[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #29004, #29005, #29006, #29007, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #29004, #29005, #29006, #29007, #29008, #29009, #29010, 
#29011 by teor:
type to enhancement

Comment:
These should all be enhancements

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[tor-bugs] #29011 [Core Tor/Tor]: PrivCount proof of concept: work out how to do integration testing without chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29011: PrivCount proof of concept: work out how to do integration testing 
without
chutney
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  privcount
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #27908
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Tor and chutney can be unreliable, so we might need to do integration
 tests on PrivCount without chutney.

 Here's one possible design:
 * split PrivCount into generic rust modules, tor-specific rust modules,
 and tor interface modules
 * create a command-line interface to the generic rust modules and tor-
 specific rust modules, which takes events, writes results, and aggregates
 results from files
 * use these file-based interfaces to integration test the non-tor, non-
 network PrivCount code

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[tor-bugs] #29010 [Core Tor/Tor]: PrivCount proof of concept: work out how to do CI for PrivCount using chutney

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29010: PrivCount proof of concept: work out how to do CI for PrivCount using
chutney
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  privcount
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #27908
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We can do CI for PrivCount using chutney:
 * launch a standard chutney network
 * launch the Tally Reporter (TR)
 * run some data through the network
 * check the results using a chutney script

 If we want to check extrainfo descriptors against PrivCount statistics,
 we'll need to publish them more often in test networks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25669 [Core Tor/Tor]: Privcount: blinding and encryption should be finished up

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#25669: Privcount: blinding and encryption should be finished up
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  privcount, 035-roadmap-master, 035   |  Actual Points:
  -triaged-in-20180711, rust |
Parent ID:  #29009   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * parent:  #22898 => #29009


Comment:

 We'll need privcount_shamir in tor for the proof of concept.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26637 [Core Tor/Tor]: Privcount noise generation implemented and deployed

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26637: Privcount noise generation implemented and deployed
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  035-roadmap-master, 035-triaged- |  Actual Points:
  in-20180711|
Parent ID:  #22898   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 We'll do some of the noise work for our proof of concept in #29006. But we
 still need to work out how to configure noise generically, and split it
 across multiple statistics.

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[tor-bugs] #29009 [Core Tor/Tor]: PrivCount proof of concept: use blinding and Shamir secret sharing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29009: PrivCount proof of concept: use blinding and Shamir secret sharing
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  privcount
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #27908
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We should split PrivCount secrets and aggregate them using
 privcount_shamir. We'll need to merge privcount_shamir into tor, and use
 it on the Data Collector and Tally Reporter.

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[tor-bugs] #29008 [Core Tor/Tor]: PrivCount proof of concept: add a PrivCount module, torrc option, and protocol

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29008: PrivCount proof of concept: add a PrivCount module, torrc option, and
protocol
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  privcount
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #27908
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We should make PrivCount into an optional module, with a compile-time
 option. If Rust is off, or the PrivCount option is off, PrivCount will be
 disabled.

 When PrivCount is enabled, it will advertise support for the PrivCount
 protocol versions and statistics versions it supports.

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[tor-bugs] #29007 [Core Tor/Tor]: PrivCount proof of concept: work out how to debug PrivCount

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29007: PrivCount proof of concept: work out how to debug PrivCount
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  privcount
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #27908
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Let's debug PrivCount by splitting statistics into multiple categories:
 * public statistics: information that is already public
 * private statistics: information that is sensitive

 We can safely log public statistics at any log level. We can publish
 public statistics' unencrypted, per-relay values and noise amounts in
 extrainfo descriptors.

 We need a debug mode to log private statistics above info level. When we
 are in debug mode, and not using any public authorities, we can publish
 private statistics' unencrypted, per-relay values and noise amounts in
 extrainfo descriptors.

 We'll work out other debugging mechanisms during the proof of concept
 process.

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[tor-bugs] #29006 [Core Tor/Tor]: PrivCount proof of concept: add noise to counters

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29006: PrivCount proof of concept: add noise to counters
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  privcount
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #27908
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We need to add noise to PrivCount counters to protect user activity. We
 split this noise between the Data Collectors (DCs), so that the final
 aggregate count includes enough noise to protect at least one user's
 activity.

 For consumed bandwidth, we can calculate an average user's activity by
 dividing the total consumed bandwidth by the total number of users. Then,
 we split this noise across all the DCs (the relays that support version 1
 of the PrivCount protocol), using each relay's consensus weight fraction.

 DCs need to add noise when we start, and when each consensus arrives,
 based on our own consensus weight fraction in that consensus. (How do we
 deal with the off-by-one error here? Weight by the time between the last
 consensus, the round end/start, and the time we'll try to fetch the next
 consensus?)

 We'll need to add excess noise to compensate for relay failures, and
 malicious relays.

 We should just use the easiest Gaussian sampling method available. Adding
 any noise is an improvement for almost all of our statistics - we can deal
 with floating point issues later.

 We should keep track of:
 * ConsensusCount - the number of consensuses we've seen
 * PrivCountConsensusWeightFraction - the consensus weight of this relay,
 divided by the consensus weight of all relays supporting PrivCount

 For each counter, we should keep track of:
 * NoiseVarianceAmount - the total variance (standard deviation squared) of
 all noise added to this counter. We use variance because it's additive.
 (And standard deviation is not.)

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[tor-bugs] #29005 [Core Tor/Tor]: PrivCount proof of concept: implement consumed bandwidth counters

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29005: PrivCount proof of concept: implement consumed bandwidth counters
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  privcount
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #27908
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We want to add a copy of the current consumed bandwidth statistic to
 PrivCount:
 * consumed bandwidth by relay flags
 https://metrics.torproject.org/bandwidth-flags.html

 We can defer these statistics, because they are not as sensitive to
 manipulation by hostile clients or services:
 * Bandwidth spent on answering directory requests
 * Fraction of connections used uni-/bidirectionally

 We will need counters for:
 * read-history
 * write-history

 Split each counter into 4 (G, E, G and E, not G and not E) using these
 flags:
 * Guard
 * Exit and not BadExit
 We can do the G/E split on the Data Collector (DC).
 We can also do a smaller check aggregation for each group on the Tally
 Reporter (TR).

 Check that relays are Running.
 We can do the Running check on the DC.
 We should also check Running on the TR, and exclude DCs that weren't
 Running at all during the period.

 How often should we update the bandwidth counters?

 If we update counters at the end of the day, we can match the current
 statistics exactly:
 "we only include bandwidth histories for a given day if a relay was listed
 as running in a consensus at least once on that day. We attribute
 bandwidth to guards and/or exits if a relay was a guard and/or exit at
 least in one consensus on a day."
 But we would be storing some sensitive data in memory for the whole day.

 Instead, we could update the counters whenever we queue data, based on the
 flags in the current consensus we have. (The difference will likely be
 minimal.)

 If updating the counters multiple times per second is too CPU-intensive,
 we can update them every few seconds. If that's too often, we can update
 them just before we delete an old consensus.

 Sources:
 https://metrics.torproject.org/reproducible-metrics.html#traffic
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/meetings/2018MexicoCity/Notes/PrivCount

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[tor-bugs] #29004 [Core Tor/Tor]: PrivCount proof of concept: implement check counters

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29004: PrivCount proof of concept: implement check counters
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  privcount
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #27908
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We can start building a PrivCount proof of concept with 3 check counters:
 * ZeroCount - all Data Collectors (DCs) store zero in this counter. If
 aggregation succeeds, the result is zero. Otherwise, all aggregated
 results for this round are meaningless.
 * DataCollectorCount - all Data Collectors (DCs) store one in this
 counter. If aggregation succeeds, the result is the number of DCs that
 reported results.
 * SampledNoiseAmount - all Data Collectors (DCs) store some noise in this
 counter, using their standard processes for generating noise, including
 noise weighting, sampling, and rounding (if needed). If aggregation
 succeeds, and the standard deviation is large enough, the result will
 almost always be non-zero, and almost always be within a few standard
 deviations of zero. We need this counter, because bugs in noise generation
 may not be obvious in the results.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27908 [Core Tor/Tor]: PrivCount proof of concept with existing statistics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27908: PrivCount proof of concept with existing statistics
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  task  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  privcount |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22898| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorV
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * type:  enhancement => task


Comment:

 This can be a parent task

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[tor-bugs] #29003 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create Go PT Bundle Project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29003: Create Go PT Bundle Project
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TBA-a3, TorBrowserTeam201812, tor-
 |  pt
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #28803
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Create Go PT Bundle project. This project has other dependencies that it
 bundles. We will need to evaluate each of these dependencies, possibly
 some for their own project builds.

  * go.crypto (https://golang.org/x/crypto)
  * go.net (https://golang.org/x/net)
  * ed25519/extra25519 (https://github.com/agl/ed25519/extra25519)
  * !SipHash-2-4 (https://github.com/dchest/siphash)
  * goptlib (!https://git.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/goptlib.git)

 !https://gitlab.com/eighthave/goptbundle

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[tor-bugs] #29002 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Upgrade Gradle to 4.6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29002: Upgrade Gradle to 4.6
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm, tbb-mobile,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TBA-a3, TorBrowserTeam201812, tor-
 |  pt
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #28803
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 AndroidPluggableTransports requires gradle 4.6. Investigate and test
 upgrade within android-toolchain.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28616 [Core Tor/Tor]: TLS internal error running Tor 0.3.4.9 on Debian Buster (OpenSSL 1.1.1a)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28616: TLS internal error running Tor 0.3.4.9 on Debian Buster (OpenSSL 1.1.1a)
--+
 Reporter:  filippo   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.4.9
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by Christian):

 * cc: tor@… (added)


Comment:

 Same here on Alpine Linux:
 {{{
 $ apk list -I tor libssl1.1 | awk '{print $1}'
 tor-0.3.4.9-r1
 libssl1.1-1.1.1a-r1
 }}}
 (Sorry for the noise, I just wanted to subscribe to this ticket to receive
 updates.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29000 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: Let torsocks run from source directory

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29000: Let torsocks run from source directory
---+---
 Reporter:  traumschule|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Very Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor  | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by onirony):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Running torsocks from src/ works fine for me both on OS X and Ubuntu. How
 are you compiling torsocks, and on what system? Also can you paste a log
 of the compilation process? I want to be able to reproduce this. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28997 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TB 8.0.4 startup problem with tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28997: TB 8.0.4 startup problem with tor
--+---
 Reporter:  jb.1234abcd   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks3):

 GDB only!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28997 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TB 8.0.4 startup problem with tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28997: TB 8.0.4 startup problem with tor
--+---
 Reporter:  jb.1234abcd   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks3):

 > tor-browser-3.log​

 "[notice] Owning controller connection has closed -- exiting now." missed.

 Deadlock after calling tor_cleanup?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28997 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TB 8.0.4 startup problem with tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28997: TB 8.0.4 startup problem with tor
--+---
 Reporter:  jb.1234abcd   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by jb.1234abcd):

 * Attachment "tor-browser-3.log" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28997 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TB 8.0.4 startup problem with tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28997: TB 8.0.4 startup problem with tor
--+---
 Reporter:  jb.1234abcd   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by jb.1234abcd):

 * Attachment "tor-browser-2.log" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28997 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TB 8.0.4 startup problem with tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28997: TB 8.0.4 startup problem with tor
--+---
 Reporter:  jb.1234abcd   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by jb.1234abcd):

 * Attachment "tor-browser-1.log" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29001 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No video with supported format and MIME type found

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29001: No video with supported format and MIME type found
--+--
 Reporter:  clide |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by clide):

 Can I fix this somehow? I disabled noscript, removed cookies but still
 doesn't work.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29001 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No video with supported format and MIME type found

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29001: No video with supported format and MIME type found
--+--
 Reporter:  clide |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks2):

 They don't give a fuck. Forget.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29001 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No video with supported format and MIME type found

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29001: No video with supported format and MIME type found
--+--
 Reporter:  clide |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by clide):

 Example:

 https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/relays.html.en

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29001 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No video with supported format and MIME type found

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29001: No video with supported format and MIME type found
--+--
 Reporter:  clide |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by clide):

 * Attachment "Screenshot" added.


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[tor-bugs] #29001 [Applications/Tor Browser]: No video with supported format and MIME type found

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29001: No video with supported format and MIME type found
+--
 Reporter:  clide   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Component:  Applications/Tor Browser
  Version:  |   Severity:  Critical
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 For some videos I receive this notice

 "No video with supported format and MIME type found"

 I have checked the same video with clear firefox and chromium and it works
 properly.

 I doesn't work with newest TorBrowser for Linux/Windows/Android

 Can you fix this please?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28962 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuits are not both ready. Stalling conn.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28962: circuits are not both ready. Stalling conn.
--+
 Reporter:  traumschule   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by cypherpunks2):

 > What do you suggest that could be done here?

 Try option
 {{{
 Schedulers Vanilla
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27531 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 8 crashes trying to print on Linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27531: Tor Browser 8 crashes trying to print on Linux
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash, tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  regression |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by traumschule):

 What do you see for {{{objdump  -T /usr/lib/i386-linux-
 gnu/libgmp.so.10.3.2|grep limbs}}}?
 (this is the location on debian, it may differ on fedora)
 {{{
 0001c9c0 gDF .text  003a  Base__gmpz_limbs_write
 0001c920 gDF .text  0046  Base__gmpz_limbs_finish
 000189f0 gDF .text  0284  Base__gmpz_prodlimbs
 0001c9b0 gDF .text  0008  Base__gmpz_limbs_read
 0001c970 gDF .text  003a  Base__gmpz_limbs_modify
 }}}

 If it is OS related it should be reported
 [https://bugzilla.redhat.com/buglist.cgi?component=gmp=Fedora
 upstream]. gmp only had one
 
[https://src.fedoraproject.org/cgit/rpms/gmp.git/commit/?h=f28=03e9d52e873eab4139f7e4f594f29b07b76de797
 commit since] Fedora 26.

 Similar issues were reported for debian and slackware years ago
 - [https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=746216 #746216:
 libhogweed.so.2: undefined reference to `__gmpz_limbs_modify']
 - [https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=753423 #753423:
 libhogweed.so.2: undefined symbol: __gmpn_cnd_add_n]
 - [https://www.linuxquestions.org/questions/slackware-14/slackware-14-2
 %3B-nettle-and-or-gmp-libraries-as-packaged-have-problems-in-software-
 builds-4175586638-print/ Slackware 14.2: libhogweed.so.4: undefined
 symbol: __gmpn_cnd_sub_n]

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