Re: [tor-bugs] #26793 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Create /pluggable-transports/httpsproxy repo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26793: Create /pluggable-transports/httpsproxy repo
-+
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  httpsproxy pt|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26923   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by arma):

 * cc: nickm, hiro (added)


Comment:

 cc'ing the two people I think are still git admins, in hopes of sparking
 some progress on this ticket. Thanks in advance! :)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25573 [Core Tor/Tor]: Track half-closed stream IDs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25573: Track half-closed stream IDs
+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard-discovery-stats 034-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25574  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
|  SponsorV-can
+--
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * cc: asn (added)
 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  guard-discovery-stats 035-roadmap-proposed needs-proposal =>
 guard-discovery-stats 034-backport
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.4.x-final


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/262

 Removing the needs-proposal and 035 tags because this version of the fix
 does not change the protocol or even change client behavior. It only
 changes the values reported to the CIRC_BW event for the vanguards
 controller to react to.

 As such it would be great if we could backport this to 0.3.4 so that we
 can eliminate these classes of false positives in the vanguard addon. I
 have tested it with vanguards and it fixes both https://github.com
 /mikeperry-tor/vanguards/issues/3 and https://github.com/mikeperry-
 tor/vanguards/issues/25, which I am able to easily reproduce otherwise.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23859 [Core Tor/Stem]: stem parse_file doesn't handle stdin

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23859: stem parse_file doesn't handle stdin
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  descriptor easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks teor. Looked into this for a while but seems we can't safely
 convert non-seekable streams like stdin into buffered streams. Adjusted
 the exception to hopefully provide a more helpful message. See the commit
 message for all the details.

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=8ec17d8

 Feel free to reopen if there's a better way for us to handle this.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25999 [Core Tor/Stem]: Build an abstraction layer over different consensus flavours

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25999: Build an abstraction layer over different consensus flavours
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  descriptor |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by atagar):

 > If it was available, we could more easily migrate sbws, depictor and
 doctor away from using ns consensuses.

 DocTor needs to directly consult vote documents so I'll be sticking with
 that. If sbws or depictor are eager for an overlay class that bundles the
 descriptors then I'd appreciate having Matt (for sbws) or Tom (for
 depictor) discuss their use case.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22022 [Core Tor/Stem]: Move to cryptography for ed25519 validation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22022: Move to cryptography for ed25519 validation
-+
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem|Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  descriptor unactionable  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by atagar):

 * keywords:  descriptor => descriptor unactionable


Comment:

 Oops, seems I spoke too soon. This looks to be the upstream tracking
 ticket.

 https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/4114

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26129 [Core Tor/Stem]: Stem should invalidate exit_policy cache for DNS_USELESS event

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26129: Stem should invalidate exit_policy cache for DNS_USELESS event
-+
 Reporter:  dmr  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem|Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  controller easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fix pushed.

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=d42e9e1

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26112 [Core Tor/Stem]: Stem should not use human-readable message of GETCONF 552 response

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26112: Stem should not use human-readable message of GETCONF 552 response
-+-
 Reporter:  dmr  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem|Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:  controller easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 If Tor doesn't want us to parse exception messages then it needs to
 provide unique error codes for its different errors. Resolving in favor
 of...

 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/27034#comment:4

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27034 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clarification on 'GETINFO exit-policy/*'s valid 'non-transient internal errors'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27034: Clarification on 'GETINFO exit-policy/*'s valid 'non-transient internal
errors'
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by atagar):

 Oh wait, just realized GETINFO 552 responses are also used to indicate
 'the getinfo parameter you requested does not exist'. I have another
 ticket where the network team asked for Stem to rely on 552 codes meaning
 *that* rather than parsing the message text to determine if tor is
 indicating that or something else...

 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/26112

 We can't have it both ways. Tor either needs to provide unique error
 statuses for different issues or we callers will need to parse exception
 messages. :/

 Gonna resolve the above ticket in favor of this since it's unactionable on
 our side.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27034 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clarification on 'GETINFO exit-policy/*'s valid 'non-transient internal errors'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27034: Clarification on 'GETINFO exit-policy/*'s valid 'non-transient internal
errors'
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by atagar):

 Stem change pushed to treat 552s as 'not a relay':
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=542fa1f

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26914 [Core Tor/Stem]: Release Stem 1.7

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26914: Release Stem 1.7
---+
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by atagar):

 Quick update that I'm deferring this a bit. Been taking a pass through
 Stem's ticket queue to ensure low hanging fruit gets into the release.
 Still gonna be cutting 1.7 in the coming weeks but no ETA at present.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25853 [Core Tor/Stem]: Behavior for Controller.get_exit_policy() for tor client

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25853: Behavior for Controller.get_exit_policy() for tor client
-+
 Reporter:  dmr  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  controller easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by atagar):

 This turned out to be more involved than I thought but in the end got to a
 good spot. Change pushed.

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=542fa1f

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25853 [Core Tor/Stem]: Behavior for Controller.get_exit_policy() for tor client

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25853: Behavior for Controller.get_exit_policy() for tor client
-+
 Reporter:  dmr  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  controller easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27034 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clarification on 'GETINFO exit-policy/*'s valid 'non-transient internal errors'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27034: Clarification on 'GETINFO exit-policy/*'s valid 'non-transient internal
errors'
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by atagar):

 Thanks rl1987! In that case could we adjust the spec to drop "or if
 there's non-transient internal error" from that sentence?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25573 [Core Tor/Tor]: Track half-closed stream IDs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25573: Track half-closed stream IDs
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard-discovery-stats 035-roadmap-   |  Actual Points:
  proposed needs-proposal|
Parent ID:  #25574   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-

Old description:

> In order to eliminate a side channel attack described in
> https://petsymposium.org/2018/files/papers/issue2/popets-2018-0011.pdf we
> need a way to determine if a stream id is invalid.
>
> Many clients (particularly Firefox) will hang up on streams that still
> have data in flight. In this case, Tor clients send RELAY_COMMAND_END
> when they are done with a stream, and immediately remove that stream ID
> from their valid stream mapping. The remaining application data continues
> to arrive, but is silently dropped by the Tor client. The result is that
> this ignored stream data currently can't be distinguished from injected
> dummy traffic with completely random stream IDs, and this fact can be
> used to mount side channel attacks.
>
> A similar situation exists for spurious RELAY_ENDs.

New description:

 In order to eliminate a side channel attack described in
 https://petsymposium.org/2018/files/papers/issue2/popets-2018-0011.pdf
 ("DropMark" attack) we need a way to determine if a stream id is invalid.

 Many clients (particularly Firefox) will hang up on streams that still
 have data in flight. In this case, Tor clients send RELAY_COMMAND_END when
 they are done with a stream, and immediately remove that stream ID from
 their valid stream mapping. The remaining application data continues to
 arrive, but is silently dropped by the Tor client. The result is that this
 ignored stream data currently can't be distinguished from injected dummy
 traffic with completely random stream IDs, and this fact can be used to
 mount side channel attacks.

 A similar situation exists for spurious RELAY_ENDs.

--

Comment (by dmr):

 Replying to [comment:5 mikeperry]:
 > Wrt DropMark, [...]

 Adding parenthetical to tie that term 'DropMark' to the paper (it might
 not otherwise be obvious by context).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25574 [Core Tor/Tor]: Eliminate "silent-drop" side channels in Tor protocol

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25574: Eliminate "silent-drop" side channels in Tor protocol
---+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard-discovery-stats  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  SponsorV-can
---+--

Old description:

> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00
>
> There are lots of ways to inject data into Tor streams, and this is a
> vector of attack for guard discovery and confirmation:
> https://petsymposium.org/2018/files/papers/issue2/popets-2018-0011.pdf
>
> I have a branch that tries to eliminate a pile of these from a while ago,
> but it has lots of false positives due to the common occurrence of
> invalid stream IDs in practice (see #25573).
> https://gitweb.torproject.org/mikeperry/tor.git/log/?h
> =timing_sidechannel_fix-squashed1
>
> I think we may want to do #25573 before trying to merge that branch.

New description:

 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00

 There are lots of ways to inject data into Tor streams, and this is a
 vector of attack for guard discovery and confirmation ("DropMark" attack):
 https://petsymposium.org/2018/files/papers/issue2/popets-2018-0011.pdf

 I have a branch that tries to eliminate a pile of these from a while ago,
 but it has lots of false positives due to the common occurrence of invalid
 stream IDs in practice (see #25573).
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/mikeperry/tor.git/log/?h
 =timing_sidechannel_fix-squashed1

 I think we may want to do #25573 before trying to merge that branch.

--

Comment (by dmr):

 Adding parenthetical to tie that term 'DropMark' to the paper (it might
 not otherwise be obvious by context).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26431 [Core Tor/Stem]: Document a threat model for stem.client

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26431: Document a threat model for stem.client
+--
 Reporter:  dmr |  Owner:  dmr
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  client website  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by dmr):

 * owner:  atagar => dmr
 * status:  needs_information => assigned


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 atagar]:
 > Hi Dave, do we still need this ticket?

 I think the original questions prompted by the ticket have been [comment:2
 answered by teor].
 However, I'd like to keep the ticket open - I think it should be
 documented to make sure this is readily apparent to stem.client consumers.

 I view this as something to be done at the time that a user-facing API is
 described.

 Assigning to self - I can take of this.

 Replying to [comment:2 teor]:
 > When we have a draft guide for embedding Tor in other browsers (like
 Firefox, Brave, or Cliqz), it might contain some useful information about
 threat models for alternative implementations.

 teor, do you know where this info will live? I would be great to link to
 (at least, eventually).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25573 [Core Tor/Tor]: Track half-closed stream IDs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25573: Track half-closed stream IDs
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard-discovery-stats 035-roadmap-   |  Actual Points:
  proposed needs-proposal|
Parent ID:  #25574   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-

Old description:

> In order to eliminate a side channel attack described in
> https://petsymposium.org/2018/files/papers/issue2/popets-2018-0011.pdf we
> need a way to determine if a stream id is invalid.
>
> Many clients (particularly Firefox) will hang up on streams that still
> have data in flight. In this case, Tor clients send RELAY_COMMAND_END
> when they are done with a stream, and immediately remove that stream ID
> from their valid stream mapping. The remaining application data continues
> to arrive, but is silently dropped by the Tor client. The result is that
> this ignored stream data currently can't be distinguished from injected
> dummy traffic with completely random stream IDs, and this fact can be
> used to mount side channel attacks.
>
> A similar situation exists for spurious RELAY_ENDs.
>
> This isn't a full fix, because malicious relays can withhold the ack, but
> having it in place would simplify a lot of the code for dealing with
> unexpected packets.

New description:

 In order to eliminate a side channel attack described in
 https://petsymposium.org/2018/files/papers/issue2/popets-2018-0011.pdf we
 need a way to determine if a stream id is invalid.

 Many clients (particularly Firefox) will hang up on streams that still
 have data in flight. In this case, Tor clients send RELAY_COMMAND_END when
 they are done with a stream, and immediately remove that stream ID from
 their valid stream mapping. The remaining application data continues to
 arrive, but is silently dropped by the Tor client. The result is that this
 ignored stream data currently can't be distinguished from injected dummy
 traffic with completely random stream IDs, and this fact can be used to
 mount side channel attacks.

 A similar situation exists for spurious RELAY_ENDs.

--

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Wrt DropMark, we can still count very early invalid cells as dropped in
 the vanguards addon (and eventually in tor-core), and react to those. This
 behavior won't prevent that, since there will be no streams at that point.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25573 [Core Tor/Tor]: Track half-closed stream IDs (was: Create a RELAY_COMMAND_END_ACK cell type)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25573: Track half-closed stream IDs
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard-discovery-stats 035-roadmap-   |  Actual Points:
  proposed needs-proposal|
Parent ID:  #25574   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Better idea: since malicious endpoints can withhold the ACK, we might as
 well just introduce a half-closed state for edge connections. With a
 simple struct, we can keep track of the outstanding END, SENDME windows,
 and data windows, and decrement those, and treat packets within the window
 as valid, until we get an END from the other side.

 This also has the advantage that we don't have to wait for anyone to
 upgrade.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26966 [Community/Relays]: More public meek bridges to use

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26966: More public meek bridges to use
--+
 Reporter:  imwt  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nusenu):

 * status:  assigned => new


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26966 [Community/Relays]: More public meek bridges to use

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26966: More public meek bridges to use
--+--
 Reporter:  imwt  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nusenu):

 * owner:  Nusenu => (none)
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 not sure why this has been assigned to me

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27035 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error when loading Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27035: Error when loading Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  paulscupoflinux   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by paulscupoflinux):

 The ticket can be closed now all fixed

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27035 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error when loading Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27035: Error when loading Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  paulscupoflinux   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by paulscupoflinux):

 Thanks for that

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27027 [Community/Relays]: TorRelayGuide/NetBSD: set ORPort to 443 where that works out of the box

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27027: TorRelayGuide/NetBSD: set ORPort to 443 where that works out of the box
---+--
 Reporter:  nusenu |  Owner:  egypcio
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bsd netbsd tdp torbsd  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by Toni Bordelo):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27038 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Green Lock for .onion websites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27038: Green Lock for .onion websites
--+---
 Reporter:  joeyyy589 |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by joeyyy589):

 Thanks for the swift review, #23247 is indeed exactly the type of thing
 that I had in mind. Can you please assist me to close this ticket, cannot
 find the button.

 Many thanks

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25440 [Core Tor/Tor]: Broken openat syscall in Sandbox mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25440: Broken openat syscall in Sandbox mode
-+-
 Reporter:  ageisp0lis   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sandbox, 033-must, regression,   |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180326, 033-included-20180326,|
  033-backport, AffectsTails,|
  034-deferred-20180602, 035-removed-20180711|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Jigsaw52):

 After looking at this again, I think my fix will not ruin anyone's day.
 My fix would only cause problems if AT_FDCWD is a 64bits value. As far as
 I know, there is no system currently using 64bits values for this
 constant.

 I've rebased my branch with the current master and wrote a better commit
 message:

 https://github.com/Jigsaw52/tor/tree/fix-25440

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #27039 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Relay Search graphs missing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27039: Relay Search graphs missing
--+--
 Reporter:  starlight |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 maintenance or a problem?  No graphs at time of ticket.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27034 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clarification on 'GETINFO exit-policy/*'s valid 'non-transient internal errors'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27034: Clarification on 'GETINFO exit-policy/*'s valid 'non-transient internal
errors'
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by rl1987):

 Hello atagar.

 Yes currently it is safe to assume that 552 indicate "not an onion
 router". At this point we have the following in router.c:

 {{{
  161 /** Return true if we expect given error to be transient.
  162  * Return false otherwise.
  163  */
  164 int
  165 routerinfo_err_is_transient(int err)
  166 {
  167   switch (err) {
  168 case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NO_EXT_ADDR:
  169   return 1;
  170 case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_CANNOT_PARSE:
  171   return 1;
  172 case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NOT_A_SERVER:
  173   return 0;
  174 case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILED:
  175   return 0; // XXX: bug?
  176 case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_CANNOT_GENERATE:
  177   return 1;
  178 case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DESC_REBUILDING:
  179   return 1;
  180   }
  181
  182   return 0;
  183 }
 }}}

 The only way to get `TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILED` is to fail
 computing identity key digest:

 {{{
 2362   ri->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(get_server_identity_key());
 2363   if (crypto_pk_get_digest(ri->identity_pkey,
 2364ri->cache_info.identity_digest)<0) {
 2365 routerinfo_free(ri);
 2366 return TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILED;
 2367   }
 }}}

 This really should not happen, and if it does, it's probably a bug.

 Let me know if anything else should be done about this.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27031 [Community/Outreach]: Usability Research: Tor Users Demographics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27031: Usability Research: Tor Users Demographics
+
 Reporter:  nyinz   |  Owner:  alison
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Outreach  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  User Demographics   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27010  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by rl1987):

 * owner:  (none) => alison
 * component:  - Select a component => Community/Outreach


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27038 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Green Lock for .onion websites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27038: Green Lock for .onion websites
--+---
 Reporter:  joeyyy589 |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 You might be interested in #23247. That is already available in the alpha
 release. Please close if you consider this a duplicate.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27010 [Community/Outreach]: UX Research

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27010: UX Research
+--
 Reporter:  antonela|  Owner:  nyinz
 Type:  project | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Outreach  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor9
+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * component:  - Select a component => Community/Outreach


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26897 [Community/Tor Support]: Download Problem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26897: Download Problem
---+---
 Reporter:  richoldlion|  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by rl1987):

 * owner:  (none) => phoul
 * component:  - Select a component => Community/Tor Support


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26936 [Community/Tor Support]: Tor browser activity tracked!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26936: Tor browser activity tracked!
---+---
 Reporter:  modestmike |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by rl1987):

 * owner:  (none) => phoul
 * component:  - Select a component => Community/Tor Support


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26966 [Community/Relays]: More public meek bridges to use

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26966: More public meek bridges to use
--+
 Reporter:  imwt  |  Owner:  Nusenu
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by rl1987):

 * owner:  (none) => Nusenu
 * component:  - Select a component => Community/Relays


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26968 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Dragging tor browser bundle icon on windows 10 start menu uses firefox icon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26968: Dragging tor browser bundle icon on windows 10 start menu uses firefox 
icon
--+--
 Reporter:  spaceship9876 |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27032 [Community/Outreach]: Usability Research: Tor Users Demographics - Applications

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27032: Usability Research: Tor Users Demographics - Applications
+
 Reporter:  nyinz   |  Owner:  alison
 Type:  project | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Outreach  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  user-demographics, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27010  | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela|Sponsor:
+
Changes (by rl1987):

 * owner:  (none) => alison
 * component:  - Select a component => Community/Outreach


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27033 [Community/Outreach]: Usability Research: Tor Launcher

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27033: Usability Research: Tor Launcher
+
 Reporter:  nyinz   |  Owner:  alison
 Type:  project | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Outreach  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by rl1987):

 * owner:  (none) => alison
 * component:  - Select a component => Community/Outreach


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27036 [Community/Tor Support]: Unable to connect to 95% of the URL's I try

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27036: Unable to connect to 95% of the URL's I try
---+---
 Reporter:  Arizona2018|  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by rl1987):

 * priority:  Very High => Medium
 * owner:  (none) => phoul
 * component:  - Select a component => Community/Tor Support


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27038 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Green Lock for .onion websites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27038: Green Lock for .onion websites
--+--
 Reporter:  joeyyy589 |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27035 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error when loading Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27035: Error when loading Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  paulscupoflinux   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by notcypherpunks):

 https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#XPCOMError

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #27038 [- Select a component]: Green Lock for .onion websites

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27038: Green Lock for .onion websites
--+
 Reporter:  joeyyy589 |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Hello,

 It would be good to have a green lock in the address for .onion websites,
 as is the case for HTTPS, otherwise .onion websites intuitively look
 sketchy and insecure in the mind of users.

 One possible idea could be to use a different color to differentiate them
 from HTTPS. Blue or black could be appropriate.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26826 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA - Does the app need the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26826: TBA - Does the app need the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission?
---+---
 Reporter:  sysrqb |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201808R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24796 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by igt0):

 Can we create flag something like disable-system-alert? I think it is
 easier to uplift.

 Other good argument about removing it, it is because the saved URL is
 stored in disk.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26895 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 'Error downloading build result' after GCC in container Tor Browser Bundle Build (rbm)... most descriptive error ever ocurred in the world

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26895: 'Error downloading build result' after GCC in container Tor Browser 
Bundle
Build (rbm)... most descriptive error ever ocurred in the world
--+---
 Reporter:  kfseaperson   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by kfseaperson):

 Maybe it is a good idea to add to the readme.builderrors (or to the rbm
 itself) instruction to change umask.
 Since if rbm requires sudo (and creates files with root) with file
 permission without o+r (other may read) the "Can't find container image in
 input files" error is shown when a project is build by the end user
 account when requiring container image (or different input files).
 allowing other to read all files is not in the philosophy of privacy (and
 so probably Tor Project one)
 Users may have different umasks (the default permissions a file got when
 it is created) especially the more privacy caring ones(more strict than
 022 (you can read write, other can read)), which shouldn't be rare with a
 product like Tor browser :)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26895 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 'Error downloading build result' after GCC in container Tor Browser Bundle Build (rbm)... most descriptive error ever ocurred in the world

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26895: 'Error downloading build result' after GCC in container Tor Browser 
Bundle
Build (rbm)... most descriptive error ever ocurred in the world
--+---
 Reporter:  kfseaperson   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by kfseaperson):

 Well if I run it now I got a new error
 "Can't find container image in input files"

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27037 [Core Tor/Tor]: autoconf error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27037: autoconf error
--+
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  regression|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:   => regression
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


Comment:

 Sorry! This should be fixed in f90c0533777f2220cd6fb5ed07a5b63cd9c3e881

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26619 [Community/Relays]: Include in Tor Relay Guide doc instructions on how to deploy relay in OpenBSD

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26619: Include in Tor Relay Guide doc instructions on how to deploy relay in
OpenBSD
--+--
 Reporter:  ggus  |  Owner:  nusenu
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  openbsd   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by egypcio):

 Replying to [comment:15 nusenu]:
 > Replying to [comment:14 egypcio]:
 > > the info regarding `User` and `RunAsDamon` were restored sounds
 strange, because these options never appeared at the wiki page.
 >
 > sorry I didn't mean to say that they ever appeared there, but they
 appear in the torrc file that is shipped by the OpenBSD port maintainer
 >
 >
 > for the topics that are outside the scope of this (OpenBSD) ticket:
 > https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2018-August/013376.html

 tor-dev@? I really did not expect that. nice. ''I did read what you wrote
 there. appreciated C:''

 would you agree on me adopting /FreeBSD and /BSDUpdates to keep up them in
 sync and up to date together with /OpenBSD, /NetBSD, /DragonFlyBSD and
 other *BSD pages? I would love to keep focused on writing such materials
 (other BSD systems to be added, btw) and you wouldn't be too much
 overloaded.

 ty for your time, concern and constructive discussion kr,

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26895 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 'Error downloading build result' after GCC in container Tor Browser Bundle Build (rbm)... most descriptive error ever ocurred in the world

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26895: 'Error downloading build result' after GCC in container Tor Browser 
Bundle
Build (rbm)... most descriptive error ever ocurred in the world
--+---
 Reporter:  kfseaperson   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by boklm):

 So it seems there is an error somewhere in `runc/remote_get`. To get more
 details about where there is an error, you can try the following change:
 {{{
 diff --git a/rbm.conf b/rbm.conf
 index 8cfa5e2..612b734 100644
 --- a/rbm.conf
 +++ b/rbm.conf
 @@ -358,6 +358,7 @@ runc:
remote_get: |
  #!/bin/sh
  set -e
 +set -x
  [%
SET src = shell_quote(c('get_src', { error_if_undef => 1 }));
SET dst = shell_quote(c('get_dst', { error_if_undef => 1 }));
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #27037 [Core Tor/Tor]: autoconf error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27037: autoconf error
--+
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 When trying to build tor master we get the following error, when running
 `./autogen.sh`:
 {{{
 configure.ac:1811: warning: The macro `AC_WARN' is obsolete.
 configure.ac:1811: You should run autoupdate.
 ../../lib/autoconf/oldnames.m4:33: AC_WARN is expanded from...
 ../../lib/m4sugar/m4sh.m4:550: AS_CASE is expanded from...
 configure.ac:1811: the top level
 configure.ac:1811: warning: The macro `AC_WARN' is obsolete.
 configure.ac:1811: You should run autoupdate.
 ../../lib/autoconf/oldnames.m4:33: AC_WARN is expanded from...
 ../../lib/m4sugar/m4sh.m4:550: AS_CASE is expanded from...
 configure.ac:1811: the top level
 autoreconf: /usr/bin/autoconf failed with exit status: 1
 }}}

 It seems related to commit `abde9fb426c7d6d0dbdaccc724c3b4257d99ad30` from
 #20424.

 I am getting this error with autoconf 2.69-8.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs