Re: [tor-bugs] #28056 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: The bwauth consensus health graphs are missing gabelmoo

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28056: The bwauth consensus health graphs are missing gabelmoo
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by tom):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Nope, you just needed to remind me to update the config :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25483 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Windows reproducible build of snowflake

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25483: Windows reproducible build of snowflake
---+--
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  sukhbir
 Type:  project| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201805   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19001 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by tom):

 Given the roadmap for Tor Browser, switching to mingw-clang sometime in
 the next 4-ish months - is a reasonable path forward for this to get it
 built with mingw-clang?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28060 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix the missing unpack function in mmdb-convert.py

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28060: Fix the missing unpack function in mmdb-convert.py
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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[tor-bugs] #28060 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix the missing unpack function in mmdb-convert.py

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28060: Fix the missing unpack function in mmdb-convert.py
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 See https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/396

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28007 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: scan-build.sh issues

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28007: shellcheck: scan-build.sh issues
--+
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26263 [Applications/Tor Browser]: browser app icon positioned incorrectly in macOS DMG installer window

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#26263: browser app icon positioned incorrectly in macOS DMG installer window
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, tbb-8.0-issues,|  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201810   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 We thought of another idea and it is looking promising: manually creating
 a new `.DS_Store` file in the Finder on an old version of macOS works (I
 think that is how Kathy and I created the one we used for the alpha builds
 which included the sandbox profiles). Using that approach I think we can
 quickly create something that will work.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27616 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Double-check Rust code for potential proxy bypass in ESR 60

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27616: Double-check Rust code for potential proxy bypass in ESR 60
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201810  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22176| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Okay. Back to this.

 I took a slightly different approach.


 Step 1. Find all Cargo.toml files starting from the root of the repo.
 These will be useful next when we must find where the vendored crate is
 located within the repo.
 {{{
 $ find . -name Cargo.toml > all_cargo_toml
 }}}

 Step 2. Find the package name within each Cargo.toml files - these are the
 crate names we'll need later. These are of the form
 `path/to/Cargo.toml:name = "name-of-crate"`.
 {{{
 $ while read crate; do echo -n $crate:; grep -A4 '\[package\]' $crate |
 grep 'name ='; done < all_cargo_toml | grep 'toml:name =' >
 all_rust_crates
 }}}

 Step 3. From the list of crates, from the ones currently being used (or
 potentially being used)
 {{{
 $ while read crate; do grep "= \"$crate\"" all_rust_crates; done <
 rust_crates | sort > used_crates
 }}}

 Step 4. Search the used crates for expected proxy-bypass
 variables/functinos/methods/etc.
 {{{
 $ cut -d: -f 1 used_crates | sed 's/Cargo.toml//' | xargs grep -rni -E
 "tcp|udp|socket|bind|connect|listener|send|recv|stream" | grep -v -E
 "[bB]inding|[bB]indgen" | grep -ni --color=always -E
 "tcp|udp|socket|bind|connect|listener|send|recv|stream" | less -R
 }}}

 This resulted in 15373 matches.

 We can prevent 100 matches by excluding the directories audited in the
 previous comment.
 {{{
 $ cut -d: -f 1 used_crates | sed 's/Cargo.toml//' | xargs grep -rni -E
 "tcp|udp|socket|bind|connect|listener|send|recv|stream" | grep -v -E
 "[bB]inding|[bB]indgen" | grep -v -e '^./media/mp4parse-
 rust/mp4parse_capi' -e '^./servo/support/gecko/nsstring' -e
 '^./xpcom/rust/nserror' -e '^./netwerk/base/rust-helper' -e
 '^./xpcom/rust/xpcom' -e '^./modules/libpref/parser' -e '^./netwerk/base
 /rust-url-capi' -e '^./dom/webauthn/u2f-hid-rs' -e '^servo/ports/geckolib'
 | grep -ni --color=always -E
 "tcp|udp|socket|bind|connect|listener|send|recv|stream" | less -R
 }}}

 (to be to continued)

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[tor-bugs] #28059 [- Select a component]: How to enable add-ons in Tor Browser for Android

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28059: How to enable add-ons in Tor Browser for Android
+--
 Reporter:  Legion  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 I'm sick of this idiocy in what is now a crippled browser. Tor Desktop and
 Orfox have add-ons enabled by default, but not Tor Browser for Android. To
 make matter worse we're not told HOW to enable them: "We know what's best
 for you - and we've thrown the key to unlocking our crippled browser down
 the well aka about:config."

 Firstly, what is the specific !about:config configuration to enable add-
 ons that shouldn't be disabled in the first place? Secondly, why are you
 so determined to cause annoyance, irritation, and a waste of time and
 effort on the user's part, trying to get an answer to something that
 shouldn't even  be an issue?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27849 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bootstrapping hangs with 'SocksPort 0'

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27849: Bootstrapping hangs with 'SocksPort 0'
-+-
 Reporter:  pabs |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  config, regression, backport-034,|  Actual Points:
  035-must   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 #17359 is a similar issue where __DisablePredictedCircuits causes
 bootstrap to hang. But I don't think it is fixed by this patch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17359 [Core Tor/Tor]: __DisablePredictedCircuits causes bootstrap to hang at "Connecting to Tor Network"

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#17359: __DisablePredictedCircuits causes bootstrap to hang at "Connecting to 
Tor
Network"
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs bootstrap sponsor8-maybe  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  small
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 #27849 fixes a similar issue with SOCKSPort 0.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27758 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Tor Website->Volunteer->Tor->Bug Tracker: REPORT_VIEW privileges are required to perform this operation on report:12. You don't have the requi

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27758: Tor Website->Volunteer->Tor->Bug Tracker: REPORT_VIEW privileges are
required to perform this operation on report:12. You don't have the
required permissions.
--+-
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by teor):

 I have added REPORT_VIEW permissions to GRP_user. That should solve the
 issue for logged-in users.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27953 [Core Tor/Tor]: Authorization types for v3 onion service have to be clarified in documentation

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27953: Authorization types for v3 onion service have to be clarified in
documentation
---+--
 Reporter:  geoip  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tor-spec, tor-hs, hs-auth  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28026 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate
 * parent:   => #28026


Comment:

 I think #28026 fixes this issue.

 If not, please re-open this ticket and let us know what the remaining
 issues are.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27929 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider no longer calling routerlist_remove_old_routers() from check_descriptor_callback()

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27929: Consider no longer calling routerlist_remove_old_routers() from
check_descriptor_callback()
+--
 Reporter:  rl1987  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => technical-debt


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27947 [Core Tor/Tor]: Chutney's owning controller process code compares strings with ints

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27947: Chutney's owning controller process code compares strings with ints
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28035 [Obfuscation/Pluggable transport]: Goal 2019 Add 2 New Bridge types to replace OBFS4 Bridges

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28035: Goal 2019 Add 2 New Bridge types to replace OBFS4 Bridges
-+-
 Reporter:  TorCub   |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Pluggable transport  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical | Resolution:
 Keywords:  Bridge Obfuscation   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>
 * component:  Obfuscation/Obfsproxy => Obfuscation/Pluggable transport


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19074 [Core Tor/Tor]: Mark fallback directories down when their key is wrong

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#19074: Mark fallback directories down when their key is wrong
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client bad-retry annoying|  Actual Points:
  infinite-loop bootstrap|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * cc: neel (removed)
 * owner:  neel => (none)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19074 [Core Tor/Tor]: Mark fallback directories down when their key is wrong

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#19074: Mark fallback directories down when their key is wrong
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client bad-retry annoying|  Actual Points:
  infinite-loop bootstrap|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26369 [Core Tor/Tor]: Re-fetch onion service descriptor for isolated request

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#26369: Re-fetch onion service descriptor for isolated request
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-client, 035-roadmap- |  Actual Points:
  proposed, tbb-needs|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  assigned => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26369 [Core Tor/Tor]: Re-fetch onion service descriptor for isolated request

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#26369: Re-fetch onion service descriptor for isolated request
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-client, 035-roadmap- |  Actual Points:
  proposed, tbb-needs|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * owner:  neel => (none)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19074 [Core Tor/Tor]: Mark fallback directories down when their key is wrong

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#19074: Mark fallback directories down when their key is wrong
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-client bad-retry annoying|  Actual Points:
  infinite-loop bootstrap|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * cc: neel (added)
 * owner:  (none) => neel


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27971 [Core Tor/Tor]: Still supports 1024 bit keys

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27971: Still supports 1024 bit keys
+
 Reporter:  kroeckx |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  crypto regression?  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => needs_revision


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22133 [Core Tor/Chutney]: When CHUTNEY_DEBUG is set, make tor log a debug log

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22133: When CHUTNEY_DEBUG is set, make tor log a debug log
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20647| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #20647


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28013 [Core Tor/Tor]: run test-network-all in Travis CI

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28013: run test-network-all in Travis CI
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  test, chutney, consistency,  |  Actual Points:
  integration-testing, continuous-integration,   |
  tor-ci |
Parent ID:  #20647   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:4 catalyst]:
 > Replying to [comment:3 nickm]:
 > > It looks like chutney's diagnostics might not be on track for us to
 add Chutney to travis right now.  Maybe we should improve the diagnostics,
 and revisit it in 0.3.6?
 > That seems reasonable.

 I added some chutney diagnostic tickets as children of #20647.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24004 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Chutney should show tor logs when tor fails to launch

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#24004: Chutney should show tor logs when tor fails to launch
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20647| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #20647


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28013 [Core Tor/Tor]: run test-network-all in Travis CI (was: run test-network in Travis CI)

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28013: run test-network-all in Travis CI
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  test, chutney, consistency,  |  Actual Points:
  integration-testing, continuous-integration,   |
  tor-ci |
Parent ID:  #20647   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Old description:

> We should run `make test-network` in Travis CI for the tor repository.
> #27912 tracks the corresponding work for the chutney repository.

New description:

 We should run `make test-network-all` in Travis CI for the tor repository.
 #27912 tracks the corresponding work for the chutney repository.

--

Comment (by teor):

 We should run "make test-network-all" to catch more bugs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24939 [Core Tor/Chutney]: chutney should log warnings from tor-gencert and other startup processes

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#24939: chutney should log warnings from tor-gencert and other startup processes
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, intro   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #20647| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:   => #20647


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[tor-bugs] #28058 [Core Tor/Tor]: Run shellcheck as part of "make check"

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28058: Run shellcheck as part of "make check"
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  technical-debt
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 To avoid introducing shell script issues into Tor, we could run shellcheck
 (https://github.com/koalaman/shellcheck) as part of "make check".

 Since this is a technical debt check, I am tentatively assigning it to
 0.3.6.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #28008, #28009, #28010, #28011, ...

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
Batch modification to #28008, #28009, #28010, #28011, #28012 by teor:
milestone to Tor: 0.3.6.x-final

Comment:
Since these tickets are about technical debt, I'm tentatively putting them in 
0.3.6.

To avoid issues like this in future, we could run shellcheck as part of "make 
check" (#28058).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28006 [Core Tor/Tor]: shellcheck: chutney-git-bisect.sh issues

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28006: shellcheck: chutney-git-bisect.sh issues
--+--
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * component:  Core Tor/Chutney => Core Tor/Tor


Comment:

 Oops, this is a tor ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28006 [Core Tor/Chutney]: shellcheck: chutney-git-bisect.sh issues

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28006: shellcheck: chutney-git-bisect.sh issues
--+--
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * component:  Core Tor/Tor => Core Tor/Chutney


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27993 [Core Tor/Tor]: craft a git pre push hook that declines to receive fixup! commits?

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27993: craft a git pre push hook that declines to receive fixup! commits?
+
 Reporter:  arma|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => technical-debt
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.6.x-final


Comment:

 Since this is a process improvement task, I am tentatively putting it in
 0.3.6, marked technical-debt.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27993 [Core Tor/Tor]: craft a git pre push hook that declines to receive fixup! commits?

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27993: craft a git pre push hook that declines to receive fixup! commits?
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Let's make sure the hook also includes squash! and the other directives.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27519 [Core Tor/Tor]: missing "Service configured in" for hs-v3 lines in info log

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27519: missing "Service configured in" for hs-v3 lines in info log
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * version:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.2.1-alpha
 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 If this is a bug, it's on 0.3.2.1-alpha.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25076 [Core Tor/Tor]: wiki NextGenOnions: add link to contact asn for additions

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25076: wiki NextGenOnions: add link to contact asn for additions
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-wiki  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:   => tor-wiki
 * cc: asn (added)
 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


Comment:

 asn, I think this one is for you.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #27491, #27492

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
Batch modification to #27491, #27492 by teor:
milestone to Tor: unspecified

Comment:
These tickets can be moved to 0.3.6 if they get code.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27490 [Core Tor/Tor]: When ClientPreferIPv6ORPort is set to auto, and a relay is being chosen for a directory or orport connection, prefer IPv4 or IPv6 at random

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27490: When ClientPreferIPv6ORPort is set to auto, and a relay is being chosen 
for
a directory or orport connection, prefer IPv4 or IPv6 at random
--+
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17835| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Thanks for this patch, I asked for a few minor changes on the pull
 request.

 Please write a few tests for the new functions as well, and make sure the
 unit tests and the CI passes.

 Reminder: make changes, add commits to the branch, and push them to github
 to update the pull request. Don't rebase or merge the branch.

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[tor-bugs] #28057 [Core Tor/Tor]: When randomly choosing IPv4 or IPv6, log better IPv6 preference info

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28057: When randomly choosing IPv4 or IPv6, log better IPv6 preference info
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-client ipv6
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #17835
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 connection_connect_log_client_use_ip_version() logs an info-level message
 when ClientPreferIPv6ORPort isn't satisfied:
 
https://github.com/torproject/tor/blob/df2b46d18c4a3d6e5eb364f80111ef6c7811383c/src/core/mainloop/connection.c#L2019

 We should update it for ClientAutoIPv6ORPort.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27490 [Core Tor/Tor]: When ClientPreferIPv6ORPort is set to auto, and a relay is being chosen for a directory or orport connection, prefer IPv4 or IPv6 at random

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27490: When ClientPreferIPv6ORPort is set to auto, and a relay is being chosen 
for
a directory or orport connection, prefer IPv4 or IPv6 at random
--+
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #17835| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.3.6.x-final


Comment:

 If this code works, and we think it doesn't introduce too much technical
 debt, it will go in 0.3.6.

 Replying to [comment:8 neel]:
 > As per your request, I have a new PR:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/373
 >
 > However, this still lacks tests. At least right now, I don't see how I
 can fit tests into ClientAutoIPv6ORPort as the output can be random as a
 result of this function.

 Here's how we can test functions with random outputs:
 * work out what the possible results are. Run the functions that have
 random results, and check that the actual result is one of the possible
 results.
 * mock the function that calls the random number generator, and check that
 other functions behave correctly with each of the possible inputs (in this
 case, 0 and 1)
 * test the tor binary in integration tests using shell scripts, python, or
 chutney

 Replying to [comment:9 neel]:
 > Also, should I check for ClientAutoIPv6ORPort is 1 in
 fascist_firewall_use_ipv6()? I have added an commit for it. If not, is it
 okay if I delete the commit `67e5a36`?

 fascist_firewall_use_ipv6() means "can this client use IPv6?"
 So it needs to check for ClientAutoIPv6ORPort == 1. Let's keep the commit.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #27353, #27999, #28000

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
Batch modification to #27353, #27999, #28000 by teor:
milestone to Tor: unspecified

Comment:
These seem like long-term projects or features

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28050 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript resets settings when Tor Browser restarts

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28050: NoScript resets settings when Tor Browser restarts
--+--
 Reporter:  One Sock  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


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[tor-bugs] #28056 [Metrics/Consensus Health]: The bwauth consensus health graphs are missing gabelmoo

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28056: The bwauth consensus health graphs are missing gabelmoo
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  tom
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Consensus Health  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 Do we need to wait a few days for the results to appear, or does depictor
 need a config change?
 https://consensus-health.torproject.org/graphs.html#bwauthstatus

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28042 [Core Tor/sbws]: Restrictions on the number of minimum measurements to include a relay in the bandwidth file give very few relays

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28042: Restrictions on the number of minimum measurements to include a relay in
the bandwidth file give very few relays
---+-
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws 1.0 (MVP nice)
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [ticket:28042 juga]:
 > In #27338##comment:6, teor suggested:
 >
 > > If any of these things are true, do not put the relay in the bandwidth
 file:
 > > * there are less than 2 sbws measured bandwidths
 > > * all the sbws measured bandwidths are within 24 hours of each other
 >
 > With these restrictions and the current data, the number of relays to be
 included in the bandwidth file is only 242.
 > Removing 1st restriction (ie, min num measurements: 1), there're 5209
 relays
 > Incrementing the number of hours between each other to 3d, doesn't give
 any relays
 > Decrementing the number of hours between each other to 12h, gives 302
 relays
 >
 > So:
 > 1. we should check prioritization, in case we're not doing it correctly,
 probably should open a new ticket for that

 If sbws' current prioritisation rule says "stop when there is 1
 measurement", we need to change it to "stop when there are 2 measurements
 that are at least 24 hours apart".

 > 2. do we want to publish bandwidth files with such a small number of
 relays?

 Torflow only publishes files when they contain 60% of the relays in the
 network. We should open a ticket for sbws to do the same thing. (If we
 want to change from 60%, we can do it in sbws 1.1.)

 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torflow.git/tree/NetworkScanners/BwAuthority/aggregate.py#n46

 > 3. should we eliminate the restriction of having at least 2 measured
 bandwidths?

 No, we should keep measuring until there are enough bandwidths. See 1.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27844 [Core Tor/Tor]: rerun rustfmt

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27844: rerun rustfmt
--+
 Reporter:  cyberpunks|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by catalyst):

 Pull request in https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/406

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25459 [Metrics/Statistics]: Add graph that compares total consensus weights across bandwidth authorities

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25459: Add graph that compares total consensus weights across bandwidth
authorities
+-
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-

Comment (by arma):

 Ha, you can clearly see on that most recent graph where we tried the
 "enable PID feedback" experiment with torflow. Nice.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25459 [Metrics/Statistics]: Add graph that compares total consensus weights across bandwidth authorities

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25459: Add graph that compares total consensus weights across bandwidth
authorities
+-
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-

Comment (by teor):

 The graph looks good to me, and it will help me to answer PrivCount spec
 questions like "how many bits do we need to store consensus weight?"

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27913 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add test-stem to travis-ci if possible

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27913: Add test-stem to travis-ci if possible
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ci travis |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:6 rl1987]:
 > Revised and rebased patch: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/399
 Thanks, looks good! I did have one more small change that I wrote in a
 comment on the pull request. Sorry for not noticing the job speed thing
 earlier.

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[tor-bugs] #28055 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create an LDAP account for Antonela

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28055: Please create an LDAP account for Antonela
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256


 Please make an ldap account for Antonela, so she can help with the
 Sponsor19 reporting, plus hopefully other things in the future.

 First name: Antonela
 Last name: Debiasi
 Desired uid: antonela
 Forwarding address: t...@antonela.me (replaces current alias)

 $ gpg --fingerprint E2330A6D1EB5A0C8
 pub   4096R/E2330A6D1EB5A0C8 2017-10-27 [expires: 2022-10-26]
   Key fingerprint = 3661 678E 1CCE C8D4 9AF5  CFCD E233 0A6D 1EB5 A0C8
 uid  Antonela 
 uid  Antonela Debiasi 
 sub   4096R/673D27355F83A946 2017-10-27 [expires: 2022-10-26]

 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
 Version: GnuPG v1

 iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJbxP8+AAoJEMIYUlgZ94RR9T0P/A1dzHnDK+JQikFn9BxcatJg
 6ticYAyU1Po/5eDGYcbuxZK8nlidyBhk12jjsnVJEAgur9/p+YZuFTpAzhFpxe5/
 F5IG4nNXylvxC+Lc/Qo4+x4QnICxz8drHUeLo5JQWsZccIdKsMEF00QVarIFosDP
 zWhUj6oTnWwbZwvmrFjl+WVmE2wSnw7dESIhSFwrfhJaCuUQcphkQfw+mA9DhkYw
 SKg0X7bLx3wBfCLLDkFFGFEJVPn4Uajn3WqQ/5qA35PLFejEYN+wk/WwElvY+aTR
 YC7J1y2gKZlvuspv8RT320xy3qoaMbWzndSOLuMA25pZSG5Cjazd5IWdhjmzc4+9
 dXEwfx1h1vq1DcJA9Z/XZfGWrWwjV9hTQVTohBOPS/iVybBXNvBpuktl1BbQ2A0R
 ijAzOXYB/u7ms43IT42akpGV+gBXmX6XKZs4yFPM12olX558ZpZYUTmgDrr88442
 QF13TzKmCllGI7PqEYBgUf+mQeCZMNOWjdl9eL6Om07q68vTNTswmA/0mfRHwSij
 savWIxd2aaUuMJxbx52pLViuufiMaAHdPWMbi0uZxFWpq09ckcihZbkz160LmLrO
 4dlk9yNavRLdKDRvaTTPrGzewn/Qj4VkEhom2liDxK2EU7Xa/hnllRyuZWdbOAp8
 PGvwH9lKUCBY4SeA9vqG
 =3bhL
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28053 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create an LDAP account for gaba

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28053: Please create an LDAP account for gaba
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arma):

 Yes please!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27810 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs_service/helper_functions test seems unreliable on slow systems

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27810: hs_service/helper_functions test seems unreliable on slow systems
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-test, tor-hs, 035-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry   |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27810 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs_service/helper_functions test seems unreliable on slow systems

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27810: hs_service/helper_functions test seems unreliable on slow systems
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-test, tor-hs, 035-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry   |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Tests pass; lgtm!

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[tor-bugs] #28054 [Internal Services/Service - git]: Add gaba to sponsor19.git with RW access

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28054: Add gaba to sponsor19.git with RW access
-+
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512

 Please add gaba to the sponsor19.git repository with RW access.

 This message was written for a ticket on trac.torproject.org.
 Mon 15 Oct 21:32:08 BST 2018

 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

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 mljsxYTSC+24W0CEW1qqACX5KWtDOgw8LHyIiPBend/YpUeBFes=
 =pRQX
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

 Waiting for #28053.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28053 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create an LDAP account for gaba

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28053: Please create an LDAP account for gaba
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by irl):

 * cc: gaba (added)


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[tor-bugs] #28053 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please create an LDAP account for gaba

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28053: Please create an LDAP account for gaba
-+-
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512


 Please create an LDAP account for gaba.

 * name: Gaba
 * initial forwarding email address: g...@riseup.net
 * OpenPGP key fingerprint: EE3F DF5C AD91 643C 21BE  8370 180D B06C 59CA
 BD19
 * desired username: gaba (replacing mail alias)

 The fingerprint above was confirmed at the keysigning party in Mexico, and
 I
 will be signing it soon.

 Justification is of the "Do they need to access (read) a private git repo,
 like
 "dirauth-conf"?" variety.  It will be useful for Gaba to be able to follow
 the
 sponsor19 reports.

 This message was written for a ticket on trac.torproject.org.
 Mon 15 Oct 21:26:14 BST 2018

 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

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 =wZhp
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27200 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:tor favicon should be the tb icon

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27200: about:tor favicon should be the tb icon
--+---
 Reporter:  ProTipGuyFWIWWeLoveARMA   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by antonela):

 hi! could we use (CC80FF) for the dark theme? I tried it here
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/27200/27200.png

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27200 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:tor favicon should be the tb icon

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27200: about:tor favicon should be the tb icon
--+---
 Reporter:  ProTipGuyFWIWWeLoveARMA   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "27200.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27443 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Firefox RBM config and build for Android

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27443: Update Firefox RBM config and build for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201810   |
Parent ID:  #26693   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by boklm):

 Replying to [comment:8 sisbell]:
 > I made some additional fixes.

 * Could you push your new revisions to new branches instead of force-
 pushing on the same branch? This makes it harder to see what was changed
 since the previous revision.
 * Could you also rebase it on current master? It is currently based on a
 commit that is more than 2 months old.
 * I am not sure I understand what those lines are doing. This seems to be
 creating a `gcc -> gcc` symlink?
 {{{
 +[% IF c('var/android') %]
 +  ln -s gcc $ANDROID_NDK_HOME/arm/bin/gcc
 +[% END -%]
 }}}
 * could you add a comment explaining why we need the
 `projects/firefox/gradle.patch`? Maybe this is something we want to patch
 in `tor-browser.git` directly?
 * there is a trailing whitespace in `projects/firefox/mozconfig-android-
 armv7` at the end of the `--with-android-sdk=` line
 * do we really need our own build of binutils for the android build of
 firefox?
 * commit `6af47ae272b6098eac1c9ba886ff9ab04e3fc441` seems to have the
 wrong bug number
 * could you explain why we need `projects/firefox/android.patch`? It seems
 to be removing some code behind `#if defined(GP_OS_linux)` and forcing use
 of the code previously behind `#elif defined(GP_OS_android)`. Shouldn't
 `defined(GP_OS_linux)` be false and `defined(GP_OS_android)` be true in
 the android build?


 >
 >
 >
 > Some additional minor cleanup items left.
 >
 >  1. What to include in dist package. Just apks?

 I think `projects/firefox/build` can just copy the generated apk files,
 for now. Later we will probably need to repackage them in `projects/tor-
 browser/build` to include other components such as tor and Orbot, but this
 can be done later.

 >
 >
 >  1. Use a new var to indicate if mar tools should be built (rather than
 platform var)

 Don't we want to build mar files for android too? Or is the firefox
 updater based on mar files not working on android?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27925 [Metrics/ExoneraTor]: Permanent link on /exonerator.html? is http

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27925: Permanent link on /exonerator.html? is http
+--
 Reporter:  modik   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/ExoneraTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Replying to [comment:2 irl]:
 > For local testing environments you need HTTPS anyway or half the browser
 features are disabled and none of your JavaScript runs.

 Hmm, I usually don't have my local testing instance on HTTPS. But I also
 don't rely much on JavaScript running or not.

 > Wherever we are using absolute links, we can set these to
 `https://metrics.torproject.org/`.

 Without looking at the code right now, I think that we might have to
 extend that to `https://metrics.torproject.org/exonerator.html`. But I'm
 not sure.

 > Ideally though most of our links would be relative links.

 True, in theory. Not sure if there are any practical reasons against doing
 that.

 > Usually web applications have a "base URL" setting that can be
 overridden. Can we set this as a property with the default being
 `https://metrics.torproject.org/`?

 Sounds fine to me!

 Not grabbing just yet. If this is still owned by metrics-team in a couple
 of days I might grab it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28049 [Metrics/Website]: Update Exonerator URL on home page

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28049: Update Exonerator URL on home page
-+
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Good catch! Merged and deployed. Closing. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28052 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please set up a new PostgreSQL database called totalcw on meronense

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28052: Please set up a new PostgreSQL database called totalcw on meronense
-+
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This is done. Thanks, weasel!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25459 [Metrics/Statistics]: Add graph that compares total consensus weights across bandwidth authorities

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25459: Add graph that compares total consensus weights across bandwidth
authorities
+-
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Cool! Created #28052 for the database setup. Will comment here as
 deployment goes forward.

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[tor-bugs] #28052 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Please set up a new PostgreSQL database called totalcw on meronense

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28052: Please set up a new PostgreSQL database called totalcw on meronense
-+-
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 We need a new database called `totalcw` on meronense for #25459. Can you
 please `createdb` one? Settings as usual, that is, as the existing
 databases on that host. Thanks in advance!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27926 [Metrics/Website]: Session cookie being set on `metrics.torporject.org`

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27926: Session cookie being set on `metrics.torporject.org`
-+--
 Reporter:  modik|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Great! Closing. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27200 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:tor favicon should be the tb icon

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27200: about:tor favicon should be the tb icon
--+---
 Reporter:  ProTipGuyFWIWWeLoveARMA   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:8 arthuredelstein]:
 > antonela suggested we could just remove the Firefox favicon for now, and
 set the color of the "Tor Browser" text to violet (420C5D):
 > https://share.riseup.net/#lIUiQZtI_HsIdMvkk8H5lw

 That seems OK, although I would argue that it would be better to have an
 icon there for consistency with Firefox (which some users may be familiar
 with).

 BUT — the URL bar icon is not the subject of this ticket (and I think we
 have a ticket for the URL bar issue somewhere). This ticket is about the
 favicon which is displayed on the tab. Open about:support to see an
 example (and yes, about:support also has the wrong icon in the URL bar).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24805 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Update fallback whitelist in late 2018

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#24805: Update fallback whitelist in late 2018
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, 034-triage-20180328,   |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328, 035-removed-20180711,|
  035-roadmap|
Parent ID:  #24786   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by phoul):

 Removed 1 relay from fallback list at operators request:
 https://github.com/Phoul/tor/commit/17f4388b0fa377f7bbdf6f9df23ff429a717d4f8

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26697 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Android toolchain

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#26697: Add Android toolchain
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201810R  |
Parent ID:  #26693   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:15 sisbell]:
 > Created a full maven-repo archive, rather than just sample.

 - could you add a comment giving instructions for generating the maven
 repo archive? (as said in
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/27438#comment:12)
 - I think the maven repo filename should include a version number, as we
 will probably need to update it a some point.
 - there are trailing whitespaces after the gradle_dependencies URL and
 sha256sum lines

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26368 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider circuit isolation when closing redundant intro points

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#26368: Consider circuit isolation when closing redundant intro points
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-client, 035-roadmap- |  Actual Points:
  proposed, tbb-needs|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 Copied from GitHub: When I check if a `oc` has at least one isolation
 flag, should I check for *any* isolation flag, or a specific one?

 If it is the former, I am thinking about something like this:

 {{{
 diff --git a/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c b/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c
 index 10b67ceda..dc2d33281 100644
 --- a/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c
 +++ b/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c
 @@ -361,10 +361,21 @@ rend_client_close_other_intros(const uint8_t
 *rend_pk_digest)
origin_circuit_t *oc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(c);
if (oc->rend_data &&
rend_circuit_pk_digest_eq(oc, rend_pk_digest)) {
 -log_info(LD_REND|LD_CIRC, "Closing introduction circuit %d that
 we "
 - "built in parallel (Purpose %d).",
 oc->global_identifier,
 - c->purpose);
 -circuit_mark_for_close(c, END_CIRC_REASON_IP_NOW_REDUNDANT);
 +int has_isolation_flag = 0;
 +for (edge_connection_t *oc_stream = oc->p_streams; oc_stream !=
 NULL;
 + oc_stream = oc_stream->next_stream) {
 +  if (EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(oc_stream)->entry_cfg.isolation_flags) {
 +has_isolation_flag = 1;
 +break;
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +if (!has_isolation_flag) {
 +  log_info(LD_REND|LD_CIRC, "Closing introduction circuit %d that
 we "
 +   "built in parallel (Purpose %d).",
 oc->global_identifier,
 +   c->purpose);
 +  circuit_mark_for_close(c, END_CIRC_REASON_IP_NOW_REDUNDANT);
 +}
}
  }
}
 }}}

 The code in this comment seems much simpler than the code in the branch.
 Would that be okay? If so, the above code will replace the code in this
 branch.

 Also if the above code is okay, will we still need a unit test?

 If it is the latter, which flag should I check for?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24393 [Core Tor/Tor]: Clients should check IPv4 and IPv6 subnets when choosing circuit paths

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#24393: Clients should check IPv4 and IPv6 subnets when choosing circuit paths
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6, intro, tor-dirauth, security,  |  Actual Points:
  sybil, 034-triage-20180328,|
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #24403   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I have added tests for `nodes_in_same_family()`. I don't believe that
 tests for `nodelist_add_node_and_family()` are feasible because of
 smartlists.

 Setting this as needs review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27750 [Core Tor/Tor]: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27750: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, assert, 035-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 I think this could be related to the token bucket changes in #25373.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26697 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add Android toolchain

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#26697: Add Android toolchain
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201810R  |
Parent ID:  #26693   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 Created a full maven-repo archive, rather than just sample.

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[tor-bugs] #28051 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build Orbot into TBA

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28051: Build Orbot into TBA
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tba-a2
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 While we're waiting for #27609, we'll try building Orbot directly into TBA
 (this flows into #27977).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27443 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Firefox RBM config and build for Android

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27443: Update Firefox RBM config and build for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201810   |
Parent ID:  #26693   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 I made some additional fixes.

  1. Build packages the android dist directory.


  1.  No more exit 0 after build package.


  1. Uses a tarball of android archives so there is no network connection
 needed during build.


  1. Uses android-ndk packaged compilers.



 Some additional minor cleanup items left.

  1. What to include in dist package. Just apks?


  1. Use a new var to indicate if mar tools should be built (rather than
 platform var)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28050 [- Select a component]: NoScript resets settings when Tor Browser restarts

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28050: NoScript resets settings when Tor Browser restarts
--+
 Reporter:  One Sock  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by One Sock):

 * Attachment "noscript.png" added.


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[tor-bugs] #28050 [- Select a component]: NoScript resets settings when Tor Browser restarts

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28050: NoScript resets settings when Tor Browser restarts
--+--
 Reporter:  One Sock  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:|   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  noscript  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 I uncheck some of the default settings in NoScript (under the DEFAULT tab
 in the attached screenshot). When I start Tor Browser the next time, it
 resets my changes and I have to uncheck the boxes all over again. I'm
 using Tor Browser 8.0.2 for Linux.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25030 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update release process document for Tor Browser 8.0

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25030: Update release process document for Tor Browser 8.0
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-spec, TorBrowserTeam201810,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201810  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:  tbb-spec, TorBrowserTeam201810R, GeorgKoppen201810 => tbb-
 spec, TorBrowserTeam201810, GeorgKoppen201810
 * status:  needs_review => new


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:20 gk]:
 > `bug_25030` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 spec.git/commit/?h=bug_25030=f051f98b8f76f52e71679c291ab2c64c54107872)
 has some updates to our release process document up for review.

 Those changes look good to me. I cherry-picked this patch as commit
 `a9cece5a2988a94acf29702b220f8ed4146ebdc2`.

 I'm not closing the ticket yet as I'm planning to read the ReleaseProcess
 file again to check if anything is missing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27810 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs_service/helper_functions test seems unreliable on slow systems

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27810: hs_service/helper_functions test seems unreliable on slow systems
+--
 Reporter:  nickm   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-test, tor-hs, 035-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry   |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by dgoulet):

 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/405

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27915 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make rust doctests get linked in same way as other rust tests

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27915: Make rust doctests get linked in same way as other rust tests
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  rust 035-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25386 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  rust => rust 035-backport
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final => Tor: 0.3.6.x-final


Comment:

 Thanks, Alex! I'll try to get some useful information here once we've got
 the other stuff reviewed and merged.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27800 [Core Tor/Tor]: Non-fatal assertion !(old) failed in node_add_to_ed25519_map

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27800: Non-fatal assertion !(old) failed in node_add_to_ed25519_map
--+
 Reporter:  stefani   |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 035-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * owner:  (none) => catalyst
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27990 [Core Tor/Tor]: Missing sys/time.h include in procmon.c breaks netbsd compilation

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27990: Missing sys/time.h include in procmon.c breaks netbsd compilation
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 This looks good. Appveyor failures appear to be unrelated.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27800 [Core Tor/Tor]: Non-fatal assertion !(old) failed in node_add_to_ed25519_map

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27800: Non-fatal assertion !(old) failed in node_add_to_ed25519_map
--+
 Reporter:  stefani   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 035-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 note: ahf and I are going to try to figure this out

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27800 [Core Tor/Tor]: Non-fatal assertion !(old) failed in node_add_to_ed25519_map

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27800: Non-fatal assertion !(old) failed in node_add_to_ed25519_map
--+
 Reporter:  stefani   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 035-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 oops, copy-paste error. I meant: "note: catalyst and I are going to try to
 figure this out"

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27331 [Core Tor/Tor]: Non-fatal assertion ent->cdm_diff_status != CDM_DIFF_PRESENT failed in cdm_diff_ht_check_and_note_pending at src/or/consdiffmgr.c:272

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27331: Non-fatal assertion ent->cdm_diff_status != CDM_DIFF_PRESENT failed in
cdm_diff_ht_check_and_note_pending at src/or/consdiffmgr.c:272
--+
 Reporter:  a_p   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 note: ahf and I are going to try to figure this out

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27750 [Core Tor/Tor]: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27750: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, assert, 035-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 note: dgoulet and I are going to try to have a look here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27750 [Core Tor/Tor]: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27750: conn_close_if_marked: Non-fatal assertion !(connection_is_writing(conn))
--+
 Reporter:  dgoulet   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.8
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, assert, 035-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  new => accepted
 * owner:  (none) => dgoulet


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27200 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:tor favicon should be the tb icon

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27200: about:tor favicon should be the tb icon
--+---
 Reporter:  ProTipGuyFWIWWeLoveARMA   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * cc: arthuredelstein (added)


Comment:

 antonela suggested we could just remove the Firefox favicon for now, and
 set the color of the "Tor Browser" text to violet (420C5D):
 https://share.riseup.net/#lIUiQZtI_HsIdMvkk8H5lw

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22178 [Community/Mirrors]: Website redesign: Mirror list site

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22178: Website redesign: Mirror list site
---+-
 Reporter:  Samdney|  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  WebsiteV3
Component:  Community/Mirrors  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22150 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by traumschule):

 * cc: hiro, antonela (added)
 * status:  needs_information => assigned
 * owner:  linda => traumschule


Comment:

 This is potentially a duplicate of #22179. What do you think?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27998 [Community/Mirrors]: Find automatic solution to run the mirror script

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27998: Find automatic solution to run the mirror script
---+--
 Reporter:  traumschule|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Mirrors  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22182 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * cc: weasel (added)
 * owner:  traumschule => hiro
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 I have no say about this and assume objections.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22179 [Community/Mirrors]: Website redesign/Support portal: Instructions - Setting up a mirror

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22179: Website redesign/Support portal: Instructions - Setting up a mirror
---+-
 Reporter:  Samdney|  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Mirrors  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22150 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by traumschule):

 * cc: hiro, antonela (added)
 * owner:  (none) => traumschule
 * status:  new => assigned


Comment:

 Looking into easy options to turn the page(s) into markdown. Happy about
 your ideas on above questions.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27586 [Community/Mirrors]: Investigate if mirrorbits is an option to balance downloads

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27586: Investigate if mirrorbits is an option to balance downloads
---+-
 Reporter:  traumschule|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Mirrors  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22150 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by traumschule):

 * cc: hiro, weasel (added)
 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 After asking around it seems this is not needed at the moment. If dist
 turns out to have issues after releases this is a candidate to reopen.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #26035

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
Batch modification to #26035 by irl:
reviewer to irl

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24419 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Improve getter names for boolean fields

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#24419: Improve getter names for boolean fields
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl  |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by irl):

 * reviewer:   => irl


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25459 [Metrics/Statistics]: Add graph that compares total consensus weights across bandwidth authorities

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#25459: Add graph that compares total consensus weights across bandwidth
authorities
+-
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28049 [Metrics/Website]: Update Exonerator URL on home page

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28049: Update Exonerator URL on home page
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review my [[https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/irl/metrics-
 web.git/commit/?h=task/28049|commit]] on my task/28049 branch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28049 [Metrics/Website]: Update Exonerator URL on home page

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28049: Update Exonerator URL on home page
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  defect   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by irl):

 * cc: metrics-team (added)
 * owner:  metrics-team => irl
 * status:  new => accepted


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[tor-bugs] #28049 [Metrics/Website]: Update Exonerator URL on home page

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28049: Update Exonerator URL on home page
-+--
 Reporter:  irl  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+--


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27926 [Metrics/Website]: Session cookie being set on `metrics.torporject.org`

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27926: Session cookie being set on `metrics.torporject.org`
-+---
 Reporter:  modik|  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by irl):

 I no longer see any session cookie there. (:

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24805 [Core Tor/Fallback Scripts]: Update fallback whitelist in late 2018

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#24805: Update fallback whitelist in late 2018
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  phoul
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Fallback Scripts|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallback, 034-triage-20180328,   |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328, 035-removed-20180711,|
  035-roadmap|
Parent ID:  #24786   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by phoul):

 Added 1 relay at
 https://github.com/Phoul/tor/commit/9b946c13a2e825311eff40713574ba1608137010

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27925 [Metrics/ExoneraTor]: Permanent link on /exonerator.html? is http

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27925: Permanent link on /exonerator.html? is http
+--
 Reporter:  modik   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/ExoneraTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_information => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27925 [Metrics/ExoneraTor]: Permanent link on /exonerator.html? is http

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#27925: Permanent link on /exonerator.html? is http
+---
 Reporter:  modik   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/ExoneraTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---

Comment (by irl):

 For local testing environments you need HTTPS anyway or half the browser
 features are disabled and none of your JavaScript runs. Wherever we are
 using absolute links, we can set these to
 `https://metrics.torproject.org/`. Ideally though most of our links would
 be relative links.

 Usually web applications have a "base URL" setting that can be overridden.
 Can we set this as a property with the default being
 `https://metrics.torproject.org/`?

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[tor-bugs] #28048 [Metrics/Relay Search]: Metrics: Allow to search for relays per continent

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#28048: Metrics: Allow to search for relays per continent
--+--
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Relay Search  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 During the last relay meetings it was pointed out that one goal is to
 increase the relay diversity around the world so I went to check for
 relays on other continents.
 - Currently the metrics interface only allows to see relays for each
 country but not for continents.
 - Also it would be nice to be able to query for more than one country at
 once. At the moment only the first is shown:
 https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/country:al%20country:dz

 (if you prefer i can file a separate issue for the second one)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22181 [Community/Mirrors]: What can we do for mirror operator community

2018-10-15 Thread Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki
#22181: What can we do for mirror operator community
---+---
 Reporter:  Samdney|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Mirrors  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22150 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by traumschule):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Is this maybe a duplicate of #22150 or are there other ideas?

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