Re: [tor-bugs] #28187 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change Tor Circuit display icon to an onion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28187: Change Tor Circuit display icon to an onion
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good to me. Merged to `master` (commit
 6a9a4f528d8b8254402802a7a86cd722b747a5a6).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13005 [Webpages/Website]: Please document Tor Browser environment variables

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13005: Please document Tor Browser environment variables
--+--
 Reporter:  mttp  |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  faq   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by traumschule):

 Made some corrections and rebased. The wiki [[TorBrowserBundle3SAQ]] has
 been incorporated while [[TorBrowserBundleSAQ]] has more info that may be
 outdated. In that case it is maybe better to blank it? Unsure what to do
 about comment:5.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28367 [Core Tor/Tor]: RFE additional DOS mitigations for exits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28367: RFE additional DOS mitigations for exits
--+--
 Reporter:  starlight |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tor-dos   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24797| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:3 starlight]:
 > An obvious objection to ulimit -n as a control is that this is
 simplistic with respect to multi-homed systems and may not always result
 in resilient behavior.  Port limits operate with respect to IP addresses
 rather than at global daemon level.  If ulimit -n is saturated, it will
 not be possible to open new control connections.

 You can open new control connections if you set ulimit -n to a level your
 system can handle, and also set `DisableOOSCheck 0`:

 > > To reduce the number of file handles, use ulimit -n (limit) or the
 equivalent daemon launcher option.
 > >
 > > You may also want to set DisableOOSCheck 0 in your torrc, which causes
 tor to terminate connections at around 90% of the limit, rather than
 failing.

 Replying to [comment:4 starlight]:
 > Another point to think about is rate limiting of connections.  Scanners
 generally operate by extending a number of circuits to an exit and then
 rapidly opening streams / edge_connections on each, so an effective way to
 mitigate this form of behavior is to have a rate limit that curtails or
 kills circuits that rapidly initiate connections while leaving calmer
 circuits untouched.  The first priority flesh-and-blood users who brows
 the web can continue unharassed while bots get squelched.

 You're right: we should work out a way of rate-limiting exit connections
 as well.

 Until we do that, I suggest using a firewall to rate-limit the number of
 new outbound connections. It's not as targeted as inbound connections per
 IP address, but it will help.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28144 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update projects/tor-browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28144: Update projects/tor-browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811, TBA-a2   |
Parent ID:  #26693   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sisbell):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Changes (android-1107)

  * build.android: added debug build signing
  * build.android: no longer unzip and then rezip. Now use the zip options
 for adding and deleting files. This prevents runtime problems where files
 are compressed incorrectly.
  * config: Add java JDK dependency. This is needed for the keytool and
 jarsigner executables
  * config: removed desktop var and use android var directly for enabling
 projects

 Verified that the debug apk starts up. I'm not sure how to verify all the
 extensions are working correctly but they are included in the apk..

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27443 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Firefox RBM config and build for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27443: Update Firefox RBM config and build for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, TBA-a2, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811   |
Parent ID:  #26693   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sisbell):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Changes (android-1107)

  * [mozconfig:L mozconfig: enable-strip option set]
  * mozconfig: added comment that llvm-config is not supported in android
 NDK
  * fetch-gradle-dependencies: add bug number to comment
  * how-to-create-gradle-dependencies-list.txt: clarified how to start
 dependency list from scatch
  * build: copy apk with a fixed file name (to make it easier to process in
 tor-browser)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28140 [Core Tor/Tor]: Our circuit died due to an invalid selected path if switching to plugabble transports

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28140: Our circuit died due to an invalid selected path if switching to 
plugabble
transports
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-path, regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by essentially):

 Replying to [ticket:28140 gk]:
 > This makes Tor Browser essentially unusable until one changes settings
 again or restarts.
 Unfortunately, this breaks the most common browsing experience (plain tor
 w/o bridges, WiFi network).
 Neither changing settings to obfs4, nor switching back can help.
 Killing tor process manually when obfs4proxy process is already running
 leads to tor process is unable to boot and exits immediately (config is
 default, switched from obfs4). Killing obfs4proxy process helps, but tor
 launcher got stuck at 80% for about a minute (no CPU or network activity),
 so it's hard to realize it's booting.
 After all, the circuit display disappeared after the tor restart :(

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28144 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update projects/tor-browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28144: Update projects/tor-browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811, TBA-a2   |
Parent ID:  #26693   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 Replying to [comment:23 sisbell]:
 > Replying to [comment:22 sisbell]:
 > > I have something locally that is building a debug signed apk with the
 extensions in the apk. When I try to run the apk it crashes. I've attached
 the crash logs if anyone has any ideas.
 > >
 > > After some research, I'm suspecting that a simple zip of the apk won't
 work. This file is what Mozilla is using
 > > ./python/mozbuild/mozbuild/action/package_fennec_apk.py
 > >
 > I can get rid of the omni.ja errors by not compressing this specific
 file during the zip process but the sqlite libraries missing error is
 still showing up.

 I have this solved. I'll check in changes shortly.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28367 [Core Tor/Tor]: RFE additional DOS mitigations for exits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28367: RFE additional DOS mitigations for exits
--+--
 Reporter:  starlight |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tor-dos   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24797| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by starlight):

 Another point to think about is rate limiting of connections.  Scanners
 generally operate by extending a number of circuits to an exit and then
 rapidly opening streams / edge_connections on each, so an effective way to
 mitigate this form of behavior is to have a rate limit that curtails or
 kills circuits that rapidly initiate connections while leaving calmer
 circuits untouched.  The first priority flesh-and-blood users who brows
 the web can continue unharassed while bots get squelched.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24797 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add an option that makes Tor use fewer connections

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24797: Add an option that makes Tor use fewer connections
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-dos,  |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328, |
  035-removed-20180711   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by starlight):

 * cc: starlight@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28367 [Core Tor/Tor]: RFE additional DOS mitigations for exits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28367: RFE additional DOS mitigations for exits
--+--
 Reporter:  starlight |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tor-dos   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24797| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by starlight):

 An obvious objection to ulimit -n as a control is that this is simplistic
 with respect to multi-homed systems and may not always result in resilient
 behavior.  Port limits operate with respect to IP addresses rather than at
 global daemon level.  If ulimit -n is saturated, it will not be possible
 to open new control connections.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28144 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update projects/tor-browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28144: Update projects/tor-browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811, TBA-a2   |
Parent ID:  #26693   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 Replying to [comment:22 sisbell]:
 > I have something locally that is building a debug signed apk with the
 extensions in the apk. When I try to run the apk it crashes. I've attached
 the crash logs if anyone has any ideas.
 >
 > After some research, I'm suspecting that a simple zip of the apk won't
 work. This file is what Mozilla is using
 > ./python/mozbuild/mozbuild/action/package_fennec_apk.py
 >
 I can get rid of the omni.ja errors by not compressing this specific file
 during the zip process but the sqlite libraries missing error is still
 showing up.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25140 [Core Tor/Tor]: Parse only .torrc files in torrc.d directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25140: Parse only .torrc files in torrc.d directory
-+-
 Reporter:  iry  |  Owner:
 |  Jigsaw52
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  035-removed-20180711   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28085 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update key/values in the bandwidth file spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28085: Update key/values in the bandwidth file spec
---+-
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws 1.0 (MVP must)
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27107 | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet, teor  |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * reviewer:  dgoulet => dgoulet, teor


Comment:

 I added some more comments on the spec.

 It seems like the bandwidth file examples are out of sync with the spec.
 Let's commit examples that match the spec. Otherwise, metrics will get
 confused.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28144 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update projects/tor-browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28144: Update projects/tor-browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811, TBA-a2   |
Parent ID:  #26693   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 I have something locally that is building a debug signed apk with the
 extensions in the apk. When I try to run the apk it crashes. I've attached
 the crash logs if anyone has any ideas.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28144 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update projects/tor-browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28144: Update projects/tor-browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811, TBA-a2   |
Parent ID:  #26693   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sisbell):

 * Attachment "crash.txt" added.

 Crash log of debug apk

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28378 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add libsystemd-devel to the travis config, if available

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28378: Add libsystemd-devel to the travis config, if available
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  fast-fix, tor-systemd,   |  Actual Points:
  029-backport, 033-backport, 034-backport,  |
  035-backport   |
Parent ID:  #28113   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Ubuntu trusty does not have systemd.
 We will have to wait until bionic or cosmic.
 
https://packages.ubuntu.com/search?keywords=systemd=names=all=all

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28357 [Core Tor/Stem]: Stem's integ tests are broken on Travis

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28357: Stem's integ tests are broken on Travis
---+-
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 > In #28170, I'll fix stem's travis config so it only tests supported Tor
 versions (0.2.9, 0.3.3 and later).

 Thanks teor! To be clear my goal with Stem is to be compatible with all
 non-deprecated **relay** versions. In checking the server-versions's line
 of a [https://collector.torproject.org/recent/relay-
 descriptors/consensuses/2018-11-05-02-00-00-consensus recent consensus]
 that's 0.2.9.14 and above.

 If there's anything you think we should do on my end please let me know.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28367 [Core Tor/Tor]: RFE additional DOS mitigations for exits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28367: RFE additional DOS mitigations for exits
--+--
 Reporter:  starlight |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tor-dos   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #24797| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * parent:   => #24797
 * version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9 => Tor: unspecified
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final => Tor: unspecified
 * keywords:   => tor-dos
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Tor will use all available file handles for connections. If your system
 does not support that many connections, then you should reduce the number
 of file handles that tor can use.

 To reduce the number of file handles, use `ulimit -n (limit)` or the
 equivalent daemon launcher option.

 You may also want to set `DisableOOSCheck 0` in your torrc, which causes
 tor to terminate connections at around 90% of the limit, rather than
 failing.

 Socket limits will be better documented in 0.3.5:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/doc/tor.1.txt#n300

 The rest of this ticket is a duplicate of #24797, which stalled in
 needs_revision.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24797 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add an option that makes Tor use fewer connections

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24797: Add an option that makes Tor use fewer connections
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-dos,  |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328, |
  035-removed-20180711   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:16 teor]:
 > Hi,
 >
 > The MaxSockets default in the man page is incorrect:
 > {{{
 > (Default: 1000)
 > }}}
 > It should say "Default: unlimited" or something similar.
 >
 > I don't think we should fail if ConnLimit_ is lower than MaxSockets: why
 not just log a notice message, and use ConnLimit_?
 > MaxSockets is a maximum, not a minimum requirement.
 >
 > Please update the options unit tests to test the new option, and its
 interaction with DisableOOSCheck.


 Replying to [comment:18 arma]:
 > Replying to [comment:16 teor]:
 > > I don't think we should fail if ConnLimit_ is lower than MaxSockets:
 why not just log a notice message, and use ConnLimit_?
 >
 > Use ConnLimit for what? As the min or as the max?

 `ConnLimit_` (underscore) is the maximum number of file descriptors
 discovered from the OS. Tor doesn't go above this limit: it is a maximum.

 `ConnLimit` (no underscore) is the minimum required value of `ConnLimit_`
 for tor to start.

 So I suggest replacing `ConnLimit_` with `min(MaxSockets, ConnLimit_)`:

 > > > If you add another torrc option MaxSockets, then use min(MaxSockets,
 ConnLimit_) instead of ConnLimit_, all the rest of the code should just
 work.
 > > >
 > > > Using min(MaxSockets, ConnLimit_) allows us to override the OS when
 its limit is too high, and it makes sure we don't ever go over the OS
 limit.

 > I'm still thinking we shouldn't add this feature. We periodically have
 people who want this sort of thing, and if they set it and it gets
 triggered, they are being a bad relay. Why are we offering them a way to
 be a bad relay?

 Because they're about to hit their limit anyway, and they want to fail
 slightly less awfully using `DisableOOSCheck 0`.

 Some people want to be able to access their relays after tor hits its
 socket limit (#28367). And as neel said, others can't set ulimit on their
 machines.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28113 [Core Tor/Tor]: notify systemd if shutdown will be longer than 30 seconds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28113: notify systemd if shutdown will be longer than 30 seconds
-+-
 Reporter:  Hello71  |  Owner:  Hello71
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.6.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-systemd, 029-backport-maybe, |  Actual Points:
  033-backport-maybe, 034-backport-maybe, 035|
  -backport-maybe|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by Hello71):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_information


Comment:

 I use Arch which includes devel files in the standard package. It turns
 out, though, that I either accidentally removed the patch from my local
 list or never included it in the first place, so it would seem that I
 haven't tested this at all. I may have assumed that Travis had systemd-
 devel already. Patch is already applied though, and seems like too much
 work to back it out, so let's say test it for a little while and see if
 anyone complains. :P

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Re: [tor-bugs] #9936 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB TorButton 'New Identity' with remote 'tor' says "It does not have access to the Tor Control Port."

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9936: TBB TorButton 'New Identity' with remote 'tor' says "It does not have
access to the Tor Control Port."
-+-
 Reporter:  starlight|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-newnym, extdev-interview, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  torbutton  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by traumschule):

 This issue is mentioned in the to be merged FAQ entry for #13005.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28363 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a torrc option which prevents Tor from falling asleep

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28363: Make a torrc option which prevents Tor from falling asleep
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  arma
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
--+--
Changes (by catalyst):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor8-can
 * milestone:   => Tor: unspecified


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28367 [Core Tor/Tor]: RFE additional DOS mitigations for exits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28367: RFE additional DOS mitigations for exits
--+
 Reporter:  starlight |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by catalyst):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28376 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TB don't create a new circuit when there is a HTTPS error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28376: TB don't create a new circuit when there is a HTTPS error
--+--
 Reporter:  h1n1  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by catalyst):

 * owner:  (none) => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28357 [Core Tor/Stem]: Stem's integ tests are broken on Travis

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28357: Stem's integ tests are broken on Travis
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:1 atagar]:
 > Hi teor, tor's [https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-
 manual.html.en#ExitRelay ExitRelay] torrc parameter was
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/commit/?id=35efce1 added in
 November 2014].
 >
 > Oddly I can't find the
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/commit/?id=412e3f7dc9c6c01a tor git
 commit] the tests cite

 It's probably a commit in the ubuntu (or debian) downstream.

 > but in checking tor's maint-0.2.4 branch that option indeed wasn't
 present so guess 0.2.4 is pretty antiquated.
 >
 > {{{
 > % git checkout origin/maint-0.2.4
 > % grep ExitRelay doc/tor.1.txt | wc -l
 > 0
 > }}}
 >
 > If you provide me with the tor version when the ExitPolicy torrc option
 was added I can adjust stem's tests to exclude it from its integ test
 torrc when older than that.

 tor-0.2.6.3-alpha

 Here's the git command to find the first version that contains a commit,
 for future reference:
 {{{
 $ git describe --contains 35efce1
 tor-0.2.6.3-alpha~199^2~1
 }}}

 Although I do wonder if the integ tests will find more unsupported
 options.

 In #28170, I'll fix stem's travis config so it only tests supported Tor
 versions (0.2.9, 0.3.3 and later).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28113 [Core Tor/Tor]: notify systemd if shutdown will be longer than 30 seconds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28113: notify systemd if shutdown will be longer than 30 seconds
-+-
 Reporter:  Hello71  |  Owner:  Hello71
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.6.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-systemd, 029-backport-maybe, |  Actual Points:
  033-backport-maybe, 034-backport-maybe, 035|
  -backport-maybe|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:14 nickm]:
 > Hm. Apparently this broke with systemd-devel installed.
 212bd9778b5c249f02f8fbdc1e8ccbe4c108f03a made it work for me, but I'm a
 little worried about how tested this could be.

 I didn't test with libsystemd-devel, and travis doesn't have libsystemd-
 devel installed.

 So I guess that just leaves any testing that Hello71 did.

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[tor-bugs] #28378 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add libsystemd-devel to the travis config, if available

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28378: Add libsystemd-devel to the travis config, if available
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:  Tor: unspecified
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  fast-fix, tor-systemd,
 Severity:  Normal   |  029-backport, 033-backport, 034-backport,
 |  035-backport
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #28113
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 In #28113, we discovered that libsystemd-devel was not installed in
 travis. We should install it, and build with it.

 We should probably do #28377 at the same time.

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[tor-bugs] #28377 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add libnss to the travis apt and macOS packages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28377: Add libnss to the travis apt and macOS packages
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  fast-fix, tor-ci, travis
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 The travis image already has these packages:
 {{{
 libnss3:amd64   2:3.28.4-0ubuntu0.14.04.3
 libnss3-dev:amd64   2:3.28.4-0ubuntu0.14.04.3
 libnss3-nssdb   2:3.28.4-0ubuntu0.14.04.3
 }}}

 But we should add them to the travis config, in case they are removed in a
 future version.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26910 [Core Tor/Tor]: Could tor drop privileges even earlier? (before trying to access anything on the filesystem beyond its torrc files)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26910: Could tor drop privileges even earlier? (before trying to access 
anything
on the filesystem beyond its torrc files)
--+--
 Reporter:  nusenu|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  036-roadmap-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 #22331 is a very related ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22331 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor needs to stop trying to read directories before it changes users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22331: Tor needs to stop trying to read directories before it changes users
-+--
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  032-unreached, apparmor  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by arma):

 #26910 is a very related ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28349 [Metrics/Website]: Make "We're Hiring" more visible on Tor Metrics website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28349: Make "We're Hiring" more visible on Tor Metrics website
-+--
 Reporter:  karsten  |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks great! Much better than what we had before. Updated and deployed.
 Closing. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28252 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Firefox Multi-Account Containers don't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28252: Firefox Multi-Account Containers don't work
--+---
 Reporter:  morar |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by morar):

 What does "does not work" mean?

 If you install Firefox Multi-Account Containers and then you try to open
 work container, this don't open without error message.

 To reproduce this issue simply install the addon and try to open work
 container.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28144 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update projects/tor-browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28144: Update projects/tor-browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811, TBA-a2   |
Parent ID:  #26693   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:20 gk]:
 > Replying to [comment:19 sisbell]:
 > > I'm not seeing the debug flag on the debug signed build that we
 generate. From what I can tell in line 78 of
 ./mobile/android/app/build.gradle, it is saying if MOZILLA_OFFICIAL is
 set, then it flags the build as not debuggable. This has implications such
 as reduced logging and not being able to step through debug points with
 the IDE. If we also flag as nightly build AND debug, it will overwrite the
 MOZ_OFFICIAL flag.
 > >
 > > I'm not sure if this is something we should be concerned about right
 now? Or can we just push it off for now?
 >
 > I think that's fine for now.

 I agree. Currently, for releasing, we only build TBA with
 MOZILLA_OFFICIAL=1. If someone needs a debuggable build, then they can
 build that separately (we can document how a developer should accomplish
 this). In fact, the reason we added `export MOZILLA_OFFICIAL=1` into
 .mozconfig-android (and subsequently other mozconfigs) was because when we
 first tried uploading the first TBA alpha version to Google Play, it still
 had debuggable=true, and Google Play rejected it. I believe tor-browser-
 build should output releasable bundles.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28113 [Core Tor/Tor]: notify systemd if shutdown will be longer than 30 seconds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28113: notify systemd if shutdown will be longer than 30 seconds
-+-
 Reporter:  Hello71  |  Owner:  Hello71
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.6.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-systemd, 029-backport-maybe, |  Actual Points:
  033-backport-maybe, 034-backport-maybe, 035|
  -backport-maybe|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Hm. Apparently this broke with systemd-devel installed.
 212bd9778b5c249f02f8fbdc1e8ccbe4c108f03a made it work for me, but I'm a
 little worried about how tested this could be.

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[tor-bugs] #28376 [- Select a component]: TB don't create a new circuit when there is a HTTPS error

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28376: TB don't create a new circuit when there is a HTTPS error
+--
 Reporter:  h1n1|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 I has get a HTTPS error in a site the I know have a valid certificate,
 maybe a bad exit node, but when I try to set up a new circuit I was unable
 to do it, I create a new identity and the site works well with the new
 identity create circuit

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28260 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor nightly builds are broken on Linux with Rust enabled (since 10/31)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28260: Tor nightly builds are broken on Linux with Rust enabled (since 10/31)
---+---
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201811  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:5 alexcrichton]:
 > Oh dear, sorry for the breakage here! This can also be fixed locally
 with a patch that looks like this --
 https://gist.github.com/alexcrichton/108f3c3bb70d8e5d250a63f0ca986d58 --
 where the feature here which requires 1.28.0 isn't used unless 1.28.0 is
 compiled in. It means that the sanitizer tests won't work on pre-1.28.0
 compilers, but that's already true for other reasons!
 >
 > If something like that would work I don't mind sending a PR for it!

 Thanks for the patch, really appreciated! I am a bit wary to either ship
 it just in our Tor Browser build environment (as we would not test tor
 `master` anymore that way) or trying to convince the tor folks to take it
 for our sake despite their policy to essentially go with Rust stable
 releases.

 This won't be the last time that we have to figure out how to deal with
 different Rust minimum version requirements (i.e. our compiler
 requirements for all platforms and all parts of the bundle vs. those tor
 has). So far I think using two different ones for our nightly builds is
 okay-ish for us. But it might be smart to think harder to be prepared for
 future issues.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28260 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor nightly builds are broken on Linux with Rust enabled (since 10/31)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28260: Tor nightly builds are broken on Linux with Rust enabled (since 10/31)
---+---
 Reporter:  gk |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201811  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201811R => tbb-rbm,
   TorBrowserTeam201811


Comment:

 Just one nit: In the macOS block it is enough to have `mkdir
 $distdir/helper` as we are now creating $distdir for all platforms at the
 beginning.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28184 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reload is additive with regards to new v3 HS client authorizations but it won't subtract deleted ones

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28184: Reload is additive with regards to new v3 HS client authorizations but 
it
won't subtract deleted ones
--+
 Reporter:  jchevali  |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by haxxpop):

 Replying to [comment:9 dgoulet]:
 > 2. Clearing our descriptor cache (client side):
 >
 >  This is a bit more interesting because if the client authorization for
 A.onion changed then the old descriptor is not usable anymore meaning we
 won't be able to decrypt it.
 >
 >  There lies another issue. I don't think we have that feature which is
 if a client looks up a descriptor in its cache and can not decrypt it, we
 should purge it and refetch it. A client does NOT store a descriptor that
 it can't decode so at least that is that. But this situation can happen if
 we change the client auth for A.onion and SIGHUP.
 >
 > All in all, we could reduce the complexity of this patch by simply
 adding a way to "purge a undecodable descriptor in our cache" which will
 lead to fetching the new descriptor and using the new client
 authorization.
 >
 > We would ignore the closing the circuits because if there is an RP
 circuit for A.onion, great we use it.

 I would like to add some opinion here. I think "refetching when the client
 can't decode or can't use the IPs" should be considered not client auth
 related.

 I mean we should refetch only when we can't decode or can't use the IPs.
 It shouldn't be triggered by anything else like when the client change the
 auth config, or anything else. Otherwise, I think the code will be too
 complex.

 ps. I use the word "refetch" instead of "clear cache" because I think the
 meanings are similar.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28144 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update projects/tor-browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28144: Update projects/tor-browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811, TBA-a2   |
Parent ID:  #26693   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:19 sisbell]:
 > I'm not seeing the debug flag on the debug signed build that we
 generate. From what I can tell in line 78 of
 ./mobile/android/app/build.gradle, it is saying if MOZILLA_OFFICIAL is
 set, then it flags the build as not debuggable. This has implications such
 as reduced logging and not being able to step through debug points with
 the IDE. If we also flag as nightly build AND debug, it will overwrite the
 MOZ_OFFICIAL flag.
 >
 > I'm not sure if this is something we should be concerned about right
 now? Or can we just push it off for now?

 I think that's fine for now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28144 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update projects/tor-browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28144: Update projects/tor-browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811, TBA-a2   |
Parent ID:  #26693   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 I'm not seeing the debug flag on the debug signed build that we generate.
 From what I can tell in line 78 of ./mobile/android/app/build.gradle, it
 is saying if MOZILLA_OFFICIAL is set, then it flags the build as not
 debuggable. This has implications such as reduced logging and not being
 able to step through debug points with the IDE. If we also flag as nightly
 build AND debug, it will overwrite the MOZ_OFFICIAL flag.

 I'm not sure if this is something we should be concerned about right now?
 Or can we just push it off for now?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22074 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Review Firefox Developer Docs and Undocumented bugs since FF52esr

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22074: Review Firefox Developer Docs and Undocumented bugs since FF52esr
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201811  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by mcs):

 One more for which I almost forgot to create a ticket:
 #28375 - improve handling of uninstalled protocol handler

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28375 [Applications/Tor Browser]: improve handling of uninstalled protocol handler

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28375: improve handling of uninstalled protocol handler
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Description changed by mcs:

Old description:

> In https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1408010 (for Firefox 58),
> Mozilla fixed things so that the protocol handler code would prompt if a
> protocol handler application was configured and then later removed from
> the user's system. However, it seems that our patch for #22618 is
> incompatible with Mozilla's fixed; with Tor Browser in this scenario,
> opening the protocol handler silently fails and a JS exception is logged
> to the browser console:
>   NS_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND: ... external-app-blocker.js:129
> (external-app-blocker.js is part of Torbutton).

New description:

 In https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1408010 (for Firefox 58),
 Mozilla fixed things so that the protocol handler code would prompt if a
 protocol handler application was configured and then later removed from
 the user's system. However, it seems that our patch for #22618 is
 incompatible with Mozilla's fix; with Tor Browser in this scenario,
 opening the protocol handler silently fails and a JS exception is logged
 to the browser console:
   NS_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND: ... external-app-blocker.js:129
 (external-app-blocker.js is part of Torbutton).

--

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[tor-bugs] #28375 [Applications/Tor Browser]: improve handling of uninstalled protocol handler

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28375: improve handling of uninstalled protocol handler
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff60-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 In https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1408010 (for Firefox 58),
 Mozilla fixed things so that the protocol handler code would prompt if a
 protocol handler application was configured and then later removed from
 the user's system. However, it seems that our patch for #22618 is
 incompatible with Mozilla's fixed; with Tor Browser in this scenario,
 opening the protocol handler silently fails and a JS exception is logged
 to the browser console:
   NS_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND: ... external-app-blocker.js:129
 (external-app-blocker.js is part of Torbutton).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28144 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update projects/tor-browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28144: Update projects/tor-browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811, TBA-a2   |
Parent ID:  #26693   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:17 sisbell]:
 > Replying to [comment:16 sysrqb]:
 >
 > > Replying to [comment:15 gk]:
 > >
 > >
 > > > I am not so sure, though, that not signing it is not a problem. How
 are we testing our final result on Android devices without *any* signing?
 (We don't have that problem on desktop platforms as signing requirements
 can get disabled if they are existing at all)
 > > >
 > > >
 > >
 > > Ah. Good point. The unsigned-unaligned apk should be (as the name
 implies) not signed. But when building Fennec with Mozilla's build system,
 they produce an additional apk that is signed with a
 [https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/app-signing#debug-mode debug
 signing key]. It looks like that happens in [https://gitweb.torproject.org
 /tor-browser.git/tree/config/android-common.mk?h=tor-
 browser-60.3.0esr-8.5-1#n11 config/android-common.mk], calling
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/mobile/android/debug_sign_tool.py?h=tor-
 browser-60.3.0esr-8.5-1#n11 mobile/android/debug_sign_tool.py]. I think we
 can use this, too.
 >
 > We have different types of signing under consideration:
 >
 >  * v1: Android 6 and earlier jarsigning
 >  * v2: with signing block (Android 7) :
 https://source.android.com/security/apksigning/v2
 >  * v3: with key rotation (Android 9):
 https://source.android.com/security/apksigning/v3
 >
 > It looks like mozilla is using v1 for debug, this is the only case we
 need to consider for the debug build. For production level signing, we
 should consider looking into v3 (perhaps mozilla is already using v3
 signing?)

 Yes, but for the outcome in our tor-browser-build whatever Mozilla is
 doing is enough (e.g. v1 if we get that in our current firefox build).
 It's just for testing on devices that our code does what it should (and
 only that :) ). The real signing for release is done later, outside of our
 tor-browser-build environment.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24193 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make v3 single onion services parse and use IPv6 introduce link specifiers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24193: Make v3 single onion services parse and use IPv6 introduce link 
specifiers
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  duplicate
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #23588   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:6 teor]:
 > I think #23588 implements this feature.

 Yes I believe it will. Closing this in favor of #23588 since we are not
 far from merging it.

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[tor-bugs] #28371 [Applications/Tor Browser]: verify that speculative connect on mousedown does not violate FPI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28371: verify that speculative connect on mousedown does not violate FPI
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-
 Severity:  Normal   |  linkability,ff60-esr
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 In Firefox 55, Firefox added code to speculatively connect when a user
 mousedowns over a link. We should verify that the early connection does
 not bypass first party isolation (if it does, it seems like we would have
 noticed by now... but we should double-check).

 See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1348278

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25140 [Core Tor/Tor]: Parse only .torrc files in torrc.d directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25140: Parse only .torrc files in torrc.d directory
-+-
 Reporter:  iry  |  Owner:
 |  Jigsaw52
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.1-alpha
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-triage-20180328, |  Actual Points:
  035-removed-20180711   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by Jigsaw52):

 I've created the pull request with the problem hopefully fixed:

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/489

 Also, I've rebased the branch to the current master and reverted commit
 ba3c785092fce23ce9ec52c89ed69b2c0f0f92f6 which fixed #27186 because I've
 already implemented the same feature on my branch with additional
 information: my version shows both the pattern on %include and the files
 that will be included when expanding it.

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[tor-bugs] #28374 [Applications/Tor Browser]: ensure RequestStorageId cannot be accessed remotely

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28374: ensure RequestStorageId cannot be accessed remotely
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-
 Severity:  Normal   |  fingerprinting,ff60-esr
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 In https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1420836 (for Firefox 59),
 Mozilla added a GMP API that appears to return a machine identifier (maybe
 based on MAC address). Is there any chance this could be accessed by a
 remote site and used as a unique fingerprint? Or do we disable enough of
 EME/GMP code that this is not a concern?

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[tor-bugs] #28373 [Applications/Tor Browser]: verify that cubeb-related tmp files do not violate disk avoidance

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28373: verify that cubeb-related tmp files do not violate disk avoidance
--+
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-disk-
  |  leak,ff60-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 The following bug caught our eye while reviewing undocumented changes made
 between ESR52 and ESR60 (for #22074):

 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1407490
 "Ensure cubeb remoting socket has unique name per server process."

 From reading the code in media/audioipc/audioipc/src/lib.rs, it looks like
 temporary files are created in the path returned by `temp_dir()` (which is
 probably /tmp or the %TEMP% directory on Windows). We should see if that
 is true, what data is in the files, and whether they are left behind when
 the browser exits.

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[tor-bugs] #28372 [Applications/Tor Browser]: determine if onvisibilitychange is a fingerprinting vector

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28372: determine if onvisibilitychange is a fingerprinting vector
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-
 Severity:  Normal   |  fingerprinting,ff60-esr
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 In Firefox 56, Mozilla added support for onvisibilitychange. See:
 https://developer.mozilla.org/en-
 US/docs/Web/API/Document/onvisibilitychange
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1333912

 We should think about whether this introduces any new fingerprinting
 risks. The following mentions a prerender state which we (mcs and brade)
 do not fully understand:
 https://w3c.github.io/page-visibility/#privacy-security

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22074 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Review Firefox Developer Docs and Undocumented bugs since FF52esr

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22074: Review Firefox Developer Docs and Undocumented bugs since FF52esr
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, TorBrowserTeam201811  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Kathy and I reviewed our remaining notes and I opened 7 new tickets:

 #28368 - determine if media.decoder.recycle.enabled allows any linkability
 #28369 - remove pingsender from Tor Browser
 #28370 - stop setting obsolete media.eme.apiVisible pref
 #28371 - verify that speculative connect on mousedown does not violate FPI
 #28372 - determine if onvisibilitychange is a fingerprinting vector
 #28373 - verify that cubeb-related tmp files do not violate disk avoidance
 #28374 - ensure RequestStorageId cannot be accessed remotely

 I will close this one now, but contributions to the new tickets are
 welcome. Maybe someone else has already investigated some of these
 potential issues, or maybe some are duplicates of existing tickets.

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[tor-bugs] #28370 [Applications/Tor Browser]: stop setting obsolete media.eme.apiVisible pref

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28370: stop setting obsolete media.eme.apiVisible pref
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff60-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 In https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1242321 (for Firefox 54)
 Mozilla removed all code that used the `media.eme.apiVisible` pref. We
 should also remove it from `browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28357 [Core Tor/Stem]: Stem's integ tests are broken on Travis

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28357: Stem's integ tests are broken on Travis
---+
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by atagar):

 Hi teor, tor's [https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-
 manual.html.en#ExitRelay ExitRelay] torrc parameter was
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/commit/?id=35efce1 added in
 November 2014].

 Oddly I can't find the
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/commit/?id=412e3f7dc9c6c01a tor git
 commit] the tests cite, but in checking tor's maint-0.2.4 branch that
 option indeed wasn't present so guess 0.2.4 is pretty antiquated.

 {{{
 % git checkout origin/maint-0.2.4
 % grep ExitRelay doc/tor.1.txt | wc -l
 0
 }}}

 If you provide me with the tor version when the ExitPolicy torrc option
 was added I can adjust stem's tests to exclude it from its integ test
 torrc when older than that.

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[tor-bugs] #28368 [Applications/Tor Browser]: determine if media.decoder.recycle.enabled allows any linkability

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28368: determine if media.decoder.recycle.enabled allows any linkability
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-
 Severity:  Normal   |  linkability,ff60-esr,tbb-mobile
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 In Fennec, `media.decoder.recycle.enabled` is set to `true` (see
 mobile/android/app/mobile.js; although the comment there implies that this
 is only enabled on nightly builds, the definition is not enclosed in an
 #ifdef).

 It is unclear exactly what this preference does, but it seems to cause
 media decoders to be reused for decoding new audio or video elements. If
 detectable state is left inside a decoder and if reuse occurs across
 sites, this could mean there is a linkability risk. We should investigate.

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[tor-bugs] #28369 [Applications/Tor Browser]: remove pingsender from Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28369: remove pingsender from Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff60-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 In https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1310703 (for Firefox 54),
 Mozilla added a `pingsender` executable that uses libcurl to send
 telemetry info when a crash occurs. While we disable telemetry by pref,
 for defense-in-depth against a potential proxy bypass we should stop
 shipping the pingsender executable.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28184 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reload is additive with regards to new v3 HS client authorizations but it won't subtract deleted ones

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28184: Reload is additive with regards to new v3 HS client authorizations but 
it
won't subtract deleted ones
--+
 Reporter:  jchevali  |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  asn   |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 Ooook we had a discussion on IRC but without much of a conclusion I would
 say. I'll express my thoughts:

 This patch is indeed quite large for what it does, not that there is a
 quicker way to do it but rather lets step back and think what we want.

 1. Closing the intro/RP circuits (client side):

  That requires quite a bit of complexity including adding a way to lookup
 circuits by service identity key from the `hs_circuitmap`. I wouldn't be
 too sad if we don't do that. Those circuits would simply close by
 themselves at some point or heck even be used for the same .onion.

 2. Clearing our descriptor cache (client side):

  This is a bit more interesting because if the client authorization for
 A.onion changed then the old descriptor is not usable anymore meaning we
 won't be able to decrypt it.

  There lies another issue. I don't think we have that feature which is if
 a client looks up a descriptor in its cache and can not decrypt it, we
 should purge it and refetch it. A client does NOT store a descriptor that
 it can't decode so at least that is that. But this situation can happen if
 we change the client auth for A.onion and SIGHUP.

 All in all, we could reduce the complexity of this patch by simply adding
 a way to "purge a undecodable descriptor in our cache" which will lead to
 fetching the new descriptor and using the new client authorization.

 We would ignore the closing the circuits because if there is an RP circuit
 for A.onion, great we use it.

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[tor-bugs] #28367 [Core Tor/Tor]: RFE additional DOS mitigations for exits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28367: RFE additional DOS mitigations for exits
--+--
 Reporter:  starlight |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 A relay I operate recently experienced a DOS state resulting from intense
 scanning behavior.  The scanner initiated huge quantities of connections
 outbound on an exit such that the interface maximum configured socket
 count (62k) was fully consumed and normal client activity was squashed to
 zero.  Load was so intense it was difficult to SSH in, NTP complained it
 could not reach time servers and numerous attempts were required to
 successfully open a daemon control socket (via loopback, not sure why).
 Was able to mitigate the attack without restarting any daemons and nothing
 broke, node resumed normal operation.  Clearly a recoverable resource
 exhaustion scenario.

 To limit the impact of this category of activity, two relatively simple
 mitigations come to mind:

 1) create a configurable limit on the number of OR + DIR + exit_edge
 connections on each interface which may be set lower than absolute
 resource limits; this will prevent a DOS situation from rendering the
 overall system inaccessible and hopefully permit unimpaired daemon control
 ports creation; the setting will interact with the maximum number of in-
 flight DNS queries when a local resolver is configured and this ought to
 be documented

 2) create a outbound exit_edge connection rate limit set to some
 reasonable value to constrain scanning

 NOTES:

 file handle limit 128k

 nf_conntrack_max = 65536

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27680 [Webpages/Website]: Explain how to use auth cookie for onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27680: Explain how to use auth cookie for onion services
--+--
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  traumschule
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  hs-auth   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by traumschule):

 * Attachment "hsv3clientkey.sh" added.

 This script generates client auth keys for a given v3 onion service
 directory. It is free software, use, modify, or copy it at your own risk;
 based on work by mtigas:
 https://gist.github.com/mtigas/9c2386adf65345be34045dace134140b

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28366 [Core Tor/sbws]: Change specification version in bandwidth file headers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28366: Change specification version in bandwidth file headers
---+-
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws 1.0 (MVP must)
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28085 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by juga):

 * milestone:   => sbws 1.0 (MVP must)


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[tor-bugs] #28366 [Core Tor/sbws]: Change specification version in bandwidth file headers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28366: Change specification version in bandwidth file headers
---+--
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #28085
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 A new bandwidth file format version is being added in #28085, sbws should
 write headers with the new version.

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[tor-bugs] #28365 [Core Tor/Tor]: Include statistics headers all bandwidth files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28365: Include statistics headers all bandwidth files
--+-
 Reporter:  juga  |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  sbws 1.0 (MVP must)
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #28085
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 In #28076 we include these headers *only* when the number of relays to be
 included in the bandwidth file is less than the 60% of the relays in
 consensus.

 As commented in
 https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/38#discussion_r231432887, these
 headers should be always included.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28144 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update projects/tor-browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28144: Update projects/tor-browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811, TBA-a2   |
Parent ID:  #26693   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sisbell):

 Replying to [comment:16 sysrqb]:

 > Replying to [comment:15 gk]:
 >
 >
 > > I am not so sure, though, that not signing it is not a problem. How
 are we testing our final result on Android devices without *any* signing?
 (We don't have that problem on desktop platforms as signing requirements
 can get disabled if they are existing at all)
 > >
 > >
 >
 > Ah. Good point. The unsigned-unaligned apk should be (as the name
 implies) not signed. But when building Fennec with Mozilla's build system,
 they produce an additional apk that is signed with a
 [https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/app-signing#debug-mode debug
 signing key]. It looks like that happens in [https://gitweb.torproject.org
 /tor-browser.git/tree/config/android-common.mk?h=tor-
 browser-60.3.0esr-8.5-1#n11 config/android-common.mk], calling
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/mobile/android/debug_sign_tool.py?h=tor-
 browser-60.3.0esr-8.5-1#n11 mobile/android/debug_sign_tool.py]. I think we
 can use this, too.

 We have different types of signing under consideration:

  * v1: Android 6 and earlier jarsigning
  * v2: with signing block (Android 7) :
 https://source.android.com/security/apksigning/v2
  * v3: with key rotation (Android 9):
 https://source.android.com/security/apksigning/v3

 It looks like mozilla is using v1 for debug, this is the only case we need
 to consider for the debug build. For production level signing, we should
 consider looking into v3 (perhaps mozilla is already using v3 signing?)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27841 [Core Tor/Tor]: Close intro circuit after introduction has been completed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27841: Close intro circuit after introduction has been completed
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs dos 033-backport, |  Actual Points:
  034-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28187 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change Tor Circuit display icon to an onion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28187: Change Tor Circuit display icon to an onion
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:  tbb-usability, ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201811 => tbb-usability,
 ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201811R
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28187 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change Tor Circuit display icon to an onion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28187: Change Tor Circuit display icon to an onion
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Here's a revised patch including the new circuit icon:

 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/torbutton/commit/28187+1

 Screenshot:

 [[Image(28187_1_hamburger.png)]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28187 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change Tor Circuit display icon to an onion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28187: Change Tor Circuit display icon to an onion
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * Attachment "28187_1_hamburger.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28334 [Core Tor/Nyx]: Nyx configurashion editor does not work with options' values properly

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28334: Nyx configurashion editor does not work with options' values properly
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Nyx  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by wagon):

 I confirm this problem also for current Nyx version from git.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28332 [Core Tor/Nyx]: Nyx configurashion editor reproducibly crashes if custom ordering is set

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28332: Nyx configurashion editor reproducibly crashes if custom ordering is set
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Nyx  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  config|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by wagon):

 > old bugs fixed, new bugs added
 When I am at log window in git Nyx version, some combination of keys
 `ESC`, `Enter` and `q` transforms Nyx to a state, where any keys pressed
 is just typed in terminal. Nyx cannot quit, and `kill -2` doesn't help,
 only `-9` works. If I look at `ps | grep nyx` in this moment, as see new
 lines after Nyx process. I checked what it is: many zeros (0x20) are added
 to the name of Nyx command at the end. I never experienced this behavior
 on stable 2.0.4 version. And got this trouble with git version about 3
 times. However, I still cannot figure out what is the exact sequence of
 keys which lead Nyx to this abnormal state.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28260 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor nightly builds are broken on Linux with Rust enabled (since 10/31)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28260: Tor nightly builds are broken on Linux with Rust enabled (since 10/31)
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201811R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201811 => tbb-rbm,
   TorBrowserTeam201811R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 > <+GeKo> boklm: in other news i think the broken rust compliation is due
 to us creating $distdir only for macOS by |mkdir -p $distdir/helper|
 > <+GeKo> starting with the canonicalization rust got picky about exising
 dirs for the prefix it seems
 > <+GeKo> (i was wondering why i did not see the problem during my bisect
 thing for #26475)
 > <+GeKo> boklm: so, doing a |mkdir -p $distdir| right at the beginning
 (and just a |mkdir $distdir/helper| for macOS later on)
 > <+GeKo> should be all we need
 > <+GeKo> and i think we should go with 1.30.0 while we are at it
 > <+GeKo> feel free to test that and add it to your branch in case it
 helps

 Adding the `mkdir -p $distdir/helper` is indeed fixing the issue issue
 building 1.30.0.

 In branch `bug_28260_v3` there is a patch updating Rust to 1.30.0, only
 for Tor:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_28260_v3=8fc28dd994888b620d8e2ae334e2466e043dead1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28187 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change Tor Circuit display icon to an onion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28187: Change Tor Circuit display icon to an onion
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * Attachment "28187_1_hamburger.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21377 [Core Tor/Tor]: DirAuths should expose bwauth bandwidth files

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21377: DirAuths should expose bwauth bandwidth files
-+-
 Reporter:  tom  |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dirauth, metrics, tor-bwauth,|  Actual Points:
  035-removed-20180711, 036-roadmap-proposed |
Parent ID:  #25925   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 New commits

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28187 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change Tor Circuit display icon to an onion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28187: Change Tor Circuit display icon to an onion
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by antonela):

 Arthur highlighted to me that the tab behavior when users click for a [New
 Circuit] is different than asking for a new tab. True. The real behavior
 is that the circuit and the page, reload. Maybe the v2 works better :)
 Mockup and assets attached.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27775 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: build newsletter.tp.o and styleguide.tp.o with Jenkins

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27775: build newsletter.tp.o and styleguide.tp.o with Jenkins
-+
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by hiro):

 * Attachment "0001-new-website-jobs.patch" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27775 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: build newsletter.tp.o and styleguide.tp.o with Jenkins

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27775: build newsletter.tp.o and styleguide.tp.o with Jenkins
-+
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by hiro):

 * Attachment "0001-lektor-build.patch" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28085 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update key/values in the bandwidth file spec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28085: Update key/values in the bandwidth file spec
--+-
 Reporter:  juga  |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  sbws 1.0 (MVP must)
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27107| Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet   |Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 New commits and comments

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28187 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change Tor Circuit display icon to an onion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28187: Change Tor Circuit display icon to an onion
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "assets_icon-2.zip" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27775 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: build newsletter.tp.o and styleguide.tp.o with Jenkins

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27775: build newsletter.tp.o and styleguide.tp.o with Jenkins
-+
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by hiro):

 Add new patches.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28187 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Change Tor Circuit display icon to an onion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28187: Change Tor Circuit display icon to an onion
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, ux-team,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "#28187-2.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28252 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Firefox Multi-Account Containers don't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28252: Firefox Multi-Account Containers don't work
--+---
 Reporter:  morar |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by Thorin):

 TBB opens in Private Browsing Mode (privateBrowsingId). Containers
 (userContextId) are not available in PB mode. These two origin attributes
 are not (currently) allowed at the same time.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #3600 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Prevent redirects from transmitting+storing cookies+identifiers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#3600: Prevent redirects from transmitting+storing cookies+identifiers
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-linkability, tbb-testcase, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  torbutton, TorBrowserTeam201811|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by tom):

 I ran across https://searchfox.org/mozilla-
 central/source/browser/base/content/content-refreshblocker.js which might
 have some prior art relevant to this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28364 [Internal Services/Service - git]: please add hiro to @jenkins-admins

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28364: please add hiro to @jenkins-admins
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by hiro):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28140 [Core Tor/Tor]: Our circuit died due to an invalid selected path if switching to plugabble transports

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28140: Our circuit died due to an invalid selected path if switching to 
plugabble
transports
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.7-rc
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-path, regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => needs_information
 * parent:  #25885 =>
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.5.x-final => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


Comment:

 Unparenting this; putting it in needs_information to see whether it is
 fixed in 0.4.0, and if not, what the diagnostic says.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25885 [Core Tor/Tor]: count_acceptable_nodes() would be more accurate using node_has_preferred_descriptor()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25885: count_acceptable_nodes() would be more accurate using
node_has_preferred_descriptor()
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 This looks good to me now; thank you! I've merged it to master.  (There's
 a travis failure, but it looks like an intermittent rust dl failure)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28318 [Core Tor/Tor]: Appveyor: build on Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows Server 2016

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28318: Appveyor: build on Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows Server 2016
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
  |  implemented
 Keywords:  fast-fix, test, appveyor, tor-ci  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28318 [Core Tor/Tor]: Appveyor: build on Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows Server 2016

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28318: Appveyor: build on Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows Server 2016
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:
  |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.3.5.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  fast-fix, test, appveyor, tor-ci  |  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 lgtm; moved to 0.3.5 and forward.

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[tor-bugs] #28364 [Internal Services/Service - git]: please add hiro to @jenkins-admins

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28364: please add hiro to @jenkins-admins
-+
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA256

 Please add hiro to @jenkins-admins
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

 iQEzBAEBCAAdFiEEs4PXhajJL968BgN2hgLIIDhyMx8FAlvjDr4ACgkQhgLIIDhy
 Mx9AfggArtmUFxJjPn0lAMgFA4bzdSugVMEcUZVMAZhrolgPGrIokH6as352JjQj
 7cCMc8ec1P9MvtZTllqQAx865IWtH38aN+rR7zqDfVpUmL2xk18G37NJXyeEdiK4
 ASUYWcRH3AFDd8zKlqHrMvz3uG3+vkWolxL8A+Mphe+wIAICtM3d+YZnZQHk+tcw
 O5Ov2hkG2ck/SlhkVQn5jsCUUwradW0i20XHkAFlR1UakBQHhRM5GrBMFSEtiKWU
 Mh9gGIkAWi2Ih/BLbwGmnVoypNZ+bRTabVuRQDDKzaGeowVKKlv8g0fWvxUZ+6JV
 NH93by8RXa2IZWn7py/uXqBhwrB+5w==
 =YISo
 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27775 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: build newsletter.tp.o and styleguide.tp.o with Jenkins

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27775: build newsletter.tp.o and styleguide.tp.o with Jenkins
-+
 Reporter:  hiro |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by weasel):

 * owner:  tpa => weasel
 * component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team => Internal
 Services/Service - jenkins


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28144 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update projects/tor-browser for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28144: Update projects/tor-browser for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811, TBA-a2   |
Parent ID:  #26693   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Replying to [comment:15 gk]:
 > I am not so sure, though, that not signing it is not a problem. How are
 we testing our final result on Android devices without *any* signing? (We
 don't have that problem on desktop platforms as signing requirements can
 get disabled if they are existing at all)

 Ah. Good point. The unsigned-unaligned apk should be (as the name implies)
 not signed. But when building Fennec with Mozilla's build system, they
 produce an additional apk that is signed with a
 [https://developer.android.com/studio/publish/app-signing#debug-mode debug
 signing key]. It looks like that happens in [https://gitweb.torproject.org
 /tor-browser.git/tree/config/android-common.mk?h=tor-
 browser-60.3.0esr-8.5-1#n11 config/android-common.mk], calling
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/mobile/android/debug_sign_tool.py?h=tor-
 browser-60.3.0esr-8.5-1#n11 mobile/android/debug_sign_tool.py]. I think we
 can use this, too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28353 [Metrics/Website]: Use Guard & Exit, Guard only, Exit only, and Middle only on all bandwidth by flag graphs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28353: Use Guard & Exit, Guard only, Exit only, and Middle only on all 
bandwidth
by flag graphs
-+--
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28328   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Replying to [comment:2 teor]:
 > Hmm, let's have the same scale on both graphs if we can?

 Sure!

 [[Image(bandwidth-flags-2018-11-07-2.png​, 700px)]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28353 [Metrics/Website]: Use Guard & Exit, Guard only, Exit only, and Middle only on all bandwidth by flag graphs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28353: Use Guard & Exit, Guard only, Exit only, and Middle only on all 
bandwidth
by flag graphs
-+--
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28328   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * Attachment "bandwidth-flags-2018-11-07-2.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28362 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure our .may_includes files describe a noncircular dependency structure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28362: Make sure our .may_includes files describe a noncircular dependency
structure
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 Branch is no_circ_includes, PR at
 `https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/488`.

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[tor-bugs] #28363 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a torrc option which prevents Tor from falling asleep

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28363: Make a torrc option which prevents Tor from falling asleep
-+--
 Reporter:  wagon|  Owner:  arma
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 Now, if Tor client doesn't see any activity within certain period of time
 on its `SocksPort`, it closes all circuits and disconnects from Internet.
 This may lead to troubles with some ISPs, where manual intervention is
 needed to connect to Internet again. It would be good to have an option
 which allows users to specify this period of inactivity manually (so it
 can be set to some big value), or an option which disables this behavior
 completely.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28362 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure our .may_includes files describe a noncircular dependency structure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28362: Make sure our .may_includes files describe a noncircular dependency
structure
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:  (none) => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


Comment:

 My branch `no_circ_includes` changes checkIncludes.py to enforce this
 policy, fixes existing deviations from this policy, and applies this
 policy to (parts of) ext/ as well.

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[tor-bugs] #28362 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make sure our .may_includes files describe a noncircular dependency structure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28362: Make sure our .may_includes files describe a noncircular dependency
structure
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 As we use the checkIncludes.py mechanism more, we'll need to make sure
 that we don't unintentionally introduce any circular dependencies into our
 structure.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #15421, #16824, #20647, #22266, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #15421, #16824, #20647, #22266, #23605, #23882, #24264, 
#25140, #25372, #26368, #27735, #27912, #27915, #28013, #28018, #28257, #7028, 
#9990, #11966, #17520, #17835, #17949, #21039, #21600, #21814, #21900, #22898, 
#23061, #23082, #23576, #23588, #24000, #24064, #24193, #24249, #24393, #24546, 
#24586, #24661, #24732, #24953, #25152, #25269, #25341, #25493, #25497, #25499, 
#25501, #25502, #25510, #25528, #25607, #25669, #25685, #25713, #25885, #25899, 
#26288, #26296, #26316, #26376, #26578, #26630, #26632, #26633, #26634, #26636, 
#26637, #26769, #26839, #26840, #26841, #26842, #26846, #26871, #26939, #26940, 
#26941, #26943, #26944, #26945, #26957, #26958, #26970, #26973, #26992, #27100, 
#27102, #27103, #27104, #27161, #27162, #27167, #27201, #27208, #27225, #27239, 
#27241, #27243, #27244, #27248, #27284, #27308, #27325, #27359, #27367, #27380, 
#27402, #27490, #27530, #27563, #27620, #27625, #27629, #27662, #27691, #27739, 
#27801, #27841, #27854, #27896, #27906, #2
 7908, #27993, #28006, #28007, #28008, #28009, #28010, #28011, #28012, #28019, 
#28020, #28037, #28057, #28058, #28060, #28077, #28090, #28094, #28096, #28097, 
#28100, #28142, #28177, #28179, #28180, #28181, #28182, #28190, #28193, #28220, 
#28226, #28255, #28265, #28266, #28281, #28308, #28319, #28330, #28335, #28336, 
#28337, #28338, #28344, #28360, #28225 by nickm:
milestone to Tor: 0.4.0.x-final

Comment:
Tor 0.3.6.x has been renamed to 0.4.0.x.

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[tor-bugs] #28361 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow few nodes-list options in torrc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28361: Allow few nodes-list options in torrc
-+--
 Reporter:  wagon|  Owner:  arma
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
 There are many options in `torrc` which accept lists of nodes, countries,
 etc.:

 {{{
 ExcludeNodes node,node,...
 ExcludeExitNodes node,node,...
 ExitNodes node,node,...
 EntryNodes node,node,...
 NodeFamily node,node,...
 Tor2webRendezvousPoints node,node,...
 HSLayer2Nodes node,node,...
 HSLayer3Nodes node,node,...
 TestingDirAuthVoteExit node,node,...
 TestingDirAuthVoteGuard node,node,...
 TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir node,node,...
 }}}

 Maybe I have not list all of them. Values for these options may be very
 long lists. It would be very convenient to write it as, e.g.:

 {{{
 ExcludeNodes node0,nodeX
 ExcludeNodes node1
 ExcludeNodes node2
 ExcludeNodes node3,nodeY,nodeZ
 }}}

 I cannot see any reason why only one such option can be specified in
 `torrc`. It makes management of long lists very hard, because one needs to
 add `\` symbols, take into account some restrictions on comments within
 these lists, etc.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27443 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Firefox RBM config and build for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27443: Update Firefox RBM config and build for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, TBA-a2, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811   |
Parent ID:  #26693   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Oh, I forgot one thing fix actually:

 4) I followed the instructions on  how to create the gradle dependency
 list. In particular I tested:
 {{{
 It may also be the case that you wish to cleanup old versions of the
 artifacts.
 For this you will need to run the build with an empty
 gradle-dependencies-list.txt file and proceed to reconstruct the list from
 scratch.
 }}}
 assuming "empty" means still there but without contents. That actually
 breaks the build. So, I am not sure which step you had in mind for
 cleaning up old versions of the artifacts. Could you reformulate that
 part?

 And s/cleanup/clean up/.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27225 [Core Tor/Tor]: Perform fewer allocations in summarize_protocol_flags()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27225: Perform fewer allocations in summarize_protocol_flags()
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-roadmap-master, 035-triaged- |  implemented
  in-20180711|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #26630   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 okay, squashed and merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27443 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update Firefox RBM config and build for Android

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27443: Update Firefox RBM config and build for Android
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile, TBA-a2, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201811   |
Parent ID:  #26693   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Okay, I spent quite some time testing and reviewing the updated patch. I
 feel we are close. Here are three things that I found so far which should
 be fixed:

 1) You have `--disable-strip` in the mozconfig file. Please use `--enable-
 strip` instead (even though the resulting binaries are indeed stripped),
 as this is less confusing.

 2) Could you add a comment in the mozconfig file above
 {{{
 ac_add_options --with-libclang-path=/var/tmp/dist/android-toolchain
 /android-ndk/arm/lib64
 ac_add_options --with-clang-path=/var/tmp/dist/android-toolchain/android-
 ndk/arm/bin/clang
 }}}
 explaining that we need that for the Stylo build part and the preferred
 way, using `LLVM_CONFIG`, is not available as there is no `llvm-config` in
 the ndk. (at least I could not find it)

 3) The gradle deps download script mentions issues with setting
 `LC_ALL=C`. Please add the bug number as reference (it is #28117).

 Finally, could you explain what breaks without setting `--with-android-
 version=22`? You mentioned "22 is the highest version that works" but what
 does that mean?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28193 [Core Tor/Tor]: Compile-time assertion

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28193: Compile-time assertion
--+
 Reporter:  riastradh |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.6.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Fixed the license again (with permission) and merged to master!

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