Re: [tor-bugs] #28640 [Applications/Tor Browser]: System addon does not override app-profile addon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28640: System addon does not override app-profile addon
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201811,|  Actual Points:
  TBA-a2 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Thanks for the work, sysrqb! Nicely done. I picked the patches more or
 less as-is to get the build going. The result of that is 4 commits on
 `tor-browser-60.3.0esr-8.5-1` (commit
 62ec69b09ff02649b3eab64a08fa87549c0bfc16,
 20f13426dec48e7b3b1df2cbd6cc41b3432fa267,
 bd3d1614a144377b32f5f548ce235c8ae0fb01d8, and
 10ca4718681668db7b0bdba0e3dd207dbe352cd8).

 Review comments:

 5f3ee64a5dcfeb884c56ee12124d0ad6166badff - I don't think there is a need
 to invoke all the preprocessing machinery here. We could do like we did in
 #27763 I think, just using `AppConstants.platform === "android"` (which we
 already have in `XPIInstall.jsm`)

 d43b65d65952ac47f6cd4cc12237dbd4a51fa36b - okay

 d56596ea32fd4499a0d6656fa5e80689110da263 - okay

 c32f80a0ad33140d1058df9845cbea92938c5c10 - this needs some considerable
 clean-up. I think we should make the result another commit starting with
 "Bug 28507". That way all the things are grouped together and easier to
 find.

 Could you try making the summaries of your commit message shorter (I know
 it is hard sometimes!)? Having those super long lines makes it harder to
 read through the log in a terminal (I generally found
 https://tbaggery.com/2008/04/19/a-note-about-git-commit-messages.html to
 be reasonable with good arguments but that's just a personal opinion).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28618 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Set MOZILLA_OFFICIAL on Windows builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28618: Set MOZILLA_OFFICIAL on Windows builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbbm-rbm, tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-   |  Actual Points:
  regression, TorBrowserTeam201811,  |
  GeorgKoppen201811  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbbm-rbm, tbb-8.0.issues, tbb-regression, TorBrowserTeam201811
 =>
 tbbm-rbm, tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression, TorBrowserTeam201811,
 GeorgKoppen201811


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Re: [tor-bugs] #9220 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser accesses LSOs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#9220: Tor Browser accesses LSOs
---+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton, tbb-newnym  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 Flash is not really a supported technology anymore. So, *if* there is
 indeed something to fix here it's a WONTFIX.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28323 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB often opens on secondary monitor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28323: TBB often opens on secondary monitor
---+--
 Reporter:  heyjoe |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-newnym  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28323 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBB often opens on secondary monitor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28323: TBB often opens on secondary monitor
---+---
 Reporter:  heyjoe |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability, tbb-newnym  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-usability => tbb-usability, tbb-newnym


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27903 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8 does not respect gtk3 settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27903: Tor Browser 8 does not respect gtk3 settings
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: sugrynidos (added)


Comment:

 #28428 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28428 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Downloading a file destroys my Nautilus settings.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28428: Downloading a file destroys my Nautilus settings.
+---
 Reporter:  sugrynidos  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Major   | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * keywords:  linux, gnome, nautilus, sort => tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression
 * version:  Tor: unspecified =>
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #27903.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28434 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows Size issue on KDE with default taskbar/window frame sizes (was: Windows Size issue)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28434: Windows Size issue on KDE with default taskbar/window frame sizes
---+---
 Reporter:  aerpel |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_information
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-resolution  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  window size adjustment => tbb-fingerprinting-resolution
 * priority:  Medium => High
 * version:  Tor: 0.2.9.16 =>
 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Could you check whether the old one, 7.5.6, works in your setup (see:
 https://archive.torproject.org/tor-package-archive/torbrowser/7.5.6/ for
 bundles)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28625 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser gets stuck

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28625: Tor Browser gets stuck
--+---
 Reporter:  kanda |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:3 kanda]:
 > I am using Arch Linux with LTS kernel 64 bit. But the problem was
 already there, when i used the non LTS kernel.
 >
 > Yep, I reseted the Tor browser, but the problem remains.

 Okay, just to be clear, this happened without any modifications to Tor
 Browser? Where do/did you get it from? And what happens with a normal
 Firefox 60 ESR on your machine (see: https://www.mozilla.org/en-
 US/firefox/organizations/all/ for bundles to test)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28305 [Metrics/Statistics]: Include client numbers even if we think we got reports from more than 100% of all relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28305: Include client numbers even if we think we got reports from more than 
100%
of all relays
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  SponsorV-can
+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * Attachment "userstats-relay-country-all-2018-09-01-2018-11-30-off.png"
 added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28305 [Metrics/Statistics]: Include client numbers even if we think we got reports from more than 100% of all relays

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28305: Include client numbers even if we think we got reports from more than 
100%
of all relays
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  defect  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  SponsorV-can
+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  accepted => merge_ready


Comment:

 Great! Deployed this change. It will take half a day for the change to
 become visible. For comparison, here's the latest graph still with gaps:

 [[Image(userstats-relay-country-all-2018-09-01-2018-11-30-off.png​,
 600px)]]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28414 [Community/Tor Support]: Tor doesn't load

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28414: Tor doesn't load
---+---
 Reporter:  Wnm987 |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker| Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by gk):

 Are you using the 32bit or the 64bit Tor Browser version?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28211 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbrowser 8.0.3 Hangs, and torbutton does not show the current circuit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28211: Torbrowser 8.0.3 Hangs, and torbutton does not show the current circuit
--+
 Reporter:  justmeee  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:7 justmeee]:
 > First, with those files triggered by the virus program, should I let it
 delete them, or restore and "trust" them?
 >
 > It might be worth looking into why that was triggered because that never
 happened before for your next builds.

 I don't know what you should do as I don't know why those got flagged.

 > As for the install issue, even the torbrowser alpha file from the link
 you gave me that did successfully install never gave any sort of
 confirmation, the dialog box just disappeared.  So that seems like a bug
 too, not knowing if it installed, if it's done, was it successful.. It
 just disappears, no confirmation at all.  That was why I tried installing
 it twice in two different locations in the first place hence the double
 popup from virus protection on one of the files.
 >
 > I did try installing that firefox, it would not install.  I did not get
 any error messages either.  After I clicked on the exe, I get the open
 file dialog box and clicked run, which I got on those other torbrowser
 files with the error messages as well.  Then it extracted, which I think
 also happened on those other files but not too sure.  Them nothing.  The
 only difference is on the torbrowser I would see the popup at this point
 about it needing Windows 7 installed, but on the Firefox it just doesn't
 do anything at all after that, the boxes just disappear and nothing is
 installed.  I put 'firefox' in the windows search box to see if it did
 install and just didn't give me any confirmation dialogs like the
 torbrowser I mentioned before, but nothing shows up on the computer except
 the one that came with torbrowser, so firefox did not install either.
 >
 > The other question and/or item to look into, is there a way to confirm
 if you're in private browsing mode while browsing?

 Tor Browser is starting by default and always in private browsing mode.
 Thus, if we don't change any settings you are fine.

 It seems your hangs are gone with the 64bit version. Closing as WORKSFORME
 then.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28398 [Core Tor/Stem]: Please provide a method on descriptors for calculating digests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28398: Please provide a method on descriptors for calculating digests
---+
 Reporter:  irl|  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by irl):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I think the only thing missing now is the bandwidth lists, but they don't
 really exist at all yet in stem, so this should be all. I'll open new
 tickets if I find anything else.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28666 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Spellcheck wont work on TorBrowser Version 8.0.3 - Linux (64-Bit) for spanish laguange

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28666: Spellcheck wont work on TorBrowser Version 8.0.3 - Linux (64-Bit) for
spanish laguange
--+---
 Reporter:  CaptainCookie |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  spell check   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Replying to [ticket:28666 CaptainCookie]:
 > Spellcheck wont work on TorBrowser Version 8.0.3 - Linux (64-Bit)
 >
 > > Allways have spell check enabled on general settings

 Yes, that should be on by default in Tor Browser.

 > > For spanish laguange version of !TorBrowser spellcheck is missed in
 the menu of mouse righ click over text boxes.

 Indeed, I can reproduce that, thanks!

 > > For english version of torbrowser, I install spanish dictionary from
 https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/language-tools/ but !TorBrowser
 wont display it on the menu when make right click in a text box to choose
 a language.

 Where do you click here exactly? Is that in some browser menu? I think I
 am not sure how to reproduce this problem.

 > Thanks!!

 Thanks!

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[tor-bugs] #28669 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280: retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28669: Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280:
retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 After suspend tor 0.4.0.0-alpha-dev-20181118T011041Z-1~d99.buster+1 had
 this issue:
 {{{
 Nov 26 00:00:07.000 [notice] Tor 0.4.0.0-alpha-dev opening new log file.
 Nov 26 10:37:43.000 [notice] {GENERAL} Your system clock just jumped 35475
 seconds forward; assuming established circuits no longer work.
 Nov 26 10:38:38.000 [warn] {CIRC} Failed to find node for hop #1 of our
 path. Discarding this circuit.
 Nov 26 10:38:39.000 [notice] {CIRC} Our circuit 0 (id: 202) died due to an
 invalid selected path, purpose Hidden service client: Fetching HS
 descriptor. This may be a torrc configuration issue, or a bug.
 Nov 26 10:41:00.000 [warn] {BUG} tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug:
 ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280: retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc:
 Non-fatal assertion !(status == HS_CLIENT_FETCH_HAVE_DESC) failed. (on Tor
 0.4.0.0-alpha-dev )
 Nov 26 10:41:01.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug: Non-fatal assertion !(status ==
 HS_CLIENT_FETCH_HAVE_DESC) failed in retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc
 at ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.0.0-alpha-
 dev )
 Nov 26 10:41:01.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x5e) [0x6d4c4e] (on Tor 0.4.0.0-alpha-dev
 )
 Nov 26 10:41:01.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xbd) [0x6d042d] (on Tor 0.4.0.0-alpha-dev
 )
 Nov 26 10:41:01.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(hs_client_dir_info_changed+0xce) [0x5da00e] (on Tor 0.4.0.0
 -alpha-dev )
 Nov 26 10:41:01.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(router_dir_info_changed+0x34) [0x5ffbc4] (on Tor 0.4.0.0
 -alpha-dev )
 Nov 26 10:41:01.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(networkstatus_set_current_consensus+0x41f) [0x5f7fef] (on Tor
 0.4.0.0-alpha-dev )
 Nov 26 10:41:01.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(connection_dir_reached_eof+0xf7f) [0x5c006f] (on Tor 0.4.0.0
 -alpha-dev )
 Nov 26 10:41:01.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(connection_handle_read+0x829) [0x53c679] (on Tor 0.4.0.0
 -alpha-dev )
 Nov 26 10:41:01.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x568f9)
 [0x5428f9] (on Tor 0.4.0.0-alpha-dev )
 Nov 26 10:41:01.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug: /usr/lib/i386-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.1.so.6(+0x2091b) [0xb7e3291b] (on Tor 0.4.0.0-alpha-dev )
 Nov 26 10:41:01.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug: /usr/lib/i386-linux-
 gnu/libevent-2.1.so.6(event_base_loop+0x4d1) [0xb7e333b1] (on Tor 0.4.0.0
 -alpha-dev )
 Nov 26 10:41:01.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(tor_libevent_run_event_loop+0x30) [0x672ab0] (on Tor 0.4.0.0
 -alpha-dev )
 Nov 26 10:41:01.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0xc0)
 [0x543d40] (on Tor 0.4.0.0-alpha-dev )
 Nov 26 10:41:01.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(tor_run_main+0x141a) [0x530f9a] (on Tor 0.4.0.0-alpha-dev )
 Nov 26 10:41:01.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x3f)
 [0x52e35f] (on Tor 0.4.0.0-alpha-dev )
 Nov 26 10:41:01.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x32)
 [0x52ded2] (on Tor 0.4.0.0-alpha-dev )
 Nov 26 10:41:01.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug: /lib/i386-linux-
 gnu/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0xf1) [0xb774c9a1] (on Tor 0.4.0.0-alpha-
 dev )
 Nov 26 10:41:01.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x41f2e)
 [0x52df2e] (on Tor 0.4.0.0-alpha-dev )
 
 Nov 26 10:41:11.000 [notice] {APP} Tried for 120 seconds to get a
 connection to
 5gdvpfoh6kb2iqbizb37lzk2ddzrwa47m6rpdueg2m656fovmbhoptqd:993. Giving up.
 (waiting for rendezvous desc)
 Nov 26 10:41:36.000 [warn] {BUG} tor_bug_occurred_(): Bug:
 ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280: retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc:
 Non-fatal assertion !(status == HS_CLIENT_FETCH_HAVE_DESC) failed. (on Tor
 0.4.0.0-alpha-dev )
 Nov 26 10:41:36.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug: Non-fatal assertion !(status ==
 HS_CLIENT_FETCH_HAVE_DESC) failed in retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc
 at ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.4.0.0-alpha-
 dev )
 Nov 26 10:41:36.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace_impl+0x5e) [0x6d4c4e] (on Tor 0.4.0.0-alpha-dev
 )
 Nov 26 10:41:36.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(tor_bug_occurred_+0xbd) [0x6d042d] (on Tor 0.4.0.0-alpha-dev
 )
 Nov 26 10:41:36.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(hs_client_dir_info_changed+0xce) [0x5da00e] (on Tor 0.4.0.0
 -alpha-dev )
 Nov 26 10:41:36.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(router_dir_info_changed+0x34) [0x5ffbc4] (on Tor 0.4.0.0
 -alpha-dev )
 Nov 26 10:41:36.000 [warn] {BUG} Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(microdescs_add_list_to_cache+0x2bc) [0x5f1fec] (on Tor
 0.4.0.0-alpha-dev )
 Nov 26 10:41:36.000

Re: [tor-bugs] #28669 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280: retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28669: Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280:
retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by traumschule):

 Related: #23588, #24610, #27410

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28618 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Set MOZILLA_OFFICIAL on Windows builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28618: Set MOZILLA_OFFICIAL on Windows builds
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-|  Actual Points:
  regression, TorBrowserTeam201811,  |
  GeorgKoppen201811  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:
 tbbm-rbm, tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression, TorBrowserTeam201811,
 GeorgKoppen201811
 =>
 tbb-rbm, tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression, TorBrowserTeam201811,
 GeorgKoppen201811


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28547 [Core Tor/sbws]: Monitor relays that are not measured by each sbws instance

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28547: Monitor relays that are not measured by each sbws instance
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, sbws-1.0-must-   |  Actual Points:
  moved-20181128 |
Parent ID:  #25925   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by juga):

 Replying to [comment:11 teor]:

 > > 2. generate could be other thread that happens every hour, instead of
 a different process, so that it can access to the results without the need
 to read them back from the results files.
 > >- pro: eliminate the need to have to run an external command, to
 have to write first the results files and then read them again
 > >- con: bigger change
 >
 > - con: if sbws restarts, some results for the day are lost

 reusults can be also written as they're gotten

 > - con: is this a breaking change? Does the command-line interface to
 generate change?

 the command generate could still exist, just no need for it if the scanner
 command also do it.
 >
 > > I'm a bit more inclinated to 2, because that would easy further
 refactorings for
 > > - not having all bandwidth values triplicated in v3bwfile, relaylist
 and resultdump. I can explain more about htis
 >
 > Why is this a problem?

 It's currently just a bit hard to modify and maintain
 >
 > > - not having to create new ResultError classes to monitor the relays
 >
 > sbws should make it easy to add new keys. If it's not easy, we should
 re-design the code so it is easier.

 ok, will see what's the easier way

 > Here's what I think:
 >
 > * sbws needs to persist the results every hour, so that it can read them
 after a restart or crash. Otherwise, we lose a day of data every time sbws
 restarts.

 my mistake here, the results are written as they are obtained:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/sbws.git/tree/sbws/core/scanner.py#n353.

 So there's no need for 1. and 2. could be an improvement, but i think it's
 not needed so far

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25164 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Reproducible Tor Browser for Android builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25164: Reproducible Tor Browser for Android builds
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201811  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor8
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * priority:  High => Very High


Comment:

 Now that we have the build integrated this item is the biggest issue left
 regarding our build process

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27762 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Implement better fix for Torbutton signing workaround

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27762: Implement better fix for Torbutton signing workaround
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: sysrqb, igt0 (added)


Comment:

 I think we can just back out/revert our previous patches, now that
 Torbutton is not a standalone extension anymore on mobile

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27762 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Implement better fix for Torbutton signing workaround

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27762: Implement better fix for Torbutton signing workaround
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201811  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile => tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201811


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28661 [Core Tor/sbws]: Change http links to https in the documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28661: Change http links to https in the documentation
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/sbws/pull/298

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28662 [Core Tor/sbws]: Change old broken links in the documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28662: Change old broken links in the documentation
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/sbws/pull/299

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[tor-bugs] #28670 [Core Tor/sbws]: CI should check for broken links in the documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28670: CI should check for broken links in the documentation
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 #28662 and #28661 were detected with sphinx make linkcheck.
 This can be added to tox and be called from travis.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28647 [Core Tor/sbws]: Update INSTALL.rst and DEPLOY.rst based on Torflow's documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28647: Update INSTALL.rst and DEPLOY.rst based on Torflow's documentation
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by juga):

 Replying to [comment:3 teor]:
 > Replying to [comment:2 juga]:
 > > Replying to [ticket:28647 teor]:
 > > > Are these things required for sbws:
 > > > * ~~500Mbit-1Gbit of upstream~~ documented in INSTALL.rst
 > >
 > > It currently says `at least 20MB/s (160 Mbit/s).`
 >
 > Why did you pick this number?

 That's what the testing sbws server has and seemed to work well.

 > 100 Mbit/s is the most common available bandwidth.
 >
 > > I think this should be changed to `between 500Mbit/s or 1Gbit/s`. The
 scanner used by longclaw is 1Gbit/s
 >
 > Why is 1 Gbit/s required?
 > Torflow and sbws scaling is relative, so high bandwidths give better
 accuracy, but they're not required.

 At some point we might relay more on the measurements than the relay's
 observed bandwidth?
 >
 > Before we set a requirement, we should make sure it is actually
 available to bandwidth authority operators.

 What do you think is the minimum required?
 I'll ask then to the bwauth operators what's available to them.
 >
 > > > * a fixed IP address
 >
 > Is this needed?

 actually, i don't think so

 > > > * SSL is needed to avoid HTTP content caches at the various exit
 nodes
 > >
 > > When the configuration file it's parsed, accepts both http and https.
 Should this be changed to allow only https and give an error when it's
 http?
 >
 > I think we should require HTTPS, because it stops caches and other forms
 of cheating.

 ok

 > > > * Self-signed certs are OK
 > > > * The server will consume around 12-15Gbytes/day
 > > > * A script to create the file
 > >
 > > Should the script be included in sbws or just written in the
 documentation?.
 >
 > I think it's enough to include it in the documentation.
 > It's a very short script.

 ok

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28661 [Core Tor/sbws]: Change http links to https in the documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28661: Change http links to https in the documentation
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * owner:  (none) => juga
 * status:  needs_review => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28670 [Core Tor/sbws]: CI should check for broken links in the documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28670: CI should check for broken links in the documentation
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by juga):

 https://github.com/torproject/sbws/pull/300 will only pass CI when #28662
 and #28661 are merged and the branch rebased to master.
 So not putting yet in needs_review

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28662 [Core Tor/sbws]: Change old broken links in the documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28662: Change old broken links in the documentation
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * owner:  (none) => juga
 * status:  needs_review => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27822 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA is leaking DNS

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27822: TBA is leaking DNS
-+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks3 |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile tbb-proxy-bypass  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I think this got fixed in a recent alpha. Please reopen with steps to
 reproduce if anyone is still seeing issues.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28648 [Core Tor/sbws]: Broken links in DEPLOY.rst

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28648: Broken links in DEPLOY.rst
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by juga):

 Regarding linkcheck, i created #28670

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28648 [Core Tor/sbws]: Broken links in DEPLOY.rst

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28648: Broken links in DEPLOY.rst
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * owner:  (none) => juga
 * status:  new => accepted


Comment:

 ok, i'll add a warning that they should be read in rtfd.io or locally
 build. I'll try to make it compatible with Github when possible.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28142 [Core Tor/Tor]: Merge original WTF-PAD branch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28142: Merge original WTF-PAD branch
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding|
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:15 mikeperry]:
 > Ok I looked at the branches a bit.. One issue is that there are a fair
 amount of fixups I still need to do for Nick's remaining comments on
 PR#461.. So I'm trying to decide how to do them. For sanity/cleanliness I
 think the answer is to squash everything down in PR#547 into a fresh PR,
 and do the fixups for Nick from PR#461 on top of that branch. There is the
 question of how to handle the new commits you're adding asn, to make those
 easy for Nick to review. Some of them look like they could be squashed
 back into circuitpadding.c. The test ones can probably remain their own
 commit.
 >

 Hey Mike, good to have you back, hope the off days were good.

 I agree that the right thing to do is squash up PR#547 and start building
 from there.
 Perhaps for the extra commits that I added we can leave them as is for the
 purposes of the next  nickm review, and squash them into circuitpadding
 etc. after that review.

 For now, I keep on working on testing the remaining remove token
 functions.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28628 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Introduce New Security Settings to users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28628: Introduce New Security Settings to users
---+--
 Reporter:  antonela   |  Owner:  dunqan
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201811  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25658 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by antonela):

 hey dunqan! Thanks for working on it!

 Personally, I would like to keep the user in the same tab. Mainly, because
 we got some interesting feedback from the circuit display walking through
 and will be a smart move if we can run it directly at `about:tor`.

 My suggestion is to have a [See your security level] (or similar) button
 instead of [Review your security]. When user hits then the doorhanger
 shows up. It will looks similar of what firefox is doing at [Show Address
 Bar] in FF63.

 GeKo, mcs, what do you think?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28601 [Core Tor/sbws]: sbws.rtfd.io does not show the contents of the API

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28601: sbws.rtfd.io does not show the contents of the API
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * milestone:   => sbws: 1.0.x-final


Comment:

 Documentation should be visible for sbws operators.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28661 [Core Tor/sbws]: Change http links to https in the documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28661: Change http links to https in the documentation
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Mistake reassigning

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28662 [Core Tor/sbws]: Change old broken links in the documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28662: Change old broken links in the documentation
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Mistake reassigning

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28669 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280: retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28669: Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280:
retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * keywords:   => tor-hs
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.0.x-final


Comment:

 Seems #27410 is back, we didn't get it right (or maybe we did partially).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28602 [Core Tor/sbws]: The call to generate the bw file is passing an old argument

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28602: The call to generate the bw file is passing an old argument
--+
 Reporter:  juga  |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  sbws:
  |  1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  sbws-1.0-must-moved-20181128  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25925| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by juga):

 Replying to [comment:8 teor]:
 > This patch changes the meaning of --torflow-round-digs, which is also a
 breaking change.

 Assuming that by default we want to use --round-digs (unless --torflow-
 round-digs is provide), what do you suggest?, use that option when it's
 provided and use --round-digs by default?, should --round-digs still
 exist?.

 > When you make changes after a review, please keep the same branch, and
 use fixup commits.
 > Then the reviewer can just review the new changes.

 Sorry i didn't realize it was reviewed, interpreted it as a comment.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27902 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser is not working with macOS 10.14

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27902: Tor Browser is not working with macOS 10.14
--+
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201811  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => worksforme


Comment:

 It seems we are good here. We got all the things we needed by rebasing our
 patches on `mozilla-esr60` which contained the necessary fixes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28669 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280: retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28669: Bug: ../src/feature/hs/hs_client.c:280:
retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 I've stated that theory in part in #27410 but now I do think this is a
 code path creating this issue:

 1. Tor gets a descriptor and tries to connect to it but intro points all
 fail so the descriptor ends up unusable that is
 `hs_client_any_intro_points_usable()` returns false.

 2. A SOCKS request is made to the .onion and because the intro points
 aren't usuable, a refetch is triggered, see `connection_ap_handle_onion()`
 which put the connection in `AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT`

 3. While (2) is happening, computer goes in suspend mode for more than 30
 minutes.

 4. When waking up, the `rend_cache_failure_clean()` callback is triggered
 which makes all the intro point usable all the sudden.

 5. Everything is stalled until we get a live consensus which, when it
 arrives, the HS subsystem is informed with `hs_client_dir_info_changed()`
 that calls `retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc()` (from the stacktrace
 we have in the ticket).

 6. And boom, for `hs_client_refetch_hsdesc()` to return
 `HS_CLIENT_FETCH_HAVE_DESC`, we need a descriptor in the cache with usable
 intro points. We have that because (4) made the intro points usable and
 the descriptor from (1) is still in the cache. The BUG() is hit because we
 still have that pending SOCKS connection that is waiting for its
 descriptor from (2).

 The solution is that for this particular condition where we do have a
 descriptor in our cache but we have a connection waiting for a descriptor,
 instead of BUG(), we need to mark it as "pending for a circuit" like we do
 in `hs_client_desc_has_arrived()` which will trigger the connection to be
 attached to a circuit and thus the HS dance to start.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28544 [Applications/Tor Browser]: about:tor onion along the bottom have inconsistent widths

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28544: about:tor onion along the bottom have inconsistent widths
--+--
 Reporter:  pospeselr |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by antonela):

 Hey, yes i made it with css and the playground lives here
 https://onion-circles.glitch.me/

 I used css border property to do it and maybe if we switch to css outline
 we don't affect the size of the container.

 I found something here
 https://developer.mozilla.org/en-
 US/docs/Web/CSS/border#Borders_vs._outlines

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28666 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Spellcheck wont work on TorBrowser Version 8.0.3 - Linux (64-Bit) for spanish laguange

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28666: Spellcheck wont work on TorBrowser Version 8.0.3 - Linux (64-Bit) for
spanish laguange
--+---
 Reporter:  CaptainCookie |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  spell check   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by CaptainCookie):

 > > Where do you click here exactly? Is that in some browser menu? I think
 I am not sure how to reproduce this problem.

 I do righ click on a text box. This picture is from a twitter DM message
 writing
 [[Image(https://ibb.co/Z1xvCFd)]]

 Next pic is to show that spanish dictionary is installed
 [[Image(https://ibb.co/54JZVVL)]]

 Sorry for my english :)

 Thanks!!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27762 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Implement better fix for Torbutton signing workaround

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27762: Implement better fix for Torbutton signing workaround
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TorBrowserTeam201811  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by igt0):

 Indeed, I reverted all the patches and the system extension worked fine.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28648 [Core Tor/sbws]: Broken links in DEPLOY.rst

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28648: Broken links in DEPLOY.rst
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by juga):

 https://github.com/torproject/sbws/pull/301

 It seems the deb.tpo trusty release today makes stem fail and therefore
 also the tests.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28179 [Core Tor/Tor]: Handle output from PT processes with the event loop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28179: Handle output from PT processes with the event loop
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, 040-roadmap-subtask  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25502   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 PR in previous comment. Branch is in `ahf:bugs/28179_pr`.

 @nickm, this is rather large branch. It had a lots of back and forth and
 testing with me and ahf so it is in `merge_ready` for your consideration
 and upstream merge.

 The spec changes of this branch are in #28180.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19566 [Core Tor/Tor]: SR: Use BUG() instead of tor_assert() when we can

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19566: SR: Use BUG() instead of tor_assert() when we can
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Minor| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-sr, dirauth, easy, disaster- |  Actual Points:
  waiting-to-happen, 034-triage-20180328,|
  034-removed-20180328 035-backport  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Made a branch out of the patch. Added changes file. This lgtm; CI should
 pass in a jiffy.

 Branch: `ticket19566_035_01`.
 PR: https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/554

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28664 [Core Tor/Tor]: Describe consensus digest calculation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28664: Describe consensus digest calculation
---+
 Reporter:  atagar |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, doc  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by atagar):

 Thanks teor, sounds good! For me the operative bit I needed was the
 digested range. Section 3.1 tells us quite a bit but my eyes glazed over
 the 'final "Signature Item"' bit (and in re-reading that it seems to say
 the last signature, not the first). I'm delighted for us to make the fixes
 you mention but how do you feel about adjusting the
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n3309
 detached signature description] to something like the following?

 From:

 {{{
 "consensus-digest" SP Digest NL

 [At start, at most once.]

 The digest of the consensus being signed.
 }}}

 To:

 {{{
 "consensus-digest" SP Digest NL

 [At start, at most once.]

 The digest of the consensus being signed. This is the uppercase
 hex encoded sha1 digest of the next hour's consensus document
 from it beginning up through its first 'directory-signature '
 line (space included).

 For more information see Section 3.1.
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #28671 [Core Tor/sbws]: Travis seems to fail to start tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28671: Travis seems to fail to start tor
---+---
 Reporter:  juga   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  sbws: 1.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+---
 sbws integration tests are failing because tor does not start anymore in
 Travis.
 When sbws try to launch it itself, the error is:
 {{{
 def timeout_handler(signum, frame):
 > raise OSError('reached a %i second timeout without success' %
 timeout)
 E OSError: reached a 90 second timeout without success
 }}}
 https://travis-ci.org/juga0/sbws/jobs/461879325#L1480
 When wait.py try to connect to the Tor test network, the error is:
 {{{
   File "/home/travis/build/torproject/sbws/.tox/integration/lib/python3.6
 /site-packages/stem/socket.py", line 525, in _make_socket
 control_socket.connect((self.address, self.port))
 ConnectionRefusedError: [Errno 111] Connection refused
 }}}
 https://travis-ci.org/torproject/sbws/jobs/461798812#L1190

 I've tried to solve it in branch
 https://github.com/juga0/sbws/tree/travis_tor unsuccessfully. Not sure why
 this started to fail today.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28281 [Core Tor/Tor]: outline of high-level bootstrap tracker abstractions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28281: outline of high-level bootstrap tracker abstractions
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  s8-boostrap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28018| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor8
--+

Comment (by catalyst):

 I thought about this a bit more, and I think we might want to disambiguate
 the connection progress messages a bit.  We probably shouldn't always
 report the first TCP connection the same way, because it means something
 different to the user if the TCP connection to the first proxy fails,
 compared to if the TCP connection to the first relay fails.  So we
 shouldn't use the raw connection progress indications from the ORCONN code
 without decoding them first a bit.

 I think if we know we're connecting through a proxy, we should report the
 first TCP connection as something like `proxy_connecting` and
 `proxy_connected`.  But then this gets confusingly named with the proxy
 handling code in connection.c that talks the proxy protocol and makes
 connection requests to the proxy.  Maybe we should report the progress of
 asking the proxy to make the relay connection as `connecting` and
 `connected`?

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[tor-bugs] #28672 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Android reproducible build of Snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28672: Android reproducible build of Snowflake
---+-
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  android
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 This ticket is for tracking the progress of porting Snowflake to Android.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28672 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Android reproducible build of Snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28672: Android reproducible build of Snowflake
---+
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  android|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dcf):

 * cc: eighthave (added)


Comment:

 Hans-Christoph did the bulk of porting both go-webrtc and Snowflake to
 Android. The process is narrated in #28205 and culminated in
  * https://github.com/keroserene/go-webrtc/pull/90 (go-webrtc port to
 Android)
  * https://github.com/keroserene/snowflake/pull/43 (Snowflake port to
 Android and deb packages)

 The current status, as I understand it, is that the build is reproducible,
 but includes or at least downloads the proprietary Google Play Services
 library as a side effect of the build.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28609 [Applications/Tor Browser]: browser.windows.create(createData) sometimes not displayed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28609: browser.windows.create(createData) sometimes not displayed
--+---
 Reporter:  NemoVoid  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by NemoVoid):

 I changed every setting (in about:config) listed in that file on git, to
 match the setting on firefox 60.3.0 esr. The exception, which were **not**
 changed are:
 startup.homepage_welcome_url, startup.homepage_override_url,
 extensions.hotfix.id, browser.download.manager.retention,
 datareporting.healthreport.about.reportUrl,
 datareporting.healthreport.about.reportUrlUnified,
 browser.syncPromoViewsLeftMap, browser.pocket.api, browser.pocket.site,
 general.appname.override, general.appversion.override,
 general.oscpu.override, general.platform.override,
 general.productSub.override, general.buildID.override,
 browser.startup.homepage_override.buildID, general.useragent.vendor,
 general.useragent.vendorSub, intl.charset.default,
 network.security.ports.banned, network.gio.supported-protocols, media.gmp-
 manager.url.override, network.file.path_blacklist,
 extensions.bootstrappedAddons, extensions.enabledAddons,
 extensions.enabledItems, xpinstall.whitelist.add,
 xpinstall.whitelist.add.36, extensions.legacy.exceptions,
 extensions.webextensions.restrictedDomains, browser.uiCustomization.state,
 browser.search.defaultenginename, browser.search.order.extra.1,
 browser.search.order.extra.2, dom.securecontext.whitelist_onions,
 browser.onboarding.newtour, browser.onboarding.updatetour,
 browser.onboarding.skip-tour-button.hide and all parameters beginning
 font.*

 In general those settings which made no sense to change and where there
 wasn't an equivalent parameter in FF I left alone.The browser still ran
 but the **error was still present**.

 Interestingly the browser knows that there should be text displayed
 because it changes the mouse pointer when you hover over where it should
 be it. I thought at one time it might be getting displayed as white on
 white, so I set the style of text to red - it still didn't display it.

 I also noticed that extensions.pendingOperations changes its type in the
 file on git - it's set as an integer and then as a string - I assume it's
 not a typo in the name.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28521 [Obfuscation/FTE]: fte is not working using default tor browser bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28521: fte is not working using default tor browser bridges
-+---
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  kpdyer
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/FTE  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:3 dcf]:
 > I wanted to know the start dates of the outages for Metrics Timeline
 purposes, so I made a graph of OONI tcp_connect tor_bridge_reachability
 measurements.
 >
 > Ignore the top line for 192.240.101.106:80 -- that bridge was removed in
 #18976. Of the others,
 >  * 131.252.210.150:8080 is online

 How is that measured actually? Because I have tried to use FTE default
 bridges in Tor Browser and connecting to even that one is timing out all
 the time. Thus, there is currently none of the FTE bridges working we
 shipped. Have you tested Tor Browser to reproduce the "online" result? Or
 maybe there is a bug in Tor Browser and that bridge is indeed working as
 it should...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28521 [Obfuscation/FTE]: fte is not working using default tor browser bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28521: fte is not working using default tor browser bridges
-+---
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  kpdyer
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/FTE  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---

Comment (by gk):

 Maybe OONI's tcp_connect test does not say that much in this case which
 would be interesting I guess...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28672 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Android reproducible build of Snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28672: Android reproducible build of Snowflake
---+
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  android|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: gk (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28281 [Core Tor/Tor]: outline of high-level bootstrap tracker abstractions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28281: outline of high-level bootstrap tracker abstractions
--+
 Reporter:  catalyst  |  Owner:  catalyst
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  s8-boostrap   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28018| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor8
--+

Comment (by catalyst):

 We might need to further disambiguate between PT proxies and firewall
 bypass proxies.

 I think we have a terminology quirk we need to be mindful of: Tor Browser
 refers to PT bridges as simply "bridges". It also uses "proxy" to refer to
 only firewall bypass proxies.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27402 [Core Tor/Tor]: stop reporting "internal paths" during bootstrap

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27402: stop reporting "internal paths" during bootstrap
-+-
 Reporter:  catalyst |  Owner:
 |  catalyst
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  s8-bootstrap, tor-spec,  |  Actual Points:  0.1
  035-deferred-20180930  |
Parent ID:  #28018   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 Pull request at https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/555

 This contains prerequisite refactoring for #27167.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28142 [Core Tor/Tor]: Merge original WTF-PAD branch

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28142: Merge original WTF-PAD branch
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, tor-relay, tor-cell,|  Actual Points:
  padding|
Parent ID:  #28631   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor2
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Ok I squashed this as https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/tor/tree
 /adaptive_padding-rebased_0.3.6-pr547-squashed -- same as head
 56376125a42de88bd57240551f7a76f5219fc455 from pr547.

 Definitely easier to look at git logs for. Hopefully not too confusing for
 Nick. And hopefully we don't step on eachother. I have a looot of fixups
 for circuitpadding.c to do. If you end up modifying that file lmk.

 I'm also in the process of making more typedefs and tighter precise int_t
 usage for the various integer types we use, for clarity and to reduce type
 confusion/sign errors/overflow risk. That may end up touching some tests.
 When I get there, I'll let you know. Probably Monday.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28525 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make tor_addr_is_internal_() aware of RFC 6598 (Carrier Grade NAT/Large Scale NAT) IPv4 Ranges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28525: Make tor_addr_is_internal_() aware of RFC 6598 (Carrier Grade NAT/Large
Scale NAT) IPv4 Ranges
--+
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by neel):

 I removed the private_nets change and only did tor_addr_is_internal_. It
 is pushed to the same PR.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28525 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make tor_addr_is_internal_() aware of RFC 6598 (Carrier Grade NAT/Large Scale NAT) IPv4 Ranges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28525: Make tor_addr_is_internal_() aware of RFC 6598 (Carrier Grade NAT/Large
Scale NAT) IPv4 Ranges
--+
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ipv6  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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[tor-bugs] #28673 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make private_nets aware of Carrier Grade NAT (RFC 6598)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28673: Make private_nets aware of Carrier Grade NAT (RFC 6598)
--+
 Reporter:  neel  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 In #28525, we make `tor_addr_is_internal_()` aware of RFC 6598. teor has
 said that we need a consensus method to do this in `private_nets`:

 {{{
 It is important
  *  that all authorities agree on that list when creating summaries, so
 don't
  *  just change this without a proper migration plan and a proposal and
 stuff.
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28668 [Core Tor/Tor]: If a Tor unit test causes a BUG log, it should fail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28668: If a Tor unit test causes a BUG log, it should fail
+
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+

Comment (by nickm):

 I think #1 was the ticket

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27429 [UX]: add https://invidio.us/ as a alternative to YouTube

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27429: add https://invidio.us/ as a alternative to YouTube
-+--
 Reporter:  h1n1 |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  UX   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by Antoniacummins):

 You are not alone, internet stranger. Weird? Maybe but if you are then so
 am I. I work nights and my sleep routine pretty much always involves
 blackout curtains and a bunch of horror narration & top 10 unsolved/creepy
 lists on autoplay https://24hwritemyessay.com. Works better than ambien,
 and I'm less likely to wake up driving to the library or something.

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