option [https://github.com
 /rust-
 lang/rust/pull/49956/commits/1a0d7a8207907e2459db8df72a8f604cdcc8285f was
 added] to rustdoc). But also, feel free to disagree.
 >
 > It might be good to have a configurable way to disable this stuff until
 all the issues are resolved, that way teor and I can continue writing
 tests as we would normally for now.  In the future, it also gives us an
 easier way to enable running the tests all the time, when we remove C code
 (e.g. if I were to write a sha2 or keccak implementation and we used that
 instead of the C code).
 After thinking about the current situation some more, I think we want to
 adopt something  like this approach.  Right now there is a restricted set
 of Rust testing configurations that we run in Travis, instead of the more
 comprehensive set that we used to do.  Basically, on master, none of the
 older Travis subjobs with Rust enabled pass tests because of linker
 problems with `--enable-fragile-hardening`.

 I put this back in "needs_review" because I want to make sure we do
 something reasonable with the doctests in the crypto crate, and a few
 potentially conflicting changes to Rust tests have happened on master
 since the original pull request.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24805 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Update fallback whitelist and blacklist in late 2018

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24805: Update fallback whitelist and blacklist in late 2018
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, 034-triage-20180328,   |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328, 035-removed-20180711 |
Parent ID:  #24786   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by phoul):

 https://github.com/Phoul/tor/commit/855feab70d35dd5093aae1f27d6cf19ee6cb3338
 3 more fallback directory mirrors added, a number of operators have been
 contacted to see if they would like any others from their relay families
 added.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26492 [Core Tor/Tor]: code style improvements for src/rust/protover/ffi.rs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26492: code style improvements for src/rust/protover/ffi.rs
-+
 Reporter:  frewsxcv |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very Low |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-triaged-in-20180711  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_revision => merge_ready


Comment:

 Pushed a changes file to the pull request branch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20700 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement standard client authorization

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20700: prop224: Implement standard client authorization
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, 035-roadmap-|  Actual Points:
  master, 035-triaged-in-20180711|
Parent ID:  #25955   | Points:  3
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * cc: nickm (added)


Comment:

 Latest spec branch that asn/dgoulet/haxxpop agree on: `asn/ticket20700_01`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26469 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor on SunOS: [err] Error from libevent: evport.c:425: Assertion evpd->ed_pending[i] == fd failed in evport_del

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26469: tor on SunOS: [err] Error from libevent: evport.c:425: Assertion
evpd->ed_pending[i] == fd failed in evport_del
-+-
 Reporter:  ruebezahl|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.7
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  libevent crash 033-backport  |  Actual Points:
  034-proposed   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ruebezahl):

 fyi: upgrade to to 0.3.3.8 did not change the behaviour

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26779 [Core Tor/Tor]: atomic_init() and friends failing on clang

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26779: atomic_init() and friends failing on clang
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  jenkins, regression, 032-backport,   |  Actual Points:
  033-backport, 034-backport, 035-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by weasel):

 I filed https://bugs.debian.org/903709

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[tor-bugs] #26782 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Translation/Localization Support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26782: TBA: Translation/Localization Support
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We need a method for supporting translations in TBA. I don't have a good
 answer for this, so we should investigate our options and compare/contrast
 the usefulness of each.

 Emma pointed me at [[https://fastlane.tools/|Fastlane]] which seems like a
 nice option and it will handle integrating translations and taking
 screenshots using them - but is seems like translations isn't a core
 feature of that project. Maybe it's good enough?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26779 [Core Tor/Tor]: atomic_init() and friends failing on clang

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26779: atomic_init() and friends failing on clang
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  jenkins, regression, 032-backport,   |  Actual Points:
  033-backport, 034-backport, 035-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Leading theory after more investigation with Weasel: clang is looking at
 the version of stdatomic.h in /usr/lib/gcc (see error messages above), but
 it shouldn't be.  It wants the one in /usr/lib/llvm-6.0.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26779 [Core Tor/Tor]: atomic_init() and friends failing on clang

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26779: atomic_init() and friends failing on clang
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  jenkins, regression, 032-backport,   |  Actual Points:
  033-backport, 034-backport, 035-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Here is a minimal C file that demonstrates the issue:
 {{{
 #include 

 void increment(atomic_size_t *arg) {
 atomic_fetch_add(arg, 1);
 }
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26778 [Core Tor/Tor]: Enable supporting multiple bridge authorities

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26778: Enable supporting multiple bridge authorities
-+-
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridges needs-testing? needs-|  Actual Points:
  proposal?  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by chelseakomlo):

 Replying to [comment:1 arma]:
 > My first thought here is that I believe it should work right now for Tor
 to have two bridge auths, and bridges will simply publish their bridge
 descriptor to both of them. (And by "two" I mean "n".)

 Ok, that is good to hear. The main purpose of this is to ensure that tor
 can have more than one bridge authority.

 > Then the bridge auths become redundant, i.e. one of them can catch fire
 but the pipeline still gets the bridges through.
 >
 > One downside of that style of redundancy is increased surface area: that
 is, there is one more place in the world that has the list of bridges and
 that is making connections to all the bridges.
 >
 > But I think it will take much more design to produce a "distributed"
 bridge authority that actually has reduced surface area in practice. (For
 example, if each bridge alternates each day which authority it sends its
 descriptor to, are we really gaining that much?)

 What is the risk of only sending it to the first authority that accepts
 the descriptor (from a authority chosen at random)? As BridgeDB is the
 point which takes the union of all descriptors, I would think relays
 uploading descriptors could load balance across available authorities.

 But in practice it might not matter whether the bridge sends the
 descriptor to n authorities or 1, if n=2 or even if n=5.

 > Also, in the original bridge authority design, which still sort of works
 in the code right now, clients would reach out to the bridge authority
 directly (or via a Tor circuit using an existing working bridge) to fetch
 new descriptors for bridges that moved addresses. So if we want to keep
 that design possible for the future, we need bridges to
 *deterministically* assign themselves to bridge authorities, such that
 clients can predict the assignment too. See #2473. Maybe we want to close
 off that design because it's more trouble than it's worth, but also maybe
 not.

 As I understand, there is a proposal where BridgeDB becomes distributed
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/226-bridgedb-
 database-improvements.txt to mitigate against single points of failure
 cases.

 What is the benefit of clients reaching out to authorities directly for
 bridge assignments, as opposed to BridgeDB being the single point where
 clients fetch bridges?

 > tl;dr I think what you want is already in the code base, so long as
 you're ok with a slight tweak to what you want. :)

 Mainly I wanted to ensure that today more than one bridge authority can
 exist, so it is good that this can already happen.

 If you can point me to where the "bridge uploads its descriptor to all
 bridge authorities" happens in the code, that would be helpful, I wanted
 to dig into this a bit more.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26781 [- Select a component]: Possible incorrect Tor onion configuration

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26781: Possible incorrect Tor onion configuration
--+
 Reporter:  modikonark|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by modikonark):

 * Attachment "without-www.png" added.

 without-www

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26781 [- Select a component]: Possible incorrect Tor onion configuration

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26781: Possible incorrect Tor onion configuration
--+
 Reporter:  modikonark|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by modikonark):

 * Attachment "with-www.png" added.

 with-www

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[tor-bugs] #26781 [- Select a component]: Possible incorrect Tor onion configuration

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26781: Possible incorrect Tor onion configuration
--+
 Reporter:  modikonark|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 As per `https://onion.torproject.org/` the mapping is `www.torproject.org:
 http://expyuzz4wqqyqhjn.onion/`.
 If http://expyuzz4wqqyqhjn.onion/ is opened as
 `http://www.expyuzz4wqqyqhjn.onion/` it opens a different page.
 (Screenshots attached).

 Also, the links on `http://www.expyuzz4wqqyqhjn.onion/` are to cleatnet
 `torproject.org`. May be onion version should have onion addresses as
 links.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26751 [Core Tor/sbws]: sbws should log its version and python's version on startup

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26751: sbws should log its version and python's version on startup
---+-
 Reporter:  pastly |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:  sbws 1.0 (MVP nice)
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  easy   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by pastly):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Reviewed and merged. Thanks juga.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26778 [Core Tor/Tor]: Enable supporting multiple bridge authorities

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26778: Enable supporting multiple bridge authorities
-+-
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bridges needs-testing? needs-|  Actual Points:
  proposal?  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  tor-bridges => tor-bridges needs-testing? needs-proposal?


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26779 [Core Tor/Tor]: atomic_init() and friends failing on clang

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26779: atomic_init() and friends failing on clang
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  jenkins, regression, 032-backport,   |  Actual Points:
  033-backport, 034-backport, 035-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * priority:  Medium => High
 * keywords:  jenkins =>
 jenkins, regression, 032-backport, 033-backport, 034-backport,
 035-must
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26779 [Core Tor/Tor]: atomic_init() and friends failing on clang

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26779: atomic_init() and friends failing on clang
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  jenkins   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Looking at the debian packages involved, it seems that sid got some new
 clang packages around Jul 8 maybe, which fits with the timeline.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26710 [Metrics/Library]: Update list of dependencies for metrics-lib that Jenkins uses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26710: Update list of dependencies for metrics-lib that Jenkins uses
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks like this is now solved, after #26753 is merged. Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26779 [Core Tor/Tor]: atomic_init() and friends failing on clang

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26779: atomic_init() and friends failing on clang
--+
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  jenkins   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 atomic_init() and friends are part of C11; they're declared in
 stdatomic.h.

 It looks like this is maybe 32-bit clang only?  Or maybe only some
 versions of clang?  I ask because clang on Travis doesn't object to this
 code.

 And for that matter, I think 32-bit clang didn't object to this code a
 while ago:  these tests used to pass on Jenkins, until a couple of weeks
 ago: https://jenkins.torproject.org/job/tor-ci-linux-0.3.3-clang/ .  We've
 been using stdatomic.h for much longer than that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26437 [Core Tor/Tor]: Forking tests fails on Windows if there is a space in the path of the test runner

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26437: Forking tests fails on Windows if there is a space in the path of the 
test
runner
-+
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-triaged-in-20180711  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Looks like AppVeyor is happy after a rebase:
 https://ci.appveyor.com/project/torproject/tor/build/1.0.390

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26780 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix division by zero error reports from Coverity (CID: 1415721, 1415722, and 1415723)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26780: Fix division by zero error reports from Coverity (CID: 1415721, 1415722,
and 1415723)
--+--
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Looks like 1407.6 has been failing for a while on Travis. Marking this
 needs review anyway.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26780 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix division by zero error reports from Coverity (CID: 1415721, 1415722, and 1415723)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26780: Fix division by zero error reports from Coverity (CID: 1415721, 1415722,
and 1415723)
--+--
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by ahf):

 Let's see what CI says to:

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/230

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25971 [Webpages/Support]: Po generator makes long strings that are harder to localize

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25971: Po generator makes long strings that are harder to localize
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  l10n  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by emmapeel):

 Ok, I edited the content.lr files and pushed a branch at
 https://0xacab.org/emmapeel/tor-support/commits/content-edits please
 review.

 I will add some instructions about how to write nicely for l10n at
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/operations/services/support

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[tor-bugs] #26780 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix division by zero error reports from Coverity (CID: 1415721, 1415722, and 1415723)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26780: Fix division by zero error reports from Coverity (CID: 1415721, 1415722,
and 1415723)
--+--
 Reporter:  ahf   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 We should fix the current Coverity issues. Coverity CID 1415721, 1415722,
 and 1415723 seems to be somewhat related in that they all stem from
 Coverity not being able to identify the output domain for
 `get_net_param_from_list()`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26776 [Core Tor/Tor]: Control port failures for hidden services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26776: Control port failures for hidden services
--+
 Reporter:  oqista|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by oqista):

 Reproduced on 0.3.3.7 on Windows.
 https://www.torproject.org/download/download.html.en has no Windows build
 for 0.3.3.8 yet, and on Linux my distribution doesn't package it yet.

 I'm not using Stem. To reproduce the bugs, talk to Tor's control port
 directly, e.g. using netcat.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #6946 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Allow filtering relays by OS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6946: Allow filtering relays by OS
-+-
 Reporter:  rransom  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  karsten  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Great! Looks good. Merged to master. Leaving open for the protocol update
 part. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26355 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure only Windows users on Windows7+ are trying to use Tor Browser based on ESR60

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26355: Make sure only Windows users on Windows7+ are trying to use Tor Browser
based on ESR60
-+---
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201807R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:14 boklm]:
 > The patch for the installer looks good to me, so I opened a pull request
 to get it merged in the upstream git repository:
 > https://github.com/moba/tbb-windows-installer/pull/2

 The patch has been merged and a new version tagged. Commit
 `7903f5828c835e52722101a83450bbeb29fc2007` is using the new `tbb-windows-
 installer` tag.

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