Re: [tor-bugs] #25485 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/libstdc++.so.6: version `CXXABI_1.3.11' not found (required by /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libmirclient.so.9)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25485: Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/libstdc++.so.6: version `CXXABI_1.3.11' not found
(required by /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libmirclient.so.9)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201808R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:48 boklm]:

 [snip]

 > I am not sure if the updater will accept an update which is not in the
 same channel, and with `tbb-nightly` as the version number. So I did a new
 build with the same patch, but building an alpha, with version number
 `8.0a9.1`:
 > https://people.torproject.org/~boklm/tmp/bug_25485-v2/

 I've uploaded the signed MAR file:

 https://people.torproject.org/~gk/testbuilds/tor-browser-linux64-8.0a9
 .1_signed_en-US.mar
 https://people.torproject.org/~gk/testbuilds/tor-browser-linux64-8.0a9
 .1_signed_en-US.mar.asc

 Applying the MAR file manually to a fresh 8.0a9 (following the steps in
 https://wiki.mozilla.org/Software_Update:Manually_Installing_a_MAR_file)
 works for me at least.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27080 [Core Tor/Tor]: bridges fail on Tor 0.3.4.1-alpha and later

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27080: bridges fail on Tor 0.3.4.1-alpha and later
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must, 035-must, regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-bridge 034-backport|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by intrigeri):

 Replying to [comment:7 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:5 intrigeri]:
 > > FWIW the Tails automated integration tests that exercise regular
 bridges and obfs4 pass just fine on an ISO that has tor installed from the
 deb.tpo tor-nightly-0.3.4.x-stretch APT suite. We use a rather old version
 of Chutney and not the real network. The host (that runs Chutney) has tor
 0.2.9.15-1.
 >
 > I'm not sure which Tor versions pass your bridge tests. Are you running
 Tor 0.3.4 or Tor 0.2.9 in chutney?

 The client (in the Tails system under test, that's running in a VM and
 exercises bridges and obfs4 usage) runs tor 0.3.4.6-rc-dev-
 20180815T162312Z-1~d90.stretch+1. The host, that runs the Chutney network,
 has tor 0.2.9.15-1.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24231 [Webpages/Website]: users looking for Tor Browser uninstall instructions should find the correct ones

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24231: users looking for Tor Browser uninstall instructions should find the
correct ones
--+--
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #14686| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * parent:   => #14686


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #22888 [Webpages/Website]: Permanent download URL for the latest release

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22888: Permanent download URL for the latest release
--+--
 Reporter:  David_Hedlund |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #14686| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * parent:   => #14686


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26932 [Core Tor/Tor]: Soft assert in HS3 with vanguards ([warn] Invalid signature for service descriptor signing key: expired)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26932: Soft assert in HS3 with vanguards ([warn] Invalid signature for service
descriptor signing key: expired)
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs possible-regression bug easy  |  Actual Points:
  034-backport 033-backport-maybe 032-backport-  |
  maybe  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Seems like a simple fix, I think we should probably backport it.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #18243 [Webpages/Website]: Website redesign - Phase 1

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18243: Website redesign - Phase 1
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  isabela
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  WebsiteV3
Component:  Webpages/Website   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  defer-new-website  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #21222 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by traumschule):

 * parent:   => #21222


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17413 [Webpages/Website]: Usability of MacOS installation process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17413: Usability of MacOS installation process
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:
 |  cypherpunks
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
 |  WebsiteV3
Component:  Webpages/Website |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux, usability, documentation,|  Actual Points:
  install, defer-new-website, website-content|
Parent ID:  #14686   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by traumschule):

 * parent:   => #14686


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24024 [Webpages/Website]: Potentially misleading illustrations suggest that Tor doesn't stick to a single guard node in the overview page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24024: Potentially misleading illustrations suggest that Tor doesn't stick to a
single guard node in the overview page
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:  bridge|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


Comment:

 If you're talking about this FAQ:
 https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/

 Then I think it's fine for now. Trying to explain that the guard is almost
 always the same is hard.

 When we implement proposal 291, we can change the answer to say "two
 guards".

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #14569 [Webpages/Website]: Download-Easy page don't make other languages obvious

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14569: Download-Easy page don't make other languages obvious
-+-
 Reporter:  saint|  Owner:  saint
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  website
 |  redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  usability-stoppoint-website|
  sebastian-0115-triaged |
Parent ID:  #14686   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by traumschule):

 * parent:   => #14686


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #27157 [Webpages/Website]: Update Tor FAQ - Tor has directory guards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27157: Update Tor FAQ - Tor has directory guards
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  easy doc
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#EntryGuards says:

 {{{
 However, that feature won't really become useful until we move to a
 "directory guard" design as well.
 }}}

 But Tor has had directory guards for a long time now.

 I think we can just delete that sentence.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #17805 [Webpages/Website]: The website should support "stable" and "oldstable" tor releases

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17805: The website should support "stable" and "oldstable" tor releases
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:
 |  cypherpunks
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
 |  WebsiteV3
Component:  Webpages/Website |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  defer-new-website, website-content,  |  Actual Points:
  ux-team|
Parent ID:  #14686   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by traumschule):

 * parent:   => #14686


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25573 [Core Tor/Tor]: Track half-closed stream IDs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25573: Track half-closed stream IDs
+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:
|  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard-discovery-stats 034-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25574  | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor|Sponsor:
|  SponsorV-can
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Please see my comments on the pull request.

 Overall, this code seems ok, but it's very large for a backport to a
 release candidate.

 (I understand you've already spoken with Nick on IRC about backporting the
 code. I don't think this ticket is a good place for backport
 conversations. Perhaps sending an email to tor-dev would be a good way of
 addressing concerns?)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24843 [Webpages/Website]: Illustrations for tpo.org redesign

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24843: Illustrations for tpo.org redesign
--+--
 Reporter:  antonela  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25638| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * parent:   => #25638


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24024 [Webpages/Website]: Potentially misleading illustrations suggest that Tor doesn't stick to a single guard node in the overview page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24024: Potentially misleading illustrations suggest that Tor doesn't stick to a
single guard node in the overview page
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridge|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 I don't know which FAQ your are talking about, please post a link to the
 answer.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24255 [Webpages/Website]: Download page offers "source" for Tor, but everything else on that page is Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24255: Download page offers "source" for Tor, but everything else on that page 
is
Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #14686| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * parent:   => #14686


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24024 [Webpages/Website]: Potentially misleading illustrations suggest that Tor doesn't stick to a single guard node in the overview page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24024: Potentially misleading illustrations suggest that Tor doesn't stick to a
single guard node in the overview page
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridge|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by traumschule):

 I see, does this mean the current images in the overview are correct and
 the FAQ answer should be updated, because the first address cannot be
 always the same, or can we just close this?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24024 [Webpages/Website]: Potentially misleading illustrations suggest that Tor doesn't stick to a single guard node in the overview page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24024: Potentially misleading illustrations suggest that Tor doesn't stick to a
single guard node in the overview page
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridge|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:4 traumschule]:
 > thanks for the link, we should prepare an image for it as well then.
 currently the entry is stable for up to three months according to
 https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/
 > the text should explain the current system (with above link) and the
 upcoming change to prepare users.

 There is no upcoming user-visible change.

 Tor uses 2 guards for circuits now. It will use 2 guards for circuits in
 future, but in a more balanced way.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25218 [Webpages/Website]: Update screenshots to use obfs4 bridges (instead of obfs3)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25218: Update screenshots to use obfs4 bridges (instead of obfs3)
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  jaruga
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #23266| Points:
 Reviewer:  t0mmy |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * parent:   => #23266


Comment:

 sorry, I meant /obfs3/obfs4/ above.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24024 [Webpages/Website]: Potentially misleading illustrations suggest that Tor doesn't stick to a single guard node in the overview page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24024: Potentially misleading illustrations suggest that Tor doesn't stick to a
single guard node in the overview page
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridge|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by traumschule):

 thanks for the link, we should prepare an image for it as well then.
 currently the entry is stable for up to three months according to
 https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-2/
 the text should explain the current system (with above link) and the
 upcoming change to prepare users.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #14686 [Webpages/Website]: Consolidate or de-emphasize our many download pages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14686: Consolidate or de-emphasize our many download pages
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  traumschule
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
 |  WebsiteV3
Component:  Webpages/Website |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-stoppoint-website, |  Actual Points:
  uxsprint2015, bridgedb-ui, defer-new-website,  |
  ux-team|
Parent ID:  #23266   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by traumschule):

 * owner:  cypherpunks => traumschule


Comment:

 I assigned myself to this because *cypherpunk might never step up.

 My proposal:
 - drop download easy
 - have one page per OS
 - list all projects on each page
 - images as navigation at the top
 - short description with link to project site
 - all collapsed per default, activated per click on an image
 - drop js, use css .active instead (see #27131:comment:2)
 - each projects maintains 1 file with the correct links to the latest
 version
 - have three static links per os and project for stable, alpha, unstable,
 whatever (looking at #26298 i don't want to fix the labels here),
 organized centrally with
 [https://httpd.apache.org/docs/current/mod/mod_rewrite.html#rewriterule
 RewriteRules]
 - architecture specific links, language version
 - link to install instructions
 - warnings/education section at the bottom as is

 It was pointed out at several locations that in censored areas it would be
 good to have a all in one download page. If all links are stable, everyone
 can keep and distribute it to download the packages several months later
 without 404.

 Downside: page is longer, but also more valuable and users could be lured
 to check out the ecosystem a bit more.

 For releases www-admins need to update rules to the new file (+.sig) on
 https://dist.torproject.org/
 (organized by a not so complicated bash script)
 - tpo/download/index.html # all in one download page (projects x OS)
 - tpo/download/[linux|osx|windows|android]/index.html # all download links
 for linux (/ [hurd]? #26873) with links to /doc/os
 - tpo/download/[os]/tor-browser/latest (=stable)
 - tpo/download/[os]/tor-browser/stable
 - tpo/download/[os]/tor-browser/alpha
 - tpo/download/[os]/[project]/[version]
 - tpo/download/tor/source/LTS
 - tpo/download/tor/source/stable
 - tpo/download/tor/source/unstable
 - tpo/download/tor/source/unstable/[version]
 - tpo/download/tor/source/slack*/*

 This more an idea and a question if this could work with your current
 workflow. I don't want to break anything or change functional processes.

 I asked myself if it would make more sense to work on the new site only.
 However I rather not want to let the current one rot until the launch in
 some months. The carryover (#23266) will be easier with a 'consolidated'
 system as it is much faster to translate up to date and correct content
 from wml to markdown (can even be done in one step). After fixing the
 links I want to get into the trust issue (#3893).

 Please help me with your ideas.

 WIP: https://github.com/torproject/webwml/pull/12

 (i'm happy to know if you disagree)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25164 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Reproducible Tor Browser for Android builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25164: Reproducible Tor Browser for Android builds
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201808  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26693| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sisbell):

 It looks like the annotation offsets in the data area of the dex file are
 different between the files.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25696 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Design of alpha onboarding for Tor Browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25696: Design of alpha onboarding for Tor Browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-mobile, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201808R  |
Parent ID:  #26531   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by igt0):

 Replying to [comment:28 igt0]:
 > Replying to [comment:27 sysrqb]:
 > > Do we need two public constructors in`FirstrunTorPanelConfig`? I only
 see one place where the constructor is used (in `SimplePanelConfigs`) and
 they all call the constructor with five arguments.
 > >
 > > 
 > >
 > > `firstrun_privacy_title` and some of the other *_title strings should
 not have "Title" in the string. They should say "Privacy", "Tor Network",
 etc. (instead of "Privacy Title", "Tor Network Title").
 >
 > Yes, it is because we don't have copy for those strings. Should we
 remove the titles? (if we keep them, and just remove the title word, the
 tab name and the title elements will have the same phrase)
 >

 I will use titles from https://marvelapp.com/5981a4b/screen/44384322

 > >
 > > 
 > >
 > > We'll want the darker Private tab theme, but that isn't critical for
 this right now.
 > >
 > > 
 > >
 > > The first two panels use the Firefox icon, we should change that.
 > >
 > > 
 > >
 > > For some reason the escaped-apostrophe in
 `firstrun_tornetwork_message` ("there\’s no single point of failure")
 isn't rendering on my device. It shows `theres no single point of
 failure`.
 > >
 > > 
 > >
 > > `firstrun_tips_message` is missing a period at the end.
 > >
 > > 
 > >
 > > Can you change `R.id.firstrun_link` in `FirstrunLastPanel` so it uses
 a resource that says "Close"?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25696 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Design of alpha onboarding for Tor Browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25696: Design of alpha onboarding for Tor Browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-mobile, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201808R  |
Parent ID:  #26531   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by igt0):

 Replying to [comment:27 sysrqb]:
 > Do we need two public constructors in`FirstrunTorPanelConfig`? I only
 see one place where the constructor is used (in `SimplePanelConfigs`) and
 they all call the constructor with five arguments.
 >
 > 
 >
 > `firstrun_privacy_title` and some of the other *_title strings should
 not have "Title" in the string. They should say "Privacy", "Tor Network",
 etc. (instead of "Privacy Title", "Tor Network Title").

 Yes, it is because we don't have copy for those strings. Should we remove
 the titles? (if we keep them, and just remove the title word, the tab name
 and the title elements will have the same phrase)

 >
 > 
 >
 > We'll want the darker Private tab theme, but that isn't critical for
 this right now.
 >
 > 
 >
 > The first two panels use the Firefox icon, we should change that.
 >
 > 
 >
 > For some reason the escaped-apostrophe in `firstrun_tornetwork_message`
 ("there\’s no single point of failure") isn't rendering on my device. It
 shows `theres no single point of failure`.
 >
 > 
 >
 > `firstrun_tips_message` is missing a period at the end.
 >
 > 
 >
 > Can you change `R.id.firstrun_link` in `FirstrunLastPanel` so it uses a
 resource that says "Close"?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27131 [Webpages/Website]: Tor download link links to TBB download page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27131: Tor download link links to TBB download page
--+-
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #14686| Points:
 Reviewer:  hiro  |Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by traumschule):

 * parent:   => #14686


Comment:

 (thanks for the spelling pointer)

 my preferred option is to fix
 https://www.torproject.org/download/download.html.en as it already has a
 TOC with a link to #source. it's just missing an id for the div. fix here:
 https://github.com/torproject/webwml/pull/12

 there are several issues accessing [https://www.torproject.org/download
 /download-easy.html.en download-easy] without js (fresh TBB 8.0a9):
 - text overlap bsd <> android https://share.riseup.net/#TUOYLm-gEr-Lh-
 nhH2ZsLA
 - all sections are expanded. css offers the
 [https://www.w3schools.com/CSSref/sel_active.asp .active] selector, no
 need for js.
 - why is download-easy there anyway if not to offer a non-js version?
 - i would drop it completely, it just makes it harder to maintain

 what do you think?

 (adding my other thoughts to the parent ticket)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24024 [Webpages/Website]: Potentially misleading illustrations suggest that Tor doesn't stick to a single guard node in the overview page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24024: Potentially misleading illustrations suggest that Tor doesn't stick to a
single guard node in the overview page
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  website redesign
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridge|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 But Tor doesn't stick to a single guard node right now, and we have a
 proposal to make it use two guards in a balanced way:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/291-two-guard-
 nodes.txt

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27154 [Metrics/Relay Search]: lets use something else than AS0 for "unknown" AS number

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27154: lets use something else than AS0 for "unknown" AS number
--+--
 Reporter:  nusenu|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 I suggest readable english words, like "(none)" or "(unknown)".

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #15518 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor considers routers in the same IPv6 /16 to be "in the same subnet"

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15518: Tor considers routers in the same IPv6 /16 to be "in the same subnet"
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, path, path-bias, tor-client|  Actual Points:
  easy   |
Parent ID:  #24393   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  Samdney => (none)


Comment:

 There's been no progress on this ticket for a month, throwing it back in
 the pool.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24805 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Update fallback whitelist and blacklist in late 2018

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24805: Update fallback whitelist and blacklist in late 2018
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, 034-triage-20180328,   |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328, 035-removed-20180711,|
  035-roadmap|
Parent ID:  #24786   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 One fallback has been terminated by the network provider:
 https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2018-August/015886.html

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23588: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in
hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:36 neel]:
 > I think I know what the bug for `hs-v23-ipv6-md` is: some addresses are
 being marked as invalid as they don't make it through
 `fascist_firewall_allows_address_ap()` (I believe the main Tor codebase
 does not make addresses go though this now, nor does my old "simplified"
 address choosing code that got abandoned).

 This issue sounds like a bug in fascist_firewall_allows_address_ap(), or a
 bug in how we're using fascist_firewall_allows_address_ap().

 (The v2 onion service code uses fascist_firewall_allows_address_ap() and
 it works.)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27130 [Core Tor/Tor]: rust dependency updating instructions don't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27130: rust dependency updating instructions don't work
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, doc, 033-backport, |  Actual Points:
  034-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  rust, doc, 032-backport, 033-backport, 034-backport => rust,
 doc, 033-backport, 034-backport


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25730 [Webpages/Website]: The Tor website's bridges page has old Tor Browser screenshots

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25730: The Tor website's bridges page has old Tor Browser screenshots
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  ggus
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25218| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #25218


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27080 [Core Tor/Tor]: bridges fail on Tor 0.3.4.1-alpha and later

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27080: bridges fail on Tor 0.3.4.1-alpha and later
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.1-alpha
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-must, 035-must, regression,  |  Actual Points:
  tor-bridge 034-backport|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:5 intrigeri]:
 > FWIW the Tails automated integration tests that exercise regular bridges
 and obfs4 pass just fine on an ISO that has tor installed from the deb.tpo
 tor-nightly-0.3.4.x-stretch APT suite. We use a rather old version of
 Chutney and not the real network. The host (that runs Chutney) has tor
 0.2.9.15-1.

 I'm not sure which Tor versions pass your bridge tests. Are you running
 Tor 0.3.4 or Tor 0.2.9 in chutney?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27135 [Core Tor/sbws]: Write descriptor bandwidths average in raw results

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27135: Write descriptor bandwidths average in raw results
---+-
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws 1.0 (MVP must)
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27108 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:2 juga]:
 > i'm not sure we should get it every hour, i haven't find yet how
 frequently torflow does.
 > Teor, do you know it?

 We need to design sbws timings to match the Tor network.
 (If torflow gets it wrong, or is outdated, we want to get it right.)

 Relays running recent Tor releases (with #23856) update their descriptor
 bandwidths every 3-18 hours. After #24104 merges, most relays will update
 their descriptor bandwidths every 12-18 hours, but new relays will update
 every 3-18 hours.

 {{{
ORs SHOULD generate a new server descriptor and a new extra-info
document whenever any of the following events have occurred:

   ...

   - Its uptime is less than 24h and bandwidth has changed by a factor
 of 2
 from the last time a descriptor was generated, and at least a
 given
 interval of time (3 hours by default) has passed since then.

   ...

ORs SHOULD NOT publish a new server descriptor or extra-info document
if none of the above events have occurred and not much time has passed
(12 hours by default).
 }}}

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n354

 Once a relay uploads its descriptor, the authorities include it in the
 next consensus. Descriptor updates in the consensus can take 10 minutes
 (the voting period) to 18 hours (the descriptor expiry period for the last
 descriptor).

 The consensus is produced every 30 minutes or 1 hour. Then clients
 download the consensus from directory mirrors, which download from
 authorities.

 Each consensus may include some new descriptors. When a client gets a
 consensus with unknown descriptors, it can take a few minutes for it to
 download those descriptors from one of its directory mirrors.

 So sbws can update descriptors:
 * as descriptors arrive, via control events (as starlight says, that's how
 torflow does it), or
 * a few minutes after every consensus arrives, or
 * every 30 minutes to 1 hour, at a randomly chosen time.

 Do whatever is easiest. Using an old descriptor is ok here.

 Replying to [comment:5 pastly]:
 > I downloaded your sbws datadir and wrote a little script to print how
 often a relay has a list of saved `relay_average_bandwidth` containing
 more than one unique element.
 >
 > It found that 1868/7999 relays had `relay_average_bandwidth` values that
 weren't all the same (118/7326 if you only look at success results). I'm
 guessing relays don't update this value in their descriptors very often.

 I don't know the period covered by juga's sbws datadir. But these figures
 seem reasonable for a few hours' consensuses: 1/18 * 7999 = 444.

 If the datadir covers days, maybe sbws is losing descriptor updates?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26973 [Core Tor/Tor]: Privcount blinding and encryption: add rustfmt CI check

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26973: Privcount blinding and encryption: add rustfmt CI check
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  privcount, 035-roadmap-master, 035   |  Actual Points:
  -triaged-in-20180711, rust |
Parent ID:  #25669   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Sounds good.

 We should re-run **nightly** rustfmt, because nightly and stable format
 the files differently.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #10506 [Applications/Orbot]: Unable to start Tor: Unable to start Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#10506: Unable to start Tor: Unable to start Tor
+
 Reporter:  jack80  |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.3.7-alpha
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  user disappeared
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27045 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add option for firefox incremental builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27045: Add option for firefox incremental builds
+--
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201808R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Confirmed on a fresh clone of your bug_27045_v3 branch.  Fails right after
 binutils.

 Did a make testbuild-ffdev-windows-i686 with my local rbm conf setting
 ffdev to my tor-browser dev directory.

 Here's the contents of my tor-browser-build/out directory:

 {{{
 $ tree out
 out
 ├── binutils
 ├── container-image
 │   ├── container-image_jessie-i386-74dfa60d3344.tar.gz
 │   └── container-image_jessie-i386-ae006590ff88.tar.gz
 ├── debootstrap-image
 │   ├── container-image_jessie-i386.tar.gz
 │   └── container-image_ubuntu-base-16.04.3-base-amd64.tar.gz
 ├── firefox
 │   └── binutils-2.26.1.tar.bz2
 ├── mingw-w64
 └── tor-browser
 }}}

 My logs dir only has container-image-windows-i686.log and debootstrap-
 image.log and neither of them have any indication of errors in them.

 The host OS is Ubuntu 18.04.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27045 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add option for firefox incremental builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27045: Add option for firefox incremental builds
+--
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201808R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by pospeselr):

 So whenever I try to do an ffdev build (tried both windows i686 and linux
 x86_64 so far) I get the following error:

 {{{
 Use of uninitialized value $fname in -f at rbm/lib/RBM.pm line 724.
 Use of uninitialized value $fname in -l at rbm/lib/RBM.pm line 725.
 Error: Template Error:
 undef error - Path::Tiny paths require defined, positive-length parts at
 rbm/lib/RBM.pm line 726.

 Makefile:113: recipe for target 'testbuild-ffdev-linux-x86_64' failed
 make: *** [testbuild-ffdev-linux-x86_64] Error 1
 }}}

 I have had successful builds in the past, so I'm going to start fresh and
 see if I somehow managed to mess things up on my end.  Will report back
 later tonight.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #27156 [Applications/Tor Browser]: The DuckDuckgo thumbnail on the new About Tor page is low resolution/blurry

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27156: The DuckDuckgo thumbnail on the new About Tor page is low 
resolution/blurry
--+--
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 The DuckDuckgo thumbnail on the new About Tor page is low
 resolution/blurry on retina displays. My display's resolution is 13.3-inch
 (2560 x 1600) macOS. Tested with the latest TorBrowser nightly.
 Here is a photo showing the DuckDuckgo thumbnail imm referring too.
 
[[Image(https://s22.postimg.cc/omehzynm9/Screen_Shot_2018-08-15_at_4.06.05_PM.png)]]

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27050 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Reverse DNS lookups are still slow

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27050: Reverse DNS lookups are still slow
-+
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  karsten  |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by irl):

 Just pushed a commit with the changelog entry.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25485 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/libstdc++.so.6: version `CXXABI_1.3.11' not found (required by /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libmirclient.so.9)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25485: Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/libstdc++.so.6: version `CXXABI_1.3.11' not found
(required by /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libmirclient.so.9)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201808R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:47 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:44 boklm]:
 > > The patch in branch `bug_25485_v3` is fixing the permissions on
 `firefox`:
 > > https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_25485_v2&id=82ab87b6742b4cc5e245739231887cbe51a59754
 > >
 > > I have not been able to test an update from 8.0a9 yet. It seems the
 pref `app.update.url.override` (which I think disabled signature
 verification) does not exist anymore. I tried manually installing the mar
 file, following the instruction from this page:
 > >
 https://wiki.mozilla.org/Software_Update:Manually_Installing_a_MAR_file
 >
 > 21:05 <+GeKo> i am wondering whether that would actually test what we
 want to test
 > 21:06 <+GeKo> we already know that starting tor browser with your patch
 applied works but that is basically what you are doing with this method

 Yes, manually installing the mar file might not be enough. With a signed
 mar, I can generate some update xml, and test the update by changing
 `app.update.url`.

 >
 > That said I can help with the signing part and we can hold off starting
 the build until tomorrow for that.

 I am not sure if the updater will accept an update which is not in the
 same channel, and with `tbb-nightly` as the version number. So I did a new
 build with the same patch, but building an alpha, with version number
 `8.0a9.1`:
 https://people.torproject.org/~boklm/tmp/bug_25485-v2/

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25696 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Design of alpha onboarding for Tor Browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25696: Design of alpha onboarding for Tor Browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-mobile, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201808R  |
Parent ID:  #26531   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Do we need two public constructors in`FirstrunTorPanelConfig`? I only see
 one place where the constructor is used (in `SimplePanelConfigs`) and they
 all call the constructor with five arguments.

 

 `firstrun_privacy_title` and some of the other *_title strings should not
 have "Title" in the string. They should say "Privacy", "Tor Network", etc.
 (instead of "Privacy Title", "Tor Network Title").

 

 We'll want the darker Private tab theme, but that isn't critical for this
 right now.

 

 The first two panels use the Firefox icon, we should change that.

 

 For some reason the escaped-apostrophe in `firstrun_tornetwork_message`
 ("there\’s no single point of failure") isn't rendering on my device. It
 shows `theres no single point of failure`.

 

 `firstrun_tips_message` is missing a period at the end.

 

 Can you change `R.id.firstrun_link` in `FirstrunLastPanel` so it uses a
 resource that says "Close"?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26514 [Applications/Tor Browser]: intermittent updater failures on Win64 (Error 19)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26514: intermittent updater failures on Win64 (Error 19)
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201808R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by heaslr):

 Replying to [comment:19 jacek]:
 > libmar uses in fact _ftelli64/_fseeki64 due to defines in mar_private.h.
 Those are not available on old msvcrt.dll, so mingw-w64 has its own
 implementation:
 >
 
https://github.com/mirror/mingw-w64/blob/master/mingw-w64-crt/stdio/fseeko64.c#L133
 > I can't see anything obviously wrong there, but in general it does a lot
 of stuff that really should be done by MS crt in fact.
 Especially, giving the fact that `msvcr100.dll` supports that, actually.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27112 [Core Tor/Stem]: Decouple payload processing from pop/unpack + tune abstraction layers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27112: Decouple payload processing from pop/unpack + tune abstraction layers
---+--
 Reporter:  dmr|  Owner:  dmr
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  client |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  atagar |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by dmr):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 atagar]:
 > [...] he's gonna revise this so cells remain immutable.

 PR branch updated!
 1 commit added, then rebased to current master HEAD and force-pushed.
 (Everything else the same)

 ​https://github.com/torproject/stem/pull/8
 branch head `f3f44a2f4572d3535ae6f2ea7f9788450fc61a20`

 The old revision / base is still available here, in case you want it:
 https://github.com/dmr-x/stem/tree/27112-relay-cell-processing-
 abstraction-old
 branch head `e02cf0edb1292f67c87df95c7a406e5f94c1e7a8`

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23588: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in
hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  assigned => needs_revision


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23588: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in
hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => neel


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25485 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/libstdc++.so.6: version `CXXABI_1.3.11' not found (required by /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libmirclient.so.9)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25485: Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/libstdc++.so.6: version `CXXABI_1.3.11' not found
(required by /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libmirclient.so.9)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201808R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:44 boklm]:
 > The patch in branch `bug_25485_v3` is fixing the permissions on
 `firefox`:
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_25485_v2&id=82ab87b6742b4cc5e245739231887cbe51a59754
 >
 > I have not been able to test an update from 8.0a9 yet. It seems the pref
 `app.update.url.override` (which I think disabled signature verification)
 does not exist anymore. I tried manually installing the mar file,
 following the instruction from this page:
 > https://wiki.mozilla.org/Software_Update:Manually_Installing_a_MAR_file

 21:05 <+GeKo> i am wondering whether that would actually test what we want
 to test
 21:06 <+GeKo> we already know that starting tor browser with your patch
 applied works but that is basically what you are doing with this method

 That said I can help with the signing part and we can hold off starting
 the build until tomorrow for that.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26514 [Applications/Tor Browser]: intermittent updater failures on Win64 (Error 19)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26514: intermittent updater failures on Win64 (Error 19)
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201808R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:21 gk]:
 > I think it is okay to be conservative and apply the fix to 32bit Windows
 as well, not knowing where exactly the bug lies. We should test the 32bit
 case however, making sure we did not regress here.

 Kathy and I tested using a 32-bit Windows build and did not find any
 problems. I think we are done here!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #27155 [Metrics/Onionoo]: add ipv4_bgp_prefix ipv6_bgp_prefix fields

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27155: add ipv4_bgp_prefix ipv6_bgp_prefix fields
-+--
 Reporter:  nusenu   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 Use case:
 * find relays in the same prefix (for example if a specific prefix has
 been hijacked)
 * group relays by prefix
 * is a requirement fore routing security related metrics (ROA, prefix
 length)


 The RIPEstat API can be used as a source and you can cache it if previous
 lookups were within the same /24 (IPv4) or /48 (IPv6) since that is the
 longest prefix length
 https://stat.ripe.net/docs/data_api#NetworkInfo
 example:
 https://stat.ripe.net/data/network-info/data.json?resource=140.78.90.50


 related: #26585

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27131 [Webpages/Website]: Tor download link links to TBB download page

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27131: Tor download link links to TBB download page
--+-
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  hiro  |Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by ggus):

 Hey!,

 >​torproject.org > ​https://www.torproject.org/download/download-
 easy.html.en

 where exactly we should link to little-t-tor in the main page?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26585 [Metrics/Onionoo]: improve AS number and name coverage (switch maxmind to RIPE Stat)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26585: improve AS number and name coverage (switch maxmind to RIPE Stat)
-+--
 Reporter:  nusenu   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by nusenu):

 from practically using RIPEstat I can now say that
 ​https://stat.ripe.net/data/related-prefixes/data.json
 is more reliable in terms of "has data for every IP we asked for" than
 ​https://stat.ripe.net/data/as-overview/data.json
 so the former is preferred.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #27154 [Metrics/Relay Search]: lets use something else than AS0 for "unknown" AS number

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27154: lets use something else than AS0 for "unknown" AS number
--+--
 Reporter:  nusenu|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 RS uses "AS0" as a placeholder for "unknown AS number",
 but "AS0" has a special meaning in BGP
 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7607 ), lets use something else?

 maybe "ASXY"?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #27153 [Metrics/Onionoo]: add ipv6_as and ipv6_as_name

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27153: add ipv6_as and ipv6_as_name
-+--
 Reporter:  nusenu   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--
 There are about ~50 relays (according to RIPEstat) where the IPv4 and IPv6
 addresses of the relay are not in the same AS (mostly due to HE IPv6
 tunnel broker).

 I suspect this number will decrease over time but I still find it valuable
 to
 have the data, you might define these fields in a way that they will only
 show up iff the ASes for IPv4/v6 differ.

 This change should probably be done after #26585

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26962 [Applications/Tor Browser]: implement new features onboarding

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26962: implement new features onboarding
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201808  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25695| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 A quick update: although Kathy and I have made significant progress over
 the past couple of days, we still have a lot to do for this ticket (and
 there aren't any examples in the onboarding or UITour code that do what we
 need and are architected in a similar way, so progress has been slower
 than we hoped). I estimate it will take another 3-5 working days of
 effort, which means we should have something ready for review by the end
 of next week (~24 August).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26456 [Applications/Tor Browser]: HTTP .onion sites inherit previous page's certificate information

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26456: HTTP .onion sites inherit previous page's certificate information
-+-
 Reporter:  pospeselr|  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201808R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Update patch: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_26456

 The comment refers to the error code returned by GetSSLStatus.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26877 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Declare gcc version in rbm.conf

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26877: Declare gcc version in rbm.conf
---+---
 Reporter:  sukhbir|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
   |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201808  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201808R => tbb-rbm,
   TorBrowserTeam201808


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27152 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use mozilla/fxc2.git for the fxc2 repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27152: Use mozilla/fxc2.git for the fxc2 repository
+--
 Reporter:  sukhbir |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201808R, tbb-rbm  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * keywords:   => TorBrowserTeam201808R, tbb-rbm
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good and applied to `master` (commit
 8a863c42d0ce0a697aaca52cc97603cf6327754e), thanks.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26877 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Declare gcc version in rbm.conf

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26877: Declare gcc version in rbm.conf
+--
 Reporter:  sukhbir |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement | Status:
|  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201808R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowser201807R => tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201808R
 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26825 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA - Does the app need RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED intent?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26825: TBA - Does the app need RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED intent?
---+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201808R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24796 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201808 => tbb-mobile,
 TorBrowserTeam201808R
 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Applied (commit a67072ef19806e4c4c5d4a0c10f5cb35b5da2de1 on `tor-
 browser-60.1.0esr-8.0-1`), thanks.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24056 [Applications/Tor Browser]: UI locale is detectable by button width

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24056: UI locale is detectable by button width
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201808R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Great, cherry-picked to `tor-browser-60.1.0esr-8.0-1` (commit
 cbb04b72c68272c2de42f157d40cd7d29a6b7b55).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26961 [Applications/Tor Browser]: implement new user onboarding

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26961: implement new user onboarding
--+
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201808R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25695| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good, thanks! Applied to `master` (torbutton) as commit and `tor-
 browser-60.1.0esr-8.0-1` (commits 1c7d5ff5c2982f6ba67e2e7cf80398b147c7182e
 and c5e0193f1771ef457a85cd7a59dda8ac99b2b03e).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27081 [Core Tor/Tor]: Don't link pthreads on win32, even if it is present

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27081: Don't link pthreads on win32, even if it is present
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  fast-fix 029-backport 032-backport   |  Actual Points:
  033-backport 034-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by heaslr):

 Tor Browser 8 is affected.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27082 [Applications/Tor Browser]: enable a limited UITour

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27082: enable a limited UITour
--+
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201808R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25695| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good. Applied to `tor-browser-60.1.0esr-8.0-1` (commits
 99042436bbdae4d849902ddf49bb5e89311a5121 and
 fa471b46da2a188f02d2e120fd5822aee818).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25164 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Reproducible Tor Browser for Android builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25164: Reproducible Tor Browser for Android builds
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201808  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26693| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sisbell):

 Apks from two builds are different, even building on same laptop. This is
 due to some differences in the classes.dex file.

 When I do a dexdump of two different dex files, the dexdumps are exactly
 the same.

 When I decompile and recompile the classes.dex file from two different
 builds, the resulting classes.dex are exactly the same.

 This leads me to believe that the differences in the classes.dex file are
 only cosmetic (padding differences?)

 I will need to build a quick program to output exactly what part of the
 dex file format is different and then go from there.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #24056 [Applications/Tor Browser]: UI locale is detectable by button width

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24056: UI locale is detectable by button width
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201808R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Latest version looks good to me!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #12968 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Specify HEASLR (High Entropy Address Space Layout Randomization) in MinGW-w64

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12968: Specify HEASLR (High Entropy Address Space Layout Randomization) in
MinGW-w64
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-rbm, ff60-esr, |  Actual Points:
  boklm201807, TorBrowserTeam201808  |
Parent ID:  #24631   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by heaslr):

 Replying to [comment:32 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:16 boklm]:
 > > There is a patch for review in branch `bug_12968`, adding the `-Wl
 ,--high-entropy-va` flag in the Windows x86_64 build:
 Windows has protections from cheaters like you who set that bit in
 executables by linker or by notepad ;)

 Replying to [comment:26 sukhbir]:
 > I tried (today) with `-mcmodel=medium`, `-mcmodel=large` (both with
 boklm's changes above and the GCC patch) and we have a similar if not the
 same error.
 Never try to change something which effect you don't know: we don't want
 executables >2 GiB, even for data. Also for you ->
 https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=46125
 > As to why it works for ffmpeg, it seems they are using the same flags so
 I am not sure; I am going to compare the toolchain and see if there is a
 difference there.
 https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=15444
 You were asked many times to stop using debug-grade gcc's crap in
 production code ;)

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #14952 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit HTTP/2 and SPDY if needed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14952: Audit HTTP/2 and SPDY if needed
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, tbb-usability-  |  Actual Points:
  website, tbb-performance, ff60-esr,|
  TorBrowserTeam201808   |
Parent ID:  #25735   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => new
 * keywords:
 tbb-linkability, tbb-usability-website, tbb-performance, ff60-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201808R
 =>
 tbb-linkability, tbb-usability-website, tbb-performance, ff60-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201808


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:47 arthuredelstein]:

 [snip]

 > Here's the revised patch for review:
 >
 > https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commit/14952+1

 Looks good. commit 36724cc11e94d0dc3094c94f046d76fb5ce44a2b on `tor-
 browser-60.1.0esr-8.0-1` has the changes.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27053 [Core Tor/Stem]: Check controller's event error handling

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27053: Check controller's event error handling
---+--
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  controller |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by atagar):

 Hi Dave, think I got it but tough to be sure. Does this do the trick for
 you?

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=abc6f29

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26189 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove our content policy hack for #8725

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26189: Remove our content policy hack for #8725
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, tbb-torbutton, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201808R  |
Parent ID:  #26544   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks. Merged to `master` (commit
 b9b87bcb3105e7aafb42f162b4bb1e8fc7dc54ba).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27112 [Core Tor/Stem]: Decouple payload processing from pop/unpack + tune abstraction layers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27112: Decouple payload processing from pop/unpack + tune abstraction layers
---+
 Reporter:  dmr|  Owner:  dmr
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  client |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  atagar |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Swapping our ticket status. Dave and I chatted on irc a couple days ago
 and he's gonna revise this so cells remain immutable.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26825 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA - Does the app need RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED intent?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26825: TBA - Does the app need RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED intent?
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201808  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24796| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Done. New branch `26825_1`.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27134 [Community/Tor Support]: connect issue

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27134: connect issue
---+--
 Reporter:  ElecLib|  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * owner:  (none) => phoul
 * component:  - Select a component => Community/Tor Support


Comment:

 {{{
 8/14/2018 9:03:15 AM.600 [WARN] Our clock is 56 minutes, 47 seconds behind
 the time published in the consensus network status document (2018-08-14
 08:00:00 UTC). Tor needs an accurate clock to work correctly. Please check
 your time and date settings!
 8/14/2018 9:03:15 AM.600 [WARN] Received microdesc flavor consensus with
 skewed time (CONSENSUS): It seems that our clock is behind by 56 minutes,
 47 seconds, or that theirs is ahead. Tor requires an accurate clock to
 work: please check your time, timezone, and date settings.
 }}}

 Did you check that time **and** timezone are correct on your machine?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25485 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/libstdc++.so.6: version `CXXABI_1.3.11' not found (required by /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libmirclient.so.9)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25485: Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/libstdc++.so.6: version `CXXABI_1.3.11' not found
(required by /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libmirclient.so.9)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201808R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 And in case you did not find it yet, you can override the default update
 URL by opening the Browser Console (Alt+Shift+J / Cmd-Shift+J), and then
 executing a command similar to:
 {{{
 Services.prefs.getDefaultBranch(null).setCharPref("app.update.url",
 
"https://myserver.com/tor/update_3/%CHANNEL%/%BUILD_TARGET%/%VERSION%/%LOCALE%";);
 }}}

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27142 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Unable to clear history / history remains after closing browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27142: Unable to clear history / history remains after closing browser
--+--
 Reporter:  AppleCrisp|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  browsing_history  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25485 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/libstdc++.so.6: version `CXXABI_1.3.11' not found (required by /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libmirclient.so.9)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25485: Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/libstdc++.so.6: version `CXXABI_1.3.11' not found
(required by /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libmirclient.so.9)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201808R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:44 boklm]:
 > So I am not sure if there is an easy way to test an update, without
 signing it.

 I don't know of s way to test without a signed MAR file. Kathy and I
 usually build from a slightly modified tor-browser tree in which we have
 replaced release_primary.der and release_secondary.der with our own files,
 which of course allows us to create and sign MAR files using our own key.
 But the entire process is inconvenient.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23818 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make v3 single onion services retry failed connections with a 3-hop path

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23818: Make v3 single onion services retry failed connections with a 3-hop path
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  assigned => new


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23818 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make v3 single onion services retry failed connections with a 3-hop path

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23818: Make v3 single onion services retry failed connections with a 3-hop path
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * owner:  neel => (none)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23588: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in
hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  assigned => new


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23588: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in
hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_revision => assigned
 * owner:  neel => (none)


Comment:

 I'll just give up on this bug. It is crashing too much.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23588: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in
hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 Replying to [comment:38 neel]:
 > I have a solution which should work (I tested and it does not crash),
 but it requires fixing #23818 first. I will upload a patch/PR for #23818
 hopefully by the end of the day.
 Never mind, this patch crashes also.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23588: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in
hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 I have a solution which should work (I tested and it does not crash), but
 it requires fixing #23818 first. I will upload a patch/PR for #23818
 hopefully by the end of the day.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27126 [Webpages]: tor-browser/user-manual: secure-connections.page includes source of tor-and-https.svg

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27126: tor-browser/user-manual: secure-connections.page includes source of tor-
and-https.svg
-+--
 Reporter:  traumschule  |  Owner:  t0mmy
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by ggus):

 * cc: Jaruga (added)
 * owner:  (none) => t0mmy
 * status:  new => assigned


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27126 [Webpages]: tor-browser/user-manual: secure-connections.page includes source of tor-and-https.svg

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27126: tor-browser/user-manual: secure-connections.page includes source of tor-
and-https.svg
-+
 Reporter:  traumschule  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by ggus):

 This only happens if you're blocking all the JavaScript.

 How to reproduce:

 - In Tor Browser set the Security Slider level to "safest".

 Maybe we could show two static images (one without https+Tor / other with
 https+Tor) if JavaScript is disabled/blocked?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27081 [Core Tor/Tor]: Don't link pthreads on win32, even if it is present

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27081: Don't link pthreads on win32, even if it is present
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  fast-fix 029-backport 032-backport   |  Actual Points:
  033-backport 034-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 ok; merged!

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27130 [Core Tor/Tor]: rust dependency updating instructions don't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27130: rust dependency updating instructions don't work
-+-
 Reporter:  cyberpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.9
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust, doc, 032-backport, |  Actual Points:
  033-backport, 034-backport |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cyberpunks):

 Yes, though the only real code change is dropping a single argument to
 cargo-vendor in the shell script.

 Backporting would make sense, but the shell script and the instructions in
 the documentation only exist in 0.3.3 and higher.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27050 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Reverse DNS lookups are still slow

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27050: Reverse DNS lookups are still slow
-+
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  karsten  |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by irl):

 Replying to [comment:5 karsten]:
 > > * The NodeStatus serialization is extended to include verified and
 unverified host names
 >
 > What exactly is the user-visible effect of this change? Should it go
 into the change log, too?

 No user-visible impact, but it changes the format of an internal document
 type. I also have a Python implementation of the NodeStatus document
 serialization for testing which required updating to interpret the new
 fields. This would not go in the changelog.

 > > * The last reverse DNS lookup time is now only updated on successful
 lookups
 >
 > This sounds potentially user-visible, too. Change log entry?

 The last lookup time is not served in the documents. Maybe it should be?
 It's not a user-visible change unless they look closely. A missing reverse
 name is treated as a failure and tried again on the next update, a success
 is only tried again after 12 hours.

 > Do you mind adding these change log entries in another commit?

 I'll do this shortly.

 > I'll start a local test run now. Assuming that it succeeds, should we
 put out 6.2-1.17.0 tomorrow?

 I wasn't sure if we should wait until 7.0 or not. This change doesn't
 violate protocol 6.2 as the host_name field is optional and I guess as
 it's mostly broken anyway it doesn't make much of a difference doing the
 update sooner.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27152 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use mozilla/fxc2.git for the fxc2 repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27152: Use mozilla/fxc2.git for the fxc2 repository
--+--
 Reporter:  sukhbir   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by sukhbir):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 For review:

 https://github.com/azadi/tor-browser-build-1/tree/fxc2

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

[tor-bugs] #27152 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Use mozilla/fxc2.git for the fxc2 repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27152: Use mozilla/fxc2.git for the fxc2 repository
--+--
 Reporter:  sukhbir   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 As https://github.com/mozilla/fxc2/pull/1 is merged, we should replace the
 fxc2 repository with that instead of using a personal repository.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #25485 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/libstdc++.so.6: version `CXXABI_1.3.11' not found (required by /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libmirclient.so.9)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25485: Browser/TorBrowser/Tor/libstdc++.so.6: version `CXXABI_1.3.11' not found
(required by /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libmirclient.so.9)
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201808R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201808 => ff60-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201808R
 * status:  reopened => needs_review


Comment:

 The patch in branch `bug_25485_v3` is fixing the permissions on `firefox`:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_25485_v2&id=82ab87b6742b4cc5e245739231887cbe51a59754

 I have not been able to test an update from 8.0a9 yet. It seems the pref
 `app.update.url.override` (which I think disabled signature verification)
 does not exist anymore. I tried manually installing the mar file,
 following the instruction from this page:
 https://wiki.mozilla.org/Software_Update:Manually_Installing_a_MAR_file
 But it complains about missing signature:
 {{{
 ERROR: There must be at least one signature.
 }}}
 So I am not sure if there is an easy way to test an update, without
 signing it.

 I uploaded my build at:
 https://people.torproject.org/~boklm/tmp/bug_25485/
 https://people.torproject.org/~boklm/tmp/bug_25485/sha256sums-unsigned-
 build.txt.asc

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26961 [Applications/Tor Browser]: implement new user onboarding

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26961: implement new user onboarding
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201808R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25695| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201808 => TorBrowserTeam201808R
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Thanks for the review. Here is a rebased Torbutton patch (yes, we had to
 import observe agsin):
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/torbutton.git/commit/?h=bug26961-02&id=b3e9549ef08adf6865aadfe5da30e2b43523931f

 I also rebased the browser patches as part of a minor change I made for
 #27082; if it is more convenient you can take the following two patches
 from our bug26961-03 tor-browser branch:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug26961-03&id=b56c7cb384d76016e9b25aaf1e252534e579ea69

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug26961-03&id=7ecd537d1d3f9120ad7e55943d8fbc59293ff0ec

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27082 [Applications/Tor Browser]: enable a limited UITour

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27082: enable a limited UITour
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201808R |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25695| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:2 gk]:
 > Those commits look good to me. I guess we could remove
 `isTestingOrigin()` as well as it is not used (anymore)?

 You are right and done. Here are the new commits:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug26961-03&id=bd51a3e4187e252a1b9ab3ec2fc714d7cd9a126c

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug26961-03&id=041bfe3d249ceb6c87d86d0c3d7c53aab16a8861

 (branch bug26961-03).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #14952 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit HTTP/2 and SPDY if needed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14952: Audit HTTP/2 and SPDY if needed
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, tbb-usability-  |  Actual Points:
  website, tbb-performance, ff60-esr,|
  TorBrowserTeam201808R  |
Parent ID:  #25735   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * keywords:
 tbb-linkability, tbb-usability-website, tbb-performance, ff60-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201808
 =>
 tbb-linkability, tbb-usability-website, tbb-performance, ff60-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201808R


Comment:

 Requesting review for the revised patch, but in the meantime I am also
 still looking into the disk avoidance question.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26189 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Remove our content policy hack for #8725

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26189: Remove our content policy hack for #8725
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, tbb-torbutton, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201808R  |
Parent ID:  #26544   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:  ff60-esr, tbb-torbutton, TorBrowserTeam201808 => ff60-esr,
 tbb-torbutton, TorBrowserTeam201808R
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Thanks for the review. Here's a revised patch:

 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/torbutton/commit/26189+1

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #23588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23588: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in
hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 Well, the "solution" above did not end up working (not committed,
 however).

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #14952 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Audit HTTP/2 and SPDY if needed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#14952: Audit HTTP/2 and SPDY if needed
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, tbb-usability-  |  Actual Points:
  website, tbb-performance, ff60-esr,|
  TorBrowserTeam201808   |
Parent ID:  #25735   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:44 gk]:
 > Nice, thanks for the investigation. Some first thoughts while reading
 through your notes:

 Thanks for the review and these good questions:

 > 1) Is the disk avoidance requirement respected in case there is some
 caching going on?

 I'm still working on figuring this out and will post here when I have an
 answer.

 > 2) Does New Identity give us a clean slate with HTTP/2 enabled?

 I looked into network connections, which are supposed to be killed as a
 result of torbutton sending a `net:prune-all-connections` notification. I
 followed the code to
 nsHttpConnectionMgr::ClosePersistentConnections(nsConnectionEntry *ent),
 which removes idle nsHttpConnections, causes active nsHttpConnections
 (which represents both HTTP1 and HTTP/2 connections) to immediately
 expire, regardless of whether these nsHttpConnections are HTTP/2
 (mSpdySession) or not. So I think New Identity is correctly stopping
 HTTP/2 connections.

 > 3) I don't see why we want to have server push enabled. Let's try with
 that disabled first.

 OK, I've opened #27127 to remind us to audit and potentially enable push
 in the future. In the meantime I will set `network.http.spdy.allow-push`
 to false.

 > 4) I am fine leaving possible PING/SETTINGS-related timing side-channels
 for a different bug for now. If so, please open a new one.

 I opened #27123.

 > 5) I am not overly happy about the different values of some of the prefs
 you mentioned above depending on being on a desktop/mobile platform we
 should investigate the impact of shipping the same configuration for both
 of them. After all, `tbb-fingerprinting-os` bugs are still bugs. I guess
 this can be done in a new bug as well.

 OK, I have opened #27128.

 Replying to [comment:45 gk]:
 > Oh, and 6): What about `dom.push.http2.*`? Are we getting the code
 behind those as well and, if so, are we good with it?

 These prefs are used by the Push API implementation. We are not currently
 affected by them, because we have dom.push.enabled set to false and
 dom.servicesWorkers.enabled set to false (both following Firefox 60ESR).
 These will be enabled in the next ESR, however (#15563).

 Here's the revised patch for review:

 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commit/14952+1

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26477 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Meek is broken in ESR60-based Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26477: Meek is broken in ESR60-based Tor Browser
+
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201807  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: Dbryrtfbcbhgf (added)


Comment:

 Resolved #27144 as a duplicate.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27144 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: When I try to request a bridge from torproject.org using Tor network settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27144: When I try to request a bridge from torproject.org using Tor network
settings
---+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 I think that's a duplicate of #26477. Nightly builds are working for me.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27144 [Applications/Tor Launcher]: When I try to request a bridge from torproject.org using Tor network settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27144: When I try to request a bridge from torproject.org using Tor network
settings
---+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf  |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Launcher  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by brade):

 * cc: tbb-team (added)


--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27050 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Reverse DNS lookups are still slow

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27050: Reverse DNS lookups are still slow
-+
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  karsten  |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 The code looks correct. I have a few questions to the list of changes
 though:

 > * SortedSets are used in place of Lists to ensure deterministic ordering
 of looked up names

 The second part, that looked up names are now ordered determistically,
 sounds like something we should mention in the change log. Whether that is
 done with SortedSet vs. List is too much detail for the change log, but
 the fact that the ordering is now deterministic is worth mentioning.

 > * The NodeStatus serialization is extended to include verified and
 unverified host names

 What exactly is the user-visible effect of this change? Should it go into
 the change log, too?

 > * The existing host name field in NodeStatus serializations is removed
 and a placeholder inserted

 No need to include this in the change log.

 > * The last reverse DNS lookup time is now only updated on successful
 lookups

 This sounds potentially user-visible, too. Change log entry?

 > * The host name field is removed from summary and details documents

 The "summary document" part here is potentially confusing, because we
 didn't include the host name in summary documents we're giving out. The
 only reason for having the field in `SummaryDocument` is that we're using
 it for the node index. I think it's fine to keep this comment in the
 commit message, but it should probably not go into the change log.

 The "details document" part should go into the change log, though.

 > * Tests are updated to use SortedSets in place of Lists

 No need to include this in the change log.

 Do you mind adding these change log entries in another commit?

 I'll start a local test run now. Assuming that it succeeds, should we put
 out 6.2-1.17.0 tomorrow?

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #26961 [Applications/Tor Browser]: implement new user onboarding

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26961: implement new user onboarding
--+
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201808  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25695| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:10 gk]:
 > This works for me, nice! I was a bit puzzled, though, that the circuit
 display pane (and every pane after it) does not have a button leading to
 the next pane. Is that intentional?

 It is intentional in the sense that it is spec'd in Antonela's design,
 here:
 https://marvelapp.com/5981a4b/screen/44384314
 (well, the circuit display panel is supposed to have an Explore button;
 that will be added as part of #26962).

 In Firefox ESR60 they do not use the buttons located in the bottom right
 for navigation between panes. The buttons are reserved for actions that
 allow users to explore more deeply, which is what we have for Circuit
 Display and the panes that follow it. Mozilla assumes users will navigate
 between panes using the names along the left hand side. I think it might
 be better to adopt that approach so that our use of the bottom right
 buttons is more consistent. But that is up to Antonela.

 It may also be possible to have more than one button (e.g., Circuit
 Display could have a "Next" button as well as "Explore"); I am not sure if
 Mozilla's implementation handles that or not, and it may be a bad idea
 from a UX perspective because people won't know which button to choose.

 > > One Torbutton patch:
 > >
 
​https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/torbutton.git/commit/?h=bug26961-01&id=4c69fedc9a0a927aea5d29e5060acb0df7016fef
 >
 > Looks good, but please rebase against `master` (note, there is no
 `observe()` imported anymore, we might want to do that again).

 I will rebase it.

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs

Re: [tor-bugs] #27150 [Core Tor/Tor]: Sandbox 1 is not working ubuntu 18.04 but worked fine in 16.04

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27150: Sandbox 1 is not working ubuntu 18.04 but worked fine in 16.04
--+
 Reporter:  peekaboo  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nusenu):

 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor


Comment:

 this is likely a duplicate of #25440

--
Ticket URL: 
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki 
The Tor Project: anonymity online
___
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs