Re: [tor-bugs] #19407 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: Support FD passing on Unix socket

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19407: Support FD passing on Unix socket
---+--
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by Marinde):

 I am trying to know much about project values to support FD passing
 socket. The unix tracks you can easily find from
 [https://www.topaperwritingservices.com/review-college-paper-org/ college
 paper.org reviews] project ticket. That all have been placed for the
 content editors and review followers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8560 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 100% CPU usage in Tor Browser?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8560: 100% CPU usage in Tor Browser?
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-firefox-patch |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by adrelanos):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  worksforme =>


Comment:

 The previous poster (although 4 years ago) shouldn't have closed the
 ticket with new status `worksforme`. With all due respect, unless I missed
 something (search `site:torproject.org "douggard"`), I don't think
 `douggard` is a developer who should close tickets that way. Looks like a
 mistake.

 `toggle extensions.torbutton.versioncheck_enabled to false` is a
 workaround but not a bugfix for this ticket.

 This issue as described in the original ticket is still happening.
 Therefore reopening.

 Could it be related to 10 years Firefox upstream unfixed bug
 [https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=508427 High CPU on Linux
 even when in the background, possibly due to frequent polling]?

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[tor-bugs] #29742 [Core Tor/Torsocks]: Support FD passing on Unix socket

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29742: Support FD passing on Unix socket
-+---
 Reporter:  Marinde  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Component:  Core Tor/Torsocks
  Version:   |   Severity:  Normal
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #19407   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+---
 I hope all the users will come to have project importance for the new
 ticket providers. The unix socket preference may help our
 [https://www.topaperwritingservices.com/review-college-paper-org/ college
 paper.org reviews] guide to all of us. Then we will manage and introduce
 perfect features for all of us.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27912 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add travis CI for the Chutney repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27912: Add travis CI for the Chutney repository
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  1.5
Parent ID:  #20647| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * actualpoints:  .5 => 1.5


Comment:

 My updates are in https://github.com/torproject/chutney/pull/7

 I'm going to take a break now, and work on #29729 later today, or tomorrow
 (in 2-16 hours time).

 I think we're going to need test-network-forgiving soon after we merge
 this CI, I'm seeing failures in about 1 in 30 jobs. Maybe the failure rate
 depends on Travis' load: I've also seen almost all jobs fail in some
 builds.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27912 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Add travis CI for the Chutney repository

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27912: Add travis CI for the Chutney repository
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .5
Parent ID:  #20647| Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor19
--+

Comment (by teor):

 I don't know how we can remember to update our travis config when deb.tpo
 repositories change. I opened #29741 as a low-priority task to work that
 out.

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[tor-bugs] #29741 [Core Tor/Chutney]: Work out how to fail chutney travis jobs when the tor repository is out of date or missing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29741: Work out how to fail chutney travis jobs when the tor repository is out 
of
date or missing
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Chutney  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #27912
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor19-can |
--+
 In #27912, we configure a bunch of deb lines that depend on
 deb.torproject.org. But what happens when the repository is updated after
 a release?

 We can either:
 * remember to update the travis config every release, or
 * work out how to make the jobs fail when they fall back to 0.2.9.14 (or
 Ubuntu security updates' current version)

 Maybe there's a travis option that we could use?

 This task does not need to be solved straight away.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29688 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Timeline limit of 1 day makes it hard to do weekly task reports

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29688: Timeline limit of 1 day makes it hard to do weekly task reports
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Someone has fixed this issue.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29688 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Timeline limit of 1 day makes it hard to do weekly task reports

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29688: Timeline limit of 1 day makes it hard to do weekly task reports
--+-
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by teor):

 I also can't do Network Team bug triage unless the timeline goes back at
 least 4 days.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29740 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix memory leaks in shared random unit tests: simple version

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29740: Fix memory leaks in shared random unit tests: simple version
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, memory-|  Actual Points:  0.1
  management, 029-backport, 034-backport,|
  035-backport, 040-backport, nickm-merge,   |
  dgoulet-merge  |
Parent ID:  #29706   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * priority:  High => Very High


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29706 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test failure due to memory leaks in shared-random unit tests: long-term fix

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29706: Test failure due to memory leaks in shared-random unit tests: long-term 
fix
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-authority-   |  Actual Points:  1.0
  test, consider-backport-after-0404-alpha,  |
  tor-ci, tor-test, memory-management, 034   |
  -backport-maybe, 035-backport, 040-backport|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * priority:  Very High => Medium
 * actualpoints:  0.5 => 1.0


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29706 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test failure due to memory leaks in shared-random unit tests: long-term fix (was: Test failure due to memory leaks in shared-random unit tests)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29706: Test failure due to memory leaks in shared-random unit tests: long-term 
fix
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  consider-backport-after-authority-   |  Actual Points:  0.5
  test, consider-backport-after-0404-alpha,  |
  tor-ci, tor-test, memory-management, 034   |
  -backport-maybe, 035-backport, 040-backport|
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review
 * keywords:
 tor-ci, tor-test, memory-management, 034-backport-maybe, 035-backport,
 040-backport
 =>
 consider-backport-after-authority-test, consider-backport-
 after-0404-alpha, tor-ci, tor-test, memory-management, 034-backport-
 maybe, 035-backport, 040-backport


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 nickm]:
 > quick question here -- when we are about to call state_query_del_, do we
 need a check to make sure that the value we are about to assign is not the
 same pointer as the previous value?

 I think replacing a pointer with itself is almost always a bug, because:
 * we've confused current and previous, or
 * we forgot sr_srv_dup().

 Unless both pointers are NULL: replacing NULL with NULL is ok.

 I changed the code so it does nothing when replacing a non-NULL pointer
 with the same pointer, and logs a BUG() warning. That BUG() doesn't
 trigger on the unit tests or chutney.

 The changes are in ​https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/776
 I re-did the merge, because I ended up with a lot of partial merges.

 We should merge it to 0.4.0 and master, then consider a backport to 0.3.4
 and 0.3.5 once arma has run it on moria for a while (and once it's been in
 at least one full alpha).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29454 [HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS Everywhere]: Updates of HTTPS-Everywhere we ship do not seem to update the rulesets

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29454: Updates of HTTPS-Everywhere we ship do not seem to update the rulesets
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  legind
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/EFF-HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere |
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by legind):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This has been fixed in

 https://github.com/EFForg/https-everywhere/pull/17553/
 https://github.com/EFForg/https-everywhere/pull/17551/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29706 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test failure due to memory leaks in shared-random unit tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29706: Test failure due to memory leaks in shared-random unit tests
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, memory-|  Actual Points:  0.5
  management, 034-backport-maybe, 035-backport,  |
  040-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 tor-ci, tor-test, memory-management, 029-backport-partial,
 034-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport
 =>
 tor-ci, tor-test, memory-management, 034-backport-maybe, 035-backport,
 040-backport


Comment:

 Ok, the quick fix is in #29740.
 I'll work on revising the refactor in this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29740 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix memory leaks in shared random unit tests: simple version

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29740: Fix memory leaks in shared random unit tests: simple version
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, memory-|  Actual Points:  0.1
  management, 029-backport, 034-backport,|
  035-backport, 040-backport, nickm-merge,   |
  dgoulet-merge  |
Parent ID:  #29706   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 tor-ci, tor-test, memory-management, 029-backport, 034-backport,
 035-backport, 040-backport
 =>
 tor-ci, tor-test, memory-management, 029-backport, 034-backport,
 035-backport, 040-backport, nickm-merge, dgoulet-merge


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29740 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix memory leaks in shared random unit tests: simple version

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29740: Fix memory leaks in shared random unit tests: simple version
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, memory-|  Actual Points:  0.1
  management, 029-backport, 034-backport,|
  035-backport, 040-backport |
Parent ID:  #29706   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => merge_ready
 * reviewer:   => asn


Comment:

 asn reviewed in #29706.

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[tor-bugs] #29740 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix memory leaks in shared random unit tests: simple version

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29740: Fix memory leaks in shared random unit tests: simple version
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core |Version:  Tor: 0.2.9.1-alpha
  Tor/Tor|   Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, memory-
 Severity:  Major|  management, 029-backport, 034-backport,
 |  035-backport, 040-backport
Actual Points:  0.1  |  Parent ID:  #29706
   Points:  0.1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Please merge https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/774 to the mainline
 branches.
 I'll merge to to 0.2.9 and later after the mainline CI passes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29706 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test failure due to memory leaks in shared-random unit tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29706: Test failure due to memory leaks in shared-random unit tests
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, memory-|  Actual Points:  0.5
  management, 029-backport-partial,  |
  034-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:1 teor]:
 > I have two pull requests on 0.2.9:
 >
 > A minimal version that fixes the unit tests on 0.2.9:
 > https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/774

 We should merge pr/774 to 0.4.0 and master, then to 0.2.9 and later once
 the CI passes.

 > A refactor that fixes the underlying memory management bug on 0.2.9:
 > https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/775

 We should not merge pr/775.
 This refactor includes the fix in pr/774.
 It also independently fixes the bug by making the memory management work
 better.
 I don't think we'll backport this refactor to 0.2.9.

 > And a merge of the refactor to 0.3.4:
 > https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/776
 > (There were some trivial conflicts where I needed to combine two sets of
 changes.)

 We should merge pr/776 to 0.4.0 and master.
 Then we should test it in an alpha, and backport it as far back as we
 think we'll backport any other shared random changes.
 (For authorities, that's 0.3.4 right now. For clients, that's probably
 0.3.5, because it's LTS.)

 I'll open a child ticket for pr/774.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25658 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying Tor Browser's security features

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25658: Activity 2.1: Improve user understanding and user control by clarifying 
Tor
Browser's security features
-+-
 Reporter:  isabela  |  Owner:
 |  antonela
 Type:  project  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, GeorgKoppen201812,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903R, tbb-8.5 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor17
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Amended the tor-browser patch with a fix for #29554 :
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/richard/tor-
 browser.git/diff/browser/components/preferences/in-
 content/preferences.js?h=bug_25658_v3

 Clicking 'Advanced Security Settings...' in the hangar now properly
 navigates the user to the new Security Level settings.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29570 [Core Tor/Tor]: Enforce mutually exclusive logic for IPv6 ORPort flags

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29570: Enforce mutually exclusive logic for IPv6 ORPort flags
-+-
 Reporter:  s7r  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, ipv6, reachability,   |  Actual Points:
  needs-proposal-or-tor-dev-email|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Two reminders:
 * A mailing list is a better place for this kind of discussion
 * I won't take any action on this ticket until there is consensus on a
 mailing list

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29737 [Core Tor/Tor]: Assign package proposal a number, change its filename, and merge it to torspec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29737: Assign package proposal a number, change its filename, and merge it to
torspec
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement | Status:
|  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, asn-merge, dgoulet-merge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28465  | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf, teor, nickm|Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by ahf):

 I highlighted irl on IRC earlier today to see if he wanted me to go ahead
 and land it in torspec.git and thus assign it a number. Awaiting to see
 what he thinks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29737 [Core Tor/Tor]: Assign package proposal a number, change its filename, and merge it to torspec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29737: Assign package proposal a number, change its filename, and merge it to
torspec
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement | Status:
|  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
|  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, asn-merge, dgoulet-merge  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28465  | Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf, teor, nickm|Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  tor-spec => tor-spec, asn-merge, dgoulet-merge


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28465 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use or remove "package" lines from votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28465: Use or remove "package" lines from votes
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * type:  enhancement => task


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:14 ahf]:
 > I'm not totally sure what it is I need to review here. The spec
 proposals needs to be reviewed on tor-...@lists.torproject.org which irl
 have already opened up for. From what I can see the proposal itself looks
 fine and I don't see any objections to it?

 Yes. I re-read te pull request to make sure.

 > The next step would be to land the proposal in torspec.git and get
 someone to implement the code parts of it?

 I split these changes up into 3 child tickets, because they can all be
 done at different times.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29737 [Core Tor/Tor]: Assign package proposal a number, change its filename, and merge it to torspec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29737: Assign package proposal a number, change its filename, and merge it to
torspec
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28465| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf, teor, nickm  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * reviewer:   => ahf, teor, nickm


Comment:

 teor and nickm reviewed this prooosal on tor-dev.
 ahf reviewed it in #28465.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28465 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use or remove "package" lines from votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28465: Use or remove "package" lines from votes
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec  |  Actual Points:  1
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_information => new
 * reviewer:  ahf =>
 * points:   => 1
 * actualpoints:   => 1


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[tor-bugs] #29739 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a new consensus method that does not include package lines

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29739: Create a new consensus method that does not include package lines
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-spec
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #28465
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 See the proposal in #28465.

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[tor-bugs] #29738 [Core Tor/Tor]: Deprecate RecommendedPackages torrc option, and remove the code for voting for packages

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29738: Deprecate RecommendedPackages torrc option, and remove the code for 
voting
for packages
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-spec
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #28465
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 See the proposal in #28465.

 Thes changes do not need a new consensus method, because they only affect
 torrcs and votes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29737 [Core Tor/Tor]: Assign package proposal a number, change its filename, and merge it to torspec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29737: Assign package proposal a number, change its filename, and merge it to
torspec
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #28465| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  assigned => merge_ready


Old description:

> See the pull request here:
> https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/60
>
> It's been reviewed on tor-dev, and zip have also reviewed it.

New description:

 See the pull request here:
 https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/60

 It's been reviewed on tor-dev, and I have also reviewed it.

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[tor-bugs] #29737 [Core Tor/Tor]: Assign package proposal a number, change its filename, and merge it to torspec

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29737: Assign package proposal a number, change its filename, and merge it to
torspec
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tor-spec
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #28465
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 See the pull request here:
 https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/60

 It's been reviewed on tor-dev, and zip have also reviewed it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29706 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test failure due to memory leaks in shared-random unit tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29706: Test failure due to memory leaks in shared-random unit tests
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, memory-|  Actual Points:  0.5
  management, 029-backport-partial,  |
  034-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  merge_ready => needs_revision


Comment:

 Yes, we need to do that check. (The current code never assigns the same
 pointer, but we should allow future code to do so without failing
 horribly.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25669 [Core Tor/Tor]: Privcount: blinding and encryption should be finished up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25669: Privcount: blinding and encryption should be finished up
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, privcount, 035   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  -roadmap-master, 035-triaged-in-20180711,  |
  rust, 040-unreached-20190109,  |
  041-accepted-20190115  |
Parent ID:  #29009   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => new
 * reviewer:  nickm =>


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:28 nickm]:
 > Query -- I don't see what I am supposed to review here. Is there a PR
 somewhere?

 Sorry, I don't know how this ticket ended up in needs review. Careless
 clicking! :-)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16570 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Add new 'awaiting backport' state for Trac tickets?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16570: Add new 'awaiting backport' state for Trac tickets?
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 The existing process is now at:
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/teams/NetworkTeam/Backports

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16570 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Add new 'awaiting backport' state for Trac tickets?

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16570: Add new 'awaiting backport' state for Trac tickets?
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:5 arma]:
 > adding teor to the cc list since I believe they are considering how best
 to describe and track tickets that are awaiting backports.

 Here's how the process works right now:
 1. we mark tickets that might need a backport with tags like
 "035-backport"
 2. when the ticket is merge_ready, it gets merged into the alpha and
 master branches
 3. the ticket is kept in merge_ready, but moved to the latest backport
 release milestone. (Which is currently 0.3.5)
 4. when a ticket gets backported to a particular release, it is moved to
 the milestone for the latest remaining release
 5. once a ticket has been backported to all releases, it is closed as
 fixed

 Here are the exceptional cases:

 When we stop supporting a release:
 A. we mark all tickets with a tag like "033-backport-unreached" (or "035
 -unreached-backport")
 B. we move tickets that can be backported to an earlier release into the
 relevant milestone
 C. we close tickets that can't be backported any further

 If we decide not to backport a ticket to any of the possible remaining
 releases:
 A. we remove the backport tags for the remaining releases
 B. I have been replacing it with a tag like "035-backport-unreached", but
 maybe that's confusing. I think we should use "035-no-backport"

 I quite like this process and I feel no need to change it.

 It's also relatively easy to write a ticket query that shows all
 backportable tickets:
 
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/user/teor#Backports:0.5daysperweek

 What I would like is a way to say "wait until after this ticket has been
 tested in the next alpha before backporting it".
 I'm using tags like "consider-backport-after-0404-alpha" right now, but
 I'd really like to be able to hide new backports until they have been
 tested enough.

 Here's are some filters we could use to hide tickets:
 * a particular release (when we add a particular version to the versions
 list in trac)
   * I don't know if Trac's query syntax supports filtering by the set of
 values in another field
 * a particular date (or a particular number of days in the future)
   * we'd need a new time field "backport", the query syntax would be
 "backport=..now"

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23576 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make service_intro_point_new() take a node instead of an extend_info

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23576: Make service_intro_point_new() take a node instead of an extend_info
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.2.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  prop224, tor-hs, single-onion,   |  Actual Points:  2
  ipv6, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-removed-20180328, fast-fix,|
  040-unreached-20190109, 041-proposed, asn- |
  merge, nickm-merge |
Parent ID:  #23588   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:
 prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6, 034-triage-20180328,
 034-removed-20180328, fast-fix, 040-unreached-20190109, 041-proposed,
 asn-merge
 =>
 prop224, tor-hs, single-onion, ipv6, 034-triage-20180328,
 034-removed-20180328, fast-fix, 040-unreached-20190109, 041-proposed,
 asn-merge, nickm-merge
 * milestone:  Tor: unspecified => Tor: 0.4.1.x-final


Comment:

 This is a feature, it belongs in master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29679 [Internal Services/Service - git]: please let cohosh push to sponsor19 git repo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29679: please let cohosh push to sponsor19 git repo
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by gaba):

 * priority:  Medium => High
 * severity:  Major => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29679 [Internal Services/Service - git]: please let cohosh push to sponsor19 git repo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29679: please let cohosh push to sponsor19 git repo
-+
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  tor-gitadm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - git  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+
Changes (by gaba):

 * severity:  Normal => Major


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29294 [Core Tor/sbws]: Create an script to automate releases

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29294: Create an script to automate releases
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:  sbws:
 |  1.0.2
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  easy, 10-proposed, network-team- |  Actual Points:  1
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  teor |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I left questions on the pull request about using GitHub's tarball.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27908 [Core Tor/Tor]: PrivCount proof of concept with existing statistics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27908: PrivCount proof of concept with existing statistics
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  privcount, 040-unreached-20190109,   |  Actual Points:
  041-accepted-20190115, network-team-   |
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #22898   | Points:  0
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV
-+-
Changes (by teor):

 * owner:  teor => (none)


Comment:

 This is a parent ticket, I'm not sure it makes sense for it to have an
 owner

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29683 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: install prometheus-node-exporter everywhere

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29683: install prometheus-node-exporter everywhere
-+-
 Reporter:  anarcat  |  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29681   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 "progress": i deployed the prometheus module in 3rdparty which required a
 bit of wrangling with the code already there. i think it's ready to deploy
 now, and I'll be following the
 [https://puppet.com/docs/pe/2017.2/r_n_p_intro.html role/profile/module
 principle] (RPM? hahaha) by creating a "profile" for all our nodes in
 modules/profile/prometheus/client.pp and then use that in a
 "role::monitored" class that gets sucked in everywhere.

 phew!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29709 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: install smartd

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29709: install smartd
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 there's a `is_virtual` fact in facter, i think we should install smartd on
 each host where that is "false".

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29734 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Broker should receive country stats information from Proxy and Client

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29734: Broker should receive country stats information from Proxy and Client
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake, geoip, stats  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29207   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  (none) => cohosh


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[tor-bugs] #29736 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Use WebSocket protocol to communicate between snowflake proxies and broker

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29736: Use WebSocket protocol to communicate between snowflake proxies and 
broker
---+--
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  ahf
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  snowflake, websocket
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #29207
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor19  |
---+--
 To create a versioned and extensible protocol for each piece of snowflake
 to talk to each other, we should consider using WebSockets (RFC 6455) to
 send these messages.

 This requires creating a WebSocket-based handler at the broker and
 modifying the proxies to make websocket connections.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29297 [Obfuscation/Obfsproxy]: Write reachability tests to verify if obfs4 is working or not

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29297: Write reachability tests to verify if obfs4 is working or not
-+-
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Obfsproxy|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  obfs4, network-team- |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #29279   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Putting this in needs_review to move things along... one thing I can think
 of that we might want is more granular large file download information as
 opposed to just "the time it takes to download the entire file". We can of
 course get this from tcpdump if we can capture on the probe site.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29297 [Obfuscation/Obfsproxy]: Write reachability tests to verify if obfs4 is working or not

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29297: Write reachability tests to verify if obfs4 is working or not
-+-
 Reporter:  chelseakomlo |  Owner:  cohosh
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Obfsproxy|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  obfs4, network-team- |  Actual Points:
  roadmap-2019-Q1Q2  |
Parent ID:  #29279   | Points:  2
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor19
-+-

Comment (by cohosh):

 Replying to [comment:8 dcf]:
 > We wrote some obfs4 testing scripts when we were testing in Kazakhstan.
 You can use them for inspiration. This is an export of the bridgetest/
 directory in !https://www.bamsoftware.com/git/repo.eecs.berkeley.edu
 /proxy-probe.git.

 Thanks! These are very useful. I've forked this repo here:
 https://github.com/cohosh/bridgetest
 and started making modifications for these new tests.

 The first thing I did was modify bridgetest to take the bridge lines from
 an input file since we're using private bridges for this test:
 
https://github.com/cohosh/bridgetest/commit/9a9f6603cba878f7dbf0193be38eb957b83d76ac

 And I've added a large (~100M) file download to check for throttling. This
 might be too large, but no matter the size I'd suggest running this test
 perhaps 4x a day as opposed to every hour to reduce load on the bridges
 and the probe sites. This commit adds the file download:
 
https://github.com/cohosh/bridgetest/commit/dcb9daaf41c2898b714291d012e3b06449016ee5

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29733 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable NoSript XSS protection for now due to bug 1532530

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29733: Disable NoSript XSS protection for now due to bug 1532530
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript, TorBrowserTeam201903R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:2 ma1]:
 > For reference, the upstream Mozilla bug is
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1532530
 >
 > This seems exceedingly drastic as a work-around.

 Well, OnionShare and SecureDrop are important tools, especially for people
 in dangerous situations. The risk here is that they mess up by not
 understanding the workarounds done by others or using a different unsafe
 tool altogether. We should avoid those failure cases.

 > What if I provide an option to just disable XSS injection checks on POST
 parameters (which would prevent the requestBody listener from being
 registered), and possibly another option to ask user confirmation for POST
 requests from JavaScript-disabled sites to TRUSTED ones, in order to
 mitigate the loss of protection?

 I think that would work for me (even though I admit that I was looking
 forward to "solve" the XSS related freezes with the patch, too :) (see:
 #29647 for details)) as long as it works for the SecureDrop/OnionShare
 users.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27503 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disabling accessibility on Windows breaks screen readers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27503: Disabling accessibility on Windows breaks screen readers
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-8.0-issues, tbb-regression,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903, GeorgKoppen201903,   |
  tbb-8.5|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  boklm|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  gk => pospeselr
 * cc: tbb-team (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #26323 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Build 32bit Linux bundles on 64bit systems

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#26323: Build 32bit Linux bundles on 64bit systems
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201903R,  |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.5|
Parent ID:  #26468   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-8.5 => tbb-rbm,
 TorBrowserTeam201903R, tbb-8.5
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 I pushed a new revision of the patch in branch `bug_26323_v9`:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_26323_v9&id=e72c3aff57a215f736e05f40f4fce3f5debde165

 This should fix the build of tor in nightly, set
 `DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive` where we install packages, and share the
 `gcc` and `rust` builds between the i686 and x86_64 builds.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #27478 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Torbutton in Tor Browser 8 difficult to see in dark theme

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#27478: Torbutton in Tor Browser 8 difficult to see in dark theme
-+-
 Reporter:  nsuchy   |  Owner:
 |  pospeselr
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-8.0-issues, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-8.0.1-can, TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-8.5   |
Parent ID:  #25658   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * parent:   => #25658


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23359 [Applications/Tor Browser]: WebExtensions icons are not shown on first start but on restart

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23359: WebExtensions icons are not shown on first start but on restart
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  pospeselr
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  AffectsTails  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25658| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by pospeselr):

 * cc: tbb-team (added)
 * owner:  tbb-team => pospeselr
 * parent:   => #25658


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29570 [Core Tor/Tor]: Enforce mutually exclusive logic for IPv6 ORPort flags

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29570: Enforce mutually exclusive logic for IPv6 ORPort flags
-+-
 Reporter:  s7r  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, ipv6, reachability,   |  Actual Points:
  needs-proposal-or-tor-dev-email|
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by AVee):

 Replying to [comment:19 s7r]:
 > You are suggesting behavior that does not have any logic,
 I'm suggesting **not** to change the existing behavior. You are suggesting
 a change which makes a specific configuration illegal. Even though there
 is at least one working relay using that config.
 Can you answer this: Do you think it's a good idea to add restrictions
 which break currently running nodes?

 > is confusing for operators
 You'd need to prove that first. It isn't confusing for me. It also wasn't
 for the Charly Ghislain who, despite the complicated setup, got his config
 correct without issues (what was confusing for him was the fact that it
 took days before he got the IPv6Reachable flag). It seems to be confusing
 for you, but that cannot be a reason to disallow other to do this.
 Could you also answer this: Do you have any prove this is a common source
 of configuration errors?

 > Don't you see the logical fracture with advertising a v6 socket but not
 listening on one?
 Yes, I do. Which is why I know I need to do something somewhere in my
 network to make sure the advertised address actually works.

 > Why not just listen to v4, since that's your only open socket?
 Because I want my node to be reachable over IPv6 as well, as teor stated
 (goal 2) we want to "encourage more IPv6 relays".

 > In this case I would like to have only a v6 socket open, and have only
 one `NoListen` IPv4 ORPort entry to be advertised. And I will use HaProxy
 to listen on that IPv4 addr:port and redirect to my IPv6 address. So I
 will be having in my descriptor both IPv4 (which is mandatory) and IPv6,
 and only listen on one IPv6 socket. You suggest this should be possible,
 right?
 Yes that should absolutely be possible as well. Why not?

 > Otherwise why would we have different behavior for same thing, but only
 different versions?
 If that currently isn't allowed that would indeed be inconsistent. But
 then the rule should be: If the node does not have at least one listening
 ORPort it is not allowed to advertise any ORPorts, because the node cannot
 possibly be reachable. (I also expect IPv6 only nodes to become possible
 at some point.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29675 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Nightly build should fail if "make fetch" fails

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29675: Nightly build should fail if "make fetch" fails
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:
 |  cypherpunks
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201903 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This is done by commits `dc49721feb8f2c3cb48079e4197cf4bfff875538` and
 `9283635ace22c3a7f629b5bc60e8fec0af4dc13c` in `tor-browser-bundle-
 testsuite.git` and `93a114bcb49f72c7131344cc67e47ce90bd81c77` in `tor-
 browser-build.git`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29667 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Add android-x86 to nightly builds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29667: Add android-x86 to nightly builds
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:
 |  cypherpunks
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing|
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201903 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This is done by commit `cd35d96cff602c304c4b3531799a2af7ef3eed0e` in `tor-
 browser-bundle-testsuite.git` and
 `93a114bcb49f72c7131344cc67e47ce90bd81c77` in `tor-browser-build.git`.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29733 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable NoSript XSS protection for now due to bug 1532530

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29733: Disable NoSript XSS protection for now due to bug 1532530
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript, TorBrowserTeam201903R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ma1):

 For reference, the upstream Mozilla bug is
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1532530

 This seems exceedingly drastic as a work-around.
 What if I provide an option to just disable XSS injection checks on POST
 parameters (which would prevent the requestBody listener from being
 registered), and possibly another option to ask user confirmation for POST
 requests from JavaScript-disabled sites to TRUSTED ones, in order to
 mitigate the loss of protection?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29733 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable NoSript XSS protection for now due to bug 1532530

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29733: Disable NoSript XSS protection for now due to bug 1532530
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  noscript, TorBrowserTeam201903R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  noscript, TorBrowserTeam201903 => noscript,
 TorBrowserTeam201903R
 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 `bug_29733`
 
(https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/torbutton.git/commit/?h=bug_29733&id=6168492237b73566348874e26a04bd52ba174e27)
 in my public `torbutton` repo has a fix for review.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28567 [Core Tor/sbws]: Report relays that sbws wants to test, but the test doesn't work

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28567: Report relays that sbws wants to test, but the test doesn't work
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  juga
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  sbws:
 |  1.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/sbws|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, sbws-1.0-must-   |  Actual Points:
  moved-20181128 |
Parent ID:  #28547   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by juga):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/sbws/pull/347

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[tor-bugs] #29735 [Webpages/Blog]: create blog account for juga

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29735: create blog account for juga
---+--
 Reporter:  steph  |  Owner:  hiro
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Blog  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+--
 juga at torproject
 nickname: juga

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28226 [Core Tor/Tor]: Backend for an async publish-subcribe messaging system for cross-module communications

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28226: Backend for an async publish-subcribe messaging system for cross-module
communications
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-pubsub, sponsor31-maybe, |  Actual Points:
  network-team-roadmap-2019-Q1Q2 |
Parent ID:   | Points:  8
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor31-must
-+-
Changes (by catalyst):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 I wrote a proof of concept hooking up part of the new bootstrap reporting
 code to pubsub.
 https://github.com/tlyu/tor/tree/bootpubsub

 It builds but doesn't pass tests, because I haven't yet figured out how to
 hook up the pubsub mainloop stuff.

 I commented in the pull request about most of difficulties I experienced
 with the code and consuming-developer documentation.  There are a few
 more, but I think they're minor documentation issues.

 I have some comments on architecture and design that it might not be worth
 delaying integration to address.  I'll write them up soon.

 How much work is it to finish hooking up pubsub to the mainloop and
 initialization code?  Would you be willing to add commits to do that?  It
 would be great to be able to test my POC.  Thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29734 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Broker should receive country stats information from Proxy and Client

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29734: Broker should receive country stats information from Proxy and Client
-+---
 Reporter:  cohosh   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake|Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  snowflake, geoip, stats  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #29207   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  Sponsor19
-+---

Comment (by ahf):

 We have a couple of options here for the implementation:

 - The broker strictly doesn't depend on anything Tor, but we could re-use
 the tor-geoipdb databases that is bundled in Debian/Ubuntu to get updates.
 These databases have a slightly different format than the official MaxMind
 GeoIP databases.

 - We can use MaxMind's own releases with the Go API found in
 https://github.com/oschwald/maxminddb-golang - this would require us to
 maintain the DB's ourselves.

 Once the broker is able to update per-country stats for the domain-fronted
 client connection it should also be able to relay information about which
 database it is using to the Snowflake proxies, such that they can keep
 stats about incoming proxy connections from clients and where these are
 coming from. This would (maybe?) allow us to notice if WebRTC filtering is
 happening in a country in that the Broker will see multiple connections
 from the given country, but the proxies reports no incoming clients from
 the given country.

 The proxies MUST NOT have to forward the client IP to the broker, which is
 why it is better for the proxies to fetch the GeoIP DB from the broker and
 cache it locally.

 The format used by Tor itself is very simple (IP-encoded as an integer
 followed by the country) that you keep in an ordered vector  where you do
 a binary search in whenever you need to look up a  country from a given
 IP. The simplicity of this data-structure might make it more interesting
 than MaxMind's binary format since we need to do the same implementation
 in both Go and JavaScript.

 The Tor implementation can be found in
 
https://github.com/torproject/tor/blob/2f683465d4b666c5d8f84fb3b234ad539d8511cd/src/lib/geoip/geoip.c

 The Tor GeoIP database format can be seen here:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/tree/master/src/config (see geoip,
 geoip6 and the mmdb-convert.py conversion script)

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[tor-bugs] #29734 [Obfuscation/Snowflake]: Broker should receive country stats information from Proxy and Client

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29734: Broker should receive country stats information from Proxy and Client
---+---
 Reporter:  cohosh |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/Snowflake  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:  snowflake, geoip,
   |  stats
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:  #29207
   Points:  1  |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor19  |
---+---
 We can use existing geoip data to collect statistics about where clients
 are connecting from in order to detect possible blocking events. These
 should be gathered both from the initial domain-fronted client connection
 and from the proxies (to be passed to the broker) in order to detect the
 blocking of individual proxies or the blocking of the WebRTC connections.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29440 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Update about:tor when Tor Browser is updated

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29440: Update about:tor when Tor Browser is updated
-+-
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-update, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903R, tbb-8.5 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mcs):

 Replying to [comment:20 gk]:
 > Do we have a way to just show the "View Changelog" link on the release
 and alpha series where there actually is a Changelog?

 Good question. We could omit the ChangeLog.txt file from the nightly
 builds and then modify the about:tor code to check that such a file exists
 (and hide the "View Changelog" link if not). But it seems simplest to just
 check the update channel, so we revised our Torbutton patch to take that
 approach. Please test (and review) using the two torbutton patches that
 are on our bug29440-02 branch:
 ​https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/torbutton.git/log/?h=bug29440-02

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29709 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: install smartd

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29709: install smartd
-+-
 Reporter:  weasel   |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by anarcat):

 smartd should run on all "physical" hosts - do we have such a group in
 puppet?

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[tor-bugs] #29733 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Disable NoSript XSS protection for now due to bug 1532530

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29733: Disable NoSript XSS protection for now due to bug 1532530
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  noscript,
 Severity:  Normal   |  TorBrowserTeam201903
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 It seems there is a Firefox bug in relation to NoScript's XSS feature that
 makes large uploads stall which is bad for SecureDrop, Onionshare and
 others. We'll therefore disable the XSS feature for now until this gets
 fixed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18311 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Document first party isolation for Tor researchers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18311: Document first party isolation for Tor researchers
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by pili):

 This is going off on a tangent slightly, but it feels like something that
 should be one of the Tor Browser features that we want to highlight  e.g
 in the Tor Browser download page. I'm thinking of a short headline + brief
 (2-3 lines) explanation

 For a more in depth description, e.g for researchers, developers, etc...
 this could possibly go somewhere on one of the upcoming dedicated portals

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29498 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Outbound proxy not working in Tor Browser Android.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29498: Outbound proxy not working in Tor Browser Android.
--+---
 Reporter:  zero_trust|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by zero_trust):

 Yes I do need to connect to a proxy first, like a corporate central proxy.
 Even if bridges work for me, it does not solve the OUTBOUND PROXY IGNORED
 bug.
 For whoever can access Tor infrastructures directly, this bug is not
 important and hard to figure out . You can try
 1. Use a nonexist proxy as a outbound proxy, integrated Orbot should still
 connect correctly.
 2. Put the phone behind a firewall with only access to one proxy,
 integrated tor should not connect.
 For standalone Orbot, it should behave the opposite.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28465 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use or remove "package" lines from votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28465: Use or remove "package" lines from votes
--+---
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by ahf):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 I'm not totally sure what it is I need to review here. The spec proposals
 needs to be reviewed on tor-...@lists.torproject.org which irl have
 already opened up for. From what I can see the proposal itself looks fine
 and I don't see any objections to it?

 The next step would be to land the proposal in torspec.git and get someone
 to implement the code parts of it?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29680 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Deploy our own Meetbot

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29680: Deploy our own Meetbot
-+-
 Reporter:  phoul|  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  wontfix
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  assigned => closed
 * resolution:   => wontfix


Comment:

 well, it looks like http://meetbot.debian.net is back, but not the bot
 itself, i asked darst what's up, but hopefully we won't have to run this
 ourselves anymore.

 i did ask darst to publish the most recent source code somewhere so we
 have a copy in case of an emergency.

 in the meantime, i'll close this because we shouldn't be rebuilding
 services that are available elsewhere while we have other fires to put
 out. hopefully we'll be able with this when it's real trouble.

 i can always put up a bot in a pinch, it's one of my super-powers. ;)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18101 [Applications/Tor Browser]: IP leak from Windows/macOS UI dialog with URI (was: IP leak from Windows UI dialog with URI)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18101: IP leak from Windows/macOS UI dialog with URI
-+-
 Reporter:  uileak   |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak, tbb-proxy-bypass, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201805   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Thanks! I guess we should revisit this bug and, now that XP is gone as
 well, should finally squash it. I'll note in the ticket description that
 we want to test the patch for macOS as well. So far only the Linux version
 landed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29680 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Deploy our own Meetbot

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29680: Deploy our own Meetbot
-+-
 Reporter:  phoul|  Owner:  anarcat
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by anarcat):

 * status:  new => assigned
 * owner:  tpa => anarcat


Comment:

 the bot apparently came back up, according to @nickm, this morning. i'll
 see what's up

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29706 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test failure due to memory leaks in shared-random unit tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29706: Test failure due to memory leaks in shared-random unit tests
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, memory-|  Actual Points:  0.5
  management, 029-backport-partial,  |
  034-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 quick question here -- when we are about to call state_query_del_, do we
 need a check to make sure that the value we are about to assign is not the
 same pointer as the previous value?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29643 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix an incorrect comment about calling FreeLibrary()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29643: Fix an incorrect comment about calling FreeLibrary()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  040-backport, fast-fix, tor- |  Actual Points:  0.1
  windows, memory-management, technical-debt |
Parent ID:  #29642   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Merged to 0.4.0 and forward!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29643 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix an incorrect comment about calling FreeLibrary()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29643: Fix an incorrect comment about calling FreeLibrary()
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  040-backport, fast-fix, tor- |  Actual Points:  0.1
  windows, memory-management, technical-debt |
Parent ID:  #29642   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  cohosh   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by cohosh):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Looks good!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18101 [Applications/Tor Browser]: IP leak from Windows UI dialog with URI

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18101: IP leak from Windows UI dialog with URI
-+-
 Reporter:  uileak   |  Owner:
 |  arthuredelstein
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-disk-leak, tbb-proxy-bypass, |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201805   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by ericlaw):

 This bug still leaks the user's IP to the remote server and full HTTP urls
 (including .onion urls) to any network intermediaries.

 Unsetting FOS_FORCEFILESYSTEM and setting FOS_SUPPORTSTREAMABLEITEMS
 appears to resolve the worst of this problem by returning unretrieved URLs
 to the browser instead of instructing the Windows Shell to download them.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29354 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update bandwidth-file-spec.txt with the country keyword

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29354: Update bandwidth-file-spec.txt with the country keyword
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, tor-spec, postfreeze-|  implemented
  ok, 040-must, spec |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 okay, merged!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25669 [Core Tor/Tor]: Privcount: blinding and encryption should be finished up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25669: Privcount: blinding and encryption should be finished up
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, privcount, 035   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  -roadmap-master, 035-triaged-in-20180711,  |
  rust, 040-unreached-20190109,  |
  041-accepted-20190115  |
Parent ID:  #29009   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Query -- I don't see what I am supposed to review here. Is there a PR
 somewhere?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29665 [Core Tor/Tor]: hs: circuit_expire_old_circuits_serverside() should check for RP circuits

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29665: hs: circuit_expire_old_circuits_serverside() should check for RP 
circuits
-+-
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, tor-relay, 029-backport, |  Actual Points:
  034-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => asn


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29434 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consider removing linux-tor-prio.sh from contrib/operator-tools

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29434: Consider removing linux-tor-prio.sh from contrib/operator-tools
--+
 Reporter:  rl1987|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  task  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  juga  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => juga


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29166 [Metrics/Statistics]: Run modules from Java only

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29166: Run modules from Java only
+-
 Reporter:  karsten |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Statistics  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  irl |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This is deployed as of Thursday/Friday, and the weekend runs looked
 normal. Closing. Yay, this is a big step towards making metrics-lib more
 maintainable in the future!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #28465 [Core Tor/Tor]: Use or remove "package" lines from votes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28465: Use or remove "package" lines from votes
--+--
 Reporter:  irl   |  Owner:  irl
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  ahf   |Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => ahf


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Re: [tor-bugs] #28656 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c:2501: compute_frac_paths_available : Non-fatal assertion !(f_exit > 0.0) failed.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#28656: Bug: src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c:2501: compute_frac_paths_available 
:
Non-fatal assertion !(f_exit > 0.0) failed.
-+-
 Reporter:  meejah   |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.5.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  regression, 035-rc-blocker?, |  Actual Points:  0.1
  035-backport, postfreeze-ok, 040-must  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:  catalyst |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => catalyst


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25669 [Core Tor/Tor]: Privcount: blinding and encryption should be finished up

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25669: Privcount: blinding and encryption should be finished up
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  technical-debt, privcount, 035   |  Actual Points:  0.2
  -roadmap-master, 035-triaged-in-20180711,  |
  rust, 040-unreached-20190109,  |
  041-accepted-20190115  |
Parent ID:  #29009   | Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:  nickm|Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => nickm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #23790 [Core Tor/Tor]: rend_service_prune_list_impl_() doesn't copy over desc_is_dirty when copying intro points

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23790: rend_service_prune_list_impl_() doesn't copy over desc_is_dirty when
copying intro points
-+-
 Reporter:  jl   |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.3.1.7
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-backport, 031-unreached- |  Actual Points:
  backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * reviewer:   => mikeperry


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[tor-bugs] #29732 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add full-fledged deterministic PRNG support for testing.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29732: Add full-fledged deterministic PRNG support for testing.
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 In several places, the tests override crypto_rand() or crypto_fast_prng()
 for one reason or another.  We should provide a standard way for the tests
 to do this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29415 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Evaluating NextCloud as replacement for Sandstorm and SVN

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29415: Evaluating NextCloud as replacement for Sandstorm and SVN
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Here is a link to a (security conscious and thorough) person's repo who is
 packaging NextCloud for NixOS (the link got dropped into #tor-project the
 other day): https://github.com/aszlig/avonc. We might be able to learn
 something from that for our needs.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29415 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Evaluating NextCloud as replacement for Sandstorm and SVN

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29415: Evaluating NextCloud as replacement for Sandstorm and SVN
-+-
 Reporter:  ln5  |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 I just read sajolida's mail (https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 project/2019-March/002250.html) and wondered whether we could/should think
 of NextCloud/Talk replacing our BlueJeans thingy, too...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29731 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor compilation hangs frequently when building Windows testbuilds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29731: tor compilation hangs frequently when building Windows testbuilds
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:2 gk]:
 > I wonder why we still need to use `faketime` here at all...

 #20426 has historical context. However, we did not set `-Wl,--no-insert-
 timestamp` back then. So, I am wondering whether doing that now would work
 and help with this ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29731 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor compilation hangs frequently when building Windows testbuilds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29731: tor compilation hangs frequently when building Windows testbuilds
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Interestingly enough I seem to have less issues by compiling `tor`
 separately with `./rbm/rbm build tor --target nightly --target torbrowser-
 windows-x86_64`. I've not double-checked whether that's only luck or
 imagination, though. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29731 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor compilation hangs frequently when building Windows testbuilds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29731: tor compilation hangs frequently when building Windows testbuilds
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: boklm (added)


Comment:

 I wonder why we still need to use `faketime` here at all...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29731 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor compilation hangs frequently when building Windows testbuilds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29731: tor compilation hangs frequently when building Windows testbuilds
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by gk):

 Oh, it can happen the `install` target as well:
 {{{
 boklm 3761  0.0  0.1  29848 16108 ?S11:38   0:00 make
 install
 boklm 3769  0.0  0.1  29816 16104 ?S11:38   0:00 make
 install-exec-am install-data-am
 boklm 3773  0.0  0.0  21036  2988 ?S11:38   0:00 /bin/bash
 -c ( cd "/var/tmp/build/tor-911f95ed9203/src/rust" ; \
 .CARGO_TARGET_DIR="/var/tmp/build/tor-911f95ed9203/src/rust/target" \
 .cargo build --release  \ .--frozen \ .--manifest-path "/var/tmp/build
 /tor-911f95ed9203/src/rust/tor_rust/Cargo.toml" )
 boklm 3774  0.0  0.0  21040  2240 ?S11:38   0:00 /bin/bash
 -c ( cd "/var/tmp/build/tor-911f95ed9203/src/rust" ; \
 .CARGO_TARGET_DIR="/var/tmp/build/tor-911f95ed9203/src/rust/target" \
 .cargo build --release  \ .--frozen \ .--manifest-path "/var/tmp/build
 /tor-911f95ed9203/src/rust/tor_rust/Cargo.toml" )
 boklm 3775  0.0  0.1  43512 12084 ?Sl   11:38   0:00 cargo
 build --release --frozen --manifest-path /var/tmp/build/tor-
 911f95ed9203/src/rust/tor_rust/Cargo.toml
 }}}
 But it's Rust related, too. Smells like a `faketime` issue (which would
 fit to the fact that I saw this once with macOS as well, recently, but
 never Linux).

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[tor-bugs] #29731 [Applications/Tor Browser]: tor compilation hangs frequently when building Windows testbuilds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29731: tor compilation hangs frequently when building Windows testbuilds
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-rbm
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 I have seen frequent hangs when building `tor` for Windows lately, the
 output `ps` gives me always indicates that's due to Rust involvement:
 {{{
 boklm27911  0.0  0.0  21032  2884 ?S11:10   0:00 /bin/bash
 -c ( cd "/var/tmp/build/tor-911f95ed9203/src/rust" ; \
 .CARGO_TARGET_DIR="/var/tmp/build/tor-911f95ed9203/src/rust/target" \
 .cargo build --release  \ .--frozen \ .--manifest-path "/var/tmp/build
 /tor-911f95ed9203/src/rust/tor_rust/Cargo.toml" )
 boklm27912  0.0  0.0  21040  2144 ?S11:10   0:00 /bin/bash
 -c ( cd "/var/tmp/build/tor-911f95ed9203/src/rust" ; \
 .CARGO_TARGET_DIR="/var/tmp/build/tor-911f95ed9203/src/rust/target" \
 .cargo build --release  \ .--frozen \ .--manifest-path "/var/tmp/build
 /tor-911f95ed9203/src/rust/tor_rust/Cargo.toml" )
 boklm27913  0.0  0.1  59928 12672 ?Sl   11:10   0:00 cargo
 build --release --frozen --manifest-path /var/tmp/build/tor-
 911f95ed9203/src/rust/tor_rust/Cargo.toml
 boklm27993  0.0  1.5 291156 124976 ?   Sl   11:10   0:00 rustc
 --crate-name external external/lib.rs --crate-type lib --emit=dep-
 info,link -C opt-level=3 -C panic=abort -C debuginfo=2 -C
 metadata=0f05d544ad739841 -C extra-filename=-0f05d544ad739841 --out-dir
 /var/tmp/build/tor-911f95ed9203/src/rust/target/x86_64-pc-windows-
 gnu/release/deps --target x86_64-pc-windows-gnu -L
 dependency=/var/tmp/build/tor-911f95ed9203/src/rust/target/x86_64-pc-
 windows-gnu/release/deps -L dependency=/var/tmp/build/tor-
 911f95ed9203/src/rust/target/release/deps --extern libc=/var/tmp/build
 /tor-911f95ed9203/src/rust/target/x86_64-pc-windows-gnu/release/deps
 /liblibc-705cca6c457715c2.rlib --extern smartlist=/var/tmp/build/tor-
 911f95ed9203/src/rust/target/x86_64-pc-windows-gnu/release/deps
 /libsmartlist-42b40589a0bfb5d0.rlib --extern tor_allocate=/var/tmp/build
 /tor-911f95ed9203/src/rust/target/x86_64-pc-windows-gnu/release/deps
 /libtor_allocate-3bee9e10e00146b6.rlib
 }}}
 I might have seen this once with macOS builds but I think never with Linux
 ones.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29706 [Core Tor/Tor]: Test failure due to memory leaks in shared-random unit tests

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29706: Test failure due to memory leaks in shared-random unit tests
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Very High|  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.1.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:  Tor:
 |  0.2.9.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-ci, tor-test, memory-|  Actual Points:  0.5
  management, 029-backport-partial,  |
  034-backport, 035-backport, 040-backport   |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM! I think this new design where the state takes responsibility for the
 SRVs is cleaner indeed.

 I also think that merging the simplified fix to 029 makes sense.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18311 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Document first party isolation for Tor researchers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18311: Document first party isolation for Tor researchers
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by boklm):

 Currently it is mentioned in the Tor Browser desgin doc, in 4.5.8:
 https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#identifier-
 linkability

 Is there an other place where this should be documented?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29572 [Applications/rbm]: Fetching latest commits fails when building testbuilds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29572: Fetching latest commits fails when building testbuilds
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/rbm|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201903R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good to me. Merged to `rbm`'s `master` branch (commit
 70d1ff3e7c1c5c69a1b4cdb61ee1b6b9e2a9bc4a) and picked up in `tor-browser-
 build` as well (commit 5a4f0853b634daa93e099ad613257f069635bb93).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29354 [Core Tor/Tor]: Update bandwidth-file-spec.txt with the country keyword

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29354: Update bandwidth-file-spec.txt with the country keyword
-+-
 Reporter:  juga |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.4.0.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-bwauth, tor-spec, postfreeze-|  Actual Points:
  ok, 040-must, spec |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  asn  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 LGTM!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #6005 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Secure download of videos from YouTube

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#6005: Secure download of videos from YouTube
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  needs-triage  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by Ashwin):

 I am so excited with this with this Online tutorial. There are only few
 platform tat gives you online and free suggestion but here you will get
 complete idea for http://desktopiconswindows10.com/ how to add desktop
 icon at your computer for short cut access. Thank you so much to this post
 comment.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #4902 [Firefox Patch Issues]: Change the default search engine in TBB

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#4902: Change the default search engine in TBB
---+---
 Reporter:  phobos |  Owner:  mikeperry
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  TorBrowserBundle 2.3.x-stable
Component:  Firefox Patch  |Version:
  Issues   |
 Severity:  Blocker| Resolution:  worksforme
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:  1
  MikePerry201204  |
Parent ID: | Points:  1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by Ashwin):

 I have a idea to learn online for useful information about how to add or
 permanently remove cookes from my windows 10 OS web browser, am learning
 with this Homepage https://deletecookieswindows10.com/ and telling you to
 must visit of you really wants to get free and online instruction.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29572 [Applications/rbm]: Fetching latest commits fails when building testbuilds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29572: Fetching latest commits fails when building testbuilds
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/rbm|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201903R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * component:  Applications/Tor Browser => Applications/rbm


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29313 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Create TBB Project for tor-android-service

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29313: Create TBB Project for tor-android-service
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903R, tbb-8.5 |
Parent ID:  #27609   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3, TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-8.5 => tbb-
 mobile, TBA-a3, TorBrowserTeam201903R, tbb-8.5


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29080 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Merge OrbotService and TOPL

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29080: Merge OrbotService and TOPL
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903R, tbb-8.5 |
Parent ID:  #27609   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #29572 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fetching latest commits fails when building testbuilds

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29572: Fetching latest commits fails when building testbuilds
+--
 Reporter:  gk  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201903R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  reopened => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-rbm => tbb-rbm, TorBrowserTeam201903R


Comment:

 In branch `bug_29572` I made a patch that uses `git rev-parse --verify
 HEAD` to decide if `git checkout --detach` should be run:
 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/boklm/rbm.git/commit/?h=bug_29572&id=70d1ff3e7c1c5c69a1b4cdb61ee1b6b9e2a9bc4a

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Re: [tor-bugs] #29575 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Configure Firefox Project to Use New TOPL Dependencies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#29575: Configure Firefox Project to Use New TOPL Dependencies
-+-
 Reporter:  sisbell  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3,  |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201903R, tbb-8.5 |
Parent ID:  #27609   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-mobile, TBA-a3, TorBrowserTeam201903, tbb-8.5 => tbb-
 mobile, TBA-a3, TorBrowserTeam201903R, tbb-8.5


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Re: [tor-bugs] #1524 [Core Tor/Tor]: Latest git source version won't compile on NetBSD 5_Stable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#1524: Latest git source version won't compile on NetBSD 5_Stable
--+
 Reporter:  yancm |  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Blocker   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by Ashwin):

 * severity:   => Blocker


Comment:

 With the latest update of windows 10 OS computer you will get a
 interesting advantages of clipboard and now you can use this at your
 desktop also, as you know what are  the usages of
 [https://clipboardwindows10.com/] clipboard  but wants to learn more then
 visit this Homepage and catch all latest update about this.

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