Re: [tor-bugs] #29244 [Core Tor/Tor]: Travis permissions error: failed to write Cargo.lock

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29244: Travis permissions error: failed to write Cargo.lock
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-proposed, tor-ci, regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 This appears to be a build environment issue, because the same commit
 succeeded 4 days ago, but failed 2 days ago:
 https://travis-ci.org/torproject/tor/builds/485707435
 https://travis-ci.org/torproject/tor/builds/484917361

 It is probably related to Rust 1.32.0, which was released 14 days ago.

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[tor-bugs] #29246 [Applications/Tor Browser]: WebGL is sometimes blocked outright instead of put behind a click-to-play placeholder

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29246: WebGL is sometimes blocked outright instead of put behind a 
click-to-play
placeholder
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  noscript, tbb-
 Severity:  Normal   |  usability-website
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 In #21805 we put WebGL behind a placeholder with the help of NoScript.
 This works well e.g. for http://webglsamples.org/aquarium/aquarium.html.
 However other sites report just that WebGL is not supported and it
 therefore gets blocked outright:

 https://demo.marpi.pl/biomes/

 Giorgio, you mentioned in comment:5:ticket:21805 that this worked
 correctly with NoScript 10.1.8.2. Is that a regression on NoScript's side
 or an issue with WebGL detection on the website?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29244 [Core Tor/Tor]: Travis permissions error: failed to write Cargo.lock

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29244: Travis permissions error: failed to write Cargo.lock
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor:
  |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  041-proposed, tor-ci, regression  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 This issue appears to be reproducible:
 https://travis-ci.org/torproject/tor/jobs/486795693#L3638

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17569 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add uBlock Origin to the Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17569: Add uBlock Origin to the Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  kernelcorn   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  new-addon, tbb-usability tbb-|  Actual Points:
  security, tbb-performance  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 It seems ublock Origin has quite some performance issues on higher
 security levels:
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/279536#comment-279536.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29175 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.3.5.x mishandles empty socks5 auth

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29175: Tor 0.3.5.x mishandles empty socks5 auth
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 035-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by gk):

 First round of users affected by this bug are showing up on the blog:

 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/279524#comment-279524
 https://blog.torproject.org/comment/279555#comment-279555

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[tor-bugs] #29245 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.4 eventually hits "Delaying directory fetches: No running bridges" after some period of inactivity with bridges

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29245: Tor 0.4 eventually hits "Delaying directory fetches: No running bridges"
after some period of inactivity with bridges
--+--
 Reporter:  ArmalsLoveArmalsLife  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:|   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 {{{
 Tor NOTICE: Delaying directory fetches: No running bridges
 Tor NOTICE: Application request when we haven't received a consensus with
 exits. Optimistically trying known bridges again.
 Tor NOTICE: Delaying directory fetches: No running bridges
 Tor NOTICE: Application request when we haven't received a consensus with
 exits. Optimistically trying known bridges again.
 Tor NOTICE: Delaying directory fetches: No running bridges
 Tor NOTICE: Application request when we haven't received a consensus with
 exits. Optimistically trying known bridges again.
 }}}

 Tested on latest Tor Browser alpha with snowflake bridge.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23576 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make service_intro_point_new() take a node instead of an extend_info

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23576: Make service_intro_point_new() take a node instead of an extend_info
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:  2
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328, fast-fix,|
  040-unreached-20190109, 041-proposed   |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Ok, the branch is ready with changes files and a cleaned-up series of
 commits:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/673

 The branch fixes all the child tickets of this ticket. See the commit
 messages for details.

 asn, if you don't want to review this branch, dgoulet reviewed the first
 two commits yesterday at the hackfest. There are 2 new commits that
 dgoulet has not seen: they remove hs_desc_link_specifier_t, and fix the
 unit tests.

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[tor-bugs] #29244 [Core Tor/Tor]: Travis permissions error: failed to write Cargo.lock

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29244: Travis permissions error: failed to write Cargo.lock
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core|Version:
  Tor/Tor   |
 Severity:  Major   |   Keywords:  041-proposed, tor-ci, regression
Actual Points:  |  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  |
+--
 Let's monitor this error, and see if it happens again.

 From
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23576?replyto=24#comment:24

 > {{{
 > error: failed to write /home/travis/build/torproject/tor/tor-0.4.0.1
 -alpha-dev/src/rust/Cargo.lock
 >
 > Caused by:
 >   failed to open: /home/travis/build/torproject/tor/tor-0.4.0.1-alpha-
 dev/src/rust/Cargo.lock
 >
 > Caused by:
 >   Permission denied (os error 13)
 > }}}
 > https://travis-ci.org/torproject/tor/jobs/486721901#L3634

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23576 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make service_intro_point_new() take a node instead of an extend_info

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23576: Make service_intro_point_new() take a node instead of an extend_info
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:  2
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328, fast-fix,|
  040-unreached-20190109, 041-proposed   |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:24 teor]:
 > The CI has two spurious errors:
 > {{{
 > circuitpadding/circuitpadding_circuitsetup_machine: [forking]
 >   FAIL src/test/test_circuitpadding.c:1880: assert(n_client_cells OP_EQ
 2): 3 vs 2
 >   [circuitpadding_circuitsetup_machine FAILED]
 > }}}
 > https://travis-ci.org/torproject/tor/jobs/486721893#L5750

 Reopened #29122.

 > {{{
 > error: failed to write /home/travis/build/torproject/tor/tor-0.4.0.1
 -alpha-dev/src/rust/Cargo.lock
 >
 > Caused by:
 >   failed to open: /home/travis/build/torproject/tor/tor-0.4.0.1-alpha-
 dev/src/rust/Cargo.lock
 >
 > Caused by:
 >   Permission denied (os error 13)
 > }}}
 > https://travis-ci.org/torproject/tor/jobs/486721901#L3634

 Opened #29244.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29122 [Core Tor/Tor]: Intermittent test failure in circuitpadding/circuitpadding_wronghop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29122: Intermittent test failure in circuitpadding/circuitpadding_wronghop
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  nickm |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


Comment:

 I don't think this issue is fixed: I got the 3 vs 2 error on a pull
 request against master yesterday:

 {{{
 circuitpadding/circuitpadding_circuitsetup_machine: [forking]
   FAIL src/test/test_circuitpadding.c:1880: assert(n_client_cells OP_EQ
 2): 3 vs 2
   [circuitpadding_circuitsetup_machine FAILED]
 }}}

 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/23576#comment:24

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23588 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23588: Write fascist_firewall_choose_address_ls() and use it in
hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:  0.5
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328, 040-unreached-20190109,  |
  041-proposed   |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * version:   => Tor: 0.3.2.1-alpha
 * actualpoints:   => 0.5


Comment:

 It looks like I have fixed the bug in the IPv6 v3 onion service code in
 #23576. I'll rebase and re-review this code in a few weeks' time, once
 #23576 has merged.

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[tor-bugs] #29243 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix minor bugs in the HSv3 unit tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29243: Fix minor bugs in the HSv3 unit tests
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core |Version:  Tor: 0.3.2.1-alpha
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,
 Severity:  Normal   |  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328,
 |  034-removed-20180328, fast-fix,
 |  040-unreached-20190109, 041-proposed
Actual Points:  0.1  |  Parent ID:  #23576
   Points:  0.1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 The tests:
 * copy the first 20 characters of a 40-character hex string to a binary
 fingerprint
 * put IPv6 addresses in a variable called "ipv4"
 * do a duplicate tt_int_op() to deliberately fail and print a value,
 without a comment explaining the code

 Let's review these changes in #23576.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #26992 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add intro point IPv6 address to service descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26992: Add intro point IPv6 address to service descriptors
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328, 040-unreached-20190109,  |
  041-proposed   |
Parent ID:  #23576   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => new
 * reviewer:  asn =>
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 This was done as part of #23576, let's just review it there.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22781 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: Unify link specifier API/ABI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22781: hs: Unify link specifier API/ABI
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-cell, tor-relay, ipv6,   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #23576   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  dgoulet => teor
 * status:  needs_revision => assigned
 * sponsor:  SponsorV-can =>
 * parent:  #24403 => #23576
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 I think this is mostly fixed in #23576, by removing
 hs_descriptor_link_specifier_t. Because there is only one type,
 link_specifier_t, I didn't need a higher-level encode/decode API.

 We should open a new ticket for any remaining changes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23759 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor common code out of setup_introduce1_data and intro point functions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23759: Refactor common code out of setup_introduce1_data and intro point 
functions
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:  0.1
  ipv6, refactor, 034-triage-20180328,   |
  034-removed-20180328   |
Parent ID:  #23576   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  dgoulet => teor
 * points:   => 0.1
 * version:   => Tor: 0.3.2.1-alpha
 * parent:  #22781 => #23576
 * actualpoints:   => 0.1


Comment:

 This is fixed in #23576.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21003 [Core Tor/Tor]: extend_info_describe should list IPv6 address (if present)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21003: extend_info_describe should list IPv6 address (if present)
-+--
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy intro ipv6 logging  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => teor


Comment:

 My commit c83e48e82 has a draft version of this change. I need to fix the
 format, and add tests.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23576 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make service_intro_point_new() take a node instead of an extend_info

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23576: Make service_intro_point_new() take a node instead of an extend_info
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:  2
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328, fast-fix,|
  040-unreached-20190109, 041-proposed   |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 The CI has two spurious errors:
 {{{
 circuitpadding/circuitpadding_circuitsetup_machine: [forking]
   FAIL src/test/test_circuitpadding.c:1880: assert(n_client_cells OP_EQ
 2): 3 vs 2
   [circuitpadding_circuitsetup_machine FAILED]
 }}}
 https://travis-ci.org/torproject/tor/jobs/486721893#L5750

 {{{
 error: failed to write /home/travis/build/torproject/tor/tor-0.4.0.1
 -alpha-dev/src/rust/Cargo.lock

 Caused by:
   failed to open: /home/travis/build/torproject/tor/tor-0.4.0.1-alpha-
 dev/src/rust/Cargo.lock

 Caused by:
   Permission denied (os error 13)
 }}}
 https://travis-ci.org/torproject/tor/jobs/486721901#L3634

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[tor-bugs] #29242 [Webpages/Website]: Please post job description to website (OONI Backend Developer)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29242: Please post job description to website (OONI Backend Developer)
--+--
 Reporter:  ewyatt|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 {{{
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA512

 Internet Freedom Nonprofit Seeks Backend Engineer for OONI

 The Tor Project, Inc. is looking for a dedicated backend engineer to work
 on OONI (https://ooni.torproject.org/). OONI is the Open Observatory of
 Network Interference: a free and open source software, global observation
 network for detecting censorship, surveillance, and traffic manipulation
 on the internet.

 You will be working to improve OONI’s data processing pipeline and other
 backend components responsible for recording measurements collected from
 our growing global user network. You will also be tasked with improving
 our network measurement methodologies and data analysis heuristics to
 increase the accuracy of our experiments.

 This is a full-time 12-month contract position, starting ASAP (no later
 than mid-May 2019); contract may be extended.

 The OONI team is based in Europe. However, this position may be performed
 remotely.

 Here are some of our code repositories:

 https://github.com/ooni/api
 https://github.com/ooni/pipeline
 https://github.com/ooni/orchestra
 https://github.com/ooni/collector
 https://github.com/ooni/sysadmin

 Required skills and qualifications:

 - - Extensive experience in python or golang.
 - - Comfortable working remotely.
 - - Self-directed, self-disciplined, but good at working and communicating
 with a team.
 - - Have experience and be comfortable with others reviewing your code and
 design; have experience and be comfortable reviewing others’ code.
 - - Experience documenting and designing protocols.
 - - Be comfortable with transparency!

 Preferred qualifications:

 - - Experience designing, implementing, and maintaining scalable complex
 network applications.
 - - Working experience with data processing pipelines.
 - - Possess the confidence to refactor code and write unit-tests.
 - - Familiarity with the challenges of developing and scaling data
 processing pipelines.
 - - Familiarity with the network measurement field.
 - - Experience with open-source software development, including working
 with distributed teams across different time-zones containing employees
 and volunteers of differing skill levels.
 - - Basic familiarity with distributed version control systems.
 - - Contributed significant chunks of code to multiple open-source
 projects in the past.
 - - Be passionate about internet freedom and interested in contributing to
 it in a concrete way!

 Other notes:

 Academic degrees are great but not required if you have the right
 experience.

 You should be very good at working remotely at communicating with the team
 on a daily basis via Slack, IRC, instant messaging, email, and issue
 trackers.

 Salary negotiable.

 How to apply:

 Please email a *PDF* of your resume/CV, and a cover letter explaining how
 your qualifications and experience meet the requirements of this job
 description. Please include the reasons why you want to work on OONI.
 Please also include link to one or several code samples (of which you are
 authorized to share), and also your GitHub or GitLab profile, and three
 professional references.

 Email should be sent to jobs at openobservatory dot org with "OONI Backend
 Engineer" in the subject line.

 About the project:

 The Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) is a free software
 project under the Tor Project. OONI collects and processes network
 measurements with the aim of detecting network interferences, such as
 censorship, surveillance, and traffic manipulation. Since late 2012, OONI
 has collected millions of measurements across more than 90 countries
 around the world.

 The Tor Project, Inc., is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization that
 provides the technical infrastructure for privacy protection over the
 Internet. With paid staff and contractors of around 30 technologists and
 operational support people, plus many volunteers all over the world who
 contribute to our work, the Tor Project is funded in part by government
 grants and contracts, as well as by individual, foundation, and corporate
 donations. We only write free and open source software, and we don't
 believe in software patents.

 The Tor Project, Inc., is an equal opportunity, affirmative action
 employer.


 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
 Comment: GPGTools - https://gpgtools.org

 iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEENecqn2ZVRfkstmYkugyUAPgPkc4FAlxSYQQACgkQugyUAPgP
 

Re: [tor-bugs] #29186 [Core Tor/Stem]: stem remote.py defaults to plain text instead of GZIP

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29186: stem remote.py defaults to plain text instead of GZIP
---+
 Reporter:  starlight  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by starlight):

 had to build Python Zstandard suport and try it

 three of eight random (though fast) relays support ZSTD compression, not
 all that rare

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[tor-bugs] #29241 [Core Tor/Tor]: NSS SSL_ExportKeyingMaterial failing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29241: NSS SSL_ExportKeyingMaterial failing
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Possibly similar/related to #28616/#28973.

 {{{
 [warn] connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(): Bug: TLS key export
 failed for unknown reason. (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha )
 [warn] Couldn't send authenticate cell
 [notice] Self-testing indicates your ORPort is reachable from the outside.
 Excellent.
 [warn] connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(): Bug: TLS key export
 failed for unknown reason. (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha )
 [warn] Couldn't send authenticate cell
 [warn] connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(): Bug: TLS key export
 failed for unknown reason. (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha )
 [warn] Couldn't send authenticate cell
 [warn] connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(): Bug: TLS key export
 failed for unknown reason. (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha )
 [warn] Couldn't send authenticate cell
 [warn] connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(): Bug: TLS key export
 failed for unknown reason. (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha )
 [warn] Couldn't send authenticate cell
 [notice] Bootstrapped 15% (handshake_done): Handshake with a relay done
 [notice] Bootstrapped 75% (enough_dirinfo): Loaded enough directory info
 to build circuits
 [notice] Bootstrapped 90% (ap_handshake_done): Handshake fininshed with a
 relay to build circuits
 [notice] Bootstrapped 95% (circuit_create): Establishing a Tor circuit
 [warn] connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(): Bug: TLS key export
 failed for unknown reason. (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha )
 [warn] Couldn't send authenticate cell
 [notice] Bootstrapped 100% (done): Done
 [warn] connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(): Bug: TLS key export
 failed for unknown reason. (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha )
 [warn] Couldn't send authenticate cell
 [warn] connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(): Bug: TLS key export
 failed for unknown reason. (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha )
 [warn] Couldn't send authenticate cell
 [warn] connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(): Bug: TLS key export
 failed for unknown reason. (on Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha )
 }}}

 Reported by Alex on tor-relays@ - https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail
 /tor-relays/2019-January/016890.html

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[tor-bugs] #29240 [Core Tor/Tor]: if not present already, consider linking libzstd.so in Debian LTS builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29240: if not present already, consider linking libzstd.so in Debian LTS builds
--+--
 Reporter:  starlight |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Component:  Core Tor/Tor
  Version:  Tor: 0.3.5.7  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
 atagar indicated in another ticket #29186 that Zstandard compression is
 not widely deployed.  Perhaps the imminent LTS release of 0.3.5 should
 reference the shared library or statically link it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29186 [Core Tor/Stem]: stem remote.py defaults to plain text instead of GZIP

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29186: stem remote.py defaults to plain text instead of GZIP
---+
 Reporter:  starlight  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by starlight):

 Replying to [comment:2 atagar]:
 > Thanks starlight! I purposefully chose for plaintext to be the default
 back in the day but it's long past due we toggled it to gzip.
 >
 > https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=52b1370

 thanks!

 > Lzma and zstd are useless because relays effectively never support it,
 but gzip is available everywhere.

 my relay supports both ZSTD and LZMA (built the libraries myself)

 if Debian does not typically have libzstd.so.1 installed perhaps the pre-
 built release binaries should include a statically linked copy

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29186 [Core Tor/Stem]: stem remote.py defaults to plain text instead of GZIP

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29186: stem remote.py defaults to plain text instead of GZIP
---+
 Reporter:  starlight  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Stem  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks starlight! I purposefully chose for plaintext to be the default
 back in the day but it's long past due we toggled it to gzip.

 https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=52b1370

 Lzma and zstd are useless because relays effectively never support it, but
 gzip is available everywhere.

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[tor-bugs] #29239 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Don't ship torbutton xpi

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29239: TBA: Don't ship torbutton xpi
--+---
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-torbutton
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 During the packaging stage, we bundle `torbut...@torproject.org.xpi`, but
 it's already being included in chrome. We can probably save some bytes in
 the resulting apk.

 {{{
  1:43.95 16559236 assets/features/torbut...@torproject.org.xpi (OK)
 }}}
 {{{
 $ ls obj-x86-linux-android/dist/fennec/features/
 torbut...@torproject.org.xpi
 }}}

 I think this is caused by the following in torbutton's moz.build:
 {{{
 FINAL_TARGET_FILES.features['torbut...@torproject.org'] += [
 'src/install.rdf'

 ]
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29238 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Prevent crash following upgrade

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29238: TBA: Prevent crash following upgrade
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 I think we should disable this. We don't **need** it, it's simply a nice
 feature. Mozilla changed how they handle this in 63.
 [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1467840 Bug 1467840].
 [https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/90f3740655ea Upstream patch].

 This came from a run-time limitation introduced in
 [https://developer.android.com/about/versions/oreo/android-8.0-changes
 #back-all Android 8].

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29238 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Prevent crash following upgrade

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29238: TBA: Prevent crash following upgrade
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 Right. I had a feeling this was added so Fennec would load Gecko in the
 background after upgrade. This provides a pre-loaded Gecko runtiime, ready
 when the user opens the browser.

 {{{
 commit 60a646160ef9cba38952e0d4d6175bc16e7797ae
 Author: Jim Chen 
 Date:   Wed Feb 15 17:13:05 2017 -0500

 Bug 1339160 - 4. Use GeckoService to extract libs on update; r=esawin

 Use the GeckoService load-libs action to load and extract new
 libraries
 when we receive the update broadcast. This makes us not block the UI
 thread to extract libs, and lets Fennec run normally if the user
 launches Fennec right after updating.
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29238 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Prevent crash following upgrade

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29238: TBA: Prevent crash following upgrade
--+--
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by sysrqb):

 This is coming from [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 
browser.git/tree/mobile/android/base/java/org/mozilla/gecko/PackageReplacedReceiver.java?h
 =tor-browser-60.5.0esr-8.5-1 PackageReplacedReceiver] which is declared in
 the [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/mobile/android/base/AndroidManifest.xml.in?h=tor-
 browser-60.5.0esr-8.5-1#n418 manifest]. There's also
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-
 browser.git/tree/mobile/android/base/AndroidManifest.xml.in?h=tor-
 browser-60.5.0esr-8.5-1#n258 WhatsNew], but that doesn't crash, at least.

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[tor-bugs] #29238 [Applications/Tor Browser]: TBA: Prevent crash following upgrade

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29238: TBA: Prevent crash following upgrade
--+
 Reporter:  sysrqb|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 For the last few releases (maybe all of them), TBA crashes after
 installing the update. I believe this only happens if the app was open and
 then the new apk is installed (therefore the app goes into the
 background). After the crash, opening the app again is successful and it
 doesn't crash (for the same reason) again.

 {{{
 01-30 11:32:58.544 22804 22804 D AndroidRuntime: Shutting down VM
 01-30 11:32:58.545 22804 22804 E AndroidRuntime: FATAL EXCEPTION: main
 01-30 11:32:58.545 22804 22804 E AndroidRuntime: Process:
 org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha, PID: 22804
 01-30 11:32:58.545 22804 22804 E AndroidRuntime:
 java.lang.RuntimeException: Unable to start receiver
 org.mozilla.gecko.PackageReplacedReceiver:
 java.lang.IllegalStateException: Not allowed to start service Intent { act
 =load-libs
 cmp=org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha/org.mozilla.gecko.GeckoService }: app
 is in background uid UidRecord{982a65d u0a163 RCVR idle change:uncached
 procs:1 seq(0,0,0)}
 01-30 11:32:58.545 22804 22804 E AndroidRuntime:at
 android.app.ActivityThread.handleReceiver(ActivityThread.java:3194)
 01-30 11:32:58.545 22804 22804 E AndroidRuntime:at
 android.app.ActivityThread.-wrap17(Unknown Source:0)
 01-30 11:32:58.545 22804 22804 E AndroidRuntime:at
 android.app.ActivityThread$H.handleMessage(ActivityThread.java:1672)
 01-30 11:32:58.545 22804 22804 E AndroidRuntime:at
 android.os.Handler.dispatchMessage(Handler.java:106)
 01-30 11:32:58.545 22804 22804 E AndroidRuntime:at
 android.os.Looper.loop(Looper.java:164)
 01-30 11:32:58.545 22804 22804 E AndroidRuntime:at
 android.app.ActivityThread.main(ActivityThread.java:6494)
 01-30 11:32:58.545 22804 22804 E AndroidRuntime:at
 java.lang.reflect.Method.invoke(Native Method)
 01-30 11:32:58.545 22804 22804 E AndroidRuntime:at
 
com.android.internal.os.RuntimeInit$MethodAndArgsCaller.run(RuntimeInit.java:438)
 01-30 11:32:58.545 22804 22804 E AndroidRuntime:at
 com.android.internal.os.ZygoteInit.main(ZygoteInit.java:807)
 01-30 11:32:58.545 22804 22804 E AndroidRuntime: Caused by:
 java.lang.IllegalStateException: Not allowed to start service Intent { act
 =load-libs
 cmp=org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha/org.mozilla.gecko.GeckoService }: app
 is in background uid UidRecord{982a65d u0a163 RCVR idle change:uncached
 procs:1 seq(0,0,0)}
 01-30 11:32:58.545 22804 22804 E AndroidRuntime:at
 android.app.ContextImpl.startServiceCommon(ContextImpl.java:1521)
 01-30 11:32:58.545 22804 22804 E AndroidRuntime:at
 android.app.ContextImpl.startService(ContextImpl.java:1477)
 01-30 11:32:58.545 22804 22804 E AndroidRuntime:at
 android.content.ContextWrapper.startService(ContextWrapper.java:650)
 01-30 11:32:58.545 22804 22804 E AndroidRuntime:at
 android.content.ContextWrapper.startService(ContextWrapper.java:650)
 01-30 11:32:58.545 22804 22804 E AndroidRuntime:at
 
org.mozilla.gecko.PackageReplacedReceiver.onReceive(PackageReplacedReceiver.java:29)
 01-30 11:32:58.545 22804 22804 E AndroidRuntime:at
 android.app.ActivityThread.handleReceiver(ActivityThread.java:3187)
 01-30 11:32:58.545 22804 22804 E AndroidRuntime:... 8 more
 01-30 11:32:58.546 22804 22804 E GeckoCrashHandler: >>> REPORTING UNCAUGHT
 EXCEPTION FROM THREAD 2 ("main")
 01-30 11:32:58.546 22804 22804 E GeckoCrashHandler:
 java.lang.IllegalStateException: Not allowed to start service Intent { act
 =load-libs
 cmp=org.torproject.torbrowser_alpha/org.mozilla.gecko.GeckoService }: app
 is in background uid UidRecord{982a65d u0a163 RCVR idle change:uncached
 procs:1 seq(0,0,0)}
 01-30 11:32:58.546 22804 22804 E GeckoCrashHandler: at
 android.app.ContextImpl.startServiceCommon(ContextImpl.java:1521)
 01-30 11:32:58.546 22804 22804 E GeckoCrashHandler: at
 android.app.ContextImpl.startService(ContextImpl.java:1477)
 01-30 11:32:58.546 22804 22804 E GeckoCrashHandler: at
 android.content.ContextWrapper.startService(ContextWrapper.java:650)
 01-30 11:32:58.546 22804 22804 E GeckoCrashHandler: at
 android.content.ContextWrapper.startService(ContextWrapper.java:650)
 01-30 11:32:58.546 22804 22804 E GeckoCrashHandler: at
 
org.mozilla.gecko.PackageReplacedReceiver.onReceive(PackageReplacedReceiver.java:29)
 01-30 11:32:58.546 22804 

Re: [tor-bugs] #29175 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor 0.3.5.x mishandles empty socks5 auth

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29175: Tor 0.3.5.x mishandles empty socks5 auth
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  rl1987
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 035-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by boklm):

 * cc: bugiguiman (added)


Comment:

 #29236 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29236 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: After updating tor to 8.0.5, socks5 started to not work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29236: After updating tor to 8.0.5, socks5 started to not work
---+---
 Reporter:  bugiguiman |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  bug socks5 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 This looks like a duplicate of #29175.

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[tor-bugs] #29237 [Core Tor/Tor]: Restore IPv6 intro points in the HS client tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29237: Restore IPv6 intro points in the HS client tests
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,
 Severity:  Normal   |  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328,
 |  034-removed-20180328, 040-unreached-20190109,
 |  041-proposed
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:  #23588
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 In #23576, I removed an IPv6-only intro point from the HS client tests. We
 should put it back in.

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[tor-bugs] #29236 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: After updating tor to 8.0.5, socks5 started to not work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29236: After updating tor to 8.0.5, socks5 started to not work
+---
 Reporter:  bugiguiman  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate   |  Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  bug socks5  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
 I usually use socks5 in Adium messenger, but when i updated tor to new
 version Adium start to give the error - Error: Connection failed
 In tor logs i found those -
 1/30/19, 20:16:31.821 [WARN] Fetching socks handshake failed. Closing.
 1/30/19, 20:16:31.821 [WARN] socks5: parsing failed - invalid user/pass
 authentication message.
 1/30/19, 20:16:31.821 [WARN] Fetching socks handshake failed. Closing.
 1/30/19, 20:16:37.680 [WARN] socks5: parsing failed - invalid user/pass
 authentication message.
 1/30/19, 20:16:37.680 [WARN] Fetching socks handshake failed. Closing.
 1/30/19, 20:16:37.680 [WARN] socks5: parsing failed - invalid user/pass
 authentication message.
 I never had this before, all have worked perfectly. Immediately after the
 update, everything stopped working. I tried all, i installed tor/messenger
 and updated os, but nothing helped.
 Help!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28716 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create a mingw-w64-clang project

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28716: Create a mingw-w64-clang project
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201901,   |  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201901  |
Parent ID:  #28238   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision
 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201901R, GeorgKoppen201901 => tbb-rbm,
 TorBrowserTeam201901, GeorgKoppen201901


Comment:

 That needs another revision. I think we should make sure the project gets
 rebuilt once at least one of the dependencies does need to (e.g. because
 we need a compiler or a linker patch). That's currently not the case.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29181 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make it possible to force rebuild of debootstrap-image

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29181: Make it possible to force rebuild of debootstrap-image
+--
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201901R, tbb-rbm  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good. Merged to `master` (commit
 929c3f8d6fe4d6182d4dfce2472581ccc45824f0).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29206 [Obfuscation/Obfsproxy]: New design for client -- proxy protocol

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29206: New design for client -- proxy protocol
---+-
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Obfsproxy  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by cohosh):

 * owner:  (none) => asn
 * cc: cohosh (added)
 * component:  - Select a component => Obfuscation/Obfsproxy


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29206 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: New design for client -- proxy protocol

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29206: New design for client -- proxy protocol
---+-
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by cohosh):

 * component:  Obfuscation/Obfsproxy => Obfuscation/Snowflake


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29207 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: New design for broker -- proxy protocol for snowflakes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29207: New design for broker -- proxy protocol for snowflakes
---+
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by cohosh):

 * cc: cohosh (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29205 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Use Firefox for the WebRTC implementation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29205: Use Firefox for the WebRTC implementation
---+---
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---
Changes (by cohosh):

 * cc: cohosh (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23576 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make service_intro_point_new() take a node instead of an extend_info

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23576: Make service_intro_point_new() take a node instead of an extend_info
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:  2
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328, fast-fix,|
  040-unreached-20190109, 041-proposed   |
Parent ID:  #23493   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * actualpoints:   => 2


Comment:

 I rebased this branch on master, and dgoulet helped me find some bugs in
 it:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/673

 I still need to tidy it up, add changes files, and find tickets for the
 new changes. But it seems to work well enough to run it on CI.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29167 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update go to 1.11.5

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29167: Update go to 1.11.5
+--
 Reporter:  boklm   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201901R, tbb-rbm  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good to me. Merged to `master` (commit
 9bac5b8ddc129cc0349f1c6350f819f8ba29af94).

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[tor-bugs] #29235 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build of https-everywhere fails because python3.6 is not available in buster anymore

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29235: Build of https-everywhere fails because python3.6 is not available in
buster anymore
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201901,
 Severity:  Normal   |  tbb-rbm
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Running `apt-get install python3.6` in buster now results in python 3.7
 being installed.

 I think we can fix that by building our own version of python 3.6 on
 Debian stable.

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[tor-bugs] #29234 [Core Tor]: Tor Browser Fails to start macos 10.14.3

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29234: Tor Browser Fails to start macos 10.14.3
+--
 Reporter:  bbush   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Component:  Core Tor
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
 I am running MacOS 10.14.3 And tour browser Phils to start. I also
 installed Firefox 60.5 esr and it to fails to start.  i have tor ver.
 8.0.4

 Here is my error log from firefox:

 AdapterDeviceID: 0x0d26
 AdapterVendorID: 0x8086
 Add-ons: activity-
 
stream%40mozilla.org:2018.04.20.1103-b3b95672,aushelper%40mozilla.org:2.0,firefox%40getpocket.com:1.0.5,followonsearch%40mozilla.com:0.9.6,formautofill%40mozilla.org:1.0
 ,jaws-
 
esr%40mozilla.org:1.2,onboarding%40mozilla.org:1.0,screenshots%40mozilla.org:30.1.0,webcompat%40mozilla.org:1.1,%7B972ce4c6-7e08-4474-a285-3208198ce6fd%7D:60.5.0
 Bug_1086977: Didn't crash, please ignore
 BuildID: 20190124141046
 ContentSandboxCapable: 1
 ContentSandboxLevel: 3
 CrashTime: 1548870646
 DOMIPCEnabled: 1
 EMCheckCompatibility: true
 FramePoisonBase: 9223372036600930304
 FramePoisonSize: 4096
 InstallTime: 1548870644
 MozCrashReason: MOZ_CRASH(Using observer service off the main thread!)
 Notes: AdapterVendorID: 0x8086, AdapterDeviceID:
 0x0d26FP(D00-L1000-W-T010) WR? WR- OMTP? OMTP+3 GL Layers? GL
 Context? GL Context+ GL Layers+
 ProductID: {ec8030f7-c20a-464f-9b0e-13a3a9e97384}
 ProductName: Firefox
 ReleaseChannel: esr
 SafeMode: 0
 StartupCrash: 0
 StartupTime: 1548870644
 TelemetryEnvironment: {"build":{"applicationId":"{ec8030f7-c20a-464f-9b0e-
 
13a3a9e97384}","applicationName":"Firefox","architecture":"x86-64","buildId":"20190124141046","version":"60.5.0","vendor":"Mozilla","platformVersion":"60.5.0","xpcomAbi":"x86_64-gcc3","updaterAvailable":true},"partner":{"distributionId":null,"distributionVersion":null,"partnerId":null,"distributor":null,"distributorChannel":null,"partnerNames":[]},"system":{"memoryMB":16384,"virtualMaxMB":null,"cpu":{"count":8,"cores":4,"vendor":"GenuineIntel","family":6,"model":70,"stepping":1,"l2cacheKB":256,"l3cacheKB":6144,"speedMHz":2200,"extensions":["hasMMX","hasSSE","hasSSE2","hasSSE3","hasSSSE3","hasSSE4_1","hasSSE4_2","hasAVX","hasAVX2","hasAES"]},"os":{"name":"Darwin","version":"18.2.0","locale
 ":"en-
 
US"},"hdd":{"profile":{"model":null,"revision":null},"binary":{"model":null,"revision":null},"system":{"model":null,"revision":null}},"gfx":{"D2DEnabled":null,"DWriteEnabled":null,"ContentBackend":"Skia","adapters":[{"description":null,"vendorID":"0x8086","deviceID":"0x0d26","subsysID":null,"RAM":null,"driver":null,"driverVersion":null,"driverDate":null,"GPUActive":true}],"monitors":[{"screenWidth":1440,"screenHeight":900,"scale":2}],"features":{"compositor":"opengl","gpuProcess":{"status":"unused"}}},"appleModelId":"MacBookPro11,2"},"settings":{"blocklistEnabled":true,"e10sEnabled":true,"e10sMultiProcesses":4,"telemetryEnabled":false,"locale
 ":"en-
 
US","update":{"channel":"esr","enabled":true,"autoDownload":true},"userPrefs":{"browser.search.widget.inNavBar":false},"sandbox":{"effectiveContentProcessLevel":3},"addonCompatibilityCheckEnabled":true,"isDefaultBrowser":null},"profile":{"creationDate":17926},"addons":{"activeAddons
 ":{"activity-
 
str...@mozilla.org":{"version":"2018.04.20.1103-b3b95672","scope":1,"type":"extension","updateDay":17920,"isSystem":true,"isWebExtension":false,"multiprocessCompatible":true,"blocklisted":false,"description":"A
 rich visual history feed and a reimagined home page make it easier than
 ever to find exactly what ","name":"Activity
 
Stream","userDisabled":false,"appDisabled":false,"foreignInstall":false,"hasBinaryComponents":false,"installDay":17920},"aushel...@mozilla.org":{"version":"2.0","scope":1,"type":"extension","updateDay":17920,"isSystem":true,"isWebExtension":false,"multiprocessCompatible":true,"blocklisted":false,"description":"Sets
 value(s) in the update url based on custom checks.","name":"Application
 Update Service
 
Helper","userDisabled":false,"appDisabled":false,"foreignInstall":false,"hasBinaryComponents":false,"installDay":17920},"fire...@getpocket.com":{"version":"1.0.5","scope":1,"type":"extension","updateDay":17920,"isSystem":true,"isWebExtension":false,"multiprocessCompatible":true,"blocklisted":false,"description":"When
 you find something you want to view later, put it in
 
Pocket.","name":"Pocket","userDisabled":false,"appDisabled":false,"foreignInstall":false,"hasBinaryComponents":false,"installDay":17920},"followonsea...@mozilla.com":{"version":"0.9.6","scope":1,"type":"extension","updateDay":17920,"isSystem":true,"isWebExtension":false,"multiprocessCompatible":true,"blocklisted":false,"description":null,"name
 ":"Follow-on Search
 

[tor-bugs] #29233 [Core Tor/Trunnel]: Add a trunnel function that duplicates a trunnel object

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29233: Add a trunnel function that duplicates a trunnel object
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core |Version:
  Tor/Trunnel|
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:  tor-hs, technical-debt, trunnel
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 In #23576, we made a function that duplicates a link specifier. But let's
 have a generic function to duplicate trunnel objects instead.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29185 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 8.5a7-build3 Windows .exe files are not reproducibly built

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29185: 8.5a7-build3 Windows .exe files are not reproducibly built
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201901,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201901  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks2):

 0x0 pixels icons from new ICOs makes unicorn sad too.

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[tor-bugs] #29232 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write a function that prints a link specifier and link specifier list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29232: Write a function that prints a link specifier and link specifier list
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-hs, technical-debt
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We want to print link specifiers for debugging, and log link specifiers,
 but we don't have an easy way to do that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29185 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 8.5a7-build3 Windows .exe files are not reproducibly built

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29185: 8.5a7-build3 Windows .exe files are not reproducibly built
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201901,|  Actual Points:
  GeorgKoppen201901  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks2):

 Simple fix. Unicorn!
 {{{
  ;Interface Configuration

!define MUI_ICON "${CHANNEL_ICON}"
 +  !define MUI_UNICON "${CHANNEL_ICON}"
!define MUI_ABORTWARNING

  ;
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28614 [Core Tor/Tor]: Can't parse networkstatus consensus time

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28614: Can't parse networkstatus consensus time
-+-
 Reporter:  Vort |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-rc-must, regression, |  Actual Points:
  postfreeze-ok, tbb-needs   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by ahf):

 * reviewer:   => ahf


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29208 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Better timeout and retry for Snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29208: Better timeout and retry for Snowflake
---+
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by dcf):

 Possible duplicate at #25429?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29231 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relays vastly underreport write-total in padding-counts line in extrainfo descriptor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29231: Relays vastly underreport write-total in padding-counts line in 
extrainfo
descriptor
---+
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay padding  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * cc: dgoulet (removed)
 * keywords:   => tor-relay padding
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29231 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relays vastly underreport write-total in padding-counts line in extrainfo descriptor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29231: Relays vastly underreport write-total in padding-counts line in 
extrainfo
descriptor
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Two functions are used to count the total read and write bytes:

 {{{
 rep_hist_padding_count_read()
 rep_hist_padding_count_write()
 }}}

 The read one is called for each cell that enters tor within
 `channel_tls_handle_cell()` which is what we want for the total cell
 counter.

 However, for the write counter, it is within
 `connection_or_write_cell_to_buf()` called by `chan->write_cell()`
 function pointer that currently points to
 `channel_tls_write_cell_method()`.

 The problem is that currently, only the channel padding subsystem (netflow
 padding) is using `chan->write_cell()`. Furthermore,
 `connection_or_write_cell_to_buf()` is directly called by:

 * NETINFO cell: `connection_or_send_netinfo()`
 * KEEPALIVE: `run_connection_housekeeping()`
 * Channel `write_cell()` function pointer.

 Thus, we are effectively only counting NETINFO, keepalive (PADDING cell)
 and netflow padding.

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[tor-bugs] #29231 [Core Tor/Tor]: Relays vastly underreport write-total in padding-counts line in extrainfo descriptor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29231: Relays vastly underreport write-total in padding-counts line in 
extrainfo
descriptor
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 Here is a snippet from WhatsGoingOn's extrainfo descriptor:
 {{{
 write-history 2019-01-27 18:10:06 (86400 s)
 7709989888,6911394816,6582383616,7393989632,6065009664
 read-history 2019-01-27 18:10:06 (86400 s)
 7644498944,6824735744,6550761472,7355173888,6059125760
 [...]
 padding-counts 2019-01-27 22:06:23 (86400 s) bin-size=1 write-drop=0
 write-pad=22 write-total=25 read-drop=0 read-pad=21 read-
 total=1231 enabled-read-pad=1 enabled-read-total=2 enabled-
 write-pad=1 enabled-write-total=1 max-chanpad-timers=6
 }}}

 Notice how the read-total is reasonable compared to read-history, but the
 write-total is way undercounting compared to write-history.

 I suspect that write-total is the wrong one.

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[tor-bugs] #29230 [- Select a component]: The PKCS #12 operation failed for unknown reasons.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29230: The PKCS #12 operation failed for unknown reasons.
---+--
 Reporter:  alexbpk8   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version: |   Severity:  Critical
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
 can't import certificate with Tor Browser 8.5a7 (based on Mozilla Firefox
 60.5.0esr) (64-bit)

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[tor-bugs] #29229 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Does anybody notice if the bridge auth goes away?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29229: Does anybody notice if the bridge auth goes away?
--+
 Reporter:  gaba  |  Owner:  sysrqb
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  2 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor19 |
--+
 Set some kind of notification system for bridge auth.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29221 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tooling to track code-style/best-practices violations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29221: Tooling to track code-style/best-practices violations
--+---
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor


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[tor-bugs] #29228 [Core Tor/Tor]: Unify some or all of Tor's various message/event/work queues.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29228: Unify some or all of Tor's various message/event/work queues.
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  10 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 We have several of these, many of which could sensibly be unified or
 refactored.

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[tor-bugs] #29227 [Core Tor/Tor]: Audit Tor roles (relay, bridge, etc) and remove needless dependencies where possible

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29227: Audit Tor roles (relay, bridge, etc) and remove needless dependencies 
where
possible
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  15 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+


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[tor-bugs] #29226 [Core Tor/Tor]: Automate application of C formatting to code

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29226: Automate application of C formatting to code
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  5  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 We have never applied a C formatter to our code.  Doing so will hurt --
 once.  After that we might be much happier.  We have the opportunity to

 This has the potential to be a major bikeshed point, though: we should try
 to come up with a set of standards that all the active developers can
 tolerate, and a mainstream well-supported tool can support.

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[tor-bugs] #29225 [Core Tor/Tor]: Improve efficiency and flexibility of threadpool/workqueue API

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29225: Improve efficiency and flexibility of threadpool/workqueue API
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  15 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 This is a good candidate for using Rust, since it's an efficiency win more
 than anything else.

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[tor-bugs] #29224 [Core Tor/Tor]: Abstractions and best practices for disabled modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29224: Abstractions and best practices for disabled modules
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  5 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We arrived at some of these when we started making directory authority
 code optional; we can do more once we have more of our modularity designs
 in pace.

 We may need additional code and tooling here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29224 [Core Tor/Tor]: Abstractions and best practices for disabled modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29224: Abstractions and best practices for disabled modules
--+---
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor31-can


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[tor-bugs] #29223 [Core Tor/Tor]: List canonical abbreviations to use in Tor functions and identifiers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29223: List canonical abbreviations to use in Tor functions and identifiers
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.5   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 We often don't abbreviate things in our function names and global
 identifiers.  This leads to beautiful things like
 "router_get_mutable_consensus_status_by_descriptor_digest" and
 "signed_descs_update_status_from_consensus_networkstatus" and
 "networkstatus_consensus_can_use_multiple_directories".

 What's more, when we do abbreviate, we often do so inconsistently: cfg
 versus config, con vs conn, orconn vs or_conn, and so on.

 We should specify which abbreviations we want to standardize, and converge
 on those.

 It is most important to do this for identifiers that are visible across
 modules, followed by identifiers that are global within a module. I don't
 think we need to do this for local variables.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12802 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: BridgeDB needs Nagios checks for the Email Distributor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12802: BridgeDB needs Nagios checks for the Email Distributor
+---
 Reporter:  isis|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-email, nagios  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  5
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * points:  4 => 5


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[tor-bugs] #29222 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix biggest violations of coding best-practices

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29222: Fix biggest violations of coding best-practices
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  10 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 Once we have some tools to tell us where our code is most unreasonable
 (#29221), we should refactor those places to smell less bad.

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[tor-bugs] #29221 [- Select a component]: Tooling to track code-style/best-practices violations

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29221: Tooling to track code-style/best-practices violations
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  5 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can |
--+
 From the list of best practices defined in #29219, when we can write
 tooling to do so, we should write tooling to find and measure violations
 of these practices

 Some of these measures (function length, file length, layer violations via
 includes) already have code for them; others will be harder.  We should
 probably aim for the lower hanging fruit here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12802 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: BridgeDB needs Nagios checks for the Email Distributor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12802: BridgeDB needs Nagios checks for the Email Distributor
+---
 Reporter:  isis|  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-email, nagios  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  4
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * points:   => 4


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[tor-bugs] #29218 [Core Tor/Tor]: Revise "handles" to be opaque, safe. Document standard usage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29218: Revise "handles" to be opaque, safe.  Document standard usage
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  3  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+


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[tor-bugs] #29220 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update review guidelines to list best practices

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29220: Update review guidelines to list best practices
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  2  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 When we come up with some target guidelines in #29219 , we should make
 sure that our coding standards document them.

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[tor-bugs] #29219 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write (more) guidelines for Tor coding best practices

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29219: Write (more) guidelines for Tor coding best practices
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  3  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 We should extend our best practices guidelines in doc/HACKING with
 all/most of the following:

  * Avoiding layer violations
  * Fewer levels of block nesting
  * Small functions
  * Small files
  * Few includes per file
  * Smaller state objects
  * Making new features compile-time optional modules
  * incremental implementation and testing
  * Fewer branches
  * Fewer callers/callees per function
  * "Leave it better than you find it"
  * Well-bounded modules
  * Fewer data dependencies

 Some of these can be quantified; the ones that can be should have targets.

 I'm putting an optimistically low time estimate on this one under the
 assumption that we will have only minimal debate. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29218 [Core Tor/Tor]: Revise "handles" to be opaque, safe. Document standard usage

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29218: Revise "handles" to be opaque, safe.  Document standard usage
--+---
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  3
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+---

Comment (by nickm):

 It would be good to make sure that handles can work with multiple
 backends, including global-id-lookup, generational indices, and nullable
 references.

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[tor-bugs] #29217 [Core Tor/Tor]: Script to add new tor files and modules in rust and/or C

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29217: Script to add new tor files and modules in rust and/or C
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  2  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 This should support modules that are subsystems and/or optional.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29205 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Use Firefox for the WebRTC implementation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29205: Use Firefox for the WebRTC implementation
---+---
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: gk (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29216 [Core Tor/Tor]: Document how to make new files/modules in Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29216: Document how to make new files/modules in Tor
--+---
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
--+---
Changes (by nickm):

 * points:  .5 => 1.5


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[tor-bugs] #29216 [Core Tor/Tor]: Document how to make new files/modules in Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29216: Document how to make new files/modules in Tor
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  .5 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 We should document how to make option/required files/modules in rust/C

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[tor-bugs] #29215 [Core Tor/Tor]: Document target, modular tor architecture

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29215: Document target, modular tor architecture
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  5  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 We'll be working during sponsor31 to make sure that we are moving towards
 a nice modular architecture. We should document what we're actually trying
 to achieve, and what our target architecture is, so that we can tell
 people "do it like X, not necessarily like Tor does it now."

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28917 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Delete the proxy opt-in cookie, don't set it to 0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28917: Delete the proxy opt-in cookie, don't set it to 0
---+
 Reporter:  dcf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by arma):

 Yes, this sounds like a smart thing to do.

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[tor-bugs] #29214 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update 'tor-guts' archictecture documentation to describe current (actual, as-built) architecture.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29214: Update 'tor-guts' archictecture documentation to describe current 
(actual,
as-built) architecture.
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  5  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+


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[tor-bugs] #29213 [Core Tor/Tor]: Minimize the boundary between src/core and src/{feature, app}

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29213: Minimize the boundary between src/core and src/{feature,app}
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  15 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 The API boundary between src/core and higher level layers is more or less
 nonexistent.  That's not surprising, since we created this distinction by
 moving files and functions around.

 We can actually do much better here.  Possibile strategies include:
* Removing up-calls from src/core to src/{feature,app}
* Designing an API for the code, and adjusting external modules to use
 that.
* Moving more pieces outside of sec/core as appropriate

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[tor-bugs] #29212 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create more modularity inside src/core

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29212: Create more modularity inside src/core
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  15?|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 The "src/core" section of our code is a bit of a catch-all: we could
 improve matters here if we can turn `src/core/or` into a set of even
 smaller pieces.

 Examples of pieces that we might extract are:
* Path selection
* The decision to build circuits
* circuit lifespan
* circuit construction implementation
* ...

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[tor-bugs] #29211 [Core Tor/Tor]: Distribute config.c functionality across more modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29211: Distribute config.c functionality across more modules
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  15 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 The config.c module and the or_options_t type are a layering problem: They
 initialize many other modules, and provide what amounts to a set of global
 variables for the configuration settings.

 Instead, we could use the subsystems design to give modules the ability to
 declare and listen to various configuration options of their own, without
 requiring all the option handling to be in a single place.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28226 [Core Tor/Tor]: Backend for an async publish-subcribe messaging system for cross-module communications

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28226: Backend for an async publish-subcribe messaging system for cross-module
communications
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pubsub, sponsor31-maybe  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can
-+-

Comment (by catalyst):

 Partial review so far, by commit:

   b7358da11 namemap::
 seems ok. I have a few misgivings about the type punning used for the
 temporary object, but it might be safe
   d26a213c9 `LD_MESG`::
 seems ok, except for needing to bump the total as mentioned above
   749456940 semicolon eater::
 seems ok. Maybe we want to uses this in ht.h, but that means changing
 all its users, so maybe not in this ticket
   33c20c70d smartlist_grow::
 seems ok, assuming the sizes bounds check in
 `smartlist_ensure_capacity()` is correct, which from a quick glance it
 seems to be

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[tor-bugs] #29210 [Core Tor/Tor]: Distribute control.c functionality across various modules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29210: Distribute control.c functionality across various modules
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points:  10 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 The control.c module accesses, and is accessed by, many other modules: it
 represents a failure of modularity and layering.

 Instead, we should give control.c only the responsibility of marshalling
 and unmarshalling messages for the controller, and give individual modules
 the responsibility for publishing events and handling commands.

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[tor-bugs] #29209 [Core Tor/Tor]: Reduce visibility of more data type internals

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29209: Reduce visibility of more data type internals
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor31-can  |
---+
 Many of our data types -- particularly the ones in or.h -- have their
 internals visible across modules, in a way that harms modularity and leads
 to weird code couplings.  We would do well to reduce this visibility and
 refactor as needed.

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[tor-bugs] #29208 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Better timeout and retry for Snowflake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29208: Better timeout and retry for Snowflake
+---
 Reporter:  cohosh  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task| Status:  new
 Priority:  High|  Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake
  Version:  |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
 Right now clients can't figure out why their connection has stopped,
 figure out how to try another snowflake more quickly

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28623 [Core Tor/Tor]: use documentation IP ranges for documentation (manpage)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28623: use documentation IP ranges for documentation (manpage)
--+--
 Reporter:  nusenu|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, doc |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by rl1987):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/674

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[tor-bugs] #29207 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: New design for broker -- proxy protocol for snowflakes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29207: New design for broker -- proxy protocol for snowflakes
---+---
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake
  Version: |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
 Add information that the snowflakes give to the broker (such as proxy
 version/type) to allow for metrics.

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[tor-bugs] #29206 [- Select a component]: New design for client -- proxy protocol

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29206: New design for client -- proxy protocol
---+--
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Component:  - Select a component
  Version: |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
 Right now we just send traffic. We need to add some control messages for
 communication between the client and proxy.

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[tor-bugs] #29205 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Use Firefox for the WebRTC implementation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29205: Use Firefox for the WebRTC implementation
---+---
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake
  Version: |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---
 Reduce fingerprintability and solve Windows reproducible builds problem by
 replacing the current Chome-based C++ WebRTC implementation with Firefox's
 built-in WebRTC implementation

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Re: [tor-bugs] #20813 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Start producing snowflakes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#20813: Start producing snowflakes
---+---
 Reporter:  arlolra|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake tor-pt   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  3
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * points:   => 3


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27850 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Provide stand-alone snowflake proxy for 32-bit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27850: Provide stand-alone snowflake proxy for 32-bit
---+--
 Reporter:  traumschule|  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * sponsor:  Sponsor19 =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #27850 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Provide stand-alone snowflake proxy for 32-bit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27850: Provide stand-alone snowflake proxy for 32-bit
---+---
 Reporter:  traumschule|  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * sponsor:   => Sponsor19


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Re: [tor-bugs] #22775 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Implement Hyphae

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22775: Implement Hyphae
--+---
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 It will not be implemented any time soon.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22776 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Implement the remaining cryptographic protocols for Hyphae

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22776: Implement the remaining cryptographic protocols for Hyphae
-+---
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:  bridgedb-distributors, rust  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22775   | Points:  21
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19-can
-+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 It will not be implemented any time soon.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #22777 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Implement a backend HTTP server for Hyphae's credentials

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#22777: Implement a backend HTTP server for Hyphae's credentials
--+---
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #22775| Points:  5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+---
Changes (by gaba):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 It will not be implemented any time soon.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28848 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Document Snowflake broker implementation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28848: Document Snowflake broker implementation
---+--
 Reporter:  ahf|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake tor-pt   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  8
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
---+--
Changes (by gaba):

 * points:   => 8


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29204 [Core Tor/Tor]: Inspect circuit queue during padidng decisions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29204: Inspect circuit queue during padidng decisions
---+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, 041-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  5
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor2
---+--
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * Attachment "Tor-Cell-Flow.jpeg" added.


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[tor-bugs] #29204 [Core Tor/Tor]: Inspect circuit queue during padidng decisions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29204: Inspect circuit queue during padidng decisions
--+---
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  wtf-pad, 041-proposed
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  5 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor2  |
--+---
 We need to inspect the circuit queue or the channel outbuf in some way
 during padding decisions. The problem is that if a guard stops reading on
 a channel, and padding keeps getting scheduled by the middle, it will
 overflow the circuit queue and/or outbuf for the channel and eventually
 oom.

 Ideally, we would make our padding decision based on the EWMA values for
 the circuit rather than just checking if there were queued cells in the
 outbuf, but at minimum we need some kind of throttling so we don't keep
 adding cells to an circuit queue or outbuf above a certain length.

 We may also want to use the circuit queue activity to update our last
 packet sent timers..

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29203 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a way to specify machines as reduced circuit padding

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29203: Add a way to specify machines as reduced circuit padding
---+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  wtf-pad, 041-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:  4
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:  Sponsor2
---+--
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * keywords:  wtf-pad => wtf-pad, 041-proposed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29202 [Webpages/Website]: pls delete (was: mail.tutanota.com page error with browser8.5a6)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29202: pls delete
--+-
 Reporter:  alexbpk8  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-
Changes (by alexbpk8):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


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[tor-bugs] #29203 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add a way to specify machines as reduced circuit padding

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29203: Add a way to specify machines as reduced circuit padding
--+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  wtf-pad
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  4 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor2  |
--+-
 We need a way for clients to specify that they want reduced circuit
 padding -- either by only selecting low overhead padding machines, or by
 requesting different overhead caps for the machines they use.

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[tor-bugs] #29202 [Webpages/Website]: mail.tutanota.com page error with browser8.5a6

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29202: mail.tutanota.com page error with browser8.5a6
---+--
 Reporter:  alexbpk8   |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate  |  Component:  Webpages/Website
  Version: |   Severity:  Critical
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
 https://mail.tutanota.com/
 is
 broken with the last torbrowser version "8.5a6 (based on Mozilla Firefox
 60.4.0esr) (64-bit)"
 does not display login/password fields

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