Re: [tor-bugs] #27049 [Core Tor/Tor]: "No circuits are opened" messages with onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27049: "No circuits are opened" messages with onion services
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  033-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Old description:

> If a Tor instance is only doing onion service activity, and circuits time
> out, then the Tor client thinks that circuits aren't opened and gives
> them a full minute to complete. It also complains about this in the logs
> at notice level.
>
> The fix is simple. circuit_any_opened_circuits() in circuitlist.c is only
> counting circuits as opened if they use the DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN. We just
> need to count >= DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN to count them.

New description:

 If a Tor instance is only doing onion service activity, and circuits time
 out, then the Tor client thinks that circuits aren't opened and gives them
 a full minute to complete. It also complains about this in the logs at
 notice level, like this:

 {{{
 Aug 06 02:55:30.000 [notice] No circuits are opened. Relaxed timeout for
 circuit 21570 (a Hidden service: Pre-built vanguard circuit 4-hop circuit
 in state doing handshakes with channel state open) to 6ms. However, it
 appears the circuit has timed out anyway.
 }}}



 The fix is simple. circuit_any_opened_circuits() in circuitlist.c is only
 counting circuits as opened if they use the DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN. We just
 need to count >= DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN to count them.

--

Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/263

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #27049 [Core Tor/Tor]: "No circuits are opened" messages with onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27049: "No circuits are opened" messages with onion services
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  033-backport
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 If a Tor instance is only doing onion service activity, and circuits time
 out, then the Tor client thinks that circuits aren't opened and gives them
 a full minute to complete. It also complains about this in the logs at
 notice level.

 The fix is simple. circuit_any_opened_circuits() in circuitlist.c is only
 counting circuits as opened if they use the DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN. We just
 need to count >= DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN to count them.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27003 [Core Tor/Tor]: Regression: 'SETCONF ORPort' can kill tor process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27003: Regression: 'SETCONF ORPort' can kill tor process
---+---
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor:
   |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 035-must 034-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn|Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => asn


Comment:

 Since asn wrote #25761 and dgoulet is on holidays, your best reviewer is
 asn.

 (For what it's worth, I checked this fix and #25761 and they look fine.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26913 [Core Tor/Tor]: DataDirectoryGroupReadable enabled does not have effect

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26913: DataDirectoryGroupReadable enabled does not have effect
-+-
 Reporter:  maha |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 035-roadmap-proposed,|  Actual Points:
  033-backport, 034-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  regression? 035-roadmap-proposed => regression, 035-roadmap-
 proposed, 033-backport, 034-backport


Comment:

 I like your second suggestion, because your first suggestion breaks
 compatibility with tools that expect CacheDirectory == DataDirectory.

 Just a minor tweak:

 When CacheDirectory is the same value as DataDirectory:
   * CacheDirectoryGroupReadable should default to
 DataDirectoryGroupReadable, and
   * If CacheDirectoryGroupReadable doesn't match
 DataDirectoryGroupReadable, log an error and exit.

 This fix handles torrcs that only set DataDirectory and
 DataDirectoryGroupReadable.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #16821 [Core Tor/Tor]: additional /var/run/tor/log default log

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16821: additional /var/run/tor/log default log
+--
 Reporter:  proper  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  downstream, logging, tor-relay  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 I think we should keep a default notice log in upstream.

 If packagers change it based on their logging policy, great!
 If they don't, then the default is safe.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Prune INSTALL file

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26588: Prune INSTALL file
--+--
 Reporter:  Hello71   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.05
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * reviewer:  dgoulet =>


Comment:

 dgoulet is on leave, throwing this one back in the review pool.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18642 [Core Tor/Tor]: Teach the OOM handler about the DNS cache

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18642: Teach the OOM handler about the DNS cache
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, oom, tor-relay, dns, 035|  Actual Points:
  -triaged-in-20180711   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * reviewer:  dgoulet =>


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26420 [Core Tor/Stem]: Testing - specify literal patterns instead of regex patterns

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26420: Testing - specify literal patterns instead of regex patterns
--+-
 Reporter:  dmr   |  Owner:  dmr
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  dev testing code-improvement  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  atagar|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Done: https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=1c030e3

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #27048 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: Bandwidth scanner graphs are empty

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27048: Bandwidth scanner graphs are empty
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 When I open:
 https://consensus-health.torproject.org/graphs.html#bwauthstatus

 I see graphs for fallbacks and running, but the graphs for bandwidth
 scanners are empty. (They have an axis, but no lines on the graph.)

 But the current status text is ok:
 {{{
 maatuska6910 Measured values in w lines
 bastet  6837 Measured values in w lines
 moria1  6888 Measured values in w lines
 faravahar   6821 Measured values in w lines
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25459 [Metrics/Statistics]: Add graph that compares total consensus weights across bandwidth authorities

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25459: Add graph that compares total consensus weights across bandwidth
authorities
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:10 karsten]:
 > Sounds good. Blocking on #21378, but once the data is available in
 CollecTor, let's make a new graph.

 I don't think archiving bandwidth files (#21378) is blocking this ticket.
 These graphs show the total bandwidth voted for by each bandwidth
 authority, and this total bandwidth is in the votes.

 Specifically, we want to graph the sum of the "Measured" fields in "w"
 lines in votes:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n2337

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24212 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Get developer access to pytorctl

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24212: Get developer access to pytorctl
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 done!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21378 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Archive bwauth bandwidth files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21378: Archive bwauth bandwidth files
+--
 Reporter:  tom |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth tor-dirauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by teor):

 I opened #27047 for tor authorities to keep recent documents.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27047 [Core Tor/Tor]: Authorities should keep recent consensuses, votes, and bandwidth files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27047: Authorities should keep recent consensuses, votes, and bandwidth files
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, tor-dirauth, needs-  |  Actual Points:
  design |
Parent ID:  #25925   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  tor-bwauth, tor-dirauth => tor-bwauth, tor-dirauth, needs-
   design
 * cc: irl (added)


Comment:

 irl, let's design the "recent" URLs in dir-spec.txt when you have time.

 Here's some background:

 The documents that are used form a tree (strictly, a DAG):
 * every consensus contains a vote-digest for the votes used to create it
 * after #26698, every vote will contain a bandwidth-file-digest for the
 bandwidth file used to create it

 So we need a design to:
 * get recent consensuses by consensus period
 * get (unused) votes by consensus period
 * (unused bandwidth files aren't relevant, because each bandwidth file is
 tied to a vote)

 Normally, there is 1 consensus per hour, but during a consensus failure,
 authorities attempt to produce 2 consensuses per hour:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n1575

 Directory caches (and authorities) store 72 hours of recent consensus
 diffs by default:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n1961

 So we should probably try to keep 72 hours of votes and bandwidth files as
 well.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26698 [Core Tor/Tor]: Authorities should put a hash of the bandwidth file in their votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26698: Authorities should put a hash of the bandwidth file in their votes
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-crypto tor-dirauth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27047  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #27047


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #27047 [Core Tor/Tor]: Authorities should keep recent consensuses, votes, and bandwidth files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27047: Authorities should keep recent consensuses, votes, and bandwidth files
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-bwauth, tor-dirauth
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #25925
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Moving https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/21378#comment:12
 into a separate ticket:

 Quoting teor:
 > Replying to teor:
 > > Replying to irl:
 > > > Using the fixed URL ​http:///tor/status-
 vote/next/bandwidth.z sounds like it would be very easy to add this to
 CollecTor.
 > >
 > > Thanks for the feedback!
 > >
 > > > We have discussed in the Metrics team extending `dir-spec.txt` to
 allow to fetch "recent" files as well as just next/current. In the case
 that there is a wide CollecTor outage, and we miss a file, it would be
 good to have those files cached (on a best-effort basis, not necessarily
 persisted to disk) and available via some URL.
 > >
 > > How is this any different to losing descriptors or consensuses?
 > > (Please answer this question on a separate ticket.)
 > >
 > > > I don't know if karsten already had some ideas about what these URLs
 would look like, but we should perhaps consider this before implementing
 changes to `dir-spec.txt`.
 > >
 > > Please open a separate ticket for this feature. It's potentially a
 large feature. And it's not essential for the initial release of this
 feature.
 >
 > If you open a separate ticket for historical directory documents, please
 make #26698 a child of that ticket. We'll need bandwidth file hashes to
 work out the exact file used in each vote.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26544 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Images are not centered anymore in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26544: Images are not centered anymore in Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 I confirmed this is caused by `content-policy.js` (from our #8725 patch)
 overzealously blocking the following two CSS files:
 * resource://content-accessible/ImageDocument.css
 * resource://content-accessible/TopLevelImageDocument.css

 In principle, `content-policy.js` is now obsolete because
 https://bugzil.la/863246 was fixed (see #26189). An alternative/stopgap is
 to add whitelisting to these URLs.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26431 [Core Tor/Stem]: Document a threat model for stem.client

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26431: Document a threat model for stem.client
+--
 Reporter:  dmr |  Owner:  dmr
 Type:  task| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  client website  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by teor):

 > Replying to [comment:2 teor]:
 > > When we have a draft guide for embedding Tor in other browsers (like
 Firefox, Brave, or Cliqz), it might contain some useful information about
 threat models for alternative implementations.
 >
 > teor, do you know where this info will live? It would be great to link
 to (at least, eventually).

 I don't know, because the Tor Browser team hasn't created the document
 yet.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24212 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Get developer access to pytorctl

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24212: Get developer access to pytorctl
-+
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  (none) => tor-gitadm
 * component:  Core Tor/pytorctl => Internal Services/Service - git


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27042 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Relay Search should not claim recommended_version is false when onionoo makes no statement about it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27042: Relay Search should not claim recommended_version is false when onionoo
makes no statement about it
--+--
 Reporter:  BHydden   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridge flag   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by irl):

 * owner:  metrics-team => irl
 * status:  new => accepted


Comment:

 Will look tomorrow

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #21787 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure exposing the calendar information does not leak the locale

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21787: Make sure exposing the calendar information does not leak the locale
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, ff60-esr |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201808R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, ff60-esr => tbb-fingerprinting, ff60-esr
 TorBrowserTeam201808R
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 This API remains chrome-only. I think there's no intention to expose it to
 content. So I would suggest closing this ticket.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26655 [Applications/Tor Browser]: onion button is wrong size and color

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26655: onion button is wrong size and color
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201808R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  assigned => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:6 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:4 antonela]:
 > > Hi arthur!
 > > I used the default Firefox's Photon assets to build this icon.
 > > https://design.firefox.com/icons/viewer/
 > >
 > > But seems like they are setting colors for icons elsewhere (not at the
 SVG). See this
 https://design.firefox.com/photon/visuals/iconography.html#color
 > >
 > > Anyways, I exported the Tor Button Icon again with no borders. And,
 also I included a version using `Grey 90 a80`. .zip attached here Arthur.
 Let me know!
 >
 > Looks better for me now. I pushed a branch for review:`bug_26655`
 
(https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/torbutton.git/commit/?h=bug_26655=046aab60950553764504ea2d300a2a734f96fec8).

 The icon looks good. But we also need a new version of the icon with the
 yellow warning triangle overlaid (for when
 `extensions.torbutton.updateNeeded` is true).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #27046 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Increase disk size on build-sunet-a.torproject.net

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27046: Increase disk size on build-sunet-a.torproject.net
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 /srv on build-sunet-a.torproject.net is currently 565G, but we are using
 all the space. Is it possible to increase its size, adding 200G or 300G?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24872 [Community/Relays]: remove outdated tor relay security recommendations and update these wiki pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24872: remove outdated tor relay security recommendations and update these wiki
pages
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  Jaruga
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nusenu):

 I didn't intent to tell you what has to be written,
 if you like the proposed things I can write a draft.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24872 [Community/Relays]: remove outdated tor relay security recommendations and update these wiki pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24872: remove outdated tor relay security recommendations and update these wiki
pages
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  Jaruga
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Jaruga):

 Noted! Thank you lots for taking the time to give such a thorough review.
 I will work on these revisions first thing when I'm at my desk tomorrow,
 will let you know when it is ready for another look

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #27045 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add option for firefox incremental builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27045: Add option for firefox incremental builds
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 In Tor Browser builds, when we need to rebuild firefox, we do a full
 firefox rebuild. During the development of firefox patches it would be
 useful to be able to do incremental rebuilds of firefox.

 To do that, we could add a new makefile target for this type of build and
 an option in `rbm.local.conf` pointing to the firefox sources directory.
 We would then mount that directory in the build container and use it
 instead of the sources from git.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27042 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Relay Search should not claim recommended_version is false when onionoo makes no statement about it (was: regression in recommended_version field for brid

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27042: Relay Search should not claim recommended_version is false when onionoo
makes no statement about it
--+--
 Reporter:  BHydden   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridge flag   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27043 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Relay Search should not claim recommended_version is false when onionoo makes no statement about it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27043: Relay Search should not claim recommended_version is false when onionoo
makes no statement about it
--+--
 Reporter:  nusenu|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nusenu):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 closed as a duplicate of #27042

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27042 [Metrics/Relay Search]: regression in recommended_version field for bridges starting at bridges_published 2018-08-04 17:49:22

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27042: regression in recommended_version field for bridges starting at
bridges_published 2018-08-04 17:49:22
--+--
 Reporter:  BHydden   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridge flag   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nusenu):

 * priority:  High => Medium
 * component:  Metrics/Onionoo => Metrics/Relay Search


Comment:

 onionoo things a back to normal:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/metrics-
 alerts/2018-August/55.html

 and so is the recommended_version field.

 Changing the component to RS.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26224 [Core Tor/Stem]: Create a README for stem

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26224: Create a README for stem
---+-
 Reporter:  dmr|  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  dev|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Thanks Dave, good idea. Done.

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=df75072
 https://github.com/torproject/stem

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27034 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clarification on 'GETINFO exit-policy/*'s valid 'non-transient internal errors'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27034: Clarification on 'GETINFO exit-policy/*'s valid 'non-transient internal
errors'
--+
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27044 [Core Tor/Tor]: be more strict in parsing HiddenServicePort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27044: be more strict in parsing HiddenServicePort
--+--
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 Seems worth fixing to me.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26793 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Create /pluggable-transports/httpsproxy repo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26793: Create /pluggable-transports/httpsproxy repo
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  httpsproxy pt|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26923   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Oh hey, I do have admin rights here, don't I?  Repository added.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26793 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Create /pluggable-transports/httpsproxy repo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26793: Create /pluggable-transports/httpsproxy repo
-+
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  httpsproxy pt|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26923   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 +1

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25440 [Core Tor/Tor]: Broken openat syscall in Sandbox mode

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25440: Broken openat syscall in Sandbox mode
-+-
 Reporter:  ageisp0lis   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.3-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  sandbox, 033-must, regression,   |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180326, 033-included-20180326,|
  033-backport, AffectsTails,|
  034-deferred-20180602, 035-removed-20180711|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.5.x-final


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27034 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clarification on 'GETINFO exit-policy/*'s valid 'non-transient internal errors'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27034: Clarification on 'GETINFO exit-policy/*'s valid 'non-transient internal
errors'
--+--
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by rl1987):

 Quick torspec patch: https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/32

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27034 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clarification on 'GETINFO exit-policy/*'s valid 'non-transient internal errors'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27034: Clarification on 'GETINFO exit-policy/*'s valid 'non-transient internal
errors'
--+--
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by rl1987):

 Perhaps we should also tweak tor code to:
 * Print stacktrace when failed to compute digest (use `BUG()` macro).
 * Only respond with 552 if not a server.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27034 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clarification on 'GETINFO exit-policy/*'s valid 'non-transient internal errors'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27034: Clarification on 'GETINFO exit-policy/*'s valid 'non-transient internal
errors'
--+--
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * owner:  (none) => rl1987
 * status:  new => accepted


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #27044 [Core Tor/Tor]: be more strict in parsing HiddenServicePort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27044: be more strict in parsing HiddenServicePort
--+
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 A possible typo like
 {{{
 HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1 1234
 }}}
 is accepted.
 IMO Tor should at least warn about a possible missing colon.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24872 [Community/Relays]: remove outdated tor relay security recommendations and update these wiki pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24872: remove outdated tor relay security recommendations and update these wiki
pages
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  Jaruga
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Relays  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nusenu):

 I'd propose:

 * lets limit the scope to tor in relay mode only (tor clients or tor onion
 services are not covered) - this is somewhat obvious since the page lifes
 under /TorRelayGuide
 * title "Tor Relay Security Best Practices"

 * have a (small) generic/high level section that applies to all platforms
 (because we can not cover every possible OS)
   * this section will not include step-by-step instructions since it is OS
 independent
   * the physical security section
   * OS (hardware vs. virtual, OS level access authentication, pointer to
 auto-updates)
 * have a (bigger) section for tor
   * primarily focuses on the tor daemon itself and its security relevant
 settings and recommendations

 * convey the order in which different options are preferred (example: bare
 metal installations are considered better than VPS installation)
 * consider the current installation steps as a baseline and tell people
 what they could do on top of that if they want to do better than that
 * include no-go's
 * avoid conflicting statements regarding disk encryption


 * maybe have something like levels
  * basic (default install as described per the guide + auto updates)
  * intermediate
  * high (runs on hardware, 2FA, offline master keys with signing key
 lifetime < 30day)


 * lets remove the following sections:
  * "Tor-only firewalling with iptables" (because we cover it generically
 for all platforms in the generic section)
  * Coldboot attacks (due to new offline master key section that mitigates
 this attack vector)

 * Replace section "Restricting SSH access"  with a recommendation to use
 strong authentication (part of the generic section)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27042 [Metrics/Onionoo]: regression in recommended_version field for bridges starting at bridges_published 2018-08-04 17:49:22

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27042: regression in recommended_version field for bridges starting at
bridges_published 2018-08-04 17:49:22
-+--
 Reporter:  BHydden  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridge flag  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by nusenu):

 filed a related ticket for RS here: #27043

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #27043 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Relay Search should not claim recommended_version is false when onionoo makes no statement about it

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27043: Relay Search should not claim recommended_version is false when onionoo
makes no statement about it
--+--
 Reporter:  nusenu|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Relay Search apparently shows the "Not Recommended" warning even if
 onionoo does not include the recommended_version field (#27042).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27042 [Metrics/Onionoo]: regression in recommended_version field for bridges starting at bridges_published 2018-08-04 17:49:22 (was: All bridges now have Not Recommended flag)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27042: regression in recommended_version field for bridges starting at
bridges_published 2018-08-04 17:49:22
-+--
 Reporter:  BHydden  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridge flag  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by nusenu):

 * owner:  sysrqb => metrics-team
 * priority:  Medium => High
 * component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB => Metrics/Onionoo


Comment:

 Thanks for reporting this.

 The following table shows onionoo's bridges_published timestamp and the
 number of bridges which have recommended_version set to true:

 {{{
 +-+--+
 | 2018-08-04 00:49:21 |  693 |
 | 2018-08-04 01:49:21 |  694 |
 | 2018-08-04 02:49:21 |  694 |
 | 2018-08-04 03:49:21 |  694 |
 | 2018-08-04 04:49:22 |  694 |
 | 2018-08-04 05:49:22 |  694 |
 | 2018-08-04 06:49:22 |  694 |
 | 2018-08-04 07:49:22 |  693 |
 | 2018-08-04 08:49:22 |  693 |
 | 2018-08-04 09:49:22 |  693 |
 | 2018-08-04 10:49:22 |  692 |
 | 2018-08-04 11:49:22 |  692 |
 | 2018-08-04 12:49:22 |  692 |
 | 2018-08-04 13:49:22 |  692 |
 | 2018-08-04 14:49:22 |  692 |
 | 2018-08-04 15:49:22 |  693 |
 | 2018-08-04 16:49:22 |  693 |
 | 2018-08-04 17:49:22 |  434 |
 | 2018-08-04 18:49:22 |   49 |
 | 2018-08-04 19:49:22 |   46 |
 | 2018-08-04 20:49:22 |   46 |
 | 2018-08-04 21:49:22 |   46 |
 +-+--+
 }}}

 The following table shows the number of bridges that did NOT have the
 recommended_version field included:

 {{{
 +-+--+
 | 2018-08-04 17:49:22 |  261 |
 | 2018-08-04 18:49:22 |  649 |
 | 2018-08-04 19:49:22 |  651 |
 | 2018-08-04 20:49:22 |  651 |
 | 2018-08-04 21:49:22 |  651 |
 +-+--+
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #27042 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: All bridges now have Not Recommended flag

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27042: All bridges now have Not Recommended flag
--+--
 Reporter:  BHydden   |  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.3.9
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  bridge flag
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 This relay (all bridges) is running a Tor version that is not recommended
 by the directory authorities and may contain known issues.

 
https://www.reddit.com/r/TOR/comments/94qk88/my_relay_is_running_a_tor_version_that_is_not/

 https://i.imgur.com/iQQXHGa.png

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27041 [Webpages/Webtools]: Relay Search shows "no data available" for all time periods

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27041: Relay Search shows "no data available" for all time periods
---+---
 Reporter:  Ralph  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Webtools  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nusenu):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 duplicate of  #27039

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27039 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Relay Search graphs missing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27039: Relay Search graphs missing
--+--
 Reporter:  starlight |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nusenu):

 #27041  has been closed as a duplicate of this

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #27041 [Webpages/Webtools]: Relay Search shows "no data available" for all time periods

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27041: Relay Search shows "no data available" for all time periods
---+--
 Reporter:  Ralph  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Webtools  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 For the following family of relays that have been running between 100 days
 and 2 years, Relay Search shows the "no data available" placeholder for
 all time periods:

 {{{
 0C3D5E19E3C75B505C8ACD26F89DCA2DF970553E
 790910748A9B5F0EB455273FF42A0DFA3E7ACDD3
 4488EEA8CA1674020D9FCC2A176E1FDB9606F0B3
 }}}

 I checked a few other random nodes and see the same "no data available"
 problem.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27037 [Core Tor/Tor]: autoconf error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27037: autoconf error
--+
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  regression|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by boklm):

 I can confirm this fixed the issue. Thanks!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24212 [Core Tor/pytorctl]: Get developer access to pytorctl

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24212: Get developer access to pytorctl
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/pytorctl  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Sorry, I was ill when this request was made. I did not see it.

 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512

 Teor and tjr can have push access to pyTorCtl.
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJbZqGuAAoJEABK0QRboP4onLsP/jKYGf8TfVo8eZPZbhHmRrmg
 UiPWZJUkAWqarVj/97nTqz8pPhjVxgIvOadrxnyKseEsWefPxUjzkb18ospG7eAa
 I2gpzvg4G6G5HH3MSdwjdRHFbleOxLGoZ86PPH/vDwN4bhZY/AEjlID3M9y1Ljz2
 2fncd5Qu7gMAMagYwKrin0HemWoiGpnUr7t2quX90Cb5imZJpBOlr22/GiC/ic3u
 nvgN0e9Z020Gxhi8vDgwsgwr0KZOD6iMAhkP48OYWeMr7njt+D6E+vs2xC7a0Dvj
 T4NgVoxmkWYIp+okOgnkmN2+8jmqh1Rrbicd55eaEV1JQaw/H/J5L2IQ+r34Yyb0
 16OMHPgbwWFGXJuBwes2HdGlyESxuye+NbjUhsP/cve69FNAyZ9GnmctqiDH0cuX
 5q9vuzzJqYC29QPXxa4FmHA6FUokz6uCiCu78vgviluPF0jpXKrB+tEVHLru3Kg/
 M84JfB1TvVkJsF6gn32Uipftbo9ral6vgOM0eP35PorD0qFcSEMYZ5rmRD0WBpeI
 H3Wn4v0iVAphmQOvACAy6TbK3VRn/UR/gnJAlwY4x2/+C2YLS/BKXharKmQq21CY
 cMD17BzfinxKl8Hvbw6R9aQ/38yb5nkx5Y369UqqE9Y8pn43pb4bCxNaEu/CC5r/
 btHcP9F1kl4L660Lst1/
 =8gNr
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #27040 [Core Tor/Tor]: [warn] We don't have a consensus, so we can't perform v2 rendezvous operations.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27040: [warn] We don't have a consensus, so we can't perform v2 rendezvous
operations.
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Start your Tor, and while it's bootstrapping, make an onion service
 request. (In my case I started 'apt-get update' which uses the apt-
 transport trick to make it use my Tor.)

 Now I have in my logs:

 {{{
 Jul 30 20:27:11.890 [notice] Bootstrapped 25%: Loading networkstatus
 consensus
 Jul 30 20:27:21.285 [warn] We don't have a consensus, so we can't perform
 v2 rendezvous operations.
 Jul 30 20:27:21.285 [warn] We don't have a consensus, so we can't perform
 v2 rendezvous operations.
 Jul 30 20:27:21.285 [warn] We don't have a consensus, so we can't perform
 v2 rendezvous operations.
 Jul 30 20:27:21.285 [warn] We don't have a consensus, so we can't perform
 v2 rendezvous operations.
 Jul 30 20:27:21.286 [warn] We don't have a consensus, so we can't perform
 v2 rendezvous operations.
 Jul 30 20:27:21.286 [warn] We don't have a consensus, so we can't perform
 v2 rendezvous operations.
 Jul 30 20:29:21.379 [warn] We don't have a consensus, so we can't perform
 v2 rendezvous operations.
 Jul 30 20:29:21.379 [warn] We don't have a consensus, so we can't perform
 v2 rendezvous operations.
 Jul 30 20:29:21.384 [warn] We don't have a consensus, so we can't perform
 v2 rendezvous operations.
 Jul 30 20:29:21.384 [warn] We don't have a consensus, so we can't perform
 v2 rendezvous operations.
 Jul 30 20:29:21.385 [warn] We don't have a consensus, so we can't perform
 v2 rendezvous operations.
 Jul 30 20:29:21.385 [warn] We don't have a consensus, so we can't perform
 v2 rendezvous operations.
 Jul 30 20:29:58.498 [notice] Bootstrapped 45%: Asking for relay
 descriptors
 }}}

 I think maybe it shouldn't warn like that if it hasn't bootstrapped yet?
 Or, is there some specific value to warning there?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs