Re: [tor-bugs] #12885 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows Jump Lists fail for Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12885: Windows Jump Lists fail for Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201901R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Okay, this is commit f4606d1c1c35eb36edf3c7cd6b2904be01f19f32 on `tor-
 browser-60.4.0esr-8.5-1` now. I think we are good here.

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[tor-bugs] #29176 [Webpages/Website]: Please add job description to website

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29176: Please add job description to website
--+--
 Reporter:  ewyatt|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512



 The Tor Project is looking for a Browser Developer (C++ and Javascript)

 As a browser developer, your job would be to work closely with other
 members of the Tor Browser development team on C++ patches to our Firefox-
 based browser, writing new APIs, altering functionality for privacy and
 security, and making improvements to our collection of Firefox add-ons
 (JavaScript code). Being a Tor Browser developer includes triaging,
 diagnosing, and fixing bugs; looking for and resolving web privacy issues;
 responding on short notice to urgent security issues; and working
 collaboratively with coworkers and volunteers to implement new features
 and web behavior changes. We also need help making our code more
 maintainable, testable, and mergeable by upstream. The person in this
 position will also review other people's code, designs, and academic
 research papers to make suggestions for improvement.

 This is a full-time position.

 Required Qualifications:

 •   Experience in C++ (and ideally, JavaScript). Five years of C++
 experience is probably necessary for the level of expertise we want,
 though some of these years can be replaced with other Object Oriented
 Programming and/or C experience. If you meet this level of experience with
 C++/OOP, JavaScript can be learned on the job.
 •   Possess a solid understanding of issues surrounding secure C++
 programming and reference counted memory (at least to the level of
 avoiding issues).
 •   Be comfortable diving into new, unfamiliar codebases, looking for
 ways to alter and augment their functionality in specific, goal-oriented
 ways.
 •   Be familiar with web technologies and how the web works,
 especially the same-origin model and web tracking.
 •   Willingness and ability to justify and document technical
 decisions for a public, world-wide technical audience.
 •   Be comfortable working remotely with a geographically distributed
 team.
 •   Experience interacting with users and other developers online,
 including experience being confronted with differing ideas and opinions
 (not always in a nice manner), while maintaining a high level of
 professionalism.
 •   Comfort with transparency: as a non-profit organization who
 develops open source software, almost everything we do is public,
 including your name (or at least your business name) and possibly salary
 information.

 Preferred qualifications:

 •   Familiarity and/or experience with writing add-ons and/or patches
 for Mozilla Firefox or other web browsers.
 •   Familiarity with compiling software for the Android platform.
 •   Familiarity with browser fingerprinting defenses
 •   Familiarity with Firefox's internal architecture, including its
 use of multiple processes and sandboxing.
 •   Be intensely creative yet also ruthlessly pragmatic in your
 thinking.
 •   Possess knowledge/familiarity of probability, statistics, and
 information theory.
 •   Know enough about networking to be able to visualize what HTTP 1.1
 looks like on the wire while encapsulated within Tor's network protocol.
 •   Experience working with distributed (remote) teams across
 different time-zones with people of differing skill levels over multiple
 mediums, including email, instant messaging, and IRC.
 •   Open-source experience: contributed significant chunks of code to
 multiple open-source projects in the past.
 •   Familiarity with distributed version control systems, including
 Git.
 •   Familiarity with rust
 •   Genuinely be excited about Tor and its values!
 •   Willingness and ability to travel internationally to twice-yearly
 team meetings (strongly preferred).

 For a more detailed understanding of the full breadth and depth of the
 work you'd be doing, have a look at The Design and Implementation of the
 Tor Browser, especially The Design Requirements section at
 https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#DesignRequirements.

 Academic degrees are great, but not required if you have the right
 experience!

 The team coordinates via IRC, email, and bug trackers. This position may
 be performed remotely, but we would be happy to provide a desk at our
 office in Seattle, Washington.

 Salary negotiable. We have a competitive benefits package, including a
 generous PTO policy; 14 paid holidays per year (US; including the week
 between 

Re: [tor-bugs] #29175 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.3.5.x mishandles empty socks5 auth

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29175: Tor 0.3.5.x mishandles empty socks5 auth
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, backport-035  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by yawning):

 Rejecting malformed username/password authentication attempts is the
 correct behavior.

 > {{{ send  [00 = zero length username, 00 = zero length
 password] }}}

 Both UNAME and PASSWD are explicitly specified as 1 to 255 octets long.
 Fix the client library.

 See:
  * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1929
  * https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-03.txt

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29050 [Community/Tor Support]: Connecting to tor over a socks 5 connection no longer works in 3.5.7

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29050: Connecting to tor over a socks 5 connection no longer works in 3.5.7
---+--
 Reporter:  arj|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Community/Tor Support  |Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.7
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  regression?|  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by arma):

 Ok, I think this was actually a Tor bug. I've filed #29175 for it. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29175 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.3.5.x mishandles empty socks5 auth

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29175: Tor 0.3.5.x mishandles empty socks5 auth
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, backport-035  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by arma):

 My proposed fix would be:
 {{{
 diff --git a/src/core/proto/proto_socks.c b/src/core/proto/proto_socks.c
 index 86c656e..8e3cf4a 100644
 --- a/src/core/proto/proto_socks.c
 +++ b/src/core/proto/proto_socks.c
 @@ -451,7 +451,6 @@ parse_socks5_userpass_auth(const uint8_t *raw_data,
 socks_re
  req->username = tor_memdup_nulterm(username, usernamelen);
  req->usernamelen = usernamelen;

 -req->got_auth = 1;
}

if (passwordlen && password) {
 @@ -459,9 +458,10 @@ parse_socks5_userpass_auth(const uint8_t *raw_data,
 socks_r
  req->password = tor_memdup_nulterm(password, passwordlen);
  req->passwordlen = passwordlen;

 -req->got_auth = 1;
}

 +  req->got_auth = 1;
 +
end:
socks5_client_userpass_auth_free(trunnel_req);
return res;
 }}}

 But I don't know if that is a *sufficient* fix. Somebody should test it.
 :)

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[tor-bugs] #29175 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.3.5.x mishandles empty socks5 auth

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29175: Tor 0.3.5.x mishandles empty socks5 auth
--+--
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  regression, backport-035
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 There is a regression in Tor 0.3.5.x with handling socks5 handshakes that
 offer username/password auth but then present empty username and password.

 It came in during commit 9068ac3c (which went into 0.3.5.1-alpha).

 The symptom is that when you do your socks5 handshake with an empty
 username and password (e.g. like pidgin does it), you get log lines like
 {{{
 Jan 24 19:40:17.000 [warn] Fetching socks handshake failed. Closing.
 Jan 24 19:40:17.000 [warn] socks5: parsing failed - invalid user/pass
 authentication message.
 }}}

 Bug reported by a person on #tor, and also separately by #29050.

 I asked Josh Glazebrook, the author of the socks library in #29050, for
 some actual traces of correct behavior / incorrect behavior, and he sent:

 {{{
 ocks v2.2.3
 tor v0.3.5.7
 client announces it only supports noauth (00)
 server chooses noauth (00)


 send  [00 = noauth]
 recv  [server chose noauth]
 send  [connect
 command - ipinfo.io]
 recv  [success]




 socks v2.2.2
 tor v0.3.5.7
 client announces it supports noauth (00) and userpass (02)
 server chooses userpass (02)
 connection is unsuccessful - server returns general socks server failure,
 tor logs indicate invalid user/pass.
 Jan 24 14:47:15.000 [warn] Fetching socks handshake failed. Closing.
 Jan 24 14:47:56.000 [warn] socks5: parsing failed - invalid user/pass
 authentication message.


 send  [00 = noauth, 02 = userpass]
 recv  [server chose userpass]
 send  [00 = zero length username, 00 = zero length
 password]
 recv  [00 = server indicates auth success]
 send  [connect
 command - ipinfo.io]
 recv  [01- general SOCKS server failure] (in tor's
 log output it's saying auth is invalid at this point)



 socks v.2.2.2
 tor via torbrowser 8.0.4 (unsure of which tor version, but likely older
 than 0.3.5.7)
 client announces it supports noauth (00) and userpass (02)
 server chooses userpass (02)
 connection is successful

 send  [00 = noauth, 02 = userpass]
 recv  [server chose userpass]
 send  [00 = zero length username, 00 = zero length
 password]
 recv  [00 = server indicates auth success]
 send  [connect
 command - ipinfo.io]
 recv  [00 = success]
 }}}

 Josh further gives us this hint:

 {{{
 It appears there is indeed something that changed between older versions
 of
 Tor and newer versions. Looking at the actual data being exchanged, it's
 exactly the same.

 The only odd thing is tor v0.3.5.7 is indicating in the auth reply that
 the
 authentication was a success, and only when the connect command is sent,
 it's returning a "general socks server failure" code, but in the actual
 tor
 log it's logging invalid user/pass.
 }}}

 I went spelunking and found this code newly in 0.3.5.x:

 {{{
   if (usernamelen && username) {
 tor_free(req->username);
 req->username = tor_memdup_nulterm(username, usernamelen);
 req->usernamelen = usernamelen;

 req->got_auth = 1;
   }

   if (passwordlen && password) {
 tor_free(req->password);
 req->password = tor_memdup_nulterm(password, passwordlen);
 req->passwordlen = passwordlen;

 req->got_auth = 1;
   }
 }}}

 Compare to the code in 0.3.4.x:
 {{{
   if (usernamelen) {
 req->username = tor_memdup(data+2u, usernamelen);
 req->usernamelen = usernamelen;
   }
   if (passlen) {
 req->password = tor_memdup(data+3u+usernamelen, passlen);
 req->passwordlen = passlen;
   }
   *drain_out = 2u + usernamelen + 1u + passlen;
   req->got_auth = 1;
 }}}

 So in 0.3.4.x when we got a type 0x02 handshake but empty username and
 empty password, we would still set got_auth to 1. In 0.3.5.x when that
 happens, we leave got_auth at 0.

 The result is that the socks5 handshake itself still goes identically, but
 when we get the empty username and password, we '''don't record that we
 received it''', even though we send back a "handshake was successful"
 response. And then when application data shows up after that, we try to
 treat it as a socks5 username and password, because we're still waiting
 for one. That's where things go bad.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29174 [Core Tor/Tor]: Guard Node can eclipse the hidden service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29174: Guard Node can eclipse the hidden service
---+
 Reporter:  TBD.Chen   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:  Tor: 0.3.0.1-alpha
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  guard, hidden service  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by TBD.Chen):

 * version:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.3.0.1-alpha


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[tor-bugs] #29174 [Core Tor/Tor]: Guard Node can eclipse the hidden service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29174: Guard Node can eclipse the hidden service
---+--
 Reporter:  TBD.Chen   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:  Tor: unspecified   |   Severity:  Critical
 Keywords:  guard, hidden service  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
 For the current Tor protocol, hidden services connect into Tor network
 only through one Guard node (Vanguard is not running on default).
 As a result, all the HS-IntroPoint circuit of the hidden service are all
 using one guard.
 As we all know, the HS-IntroPoint is quite special on its cell sequence,
 so the malicious guard relays can drop all the incoming cells of HS-
 IntroPoint until the hidden service rebuild its HS-IntroPoint circuit.
 And the malicious guard can attack the new circuits again.
 Because the incoming cells of HS-IntroPoint circuit (introduce1 cells) are
 all droped, so the hidden services cannot be accessed by any user, and
 eclipsed by its Guard relay.

 This mater is appearing after reduce the number of guards to one, and if
 the hidden service not run the vangard, the hidden service has the risk of
 being eclipsed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27385 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: https://snowflake.torproject.org/embed is confusing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27385: https://snowflake.torproject.org/embed is confusing
---+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks3   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Major  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake, ux-team |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by arma):

 I'm not sure how this idea ties into the above prototypes and
 requirements, but it might be nice to have something more than the "you
 aren't being helpful right now" and "you are helping someone now" binary
 situation.

 Specifically, if I turn on my snowflake and go to sleep and wake up and
 look, and it's on "nope not helpful", I have no idea whether I've been
 helpful anytime in the past.

 So it would be interesting to consider changing the icon over time to
 reflect not just current state right now, but past contributions.

 (The idea came about based on antonela's sentence above about "adding" a
 snowflake.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12885 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Windows Jump Lists fail for Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12885: Windows Jump Lists fail for Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201901R  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 from IRC:

 

 (2019-01-24 2:03:34 PM) pospeselr: GeKo: ok fun fact, the code change
 isn't even necessary for #12885
 (2019-01-24 2:04:14 PM) pospeselr: all we need to do is flip
 taskbar.grouping.useprofile to true and all of the browser.taskbar.lists.*
 options work as expected
 (2019-01-24 2:04:16 PM) GeKo: which?
 (2019-01-24 2:04:25 PM) GeKo: ha, okay
 (2019-01-24 2:04:35 PM) pospeselr: including browser.taskbar.lists.enabled
 acting as a master switch
 (2019-01-24 2:05:10 PM) pospeselr: just verified stock
 (2019-01-24 2:05:14 PM) pospeselr: on stock*

 

 Amended the change to remove the unnecessary code change, left the prefs
 change.

 tor-browser: https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_12885_v3

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29143 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Building obfs4 in tor-browser-build nightlies is broken due to uTLS support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29143: Building obfs4 in tor-browser-build nightlies is broken due to uTLS 
support
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201901R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good now. Thanks for the work while being busy with all the other
 important stuff, boklm! Merged to `master` (commit
 f27f11201d86b8bb909bad8b4c04f841b5487ddb).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28885 [Applications/Tor Browser]: notify users that update is downloading

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28885: notify users that update is downloading
---+---
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201901, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25694 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:7 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:6 gk]:
 > > Yes, it opens the dialog. It's not canceled in the way that one has to
 start over again but it suddenly stops making progress (and the icon on
 the hamburger menu + the menuitem vanish).
 >
 > So far Kathy and I have not been able to reproduce this using a debug
 build on Linux or macOS. We will try again with an optimized build. Two
 more questions for you:
 > 1. Can you reproduce the problem if you open the about dialog a second
 time without using the new hamburger menu item? If so, that might imply
 this is not a new bug (it is much more noticeable with the new
 "Downloading..." hamburger menu item though).

 Yes.

 > 2. Does the download restart on its own if you wait a while? We see a
 pause but it does restart within 5-10 seconds. This behavior is confusing
 though.

 No, it does not. It is just saying "Downloading update" and the throbber
 spins but nothing happens.

 I am using a patched 8.5a5 (I essentially applied your patch "by hand" to
 the various pieces in the omni.ja's) to test the update to 8.5a6 on a
 Linux machine.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15035 [Applications/Orbot]: URI format for bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15035: URI format for bridges
+---
 Reporter:  eighthave   |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  uri, url, bridge|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28015  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29143 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Building obfs4 in tor-browser-build nightlies is broken due to uTLS support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29143: Building obfs4 in tor-browser-build nightlies is broken due to uTLS 
support
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201901R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by boklm):

 There is a new revision of the patch in `bug_29143_v6`:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_29143_v6=f27f11201d86b8bb909bad8b4c04f841b5487ddb

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28885 [Applications/Tor Browser]: notify users that update is downloading

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28885: notify users that update is downloading
---+---
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201901, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25694 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:6 gk]:
 > Yes, it opens the dialog. It's not canceled in the way that one has to
 start over again but it suddenly stops making progress (and the icon on
 the hamburger menu + the menuitem vanish).

 So far Kathy and I have not been able to reproduce this using a debug
 build on Linux or macOS. We will try again with an optimized build. Two
 more questions for you:
 1. Can you reproduce the problem if you open the about dialog a second
 time without using the new hamburger menu item? If so, that might imply
 this is not a new bug (it is much more noticeable with the new
 "Downloading..." hamburger menu item though).
 2. Does the download restart on its own if you wait a while? We see a
 pause but it does restart within 5-10 seconds. This behavior is confusing
 though.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29120 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Default value of media.cache_size (0) causes some media to load extremely slowly or become unplayable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29120: Default value of media.cache_size (0) causes some media to load 
extremely
slowly or become unplayable
-+-
 Reporter:  QZw2aBQoPyuEVXYVlBps |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak, tbb-usability-|  Actual Points:
  website, TorBrowserTeam201901  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by QZw2aBQoPyuEVXYVlBps):

 * Attachment "MemoryMediaCache3.patch" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29120 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Default value of media.cache_size (0) causes some media to load extremely slowly or become unplayable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29120: Default value of media.cache_size (0) causes some media to load 
extremely
slowly or become unplayable
-+-
 Reporter:  QZw2aBQoPyuEVXYVlBps |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak, tbb-usability-|  Actual Points:
  website, TorBrowserTeam201901  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by QZw2aBQoPyuEVXYVlBps):

 Alright, I poked around the code a little more and I think I found a
 decent solution.

 I changed {{{GetMediaCache}}} to add a {{{aIsPrivateBrowsing}}} parameter.
 As far as I can tell, {{{GetMediaCache}}} is only ever called from
 {{{MediaCacheStream::Init}}}, so I just changed the call there to pass in
 the stream's {{{mIsPrivateBrowing}}} member.

 The rest of the code is pretty similar to the previous patch, but the new
 logic only applies in private browsing mode now. I added and updated a few
 comments in the code to reflect the new behavior as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15035 [Applications/Orbot]: URI format for bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15035: URI format for bridges
+---
 Reporter:  eighthave   |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  uri, url, bridge|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28015  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * parent:   => #28015


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25723 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Multiplex - one client splits traffic across multiple proxies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25723: Multiplex - one client splits traffic across multiple proxies
---+--
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * owner:  (none) => dcf
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26092 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Split broker into components

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26092: Split broker into components
---+--
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  project| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * owner:  (none) => dcf
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29158 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add fix for DSA 4371-1 (apt vulnerability)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29158: Add fix for DSA 4371-1 (apt vulnerability)
+--
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201901R, tbb-rbm  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201901, tbb-rbm => TorBrowserTeam201901R, tbb-
   rbm


Comment:

 There is a patch for review in branch `bug_29158_v4`:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_29158_v4=f9cbcb92e13bea3792733dd89d6efab4d62be7e2

 We are now checking the version of the `apt` package installed.

 It is still missing the fix for `wheezy-i386` which I think could be done
 in a separate commit.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27850 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Provide stand-alone snowflake proxy for 32-bit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27850: Provide stand-alone snowflake proxy for 32-bit
---+--
 Reporter:  traumschule|  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  needs_review => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => dcf


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28015 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Brainstorm improved ux for orgs that want to give bridges to their people

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28015: Brainstorm improved ux for orgs that want to give bridges to their 
people
---+---
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, education, documentation  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---
Changes (by eighthave):

 * cc: eighthave (added)


Comment:

 One important part of this is working out an easy to use URL setup that
 works on all platforms.  We've done a bunch of work on this for
 ChatSecure.  Here's the thread on doing it for bridges:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/15035

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29172 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Redeploy Snowflake services with go1.11.15

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29172: Redeploy Snowflake services with go1.11.15
---+--
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by dcf):

 * owner:  (none) => dcf
 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28885 [Applications/Tor Browser]: notify users that update is downloading

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28885: notify users that update is downloading
---+---
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201901, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25694 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:5 mcs]:
 > Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > > Here is what I got so far:
 > >
 > > 1) I wonder whether we should use a different icon for the download
 (like an arrow *down*) as we have
 > > the arrow up associaed with *up*date is ready to get applied and this
 is the general Firefox meaning of that icon. I am a bit worried that we
 set user expectations wrong here one can't discriminate between the
 download and ready-to-apply state at a glance.
 >
 > We opted to use the same icon because Mozilla uses the same upward arrow
 icon for all updater-related messages, i.e.,
 > {{{
 >   Download Tor Browser update// Shown if automatic updates
 are disabled
 >   Download a fresh copy of Tor Browser   // shown if the update fails
 >   Restart to update Tor Browser
 > }}}
 >
 > Kathy and I don't have strong feelings about using one icon or two,
 although we have not looked at how difficult it would be to use more than
 one. In some of explorations Antonela did in #25694, the design did
 include a different icon for restart as well. Kathy and I would like to
 minimize changes we make so as to avoid diverging from Firefox too much.

 Okay. Not needed for this bug anyway, just something I was wondering while
 testing.

 > > 2) If one has the about dialog open while a download is happening,
 closes it, opens the hamburger menu and clicks on menuitem then the
 download stops. I guess this is unexpected and should get fixed?
 > > (Interestingly enough, after clicking the about dialog in that
 scenario and opening it again shows 0 of XX MB at the beginning. It jumps
 to the already download amount (and goes from there) later on when the
 download is resumed. It seems showing "0" in this case is wrong.)
 >
 > Kathy and I will try to reproduce this bug. Does clicking the
 "Downloading..." menu item open the about dialog like it is supposed to
 (at which point the download stops)? By "stops" do you mean "stops making
 progress" or do you mean the download is completely canceled?

 Yes, it opens the dialog. It's not canceled in the way that one has to
 start over again but it suddenly stops making progress (and the icon on
 the hamburger menu + the menuitem vanish).

 > Showing 0MB when resuming a download is probably not something we
 introduced but we could look into it. When the about dialog or large
 update dialog is opened (i.e., via "Check for Tor Browser update"),
 Mozilla stops and restarts the download. This may be the root cause of
 some of the problems you saw. They used to download MAR files slowly when
 no UI was visible, which is the origin of the stop and restart behavior. I
 am not sure if we can easily eliminate that code though.

 Okay, thanks for the explanation. It's been confusing that trying to get
 more information about the download progress by clicking on that item
 suddenly stops this progress. And it is not resuming automatically once
 the dialog closes or something. One has to re-trigger the update process
 to get it going again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29173 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Add meek-server in jenkins-ci

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29173: Add meek-server in jenkins-ci
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:1 gk]:
 > #29171 is the context here. So we should be sure to have the right Go
 version and make sure we deploy the result later on the BridgeDB side (for
 Moat).

 Yes, but it seems like our jenkins doesn't support downloading the build
 artifacts, so adding a meek-server job wouldn't be very useful for this
 right now.

 In some glorious future, it would be nice if we had a build system where
 we could get the most recent version of a program (meek-server, in this
 instance) and then we can deploy it onto the correct server. (The "deploy"
 step is another challenge in this scenario, but there are different tools
 for that, too). And maybe both stages run on the same server, but the
 "build" and "deploy" stages are automated.

 I'll close this, but we should have a discussion about how we can maintain
 the custom applications we are running on the servers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25502 [Core Tor/Tor]: Report intermediate PT bootstrapping status

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25502: Report intermediate PT bootstrapping status
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-roadmap-master, tor-pt,  |  implemented
  postfreeze-ok  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28180 [Core Tor/Tor]: Signal mechanism from PT processes to Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28180: Signal mechanism from PT processes to Tor
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, 040-roadmap-subtask, |  implemented
  postfreeze-ok  |  Actual Points:  4
Parent ID:  #25502   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28181 [Core Tor/Tor]: spec: Add to pt-spec.txt control messages going back to main process (tor)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28181: spec: Add to pt-spec.txt control messages going back to main process 
(tor)
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, tor-pt, 040-roadmap-   |  implemented
  subtask, postfreeze-ok |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28180   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * parent:   => #28180


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28180 [Core Tor/Tor]: Signal mechanism from PT processes to Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28180: Signal mechanism from PT processes to Tor
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pt, 040-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:  4
  postfreeze-ok  |
Parent ID:  #25502   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  implemented =>


Comment:

 Temporarily reopening for ticket parentage purposes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25502 [Core Tor/Tor]: Report intermediate PT bootstrapping status

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25502: Report intermediate PT bootstrapping status
-+-
 Reporter:  ahf  |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-roadmap-master, tor-pt,  |  Actual Points:
  postfreeze-ok  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  implemented =>


Comment:

 Temporarily reopening for ticket parentage purposes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28705 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser on Android is crashing on newer Android devices (>= Android N) by file download

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28705: Tor Browser on Android is crashing on newer Android devices (>= Android 
N)
by file download
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-crash, TBA-a3,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201901   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good. I cherry-picked your patches onto `tor-
 browser-60.4.0esr-8.5-1` (commits
 e80f96596129a94a39caa8e525affa892077d3b0
 f74197a8e82b67b0351e91e134138f91ae0173d4
 d00611cec519373705b83ed2ac89e1db58532fa2
 3b926685447ea2056e73d9b3396ea8d5cbdd349f
 ad9b3c0d704dceab75c2b3f6246740c78d8f7c04
 17314deba4ef021723dbb67d3e31af33790a5147
 394ffba812d69d4b5767376f0f3ff1e303ba26d1).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28181 [Core Tor/Tor]: spec: Add to pt-spec.txt control messages going back to main process (tor)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28181: spec: Add to pt-spec.txt control messages going back to main process 
(tor)
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, tor-pt, 040-roadmap-   |  implemented
  subtask, postfreeze-ok |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by dcf):

 * parent:  #28180 =>


Comment:

 I asked for feedback from the author of
 [https://github.com/twisteroidambassador/ptadapter ptadapter], which is
 one of the few PT manager implementations apart from tor; i.e., it will
 have to handle LOG and STATUS messages from PT implementations.

 > I agree with dcf's sentiments in general, that LOG messages are for
 human consumption and STATUS messages are for machines. The LOG mechanism
 basically becomes another handler for the logging system, alongside file
 output, syslog, etc. It might be worthwhile to add some way for the
 controlling application to indicate allowed log level, to avoid being
 flooded with debug messages (I know I like to flood my debug logs!)
 >
 > As for STATUS, if these are messages meant for machines, then the
 machine is probably expected to take actions on them. It might be a good
 idea to think about what actions are wanted, and define some standardized
 keys to trigger these actions. A PERCENT key that moves a progress bar
 would be one example.

 They add, "I think the existing syntax is a good foundation to build on."
 (Referring to what shipped in [https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-
 tor-0401-alpha tor 0.4.0.1-alpha].)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28226 [Core Tor/Tor]: Backend for an async publish-subcribe messaging system for cross-module communications

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28226: Backend for an async publish-subcribe messaging system for cross-module
communications
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pubsub, sponsor31-maybe  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor31-can


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28885 [Applications/Tor Browser]: notify users that update is downloading

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28885: notify users that update is downloading
---+---
 Reporter:  mcs|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201901, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25694 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > Here is what I got so far:
 >
 > 1) I wonder whether we should use a different icon for the download
 (like an arrow *down*) as we have
 > the arrow up associaed with *up*date is ready to get applied and this is
 the general Firefox meaning of that icon. I am a bit worried that we set
 user expectations wrong here one can't discriminate between the download
 and ready-to-apply state at a glance.

 We opted to use the same icon because Mozilla uses the same upward arrow
 icon for all updater-related messages, i.e.,
 {{{
   Download Tor Browser update// Shown if automatic updates are
 disabled
   Download a fresh copy of Tor Browser   // shown if the update fails
   Restart to update Tor Browser
 }}}

 Kathy and I don't have strong feelings about using one icon or two,
 although we have not looked at how difficult it would be to use more than
 one. In some of explorations Antonela did in #25694, the design did
 include a different icon for restart as well. Kathy and I would like to
 minimize changes we make so as to avoid diverging from Firefox too much.

 > 2) If one has the about dialog open while a download is happening,
 closes it, opens the hamburger menu and clicks on menuitem then the
 download stops. I guess this is unexpected and should get fixed?
 > (Interestingly enough, after clicking the about dialog in that scenario
 and opening it again shows 0 of XX MB at the beginning. It jumps to the
 already download amount (and goes from there) later on when the download
 is resumed. It seems showing "0" in this case is wrong.)

 Kathy and I will try to reproduce this bug. Does clicking the
 "Downloading..." menu item open the about dialog like it is supposed to
 (at which point the download stops)? By "stops" do you mean "stops making
 progress" or do you mean the download is completely canceled?

 Showing 0MB when resuming a download is probably not something we
 introduced but we could look into it. When the about dialog or large
 update dialog is opened (i.e., via "Check for Tor Browser update"),
 Mozilla stops and restarts the download. This may be the root cause of
 some of the problems you saw. They used to download MAR files slowly when
 no UI was visible, which is the origin of the stop and restart behavior. I
 am not sure if we can easily eliminate that code though.

 > 3) 15:34 <+GeKo> you do
 > 15:34 <+GeKo> this.showUpdateDownloadingNotification(update, false);
 > 15:34 <+GeKo> but only have
 > 15:34 <+GeKo> showUpdateDownloadingNotification()
 > 15:34 <+GeKo> without any arguments
 > 15:35 <+GeKo> is that a copy and paste error?

 That is an easy one and we will fix it.

 > I applied the Torbutton patch to `master` (commit
 15c369f661fd360c9715b4dd7da147f7aa8f2443), though, to give more time to
 translators.

 Good plan, and thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29166 [Metrics/Statistics]: Run modules from Java only

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29166: Run modules from Java only
+--
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => irl


Comment:

 There, revised my earlier patch and assigned irl as reviewer as discussed
 today. Please review that commit above plus
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/metrics-
 web.git/commit/?h=task-29166=d8049ba7ebf6c2eb353ed2a68124ca87de73a3dc
 commit d8049ba in the same branch]. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29173 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Add meek-server in jenkins-ci

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29173: Add meek-server in jenkins-ci
-+
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by gk):

 #29171 is the context here. So we should be sure to have the right Go
 version and make sure we deploy the result later on the BridgeDB side (for
 Moat).

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #12411, #12413

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #12411, #12413 by nickm:


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Re: [tor-bugs] #12412 [Applications/Orbot]: Orbot broke using TransPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12412: Orbot broke using TransPort
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  n8fr8
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Orbot   |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  orbot-14.0.3.1, orbot-14.0.4,|  Actual Points:
  software-engineering   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * keywords:  orbot-14.0.3.1, orbot-14.0.4, wtf, software-engineering =>
 orbot-14.0.3.1, orbot-14.0.4, software-engineering
 * severity:   => Blocker


Comment:

 Removing "wtf" keyword so that wtf-pad tickets are easier to find.

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #28634, #28780, #29085, #28638, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #28634, #28780, #29085, #28638, #28693, #28804, #29083, 
#28631, #28632, #28636, #28637, #28777, #29084, #29102, #28821, #28878 by nickm:
sponsor to Sponsor2

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[tor-bugs] #29173 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Add meek-server in jenkins-ci

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29173: Add meek-server in jenkins-ci
-+
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 Hi!

 Can we have meek-server builds included in jenkins-ci? I see there are
 build instruction here: https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/meek.git/tree/meek-server/README

 It seems relatively simple (assuming go-lang is installed)
 {{{

 cd meek-server
 go build
 }}}

 https://git.torproject.org/pluggable-transports/meek.git

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28610 [Core Tor/Tor]: will WTF-PAD impair bandwidth scanning?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28610: will WTF-PAD impair bandwidth scanning?
--+
 Reporter:  starlight |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor2
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor2


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #27908, #29005, #29006, #29007, ...

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #27908, #29005, #29006, #29007, #29008, #29010, #29004, 
#29009, #29011, #29129 by nickm:
sponsor to SponsorV

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27503 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disabling accessibility on Windows breaks screen readers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27503: Disabling accessibility on Windows breaks screen readers
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  gk
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201901, TorBrowserTeam201901R   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:31 cypherpunks33]:
 > :) #26148?

 Yeah, I had the same idea but it's not that. So, I guess either a) Mozilla
 added some additional commit to esr60 that resolves this issue which I had
 not or b) the mingw-w64 diff explains this or c) I messed up the patch for
 this bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29169 [Core Tor/Tor]: 32-bit warnings in test_circuitpadding.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29169: 32-bit warnings in test_circuitpadding.c
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor2
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Merged.  Let's see if Jenkins is happier now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29167 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update go to 1.11.5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29167: Update go to 1.11.5
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201901, tbb-rbm  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by dcf):

 I started a testbuild; not sure when it will finish. It's unlikely that
 the patch won't work, but also I think it's not urgent to get it into the
 next alpha.

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[tor-bugs] #29172 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Redeploy Snowflake services with go1.11.15

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29172: Redeploy Snowflake services with go1.11.15
---+
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+
 [https://github.com/golang/go/issues/29903 CVE-2019-6486] is a DoS on the
 implementation of certain elliptic curves, fixed in go1.11.5.

 Redeploy services that use crypto/tls and therefore may be exposed to the
 bug:
 - broker at snowflake-broker.bamsoftware.com
 - WebSocket server at snowflake.bamsoftware.com
 - standalone proxy-go instances (currently at snowflake.bamsoftware.com)

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[tor-bugs] #29171 [Obfuscation/meek]: Redeploy meek-server instances with go1.11.5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29171: Redeploy meek-server instances with go1.11.5
--+-
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 [https://github.com/golang/go/issues/29903 CVE-2019-6486] is a DoS on the
 implementation of certain elliptic curves, fixed in go1.11.5.

 Redeploy servers that use crypto/tls and therefore may be exposed to the
 bug:
 -
 
[https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/8F4541EEE3F2306B7B9FEF1795EC302F6B84DAE8
 cymrubridge02] (backend for meek-azure)
 - starman (throttled meek.bamsoftware.com)
 - maenad (unthrottled meek.bamsoftware.com)
 - GAEuploader (gaeuploader.meek.bamsoftware.com)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29167 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update go to 1.11.5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29167: Update go to 1.11.5
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201901, tbb-rbm  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by gk):

 Happy to merge the patch for the upcoming alpha. However, I'd need it
 today-ish in that case. I plan to kick off the alpha build tomorrow (Jan
 25) morning European time.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29167 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update go to 1.11.5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29167: Update go to 1.11.5
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201901, tbb-rbm  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by dcf):

 It's safe to assume that meek-client is affected, though in `--helper`
 mode which Tor Browser uses it's probably not. I'll redeploy the meek-
 server and Snowflake websocket-server and whatnot.

 This is the patch I'm trying:
 {{{#!diff
 index 1841705..be9f84d 100644
 --- a/projects/go/config
 +++ b/projects/go/config
 @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
  # vim: filetype=yaml sw=2
 -version: 1.11.1
 +version: 1.11.5
  filename: '[% project %]-[% c("version") %]-[% c("var/build_id")
 %].tar.gz'

  var:
 @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ input_files:
  enable: '[% c("var/windows") || c("var/osx") %]'
- URL: 'https://golang.org/dl/go[% c("version") %].src.tar.gz'
  name: go
 -sha256sum:
 558f8c169ae215e25b81421596e8de7572bd3ba824b79add22fba6e284db1117
 +sha256sum:
 bc1ef02bb1668835db1390a2e478dcbccb5dd16911691af9d75184bbe5aa943e
- URL: 'https://golang.org/dl/go[% c("var/go14_version") %].src.tar.gz'
  name: go14
  sha256sum:
 9947fc705b0b841b5938c48b22dc33e9647ec0752bae66e50278df4f23f64959
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28814 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport 1480079 - Allow installing apps downloaded by Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28814: Backport 1480079 - Allow installing apps downloaded by Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201901R, GeorgKoppen201901   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks! This is now commit 4fe43cba0780a310cea820589ae0dc52837ebef9 on
 `tor-browser-60.4.0esr-8.5-1`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29170 [- Select a component]: expanded notifications missing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29170: expanded notifications missing
--+
 Reporter:  itsoksport|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by itsoksport):

 * Attachment "2019-01-24-12-27-16.png" added.

 screenshot

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[tor-bugs] #29170 [- Select a component]: expanded notifications missing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29170: expanded notifications missing
+--
 Reporter:  itsoksport  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 Expanded notification with tor exit country and IP missing although
 checked in orbot settings. This happened after last update. LG phone,
 4.4.2

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29169 [Core Tor/Tor]: 32-bit warnings in test_circuitpadding.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29169: 32-bit warnings in test_circuitpadding.c
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor2
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor2


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29169 [Core Tor/Tor]: 32-bit warnings in test_circuitpadding.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29169: 32-bit warnings in test_circuitpadding.c
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => merge_ready
 * actualpoints:   => .1


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/668 is my PR for `bug29169`.  I'll
 merge this if travis passes, since the change is trivial.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28814 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport 1480079 - Allow installing apps downloaded by Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28814: Backport 1480079 - Allow installing apps downloaded by Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201901R, GeorgKoppen201901   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:3 gk]:
 > `bug_28814` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug_28814=8ee6fbadffbe5a82b9162da03f52a470302bc32c)
 has the patch for review. I cherry-picked the patch and resolved the
 conflict (was not that hard).

 The patch looks good. I rebased it onto my branch for #28705 and tested it
 by [https://signal.org/android/apk/ downloading the signal] apk and
 installing it. I also tested this on Android API levels 23 and 28.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29143 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Building obfs4 in tor-browser-build nightlies is broken due to uTLS support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29143: Building obfs4 in tor-browser-build nightlies is broken due to uTLS 
support
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201901R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201901 => tbb-rbm,
   TorBrowserTeam201901R


Comment:

 There is a new revision of the patch, for review, in branch
 `bug_29143_v5`:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_29143_v5=2b4d602d729c448c4f7246eb8220f4f0614f77a5

 I checked that it is running correctly on Linux, in the alpha and nightly
 builds.

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[tor-bugs] #29169 [Core Tor/Tor]: 32-bit warnings in test_circuitpadding.c

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29169: 32-bit warnings in test_circuitpadding.c
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  .1|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Ugh, Jenkins is failing.  Time to fix it.  Here's an example:
 {{{
 16:52:06 src/test/test_circuitpadding.c:1864:43: error: implicit
 conversion loses integer precision: 'circpad_time_t' (aka 'unsigned long
 long') to 'long' [-Werror,-Wshorten-64-to-32]
 16:52:06
 tt_int_op(client_side->padding_info[0]->padding_scheduled_at_usec,
 16:52:06
 ^~
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28705 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser on Android is crashing on newer Android devices (>= Android N) by file download

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28705: Tor Browser on Android is crashing on newer Android devices (>= Android 
N)
by file download
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, tbb-crash, TBA-a3,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201901   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by sysrqb):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Okay, done. I have a new branch with the different commit - `28705_2`.
 Thanks for noticing the better patch on the release branch. I confirmed
 downloading files and sharing files do not result in a crash on Android
 API levels 23 and 28.

 As above:

 ​bug 1500906 (patch from gecko-dev/release)
 {{{
 8996c48bf15755afe1be82aa7d33c801c16af3e6 ->
 36cfe9fccff5352fe4799ccdace9d8f924d8a0b9
 }}}

 ​bug 1484472

 {{{
 36ca86c711fee27772ede9974aafbee13165f596 ->
 36cfe9fccff5352fe4799ccdace9d8f924d8a0b9
 }}}

 ​bug 1450449
 {{{
 6ba2bc9edab7bd26466134838a1c59ecfaaa5d6b ->
 42a6f342be560ae8ac83c5a7511d1dce07133c71
 e4262bc3a8fce3b1d75be8e402adc116b1b8db66 ->
 bd20fb21c1c47bc55f16924acec3628d39845241
 3213d2db0c3d2fa6ea5ad258f9925bfcde55004e ->
 6fb75012e7f5c016cf830746274d0f4d33c5244a
 6020b72cc4c821d6266a13046cd491da2a78d330 ->
 4ee5ee7ef70a1f5cc8c3820f325f1f68e499d0b0
 4a47c55e8f9b038a662ab8dc28a043e018bbdd29 ->
 6310dae7c83efb5b7fced217203afaa824bb2daa
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28615 [Metrics/Library]: Additional @type annotation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28615: Additional @type annotation
-+--
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  metrics-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Library  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by atagar):

 Thanks Karsten! Looks good to me.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25417 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSFETCH support for v3 Hidden Services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25417: HSFETCH support for v3 Hidden Services
-+-
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control, tor-hs, prop224-extra,  |  Actual Points:
  onionbalance, 041-proposed |
Parent ID:  #28841   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 ack!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28614 [Core Tor/Tor]: Can't parse networkstatus consensus time

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28614: Can't parse networkstatus consensus time
-+-
 Reporter:  Vort |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-rc-must, regression, |  Actual Points:
  postfreeze-ok, tbb-needs   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  040-rc-must, regression, postfreeze-ok => 040-rc-must,
 regression, postfreeze-ok, tbb-needs


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25417 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSFETCH support for v3 Hidden Services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25417: HSFETCH support for v3 Hidden Services
-+-
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control, tor-hs, prop224-extra,  |  Actual Points:
  onionbalance, 041-proposed |
Parent ID:  #28841   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 Removed the sentence and pushed it to my torspec.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25417 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSFETCH support for v3 Hidden Services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25417: HSFETCH support for v3 Hidden Services
-+-
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control, tor-hs, prop224-extra,  |  Actual Points:
  onionbalance, 041-proposed |
Parent ID:  #28841   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Great thanks! We can go and merge this imo! Just tested it, works well!
 Reminder where the code and spec are. Quickly neel, can you push a quick
 fix on the spec comment I left. I made a mistake and it got into the spec
 so we just need to remove one sentence :).

 Tor: ​https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/646
 Torspec: ​https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/52

 Big thanks! Sorry for all the back and forth! :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28976 [Core Tor/Tor]: git pre-commit hook that runs 'make check-spaces' and 'make check-changes'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28976: git pre-commit hook that runs 'make check-spaces' and 'make 
check-changes'
--+
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Great; merged to master!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28976 [Core Tor/Tor]: git pre-commit hook that runs 'make check-spaces' and 'make check-changes'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28976: git pre-commit hook that runs 'make check-spaces' and 'make 
check-changes'
--+
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by rl1987):

 Yes, looks good!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25417 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSFETCH support for v3 Hidden Services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25417: HSFETCH support for v3 Hidden Services
-+-
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control, tor-hs, prop224-extra,  |  Actual Points:
  onionbalance, 041-proposed |
Parent ID:  #28841   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by neel):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Made the changes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29154 [Core Tor/Tor]: My tor does not work anymore!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29154: My tor does not work anymore!
--+--
 Reporter:  killerbee |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => not a bug


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28630 [Core Tor/Tor]: Resolve TROVE-2018-006

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28630: Resolve TROVE-2018-006
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  not a bug
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by nickm):

 Yeah; this was a case of me panicking about the impact of #28973.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25417 [Core Tor/Tor]: HSFETCH support for v3 Hidden Services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25417: HSFETCH support for v3 Hidden Services
-+-
 Reporter:  atagar   |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-control, tor-hs, prop224-extra,  |  Actual Points:
  onionbalance, 041-proposed |
Parent ID:  #28841   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:22 neel]:
 > I have made the changes asked for. Setting as needs review.

 Great! I like it. Couple comments on assert that shouldn't be there but
 after that we should be good to merge!

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29154 [Core Tor/Tor]: My tor does not work anymore!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29154: My tor does not work anymore!
--+--
 Reporter:  killerbee |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by killerbee):

 Ok, you can close the ticket. I'm a n00b lol!

 I have to launch curl --socks5-hostname 127.0.0.1:9050 ifconfig.me

 Tor has always worked.

 Thanks at all.

 Mike

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[tor-bugs] #29168 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix TROVE-2019-001

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29168: Fix TROVE-2019-001
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29167 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update go to 1.11.5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29167: Update go to 1.11.5
---+--
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201901, tbb-rbm  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by yawning):

 As far as obfs4proxy is concerned, the only thing that might trigger this
 is meek_lite, which Tor Browser doesn't use (yet).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29040 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor crashes if ClientOnionAuthDir contains more than one private key for a hidden service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29040: Tor crashes if ClientOnionAuthDir contains more than one private key 
for a
hidden service
-+-
 Reporter:  demfloro |  Owner:  haxxpop
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.7
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-proposed, tor-hs, crash, |  Actual Points:
  035-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Looks good now.  Could I please have a changes file?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29154 [Core Tor/Tor]: My tor does not work anymore!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29154: My tor does not work anymore!
--+--
 Reporter:  killerbee |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by killerbee):

 P.S: If i use Tor Browser or Tor Chrome extension with Chromium, it works
 fine.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29154 [Core Tor/Tor]: My tor does not work anymore!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29154: My tor does not work anymore!
--+--
 Reporter:  killerbee |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by killerbee):

 I don't know, I have installed tor via 'sudo apt install tor', but this
 method (tor &; curl ifconfig.me) was working for me few month ago. I don't
 know what is changed. My OS is Ubuntu 16.04.5 LTS.

 I use tor to launch python scripts in anonymous mode, so tor browser is
 not what i need.

 I have tryed to use the service command, but the result is the same. The
 IP doesn't change.

 How can I configure the curl or make sure it is configured correctly? Once
 time it was working...

 Thanks in advance.
 Mike

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29166 [Metrics/Statistics]: Run modules from Java only

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29166: Run modules from Java only
+
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Taking this out of review until I have resolved all the path issues that I
 just discovered.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29162 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Nonfunctional options should be grayed out

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29162: Nonfunctional options should be grayed out
--+---
 Reporter:  Crissy|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by gk):

 * priority:  Very High => Medium
 * status:  new => needs_information
 * severity:  Major => Normal


Comment:

 Replying to [ticket:29162 Crissy]:
 > The nonfunctional options should be grayed out.
 >
 > Part of nonfunctional options in Tor Browser:
 > Tools > options > Privacy > Manage Data / Clear Cookie doesn't
 work and gives the user the wrong impression that the deed is done.
 >
 > This inform that the action is done, the button is not grayed, but these
 options do nothing. It is very dangerous for user.

 How do you verify that those options actually do nothing?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29154 [Core Tor/Tor]: My tor does not work anymore!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29154: My tor does not work anymore!
--+--
 Reporter:  killerbee |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by killerbee):

 Hi nickm,

 the first time I thought the same thing, it was the same tor that wal
 already running when I finish its command execution with ctrl + c.

 If you notice, in fact, I launch a subsequent sudo killall tor, which goes
 to free up port 9050 again.

 Later, however, when I reconnect, and tells me that everything is OK, the
 IP does not change.


 mike@dev:~$''' curl ifconfig.me'''

 xx.104.95.86mike@dev:~$

 mike@dev:~$ '''tor'''

 Jan 24 14:59:23.965 [notice] Tor 0.2.9.14 running on Linux with Libevent
 2.0.21-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.2g and Zlib 1.2.8.

 Jan 24 14:59:23.965 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn
 how to be safe at !https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning

 Jan 24 14:59:23.965 [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc".

 Jan 24 14:59:23.967 [notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9050

 Jan 24 14:59:23.967 [warn] Could not bind to 127.0.0.1:9050: Address
 already in use. Is Tor already running?

 Jan 24 14:59:23.967 [warn] Failed to parse/validate config: Failed to bind
 one of the listener ports.

 Jan 24 14:59:23.967 [err] Reading config failed--see warnings above.

 mike@dev:~$ '''sudo killall tor'''

 Jan 24 14:59:27.000 [notice] Catching signal TERM, exiting cleanly.

 mike@dev:~$ '''tor &'''

 ![2] 32737

 ![1]   Completato              tor

 mike@dev:~$ Jan 24 14:59:39.015 [notice] Tor 0.2.9.14 running on Linux
 with Libevent 2.0.21-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.2g and Zlib 1.2.8.

 Jan 24 14:59:39.015 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn
 how to be safe at !https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning

 Jan 24 14:59:39.015 [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc".

 Jan 24 14:59:39.018 [notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9050

 Jan 24 14:59:39.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file /usr/share/tor/geoip.

 Jan 24 14:59:39.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file
 /usr/share/tor/geoip6.

 Jan 24 14:59:39.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%: Starting

 Jan 24 14:59:39.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor
 network

 Jan 24 14:59:40.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 85%: Finishing handshake with
 first hop

 Jan 24 14:59:40.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 90%: Establishing a Tor circuit

 Jan 24 14:59:40.000 [notice] Tor has successfully opened a circuit. Looks
 like client functionality is working.

 Jan 24 14:59:40.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 100%: Done

 mike@dev:~$ '''curl ifconfig.me'''

 xx.104.95.86mike@dev:~$

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29154 [Core Tor/Tor]: My tor does not work anymore!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29154: My tor does not work anymore!
--+--
 Reporter:  killerbee |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 Is your 'curl' configured to send its traffic into tor? tor doesn't
 magically intercept all outgoing connections.

 More generally, you're definitely using Tor in a nonstandard way. Most
 people should just use Tor Browser, and those that use it in expert mode
 on Debian / Ubuntu should be using the Tor deb. (If you are using the Tor
 deb, you are definitely invoking it wrong -- it should be through 'service
 tor start' and the like.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26858 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Investigating patching AccountManager

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26858: TBA: Investigating patching AccountManager
-+-
 Reporter:  sysrqb   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201901   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3, TorBrowserTeam201901R => tbb-mobile,
 TBA-a3, TorBrowserTeam201901
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Sorry, for the long delay here. I started looking into the patches today.
 It seems they do not compile (anymore) I checked with my bug_26858_test
 branch and get:
 {{{
  0:31.73
 
:app:compileOfficialWithoutGeckoBinariesNoMinApiPhotonDebugJavaWithJavac/var/tmp/build
 /firefox-
 cbe1939d23ce/mobile/android/base/java/org/mozilla/gecko/BrowserApp.java:153:
 error: cannot find symbol
  0:31.73 import org.mozilla.gecko.telemetry.TelemetryCorePingDelegate;
  0:31.73   ^
  0:31.73   symbol:   class TelemetryCorePingDelegate
  0:31.73   location: package org.mozilla.gecko.telemetry
  0:31.77 /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 cbe1939d23ce/mobile/android/base/java/org/mozilla/gecko/BrowserApp.java:427:
 error: cannot find symbol
  0:31.77 private final TelemetryCorePingDelegate
 mTelemetryCorePingDelegate = new TelemetryCorePingDelegate();
  0:31.78   ^
  0:31.78   symbol:   class TelemetryCorePingDelegate
  0:31.78   location: class BrowserApp
  0:32.17 /var/tmp/build/firefox-
 cbe1939d23ce/mobile/android/base/java/org/mozilla/gecko/BrowserApp.java:427:
 error: cannot find symbol
  0:32.17 private final TelemetryCorePingDelegate
 mTelemetryCorePingDelegate = new TelemetryCorePingDelegate();
  0:32.17
 ^
  0:32.17   symbol:   class TelemetryCorePingDelegate
  0:32.17   location: class BrowserApp
  0:33.23 Note: Some input files use or override a deprecated API.
  0:33.23 Note: Recompile with -Xlint:deprecation for details.
  0:33.23 3 errors
  0:33.25  FAILED
 }}}

 Additionally, do we actually need the `TabSender` interface in our
 `SendTab` stub?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29154 [Core Tor/Tor]: My tor does not work anymore!

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29154: My tor does not work anymore!
--+--
 Reporter:  killerbee |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 This is the error message:
 {{{
  Jan 24 09:45:46.035 [warn] Could not bind to 127.0.0.1:9050: Address
 already in use. Is Tor already running?
 }}}

 Something else is using port 9050 on your computer.  It might be another
 copy of Tor?  You can use the `netstat` to find out what is listening on
 what port. "netstat -tlp" will tell you the PID that is using ever current
 TCP listener.  You might need to run it as root.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28363 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a torrc option which prevents Tor from falling asleep

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28363: Make a torrc option which prevents Tor from falling asleep
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by nickm):

 Dormant mode only exists in 0.4.0.x later; if you're seeing a change in
 recent releases, then it's not dormant mode that you're seeing.  Also,
 dormant mode isn't supposed to make Tor close its circuits, so that's
 another reason this isn't likely to be dormant mode.

 What's the first version where you have seen this problem?  And are the
 steps to reproduce it just "wait 60 minutes and use a control port to ask
 what circuits there are?"

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28976 [Core Tor/Tor]: git pre-commit hook that runs 'make check-spaces' and 'make check-changes'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28976: git pre-commit hook that runs 'make check-spaces' and 'make 
check-changes'
--+
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Thanks!  I've made two small changes for compatibility with older
 branches, in a new branch called "precommit_squashed".  Please let me know
 if you like them, and if so, I'll merge this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28668 [Core Tor/Tor]: If a Tor unit test causes a BUG log, it should fail

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28668: If a Tor unit test causes a BUG log, it should fail
---+---
 Reporter:  teor   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor:
   |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, postfreeze-ok  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  juga   |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 okay; the CI is passing!  Back into needs_review with this branch.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28363 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make a torrc option which prevents Tor from falling asleep

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28363: Make a torrc option which prevents Tor from falling asleep
--+--
 Reporter:  wagon |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by wagon):

 Replying to [comment:7 nickm]:
 > Is that good enough, or do we need more here?
 It sounds as exactly the thing I wanted. However, I'm confused by
 [[https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual-dev.html.en|documentation]]:

 > `DormantClientTimeout` N minutes|hours|days|weeks
 >
 >  If Tor spends this much time without any client activity, enter a
 dormant state where automatic circuits are not built, and directory
 information is not fetched. Does not affect servers or onion services.
 Must be at least 10 minutes. (Default: 24 hours)
 Did you change this default timeout in recent Tor versions? It wasn't 24
 hours. I cannot say exactly, but according to my feelings Tor falls asleep
 and closes all its circuits after very short period of inactivity,
 probably 20-40 minutes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27010 [UX/Research]: 2018 UX Research (was: UX Research)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27010: 2018 UX Research
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  nyinz
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  UX/Research  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor9
-+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Old description:

> This ticket contains Tor's UX research efforts.
>
> **Upcoming Research**
>
> TBD
>
> **Research Archive**
>
> Apr 2018 - Circuit Display
> Apr 2018 - Onion Indicator
> Mar 2018 - Onion Indicator
> Jan 2018 - Onion Indicator
> Jan 2018 - Tor Launcher

New description:

 This ticket contains 2018 UX research efforts.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27032 [UX/Research]: Survey: Tor Users Demographics - Applications (was: Usability Research: Tor Users Demographics - Applications)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27032: Survey: Tor Users Demographics - Applications
+--
 Reporter:  nyinz   |  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  project | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  UX/Research |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  user-demographics, ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela|Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * owner:  nyinz => antonela
 * cc: ux-team (added)
 * parent:  #27010 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27119 [UX/Research]: Usability Testing: Support Portal (was: Usability Research: Support Portal Feedback)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27119: Usability Testing: Support Portal
-+--
 Reporter:  nyinz|  Owner:  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  UX/Research  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela |Sponsor:  Sponsor9
-+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * owner:  nyinz => antonela
 * cc: ux-team (added)
 * parent:  #27010 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27149 [UX/Research]: TB8 Alpha Users Feedback TBB 7.5.4, 7.5.5 and 7.5.6. TBB 8.0a9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27149: TB8 Alpha Users Feedback TBB 7.5.4, 7.5.5 and 7.5.6. TBB 8.0a9
-+-
 Reporter:  nyinz|  Owner:  nyinz
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  UX/Research  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27010   | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28088 [UX/Research]: User Needs Discovery: Kenya

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28088: User Needs Discovery: Kenya
-+-
 Reporter:  nyinz|  Owner:  nyinz
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  UX/Research  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27010   | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela |Sponsor:  Sponsor9
-+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28626 [UX/Research]: Usability Research: Circuit Display - Uganda

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28626: Usability Research: Circuit Display - Uganda
-+-
 Reporter:  nyinz|  Owner:  nyinz
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  UX/Research  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27010   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28086 [UX/Research]: Usability Research: Onboarding - about:tor TB8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28086: Usability Research: Onboarding - about:tor TB8
-+-
 Reporter:  nyinz|  Owner:  nyinz
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  UX/Research  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27010   | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27745 [UX/Research]: Usability Research: Circuit Display: Nairobi (group 2)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27745: Usability Research: Circuit Display: Nairobi (group 2)
-+-
 Reporter:  nyinz|  Owner:  nyinz
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  UX/Research  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27010   | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela |Sponsor:  Sponsor9
-+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27747 [UX/Research]: Usability Research: Onions - Nairobi (group 1)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27747: Usability Research: Onions - Nairobi (group 1)
-+-
 Reporter:  nyinz|  Owner:  nyinz
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  UX/Research  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27010   | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela |Sponsor:  Sponsor9
-+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27742 [UX/Research]: Usability Research: Onions Mombasa, Kenya

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27742: Usability Research: Onions Mombasa, Kenya
-+-
 Reporter:  nyinz|  Owner:  nyinz
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  UX/Research  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27010   | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela |Sponsor:  Sponsor9
-+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27744 [UX/Research]: Usability Research: Circuit Display: Nairobi (group 1)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27744: Usability Research: Circuit Display: Nairobi (group 1)
-+-
 Reporter:  nyinz|  Owner:  nyinz
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  UX/Research  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27010   | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela |Sponsor:  Sponsor9
-+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27743 [UX/Research]: Usability Research: Circuit Display - Mombasa, Kenya

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27743: Usability Research: Circuit Display - Mombasa, Kenya
-+-
 Reporter:  nyinz|  Owner:  nyinz
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  UX/Research  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27010   | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela |Sponsor:  Sponsor9
-+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27118 [UX/Research]: Usability Research: Onions - Valencia

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27118: Usability Research: Onions - Valencia
-+-
 Reporter:  nyinz|  Owner:  nyinz
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  UX/Research  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27010   | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27116 [UX/Research]: Usability Research: Onions - Mumbai

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27116: Usability Research: Onions - Mumbai
-+-
 Reporter:  nyinz|  Owner:  nyinz
 Type:  project  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  UX/Research  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #27010   | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by antonela):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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